Summary: Signatory Angola regularly expresses its desire to ratify the convention, but has struggled to do so. Angola has participated in all of the convention’s international meetings. Angola is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. Cluster munitions were used in the past in Angola, but it is unclear when or by whom. The government has yet to make an official determination and public announcement confirming that all stocks of cluster munitions have been identified and destroyed.

Policy

The Republic of Angola signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008.

Angolan officials have promised since 2009 that the government will soon ratify the convention.[1] However, in June 2015, Angola said it was “struggling” to ratify because of a lack of funds to ensure it can meet the convention’s obligation to clear areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants within 10 years.[2] Previously, in September 2013, Angola stated the ratification process was “already at a very advanced stage.”[3] At that time, an official informed the CMC that the ratification package had been prepared for cabinet and then parliamentary approval, repeating what another official said in 2011.[4]

In August 2015, Angola’s representative to Canada acknowledged a call for Angola to ratify the convention.[5]

Angola participated extensively in the Oslo Process and, while it did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, it signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Oslo in December 2008.[6]

Angola attended the First Review Conference for the Convention on Cluster Munitions in September 2015, but did not make a statement. It has participated in all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties and intersessional meetings. Angola has participated in regional workshops on the convention, most recently in New York on 16 April 2015.

On 7 December 2015, Angola was absent from the vote on the first UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[7] However, it voted in favor of the draft resolution during the first round in the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security on 4 November 2015.[8]

As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Angola voted on 29 June 2015 for a UNSC resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and called on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions.”[9] On 27 May 2014, Angola voted in favor of a UNSC resolution on South Sudan that notes “with serious concern” reports of the “indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and calls on “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[10]

Angola has abstained from voting on recent UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2015.[11]

Angola is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and use

Angola is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Cluster munitions were used in the past in Angola, but it is unclear when or by whom. An Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) official who had seen cluster munitions remnants in Huambo province near Caala and Bailundo, probably from the heavy fighting during 1998–1999, said he believed that the Angolan Armed Forces used cluster munitions because only they used aircraft during this conflict, unlike the rebel UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) forces.[12]

Stockpiling and destruction

The government has not made an official determination and public announcement that all stocks have been identified and destroyed.

In June 2010, a CNIDAH official said that Angola had destroyed its stockpile of cluster munitions between 2003 and 2010 in a joint initiative of the government and HALO Trust, and that the armed forces no longer held any stocks.[13] In addition, HALO’s weapons and ammunition disposal teams, which operate in all 18 provinces destroying weapons caches belonging to the police, army, navy, and air force, found and destroyed 51 abandoned explosive submunitions in military warehouses.[14]

Deminers operating in Angola have also documented the presence of casings of Soviet-made RBK 250-275 cluster bombs among abandoned ammunition.[15]

Angola is also reported to possess BM-21 Grad and RM-70 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if these include ammunition with submunition payloads.[16]

Contaminated by: landmines (massive contamination), cluster munition remnants (light/unclear contamination), and other unexploded ordnance.

Article 5 Deadline: 1 January 2018
(Not on track to meet deadline) 

Signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The Republic of Angola reported a total of almost 129km² of confirmed mined area and a further 356km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) as of mid-2014. International operators canceled 125km² of SHAs through non-technical survey (NTS), reduced 3km² through technical survey (TS), and confirmed 18km². They cleared 4.14km² of mined areas, destroying 3,800 antipersonnel mines. Land release figures for the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) and commercial operators were not provided. 

The extent to which Angola is affected by cluster munition remnants remains unclear. There is no confirmed contamination, but a small threat may exist from either abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions.

Recommendations for action 

• Angola should continue efforts to work more closely with operators to improve the national mine action database so as to be able to plan effectively and to report accurately on land release.
• Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national mine action program, including the roles, responsibilities, and funding of the two mine action entities.
• Angola should increase its international advocacy to attract re-entry of donors and reverse the decline in international funding for mine action, and to compensate for the loss of national resources due to the deep financial crisis following the oil price crash in June 2014. It should update its national resource mobilization strategy accordingly, to ensure timely clearance in line with the Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline and goals of the Maputo declaration by 2025.

Mine Contamination

Angola reported a total of almost 129km² of confirmed mined area and a further 356km² of SHA as of mid-2014. It has been unable to provide a more recent assessment of the problem.

Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico.

All 18 provinces still contain mined areas. However, the precise extent of contamination is still not well understood in some cases. Based on the first results of a nationwide NTS, on which Angola reported in June 2014, nearly half of all remaining contamination is located in the provinces of Moxico (120km² across 447 areas) and Kunene (113km² across 168 areas). In the provinces of Bié, Benguela, Huambo, Huila, Kuando Kubango, and Kwanza Sul, all SHAs were recorded as confirmed mined areas as a result of survey by HALO Trust.[1] In Bié and Kuando Kubango, a considerable extent of suspected contamination was canceled by NTS or by eliminating discrepancies in the national mine action database.[2] As of 31 December 2015, HALO Trust reported that 475 minefields remained in its areas of operations: 80 in Benguela, 110 in Bié, 36 in Huambo, and 249 in Kuando Kubango, while Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported 299 minefields remained in Moxico province.[3]

Landmine contamination affects some of the poorest and most marginalized communities in the country, including those experiencing chronic food insecurity.[4] In 2015, remaining contamination was predominately located in rural, underdeveloped areas.[5] Contamination continued to have a significant socio-economic impact for rural communities, as well as impeding the return of displaced persons and blocking access to land and water resources. International mine action operators reported that released land was rapidly being put to use by local communities for agricultural purposes and the development of housing and communal institutions such as clinics, schools, churches, and police stations, and in south-east Kuando Kubango, clearance was enabling future eco-tourism and social revenue-generating opportunities by returning national park and game reserve land to economic viability.[6] 

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent to which Angola is affected by cluster munition remnants remains unclear. There is no confirmed contamination, but a small threat may exist from either abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions. Cluster munition contamination was a result of decades of armed conflict that ended in 2002, although it is unclear when, or by whom, cluster munitions were used in Angola.

As of May 2016, clearance operators had not found cluster munition remnants in more than eight years,[7] apart from HALO Trust, which reported finding and destroying 12 unexploded submunitions in 2012.[8] In 2011, HALO Trust and the National Institute for Demining (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD) affirmed that unexploded submunitions remained in Cuando Cubango.[9] In June 2016, however, HALO Trust reported that it had found only very few submunitions in more than 20 years of clearance operations across Angola.[10] Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) also reported that it had not encountered cluster munition remnants in nearly 10 years of operations in six Angolan provinces, including near Jamba an area in southeastern Cuando Cubango province where contamination might have been expected.[11]

More typical is the disposal of old or unserviceable cluster munitions identified by HALO Trust’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which were earmarked for destruction by the Angolan armed forces. Between 2005 and 2012, HALO Trust WAD teams reported destroying a total of 7,284 submunitions.[12] In May 2016, HALO Trust indicated that it had not been asked by the military to do any further destruction of cluster munition stockpiles since 2012.[13]

Other Explosive Remnants of War Contamination

There is also a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially unexploded ordnance (UXO). In 2015, during October more deaths and injuries resulted from UXO-related incidents than mine incidents in HALO Trust’s area of operations in Angola.[14] (See the Casualties and Victim Assistance country profile for further details.)

Program Management

Angola’s national mine action program is managed by two mine action structures. The National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) serves as the national mine action center, reporting to the Council of Ministers. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies. Under the vice-governor of each province, CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices determine annual objectives.

The other mine action body, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), was established to manage Angola’s national development plan and is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration (MINARS). It supports mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority. In 2002, in order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, Angola established INAD, which is responsible for conducting demining, verification, and training operations under the auspices of MINARS.

Tension between the two national authorities over who has the ultimate power to represent national demining efforts has persisted, to the apparent detriment of mine action.[15] Operators working under CED auspices remain reluctant to report to CNIDAH according to the agreed Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) format. Part of the problem is that CNIDAH is still only a temporary governmental body. Transforming it into an agency would strengthen CNIDAH’s position, but this has been consistently delayed by lack of presidential approval.[16]

Strategic planning

Following a request by the Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Angola elaborated a workplan for 2014–2017 based on the preliminary results of its national NTS. It projected clearance of 327 confirmed mined areas covering about 35.5km² by the end of 2017, proposing the following breakdown of tasks by operators (in the expectation that funding would be forthcoming):

• Local NGO APACOMINAS would clear 59 areas covering 5.2km² in Huambo, Kwanza Sul, and Malanje.
• DanChurchAid (DCA) would clear 12 areas covering 1.9km² in Moxico.
• HALO Trust would clear 155 areas covering 12.4km² in Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango.
• MAG would clear 29 areas covering 7.1km² in Moxico.
• Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) would clear 20 areas covering 2.3km² in Kuando Kubango.
• Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) would clear 52 areas covering 6.8km² in Kwanza Norte, Malanje, Uige, and Zaire.[17] 

As described in Angola’s 2012 Article 5 deadline extension request, the national NTS and a mapping project designed to identify contamination and map ongoing clearance were intended to have clarified the extent of contamination nationwide before 2016. In May 2016, Angola announced a “Non-Technical Survey Completion Plan,” under which completion of survey/re-survey is expected by the end of 2016, with the survey results to be publicly presented in January 2017, in preparation for completing a first draft of a “final” Article 5 deadline extension request in January–March 2017.[18] (See Article 5 Compliance section below). However, according to MAG, as of October 2016, it was clear that additional resources, and several months in 2017, would be needed to finalize resurvey in Lunda Norte, Lunda Sul, Cabinda, Bengo, and Luanda provinces.[19]

Operators 

Four international NGOs conducted demining for humanitarian purposes in Angola in 2015: HALO (primarily in Bié and Kuando Kubango), MgM (in south-east Kuando Kubango), MAG (in Moxico), and NPA (in Malanje and Zaire, with support from APOPO in the province of Zaire).[20] DCA closed its operations in November 2015 due to lack of funding.[21] Humanitarian demining operators also included local NGOs APACOMINAS and Terra Mãe.

HALO’s capacity in 2015 included an average of 28 manual demining teams and three combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and marking teams. It employed some 400 staff, a decrease of 50 from 2014 due to reduced funding and clearance assets.[22] NPA deployed three teams of a total of 74 deminers at the end of 2015, along with two Mini Mine Wolf and four CASSPIR machines. It continued its partnership with APOPO, which used its mine detection rats on NPA’s tasks in Zaire.[23] MAG deployed one NTS team, six manual demining teams, one EOD team, and one mini-excavator for ground preparation, with a combined total of 148 staff at the end of 2015. It had to disband two demining teams in December 2015 due to reduced funding, and a further two teams in April 2016.[24] MgM’s operational capacity included one manual clearance team, and one mechanical team with two Armored Graders, one Wolf III Turbo Armored Personnel Vehicle, as well as two mine detection dog teams (MDDs).[25] In 2015, DCA had two teams for manual mine clearance, with ground preparation by a Minewolf.[26] 

Collectively, the four CED operators—the armed forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard—are working in all 18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritized by national infrastructure development plans.[27] A number of commercial companies[28] operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.[29]

Information management

Angola has had persistent difficulties in gathering and managing accurate mine action data, making it difficult to have a comprehensive and accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, in 2007 to June 2014, Angola has provided widely different reports on the extent of its mine problem. In 2015, there continued to be two sides to Angola’s lack of a reliable mine action database: on one, CNIDAH’s database does not match NGOs’ own records; while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format.[30]

While progress has been made over the years in reducing database discrepancies with NGO operators, Angola still needs to address database and reporting issues with CED operators. Operators did not report any significant improvements to the national mine action program’s information management capacity in 2015. MAG stated that due to internal issues within CNIDAH, updates to the database had been delayed and that as of May 2016, the database did not yet contain accurate data for MAG’s outputs in 2015.[31] HALO reported it had facilitated electronic transfer of updated data to IMSMA for Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces and archiving of some historical operator data, as had been previously done for the provinces of Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango in 2013.[32] In October 2016, however, MAG reported that an upgrade to the newer version of IMSMA, which occurred in February 2016, had not led to improved or more accessible data management.[33]

Quality management

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to handing over land to beneficiaries.[34] NPA, though, reported that in 2015 and through the first half of 2016, CNIDAH had not conducted external QC on any of its completed tasks.[35] MAG stated that CNIDAH visited clearance teams regularly in 2015, but was not aware of any sampling having been done.[36] MgM reported that only one external QC visit occurred during the year.[37] HALO indicated that QA at provincial level was generally weak owing to lack of funding and support. It also reported that while national mine action standards were in place in 2015, they were rarely monitored or evaluated.[38]

Land Release

The various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, make it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola. Furthermore, clearance data for 2015, or the previous year, from the CED and commercial companies was not yet available as of October 2016, and CNIDAH did not respond to requests for updated data. Angola has also failed to submit any Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports since 2014.

Survey in 2015 

International operators reported canceling nearly 125km² of SHA through NTS in 2015, and reducing a further 3km² through technical survey, while confirming as contaminated 274 mined areas with a total size of nearly 18km² (see table below).[39]

Antipersonnel mine survey in 2015[40]

In 2014–2015, HALO was requested by CNIDAH to resurvey Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces to update the national database, which still contained significantly high numbers of SHAs outstanding from the 2007 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), and obtain greater clarity on the size of remaining contamination. Upon finishing its resurvey of Huila province, HALO reported 18 minefields remaining, including the fenced perimeter of Lubango airport.[42] Resurvey of Kwanza Sul province in 2015 allowed HALO to cancel 102 SHAs with a total size of more than 94km² from the database, while confirming 129 CHAs impacting over 8.6km².[43] HALO reported that the area had been previously surveyed by NPA during the LIS and then again to define a number of CHAs; however, despite the number of demining agencies, both humanitarian and commercial, that had operated in the province previously, the IMSMA database had not been updated with results.[44]

Clearance in 2015 

As set out in the table below, international NGO operators reported clearing a total of more than 4.1km² of mined area in 2015, destroying in the process nearly 3,800 antipersonnel mines, 1,200 antivehicle mines, and 820 items of UXO.[45] This is nearly double the area of clearance output from 2014, when the four NGOs cleared a total of 2.2km² of mined area and destroyed 2,665 antipersonnel mines and 461 antivehicle mines.[46]

Mine clearance in 2015[47]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

In addition to its mine clearance, HALO reported carrying out 209 EOD spot tasks in 2015, with the destruction of 47 antipersonnel mines, 26 antivehicle mines, and 1,482 items of ERW across six provinces.[48] NPA reported destroying 30 antipersonnel mines, nine antivehicle mines, and 3 items of abandoned explosive ordinance (AXO) during EOD spot tasks in 2015.[49] DCA reported clearing 21 items of UXO and 1,432 small arms ammunition (SAA) during seven spot tasks.[50]

MAG stated that due to a reduction in its number of clearance teams, it used a roving EOD team to reduce immediate threats in critical areas where clearance could not occur due to lack of capacity, and carried out 832 EOD spot tasks, destroying 88 antipersonnel mines, seven antivehicle mines, and 699 items of UXO, and visually cleared 54,820m².[51] MgM reported that in addition to its area demining in 2015, it re-opened 200km of roads previously closed due to the threat of mines.[52]

Deminer safety 

MAG reported that one deminer sustained light injuries from an uncontrolled detonation of an antipersonnel mine in January 2015.[53]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2012), Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2018. Angola is not on track to meet this deadline.

Angola’s latest extension request submitted in March 2012 was presented as an “interim period” during which efforts would be undertaken to better estimate the extent of the contamination and sort out database issues through a national survey and a mapping project to geographically represent the extent of contamination. Based on results of surveys and clearance, Angola plans to submit another extension request but has already predicted needing more than 10 years beyond 2018.[54]

The 2012 request indicated the size of the country, the different mine-laying techniques used, the fact that the locations and number of mines were not recorded, and lack of resources as the main reasons for Angola’s inability to comply with its initial deadline. Another significant impeding factor noted was Angola’s information management problems.[55]

In granting the request, the Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties requested that Angola provide, to the Third Review Conference, updated information on the size and location of all mined areas identified during its NTS project, and asked Angola to submit a revised land release plan for the rest of its extension period.[56] Accordingly, in June 2014, Angola submitted its workplan for 2014–2017, which provided an update on progress in its national NTS and database clean-up, and set annual clearance targets.[57] Angola is way behind schedule in the tasks planned for its first extension period, but this is related to reduced funding. The NTS was due to be completed by 2013, and as of October 2016, activities were still ongoing.[58]

At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in May 2016, Angola said the delay in the survey were “of great concern” to CNIDAH as it hindered Angola’s efforts to fully comply with its extended Article 5 obligations.[59] It pledged to complete survey in 2016 and prepare its next Article 5 deadline extension request by March 2017.[60]

The government of Angola was reported to have provided significant funding for demining in 2015, though this was almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects.[61] HALO and NPA reported that while this work was necessary, it was not addressing the provincial minefields that affect rural, poor communities, making assistance from international NGOs vital.[62] Despite not funding mine action by international operators directly in 2015, the government did make available in-kind support (free use of land for office space, institutional incentives such as tax exemptions on the import of goods, and land for building of staff houses).[63]

Angola has traditionally been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding. Nevertheless, demining operators and officials have noted a critical decrease in financial support, and most worrying a disengagement of traditional donors such as the European Union (EU), with the exception of the United States (US) and Japan.[64] Collectively, the resources of the three largest operators, HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA, have decreased by more than 80% in 2008 to end 2015. DCA ended its operations in November 2015. This sharp reduction, combined with the national economic crisis brought on by the fall of oil prices, which has resulted in a decrease in government revenue by more than half, is jeopardizing the future of demining in the country.[65]

In 2016, HALO suspended its demining operations in Bié province, following the end of EU funding from the European Development Fund. This marked the first year that HALO would not have operational demining teams in Bié since it began operating in Angola in 1994. Bié remains one of the most mine-impacted provinces, with 110 confirmed mined areas.[66]

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2015, the Republic of Angola received US$6.7 million (five-times less than in 2014) from three donors.[1]

The United States (US) provided 80% of all international assistance to Angola in 2015. Since 1995, the US has been a major donor in Angola, with more than $117 million provided since then.[2]

In October 2015, Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs published the results of the evaluation of its humanitarian mine action policy. Among the main recommendations presented was the rapid phasing down of funding in Angola—which was among the main recipients of Finland’s support to mine action between 2011–2015, with $6 million received over that period.[3]

Angola did not receive international support for victim assistance in 2015. Instead, all funds were allocated to clearance and risk education activities.

International contributions: 2015[4]

The government of Angola has contributed more than $430 million to mine action since 2011, an average of $86 million per year and 85% of its total mine action budget.

In 2015, it contributed almost AOA7.1billion ($60 million) resulting in a $65.8 million overall budget, this is half as much as in 2014 when it provided more than $210 million.[5]

National funding supports the Intersectoral Commission on Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), with funding going to coordination (salaries), quality control, and provincial offices. In 2015, the CNIDAH budget was approximately $11 million or 18% of national funding. The Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) received $48.6 million or 82% of the national contribution. The CED was established in 2005 to fund development projects and provide financial support to the demining operations of the Angolan armed forces, the National Reconstruction Office, and the National Demining Institute.[6]

Despite variations in mine action funding since 2013, Angola has been one of the largest recipients of international mine action funding since 2011, and received more than $76 million, or an average of more than $15 million per year.

Summary of contributions: 2011–2015[7]

Action points based on findings

• Fully fund prosthetics centers, including provision of materials.
• Support the effective implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), including through the rapid establishment of a national council for persons with disabilities.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Angola is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Angola has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Angola ratified the CRPD on 19 May 2014.

Casualties Overview

Details and trends

In 2015, the Monitor identified 25 mine and ERW casualties in Angola.[1] All casualties were civilians.

Of the casualties where the age and gender of the victim were known: seven were adults, four men and three women; and 14 casualties were children, 13 boys and one girl.[2] Fifteen of the casualties resulted from explosions caused by tampering with explosive devices.

The 25 casualties identified in 2015 more than doubles the number reported in 2014, but likely does not fully document the true number of casualties. Casualties were only reported from six provinces, the same provinces where international NGOs are conducting mine clearance. No information was available from the other 12 provinces. In 2014, the Monitor was only able to report casualties from three of Angola’s provinces and history suggests that casualty report figures are correlated with the number of provinces from which the Monitor is able to obtain data. The absence of any national casualty reporting system remains a significant gap in data collection in Angola, which makes ascertaining the extent of the casualties or the needs of victims near impossible. Even in provinces where casualties were reported, many more landmine accidents were believed to have occurred, especially in rural areas or in areas far from the international mine action operators’ work areas.[3]

In 2015, two efforts were made to document the number of landmine casualties in the country. In May 2014, the Angolan government conducted a nationwide census, the results of which were published in March 2015. According to the census, 88,716 people were living with a disability caused by landmines or other explosive devices. Survivors were identified in all 18 provinces with one-quarter living in Luanda. Mine and ERW survivors represented one-eighth of the disabled population, with 2.5% of the Angolan population identified as disabled.[4]

The HALO Trust conducted a desk review of all explosive incidents in the country between 1975 and 2015. Combining media reports with their own survey and data records, HALO identified 1,573 casualties from 791 mine/ERW incidents in six provinces. While not representative of all casualties in those provinces over the time period, the review indicates that antivehicle mines are the most common cause of injury and that the fatality rate from explosive devices was higher than previously believed. The review also indicates that the years with the most mines/ERW casualties were 2002 and 2003, when Angolans returned to their homes after the conclusion of the civil war.[5]

The national mine action center (CNIDAH) planned to continue its survey of survivors, but this has been suspended since 2014.[6] The survey would help to identify the exact needs of survivors—the census data is not disaggregated by type of injury, age, or gender. As of the end of 2014, CNIDAH had registered 9,165 survivors in the provinces of Benguela, Cabinda, Cunene, Huambo, Huila, Malanje, Namibe, Uige, and Zaire as part of its national mine/ERW victim survey.[7] Between 2000 and 2015, the Monitor identified 2,964 mine/ERW casualties, including 983 people killed, 1,833 injured, and 148 for which the outcome was unknown.[8] Between 2006 and 2011, CNIDAH registered 433 mine/ERW casualties, including 77 people killed and 356 injured.[9]

Cluster munition casualties

CNIDAH’s national victim survey had identified at least 354 cluster munition survivors, all in the province of Huambo.[10] The 2014 and 2015 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor reports repeated these figures. Subsequent information calls this finding into question. The survey of survivors in Huambo was conducted by Instituto ao Apoio a crianca Vulneravel (Institute for the Support of Vulnerable Children, IACV), not a mine action organization, and the survey questionnaire used by the IACV did not specifically identify cluster munitions as a possible cause of injury.[11] In 2015, HALO conducted a desk review of all known landmine and ERW accidents from 1975 through 2015. While the review was limited to HALO’s area of operations, including Huambo Province, in the course of the review it could not identify a any cluster munition victims.[12] Norwegian People’s Aid compiled a desk review on potential cluster munition contamination in Angola but could not confirm a single cluster munition victim despite documenting clearance and identifying some cluster munitions.[13] As such, reports of cluster munitions victims in Angola cannot be confirmed as of June 2016.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors reported in Angola is 88,716.[14] As of December 2014, 9,165 survivors had been surveyed and their needs identified in the first nine (of 18) provinces surveyed as part of CNIDAH’s intended national victim survey.[15]

Victim assistance during the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 and Vientiane Action Plan 2011–2015

International organizations began closing their programs and transferring management of healthcare facilities and rehabilitation centers to the government in 2005. The departure of Handicap International (HI) by the end of 2011 completed the withdrawal of international organizations that had been providing support for victim assistance. All 11 physical rehabilitation centers were already managed by the Ministry of Health by 2008. However, by 2009 production of prosthetics in all centers had declined due to a lack of materials and unpaid staff salaries. This decline continued until mid-2013, when the national mine action center began efforts to improve the quality of services in five provinces, funded by the Ministry of Health’s National Rehabilitation Program. Those efforts continued into 2014 with the construction or expansion of rehabilitation facilities and orthopedic clinics in seven provinces, with plans to do likewise in several more.

A limited number of economic inclusion projects were available to survivors over the period, either through international organizations, national and local organizations of persons with disabilities, or government agencies, such as the Ministry of Assistance and Social Reintegration (MINARS) and CNIDAH, which began coordinating and facilitating victim assistance in 2001. These projects have fallen far short of the overall need.

International organizations supported the development of local survivor networks and disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs). However, these groups were hamstrung by a lack of funding and the distances between them that prevented collaboration among groups. Through the Comprehensive National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2007–2011, CNIDAH aimed to support the development of a national survivor network, but no progress was made toward this objective within the timeframe of the plan due to insufficient funding and organizational problems. Angola’s victim assistance program is defined by the National Integrated Plan for Mine Victim Assistance 2013–2017, which CNIDAH is implementing.

Victim assistance in 2015

The economic crisis in Angola, caused by the global decline in oil prices leading to a dramatic reduction in the Angolan government’s revenues, has slashed the funds available for government-supported survivor assistance. The result has been a near shutdown of most survivor assistance programs, including those led by CNIDAH. Some programs are still available from domestic and international NGOs, but their reach is limited. The government refurbished some rehabilitation and orthopedic clinics, but failed to furnish them with the supplies and materials to deliver services.

Due to a general unavailability of services and difficulty in accessing available services, only about 30% of those who need assistance services are able to obtain them.[16]

Assessing victim assistance needs

As of the end of 2014, mine/ERW survivors with disabilities in nine of Angola’s 18 provinces had been surveyed as part of the National Victim Survey and Needs Assessment. The survey was launched in October 2010 with the purpose of identifying and registering mine and cluster munition survivors with disabilities, to understand their living situation, and to determine how to promote their socio-economic inclusion.[17]

After having been suspended in 2012 due to funding constraints and to avoid the potential confusion of those surveyed with the national election registration process, it resumed in 2013. By the end of 2014, the survey was completed in Benguela, Cabinda, Cunene, Huambo, Huila, Malanje, Namibe, Uige, and Zaire and a total of 9,165 survivors with a disability had been registered in these nine provinces which contain an estimated 50% of Angola’s total population.[18] As of the end of 2014, CNIDAH and MINARS found the results of the ongoing survey and needs assessment to be beneficial for planning and determining priorities to assist the target population.[19] In provinces where the survey was conducted, local CNIDAH offices were trained to assist with the data collection and serve as focal points for ongoing casualty data collection.[20] The results of the survey have yet to be translated into programming and the survey is limited only to landmine and ERW survivors,[21] therefore it is not reflective of the needs of the broader community of persons with disabilities.

Victim assistance coordination[22]

CNIDAH’s victim assistance coordination efforts in 2015 were severely limited by funding constraints and limited to reporting and information sharing. CNIDAH’s victim assistance team sees its role as limited to landmine and ERW survivors and therefore separate from other disability programming. CNIDAH is responsible for the implementation of the National Integrated Victim Assistance Plan 2013–2017 (PNIAVM), but with little support for landmine victim only programming, implementation has stalled.[23] CNIDAH members meet with partner organizations, both service providers and DPOs, to review their programs and monitor the impact for the beneficiaries but these activities are solely informational.[24]

Angola developed the PNIAVM as part of its national development plan “Angola 2025.” The disability plan includes the objective of establishing a national council for persons with disabilities, designed to raise the profile of disability issues within the executive branch of the government and to improve coordination on disability issues among all government ministries.[25] The National Council for Persons with Disabilities was established in 2014 under the coordination of MINARS, however CNIDAH is not a member of the council.[26]

Angola did not report on victim assistance activities at meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2015.

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Landmine victims are included in “coordination of awareness activities” and through the national NGO the Angolan Federation of Associations of People with Disabilities (FAPED), survivors have been able to meet with line ministries relevant to disability.[27] In 2016, the Angola National Disability Association (ANDA) attended the Ninth World Assembly of Disabled People.[28]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[29]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

In 2013 and into 2014, the government announced progress in reconstructing roads to aid in the emergency evacuation of mine/ERW survivors and others in need of emergency medical care; it also announced the construction of health facilities, the decentralization of specialized services, and an increase in highly trained medical professionals.[30]

Physical rehabilitation

Only one prosthetic workshop in Angola was able to produce new prosthetic devices in 2015, the facility in Bie province. The governor of Bie prioritized the funding of supplies for the clinic in his province, the delivery of which were made by the ICRC, which enabled the facility to continue to manufacture new devices. Other centers’ capacity was reduced to repairs and physical rehabilitation, which were also limited by the availability of equipment.[31]

The government repaired the prosthetics centers in Uige and Huila provinces, but the lack of supplies for those centers prevented them from providing adequate services.[32]

There are no private prosthetics centers in Angola; Angolans who can afford to do so, travel to Europe or elsewhere to obtain new appliances. The Fundacao Lwini’s Passo Seguro project purchases all of its prosthetic devices from Iceland and sponsors the travel costs of the prosthetists.[33]

In addition to the public-sector facilities, several civil society organizations including AACVDA, IACV, the Evangelical Baptist Church of Angola, and the Lwini Foundation, provided mobility devices and access to healthcare for landmine survivors and persons with disabilities.

There is no domestic production of wheelchairs, crutches, or other mobility devices; most were imported from China. With support from the government, ANDA purchased these devices and distributed them directly to prosthetics centers, hospitals, and other associations working with persons with physical disabilities.[34]

Psychological support

No advances where identified in the availability of psychological support in 2015. The need for psychological support was recognized by the Institute of Vulnerable Child Support and the Evangelical Baptist Church, which sought funds in 2015 for psychological support as part of a comprehensive package of victim assistance services in Huambo and Uige provinces.[35]

Economic and social inclusion

Few changes were identified in the availability or access to economic inclusion activities in 2015.

The Lwini Foundation provided integration kits to survivors to supplement vocational training courses, enabling participants to start businesses or take on formal employment.[36]

Laws and policies

National laws preventing discrimination against persons with disabilities exist but were not fully enforced. The National Council for Persons with Disabilities is responsible for monitoring violations.[37] Physical accessibility of buildings is a priority for both the government and ANDA. The Ministry of Construction planned to release guidelines for accessible housing in 2016.[38]