South Sudan

Mine Action

Last updated: 29 November 2015

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline: 9 July 2021
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Recommendations for action

  • South Sudan should ensure every effort is made to identify and address all cluster munition remnants on its territory as a matter of priority.
  • The Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database reporting format should disaggregate cluster munition remnants from other unexploded ordinance (UXO). Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards land release terminology.

Contamination

The Republic of South Sudan is heavily contaminated by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and other explosive weapons, including cluster munition remnants, which were used regularly during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–1972 and 1983–2005, prior to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005, leading to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011.

In 2015, UNMAS reported that the socio-economic cost of mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement “is incalculable.” UNMAS estimated that explosive hazards threatened more than 1.5 million internally displaced people, local communities, peacekeepers, and humanitarian aid workers.[1]

Mine contamination

At the end of 2014, South Sudan had a total of 311 areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, covering a total area of nearly 119km2, as set out in the table below.[2] All 10 of South Sudan’s states contain suspected mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by East Equatoria and Jonglei.[3]

Contamination as of end 2014[4]

Contamination

Suspected hazardous areas

Area (m2)

Antipersonnel mines[5]

311

118,974,003

Antivehicle mines

90

2,667,621

Cluster munition remnants

110

7,617,820

Unexploded ordinance (UXO)

210

2,214,563

Total

721

131,474,007

 

Contamination by province as of end 2014[6]

Province

Suspected hazardous areas

Area (m2)

Central Equatoria

291

9,590,193

East Equatoria

150

28,777,703

Jonglei

104

32,676,677

Lakes

16

982,903

North Bahr El Ghazal

10

1,477,220

Unity

50

13,827,607

Upper Nile

24

39,301,954

Warrap

15

8,000

West Bahr El Ghazal

16

2,838,216

West Equatoria

45

1,993,534

Total

721

131,474,007

 

The full extent of South Sudan’s mine and ERW contamination remains unknown. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) continue to be identified, while the existing threat is being compounded by renewed heavy fighting since December 2013, which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Unity, Upper Nile, and Jonglei states. Ongoing conflict in these states has made access to certain areas extremely limited, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination.[7] In 2014, UNMAS reported it expected to see “a substantial change in contamination levels and a significant increase in the threat posed by ERW and possibly landmines.”[8]

In 2015, the Monitor recorded a number of allegations of new use of anti-personnel mines by government and non-states armed groups.[9]

Cluster munition contamination

At the end of 2014, South Sudan had a total of 108 areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants with a total size estimated at more than 7.5km2.[10] Areas of cluster munition contamination from decades of pre-independence conflict continued to be identified in 2014, and the threat was compounded by renewed fighting that began in December 2013.[11] In particular, instability in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states has made access to certain areas extremely limited, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination.[12]

Nine of the 10 states in South Sudan contain suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas (see table below). Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria remain the most heavily contaminated.[13] Cluster munition remnants have been found in residential areas, farmland, pastures, rivers and streams, on hillsides, in desert areas, in and around former military barracks, on roads, in minefields, and in ammunition storage areas.[14]

Cluster munition contamination by province as of end 2014[15]

Province

Suspected areas

Area (m2)

Central Equatoria

40

2,572,138

East Equatoria

40

2,925,822

Jonglei

4

96,972

Lakes

2

890,186

North Bahr El Ghazal

3

105,791

Unity

2

40,000

Upper Nile

2

-

West Bahr El Ghazal

3

-

West Equatoria

12

881,896

Total

108

7,512,805

 

From 1995 to 2000, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan. Many types of submunitions have been found, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, US-manufactured M42 and Mk-118 (Rockeyes), Chilean-made PM-1, and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO-1SCh submunitions.[16]

Since 2006, more than 770 sites containing cluster munition remnants have been identified across all 10 states in South Sudan, including new contamination as a result of the conflict ongoing since December 2013.[17] In August 2014, UNMAS reported that 95 known dangerous areas containing cluster munition remnants remained. From August 2014 to December 2014, an additional 13 contaminated areas were identified in Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria.[18]

On 7 February 2014, UNMAS UXO survey teams discovered remnants of RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and unexploded AO-1SCh submunitions on the Juba-Bor road, south of Bor in Jonglei state.[19] Evidence indicated the cluster munitions had been used in previous weeks during the conflict between opposition forces supporting South Sudan’s former Vice President Riek Machar and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government forces, which received air-support from Uganda. The RBK-type cluster munitions are air-delivered weapons, which are dropped by fixed wing aircraft or helicopters. Both Uganda and the South Sudanese government forces are believed to possess the air power to deliver these weapons, whereas opposition forces are not.[20] In September 2014, South Sudan reported that a joint government-UNMAS team had investigated the allegations in the field and established that cluster munitions had been used, but could not determine the user.[21]

Cluster munition contamination in South Sudan has a significant social, economic, and humanitarian impact on local communities, which is exacerbated by the lack of humanitarian access caused by the ongoing fighting and other contamination.

Program Management

The South Sudan Demining Authority (SSDA)—now named the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA)—was established in 2006 by presidential decree to act as the national agency for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.[22]

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1996 (2011), UNMAS was given the responsibility to support South Sudan in demining while strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. Accordingly, UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing all mine action in South Sudan through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Malakal, Wau, and Yei. UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organizations, developing national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the IMSMA database, and tasking operators.[23] The NMAA takes the lead on victim assistance and risk education.[24]

While it is planned that the NMAA will eventually assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did “not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance.”[25] UN Security Council Resolution 1996 authorized the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to support mine action through assessed peacekeeping funds.[26]

In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke out in December 2013. The resolution, which marked a significant change from Resolution 1996, focuses on four areas: protection of civilians; creating the conditions for humanitarian access; reporting and investigation of human rights violations; and support to the Cessation of Hostilities agreements. Significantly, most capacity development for government institutions is no longer part of the mission’s mandate.

Strategic planning

South Sudan has a National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2012–2016, which was developed by the NMAA with assistance from the UN and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[27] The main objectives of the plan are to ensure that:

  • “South Sudan is in a position to comply with all international instruments related to mines and ERW, and has the capacity to conduct and manage the national mine action programme.
  • The scope and location of the mine and ERW contamination are fully recorded, and all high impact contaminated areas are identified, prioritised, cleared, and released.
  • The national mine action programme actively contributes to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, reducing poverty and increasing socio-economic development, through mainstreaming mine action activities into development programmes.”[28]

In March 2015, UNMAS reported that due to the ongoing conflict, all evaluation of progress against the National Mine Action Strategic Plan for 2012–2016 had been suspended.[29] In October 2015, UNMAS stated that the plan was in the process of being redrafted.[30] According to the NMAA, South Sudan intends to develop a multi-year clearance plan for 2015–2017, “which takes into consideration the known hazardous areas, historical patterns for resources available to the mine action sector, as well as the prevailing operational and security environment in various regions of the country.”[31]

Operators

There were four international demining NGOs in 2014: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, MineTech International (MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organizations were involved in clearance in 2014.[32]

Of these, seven operators (the four NGOs and three of the four commercials) reported destroying antipersonnel mines in 2014.[33] Four—NPA, MAG, G4S, and TDI—reported clearing cluster munition remnants in 2014.

At the beginning of the year, DDG operated 11 explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams; this number was reduced to two by the end of 2014 due to funding.[34] NPA deployed four teams, including three multitask teams (MTTs) and one manual demining team with six deminers trained to clear cluster munition remnants.[35] MAG primarily conducted EOD spot clearance and community liaison activities, but reported clearing cluster munition remnants, as well as destroying landmines and other UXO. MAG deployed one seven-deminer MTT from February 2014 with a Bozena 4, and a new MineWolf team with eight deminers starting in November 2014.[36] G4S reported a total capacity for its mine action operations of approximately 230 staff, including two integrated clearance teams, supported by 10 deminers and a community liaison team, with a MineWolf 240 as a primary resource, and eight MTTs.[37] TDI, which employed 298 staff in South Sudan, reported its teams were completing the final year of a three-year operation in 2014.[38]

UNMAS assigns cluster munition remnants tasks to operators.[39]

National mine action standards

In October 2015, UNMAS reported that a review of South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) for mine action had been completed and that the NTSG were in use.[40]

According to UNMAS, South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines for mine action cover cluster munition survey and clearance activities, and do not require specific revision.[41]

Land Release (Mines and UXO)

In 2014, UNMAS reported “closing” 1,320 “hazardous areas” and releasing a total of approximately 9.3km2 back to local communities, with the destruction of 880 antipersonnel mines, 357 antivehicle mines, and 15,245 items of UXO in the process. In addition, a total of 407km of roads were opened through route assessment and verification.[42] This is a significant decrease in the size of land release from 2013, when UNMAS reported release of 1,518 hazardous areas totaling 27.1km2, with the destruction of 845 antipersonnel mines, 215 antivehicle mines, and 22,018 items of UXO.[43] UNMAS explained that in 2014, due to ongoing conflict and security restrictions, movement of mine action teams was “severely curtailed” and that operations were constantly held up awaiting permission to enter certain areas, with many areas becoming inaccessible.[44]

UNMAS has also reported that in 2004–2014 a total of 9,486 hazards have been addressed, more than 1,130km2 of land has been released, and nearly 23,300km of roads opened, with nearly 29,000 antipersonnel mines, 5,000 antivehicle mines, and 855,000 items of UXO destroyed.[45]

Survey in 2014 (mines)

As summarized in the table below, a total of 55 suspected mined areas covering just over 1km2 were cancelled through non-technical survey and a total of 96,019m2 was reduced by technical survey in 2014. A further 107 areas comprising nearly 1.6km2 were confirmed as mined through technical survey, according to UNMAS records.[46] This compares to release of 82 confirmed mined areas in 2013 through technical survey and clearance of over 4.3km2, with non-technical survey resulting in the cancellation of almost 17km2 in addition.[47]

UNMAS reported that the significant decrease in SHA cancelled by non-technical survey in 2014 compared to the previous year was due to operations focusing on better defined hazardous areas in 2014, which did not contain large areas that could be cancelled. Additional cancellation, beyond that reported from non-technical survey, also occurred in 2013 due to database clearance based on spatial analysis of hazardous areas and the completion of polygons.[48]

Survey in 2014[49]

Operator

SHAs cancelled

Area cancelled (m²)

Mined areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by technical survey (m2)

DCA

0

0

15

24

0

DDG

0

0

5

300

0

G4S

24

546,686

10

56,315

96,019

MECHEM

2

0

0

0

0

MAG

5

10,000

8

81,310

0

MTI

0

0

19

140,996

0

NPA

1

0

29

1,186,193

0

OSIL

0

0

3

33,385

0

SIMAS

1

0

0

0

0

TDI

13

480,866

12

70,973

0

UNMAS

9

0

6

0

0

Total

55

1,037,552

107

1,569,496

96,019

 

Clearance in 2014 (mines)

A total of 120 mined areas covering almost 2.72km2 were released through clearance and technical survey in 2014, including 2.62km2 through clearance and nearly 0.1km2 by technical survey, with 880 antipersonnel mines, 357 antivehicle mines, and 15,245 items of UXO destroyed.[50] The bulk of the clearance was conducted by the three commercial operators, G4S, MTI, and TDI, using mechanical methods. In comparison, in 2013, a total of 135 confirmed mined areas and 24 suspected mined areas were released through technical survey and clearance over 4.33km2, destroying in the process 691 antipersonnel mines, 150 antivehicle mines, and 2,142 items of UXO.[51] According to UNMAS, the reduction in land release through clearance and technical survey in 2014 was due to a decrease in access and information from certain areas.[52]

Mine clearance in 2014[53]

Operator

Areas released

Area cleared (m²)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

DCA

7

4,354

16

0

1,419

DDG

1

0

1

3

315

G4S

50

1,007,471

395

71

3,556

MAG

12

55,048

195

3

1,691

MECHEM

6

0

0

0

0

MTI

16

1,088,091

113

133

231

NPA

6

433,163

79

96

830

TDI

10

31,814

81

51

7,203

UNMAS

12

0

0

0

0

Total

120

2,619,941

880

357

15,245

 

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

The total cluster munition-contaminated area released in 2014 was 1.4km2, compared with 0.6km2 in 2013. Of this, 1.28km2 was cleared and a further 0.12km2 wascancelled through non-technical survey.[54] This compares to release in 2013 of 96 cluster munition-contaminated areas totaling 0.63km2 (0.51km2 through technical survey and clearance, and cancellation of 0.12km2 through non-technical survey).[55]

UNMAS reported that due to ongoing conflict and security restrictions, movement of mine action teams was “severely curtailed” during the year and that operations were constantly delayed awaiting permission to enter certain areas, with many areas becoming inaccessible.[56]

Survey in 2014 (cluster munition remnants)

UNMAS database survey results for 2014 indicate that 1.4km2 of land was confirmed as contaminated with cluster munition remnants and 0.12km2 was cancelled by non-technical survey (see table below).[57]

Survey of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants in 2014[58]

Operator

Areas cancelled

Area cancelled (m²)

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

DCA

0

0

1

100

G4S

2

114,000

7

497,299

MAG

1

10,000

5

115,436

UNMAS

0

0

1

Not known

MTI

0

0

1

233,600

NPA

0

0

12

187,598[59]

TDI

0

0

4

378,898

Total

3

124,000

31

1,412,931

 

Clearance in 2014 (cluster munition remnants)

Almost 1.28km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2014 by MAG, NPA, G4S, and TDI (as shown in the table below).[60]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2014[61]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

UXO destroyed

DDG

0

0

0

14

G4S

6

396,213

N/R

238

MAG

3

10,345

148

24

MTI

1

0

0

0

NPA

7

219,502

106

524[62]

OSIL[63]

3

0

0

0

TDI

4

652,919

N/R

458

Total

25

1,278,979

254

1,258

Note: N/R = Not reported

 

G4S stated it could not provide disaggregated figures on the number of cluster munition remnants destroyed from total UXO clearance figures, as it reports according to the IMSMA database format.[64] Likewise, TDI stated it could not provide separate figures for cluster munition remnants destroyed from UXO in 2014 from those contained in IMSMA reports.[65]

Other operators conducting mine action activities in South Sudan, such as Mechem and MTI, reported not encountering or destroying any submunitions as part of their operations in 2014.[66] Despite reporting not finding any submunitions, MTI noted, however, that due to the vast amount of weaponry used in the conflict and large numbers of cluster munitions, clearance of “fringe” submunitions (i.e. not part of an uncleared strike) during mechanical demining operations was common.[67]

Battle area clearance

In 2014, five operators (MAG, G4S, MTI, TDI, and NPA) conducted battle area clearance (BAC) over 5.57km2 and closed a total of 1,119 UXO spot tasks, destroying 13,987 items of UXO.[68] This is a slight decrease from the 5.78km2 of BAC carried out in 2013, with the destruction of 13,430 UXO items.[69]

Progress in 2015

From January to 1 September 2015, some 10.4km2 of “hazardous areas” was released, including 3.1km2 through non-technical survey, 4.1km2 through mine clearance and technical survey, and 3.1km2 through BAC, with the destruction of a total of 1,374 antipersonnel mines, 381 antivehicle mines, and 17,224 items of UXO.[70]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, South Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. It is not on track to meet the deadline.

Under its existing national mine action strategic plan for 2012–2016, South Sudan expects to have surveyed and recorded all SHAs by the end of 2016 to facilitate development of the next strategic mine action plan and to release 5km2 of confirmed hazardous area per year through technical survey and/or clearance, corresponding to a total of 25km2 for 2012–2016.[71]

In March 2015, however, UNMAS again highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with continuing significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country and the unpredictable rainy seasons.[72] Given the current security situation, it is not possible to know if South Sudan could still meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.

Release of mine areas in 2010–2014[73]

Year

Area cleared and reduced (km2)

Area cancelled (km2)

Antipersonnel mines destroyed

Antivehicle mines destroyed

2014

2.72

1.01

880

357

2013

4.33

16.99

845

215

2012

4.20

21.78

1,278

156

2011

2.62

0.64

3,509

699

2010

3.85

35.46

6,916

666

Total

17.72

75.88

13,428

2,093

 

South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan budget for 2012–2016 is estimated at US$204 million.[74] According to UNMAS, no national funding or in-kind support is provided by the government of South Sudan for mine action, but it has been previously claimed that the government provides a budget to the NMAA to cover salaries and limited operational costs.[75]

In April 2015, the NMAA reported that South Sudan would develop a multi-year clearance plan for 2015–2017, including projections for clearance targets based on levels of remaining contamination, available resources, and the operational and security environment across the country. It stated that the plan would be published in “subsequent Article 7 reports” and that updates would be provided to States Parties.[76]

UNMAS did not foresee major changes in mine action capacity in South Sudan during 2015.[77] However, with the collapse of peace talks in March 2015, continued conflict and internal unrest were expected, particularly during the dry season, raising serious concerns of new contamination and further constraints on access to mined and ERW-contaminated areas.[78]

Despite the heightened need for an urgent response to new explosive hazard contamination and the impacts of renewed conflict on the civilian population, many operators have expressed concern over decreased funding for mine action in South Sudan in 2015, with donors prioritizing other humanitarian sectors or refusing to fund mine action activities while the conflict is ongoing.[79]

Cluster Munition Remnants Clearance Completion

South Sudan is not party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 includes as a specific objective that South Sudan become a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, approve national legislation ensuring the applications of its provisions, and develop policy dialogue with partners to mobilize resources for effective implementation.[80]

Due to the ongoing conflict, it is not possible to estimate when South Sudan might complete clearance of cluster munition remnants on its territory, nor identify the full extent of contamination.[81]



[1] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated March 2015.

[2] Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 27 October 2015; and response to NPA questionnaire 30 March 2015. According to UNMAS, all recorded mined areas contained in the IMSMA database are considered suspected mined areas as no technical survey has been performed on them. The areas were registered on the basis of non-technical survey and as such are considered suspected mined areas.

[3] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[4] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 27 October 2015.

[5] Ibid.; and response to NPA questionnaire, 30 March 2015. According to UNMAS, all recorded mined areas contained in the IMSMA database are considered suspected mined areas as no technical survey has been performed on them. The areas were registered on the basis of non-technical survey and as such are considered suspected mined areas.

[6] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 27 October 2015.

[7] UNMAS South Sudan, “What We Have Achieved,” undated but 2015; and response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[8] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated March 2014.

[9] ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: South Sudan: Mine Ban Policy,” 20 October 2015.

[10] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[11] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated March 2014.

[12] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[13] Ibid.; and email, 12 May 2014.

[14] South Sudan, “National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, pp. 4–6, & 9.

[15] Ibid.

[16] V. Wiebe and T. Peachey, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” Chapter 4, July 2000; and Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (May 2007), p. 55; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 8 August 2014. See also UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014. See also, UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26.

[17] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 12 May 2014.

[18] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and email, 12 May 2014.

[19] UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014. See also, UNMISS, “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26.

[20] UNMISS, “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, pp. 26–27; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 8 August 2014.

[21] Statement of South Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, Costa Rica, 3 September 2014.

[22] South Sudan, “South Sudan De-Mining Authority,” undated.

[23] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. iv.

[24] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 24 May 2013.

[25] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. iii.

[27] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. iii.

[28] Ibid., p. v.

[29] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[30] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 23 October 2015.

[31] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F, p. 13.

[32] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 4 June 2015. Four national organizations carried out risk education.

[33] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014;” and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 11 May 2015. Mechem and DDG did not conduct area clearance in 2014.

[34] Response to NPA questionnaire by Rickard Hartmann, Head of Programme, DDG, 22 May 2015.

[35] Response to NPA questionnaire by Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015.

[36] Response to NPA questionnaire by Ismael Frioud, Programme Officer, MAG, 9 April 2015.

[37] Email from Mark Buswell, Programme Manager South Sudan, G4S, 3 June 2015.

[38] Response to NPA questionnaire by Stephen Saffin, Chief Operating Officer, TDI, 4 June 2015.

[39] Email from Mark Buswell, G4S, 3 June 2015.

[40] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 23 October 2015. NPA reported in May 2015 that South Sudan’s National Technical Standards and Guidelines for mine action were under revision, but that the existing national standards revised in 2013 were being implemented. Response to NPA questionnaire by Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015.

[41] Responses to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and by Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015.

[42] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014;” and UNMAS, “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated March 2015.

[43] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014.”

[44] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[45] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014.”

[46] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and emails, 11 May 2015, and 27 October 2015; and UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—August 2015.”

[47] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G, April 2014; and emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2015, and 29 September 2014.

[48] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 11 May 2015, and 27 October 2015.

[49] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and email 27 October 2015. In South Sudan, UXO spots are also recorded as hazardous areas, so for some suspected mined areas that were confirmed or cancelled, no corresponding area is reported if the areas were actually UXO spots. Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) is a national implementing partner of MAG. They assessed three UXO spots in 2014 but found no contamination and the areas were subsequently closed. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 11 May 2015. Figures initially reported by G4S and MTI varied from UNMAS records, however both operators later confirmed UNMAS’s records in the IMSMA database as correct. Likewise, TDI provided a narrative response to the NPA’s research questionnaires in 2015 but indicated that IMSMA database figures should be used by NPA for TDI’s land release figures. Emails from Melvin Smith, MTI, 3 June 2015; from Stephen Saffin, TDI, 4 June 2015; and from Mark Buswell, G4S, 3 June 2015. NPA’s figures in response to the research questionnaires varied slightly from those recorded in the IMSMA database, but according to NPA, this was due to the fact that UNMAS calculates land release based on daily productivity per asset, whereas NPA determines land released after task completion. Email from Quartim Carlos Matongueiro, Programme Manager, NPA South Sudan, 15 May 2015. Mechem and DDG did not conduct area clearance in 2014.

[50] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and email 27 October 2015.

[51] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form G, April 2014; and emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014, and 29 September 2014.

[52] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 23 October 2015.

[53] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014;” and response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and email 27 October 2015. In South Sudan, UXO spots are also recorded as hazardous areas, so for some suspected mined areas that were confirmed or cancelled, no corresponding area is reported if the areas were UXO spots. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 11 May 2015. Figures initially reported by G4S and MTI varied from UNMAS records, however both operators later confirmed UNMAS’s records in the IMSMA database as correct. Likewise, TDI provided a narrative response to the NPA’s research questionnaires in 2015 but indicated that IMSMA database figures should be used by NPA for TDI’s land release figures. Emails from Melvin Smith, MTI, 3 June 2015; from Stephen Saffin, TDI, 4 June 2015; and from Mark Buswell, G4S, 3 June 2015. NPA’s figures in response to the research questionnaires varied slightly from those recorded in the IMSMA database, but according to NPA, this was due to the fact that UNMAS calculates land release based on daily productivity per asset, whereas NPA determines land released after task completion. Email from Quartim Carlos Matongueiro, NPA, 15 May 2015. Mechem and DDG did not conduct area clearance in 2014.

[54] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Response to questionnaire from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 8 May 2014; and emails, 8 May 2014, and 29 September 2014.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid. The totals are those cancelled and confirmed in 2014 and are included in the totals in the Cluster munition contamination by province table above on recorded contaminated areas. In South Sudan, UXO spots are also recorded as hazardous areas, so for some suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas that were confirmed or cancelled, no corresponding area is reported if the areas were UXO spots. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 11 May 2015.

[60] NPA reported confirming a total cluster munition-contaminated area of 177,713m2 in 2014. According to NPA, its figures vary slightly from those recorded in the IMSMA database as UNMAS calculates land release based on daily productivity per asset, whereas NPA determines land released after task completion. Email from Quartim Carlos Matongueiro, Programme Manager, NPA South Sudan, 15 May 2015.

[61] Response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[62] Ibid.; and responses to NPA questionnaire by Ismael Frioud, MAG, 9 April 2015; and by Augustino Seja, NPA, 11 May 2015. Cluster munition remnants are not separately recorded in the IMSMA database in South Sudan and are included under figures for UXO. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 11 May 2015. Figures for submunitions destroyed are from reports from the clearing operator where available. NPA reported clearing a total of 222,980m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2014.

[63] NPA did not report destroying UXO during cluster munition clearance in its response to the questionnaire. However, it did report destroying a total of 830 UXO in 2014, which is the same number reported in the UNMAS IMSMA database (524 UXO destroyed by NPA during cluster munition clearance and 306 during mine clearance in IMSMA). NPA reported this discrepancy was due to the fact it stores information on operational productivity, task completion, and land release in different formats from UNMAS. Email from Augustino Seja, NPA, 18 May 2015.

[64] Operation Save Innocent Lives (OSIL) is a national implementing partner of MAG. They assessed three UXO spots in 2014 but found no contamination and the areas were subsequently closed. Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 11 May 2015.

[65] Email from Mark Buswell, G4S, 3 June 2015.

[66] Skype interview with Stephen Saffin, TDI, 3 June 2015. While they were not reported to have cleared any cluster munition contamination, MTI stated that it did not distinguish between UXO in its statistical reporting. Email from Melvin Smith, MTI, 3 June 2015.

[67] Responses to NPA questionnaire by Johan Coetzee, Chief Technical Advisor, Mechem, 25 May 2015; and by Mark Livingstone, Project Manager, MTI, 2 June 2015.

[68] Response to NPA questionnaire by Mark Livingstone, MTI, 2 June 2015.

[69] Ibid., 8 May 2014, and 29 September 2014.

[70] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—August 2015.”

[71] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, 2012, pp. 16–18.

[72] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated March 2015.

[73] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report—December 2014;” and response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and email 27 October 2015.

[74] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. viii.

[75] Ibid., p. 30.

[76] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F, p. 13.

[77] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Responses to NPA questionnaire by Rickard Hartmann, DDG, 22 May 2015; by Ismael Frioud, MAG, 9 April 2015; and by Augustino Seja, NPA, 2 June 2015.

[80] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. vi.

[81] Response to NPA questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015.