Summary: Non-signatory Georgia last commented on the convention in 2010, when it stated that it could not consider accession until the security environment in the region improved. It abstained from the vote on the first UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. Georgia attended a meeting of the convention in 2012.

Georgia imported cluster munition rockets from Israel in 2007, which it used a year later during its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. It also inherited stocks of cluster munitions from the Soviet Union and destroyed a stockpile of 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing over 320,000 submunitions in 2013.Georgia is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Georgia has not elaborated its views on accession to the convention in more than six years.[1] In a letter received in April 2010, Georgia informed the Monitor of its support for “the spirit” of the convention, but stated “the bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security situation in the region” does not allow it to accede. The letter continued, “Unfortunately the situation has not changed much and has even worsened security-wise that does not leave us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conventions until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.”[2]

On 7 December 2015, Georgia abstained from the vote on the first UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[3] However, it voted in support of the draft resolution during the first round of voting in UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security on 4 November 2015.[4] Georgia did not explain its decision to abstain on the final vote of the non-binding resolution, which 140 states voted for, including many non-signatories.

Georgia participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5]

Georgia was invited to, but did not attend the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015. It has participated as an observer in one meeting of the convention: the Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway in September 2012, but did not make any statements. Georgia also attended an international conference on cluster munitions in Santiago, Chile in June 2010.

Georgia has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2015.[6]

Georgia has not joined the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer

Georgia is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Georgia acquired Mk-4 160mm surface-to-surface rockets equipped with cluster munition payloads (each rocket contains 104 M85-type submunitions) from Israel in 2007.[7] Georgian forces used these weapons during the conflict with Russia in August 2008 over the break-away region of South Ossetia. Georgia’s Ministry of Defense said that it used 24 volleys with 13 Mk-4 rockets in each.[8]

On 31 August 2008, the Ministry of Defense acknowledged that the Georgian Armed Forces used cluster munitions against the Russian forces near the Roki tunnel.[9] Remnants of Georgian cluster munitions were also found by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in civilian areas in the north of Gori district, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[10]

In January 2016, the International Criminal Court authorized an investigation into war crimes and crimes against humanity allegedly committed during the 2008 war between Georgia and Russia.[11]

Stockpiling and destruction

Georgia inherited a stockpile of air-dropped cluster bombs from the Soviet Union.[12]

A total of 844 RBK-series cluster bombs and 320,375 explosive submunitions were destroyed in 2013 as part of a project to destroy obsolete weapons that began in July 2011 with the support of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UNDP.[13] Bombs containing incendiary submunitions and cartridges containing antivehicle mines were also destroyed. The last RBK-series bombs were destroyed by open detonation at the Vaziani military firing range, 20 kilometers outside Tbilisi, on 12 July 2013.

Cluster munitions destroyed in Georgia[14]

Contaminated by: landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) (extent of contamination unknown), possibly including cluster munition remnants.[1]

Not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 

At the end of 2015, Georgia had almost 2km² of known mined areas. In 2015, technical survey commenced of the Red Bridge minefield, after prioritization of battle area clearance (BAC) of former military sites and of cluster munition remnants in previous years.

Recommendation for action

• Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the Red Bridge border minefield. 

Contamination 

Georgia has almost 2km² of mined area across seven minefields, as set out in the table below.[2] This includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri district, which is in a military zone and Khojali mountain, in Mestia district, on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with the Abkhazia region, where the size of mined and battle areas is not known. Contamination comprises both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. 

Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases. The precise extent of the threat has not been reported publicly. According to the Georgian Ministry of Defense, in 2009 mined areas were suspected at Akhalqalaqi, Gonio Firing Range, Kopitnari, Mtskheta, Osiauri, Sagarejo, Telavi, and Vaziani.[3]

Contamination as at end 2015

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle; N/K = not known.
* Located at the ABL with South Ossetia. As of October 2016, HALO did not have access to the minefield.
** New information provided by HALO Abkhazia program. Khojali minefield is located on a mountain at the ABL with Abkhazia. As of October 2016, HALO did not have access to the minefield.

There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia. Since the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and more recently the 2008 conflict with Russia, South Ossetia is occupied by Russia and is inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO clearance operators.

Contamination (cluster munition remnants)

Georgia, including the breakaway area of Abkhazia, is now believed to be free of contamination from cluster munition remnants, with the possible exception of South Ossetia.[4]

Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which Georgian and Russian forces both used cluster munitions. After the conflict, by December 2009, HALO Trust had cleared some 37km² in Georgian-controlled territory contaminated with submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[5] In May 2010, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) completed clearance of its tasked areas.[6] 

HALO Trust believes that the August 2008 conflict was likely to have resulted in some cluster munition contamination in South Ossetia, but it has no way of determining the level of possible contamination, or what, if any, clearance may have been conducted.[7]

Other ERW

Georgia remains contaminated by other UXO. Following the 2008 conflict with Russia, there was evidence of a problem with UXO in South Ossetia, although the precise extent of this remains unclear. In addition, UXO contamination in Georgia persists in former firing ranges.[8]

Program Management

The Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC) is the Georgian Mine Action Authority, under the State Military Scientific Technical Center—known as “DELTA”—an entity within the Ministry of Defense. It is tasked to coordinate and execute action to address the ERW threat.[9] The primary task of the ERWCC is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, including quality assurance/quality control, and to facilitate the creation and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[10] The ERWCC was established with the support of the international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP).[11]

Strategic planning

Georgia has identified the Red Bridge and Chognari minefields as the main strategic mine action priorities, in addition to BAC of the Udabno task site and the Skra military base (a storage facility).[12]

Standards

Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSG) have been drafted in accordance with IMAS and are awaiting completion in consultation with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[13] Once finalized, they will be translated and sent to parliament for approval.[14]

Operators

HALO Trust conducts clearance in Georgia, but NGOs are not permitted to clear land belonging to the military.[15] HALO employed an average of 135 personnel in 2015, of whom 80% were trained only on BAC while the remainder were experienced HALO deminers.[16]

At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict. In 2010, a NATO Trust Fund project started to provide support to establish long-term local capability and capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[17] As part of the project, 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, BAC, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[18] From March 2015, these deminers have been conducting EOD of abandoned explosive ordnance and UXO at the former ammunition storage facility at Skra.[19]

Land Release 

No mine clearance took place in 2015, but survey resulted in cancelation of more than 0.9km² of area and confirmation as mined of almost 1.3km².[20]

No new cluster munition contamination was identified in 2015, and therefore no survey or clearance was required.[21]

Survey in 2015

In 2015, HALO canceled 913,489m² through non-technical survey (NTS), and reduced a further 1,183m² through technical survey. In addition, almost 1.3km² of mined area was confirmed, all during survey of the Red Bridge minefield.[22] This is the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.

Clearance in 2015

Georgia previously reported plans to start clearance of the Red Bridge minefield in 2015.[23] However, while Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss demining the minefield,[24] only survey was permitted. HALO conducted NTS between 1 and 3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. However, the Azerbaijani military located on the other side of the border subsequently demanded that technical survey operations be halted one month later, on 4 August 2015, and as of October 2016 survey had not been permitted to resume.[25]

Progress in 2016

HALO started operations at the Chognari minefield in March 2016, initially conducting NTS, and then beginning technical survey in April.[26] This minefield is part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. It was previously under military restriction, but has since been handed over by the government for clearance.[27] Chognari was also the site of an uncontrolled explosion in the 1990s; in addition to the minefield around the perimeter of the base, the site is also contaminated by UXO.[28] The base threatens the lives and livelihoods of more than 4,500 villagers who live nearby and use the area for grazing their livestock. Once cleared, the Georgian government also plans to build a waste processing facility on the site, which is expected to employ more than 130 people.[29]

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2015, four donors contributed a total of US$1.2 million toward mine action operations in Georgia.[1]

Three donors—the Czech Republic, Japan, and Lithuania—contributed a combined total of $71,792 through the NATO Support Agency for clearance efforts and the provision of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) trainings.

Georgia has never reported contributions to its own mine action operations.

International contributions: 2015[2]

Since 2011, international contributions to mine action activities in Georgia totaled some $6.6 million, an average of $1.3 million per year.

Summary of international contributions: 2011–2015[3]