Iraq

Mine Action

Last updated: 28 November 2016

Contaminated by: landmines (massive contamination), cluster munition remnants (heavy contamination), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). 

Article 5 deadline: 1 February 2018
(Not on track to meet deadline

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline: 1 November 2023
(Not on target to meet deadline

In 2015, mine action operations were overshadowed by conflict.

Landmines: Total landmine contamination at the end of 2015 was 1,522km2 of suspected and confirmed contaminated areas, of which 182km2 were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) containing only antipersonnel mines. This figure does not include contamination by IEDs. 50.58km2 was reported to be released in 2015, with 25.4km2 canceled and 24.18km2 cleared.

Cluster munition remnants: CHAs covered a total of 200km2 in central and southern Iraq as of May 2016, 95% of which is in three governorates: Basra, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar. There are also 2.42km2 of suspected and confirmed hazardous areas in the northern Kurdish region. Survey identified 4.5km2 of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed 42km2 of CHAs in the center and south. In total across the country, 8.78km2 of land was cleared of cluster munition remnants, and 2,867 submunitions were destroyed.

Recommendations for action

  • The Republic of Iraq should strengthen the mandate, management, personnel, and resources of the Department of Mine Action (DMA).
  • The DMA and the Iraq Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) should formulate multi-year plans setting out policy, priorities, and objectives for mine clearance.
  • The DMA should streamline registration and accreditation procedures and take action to facilitate the import of demining equipment.
  • Iraq should draw up a strategic plan for the clearance of cluster munition remnants, setting out operational priorities, clarifying institutional responsibilities, identifying and allocating available resources, and setting timelines for implementation.
  • Iraq should introduce national standards for cluster munition remnants survey and clearance, and develop the capacity of national operators to meet them.
  • The DMA should draw on international assistance to enable it to fulfil its Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 5 clearance obligations.

Mine Contamination

Iraq ranks among the world’s most heavily mine-affected countries, much of it a legacy of the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led Coalition. The already serious contamination left from these conflicts has been made significantly worse by the present fighting in Iraq and enormous quantities of IEDs in areas recaptured from Islamic State (IS), including many pressure-plate devices that are prohibited as antipersonnel mines by the Mine Ban Treaty. 

Estimates by the DMA and IKMAA put Iraq’s total mine contamination at the end of 2015 at 1,522km2 compared with 1,604km2 at the end of the previous year, but these year-end totals, although similar, do not include IED contamination (see below) and also mask some significant shifts in regional estimates of contamination. Suspected and confirmed mined areas in central and southern Iraq remained largely unchanged at 1,286km2 (see table below). 

Central and Southern Iraq contamination by device end-2015[1]

Contamination

SHAs

Area (m2)

CHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

AP mines

14

13,625,700

116

56,165,407

69,791,107

AV mines

0

0

5

164,092

164,092

Mixed AP and AV mines

18

3,042,221

165

1,213,385,282

1,216,427,503

Total

32

16,667,921

286

1,269,714,781

1,286,382,702

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle. 

Antipersonnel mine contamination in central and south governorates at end 2015

Governorate

SHAs

Area (m2)

CHAs

Area (m2)

Basrah

0

0

7

29,154,826

Diyala

14

13,625,700

0

0

Missan

0

0

98

6,888,727

Muthanna

0

0

1

10,479,896

Wassit

0

0

10

9,641,958

Total

14

13,625,700

116

56,165,407

 

In the northern governorates under the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the estimate of overall contamination dropped by one quarter in 2015 to 218km2, with confirmed mined area containing antipersonnel mines nearly 30% lower at almost 126km2 after big reductions were recorded in Sulimaniya and Garmian governorates.[2] In the absence of significant survey or clearance activity, these reductions appeared to be a result of data revisions and corrections. 

KRG mine contamination by device at end 2015[3]

Contamination

SHAs

Area (m2)

CHAs

Area (m2)

Total Area (m2)

AP mines

635

92,685,963

2,016

125,931,570

218,617,533

AV mines

3

19,700

9

230,353

250,053

Mixed AP and AV mines

29

10,950,724

197

5,901,176

16,851,900

Total

667

103,656,387

2,222

132,063,099

235,719,486

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle. 

KRG antipersonnel mine contamination

Province

SHAs

Area (m2)

CHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Dohuk

0

0

409

20,758,373

20,758,373

Erbil

1

230,000

343

48,634,647

48,864,647

Garmian

174

20,085,528

128

6,875,562

26,961,090

Sulimaniya (Slemani)

460

72,370,435

1,136

49,662,987

122,033,422

Total

635

92,685,963

2,016

125,931,570

218,617,532

 

A key concern emerging for Iraq in 2015 was use of IEDs “on an industrial scale” by IS, posing not only a threat to Iraqi security forces but a major obstacle to resettlement of more than a million people displaced by conflict. Iraq experienced 11,500 IED explosions causing nearly 35,000 casualties in 2015, according to US Defense Department estimates cited by Foreign Affairs. This put Iraq ahead of Afghanistan in terms of the number of IED casualties.[4] (See the Casualties and Victim Assistance country profile for further details.

The DMA reported new contamination in conflict areas in 2015 that consisted primarily of IEDs and affected 997km2 (see table below). It reported that Diyala governorate’s Khanaqin district alone accounted for 568 km2.[5]

Estimated IED contamination in conflict areas at end-2015

Governorate

Area (km2)

Babylon

316.43

Diyala

572.82

Salahadin

107.99

Total

997.24

 

Cluster Munition Contamination

Cluster munition remnants contaminate significant areas of central and southern Iraq, a legacy of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iraq reports that cluster munition remnants in CHAs cover a total of 200km2 across nine central and southern governorates: 95% is in just the three governorates of Basra, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.[6] A small amount of cluster munition contamination also remains in northern Iraq’s Kurdish region, the result of air strikes conducted under former President Saddam Hussein.

The highway between Kuwait and Basrah was heavily targeted by cluster bomb strikes in the 1991 Gulf War[7] and cluster munitions were also used extensively during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, particularly around Basra, Nasiriyah, and the approaches to Baghdad.

Cluster munition contamination in central and southern Iraq as of May 2016[8]

Governorate

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Babylon

1

89,500

0

0

Basra

104

16,614,715

0

0

Karbala

4

1,595,474

1

218,708

Missan

5

668,090

0

0

Muthanna

30

128,646,307

0

0

Najaf

4

4,012,033

1

1,309,596

Al-Qadisiyah

4

3,740,034

1

226,303

Thi-Qar

14

45,157,988

0

0

Wassit

2

299,143

0

0

Total

168

200,823,284

3

1,754,607

 

The northern governorates under the KRG confirmed cluster munition contamination totaling 1.18km2 in two areas: the northern district of Dohuk close to the border with Turkey and the Garmiyan area south of Sulimaniya.[9]

KRG cluster munition contamination as of May 2016[10]

Governorate

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Dohuk

3

486,628

11

672,158

Garmiyan

7

689,500

0

0

Total

10

1,176,128

11

672,158

 

Program Management

Mine action in Iraq is managed along regional lines. Mine action in Iraq’s northern governorates under the KRG is managed by IKMAA. The DMA, which falls under the Ministry of Environment in Baghdad, coordinates and manages the sector in central and southern Iraq.[11] The DMA and IKMAA agreed in September 2015 to share operations in a so-called Gray Zone, an area of about 69,000km2 overlapping their respective operating areas. A Joint Operations Centre in Erbil managed by iMMAP coordinates operations in the zone.[12] 

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess the extent of the threat of explosive weapons, including IEDs, in areas retaken from IS, and to help authorities develop and coordinate an emergency response, facilitating the return of displaced people. Under this program, UNMAS is training and mentoring selected security service and mine action personnel in how to organize an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) response and develop standards and procedures for IED clearance. By 2016, UNMAS had offices in Erbil with 12 national staff, and in Baghdad with four national staff, and expected to expand its capacity in 2017. UNMAS requested US$100 million to fund the program in 2016, and as of September had secured only one-quarter of that amount.[13]

iMMAP provided information management technical support to IKMAA in Erbil and the DMA in Baghdad and Basrah.[14] 

Iraqi Kurdistan region

IKMAA coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). It also operates 27 12-strong manual demining teams, seven mechanical teams, five EOD teams, and 35 quality assurance (QA) teams responsible for accreditation and monitoring the work of all operators.[15]

Mines Advisory Group (MAG) remains the biggest of the international humanitarian operators in Iraq with a total staff of 255, including 169 deminers organized in 10 mine action and seven multi-task teams, along with two mechanical teams, two mine detection dog (MDD) teams, and an EOD team.[16] IKMAA reported that MAG conducted cluster munition clearance.[17] The only other humanitarian NGO active in 2015 was Mines and UXO Impact Relief (MIR). Commercial operators included Ararat, ASA, Chamy Razan, EODT, General Safety, Khabat, RONCO, Sardal Company for Demining, Shanica, and Valmara. 

IKMAA does not have a strategic plan but reported in 2016 it was in the process of drafting one. IKMAA’s priorities in drawing up annual plans include clearing agricultural land and infrastructure, tackling CHAs close to populated areas and areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties.[18]

Central and southern Iraq

The DMA implements policy set by a Higher Council for Mine Action (HCMA) created by, and reporting to the prime minister, in which the ministries of defense, interior, and oil are major actors. The HCMA is supported by a Technical Committee, functioning as its secretariat.[19]

The DMA oversees four regional mine action centers (RMACs) for the north (covering the governorates of Anbar, Mosul, Saladin, and Kirkuk); the center (for Baghdad, Diyala, and Wassit); an area identified as “ME” (for Babylon, Karbala, Najaf, and Qadisiyah); and the south (for Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar).[20] The extent to which the RMACs were active in 2015 was unclear and appeared to vary. However, the DMA reported it has formed a committee to draw up a strategic plan for the sector for 2017−2022.[21] 

However, the DMA’s role has been weakened in recent years by the lack of any legislation or regulatory framework establishing its mandate. Mine action stakeholders continued to report obstacles to management and regulation of the sector arising from division of responsibilities between different government institutions; poor communication and coordination between ministries; lack of transparency; and convoluted bureaucracy. Operators cite a litany of obstacles to working in Iraq from accreditation to importing and registering vehicles and equipment, access to reliable or consolidated data, demolitions, and obtaining official sign-offs for land release.[22]

The DMA reported mine clearance by nine organizations in 2015, including the army and civil defense. NPA was the only international humanitarian organization actively demining in 2015. The other organizations included Arabian Gulf Company, BACTEC, Green Land, Kanary Mine Action, Peace Land Company, and Al Khibra Al Faniya for Mine Action & ERW.

The army and the civil defense, along with two humanitarian operators, NPA and Iraq Mine Clearance Organization (IMCO), were engaged in survey and/or clearance of cluster munition remnants. IMCO, the biggest humanitarian NGO, closed operations at the end of June 2015 after failing to resolve long-running issues with the DMA over registration and accreditation requirements.[23]

The army and civil defense were also active conducting EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).[24]

DDG closed its operations in Basrah towards the end of 2014 and although it received funding to resume operations in the north in October, long drawn out negotiations over equipment meant it was unable to begin work in that year.[25] IMCO was unable to resolve long-running issues over registration and accreditation with the DMA. As a result, in May 2015, it received a grant termination order from the US, its key donor, and ceased operating at the end of June 2015.[26]

Deminer safety 

In May 2016, an international technical adviser working for the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) was killed while trying to defuse a single-switch, victim-activated IED in Daquq district.[27] 

Land Release (mines)

Iraq’s two mine action authorities, IKMAA and the DMA, reported release of a total of 50.6km2 in 2015 through a combination of cancelation (only in the KRG-controlled areas) and clearance. Available data did not cover the activities of commercial companies clearing ERW from oilfields under contract to the Ministry of Oil. 

Survey in 2015 (mines)

IKMAA canceled 25.4km2 in 2015 and confirmed 228 mined areas covering 7.96km2.[28] The DMA did not cancel any land through non-technical survey (NTS) in 2015, but confirmed 57 hazardous areas covering 211km2.[29]

Clearance in 2015

The amount of mined area released in the KRG-controlled areas through clearance fell sharply in 2015 to 2km2 (see table below), little more than half the area released the previous year, although data provided by NGOs suggested a higher total. IKMAA, which cleared 1.45km2 in 2015 compared with 2.92km2 in 2014, attributed the drop partly to funding constraints resulting from the drop in oil prices, but a key factor was the new threats resulting from occupation of large areas of Iraq by IS.[30] 

MAG, the biggest and longest-established humanitarian operator, was not immune to funding constraints, reducing the number of mine action teams by two to finish the year with 10. This resulted in lower clearance rates. MAG reported release of 1.62km2 of mined area, triple the amount recorded by IKMAA, but still less than half the 3.58km2 it reported clearing in 2014. In mid-2015, MAG was able to increase the number of multi-task teams from three to seven to deal with increasing emergency requirements, particularly for support to the needs of people displaced by conflict; the teams became fully operational in the last quarter of the year. MAG increased the area covered by operations in 2015 deploying manual deminers, mechanical assets, and community liaison teams in five governorates.[31]

KRG mine clearance in 2015[32]

Operator

Areas released

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

IKMAA

26

1,448,201

6,752

3

3,646

MAG[33]

18

494,705

157

0

1,548

MIR

1

73,849

111

0

0

Total

45

2,016,755

7,020

3

5,194

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Clearance operations in central and southern Iraq released 23.18km2 of mined in 2015, 77% more than the previous year, according to DMA data, resulting in the destruction of 463 antipersonnel mines. The increase was attributed mainly to the work of civil defense teams that accounted for close to 70% of the total. Release of cleared land continued to be hampered by delays in demolitions. These can only be conducted by the army, which was heavily preoccupied with campaigns to take back control of areas occupied by IS, and the threat from IEDs.[34] 

DMA data also attributed mine clearance to NPA, which reported working only on survey and BAC in 2015.[35] 

Mine clearance in central and southern Iraq in 2015[36]

Operator

Areas released

Area cleared (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

Arabian Gulf

2

254,489

52

0

0

BACTEC

36

1,233,152

0

0

0

Civil Defense

127

16,364,828

0

1

4

Green Land

1

38,887

0

0

0

Kanary Mine Action

1

15,287

6

0

0

Ministry of Defense

7

2,241,516

0

0

0

NPA

8

2,630,453

77

1

0

Peace Land Co.

1

41,387

0

0

0

Al Khibra Al Faniya

13

361,979

328

7

0

Total

196

23,181,978

463

9

4

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Progress in 2016

FSD set up operations in the KRG-controlled area in late 2015, and started operating in March 2016 with three international staff and 24 national operations staff in Kirkuk governorate clearing IEDs from recaptured areas.

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants) 

Cluster munition contamination was not a priority, and survey and clearance slowed in 2015 compared to the previous year, although data deficiencies hinder an accurate determination of progress.

Survey in 2015 (cluster munition remnants)

NTS and technical survey in parts of central and southern Iraq continued to define cluster munition contamination, but national survey standards have yet to be introduced.

In central and southern Iraq, the DMA reported that in 2015 NTS had identified 34 SHAs totaling 4.5km2 in three governorates: Basra (3.37km2), Karbala (0.22km2), and Missan (0.87km2).[37] The DMA also reported that operators confirmed 101 hazardous areas affecting 42km2, nearly three-quarters of which was accounted for by Iraq’s Civil Defense.[38] 

Survey of cluster munition-contaminated areas in central and southern Iraq in 2015[39]

Operator

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m2)

Civil Defense

43

30,882,887

IMCO

10

7,818,484

Iraqi army

1

54,967

NPA

46

3,245,511

RMAC South

1

169,141

Total

101

42,170,990

 

The DMA’s record of activities undertaken by NPA was of significant variance from the operator’s own figures. NPA said it confirmed 10 hazardous areas contaminated by cluster munition remnants covering almost 7.4km2, mostly in Missan governorate.[40]

IKMAA did not record any survey of cluster munition-affected areas in the KRG-controlled area in 2015.[41]

NPA also reported canceling 301km2 of area suspected to be contaminated by unexploded ordnance in nine areas by NTS in Missan governorate.[42] 

Clearance in 2015 (cluster munition remnants) 

Most clearance in central and southern Iraq was undertaken by Civil Defense units, which the DMA said cleared more 6.3km2 of cluster munition-affected area in 2015, more than three times the amount reported in 2014. However, mine action sources said Civil Defense struggled with financial constraints and equipment shortages. 

NPA accelerated the pace of clearance with the arrival of long-awaited large-loop detectors and the addition of two BAC and two survey teams in October 2015, bringing its operations staff to 52.[43] NPA reported figures different to that of the DMA, saying that it had actually cleared seven areas containing cluster munition remnants totaling 2,276,588m2, destroying 1,157 submunitions, 79 antipersonnel mines, 22 antivehicle mines, and 183 items of UXO.[44]

IKMAA reported that cluster munition clearance in the KRG-controlled area was conducted by MAG, which cleared 0.5km2.[45]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2015[46]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

AVM destroyed

UXO destroyed

Center & South

Civil defense

11

6,387,984

2,017

4

1,514

NPA

6

1,847,110

616

0

162

Subtotal

17

8,235,094

2,633

4

1,676

KRG

MAG

12

546,371

234

0

4

Total

29

8,781,465

2,867

4

1,680

Note: AVM = Antivehicle mines.

The figures provided by the DMA in the table above for the center and south differ slightly from the figures presented in Iraq’s Article 7 report for 2015, which reported 8,065,903m2 cleared and 2,646 submunitions destroyed during clearance and 672 during survey operations.[47] 

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2018.

Incomplete reporting on mine clearance makes it impossible to quantify accurately the extent of Iraq’s progress towards fulfilling its treaty obligations, but officials have said since 2012 that it would not fulfil its treaty obligations by 2018.[48] The conflict of the last two years with IS has presented further obstacles by diverting resources from mine clearance and adding massive additional explosive contamination at a point when low oil prices have reduced national funding available for the sector. The DMA reports it has set up a committee to prepare an extension request.[49]

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance 

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Iraq is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2023. 

The likelihood of Iraq meeting its deadline looks remote in view of military conflict, political instability, financial constraints, and competing security and humanitarian priorities. 

 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

 


[1] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 22 May 2016.

[2] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, Planning Manager, Directorate General of Technical Affairs, IKMAA, 14 August 2016.

[3] Ibid.

[4] F. Bhojani, “How ISIS makes IEDs,” Foreign Affairs, 2 March 2016.

[5] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.

[6] Ibid., 30 May 2016.

[7] UNICEF and UN Development Programme (UNDP), “Overview of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War in Iraq,” June 2009, p. 10.

[8] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 30 May 2016.

[9] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 20 May 2016.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Interview with Kent Paulusson, Senior Mine Action Advisor for Iraq, UNDP, in Geneva, 27 May 2009.

[12] Email from Isam Ghareeb, iMMAP, 1 August 2016.

[13] Email from Lauren Cobham, Programme Officer, UNMAS Iraq, 7 September 2016.

[14] Email from Isam Ghareeb, Country Representative, iMMAP, 8 July 2015.

[15] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 20 May 2016.

[16] Email from Jacqueline Brownhill, Middle East Programme Support Coordinator, MAG, 11 July 2016.

[17] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 20 May 2016.

[18] Ibid.

[19] DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015; “Capacity Development Support to National Mine Action Authorities in Iraq, Phase 1: Initial Assessment Mission,” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), February 2012.

[20] DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015.

[21] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 June 2016.

[22] Interviews with mine action stakeholders in Geneva, 10 March 2015; and by telephone, 3 June 2015; and information received by emails, April–July 2015.

[23] Emails from Per Breivik, Chief Operating Officer, IMCO, 5 May 2015, 4 June 2015, and 22 October 2015.

[24] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.

[25] Email from Bazz Jolly, Programme/Operations Manager, DDG (KRG), 26 April 2016.

[26] Emails from Per Breivik, IMCO, 5 May 2015, 4 June 2015, and 22 October 2015.

[27] Email from Alex van Roy, Programme Manager, FSD, 11 August 2016; “Australian NGO worker killed while defusing Islamic State bomb in Iraq,” Reuters, 17 May 2016.

[28] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 15 August 2016.

[29] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 June 2016.

[30] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 15 August 2016.

[31] Email from Jacqueline Brownhill, MAG, 11 July 2016.

[32] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 15 August 2016.

[33] MAG reported 1,620,365m2 cleared with 538 antipersonnel mines and two antivehicle mines destroyed. Email from Jacqueline Brownhill, MAG, 11 July 2016.

[34] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 30 May 2016.

[35] Email from Bjørn Skodvin Hannisdal, NPA, 3 June 2016.

[36] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.

[37] Ibid., 21 May 2016.

[38] Ibid., 30 May 2016. Other data provided by the DMA indicated NTS had identified suspected or confirmed hazardous areas covering 9.5km2, close to 90% of it in Basra and al-Qadisiyah governorates, but with small SHAs in Missan and Karbala.

[39] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 30 May 2016.

[40] Email from Bjørn Skodvin Hannisdal, Country Programme Director, NPA, 3 June 2016.

[41] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 20 May 2016.

[42] Email from Bjørn Skodvin Hannisdal, NPA, 3 June 2016.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Emails from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 30 May 2016, and 10 June 2016.

[46] Emails from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 30 May 2016, and 10 June 2016; and from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 20 May 2016. NPA reported that it had actually cleared seven areas containing cluster munition remnants totaling 2,276,588m2, destroying 1,157 submunitions, 79 antipersonnel mines, 22 antivehicle mines, and 183 items of UXO. Email from Bjørn Skodvin Hannisdal, NPA, 3 June 2016.

[47] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for 2015).

[49] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 22 May 2016.