Cambodia

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 18 July 2016

Summary: Non-signatory Cambodia has expressed its support for the convention, but has not taken any steps towards accession to the convention. Cambodia has participated in almost all of the convention’s meetings, including the First Review Conference in September 2015. Cambodia is not known to have ever produced, used, or exported cluster munitions. It has not disclosed the size or precise content of its cluster munition stockpile. Cambodia’s cluster munition contamination dates from the 1960s and 1970s, when the United States (US) extensively bombed the country in air attacks. In February 2011, Thailand fired cluster munitions into Cambodian territory on the border near Preah Vihear temple.

Policy

The Kingdom of Cambodia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Cambodia stated in 2013 and 2014 that it was studying the implications of accession with stakeholders and is not prepared to make a decision until consultations conclude.[1] The current status of its internal process is unclear as the Cambodian government has said little about its views on the convention since 2014.

Cambodia participated as an observer in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015, but did not make any statements, including during the high-level segment.

On 7 December 2015, Cambodia was absent from the vote on the first UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[2] A total of 140 states, including many non-signatories, voted in favor of the non-binding resolution.

Cambodia was an early, prominent, and influential supporter of the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions and hosted the first regional forum on cluster munitions in Phnom Penh in March 2007. Cambodia advocated forcefully for the most comprehensive and immediate ban possible and joined in the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the Dublin negotiations in May 2008. Yet, despite this extensive and positive leadership role, Cambodia attended the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo on 3 December 2008 as an observer and did not sign, stating at the time that due to “recent security developments” in the region, it needed more time to study the security implications of joining.[3]

Cambodia has cited several reasons for not joining the Convention on Cluster Munitions, most of them security-related.[4] The Ministry of Defense has raised questions including how to destroy stockpiled cluster munitions and how to replenish defense capabilities after their destruction.[5]

The ICRC and Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace (CICP) held a seminar on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Phnom Penh on 12 May 2016.[6] In a keynote address, General Chau Phirun, the director of the Ministry of Defense’s General Department of Material and Technical Services, reportedly expressed concern that some of Cambodia’s neighboring countries have used cluster munitions.[7] The Khmer Press reported that Phirun saw “significant benefits” to Cambodia “joining the convention,” and called on all countries to prohibit the use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and sale of cluster bombs.[8] In its summary of the meeting, chair CICP concluded that after listening to all views the reason for joining the convention outweigh those for not joining, but noted the Cambodian government requires time to decide.

Cambodia has long emphasized the need for its neighboring states, particularly Thailand, to accede to the convention.[9] Cambodia’s position on accession to the convention seemed to show signs of positive change in 2011 after Thailand fired cluster munitions into Cambodian territory on the border near Preah Vihear temple, killing two men and injuring seven.[10] But since 2012, it has continued to repeat the line that, “Cambodia is still assessing the impact of signing the Convention on Cluster Munitions on its defense capability and the ability to comply with all obligations.”[11]

Despite not joining, Cambodia participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, except in 2014, as well as intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011–2015 and regional workshops on the convention.

Cambodia has condemned new use of cluster munitions.[12]

The Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs continues to call for the government to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[13]

Cambodia is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, and transfer

Cambodia is not known to have used, produced, or exported cluster munitions.

The US used some 80,000 air-dropped cluster munitions containing 26 million submunitions on Cambodia in the 1960s and 1970s during the Vietnam War, mostly in the east and northeast of the country.

After Thailand fired cluster munitions into Cambodian territory in June 2011, Cambodian officials informed a meeting of the convention that, “Despite being confronted and threatened by forces, so far we have refrained from employing cluster munitions in our response.”[14]

Stockpiling

The size and precise content of Cambodia’s stockpile of cluster munitions is not known. In December 2008, a Ministry of Defense official said that Cambodia has “some missile launchers that use cluster munitions that weigh more than 20 kg” and that there were also stockpiles of cluster munitions weighing 250kg left over from the 1980s that Cambodia intends to destroy.[15] Weapons with submunitions that weigh more than 20kg each are not defined as cluster munitions by the Convention on Cluster Munitions and are thus not prohibited.[16]

According to standard international reference publications, Cambodia also possesses BM-21 Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[17] Cambodian officials have sought clarification from States Parties and NGOs as to whether BM-21 multiple barrel rocket launchers are banned under the convention. The launchers are capable of firing rockets with a variety of warheads, one of which is a cargo warhead containing explosive submunitions. The CMC has informed Cambodia that the rocket delivery system itself is not prohibited by the convention, and the convention would allow use of the BM-21 with unitary munitions. However, under the terms of the convention, a BM-21 rocket launcher could not be used to deliver rockets containing explosive submunitions.[18]

[1] In April 2014, an official said the convention’s “lack of clearly defined definition of cluster munitions” requires Cambodia to undertake “a much more vigorous study among key national technical stakeholders…to explore technical matters and to seek a possible consensus.” He said Cambodia will consider accession to the convention when it “concludes all relevant assessments.” Statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 April 2014. See also, statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013.

[2] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015. It was also absent during the first round of voting on the draft resolution in UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security on 4 November 2015. “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution AC.1/70/L.49/Rev.1, 4 November 2015.

[3] For details on Cambodia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 193–195.

[4] See ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), p. 201.

[5] Peter Sombor, “Cambodia Still Undecided About Signing Cluster Munitions Treaty,” The Cambodia Daily, 9 September 2013; and ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 – Cambodia ban policy update, 21 October 2010.

[6] Ban Sokrith, “Cluster-bomb Seminar Will Aim to Push for Global Ban,” Khmer Times, 10 March 2016.

[7] Seminar on the global humanitarian problem of cluster munitions and the Convention on Cluster Munitions organized by the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace and the ICRC, Phnom Penh, 12 May 2016. Notes provided to the Monitor by a participant in the meeting.

[8] Ros Chanveasna, “Cambodia Considers Ban on Cluster Bombs,” Khmer Times, 12 May 2016.

[9] ICBL, “Country Profile: Cambodia: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 21 October 2010.

[10] At the convention’s first intersessional meetings in June 2011, Cambodia said its accession was “just a matter of time.” Statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 27 June 2011.

[11] Statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 11 September 2012; and statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 17 April 2012.

[12] In April 2014, Cambodia condemned reported new use of cluster munitions in South Sudan. Statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, April 2014.

[13] See the Facebook page of the Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines and Cluster Bombs.

[14] Statement of Cambodia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 27 June 2011.

[15] The official was Chau Phirun of the Ministry of Defense. Lea Radick and Neou Vannarin, “No Rush to Sign Cluster Munition Ban: Gov’t,” The Cambodia Daily, 5 December 2008.

[16] Article 2.2 states: “‘Cluster munition’ means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions.”

[17] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 229; and Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2008, CD-edition, 3 December 2007 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008).

[18] Letter to Prime Minister Hun Sen from Steve Goose, CMC, 30 November 2011.

Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 28 October 2014

Policy

The Kingdom of Cambodia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 28 July 1999, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2000. Domestic implementation legislation—the Law to Prohibit the Use of Anti-personnel Mines—took effect on 28 May 1999.[1] In 2013, Cambodia submitted its 15^thMine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, covering calendar year 2013.[2]

Cambodia has attended all of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Review Conferences held in 2004, 2009, and 2014 as well as most of the treaty’s Meetings of States Parties and many of the intersessional meetings held in Geneva, including in April 2014. It hosted the Mine Ban Treaty’s Eleventh Meeting of States Parties in December 2011.[3]

Cambodia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

Use

There were no allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines on the Cambodian border with Thailand in the second half of 2013 or first half of 2014.

Previously, in March 2013, three Thai soldiers were injured by what the Thai military described as newly planted mines near the Ta Kwai Temple in Phanom Dong Rak district. Cambodia investigated and in its report to States Parties found the mines were old, dating from the Cambodian civil war.[4] Cambodia provided a copy of its investigation report to the Mine Ban Treaty Implementation Support Unit and the ICBL at the May 2013 intersessional meetings, and to the government of Thailand through diplomatic channels.[5]

Other allegations made by Thailand of Cambodian use of antipersonnel mines on the Cambodian-Thai border in 2008 and 2009 were never resolved.[6]

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Previously, the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) destroyed its declared stockpile of 71,991 antipersonnel mines between 1994 and 1998, and in February 1999 the RCAF Deputy Commander in Chief formally stated that the RCAF no longer had stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.[7] In 2000, Cambodia reported an additional stockpile of 2,035 antipersonnel mines held by the national police that were subsequently destroyed.[8] In 2013, Cambodia reported that while there have been no antipersonnel mine stockpiles in the country since 2001, “police and military units are still finding and collecting weapons, ammunitions and mines from various sources, locations and caches.”[9] Discovered mines are supposed to be reported to the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) and handed over to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) for destruction.[10] A Cambodian official has previously stated that newly discovered stocks are destroyed immediately.[11]

Previous Article 7 reports document a total of 133,478 stockpiled antipersonnel mines that were found and destroyed from 2000 to 2008, including 13,665 in 2008; this included 9,698 by CMAC, 2,713 by HALO Trust, and 1,254 by Mines Advisory Group (MAG). Cambodia stated that these mines were “reported by local communities.”[12] It is not clear why significant numbers of stockpiled mines were discovered each year through 2008, but none have been discovered since.

Cambodia has each year reported transfer of mines removed from mined areas to the CMAC training center and other operators for training purposes.[13] In June 2011, the deputy secretary general of the CMAA told the Monitor that all mines held by Cambodia are fuzeless and that Cambodia retains no live mines for training.[14] In its 2014 Article 7 report, Cambodia reported the transfer of 60 inert antipersonnel mines for use to train animals in landmine detection.[15]

[1] The law bans the production, use, possession, transfer, trade, sale, import, and export of antipersonnel mines. It provides for criminal penalties, including fines and imprisonment for offenses committed by civilians or members of the police and the armed forces. It also provides for the destruction of mine stockpiles.

[2]Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, undated, covering the period of 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013. Previous reports were submitted in 2013 (for calendar year 2012), 2012 (for calendar year 2011), 2011 (for calendar year 2010), May 2010 (for calendar year 2009), April 2009 (for calendar year 2008), in 2008 (for calendar year 2007), on 27 April 2007, 11 May 2006, 22 April 2005, 30 April 2004, 15 April 2003, 19 April 2002, 30 June 2001, and 26 June 2000.

[3] Prak Sokhonn, Minister Attached to the Prime Minister and Vice-Chair of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), was elected president of the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty, which Cambodia hosted in Phnom Penh in November–December 2011 at Vimean Santepheap (the Peace Palace).

[4] See Landmine Monitor 2013, Thailand Mine Ban Policy profile. According to a request made by the ICBL, Cambodia conducted a fact-finding mission to the site from 10–12 May 2013 that determined the Thai solders were injured by mines laid during the Cambodian civil war. It said its soldiers found indications of the incident on the same day, and recorded a GPS reference that differed from the reference declared by the Thai military. Cambodia stated that the incident took place to the side of, not on, a specially cleared path used for military-to-military meetings between the Thai and Cambodian military in the area. The Cambodian delegation provided copies of the report at the May 2013 intersessional meeting in Geneva.

[5] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Compliance, Geneva, 30 May 2013. Notes by the ICBL; and Investigation Report on Thailand’s Allegation of New Mines Laid by Cambodia, 17 May 2013. Report copy provided to ICBL at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meeting, 31 May 2013. Report prepared by a five-person team from the Cambodian Mine Action Authority and the Cambodian National Center for Peacekeeping Forces and ERW Clearance.

[6] In October 2008, two Thai soldiers stepped on antipersonnel mines while on patrol in disputed territory between Thailand and Cambodia, near the World Heritage Site of Preah Vihear. Thai authorities maintained that the area was previously clear of mines and that the mines had been newly placed by Cambodian forces. Cambodia denied the charges and stated that the Thai soldiers had entered Cambodian territory in an area known to contain antipersonnel mines and were injured by mines laid during previous armed conflicts. In April 2009, another Thai soldier was reportedly wounded by an antipersonnel mine at the same location during further armed conflict between the two countries. In September 2009, Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, Gen. Anupong Paochinda, stated that Cambodian troops were laying fresh mines along the disputed areas and close to routes where Thai soldiers make regular patrols. See Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 243–244, 719–720; and also ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Cambodia: Mine Ban Policy,” 6 August 2010.

[7] See Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 391.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 26 June 2000.

[9]Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2012), Form F.

[10] Ibid.

[11] See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 206.

[12]Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form G (1). Mines destroyed in previous years included: 8,739 in 2000; 7,357 in 2001; 13,509 in 2002; 9,207 in 2003; 15,446 in 2004; 16,878 in 2005; 23,409 in 2006; and 20,268 in 2007.

[13] Cambodia reported in 2012 that 1,190 mines were transferred for development and training. See Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2012), Form D (2). Cambodia has reported a total of 7,679 mines transferred for training purposes from 1998–2010. All of the mines that are transferred each year are apparently consumed (destroyed) during training activities.

[14] Interview with Sophakmonkol Prum, Deputy Secretary General, CMAA, in Geneva, 24 June 2011.

[15] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, April 2014, Form D.

Mine Action

Last updated: 22 November 2016

Contaminated by: landmines (massive contamination), cluster munition remnants (heavy contamination), and other unexploded ordnance.

Article 5 deadline: 1 January 2020
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

The Kingdom of Cambodia has an estimated 860km² of antipersonnel mine-contaminated land, out of total mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination estimated at 1,640km². In 2015, Cambodia released a total of 147km², an increase from 96.22km² in 2014, mainly as a result of a sharp increase in the amount of land released by non-technical survey (NTS). 70.38km² was released by NTS, 30.11km² was reduced by technical survey, and 46.47km² was cleared. Land release has accelerated sharply in the past five years but the release of substantial amounts of land through survey and cancelation, particularly in the last three years, suggests operators will be dealing increasingly with land that needs full clearance that may slow the pace of land release in years ahead.

Cambodia also has heavy contamination from cluster munition remnants but the extent is not known. As of May 2016, Cambodia estimated the amount of land contaminated by cluster munition remnants to be 334km². Cambodia reported the release of 0.77km² of cluster munition-contaminated area by clearance and the reduction of a further 3.34km² by technical survey in 2015.

Recommendations for action

Cambodia should present as soon as possible a strategy detailing plans for completing its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations.
The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) should accelerate clearance of dense (category A1) antipersonnel mine contamination.
Cambodia should ensure clearance is only conducted of land where there is firm evidence of contamination.
The CMAA should adopt standards for survey and clearance appropriate for dealing with cluster munitions.
The CMAA should set strategic goals for clearance of ERW, giving priority to cluster munition remnants in the most affected provinces.
The CMAA should centralize data management to produce comprehensive and disaggregateddata on survey and clearance of mined areas, cluster munition remnants, and battle area contaminated with other ERW.
The CMAA should present this data in an annual report summarizing progress towards strategic targets.
The CMAA and mine action stakeholders should review land release planning, prioritization, and tasking to ensure assets are used to maximum effect.

Cambodia is affected by mines and ERW, including cluster munition remnants, left by 30 years of conflict that ended in the 1990s.

Mine Contamination

Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand that account for the great majority of mine casualties. Contamination includes the remains of the 1,046km-long K5 mine belt that was installed along the border with Thailand in the mid-1980s in a bid to block insurgent infiltration, and ranks among the densest contamination in the world with, reportedly, up to 2,400 mines per linear kilometer.[1]

Cambodia conducted a baseline survey of the 139 most mine-affected districts, which was completed in 2013, and followed up by further survey in 2014 and 2015. By the end of 2015, the CMAA estimated it had 7,871 landmine polygons covering almost 860km² out of total contamination by landmines and ERW estimated at 1,640km² (see the table below). Of this total, 1,676 polygons amounting to 106km² was densely contaminated.[2]

Mine contamination based on Baseline Survey results for 139 districts[3]

Contamination classification	Area (m²) May 2013	Area (m²) End 2014	Area (m²) End 2015
A1 Dense AP mines	63,894,629	99,750,628	99,490,452

A2 Mixed AP and AV mines	78,601,787	N/R	40,064,014
A2.1 Mixed dense AP and AV mines	9,154,925	N/R	6,561,919
A2.2 Mixed scattered AP and AV mines	216,840,425	N/R	173,915,747
A2 Total	304,597,137	255,370,490	220,541,680
A3 AV mines	68,187,332	N/R	31,510,235

A4 Scattered or nuisance mines	674,882,897	627,720,309	508,247,851
Total	1,111,561,995	982,841,427	859,790,218

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle; N/R = not reported.

Cluster munition Contamination

Cambodia has heavy contamination from cluster munition remnants but the extent is not known. Contamination resulted from intensive bombing by the United States (US) during the Vietnam War, concentrated in northeastern provinces along the borders with Lao PDR and Vietnam. The US air force dropped at least 26 million explosive submunitions, between 1.9 million and 5.8 million of which are estimated to have not exploded.[4]

On the basis of the Baseline Survey (BLS) of eight eastern provinces conducted between 2012 and 2015, the CMAA estimated the area affected by cluster munition remnants as of May 2016 at 334km², almost 70% of total ERW contamination amounting to more than 482km². It also revealed that 60% of the cluster munition problem is located in the provinces of Kratie and Stung Treng (see table below).[5]

ERW survey of eight eastern provinces[6]

Province	Cluster munition-contaminated area (m²)	Total ERW contamination (m²)
Kampong Cham	27,295,691	54,169,282
Kratie	102,216,147	152,370,918
Mondolkiri	18,648,581	37,223,450
Prey Veng	16,585,017	18,217,222
Rattanakiri	35,689,634	38,104,182
Stung Treng	98,503,248	124,866,799
Svay Rieng	17,044,341	32,809,678
Tboung Khmum	18,247,617	24,997,166
Total	334,230,276	482,758,697

Much of Cambodia’s cluster munition contamination lies in areas that are heavily forested and have been sparsely populated. Population growth and demand for land, however, have resulted in large numbers of people moving into these areas, generating increasing evidence of the scale of contamination and increasing the threat posed.[7] There have been a total of 209 submunition casualties since 1999, 43 killed and 166 injured.[8]

Program Management

The CMAA, set up in September 2000, regulates and coordinates all activities relating to survey and clearance of ERW, including cluster munition remnants.[9] The CMAA’s responsibilities include regulation and accreditation of all operators, preparing strategic plans, managing data, conducting quality control, and coordinating risk education and victim assistance.[10]

Prime Minister Hun Sen is the CMAA President, and in April 2016 he appointed a senior official, Serei Kosal, as first Vice President, replacing a senior government minister, Prak Sokhonn, who became foreign minister. In May 2016, he also replaced the CMAA’s Secretary General, Prum Sophakmonkol, with another senior minister, Ly Thuch.[11]

The UNDP has supported the CMAA through a “Clearing for Results” (CFR) program since 2006, awarding contracts through a process of competitive bidding. The first two phases from 2006 to the end of 2015 resulted in release of 167.5km² at a cost of US$37.5 million.[12] By May 2016, donors had committed to provide $11 million for four years, of which $7 million was committed by Australia.[13] For 2016, the CMAA issued three contracts worth a total of $1.5 million. This included two contracts worth $1.1 million awarded to the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) to clear 6.97km² in Battambang and Bantheay Meanchey provinces and one contract worth $0.39 million awarded to the National Centre for Peacekeeping Forces Management, Mines, and Explosive Remnants of War Clearance (NPMEC) to clear 2km² in Pailin.[14]

Strategic planning

The CMAA’s management reshuffle came as Cambodia was due to draw up a new strategic plan that operators hoped would help to invigorate donor support. A draft national strategic plan produced by a consultant in 2014 observed that Cambodia’s mine action has moved from an emergency phase to a development phase and proposed that “much of the remaining contamination will be dealt with” within the present Article 5 deadline extension request. The plan remained under consideration by the CMAA in 2015 but was not adopted.[15]

A “Concept Paper” on resource mobilization released by the CMAA in early 2016 stated that Cambodia had to deal with contamination totaling 1,638km², of which some 930km² was mined area and 707km² was battle area. It further stated that Cambodia would be able to release 1,545km², or 94% of the total by 2025 through technical survey and clearance at a cost of $338.5 million but warned that mine action targets were “seriously threatened” by a lack of funding. The paper projected annual clearance targets (see the table below) but gave no details.[16]

Concept paper targets

Year	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
Area to be released (km²)	162.4	176.6	177.4	177.4	174.3
Funds required ($ million)	34.02	39.22	38.22	38.22	37.72
Year	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Area to be released (km²)	171.2	150.7	143	115.8	96.3
Funds required ($ million)	37.12	34.62	33.22	25.82	20.32

The CMAA paper also identified additional financial requirements totaling $2.4 million, including $600,000 for risk education, $500,000 to support data management, and $500,000 “to develop a formalized knowledge exchange programme with other countries.”

The CMAA held a series of technical working group meetings with operators and other mine action sector stakeholders in 2015 and 2016 to prepare a new strategic plan with the intention of completing an initial draft by mid-2016 and a final document ahead of the Meeting of States Parties at the end of 2016. This would provide the basis of a request to extend its Article 5 deadline, which falls in 2020. Work on drafting a plan was running behind schedule in 2016.[17]

Planning, prioritization, and the effectiveness of the present system of tasking operators meanwhile, remained an issue of particular debate. Under existing policy, the CMAA identifies priority communes for clearance on the basis of casualty data and provincial-level Mine Action Planning Units (MAPUs)—responsible for preparing annual clearance task lists, working in consultation with local authorities to identify community priorities, and with operators, taking account of donor funding and objectives. Task lists are reviewed and approved by Provincial Mine Action Committees (PMACs) and the CMAA. Reviews of the system in 2015 identified weaknesses, notably in reconciling local-level priorities with wider strategic goals.[18]

A review of prioritization in western provinces targeted under the second phase of CFR noted that CMAA top-down guidance did not adequately focus mine action resources on the most impacted communities or development needs. It found that decisions on task selection did not systematically follow official selection criteria, lacked transparency, and appeared to be influenced by ease of access for operators rather than the impact of mined areas on communities. It also noted that the accident data used by the CMAA as criteria for assessing prioritization was too “reactive” and did not sufficiently capture the risks for some new villages set up in areas close to dense (category A1) antipersonnel mine contamination.[19]

A review by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), citing official data, reported that almost half the land released by full clearance or reduced by technical survey in 2015 contained no mines (26%) or very few (one to three) devices (23%). It also found that dense antipersonnel mine contamination accounted for 7% of land released by full clearance in 2015 and 3.5% of land cleared in 2010−2015. Land contaminated by nuisance or scattered mines accounted for almost half the area released in 2010−2015.[20]

HALO Trust pointed to the need to avoid clearing land about to reach reclamation status (after three years’ cultivation without mine detonation incidents). (See the Survey (mines) section below.) It also argued for more clearance of land with highly functional mine types (such as PMN, PPM-2, and 72 Alpha antivehicle mines) than areas with mine types known by local communities to be particularly prone to degrading (Type 69, PMD 60, and POM).[21]

Operators

Mine clearance is undertaken mainly by the national operator, CMAC, and two international mine action NGOs, HALO Trust and Mines Advisory Group (MAG). CMAC’s Demining Unit 6, based in Siem Reap, came under the management of international NGO APOPO in 2014. A national NGO, Cambodian Self-help Demining (CSHD), has been active since 2011. At the start of 2014, three commercial companies active on a small scale were BACTEC, D&Y, and Viking.[22] Three other commercial companies, CMEC Cooperation, Hi-Tech Recond (Cambodia), and MUCC received provisional accreditation. NPMEC had thirteen demining and four explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams accredited with the CMAA in 2016, two more EOD teams than at the start of 2015.[23]

Survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants in eastern Cambodia are undertaken mainly by CMAC, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), and MAG. NPMEC have conducted clearance in cluster munition-affected areas but they have not reported the extent and results of their operations.[24]

Land Release (mines)

Cambodia appears to have released close to 147km² of mined area in 2015,[25] but reporting continues to be hampered by the absence of comprehensive, disaggregated data. The 2015 result represented a more than a 50% increase over the previous year, achieved mainly by a sharp rise in land canceled by NTS (see the able below). Land release, however, continued to be focused on land with sparse contamination. Land with dense contamination (categories A1 and A2-1) released in 2015 totaled 1.98km², only a slight increase over the 1.65km² released the year before.[26]

Mined land released by survey in 2014 and 2015[27]

Year	Area canceled by NTS (m²)	Area reduced by technical survey (m²)	Area cleared (m²)	Total
2014	22.21	23.77	50.24	96.22
2015	70.38	30.11	46.47	146.96

Cambodia’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2015 said it “cleared” a total of 185.34km², but included all forms of land release, including mine and battle area clearance; land released through NTS and technical survey; and areas cleared by the NPMEC that were not identified as contaminated in the BLS.[28]

Survey in 2015 (mines)

CMAC, HALO, and MAG conducted a non-technical “reclamation” survey between March and October 2015 following up the BLS to determine the amount of land identified as BLS polygons that had been reclaimed by local inhabitants. The survey resulted in cancelation of 70.38km², of which 49.6km² was canceled by HALO, 12.1km² by CMAC, and 8.6km² by MAG.[29] In addition, CMAC reported that it released 30.11km² through technical survey.[30]

Clearance in 2015 (mines)

Mined land released through clearance is estimated to have totaled 46.5km² in 2015, 14% lower than the previous year, although the total is approximate because of data weaknesses. The number of antipersonnel mines that operators destroyed in 2015 fell to 12,179, compared with 20,479 in 2014.[31]

The downturn in total area cleared resulted from a fall of more than one-third in the amount of mined area cleared by CMAC, the biggest operator but, with more than 1,700 staff, struggling to maintain capacity in the face of financial constraints. Germany ended financial support for CMAC’s Siem Reap-based Demining Unit 6 and contracts under the Clearing for Results program were smaller than the previous year. CMAC also cleared 12.5km² of battle area in 2015, less than half the amount of battle area clearance (BAC) conducted in the previous year and expressed concerns that it would have to lay off staff in 2016 unless it was able to attract additional funds.[32]

HALO Trust employed about 1,000 staff, the same capacity in 2015 as the previous year, and cleared 12.25km², marginally more than in 2014. About half the area was land suspected of antivehicle mine contamination and cleared with large loop detectors. HALO was able to continue working on parts of the K5 mine belt, where access has been restricted because of border tensions with Thailand. Increasing development along the border, accelerated by construction of a road running parallel to the border and plans for opening dozens of border crossing points, has increased population settlement reinforcing the case for clearance of dense border minefields. HALO expected to expand work on K5 after a directive issued by Prime Minister Hun Sen in March 2016 confirming border clearance as beneficial to people living in the area.[33]

MAG expanded capacity significantly adding seven mine action teams in the course of 2015, reporting a 61% rise in the amount of land cleared although, as with other operators, the number of mines it destroyed also dropped sharply. MAG worked with manual teams, dogs, and mechanical assets, expecting further improvements in productivity in 2016 as its new teams become more experienced and with the help of HSTAMID detectors.[34]

Mine clearance in 2015[35]

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	AP mines destroyed	AV mines destroyed	Submunitions destroyed	UXO destroyed
CMAC[36]	902	22,855,607	4,385	82	N/R	4,554
CSHD	19	673,767	510	3	0	486
HALO	254	12,249,277	2,772	56	0	779
MAG	35	1,226,971	148	2	0	61
NPMEC	89	9,461,409	1,026	13	611	762
Total	1,299	46,467,031	8,841	156	611	6,642

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle

CMAC reported clearance of a total of 7,723 antipersonnel 187 antivehicle mines in the course of mine and battle area clearance, but did not disaggregate the items destroyed in each activity.[37] Therefore a total of 12,179 antipersonnel mines was destroyed in 2015.

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remants)

Cambodia released 0.77km² of cluster munition-contaminated area by clearance and reduced a further 3.34km² by technical survey in 2015. In addition, CMAC reported clearing 22.86 km² of battle area, but did not indicate whether this included any cluster munition-contaminated areas.

Survey in 2015 (cluster munition remnants)

Cambodia is still in the process of scaling up its survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants. CMAC’s survey of ERW identified substantial areas of submunition contamination but was conducted using the mine survey methodology of the BLS and was not best suited to capturing cluster munition strikes. Operators report the survey produced some large polygons that have few cluster remnants, and different survey methods and roving tasks have identified confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) outside the ERW survey polygons. Moreover, the influx of new settlers to the province continues to generate additional information on the location of cluster munition remnants.[38]

NPA focused operations on survey using the methodology tailored to cluster munitions that it developed in Lao PDR. In 2015, it surveyed 4.8km² in the northeastern province of Rattanakiri and identified 20 CHAs covering a total of 1.5km². NPA planned to complete survey of Rattanakiri by the end of 2016 but new information emerging on contamination and its low capacity may prolong operations. In addition to survey, NPA also cleared 0.2km² of area, destroying 220 submunitions.[39]

Technical survey in 2015[40]

Operator	Area surveyed (m²)	Areas confirmed	Area confirmed (m²)	Area reduced from BLS (m²)
NPA	4,796,761	20	1,459,261	3,337,500

Clearance in 2015 (cluster munition remnants)

CMAA data shows levels of cluster munition contamination have dropped in Kratie and Stung Treng provinces where CMAC has conducted clearance under a project funded by the US, partnering with NPA.[41] CMAC reported clearing 22.86km² of battle area in 2015 but its data does not identify if any of this represented cluster munition contamination, nor does it disaggregate submunitions from other items destroyed.

The other operator tackling cluster munition remnants in 2015 was MAG, which had one team working in 2014 and added capacity in the course of 2015 to finish the year with three clearance teams, two EOD teams, and 60 personnel in Rattanakiri. As in Lao PDR and Vietnam, MAG worked in cooperation with NPA, clearing polygons prioritized by MAPUs.[42]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2015[43]

Operator	Areas cleared	Area cleared (m²)	Submunitions destroyed	UXO destroyed
MAG	5	534,758	213	29
NPA	3	234,332	220	10
Total	8	769,090	433	39

MAG also continued field evaluation for the US Department of Defense of an advanced detector, known as Scorpion, which allows for sub-surface metal signals to be mapped and identified as clutter or possible UXO/cluster munition contamination. MAG reported that initial results suggested the system is significantly more productive than a traditional large-loop detector and able to operate in a range of environments similar to Cambodia.[44]

MAG and NPA also undertook increasing numbers of spot/roving tasks, partly reflecting growing understanding and confidence in their work on the part of local communities (see table below). Both operators reported that many items were found outside the baseline survey polygons.[45]

Spot/roving clearance and EOD in 2015[46]

Operator	Roving tasks	Submunitions destroyed	UXO destroyed
MAG	1,218	3,699	2,826
NPA	82	512	74
Total	1,300	4,211	2,900

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2009), Cambodia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2020. It is not on track to meet this deadline.

Cambodia stated at the end of 2015 that it expected to release about 868km² over the ensuing five years, leaving around 775km² to be released later. The implied rate of clearance projected in the first five years appeared optimistic, exceeding rates achieved to date (see the table below).[47]

Release of mined areas in 2011–2015 (km²)[48]

Year	Area cleared	Area canceled or reduced by survey	Total area released
2015	46.47	100.49	146.96
2014[49]	54.38	42.08	96.46
2013	45.59	21.46	67.05
2012	45.96	6.62	52.58
2011	37.85	N/R	37.85
Total	230.25	170.65	400.90

In 2016, the CMAA was developing a strategy that focused on achieving clearance of most (94%) of both mined and battle area by 2025, and believed that by 2019 Cambodia would need an extension of less than 10 years. The CMAA cautioned that progress is threatened by funding shortfalls,[50] but operators and reviews of Cambodia’s mine action program also drew attention to factors that may impact performance and prospects for achieving its strategic goals.

Land release has accelerated sharply in the past five years but the release of substantial amounts of land through survey and cancelation, particularly in the last three years, suggests operators will be dealing increasingly with land that needs full clearance that may slow the pace of land release in years ahead.[51] Community and development priorities may require clearance of land with low levels of contamination, but clearance of densely contaminated land has averaged less than 2km² a year for the last five years compared with the 10km² a year that would be needed to complete clearance of these minefields by 2025. GICHD commented that without more focus on tackling these areas “Cambodia will have to address high density antipersonnel contaminated areas while international operators may have left the country and external funding may have expired.”[52]

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

[1] HALO Trust, “Mine clearance in Cambodia–2009,” January 2009, p. 8.

[2] Email from Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary General, CMAA, 18 April 2016.

[3] Data received by emails from CMAA, 4 May 2015, and 18 April 2016, and presented by Cambodia to the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Geneva, 11 April 2014.

[4] South East Asia Air Sortie Database, cited in D. McCracken, “National Explosive Remnants of War Study, Cambodia,” Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in collaboration with CMAA, Phnom Penh, March 2006, p. 15; Human Rights Watch, “Cluster Munitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” April 2008; and Handicap International, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions (HI, Brussels, November 2006), p. 11.

[5] Data received from CMAA, 30 May 2016.

[6] Ibid. Districts are subdivision of provinces.

[7] Data as of 3 March 2016, received by email from CMAA, 18 May 2016.

[8] Data query from the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor global casualty database for 1999–2015.

[9] CMAC is the leading national demining operator, but does not exercise the wider responsibilities associated with the term “center.” Set up in 1992, CMAC was assigned the role of coordinator in the mid-1990s. It surrendered this function in a restructuring of mine action in 2000 that separated the roles of regulator and implementing agency and led to the creation of the CMAA.

[10] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “A Study of the Development of National Mine Action Legislation,” November 2004, pp. 64–66.

[11] Interviews with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016; and with clearance operators, Phnom Penh, 9−11 May 2016.

[12] “Clearing for Results Phase II, Annual Report 2014,” UNDP, undated but 2015, pp. 18−19. Results included contracts awarded in 2015 for release of 54.1km² at a cost of $4.9 million.

[13] Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016; and Enrico Gaveglia, Acting Country Director, UNDP, Phnom Penh, “Mine Action in Cambodia: beyond clearing landmines,” Phnom Penh Post, 12 January 2016.

[14] Information provided by Tong Try, Senior Project Officer, Clearing for Results/UNDP, 11 May 2016.

[15] CMAA, “National Strategic Plan for Mine Action in Cambodia,” Draft, January 2014, pp. 10 and 18; and email from Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, 22 May 2015.

[16] “Concept Paper: Cambodian Mine Action Resources Mobilisation,” CMAA, undated but 2016.

[17] Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016.

[18] Ibid.; and “Review of MAPU-led prioritization decisions in CFRII target provinces, western Cambodia,” Draft Report, 24 January 2016, pp. 4 and 47.

[19] “Review of MAPU-led prioritization decisions in CFRII target provinces, western Cambodia,” Draft Report, 24 January 2016, pp. 3−4, 44−47.

[20] GICHD, “‘Finishing the Job,’ an independent review of Cambodia’s mine action sector,” Geneva, 30 April 2016, pp. 41−42.

[21] Interview with Matthew Hovell, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 12 May 2016.

[22] Information provided by CMAA in response to Landmine Monitor questions, 13 March 2014.

[23] Email from CMAA, 18 April 2016.

[24] Interviews with CMAA and operators, Phnom Penh, 9−12 May 2016.

[25] Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by CMAA and operators on mined area released by survey and clearance.

[26] Data provided by email by the Database Unit, CMAA, 14 September 2016.

[27] Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by CMAA and operators on mined area released by survey and clearance.

[28] Article 7 Report for 2015, Form F.

[29] Email from CMAA, 18 April 2016.

[30] CMAC, “Operational Summary Progress Report, 1992−January 2016,” received by email from CMAC, 17 May 2016.

[31] Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by CMAA and operators on mined area released by survey and clearance.

[32] Interview with Heng Rattana, Director, CMAC, Phnom Penh, 10 May 2016; and CMAC, “Operational Summary Progress Report, 1992−January 2016,” received by email from CMAC, 17 May 2016.

[33] Interview with Matthew Hovell, HALO Trust, Siem Reap, 12 May 2016.

[34] Email from Greg Crowther, Regional Director, South and South East Asia, MAG, 28 April 2016; and interview, Phnom Penh, 9 May 2016.

[35] Data received by email from CMAA, 18 April 2016; and from CMAC, 17 May 2016. CMAA reported CMAC released 49.15km² through clearance in 2015, more than double the mined area clearance reported by CMAC.

[36] Data shown for the mined area CMAC released by clearance is taken from CMAC, “Operational Summary Progress Report, 1992−January 2016,” received by email from CMAC, 17 May 2016. CMAC also reported destroying a total of 7,723 antipersonnel and 187 antivehicle mines in the course of mine and battle area clearance, but did not disaggregate the items destroyed in each activity.

[37] CMAC, “Operational Summary Progress Report, 1992−January 2016,” received by email from CMAC, 17 May 2016.

[38] Interviews with Greg Crowther, MAG, in Phnom Penh, 9 May 2016; and with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, Country Director, NPA, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016.

[39] Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 27 April 2016; and interview, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016.

[40] Email from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 27 April 2016.

[41] Ibid., 31 May 2016.

[42] Interview with Greg Crowther, MAG, in Phnom Penh, 9 May 2016; and email, 10 May 2016.

[43] Emails from Greg Crowther, MAG, 10 May 2016; and from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 27 April 2016.

[44] Email from Greg Crowther, MAG, 10 May 2016.

[45] Interviews with Greg Crowther, MAG, in Phnom Penh, 9 May 2016; and with Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, Phnom Penh, 11 May 2016.

[46] Email from Greg Crowther, MAG, 10 May 2016; and from Aksel Steen-Nilsen, NPA, 27 April 2016.

[47] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.

[48] Compiled by Mine Action Review from data provided by CMAA and operators, May 2015.

[49] CMAA data reported release of 96.2km² in 2014, including 50.2km² released by full clearance and 46km² canceled or reduced by survey.

[50] Interview with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA, in Geneva, 17 February 2016; and “Concept Paper: Cambodian Mine Action Resources Mobilisation,” CMAA, undated but 2016.

[51] Interviews with Prum Sophakmonkol, CMAA; and with Greg Crowther, MAG, and Matthew Hovell, HALO Trust, in Phnom Penh and Siem Reap, 9−12 May 2016.

[52] GICHD, “‘Finishing the Job,’ an independent review of Cambodia’s mine action sector,” p. 42.

Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 06 October 2016

In 2015, the Kingdom of Cambodia received US$28.2 million of international assistance from 11 donors; this represents a decrease of $2 million from 2014.[1]

The largest contributions came from Japan ($13.8 million), the United States (US) ($6 million), and Australia ($2.3 million) toward clearance, victim assistance, risk education, and capacity-building activities.

In addition to financial contributions, Cambodia received in-kind assistance from China valued at $500,000, including demining equipment and start-up funding to the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center.[2]

Although donors contributed to various sectors, of the total contribution, more than three-quarters went toward clearance and risk education ($2.1 million).

International contributions: 2015[3]

Donor	Sector	Amount (national currency)	Amount ($)
Japan	Various	¥1,672,008,935	13,812,548
US	Clearance and victim assistance	$6,000,000	6,000,000
Australia	Clearance	A$3,000,000	2,256,600
Finland	Clearance	€1,378,811	1,529,929
United Kingdom	Clearance and risk education	£842,869	1,288,241
Germany	Clearance	€978,325	1,085,549
Norway	Clearance	NOK8,000,000	991,559
Ireland	Clearance	€500,000	554,800
Switzerland	Clearance	CHF405,000	420,648
Netherlands	Clearance	€220,000	244,112
Liechtenstein	Clearance	CHF40,000	41,545
Total			28,225,531

Since 2011, international contributions to mine action in Cambodia totaled $148.6 million, and averaged about $30 million per year.

The national strategy estimated that more than $175 million would be needed for activities in 2015–2019.[4] However, while funding requirements are increasing, there are some concerns about a potential decline in international assistance in the next few years. In June 2015, Prum Sophakmonkol, Secretary-General of the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority, expressed some doubts about Cambodia’s ability to maintain its demining efforts if funding from international partners drops, and was quoted in the media saying that “Money to support mine action from the Cambodian government needs to be balanced with funding for other priorities...We don’t think Cambodia can shoulder this without other countries’ support.”[5]

Summary of international contributions: 2011–2015[6]

Year	International contributions ($)
2015	28,225,531
2014	30,273,798
2013	32,885,151
2012	21,450,721
2011	35,777,295
Total	148,612,496

[1] Australia, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol II Annual Report, Form B, 1 April 2016; Germany, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 4 April 2016; Ireland, CCW Protocol II Annual Report, Form E and Annex 1, 31 March 2016; Japan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2016; Liechtenstein, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 29 April 2016; Netherlands, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2016; Switzerland, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 28 April 2016; United Kingdom, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 29 April 2016; emails from Ingrid Schoyen, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 24 May 2016; and from Katherine Baker, Foreign Affairs Officer, Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 12 September 2016; and “Aid for humanitarian mine action in 2015,” Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, 29 October 2015.

[2] China Military, “China donates demining equipment to Cambodia, start-up funds to ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center,” 24 December 2015.

[3] Average exchange rate for 2015: A$1=US$0.7522; €1=US$1.1096; ¥121.05=US$1; NOK8.0681=US$1; CHF0.9628=US$1; £1=US$1.5284. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2016.

[4] Government of Cambodia, “National Mine Action Strategy 2010-2019,” Annex B, p. 23.

[5] “Money a worry for deminers ahead of 2019 clean-up deadline,” The Phnom Penh Post, 6 June 2015.

[6] See previous Monitor reports.

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 27 January 2017

Action points based on findings

Devote resources to reach survivors where they live, as survivors in remote and rural areas continue to face obstacles to access adequate assistance.
Standardize management systems and improve sustainability and accessibility of the physical rehabilitation sector.
Increase economic opportunities for survivors and persons with disabilities and develop education and training opportunities that are appropriate for survivors and other persons with disabilities and many survivors who lack education and literacy and have no work or land from which to make a living.
Improve the physical accessibility of living and working environments.
Provide quality psychological support services.

Victim assistance commitments

The Kingdom of Cambodia is responsible for significant numbers of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW) who are in need. Cambodia has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Cambodia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 20 December 2012.

Casualties

Casualties Overview

All known mine/ERW casualties by end 2015	64,579 (19,723 killed and 44,856 injured) since 1979
Casualties in 2015	111 (2014: 154)
2015 casualties by outcome	18 killed; 93 injured (2014: 21 killed; 133 injured)
2015 casualties by device type	13 antipersonnel mines; 17 antivehicle mines; 2 unexploded submunitions; 79 ERW

Details and trends

In 2015, the Cambodia Mine/Unexploded Ordnance Victim Information System (CMVIS) recorded 111 casualties from mines, ERW, and unexploded submunitions. Of the total, 100 casualties were civilian, 10 military, and one a deminer.[1] There were six deminer casualties in 2014. CMVIS recorded 154 mine/ERW casualties in 2014,[2] which represented an irregularity from the continuing trend of significant decreases in the number of annual casualties: 111 recorded in 2013, 186 in 2012, 211 in 2011, and 286 in 2010. In January 2017, it was reported that there were 83 mine/ERW casualties, a 25% decrease compared with 2015 and marking the first time that the total annual casualty figure was less than 100 people.[3]

In 2015, 31 (31% of civilian casualties) were children including seven girls and 24 boys, an increase in the percentage of civilian casualties although a slight decrease in real terms from 21% (33) in 2014, 26% in 2013, and 35% in 2012. Of the total adult civilian casualties, 76 were men and four were women.

As in recent years, most casualties were caused by ERW. Antivehicle mines continued to cause a significant proportion of casualties, comparable to antipersonnel mines, following a trend that began in 2010 when antivehicle mines caused more casualties than antipersonnel mines for the first time in Cambodia. This occurred again in 2015, when there were 17 antivehicle mine casualties compared to 13 casualties from antipersonnel mines.

As of the end of 2015, CMVIS reported at least 64,579 mine/ERW casualties in Cambodia: 19,723 people killed and another 44,856 injured since 1979. Of the total 50,998 (79%) were caused by mines and 13,581 (21%) by ERW. Among the survivors injured, 8,982 people had amputations.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

Data collection on cluster munition casualties has been limited and the total number, although not known, is thought to be much higher than reported. Cambodia is considered to be among the states “worst affected” by cluster munitions, with responsibility for significant numbers of cluster munition victims.[5] Two casualties from unexploded submunitions were recorded in 2015 and one in 2014. For the period from 1998 to the end of 2015, 197 cluster munition remnant casualties were reported in Cambodia.[6]

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Cambodia is not known. At least 44,856 people have been reported to have been injured by mines/ERW.[7]

Victim assistance during the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014

The Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA) delegated responsibility for the coordination of victim assistance to the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY) and its support mechanism, the Disability Action Council (DAC). Despite hopes for improved national disability representation following a long restructuring process, the DAC was placed directly under ministerial authority in 2010. The focus of coordination changed from survivors to broader disability needs when the National Coordination Committee on Disabilities (NCCD) replaced the Steering Committee for Landmine Victim Assistance in 2009.

Survivors had increased opportunities to access free healthcare programs. However, emergency transportation to save lives was not widely available. Through NGO efforts to expand services and geographical coverage, physical rehabilitation improved in both quality and in the number of services available from existing service providers. Physical rehabilitation services have been available throughout the country from both government agencies and NGOs. However, since the handover of the physical rehabilitation centers to MOSVY, there has been a reduction in available services and in some cases, persons with disabilities or NGOs assisting them are being asked to pay for assistive devices.

Gradual improvements were made in the availability of employment opportunities, social inclusion activities, and accessibility of existing services. Inclusive education programs provided by the government and relevant organizations increased. Vocational programs were phased out due to a lack of funding. There has been an increased emphasis on community-based rehabilitation (CBR) efforts.

Reaching survivors in remote and rural areas remained a challenge for service providers and generally these populations did not receive adequate assistance. Many survivors lacked education and literacy and had no work or land from which to make a living. Overall, they received little or no support and did not have full access to social services and healthcare.

At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in June 2014, Cambodia stated that it had faced many challenges in providing victim assistance under the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014, including limited financial support and limited human and technical resources for the implementation of both international and national obligations for persons with disabilities, including mine survivors.[8]

Assessing victim assistance needs

Throughout 2016, the Jesuit Refugee Services (JRS)/Cambodia Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCBL) and the CMAA continued to undertake the “Survey on the Quality of life for Landmine/ERW survivors” (QLS), which was begun in 2013.[9] QLS survey teams organized home visits to understand the situation of respondents and provided peer counseling, raised awareness on the rights and needs of persons with disabilities including survivors, and engaged local authorities and service providers to support and promote the rights and dignity of landmine/ERW survivors.[10] Information and recommendations from the QLS were shared for the development of the National Disability Strategic Plan (NDSP).[11]

CMVIS provided ongoing systematic data collection of mine/ERW casualties, including numbers of survivors and referrals to services.[12] Lack of reliable statistics on disability was reported to be among the main issues of concern for the promotion of disability rights in Cambodia.[13]

A working group for monitoring data on services received by mine/ERW victims was established in May 2015. It is led by CMAA and members also included the MoSAVY, the DAC, and physical rehabilitation centers.[14]

Victim assistance coordination

Government coordinating body/focal point	The MoSVY and the DAC, as delegated by the Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA)
Coordinating mechanism	National Disability Coordination Committee (NDCC)/DAC/MoSVY
Plan	National Disability Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (NDSP)

The National Disability Coordination Committee (NDCC) established in 2009, was co-chaired by both the MoSVY and the DAC; it included some victim assistance service providers as well as other disability actors.[15]

The DAC, a semi-autonomous body attached to the MoSVY, provides technical, coordination, and advisory services for the MoSVY. The Persons with Disabilities Fund, an institution created under the MoSVY, has a mandate to provide rehabilitation services for people with disabilities, manage the rehabilitation centers, provide funds for implementing various projects such as support for education and vocational training, manage job placement services, and prepare policies for assisting and supporting persons with disabilities.[16]

At a more local level, relevant actors include a wide range of the Provincial and District Offices’ of Social Affairs, Veterans and Youth Rehabilitation (PoSVY/DoSVY); provincial, district, and commune bodies; and village chiefs. In some specific areas, there are Commune Disability Committees, supported by NGOs.[17]

The National Disability Strategic Plan 2014–2018 (NDSP) was developed by the DAC in cooperation with the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), the Asia and Pacific Centre for Development (APCD), the Australian Agency for International Development/the Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Cambodia, and other national and international organizations.[18] The plan contains four goals and 10 key objectives, all of which are relevant to addressing the rights and needs of survivors.[19] The NDSP itself notes that it represents a continuation of the implementation of the National Plan of Action for Persons with Disabilities, including Landmine and ERW Survivors 2009–2011, which had remained in place by extension through 2013.[20]

The NDSP was launched by the Cambodian prime minister in July 2014.[21] Ten key objectives of the plan are:[22]

Increase economic opportunities for persons with disabilities;
Provide quality health services and physical and mental rehabilitation services;
Increase legal services and interventions to address discrimination, abuse, threats, and exploitation of persons with disabilities;
Strengthen and enhance freedom, personal security, and disaster risk reduction;
Ensure access to education and vocational training;
Promote the participation of persons with disabilities, including with advocacy and information;
Ensure the involvement of persons with disabilities in social activities including culture, religion, sport, arts, and entertainment;
Develop and improve the accessibility of the physical environment, means of public transportation, information technology, and communication;
Ensure gender equality and promote equality of women and children with disabilities; and
Strengthen and enhance cooperation at international, inter-regional, regional, sub-regional level, national, and sub-national levels.

The DAC is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the progress of implementation of the NDSP to government as well as proposing revisions to the plan in order to respond to the needs of persons with disabilities according to the resources available.[23]

The NDSP is the basis of enforcement of Cambodia’s core legal commitments to disability rights: the Law on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; the CRPD; and the Decade of Persons with Disabilities in Asia and the Pacific 2013–2022, Incheon Strategy: Make the Right Real.[24] Disability advocates expressed concern that, if the new strategic disability plan lacked a corresponding state-allocated budget and was based on limited existing human resources, its goals could not be adequately implemented.[25]

In June 2015, it was reported that no institutional and financial arrangements had been made for the implementation of the NDSP. Furthermore, the relevant ministries and agencies had no developed prioritized action plans, and such inaction “might eventually result in NDSP remaining as an aspirational document with no concrete action to improve the quality of life for persons with disabilities.”[26]

A national workshop to review the implementation of NDSP was held in December 2015. Government agencies, NGOs, and private sector actors shared their progress in implementation of plan, the Law on the Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and the CRPD. It was also apparent that some ministries were not aware of, or did not yet understand well, disability-related legislation, policies, and guidelines and that more awareness raising was needed.[27]

Cambodia has a relatively complex governmental structure for implementing the rights of persons with disabilities. In addition to the MoSVY, DAC and NDCC, the DAC Secretariat, the Department of Welfare of Persons and the Persons with Disabilities Foundation have specific roles and there were also many committees, sub-committees and working groups. Due to overlapping functions of the various institutions, in practice accountability was often ambiguous. Most did not meet regularly and their effectiveness was reported to be “questionable.”[28] The joint project document for the UNDP Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia 2014, listed the following key challenges facing the government’s implementation of the CRPD overall:[29]

The lack of clear division of roles and responsibilities for the multiple government units with disability responsibilities;
Low levels of knowledge and experience within these government units;
Limited commitment to ensure the meaningful participation of disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) and civil society organizations;
Challenges facing the MoSVY in facilitating coordination with other ministries;
Relatively low levels of government funding for government units with disability responsibilities; and
A lack of reliable data on disability.[30]

The NDSP contains many goals and objectives relevant to mine/ERW survivors, including implementing the national disability strategy for 2014–2018, “including people with disabilities by mines” as well as implementing the national policy on disability through the Disability Action Council; strengthening the implementation of the Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; promoting enhancement of rights and welfare of the disabled according to the CRPD; improving the quality and efficiency of the disability fund; enhancing welfare for persons with disabilities; supporting poor people with disabilities with availability of funds; continuing implementation of community-based services; and providing employment opportunities.[31]

The MoSVY has core responsibility for disability issues and rehabilitation services. Several other ministries were involved in disability issues, including the Ministry of Health, which promoted physiotherapy services; the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, with a Special Education Office responsible for promoting inclusive education for children with disabilities; the Ministry of Public Works and Transport; and the Ministry of National Defense.[32]

The government launched the Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia (DRIC), a five-year, Australian-funded program, in July 2014.[33] The DRIC is aimed at ensuring that persons with disabilities have increased opportunities for participation in social, economic, cultural, and political life through effective implementation of the NDSP. The main goals include to support Cambodia’s coordination of the NDSP, strengthen the capacity of DPOs, improve physical rehabilitation centers, and work with provincial and commune officials to promote disability inclusiveness.[34]

Carrying out the DRIC is a joint program of the UNDP, WHO, and UNICEF, through four components:

Component 1 (UNDP): Supporting Government implementation of the CRPD.
Component 2 (UNDP): Supporting DPOs to raise the voice and protect the rights of persons with disabilities.
Component 3 (WHO): Supporting rehabilitation systems strengthening.
Component 4 (UNICEF): Inclusive governance and inclusive community development.

By 2016, the mid-term review of the initiative found that due to changes in the Australian aid program and budget cuts the “DRIC in its present version, however relevant or effective, may not be feasible to maintain in the long run.” When considering the budgetary situation of DRIC on the whole, including the funding allocated during the first two years of the initiative as compared with the outcomes achieved, the mid-term review found, “it would appear that it has been an expensive programme, raising concerns about its cost-effectiveness.”[35] By Mid-2015, decreased funding due to currency fluctuation of the Australian dollar was already a concern for the DRIC’s successful operation and UN implementing agencies had revised their budgets and reduced activities in work plans in consultation with the donor, Australia. They also looked for additional resources to fulfil components 3 and 4 of the initiative.[36]

Through component 3 of the initiative, the WHO is supporting the development of the government’s ability to manage the rehabilitation sector by building the capacity of key rehabilitation sector stakeholders, increasing government involvement and rehabilitation sector leadership, and establishing a coordination mechanism.[37] In 2016, it was reported that the DRIC was “largely on track in achieving the stated outputs, with the exception of component 3 which is the most complex and challenging.”[38]

The Cambodia Disability Inclusive Development Fund (CDIDF), managed by UNICEF, is part of the broader DRIC program. In order to achieve the rights of persons with disabilities, the fund aims to increase capacity of and collaboration between decision makers, civil society, and communities by providing funding through international and national NGOs and community-based organizations.[39] It applies only to certain geographic focus areas in about half of Cambodia’s provinces.[40] In 2015, six NGOs had grants approved through the UNICEF-managed CDIDF: Caritas Cambodia, Handicap International, Komar Pikar Foundation, Krousar Thmey, Capacity Building for Disability Cooperation (CABDICO), and Phnom Penh Center for Independent Living.[41]

Cambodia provided an update on victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2016.[42] Cambodia also included updates on physical rehabilitation and medical services provided to persons with disabilities in 2015 in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report.[43]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

JRS and the CMAA developed a survivor network in provinces in Cambodia, encouraging persons with disabilities to understand their legal and human rights and to take action to access those rights.[44]

Many organizations included survivors and persons with disabilities in the provision of services.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2015

Organization	Type	Activities
MoSVY	Government	Rehabilitation services; gradual assumption of responsibilities for funding and management of the rehabilitation sector
CMAA/CMVIS	Government	Survey and data collection, referrals, training on disability rights, included providing emergency food aid, house repair, funeral costs, and referrals, as well as disability awareness-raising
Angkor Association for the Disabled	National NGO	Education for persons with disabilities near Siem Reap
Arrupe Outreach Center Battambang	National NGO	Wheelchair classes for children, economic inclusion through loans and grants, youth peer support, awareness raising, inclusive dance
Buddhism for Development	National NGO	Assisting commune leaders to integrate persons with disabilities into existing programs, including loans and conflict negotiation in Pailin and Battambang
Cambodian Development Mission for Disability (CDMD)	National NGO	Comprehensive community-based rehabilitiation; referrals, loans, specific services to address visual impairments
Capacity Building of People with Disabilities in Community Organizations (CABDICO)	National NGO	Referrals, awareness, and educational support in Kep provinces; capacity-building for self-help groups; economic inclusion
Cambodian Disabled People’s Organization (CDPO)	National DPO	National coordination, mainstreaming disability into development, advocacy (rights monitoring, awareness-raising), and rights training for relevant ministries
Disability Development Services Program (DDSP: formerly Disability Development Services Pursat)	National NGO	Self-help groups, economic inclusion, referral, and community-based rehabilitation
National Center for Disabled Persons (NCDP)	National NGO	Referral, education, awareness, and self-help groups
Opération Enfants du Cambodge (OEC)	National NGO	Home-based physical rehabilitation and referrals, education, and economic inclusion, and emergency support to new mine survivors
Association for Aid and Relief (AAR) - Wheel Chairs for Development (WCD)	National NGO	Wheelchair production and production of assistive mobility devices
ADD Cambodia	International NGO	Capacity-building of national DPOs; community-based rehabilitation
Exceed/Cambodia Trust	International NGO	Physical rehabilitation, prosthetic devices, training, and economic inclusion
Handicap International (HI)	International NGO	Support to national NGOs for economic inclusion; physical rehabilitation, disability mainstreaming activities
ICRC	International organization	Physical rehabilitation, outreach, referrals; components for all prosthetic centers
Japan Cambodia Interactive Association (JCIA)	International Organization	Vocational training
JRS/Jesuit Service Cambodia (JSC)	International organization/national NGO	Economic inclusion, rehabilitation, peer support, awareness, material support (housing and well grants), referral, wheelchair production; hearing aids and ear service, psychosocial support visits to rural survivors, advocacy with cluster munition and mine/ERW survivors
New Humanity	International NGO	Community-based rehabilitation
Veterans International-Cambodia Rehabilitation Project (VIC)	International NGO	Physical rehabilitation, prosthetics, self-help groups, community-based rehabilitation, and economic inclusion

Emergency and continuing medical care

No significant improvements to healthcare services available to survivors were reported in 2015.

Less than 1% of the population had voluntary health insurance. Some NGOs offered community-based health insurance. This covered less than 500,00 people in 11 provinces, but targeted people who are not poor.[45]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

The physical rehabilitation sector included 11 rehabilitation centers; the Phnom Penh Component Factory, supported by the ICRC; the Cambodian School for Prosthetics and Orthotics (CSPO); and the Technical School for Medical Care.[46] Services for people with physical disability offered through the physical rehabilitation centers were inadequate to meet demand. Furthermore, financing mechanisms for rehabilitation services, including funding pathways, were unclear. A lack of a standardized information system for the rehabilitation sector in Cambodia made it difficult to monitor the total numbers of people receiving services.[47] A consultant was hired with the financial support from the ICRC to develop procedures and tools for the implementation of quality assurance within all MoSVY-managed centers. The MoSVY continued to try to implement the Patient Management System as a common rehabilitation center management tool, with the financial and technical support of the ICRC.[48] This issue of inconsistent data may be reflected in comparisons between time periods.

In 2015, the ICRC and national authorities were reviewing the preliminary findings of a study on how the orthopedic component factory in Phnom Penh could be enabled to operate independently.[49]

In 2014, 10,178 mine/ERW survivors received services from physical rehabilitation centers, including prosthetics, orthotics, and repairs to assistive mobility devices.[50] This was similar to the 1,909 prostheses and 6,300 repairs reported for 2013.[51]

The ICRC continued to improve the accessibility of rehabilitation services by providing direct support for the beneficiaries (reimbursing, together with the Ministry of Social Affairs, the cost of transport and of accommodation at the centers), as well as by supporting staff training, outreach programs, and networking between the rehabilitation centers and potential local partners. ICRC-assisted centers provided 1,224 prosthetists for mine/ERW survivors in 2015; a slight decrease from 1,647 prostheses (81% for mine survivors) in 2014 and a slight increase from 1,597 prostheses (1,287 or 81% for mine survivors) in 2013.[52]

In 2015, Veterans International in Cambodia (VIC) reregistered as a local NGO in Cambodia.

An AAR-WCD program increased its geographic coverage through Svay Rieng, Battembang, and Siem Reap with support from LDS Charities. Due to many organizations having reduced their activities and physical rehabilitation centers being handed over to government management, there was an increase in the number of persons with disabilities needing wheelchairs and assistive devices compared to the limited number of wheelchairs that the AAR-WCD could provide.[53]

Economic and social integration and psychological support

The prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder in Cambodia is substantially higher than global averages. It was reported that there was a lack of activity to address this challenge with “just 0.2 per cent of the total health budget spent on mental health and no planning for psychologists and social workers in health sector human resource planning (in addition to psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses).”[54] A lack of awareness, understanding, funding, human resources, and leadership, as well as poor coordination of groups working in mental health were reported to be among the biggest challenges to accessing adequate psychological support.[55]

There were only two functioning vocational training centers for persons with disabilities in Cambodia, the Panteay Prieb center operated by JSC and the Phnom Penh Thmey center supported by JCIA.

Water, sanitation, and hygiene

Water supply and sanitation was included in the national strategic development framework for Cambodia (2013) and there is a commitment that by 2025 every person in rural communities in Cambodia, including persons with disabilities, will have sustained access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) facilities.[56] Several NGOs, including JRS and its survivor network, the DDSP, provided accessible toilet facilities and drinking water specifically for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors. However, the need remained extensive. In 2015, the DDSP and WaterAid-Australia produced guidelines and a checklist for disability-inclusive accessibility and safety audits for WASH.[57]

Laws and policies

The 2009 Law on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. The law also requires that buildings and government services be accessible to persons with disabilities.However, inaccessibility to public buildings, transport, facilities, and referral systems continued to prevent persons with disabilities from actively participating in social and economic activities. The government continued efforts to implement the law.[58]

Some key provisions of national legislation are not in accordance with the CRPD, and the national disability law has not been amended by the MoSVY to ensure it is compatible with the CRPD. Though this is clearly the role of the ministry, the DAC, in accordance with Article 6 of the National Disability Law, is responsible for proposing revision to the national law.[59]

A 2010 sub-decree to the Law on Protection and the Promotion of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities requires that persons with disabilities make up at least 2% of the public sector and government departments with more than 50 employees. Private businesses with more than 100 employees have a quota for employing persons with disabilities as 1% their staff according to the sub-decree. Both the public and private sector were expected to fulfil the quota by 2013; within three years from the adoption of the sub-decree. By 2016, there was still “no accurate data” on how many persons with disabilities were employed overall, but some 1.3% of civil servants in 40 government agencies were persons with disabilities.[60]

[1] Monitor analysis of CMVIS casualty data provided by email from Nguon Monoketya, CMVIS Officer, Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), 25 January 2015.

[2] Ibid., 30 January 2014.

[3] “Landmine casualties drop by 25 percent,” Khmer Times, 20 January 2017.

[4] CMAA, “CMVIS Monthly Report December 2015,” undated.

[5] “Draft Beirut Progress Report,” CCM/MSP/2011/WP.5, 25 August 2011, pp. 10–11. The definition of a cluster munition victim encompasses the individuals, their families, and affected communities.

[6] For the period 2005 to the end of 2012, 120 cluster munition remnant casualties were identified by CMVIS. Another 83 casualties, which occurred prior to 2005, were reported in Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (HI: Brussels, May 2007), pp. 23 and 26; and Monitor analysis of CMVIS casualty data provided by email from Nguon Monoketya, CMAA, 14 March 2013. See also previous Cambodia country profiles available on the Monitor website. Prior to 2006, cluster munition remnant incidents were not differentiated from other ERW incidents in data.

[7] CMAA, “CMVIS Monthly Report December 2015,” undated.

[8] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

[9] Statistics from JRS QLS received by email 15 February 2016; statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2014), Form J.

[10] Notes from Monitor field mission, December 2014.

[11] CCBL, CMAA, and JRS, “I Am Happy I Am Alive: A Practical Approach Towards a Dignified Quality of Life of People with Disability in Cambodia,” 2013, pp. 24 and 30.

[12] Analysis of CMVIS Monthly Reports for calendar year 2015, and January to November 2016.

[13] “Regional Meeting on Good Practices on the ‘Implementation of the convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Disability Data Collection in Asia-Pacific,’” Phnom Penh, 18–19 December 2014; UNDP & Cambodia, “Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia: Joint Programme Document,” December 2013, p. 3.

[14] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015.

[15] Sheree Bailey and Sophak Kanika Nguon, (Report Prepared for UNICEF Cambodia) “Situation Analysis for Disability-Inclusive Governance and Community Development in Cambodia,” July 2014, p. 12.

[16] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, p. 52.

[17] Sheree Bailey and Sophak Kanika Nguon, (Report Prepared for UNICEF Cambodia) “Situation Analysis for Disability-Inclusive Governance and Community Development in Cambodia,” July 2014, p. 12.

[18] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2013.

[19] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

[20] National Disability Strategic Plan 2014.

[21] DAC, “Launching Ceremony on the National Disability Strategic Plan 2014-2018 and the Five Years Anniversary of the Law of the Protection and Promotion on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,” 4 July 2014.

[22] Ibid.

[23] National Workshop to Review the Implementation of NDSP 2014–2018 and the Way Forward, Phnom Penh, 14–16 December 2015.

[24] Cambodia, NDSP, 2014.

[25] Holly Robertson and Khy Sovuthy, “Disability Initiatives Launched as Jobs Quota Not Met,” Cambodia Daily, 5 July 2014.

[26] Pradeep Bagiva, “Mid-Term Progress Report: Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia, 01 January 2015 – 30 June 2015,” undated.

[27] CCBL, Notes from National Workshop to Review the Implementation of the NDSP, Phnom Penh, 14 December 2015.

[28] SIDA, “Disability Rights in Cambodia,” January 2015.

[29] UNDP & Cambodia, “Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia: Joint Programme Document,” December 2013, p. 3; and DAC, “H.E Sem Sokha presided over the Launch of Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia,” 4 July 2014.

[30] UNDP & Cambodia, “Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia: Joint Programme Document,” December 2013, p. vi.

[31] Cambodia, NDSP, 2014.

[32] United States (US) Department of State, “2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cambodia,” Washington, DC, 25 April 2015.

[33] UNDP & Cambodia, “Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia: Joint Programme Document,” December 2013; and DAC, “H.E Sem Sokha presided over the Launch of Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia,” 4 July 2014.

[34] Holly Robertson and Khy Sovuthy, “Disability Initiatives Launched as Jobs Quota Not Met,” Cambodia Daily, 5 July 2014.

[35] Maya Thomas, “Mid-term Review of Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia,” May 2016, pp. 33–34.

[36] Pradeep Bagiva, “Mid-Term Progress Report: Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia, 01 January 2015 – 30 June 2015,” undated.

[37] UNDP, “Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia (DRIC): Project summary,” undated.

[38] Maya Thomas, “Mid-term Review of Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia,” May 2016, p. 34.

[39] CDIDF, “Call for Proposals 2014,” 30 September 2014; and “Call for Proposals 2015,” 30 April 2015.

[40] These were in the following provinces: Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Pursat, Siem Reap, Kampong Thom, Kampong Cham, Kandal, Phnom Penh, Preah Sihanouk, Ratanakiri, Mondulkiri, Prey Veng, and Svay Rieng.

[41] UNICEF, “Six NGOs receive grants to support Cambodian children and families with disabilities,” 26 October 2015.

[42] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, 29 November 2016.

[43] Statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form J.

[44] Notes from Monitor field mission, December 2015; and statement of Cambodia, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

[45] Presentation by Ros Chhung Eang, Ministry of Health, National Workshop to Review the Implementation of NDSP, Phnom Penh, 14 December 2015.

[46] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, p. 52.

[47] UNDP and Cambodia, “Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia: Joint Programme Document,” December 2013, p. 5.

[48] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, p. 52; ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014.

[49] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, pp. 372 and 374.

[50] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, (for calendar year 2014)

[51] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, (for calendar year 2013).

[52] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 374; ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, p. 52; and ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014.

[53] Email from Chin Yok, Director of AAR-WCD, 30 September 2014.

[54] SIDA, “Disability Rights in Cambodia,” January 2015.

[55] “Mental Health Care Cambodia,” Asia Life, 2 January 2013; “Analysis: What ails Cambodia's mental health system?” IRIN, 12 March 2012; and Denise Hruby, “Cambodia suffers from an appalling mental health crisis,” Global Post, 18 June 2014.

[56] Social Research Cambodia for WaterAid and Australian Red Cross “Accessible WASH in Cambodia,” November 2014.

[57] DDSP and WaterAid, “How to conduct Wash Accessibility and Safety Audit,” presentation to the National Workshop to Review the Implementation of NDSP, 14 December 2015.

[58] US Department of State, “2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cambodia,” Washington, DC, 13 April 2016; and CCBL, Notes from National Workshop to Review the Implementation of NDSP, Phnom Penh, 14 December 2015.

[59] Pradeep Bagiva, “Mid-Term Progress Report: Disability Rights Initiative Cambodia, 01 January 2015 – 30 June 2015,” undated.

[60] David Hutt, “Failure to enforce jobs quota law shortchanges Cambodia’s disabled,” Southeast Asia Globe, 26 April 2016.