Summary | Contamination and Land Release (Contamination statistics | Land release statistics | Clearance obligations under Article 4 | Clearance completed | Progress by States Parties under the Dubrovnik Action Plan | Progress in signatories, non-signatories, and other parties | Clearance in conflict) | Country Summaries (States Parties | Non-signatories with more than 5km2 of contaminated land | Other areas with more than 5km2 of contaminated land)
* Argentina and the UK both claim sovereignty over the Falkand Islands/Malvinas, where any cluster munition contamination is likely within mined areas.
** It is unclear whether the territory under government control is contaminated. Nagorno-Karabakh, however, is contaminated.
Note: States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are indicated in bold; convention signatories are underlined; other areas are in italics.
As of August 2016, a total of 24 states (13 States Parties, one signatory, and 10 non-signatories) and three other areas are contaminated by cluster munition remnants. It is unclear whether five additional states are contaminated (one State Party, one signatory, and three non-signatories).
Very little changed in the global understanding of the extent of the problem during 2015. The size of contaminated areas is not known in approximately half of the cluster munition-affected states. In 2015, several states and other areas continued to identify previously unknown areas of contamination.
New use increased contamination in Sudan and Ukraine in 2015, in Syria and Yemen in 2015 and 2016, and in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2016.
In 2015, at least 70km2 of contaminated land was cleared, with a total of at least 120,000 submunitions destroyed during land release (survey and clearance) operations. However, this estimate is based on incomplete data. Between 2010 and 2015, a total of more than 415,000 submunitions were destroyed and at least 325km2 of land cleared. In 2015, cluster munition contamination reportedly decreased as a result of survey and clearance in States Parties Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, and Lebanon; in signatory Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); and non-signatories Serbia and Sudan.
No states reported completion of clearance in 2015 or up to August 2016. Only three States Parties appear to be on track to meet their Article 4 clearance deadline: BiH, Croatia, and Mozambique.
Conflict and insecurity in 2015 and 2016 impeded land release efforts in three States Parties (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia) and six non-signatories (Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen).
The convention entered into force for Colombia and Somalia in 2016. Colombia may be able to declare it has no contaminated areas, once assessment and survey have been conducted. The extent of contamination in Somalia is not known. Initial Article 7 transparency reports for both states are due in August 2016.
Very little changed in the global understanding of the extent of cluster munition contamination during 2015.
The extent of contamination remains unknown in the most cluster munition-contaminated countries in the world: Cambodia, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. Survey efforts are being made to improve understanding of the problem.
In only six countries did the total size of cluster munition-contaminated areas decrease during 2015 as a result of land release (survey and clearance) efforts: BiH, Croatia, DRC, Lebanon, Serbia, and Sudan.
As a result of the identification of previously unknown or unreported contaminated areas, the total size of estimated cluster munition contamination has increased in Mozambique, and three other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.
New contamination was reported in 2015 in Libya, Sudan, and Ukraine, and in 2015 and 2016 in Syria and Yemen. In all these states the extent of contamination is not known as insecurity prevents or hampers survey and clearance. In 2016, the use of cluster munitions in Nagorno-Karabakh resulted in additional contamination of approximately 2km2.
The data contained in the following table is drawn from various sources—those that appear to be most accurate and complete have been used.
Note: * Mid-2016 data; States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are indicated in bold; convention signatories are underlined; other areas are in italics.
The information provided in the table below draws on data provided in Article 7 transparency reports, by national programs, and from mine action operators. There are sometimes discrepancies between these sources. Where this is the case, the data that appears to be most reliable is used and a note has been made. For an explanation of land release terminology see “Improving clearance efficiency: land release,”in the Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 contamination and clearance chapter.
Under the Convention on Cluster Munitions, each State Party is obliged to clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the convention. If unable to complete clearance in time, the State Party may request a deadline extension for periods of up to five years. No such requests have yet been made as the first clearance deadline is 1 August 2020.
In seeking to fulfill their clearance and destruction obligations, affected States Parties are required to:
- Survey, assess, and record the threat, making every effort to identify all contaminated areas under their jurisdiction or control;
- Assess and prioritize needs for marking, protection of civilians, clearance, and destruction;
- Take “all feasible steps” to perimeter-mark, monitor, and fence affected areas;
- Conduct risk education to ensure awareness among civilians living in or around areas contaminated by cluster munitions;
- Take steps to mobilize the necessary resources (at national and international levels); and
- Develop a national plan, building upon existing structures, experiences, and methodologies.
The following table provides an assessment of progress of States Parties against clearance deadlines based on size of contamination, the existence of a resourced plan, progress to date, and obstacles to land release operations such as conflict and insecurity.
Convention on Cluster Munitions Clearance Progress
No States Parties reported the completion of clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2015.
Seven States Parties have in previous years completed the clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants: Albania, the Republic of the Congo, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Norway, and Zambia. One signatory, Uganda, and one non-signatory, Thailand, have also completed clearance of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants.
The Dubrovnik Action Plan adopted by States Parties at the Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015 builds on the Vientiane Action Plan adopted by States Parties in 2010. It seeks to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of the convention until the Second Review Conference in 2020. Section III (Actions 3.1–3.8) is related to “Clearance and Risk Reduction Education.”
This section examines the progress of States Parties related to clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants.
Action 3.1—Assess the extent of the problem of cluster munition contamination
States Parties are required to provide an assessment of the extent of the problem of cluster munition contamination within two years of the First Review Conference or two years after entry into force of the Convention for that State Party. (Refer to the table “Estimated cluster munition contamination” above for existing knowledge of extent of the problem.) By the end of 2015:
- Five States Parties had a fairly good understanding of the extent of the problem, although only in Croatia is the problem very well defined;
- Three states knew the locations of suspected contamination but not the precise extent;
- Four states—including the most heavily contaminated states—had a poor understanding of the problem; and
- Two states may soon be in a position to declare they have no remaining contamination.
The five States Parties that have a fairly good understanding of the extent of the problem are Afghanistan, BiH, Croatia, Lebanon, and Montenegro. However, with the exception of Croatia, that understanding can be improved. The contamination in Afghanistan may be more widespread than reported. BiH has suspected hazardous areas that require survey to either confirm or release. Lebanon continued to identify previously unknown contaminated areas in 2015. Although Montenegro has conducted survey of all its known contaminated areas, there are discrepancies in the information regarding their location.
The three States Parties that know the locations of suspected contamination, but not the extent of contamination, are Chile, Germany, and the UK. Chile has yet to survey the four military training areas that it suspects are contaminated. Germany started its survey of a contaminated military training area in 2015. The UK has reported that any cluster munition contamination in the Malvinas/Falkland Islands is most likely within mined areas, but is not aware of the extent of such contamination.
The four States Parties that have a poor understanding of the extent or location of the cluster munition problem are Chad, Lao PDR, Iraq, and Somalia. Lao PDR is the world’s most contaminated country, and the extent of affected areas is not known. It has now taken steps to improve this; in 2016, it committed to a nationwide non-technical and technical survey with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination by the end of 2021. Although Iraq has confirmed more than 200km2 of cluster munition contamination, the true extent is not known, and conflict and insecurity continued to prevent efforts to better define the problem in 2015. Although Chad and Somalia are contaminated by cluster munitions, they have not recorded any suspected or confirmed hazardous areas.
Two States Parties may be close to declaring that they are free of contamination: Colombia and Mozambique. Mozambique is in the process of clearing its last known areas, and hopes to declare completion by the end of 2016. Colombia may be able to declare it has no contaminated areas, once assessment and survey have been conducted.
Action 3.2—Protect people from harm
This action point requires States Parties “to mark and fence, to the extent possible, confirmed hazardous areas as soon as possible and enforce legislation that protects the marking.”
Croatia, Germany, and the UK have reported on the measures they have taken to protect people from contaminated areas. In Germany, the areas are completely perimeter-marked with warning signs and an official directive constrains access to the area. The UK has conducted comprehensive perimeter-marking of mined areas potentially containing cluster munition remnants. Croatia’s priorities for 2016 include maintaining the marking of all confirmed hazardous areas containing cluster munition remnants.
In all States Parties, apart from Chile, Germany, and the UK, a humanitarian and/or socio-economic impact is reported to varying degrees, indicating the need for greater efforts to fulfill this action. In several states, cluster munition remnants continue to cause casualties (see the casualties chapter for further details).
Action 3.3—Develop a resourced plan
Little progress has been made in the development of national clearance strategies and plans since 2014, despite the requirement to have a plan in place within one year of the First Review Conference or by entry into force of the convention for that State Party.
Four States Parties have a plan for survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants: Afghanistan, Lebanon, Montenegro, and Mozambique. However, of these, only Mozambique is on track. Afghanistan has reported that insecurity is hampering its ability to conduct clearance. Lebanon estimates that 40 battle area clearance teams would be needed in order to complete clearance by 2020, but in 2015 it had 21 to 25 teams. Montenegro’s plan to complete clearance of cluster munition remnants is not funded.
Lao PDR plans to complete a survey by the end of 2021, which will provide the basis upon which a clearance plan can be developed. However, this will not be achieved within the Article 4 clearance deadline, and an extension request will need to be submitted.
Three other States Parties have mine action plans in place, but they do not contain specific plans for survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants: BiH, Croatia, and Chad. In BiH, a revised plan including cluster munition remnants is awaiting adoption by the Council of Ministers. Although Croatia does not have a specific cluster munition clearance strategy, it is nevertheless on track for meeting its Article 4 deadline. Chad’s plan notes that it adheres to the Convention on Cluster Munitions but does not detail plans to clear cluster munition remnants.
In addition, the following States Parties have not presented plans for how they will achieve their Article 4 clearance deadline: Chile, Germany, Iraq, and the UK.
The convention entered into force on 1 March 2016 for Colombia and Somalia, which now have one year to develop and start implementing a clearance plan, in accordance with the Dubrovnik Action Plan.
Action 3.5—Manage information for analysis, decision-making, and reporting
Each State Party is required to “record and provide information to the extent possible on the scope, extent and nature of all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control.” (See Action 3.1 above for details.)
The quality of reporting on survey and clearance is variable, and has not improved significantly since 2014. Of those States Parties that conducted survey and clearance of cluster munition contaminated-areas in 2015, only Croatia, Mozambique, and the UK had clear, consistent land release data across the different sources.
Discrepancies between survey and clearance data provided by mine action centers, operators, and Article 7 reports were found in BiH, Iraq, Lao PDR, and Lebanon.
Germany should provide more detaisl of the results of its technical and non-technical survey, to enable a better understanding of the efforts it has taken to tackle its cluster munition problem.
As of July 2016, Chile and Montenegro had not provided Article 7 transparency reports covering calendar year 2015. Chile has not reported since 2013.
Action 3.7—Apply practice development
States Parties continue to implement land release methodologies to improve the efficiency of clearance of cluster munition remnants (for further information about land release, see “Improving clearance efficiency: land release,” in the Cluster Munition Monitor 2015 contamination and clearance chapter).
In 2015, the following States Parties reported using technical and/or non-technical survey to confirm, reduce, or cancel hazardous areas: BiH, Croatia, Germany, Lao PDR, Iraq, Lebanon, and Mozambique. In Lao PDR, the introduction of cluster munition-specific survey greatly improved the efficiency of clearance. While the total area cleared in Lao PDR reduced significantly in 2015, the number of submunitions destroyed increased significantly.
Action 3.8—Promote and expand cooperation
International cooperation and assistance to support survey and clearance is provided to almost all States Parties. The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) provides support to mine action programs in States Parties Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, and Somalia. In Lebanon, UNMAS supports the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). In 2015, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) had an advisor in Lebanon, and conducted an evaluation in BiH, where it also contracted a consultant.
International NGOs provided support to mine action programs, capacity-building support on standards (particularly on land release and information management), as well as conducted clearance operations and mine risk education in 2015 in States Parties Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Mozambique, and Somalia.
(For information about funding for cluster munition survey and clearance, please see the Support for Mine Action sections of the country profiles).
In general, there is much better knowledge of cluster munition contamination and more thorough reporting of land release activities in States Parties and signatories than in non-signatories. This underlines the importance of striving for universalization of the convention, in order to improve global efforts to address the threat posed by cluster munition remnants.
The extent of contamination is not known in six of the 14 States Parties (43%). This compares to 11 of 13 non-signatories (84%), and one of the two signatories. All three other areas have a good understanding of the extent of contamination.
Reports of land release activities—or confirmation that these did not take place—were available for all States Parties, signatories, and other areas. However, no data on survey or clearance was available for five non-signatories: Iran, Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
While all States Parties, signatories, and other areas have a mine action program, authority, center, or other institutions responsible for mine action, two non-signatories do not. Syria does not have a national mine action program, authority, or center, while as of mid-2016, Ukraine was in the process of establishing the national mine action institutional structure.
With the exception of Iran, all non-signatories, signatories, and other areas received international support from either the UN or international NGOs, or both, in 2015.
In 2015 and 2016, conflict has hindered land release activities in three States Parties (Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia), and six non-signatories (Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen). These are the same countries that were affected by conflict in 2014, and little has changed in the overall picture since then.
Not only is clearance of cluster munition remnants impeded, but the contamination exacerbates the impact of conflict on civilians. Refugees and internally displaced persons may face danger from cluster munition remnants while on the move and when they resettle or return home. Access to vital services and livelihoods, already impeded by conflict, may be even further constrained by cluster munition contamination.
Conflict affects the functioning of mine action programs, as well as prevents access to contaminated areas. In Syria, there is no national mine action program, and most of the country is inaccessible to clearance operators. In Libya, mine action is impaired by the lack of a functioning central government. International mine action actors stopped land release operations when the conflict escalated in July 2014, and these had not been resumed as of July 2016. In Yemen, it was reported that the conflict had affected the mine action center’s ability to fulfill its role. Its operations were frozen in mid-2014 and resumed on a limited emergency basis only after late September 2015. In Sudan, the National Mine Action Center reported that it was not possible to implement activities according to the national mine action plan due to insecurity. In Iraq, mine action operations were overshadowed by conflict and insecurity, and the urgent need to clear and destroy improvised explosive devices. Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, and Yemen continued to report that some cluster munition-contaminated areas cannot be accessed due to insecurity or conflict.
In both Syria and Libya, non-state armed groups and volunteers have often conducted clearance immediately after fighting has occurred, despite a lack of adequate training, equipment, and resources. In both countries, international efforts to support mine action have therefore focused on developing national capacity. In Libya, in 2015 and 2016, UNMAS and its implementing partners conducted training on explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), quality assurance and quality control, and non-technical survey to the Libyan Mine Action Center, as well as other government institutions and NGOs. These training courses have taken place outside Libya. In Syria, UNMAS also planned to begin a training and mentoring program for national organizations in early 2016.
In Ukraine, clearance of ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups. The State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), which is responsible for humanitarian demining, suffered severe losses to buildings and vehicles during the conflict. The OSCE project coordinator and Danish Deming Group (DDG) therefore provided the SESU with equipment and training to support their operational capacity.
In 2016, conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh in April resulted in a need for emergency clearance of approximately 2km2 of contaminated areas.
Where discrepancies between data sources exist, only one source has been utilized—usually the mine action center (for details of data variations, please refer to the mine action country profiles).
Afghanistan’s cluster munition contamination dates from use by Soviet and United States (US) forces and blocks access to agricultural and grazing land. Most cluster munitions used by the US in late 2001 and early 2002 were removed during clearance operations in 2002–2003, guided by US airstrike data. At the end of 2015, 6.86km2 of cluster munition-contaminated areas were recorded, a level unchanged since April 2015. Contamination, however, is probably more widespread than reported. No release of areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants occurred in 2015 due to insecurity in affected areas and a downturn in funding.
BiH’s cluster munition contamination results from Yugoslav use in the 1992–1995 conflict after the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Additionally, cluster munitions were used by NATO forces in Republika Srpska. Sixty communities across seven cantons are affected by 0.85km2 of confirmed hazardous area and 7.3km2 of suspected hazardous area. The total amount of hazardous areas reduced in 2015 as a result of survey and clearance. During 2015, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the Federal Administration of Civil Protection, and the BiH Armed Forces conducted cluster munition remnants survey and clearance.
Chad is believed to be contaminated bycluster munitions used by France and Libya in the 1980s, but the full extent of contamination is not known. Chad stated in 2013 that the Tibesti region in the northwest of the country was being surveyed, but has provided no further information since then. There was evidence of cluster munition contamination in 2015, as three cluster munition remnants were discovered and destroyed in 2015, and civilian casualties were reported as a result of an accident with a submunition. No clearance of cluster munition remnants has been reported during the last six years. The National Demining Center (Centre National de Déminage, CND) operates demining and EOD teams. Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Handicap International operated in Chad in 2015.
Chile hasreported three military training areas totaling 97km2 that are suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants. No survey had been conducted as of June 2016. Chile has not reported on any steps taken to elaborate a workplan to address its four contaminated areas.
The convention entered into force for Colombia on 1 March 2016. In 2009 and 2010, the Ministry of Defence acknowledged that cluster munitions had been used in the past. However, the impact of any cluster munition contamination is believed to be minimal, and operators have not encountered or received reports of unexploded submunitions. As of the end of May 2016, Colombia had not reported conducting any survey or clearance of any cluster munition-contaminated areas. Colombia may be able to declare full completion of its Article 4 obligations once the requisite assessment and survey has been taken.
Croatia is contaminated by cluster munitions used in the 1990s conflict that followed the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia. As of the end of 2015, 2.64km2 of land across four counties was confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, a reduction of 0.18km2 from 2014. The decrease in contaminated area resulting from clearance in 2015 was partly offset by the discovery of previously unrecorded cluster munition contamination. The majority of clearance was conducted by the state-owned operator MUNGOS, and the remainder by two commercial demining companies.
Germany reportedin June 2011 that it had identified areas suspected of containing cluster munition remnants at a former Soviet military training range at Wittstock in Brandenburg. Non-technical survey resulted in a suspected area of approximately 11km2. The area is completely perimeter-marked with warning signs and an official directive constrains access to it. After a delay since 2012, in September 2015, Germany reported that it has “carried out extensive non-technical and technical surveys,” during which four ShOAB-0.5 submunitions were cleared and destroyed. Site and “geophysical investigation” revealed strong evidence that contamination from cluster munition remnants existed only on the surface.
The extent of Iraq’s cluster munition contamination is not known with any degree of accuracy. Cluster munition remnants contaminate significant areas of central and southern Iraq, a legacy of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iraq reports that cluster munition remnants in confirmed hazardous areas cover a total of 200km2 across nine central and southern governorates: 95% is in just the three governorates of Basra, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. There are also 2.42km2 of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas in the northern Kurdish region. In 2015, survey and clearance were conducted by the civil defense and the army, along with humanitarian operators Iraq Mine Clearance Organization, NPA, and MAG. Mine action sector operations were overshadowed by conflict. Survey and clearance slowed in 2015 compared to the previous year, although data deficiencies hinder an accurate determination of progress.
Lao PDR is the world’s most heavily contaminated state as a result of cluster bombs used by the US between 1964 and 1973, including more than 270 million submunitions. There is no agreed estimate of the full extent of contamination, but 14 of the country’s 17 provinces and a quarter of all villages are reported to be UXO-contaminated. Submunitions are reported to be the most common form of remaining ERW contamination with a significant economic impact. Although the amount of land cleared in 2015 reduced to 41.30km2, a considerable reduction in clearance rate over the past three years, the number of submunitions destroyed in 2015 rose significantly to 100,022, the most recorded in any year. In 2016, Lao PDR committed to a nationwide non-technical and technical survey with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination by the end of 2021. Operators included five humanitarian operators, one national (UXO Lao), and four international (HALO Trust, Handicap International, MAG, and NPA), as well as several international and national commercial operators.
Lebanon’s four southern regions are affected by contamination resulting from Israeli use of cluster munitions during the July–August 2006 conflict, while some parts of the country are also contaminated by cluster munitions used in the 1980s. Cluster munition remnants continue to affect agriculture. New contamination continued to be discovered in 2015. Cluster munition clearance was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), MAG, and NPA; national operator Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD); and the Engineering Regiment of the Lebanese Armed Forces.
Montenegro’s cluster munition contamination is the result of NATO airstrikes in 1999. A non-technical survey conducted in 2012–2013 identified approximately 1.7km2 suspected and confirmed contaminated areas in two municipalities and one urban municipality. The contamination mainly affects infrastructure and utilities, accounting for 63% of the affected land, with agriculture accounting for another 30%. One area remains unsurveyed. No land release operations took place in 2015, as funding has not yet been secured.
Mozambique stated in 2014 that there was limited use of cluster munitions during its 1977–1992 civil war. During surveys conducted in 2015 with the intention of confirming the absence of cluster munition remnants, in order to complete Mozambique’s Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 obligations, six areas with a total size of nearly 0.74km2 of confirmed cluster munition contamination were identified. Clearance of these areas began in January 2016. In 2016, two additional areas of cluster munition contamination were also identified, and clearance of those areas commenced. NPA was the only operator conducting cluster munition survey and clearance in 2015–2016.
The convention entered into force for Somalia on 1 March 2016. The Ethiopian National Defence Forces reportedly used cluster munitions in clashes with Somali armed forces along the Somali-Ethiopian border during the 1977–1978 Ogaden War. Cluster munition contamination is suspected in south-central Somalia and Puntland, but the extent is not known. No survey or clearance of cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2015, and no cluster munition remnants were found.
UK. There may be an unknown number of cluster munition remnants on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas as a result of use of cluster bombs by the UK against Argentine positions in 1982. Most cluster munition contamination was cleared in the first year after the conflict. In 2015 and 2016, land release was conduced by BACTEC. In 2015, 19 submunitions were destroyed during mine clearance operations. The UK affirmed in 2015 that no known areas of cluster munition remnants exist outside suspected hazardous areas on the islands, in particular mined areas, which are all marked and fenced.
Cambodia’s cluster munition contamination is the result of the intensive US air campaign during the Vietnam War that concentrated on the country’s northeastern provinces along its border with Lao PDR and Vietnam. In 2011, Thailand fired cluster munitions into Cambodia’s northern Preah Vihear province, which resulted in additional contamination of approximately 1.5 km2. The full extent of the country’s contamination is not known. On the basis of a baseline survey of eight eastern provinces, the estimated area affected by cluster munition remnants was 334km2 as of May 2016, almost 70% of total ERW contamination amounting to more than 482km2. The survey showed 60% of the cluster munition problem is located in the provinces of Kratie and Stung Treng. Survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants in eastern Cambodia are undertaken mainly by the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), NPA, and MAG. The armed forces have conducted clearance in cluster munition-affected areas but they have not reported the extent and results of their operations.
South Sudan. From 1996 to 1999, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air-dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan. All 10 states experienced cluster munition use at some point, as operators have identified cluster munition remnants since 2006. At the end of 2015, contamination was suspected across eight of 10 states. New use of cluster munition contamination was identified in 2014 in Jonglei state.. However, ongoing insecurity, particularly in Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states), prevents access to confirm or address cluster munition contamination. Cluster munition contamination in South Sudan continues to pose a physical threat to local populations, prevents the delivery of vital humanitarian aid, curtails freedom of movement, and significantly impedes the development of affected communities. Four international NGOs (DCA, DDG, MAG, and NPA) and four commercial companies (G4S Ordnance Management, Mecham, Dynasafe MineTech Limited, and the Development Initiative) operated in 2015.
Syria. Cluster munitions have been used extensively since 2012, by government forces and a non-state armed group, and likely Russia, but the full extent of contamination is not known. Prior to the current conflict, the Golan Heights was contaminated by UXO, including unexploded submunitions. There is no national mine action program in Syria. UNMAS deployed a team to southern Turkey in August 2015. Conflict in many governorates has prevented access by mine action organizations. The extent and impact of contamination has resulted in Syrians without formal training conducting ad hoc clearance without the technical ability to do so.
Ukraine. The full extent of contamination from cluster munition rockets used by both government and pro-Russian armed opposition forces in Ukraine’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk from mid-2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire is not known. Prior to 2014, cluster munitions had never been used in Ukraine. Both Ukrainian government authorities and opposition groups have conducted clearance of ERW, including cluster munition remnants, usually reacting after attacks have taken place or when community members notify authorities of remnants and suspected contamination. A UN-coordinated mine action sub-cluster is comprised of several international mine action organizations.
Vietnam is one of the most cluster munition-contaminated countries in the world as a result of the US use in 1965–1973 in 55 provinces and cities. The US military also abandoned substantial quantities of cluster munitions. There is no accurate assessment of contamination and no clear data on land release. The Army Engineering Corps has conducted most clearance in the country over the past few years, but they did not provide data for 2015. Two international NGOs, MAG and NPA, conducted survey and clearance in 2015.
Yemen. Since the start of the latest conflict on 26 March 2015, intensive air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition have resulted in a significant amount of contamination and threat to the civilian population. The Yemen Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) has identified heavy cluster munition contamination in Saada governorate as well as contamination in Amran, Hodeida, Mawit, and Sanaa governorates. Most is in areas of ongoing conflict and the full extent is not known. Contamination also results from use in 2009 and perhaps earlier. There are some 18km2 of suspected contamination with submunitions in the northern Saada governorate, but it has not been possible to survey other suspected areas in the northwestern Hajjah governorate. All survey and clearance is conducted by YEMAC. YEMAC operations were frozen in mid-2014 and resumed on a limited emergency basis only after late September 2015.
Kosovo is affected by cluster munitions used by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia armed forces in 1998–1999 and by a NATO air campaign in 1999. After demining operations finished in 2001, the UN reported the problem virtually eliminated. However, subsequent surveys since 2008 have identified uncleared areas. At the end of 2015, contamination from cluster munition remnants in Kosovo doubled from the size reported at the end of 2014, due to the identification of previously unrecorded contamination. Land release was conducted by the Kosovo Security Forces, the HALO Trust, and NPA.
Most of Nagorno-Karabakh’s cluster munition contamination dates from use in 1992–1994 during armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. An estimated 67km2 affects all regions with more than 75% of the contamination located in three regions: Askeran, Martuni, and Martakert. Survey and clearance was conducted by HALO Trust. In 2016, a further 2km2 of new contamination was estimated to have resulted from use of cluster munitions in the hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April. HALO Trust’s survey teams and the de facto authority conducted rapid survey and clearance close to populated areas.
Western Sahara. Morocco used cluster munitions against Polisario Front forces during their conflict from 1975 to 1991. Some cluster munition contamination is located inside the buffer strip and is inaccessible to clearance operators. Additional strike sites may be identified from information provided by the local population. A UN Mine Action Coordination Centre is responsible for managing mine action in Western Sahara. The Polisario Front has a local center (the Saharawi Mine Action Coordination Office, SMACO), which is supported by the UN and is responsible for coordinating mine action activities in Western Sahara, east of the Berm, and for land release activities. Dynasafe MineTech Limited was the only implementing operator tasked with conducting cluster munition survey and clearance during 2015. In March 2016, Morocco expelled the international staff of UNMAS, resulting in the suspension of UNMAS-contracted demining activities. This also severely constrained the activities of the Saharawi Mine Actions Coordination Office (SMACO), as anticipated funding was put on hold.
 The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
 States Parties with cluster munition remnants: Afghanistan, BiH, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Montenegro, Mozambique, Somalia, and the UK; signatory: DRC; non-signatories: Cambodia, Iran, Libya, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen; other areas: Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Western Sahara.
 States Parties where it is unclear whether there is cluster munition contamination: Colombia; signatory: Angola; non-signatories: Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Tajikistan.
 HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016, www.halotrust.org/media-centre/news/halo-begins-emergency-clearance-in-karabakh/.
 Cluster Munition Monitor does not report on Action 3.4, “Be inclusive when developing the plan.” For Action 3.6, “Provide support, assist and cooperate,” please see the Support for Mine Action country profiles.
 Interviews with the Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) implementing partners, Kabul, May 2013.
 Email from Tarik Serak, Head, Department for Mine Action Management, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 26 May 2016.
 Emails from Brig. Gen. Elie Nassif, Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC), 12 May, 17 June, and 2 July 2015.
 Statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.
 Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1 July 2015.
 The National Regulatory Authority (NRA), “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.
 It also requires that states conduct mine risk education, a topic on which the Cluster Munition Monitor does not report.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form G, 4 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form F (for 2014), 20 April 2015.
 Statement of the UK, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings (Standing Committee on Mine Action), Geneva, 27 May 2009.
 In Chile and Germany, the contamination is at military training ranges. In the UK (Falkland Islands/Malvinas), areas are marked and fenced.
 Email from Mohammed Wakil, MACCA, 1 May 2016; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
 Lebanon, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
 Email from Veselin Mijajlovic, The Regional Centre for Divers’ Training and Underwater Demining (RCUD), 13 May 2016.
 NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.
 UNDP, “Draft Mine Action Governance and Management Assessment for Bosnia and Herzegovina,” 13 May 2015, p. 17.
 The National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), “Mine Action Plan 2014–2019,” May 2014, p. 4.
 Whether there is contamination or the extent of it is not known in States Parties Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Somalia, and the UK; in signatory Angola; and in non-signatories Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Iran, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen.
 “Mine Action in Ukraine,” Side-event presentation by Lt. Col. Yevhenii Zubarevskyi, Ministry of Defence, Geneva, 17 February 2016; and interviews in Geneva, 19 February and 20 May 2016.
 For instance, in Ukraine, cluster munition remnants, mines, and other ERW contamination are reported to pose a risk to the internally displaced and returning refugees. See, Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Eastern Ukraine: Brief on the need for humanitarian mine action activities,” undated, bit.ly/EasternUkrainebrief.
 UNMAS, “Programmes: Syria,” last updated March 2016.
 UNDP, “Grant Progress Reports for 1 July–30 September 2015 and 1 October–31 December 2015,” 25 January 2016.
 Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, National Mine Action Center (NMAC), 9 May 2016. However, note that the NMAC stated that no cluster munitions had been found in all mine action activities “to date,” although the UN provided a list of contaminated areas in 2011 and there have been reports of new use as recently as 2015. Email from Mohamed Kabir, Chief Information Officer, UNMAO, 27 June 2011; and email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 8 June 2016.
 Email from Mohammed Wakil, MACCA, 1 May 2016; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F; UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects, Somalia,” undated but 2016, www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/print/country_portfolio6512-1530-12626.pdf; Somalia, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 16 April 2012–30 March 2013); UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan,” undated but 2016, www.mineaction.org/taxonomy/term/1116; and, email from Ali al-Kadri, General Director, Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC), 20 March 2014.
 UNMAS, Programmes: Syria,” updated March 2016; and email from Bridget Forster, UNMAS Libya, 25 August 2015.
 Skype interview with Ezzedine Ata Alia, Administration Manager, 9 August 2016; and email from Caitlin Longden, Junior Programme Officer, UNMAS, 9 August 2016.
 Statement of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015.
 Emails from Rowan Fernandes, DDG Ukraine, 20 May and 17 June 2016; and email from Anton Shevchenko, OSCE, 14 June 2016.
 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 7 June 2016.
 Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 15 April 2013.
 HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Mines Action Canada, Ottawa, May 2009), p. 27; and interviews with demining operators, Kabul, 12–18 June 2010.
 Emails from Mohammed Wakil, Chief of Staff, MACCA, 1 May 2016; and from Abdel Qudos Ziaee, MACCA, 30 April 2015; and Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
 Interviews with MACCA implementing partners, Kabul, May 2013.
 Email from Mohammed Wakil, MACCA, 1 May 2016.
 NPA, “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Sarajevo, undated but 2010, provided by email from Darvin Lisica, NPA, 3 June 2010. See also, country profile for BiH available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
 Email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
 Statement of BiH, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015; and email from Tarik Serak, BHMAC, 26 May 2016.
 Statement of Chad, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 13 September 2012.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Forms F and H; and email from Llewelyn Jones, Director of Programmes, MAG, 31 May 2016.
 ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Chad: Mine Action,” 14 August 2014, the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2014/chad/mine-action.aspx.
 MAG, “New Help for More Than 400,000 People in Chad,” 15 December 2014, www.maginternational.org/our-impact/news/new-project-will-help-more-than-400000-people-in-chad/; and, emails from Julien Kempeneers, Deputy Desk Officer, Mine Action Department, Handicap International (HI), 2 May 2016; and HI, “Landmine Clearance Efforts Begin in Chad,” undated, www.handicap-international.us/landmine_clearance_efforts_begin_in_chad.
 Email from Juan Pablo Rosso, Expert in International Security, International and Human Security Department, Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 June 2015; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form F, September 2012.
 C. Osorio, “Colombia destruye sus últimas bombas de tipo racimo” (“Colombia destroys its last cluster bombs”), Agence France-Presse, 7 May 2009; and Ministry of National Defense presentation on cluster munitions, Bogotá, December 2010.
 Email from Dan Haddow, Colombia Programme Support Officer, HALO Trust, 28 May 2016; and, email from Fredrik Holmegaard, Project Manager, Humanitarian Disarmament – Colombia, NPA, 13 June 2016.
 Emails from Miljenko Vahtaric, Assistant Director for International Cooperation and Education, CROMAC, 13 and 18 May 2016, and 10 June 2015; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form A.
 Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, CROMAC, 13 May 2016; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form A.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F, 20 April 2015.
 Ibid.; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form G, 4 April 2012.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F; and statement of Germany, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 7 September 2015.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F.
 Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, Head of Information Management Department, Department of Mine Action (DMA), 30 May 2016.
 Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, Directorate General of Technical Affairs, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 20 May 2016.
 “US bombing records in Laos, 1964–73, Congressional Record,” 14 May 1975; NRA, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2009,” Vientiane, undated but 2010, p. 13; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form F.
 NRA, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2012,” undated but 2013, p. 5.
 Ibid.; and “Hazardous Ground, Cluster Munitions and UXO in the Lao PDR,” UNDP, Vientiane, October 2008, p. 8.
 Data from operators. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F states that 35.99km2 of land was cleared, and 115,082 items destroyed, of which 87,389 were “cluster munitions.” NRA, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2012”, Vientiane, undated but 2013 states that 100,026 submunitions were destroyed.
 NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.
 LMAC, “Lebanon Mine Action Strategy 2011–2020,” September 2011; and responses to NPA questionnaire by Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 12 May and 17 June 2015.
 MAG, “Cluster Munition Contamination in Lebanon using survey data,” September 2014, p. 4.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F; and email from Brig.-Gen. Elie Nassif, LMAC, 14 May 2016.
 NPA, “Cluster Munition Remnants in Montenegro,” July 2013, p. 21.
 Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F; Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form F; and NPA, “Cluster Munition Remnants in Montenegro,” July 2013, p. 26. There is a discrepancy in the locations reported as contaminated between the Article 7 reports and NPA.
 Email from Veselin Mijajlovic, RCUD, 16 June 2015.
 Ibid., 13 May 2016.
 Statement by Alberto Maverengue Augusto, National Demining Institute (IND), Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 4 September 2014.
 Skype interview with Afedra Robert Iga, Programme Manager Mozambique, NPA, 7 June 2016.
 Skype interview with, and email from, Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016.
 Email from Afedra Robert Iga, NPA, 7 June 2016.
 UNMAS, “UN-suggested Explosive Hazard Management Strategic Framework 2015–2019,” undated, provided by email from Kjell Ivar Breili, Project Manager, Humanitarian Explosive Management Project, UNMAS Somalia, 7 July 2015; and email from Mohammed Abdulkadir Ahmed, Somali National Mine Action Authority (SNMAA), 17 April 2013.
 Letter to Landmine Action from Lt. Col. Scott Malina-Derben, Ministry of Defence, 6 February 2009.
 Email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1 July 2015.
 South East Asia Air Sortie Database, cited in D. McCracken, “National Explosive Remnants of War Study, Cambodia,” NPA in collaboration with Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), Phnom Penh, March 2006, p. 15; HRW, “Cluster Munitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” April 2008, www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/arms/CMC.ClusterMunitions.Asia-Pacific.2008.pdf; and HI, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions (HI, Brussels, November 2006), p. 11.
 South East Asia Air Sortie Database, cited in D. McCracken, “National Explosive Remnants of War Study, Cambodia,” NPA in collaboration with CMAA, Phnom Penh, March 2006, p. 15; HRW, “Cluster Munitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” April 2008, www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/arms/CMC.ClusterMunitions.Asia-Pacific.2008.pdf; and HI, Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions (HI, Brussels, November 2006), p. 11.
 Data received from CMAA, 30 May 2016.
 Interviews with CMAA and operators, Phnom Penh, 9−12 May 2016.
 Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: South Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 23 August 2014. See also, UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014; and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26.
 Email from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.
 UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014. See also, UNMISS, “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26.
 Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and from Hilde Jørgensen, Desk Officer for Horn of Africa, NPA, 19 May 2016.
 Side-event presentation by Mark Hiznay, HRW, Geneva, February 2015; and interview, in Geneva, 18 February 2015.
 UN Ukraine, “Joint UN Mission to Assess Mine Action Needs in Ukraine,” 25 January 2016.
 “Vietnam mine/ERW (including cluster munitions) contamination, impacts and clearance requirements,” presentation by Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
 Interview with Sr. Col. Phan Duc Tuan, PAVN, in Geneva, 30 June 2011.
 UNDP, “Grant Progress Report for the period 1 October 2015–31 December 2015,” 25 January 2016.
 Interview with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, 17 February 2016.
 Email from Ali al-Kadri, General Director, YEMAC, 20 March 2014.
 UNDP, “Grant Progress Reports for 1 July–30 September 2015 and 1 October–31 December 2015,” 25 January 2016.
 See, UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), “UNMIK OKPCC EOD Management Section Annual Report 2005,” Pristina, 18 January 2006, p. 2; and ICRC “Explosive Remnants of War, Cluster Bombs and Landmines in Kosovo,” Geneva, revised June 2001, pp. 6 and 15, www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/report/explosive-remnants-of-war-brochure-311201.htm.
 “UNMIK Mine Action Programme Annual Report – 2001,” Mine Action Coordination Cell, Pristina, undated but 2002, p. 1.
 HALO Trust, “Failing the Kosovars: The Hidden Impact and Threat from ERW,” 15 December 2006, p. 1.
 Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus & Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 29 May 2015.
 HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016, www.halotrust.org/media-centre/news/halo-begins-emergency-clearance-in-karabakh/.
 Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016.
 The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), “Ceasefire Monitoring Overview,” undated, https://minurso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11421&language=en-US.
 Email from Gordan Novak, Action on Armed Violence Western Sahara, 25 July 2014.
 Response to questionnaire by Sarah Holland, UNMAS, 24 February 2014, and email, 25 February 2014.
 Rick Gladstone, “Morocco Orders U.N. to Cut Staff in Disputed Western Sahara Territory,” The New York Times, 17 March 2016, bit.ly/WesternSahara17Mar2016; and What’s in Blue: Insights on the work of the UN Security Council, “Western Sahara: Arria-formula Meeting, Consultations, and MINURSO Adoption,” 26 April 2016, bit.ly/WesternSahara26Apr2016.
 Email from Samu Ami, Coordinator, SMACO, 27 April 2016.