October 2016 marked 20 years since Canada’s then-Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy challenged states to negotiate and sign an instrument banning antipersonnel landmines by the end of 1997. After a whirlwind process that forged a new model of citizen diplomacy, the Mine Ban Treaty opened for signature on 3 December 1997 and entered into force on 1 March 1999.
The Mine Ban Treaty now has 162 States Parties. It provides the framework for eradicating antipersonnel landmines through its comprehensive prohibitions and requirements that States Parties clear mined areas within 10 years, destroy stockpiles within four years, and provide victim assistance.
The Mine Ban Treaty has created a humanitarian disarmament standard that other instruments have followed, particularly its sister instrument the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, Mine Ban Treaty States Parties are being tested by new use of the weapon and a significant rise in casualties.
Over the past year, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have used antipersonnel landmines in 10 countries. The new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in conflicts in Ukraine and Yemen and continued large-scale use of victim-activated improvised mines across Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and other countries is particularly disturbing. These victim-activated mines are often referred to as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or booby-traps. If they can be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person, they meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine in the Mine Ban Treaty, and therefore are banned.
Yet mine-laying by states remains a relatively rare phenomenon, with use only by the government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria in the past year.
States Parties are steadily implementing the Mine Ban Treaty. Most of the 35 nations that remain outside of the treaty also abide by its key provisions despite not acceding.
Several States Parties are still facing serious compliance issues, particularly with respect to missed stockpile destruction deadlines and repeated mine clearance deadline extensions. However, governments, international organizations—such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)—continue to work together to support those facing challenges. Since its creation in 2014, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance has diligently followed up on allegations of landmine use by States Parties.
Use of antipersonnel landmines
In this reporting period—October 2015 through October 2016—Landmine Monitor has confirmed new use of antipersonnel mines by the government forces of Myanmar, North Korea, and Syria, and by NSAGs in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen. Additionally, Landmine Monitor has also recorded but has been unable to confirm allegations of new mine use by NSAGs in Cameroon, Chad, Iran, Niger, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.
Locations of antipersonnel mine use, including victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines), October 2015–October 2016
In the reporting period, there were also reports of NSAG use of antivehicle mines in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.
Use by non-state armed groups in States Parties
The use of victim-activated improvised mines continued in Afghanistan by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Hezb-e-Islami, that oppose the government. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that anti-government forces used victim-activated improvised mines in decreasing numbers during early 2016. Victim-activated (pressure plate) improvised mines were responsible for almost half of all casualties recorded from IEDs during the first half of 2016, down 17% from 2015.
Every year since 1999, Landmine Monitor has reported new mine use by armed opposition groups, mainly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC), but new use of victim-activated devices appears to have dropped dramatically beginning in the second half of 2015 and through 2016. The 2016 peace accord, narrowly rejected by voters in October 2016, requires the FARC to cease all armed conflict, demobilize, and turn in all weapons, including mines and components. Previously, in March 2015, the peace talks agreed to begin limited joint clearance activities as a confidence-building measure. That agreement did not require the FARC to halt new use or production, although FARC did pledge not to re-lay mines in any areas cleared.
In this reporting period (October 2015 through October 2016), the Monitor found no evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines by the FARC, including no use of victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines). A review of media reporting during the period found two incidents of new mine use that were attributed to the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) and two more incidents blamed on “criminals.” 
The Colombian army attributed one mine incident in Santander department in August 2015 to the Capt. Paremino Company of the ELN. In October 2015, media reported that the ELN allegedly planted explosive devices near the bodies of dead soldiers. 
Forces of the so-called Islamic State (IS, also called ISIS or ISIL) fighting the government of Iraq have used victim-activated improvised mines, including explosive booby-traps, extensively since 2014. Numerous media reports in 2015 and 2016 suggest widespread use of victim-activated devices by IS forces continues unabated. Iraq stated in its annual transparency report for 2015 that the large IS-controlled areas in Nineveh and Al Anbar, and parts of Babil and Diyala, governorates are where they are “planting landmines, booby traps, and explosives devices.” On 23 October 2016, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that casualties among people fleeing the fighting during the government campaign on Mosul were caused by victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines).
The scale and complexity of IS’s use of improvised mines, including booby-traps, has been the subject of many media reports. According to Lt. Gen. Michael Shields, the director of the United State (US) Joint IED Defeat Organization, “ISIL does an incredible job of booby-trapping urban terrain as either they are still fighting in it or departing it, as has been proven in Fallujah and other places.” During a January 2016 operational update from Baghdad, Army Colonel Steve Warren said that while clearing Ramadi is progressing, it’s “slow and it’s painstaking” because clearance teams have “literally found thousands of booby-traps, IEDs, buried explosives [and] houses rigged to explode with a single trip-wire.” According to Zwer Mohammed, an officer from the Peshmerga bomb disposal teams in Kirkuk, “Since the beginning of the ISIS war in 2014, we have defused 10,000 bombs and booby traps left by ISIS. We defuse around 100 bombs on a daily basis in the liberated areas.”
Boko Haram militants have allegedly been laying unspecified types of landmines in Nigeria since mid-2014. A technical expert working for the Norwegian Refugee Council provided the Monitor with photographs and technical characteristics of victim-activated IEDs made by Boko Haram that are triggered by a pressure plate. He said Al Shabaab in Somalia may have shared its technical knowledge in making such devices with Boko Haram.
In August 2015, Colonel Sani Usman, the spokesperson of the Nigerian Army, reportedly stated that the army cleared landmines planted by Boko Haram from a major road in Borno state. He said that after the militants seized the town, they converted chemistry laboratories at the Dikwa School of Agriculture into bomb-making factories. The Nigerian Army released a series of photos showing its engineers removing improvised mines planted along the Gwoza-Yamteke highway. In August 2016, Nigerian media reported that the army was clearing Boko Haram-laid landmines in Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe states.
Since 2014, the government of Ukraine stated that it had not used antipersonnel landmines in the conflict and accused Russian forces of laying landmines in Ukraine. In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed forces or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions.
In February 2016, Ukraine informed the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance that “its Armed Forces are authorized to use mines in command-detonate mode, which is not prohibited under the Convention. All mines planted in command-detonate mode are recorded, secured and access is restricted.”
Ukrainian civilian and military officials have accused separatist NSAGs of using antipersonnel mines, including improvised mines. At the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015, Ukraine stated that there were mined areas in territory under its jurisdiction but not under its control. In addition to those areas, it said that “sabotage acts are carried out on its territory which is under the control of Ukraine, including mining territory and infrastructure.”
In November 2015, an officer from the General Staff informed soldiers that separatist NSAGs were using landmines attached to fish hooks and fishing lines to snag the clothing of soldiers as they moved through wooded areas, thereby detonating nearby mines. In May 2016, two Ukrainian army engineers in Donetsk region were injured by an improvised mine as they were checking the area for explosives.
In September 2016, Ukraine’s Department of Defense Intelligence reported that pro-Russian separatists had laid POM-2 antipersonnel mines. Later that month, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine reported the presence of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines that it said were preventing the SMM representatives from traveling from Pervomaisk toward Zolote, between Mykolaiv province and Luhansk province.
HRW has reported numerous instances of antipersonnel mine use by Ansar Allah, also called Houthis, and their allied forces loyal to former President Ali Abduallah Saleh in 2015 and 2016. Another NSAG, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, also appears to be using antipersonnel mines.
Areas in and near the city of Taizz in Taizz governorate that Houthis and allied forces occupied from March 2015 until March 2016 were subsequently discovered to have been mined, including with PPM-2 mines manufactured in the former East Germany. Houthi officials denied using antipersonnel mines in Taizz. A September response by Yemen’s foreign ministry affirmed Yemen’s commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty and said that when the conflict ends a committee will be created to investigate the landmine use in Taizz.
In November 2015, HRW reported numerous casualties from landmines, including PPM-2 and Hungarian-made GYATA-64 antipersonnel mines that Houthi forces laid before retreating from Abyan governorate and Aden governorate in July 2015. New use of landmines by Houthi forces was also reported in Marib and Lahj governorates, but the areas remain inaccessible to independent researchers.
In September 2015, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Cooperative Compliance Committee requested to meet with Yemen to discuss continuing mine use. According to the committee’s report, Yemen replied that due to the difficult circumstances faced by the government “it is not able to conduct an investigation for the moment on these new allegations and that due to the lack of adequate information it was unable to attend the meeting.”
Officials reported in May 2016 that large stocks of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines had been recovered from the port city of Mukalla in Hadramout governorate that were allegedly used by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula until it was forced out in April 2016. The governor of Hadramout told a regional media outlet that Al-Qaeda forces extensively mined the Dhabah oil terminal.
There has been no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have used landmines in their military operations in Yemen.
Use by and in states not party
There have been some indications that improvised landmines and other devices are being used in Libya, particularly in Sirte. Further evidence of landmine use has likely gone unrecorded due to a lack of media and independent reporting from the ground.
In June 2016, Reuters reported that Libyan forces, mainly composed of fighters from nearby Misrata, were encountering “mines and concealed explosives” as it fought to capture Sirte from IS militants besieged in the center of the city. Several international media representatives visited the city in September 2016, when IS forces left parts of the city. Fabio Bucciarelli, an Italian photojournalist who documented fighting in Sirte in 2011 and returned in 2016, told TIME that his second visit was different because “today’s war is an even dirtier one” as “ISIS militants used booby-traps, IEDs and car bombs in its attempt to hold onto the city.” In September 2016, a visiting Russia Today (RT) reporter described booby-traps or “explosive devices masked as innocent-looking objects” throughout the city. One Twitter user has posted several examples of improvised antipersonnel mines this year.
Until 2016, the last recorded landmine use in Libya was 20 T-AB-1 antipersonnel mines discovered at Tripoli International Airport in August 2014 by the Libya Dawn alliance, led by militias from the coastal city of Misrata. A coalition of militias from the inland mountain town of Zintan controlled the airport from the end of 2011 until Libya Dawn seized it in 2014.
Since the publication of its first annual report in 1999, Landmine Monitor has consistently documented the use of antipersonnel mines by government forces and NSAGs in Myanmar (Burma). During this reporting period, information available to the Monitor indicates a continuation of the trend of a significantly lower level of new mine use.
In September 2016, deputy Minister of Defence Major General Myint Nwe informed the Myanmar parliament that the army continues to use landmines in the internal armed conflict. At the same session, a Member of Parliament from Shan State said that “it can’t be denied that non-state armed groups are also using landmines…particularly since 2012.”
There have been numerous reports from various credible local sources that antipersonnel mines or devices have been used in Kachin, Kayin, and Shan states between October 2015 and October 2016. It is often not possible to determine if the army or a NSAG laid the mines. NSAGs operating in those provinces include the Democratic Karen Benevolence Army, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, the Shan State Army-South, the Shan State Progress Party/Shan State Army, and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA).
In January 2016, China protested after a Chinese official was injured on the China-Myanmar border by a landmine that was apparently laid during fighting between the Myanmar military and an armed group, however it is unknown which side laid the landmine. Local residents of Kutkai township in Shan State accused the KIA and the TNLA of planting landmines in the town in January 2016. The TNLA had previously stated it would refrain from mine use.
In July 2016, South Korea’s Yonhap News Agency published allegations of mine use by North Korea in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) between the two countries. In August 2016, the US military, citing the United Nations Command (UNC), reported that North Korea was using landmines, and that the UNC condemned the new mine laying as a violation of the 1953 armistice. Previously, two South Korean soldiers on patrol on the South Korean side of the DMZ at Yeonchon in Gyeonggi province were maimed on 4 August 2015 by antipersonnel mines. The South Korean military accused North Korea of laying PMD-6 wooden box mines, made in North Korea.
North Korea denied the use. In August 2015, the North Korean ambassador asserted that the South Korean military had identified the mine as its own, a round M-14, on 4 August and then changed it to a square North Korean box mine on 10 August for political purposes.
In April 2016, a representative of Pakistan told the Monitor that 14% of recovered IEDs used by militants in Pakistan are victim-activated. The explosive devices are victim-activated through pressure plate and infra-red initiation. Sometimes these improvised antipersonnel mines are used as detonators for larger explosive devices, or one initiator will set off multiple explosive devices. NSAGs in Baluchistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) used antipersonnel landmines and victim-activated explosive devices during the reporting period. Use was attributed to Tehrik Taliban Pakistan and Balochistan insurgent groups.
In late 2011, the first reports emerged of Syrian government use of antipersonnel mines in the country’s border areas. A Syrian official acknowledged the government had “undertaken many measures to control the borders, including planting mines.”
In 2016, reports of mine use by IS and Syrian government forces increased. The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) reported several incidents from mines that IS fighters likely laid as the group controlled the territory for prolonged periods of time. For example, in Aleppo governate alone, SNHR reported civilian casualties in August, September, and October 2016 from landmines that IS apparently laid in the villages of Najm, Abu Qalqal, Al Humar, and Al Dadat.
In January 2016, Doctors Without Borders (Medecins sans Frontieres, MSF) reported that Syrian government forces laid landmines around the town of Madaya in Rif Dimashq governorate, 10 kilometers from the Lebanon border. According to MSF, civilians trying to flee the city have been killed and injured by “bullets and landmines.” In October 2016, residents of Madaya claimed that the Lebanese armed group Hezbollah, operating together with government forces, laid antipersonnel mines around the town. A medical group and a media organization reported that “landmines” have been laid around the edge of the town.
In March 2016, Syrian government forces in the city of Palmyra reported that they were finding “landmines” planted by IS fighters.
During a five-day investigation in Manbij in early October 2016, HRW collected the names of 69 civilians, including 19 children, killed by improvised mines, including booby-traps, laid in schools, homes, and on roads during and after the fighting for control for the city, involving IS and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)—a coalition of Kurdish, Arab, and other forces supported by the US government. Nearly all the incidents HRW documented appeared to have been caused by victim-activated IEDs, rather than by explosives detonated by a vehicle or by remote-control.
Allegations and other reports
Landmine Monitor has also recorded allegations and other reports of new mine use by NSAGs in States Parties Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Philippines, and Tunisia, as well as states not party Iran and Saudi Arabia. The Monitor cannot confirm use in any of these instances.
Various media outlets have continued to report new “landmine” use by Boko Haram militants in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger. Landmine Monitor has not confirmed the nature of the devices used or the circumstances of the allegations.
In March 2016, the Philippines Campaign to Ban Landmines called on the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF), a breakaway faction of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, to stop using victim-activated explosive devices at Barangay Tee in Datu Salibo municipality in Maguindanao province and to respect international humanitarian law. In June 2016, government troops were killed and injured by explosive devices left by Islamist armed groups fleeing their camp.
In Tunisia, government forces engaged in operations against militants in Jebel Al-Cha’anby in Qsrein Wilaya/Kasserine governorate near the Algerian border suffered casualtiesfrom victim-activated explosive devices in 2015 and 2016. The Monitor cannot confirm when the improvised mines were emplaced, but due to the ongoing nature of the conflict, it is likely that they were recently laid.
In October 2015, several newspapers reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guards were laying antipersonnel mines on Iran’sborder with northern Iraq. Eyewitnesses reportedly observed the mine-laying operation and media reports state that the Kurdish authorities warned the inhabitants of the Penjwen area of Sulaymaniyah governorate not to approach the border due to new mine use. The mines were reportedly laid to prevent incursion by Kurdish militants and smugglers.
Saudi Arabia has reported that soldiers have been injured by landmines on its border with Yemen, however it is not clear from the reports on which side of the border the mines were laid or who had laid them.
Stockpiles of antipersonnel mines possessed by states not party and non-state armed groups
The Monitor estimates that as many as 31 of the 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty stockpile landmines. Previously, in 1999, the Monitor estimated that, collectively, states not party stockpile about 160 million antipersonnel mines, but today the global total may be less than 50 million.
Largest stockpilers of antipersonnel mines
States not party that likely have stockpiled antipersonnel mines
It is unclear if all 31 states are currently stockpiling antipersonnel mines. Officials from the UAE have provided contradictory information regarding its possession of stocks, while Bahrain and Morocco have stated that they have only small stockpiles used solely for training purposes.
Three states not party, all Pacific states, have said that they do not stockpile antipersonnel mines: Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Tonga. It is unclear if Palestine possesses stockpiles of antipersonnel mines.
States not party to the Mine Ban Treaty routinely destroy stockpiled antipersonnel mines as an element of ammunition management programs and the phasing out of obsolete munitions. In recent years, such stockpile destruction has been reported in China, Israel, Mongolia, Pakistan, Russia, the US, and Vietnam.
Non-state armed groups
Fewer NSAGs appear to be able to access factory-made antipersonnel mines now that production and transfers have halted under the Mine Ban Treaty, and stockpiles have largely been destroyed. Some NSAGs have acquired mine stocks, at times stolen from arsenals or purchased from corrupt officials in states not party, or removed them from minefields, but most appear to make their own improvised mines, also known as IEDs and as booby-traps, from locally available materials.
During this reporting period, NSAGs and criminal groups in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were reported to possess stocks of factory-made antipersonnel mines or components to manufacture victim-activated IEDs (improvised mines). The Monitor largely relies on reports of seizures by government forces or verified photographic evidence from journalists to identify NSAGs possessing mine stockpiles.
Production of antipersonnel mines
More than 50 states produced antipersonnel mines at some point in the past. Forty-one states have ceased production of antipersonnel mines, including four that are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty: Egypt, Israel, Nepal, and the US.
In November 2015, Singapore Technologies Engineering announced that it had ceased production of antipersonnel mines and published the decision on its website in a section entitled “Sustainability Governance.” In a letter to PAX, a Dutch NGO, the company’s president Tan Pheng Hock stated, “ST Engineering is now no longer in the business of designing, producing and selling of anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions or any related key components.” The Monitor will continue to list Singapore as a producer until the government formally commits to no future production. Singapore already observes an indefinite export moratorium.
The Monitor identifies 11 states as producers of antipersonnel mines, unchanged from the previous report: China, Cuba, India, Iran, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam. Most of these countries are not believed to be actively producing mines but reserve the right to do so. Those most likely to be actively producing are India, Myanmar, Pakistan, and South Korea.
NSAGs in countries including Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia, and Syria fabricate antipersonnel mines and victim-activated IEDs. The NGO Conflict Armament Research reported in April 2015 that IS is producing and deploying IEDs on a large scale.
Transfers of antipersonnel mines
A de facto global ban on the transfer of antipersonnel mines has been in effect since the mid-1990s. This ban is attributable to the mine ban movement and the stigma attached to the weapon. The Monitor has never conclusively documented any state-to-state transfers of antipersonnel mines since it began publishing annually in 1999. However, the use of factory-produced antipersonnel mines in conflicts in Yemen and Ukraine, where declared stockpiles had been destroyed, indicates that some transfers, either internally among actors or from sources external to the country, are occurring.
Three types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen since 2013: PPM-2 mines, GYATA-64 mines, and a Bulgarian-made PSM-1 bounding fragmentation mine, found in its 1980s-vintage factory packaging in an arms bazaar in the town of Marib in 2015. None of these mines were among the four types of antipersonnel mines that Yemen reported stockpiling in the past, including for training mine clearance personnel. The evidence of further use of these specific types of antipersonnel mines in 2015 and 2016 suggests either that Yemen’s 2002 declaration to the UN Secretary-General on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 2002. In a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, said that individuals had smuggled weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that the current government had not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.
The State Security Service of Ukraine has reported seizing and recovering antipersonnel mines from Russian-backed separatists in 2016, including 24 MON-series directional fragmentation munitions, five OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines, one PMN-2 blast mine, and 24 TM-62 antivehicle mines. Ukraine finished destroying stockpiles of PMN mines in 2003; other mine types are possessed by Russia, Ukraine, and any number of successor states of the Soviet Union.
At least nine states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, including six landmine producers, have enacted formal moratoriums on the export of antipersonnel mines: China, India, Israel, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, and the US. Other past exporters have made statements declaring that they have stopped exporting, including Cuba, Egypt, and Vietnam. Iran also claims to have stopped exporting in 1997, despite evidence to the contrary.
Universalizing the landmine ban
Since the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force on 1 March 1999, states that had not signed it by then may no longer sign and ratify the treaty but must accede, a process that essentially combines signature and ratification. Of the 162 States Parties, 132 signed and ratified the treaty, while 30 acceded.
The last country to accede to the Mine Ban Treaty was Oman on 20 August 2014.
The 35 states not party to the Mine Ban Treaty include the Marshall Islands, which is the last signatory yet to ratify.
On 2 March 2016, Ambassador Ravinatha Pandukabhaya Aryasinha announced that Sri Lanka’s cabinet of ministers has approved accession to the Mine Ban Treaty, but the instrument of ratification had not been deposited as of 15 October 2016.
The US government announced policy measures in June and September 2014 banning US production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines, accelerating stockpile destruction, and banning mine use, except on the Korean Peninsula. The Obama administration also indicated its “aspiration” for the US to “eventually accede to the Ottawa Convention,” but there have been few signs of new steps toward that goal.
Annual UN General Assembly resolution
Since 1997, the annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution has provided states outside the Mine Ban Treaty with an important opportunity to indicate their support for the humanitarian rationale of the treaty and the objective of its universalization. A dozen of the countries that have acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty since 1999 did so after voting in favor of consecutive UNGA resolutions.
On 7 December 2015, UNGA Resolution 70/55 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty was adopted by a vote of 168 states in favor, none against, and 17 abstentions. This is the highest number of affirmative votes for the annual resolution.
A core of 14 states not party have abstained from consecutive Mine Ban Treaty resolutions, most of them since 1997: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Uzbekistan, the US, and Vietnam.
Non-state armed groups
Some NSAGs have expressed a willingness to observe the ban on antipersonnel mines, which reflects the strength of the growing international norm and stigmatization of the weapon. In June 2015, the Kurdistan Freedom Party of Iran signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment pledging not to use antipersonnel mines. At least 65 NSAGs have committed to halt using antipersonnel mines since 1997. The exact number is difficult to determine, as NSAGs have no permanence, frequently split into factions, go out of existence, or become part of state structures.
Convention on Conventional Weapons
Amended Protocol II of the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) entered into force on 3 December 1998 and regulates the production, transfer, and use of mines, booby-traps, and other explosive devices. Weaknesses of the original protocol and inadequate measures to improve it through Amended Protocol II gave impetus to the Ottawa Process that resulted in the Mine Ban Treaty. As of October 2016, a total of 102 states were party to Amended Protocol II.
Only 10 states that are party to Amended Protocol II have not joined the Mine Ban Treaty: China, Georgia, India, Israel, Morocco, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Sri Lanka, and the US. Therefore, for antipersonnel mines, the protocol is only relevant for those 10 countries as the rest are bound by the much higher standards of the Mine Ban Treaty.
The original Protocol II on mines, booby-traps, and other devices entered into force on 2 December 1983. It has largely been superseded by the 1996 Amended Protocol II, but 13 states that are party to the original protocol have yet to ratify the amended protocol: Cuba, Lao PDR, Mongolia, and Uzbekistan and Mine Ban Treaty States Parties Burundi, Djibouti, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Togo, Uganda, and Uzbekistan.
A total of 17 states that stockpile antipersonnel mines are not party to the Mine Ban Treaty, CCW Amended Protocol II, or CCW Protocol II. Five of these states are also landmine producers.
States that stockpile antipersonnel mines but are not party to the CCW
Status and Operation of the Mine Ban Treaty
In general, States Parties’ implementation of and compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty has been excellent. The core obligations have largely been respected, and when ambiguities have arisen they have been dealt with in a satisfactory matter. However, there are serious compliance concerns regarding a small number of States Parties with respect to use of antipersonnel mines and missed stockpile destruction deadlines. In addition, some States Parties are not doing nearly enough to implement key provisions of the treaty, including those concerning mine clearance and victim assistance, which are detailed in other chapters of this report.
At the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties created a new Committee on Cooperative Compliance to consider whether a concern about compliance with the prohibitions contained in Article 1.1 is potentially credible and, if so, to consider any follow-up that might be appropriate for States Parties.
The chair of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Cooperative Compliance delivered a report to the May 2016 intersessional meetings, detailing its work and preliminary observations concerning allegations or reports of landmine use in States Parties. According to the report, beginning in January 2016, “the Committee met regularly to consider past instances of alleged use of antipersonnel mines and assess the credibility of these allegations and the value of follow-up on them.” The committee met with the representatives of concerned States Parties Sudan, South Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen to engage each in a cooperative dialogue regarding allegations of use of antipersonnel mines. The committee did not recommend specific actions be taken by States Parties, but will continue its work to further follow-up on these and other allegations of use.
Use of antipersonnel mines by States Parties
In this reporting period, commencing in October 2015, there has been no confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by government forces of States Parties. Prior to Landmine Monitor Report 2013, there had never been a confirmed case of use of antipersonnel mines by the armed forces of a State Party since the Mine Ban Treaty became binding international law in 1999. That is no longer the case since the confirmation by Yemen that a violation of the convention by its forces occurred in 2011.
A number of allegations of mine use in previous years by the armed forces of South Sudan (in 2013 and 2011) and Sudan (in 2011) were addressed by the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance in its report to the May 2016 intersessional meetings.
A total of 156 of the 162 States Parties do not stockpile antipersonnel mines, of which 89 have officially declared completion of stockpile destruction and 65 have declared never possessing antipersonnel mines (except in some cases for training purposes). Tuvalu has not made an official declaration, but is not thought to possess antipersonnel mines. Somaliaacknowledgedthat “large stocks are in the hands of former militias and private individuals,” and that Somalia is “putting forth efforts to verify if in fact it holds antipersonnel mines in its stockpile.” No stockpiled mines have been destroyed since the treaty came into force for Somalia, which has a destruction deadline of 1 October 2016. It has not provided an annual update to its transparency report since 2014.
Collectively, States Parties have destroyed more than 51 million stockpiled antipersonnel mines, including more than 2.1 million destroyed in 2015.
Four States Parties possess more than seven million antipersonnel mines remaining to be destroyed: Ukraine (5.4 million), Belarus (1.5 million), Greece (643,265), and Oman (15,734).
Poland reported informally to Landmine Monitor that it had completed the destruction of its stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in the second half of 2016, well ahead of its 1 June 2017 deadline, and that it intended to make a formal announcement at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2016.
Oman destroyed 1,526 antipersonnel mines in two destruction events in September 2015. It has committed to destroy its stockpile by the deadline of 1 February 2019.
Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine remain in violation of Article 4 after failing to complete the destruction of their stockpiles by their four-year deadline. The inability of Belarus, Greece, and Ukraine to complete their stockpile destruction is a matter of deep concern for States Parties, the ICBL, and the ICRC. The Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014 called on States Parties that missed their deadline to comply without delay and also to communicate their plans to do so, to request any assistance needed, and to provide an expected completion date. The Maputo Action Plan added a call for these states to provide a plan for the destruction of their remaining stockpiles by 31 December 2014.
Belarus reported destroying 1,862,080 PFM-1 mines in 2015 in its transparency report submitted on 30 April 2016. At the Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties in December 2015, Belarus said the project to destroy stockpiles of PFM-type mines was extended until August 2020 and the contract between the European Commission and the company in charge of carrying out destruction, EXPAL, until February 2018. In a May 2016 progress report, Belarus stated that this project is scheduled to be completed by the end of 2017. Belarus also stated that it will destroy any residual stocks of PFM mines that were in an “unsafe” condition to be destroyed by EXPAL.
Complicated legal and contractual issues surrounding the destruction of Greece’s stockpile of antipersonnel mines continue to stall any physical destruction. This situation is further complicated by the stockpiles being located in both Greece and Bulgaria. Greece reported in May 2016 that an amended contract between the Ministry of National Defence and the Hellenic Defence Systems will be signed at some unspecified point to set a timetable for the destruction of the remaining stockpiles.
At the May 2016 intersessional meetings, Ukraine stated that on 19 October 2015 an additional agreement was reached among the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, NATO Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the resumption of the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines. Within the context of this agreement, a total of 642,960 PFM-1 mines are slated to be destroyed between 2015 and the end of 2016; 233,496 had been destroyed by 1 May 2016. Ukraine has not detailed any plans to destroy stockpiled POM-2 antipersonnel mines.
Mines retained for training and research (Article 3)
Article 3 of the Mine Ban Treaty allows a State Party to retain or transfer “a number of anti-personnel mines for the development of and training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques…The amount of such mines shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely necessary for the above-mentioned purposes.”
A total of 71 States Parties have reported that they retain antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, of which 40 have retained more than 1,000 mines and three (Finland, Turkey, and Bangladesh) have each retained more than 12,000 mines. Eighty-six States Parties have declared that they do not retain any antipersonnel mines, including 33 states that stockpiled antipersonnel mines in the past.
States retaining more than 1,000 antipersonnel mines
In addition to those listed above, another 32 States Parties each retain fewer than 1,000 mines and together possess a total of 13,267 retained mines. This amount is 1,952 fewer retained mines than reported for the previous year.
While laudable for transparency, several States Parties are still reporting as retained antipersonnel mines devices that are fuzeless, inert, rendered free from explosives, or otherwise irrevocably rendered incapable of functioning as an antipersonnel mine, including by the destruction of the fuzes. Technically, these are no longer considered antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty; a total of at least 12 States Parties retain antipersonnel mines in this condition.
The ICBL has expressed concern at the large number of States Parties that are retaining mines but apparently not using those mines for permitted purposes. For these States Parties, the number of mines retained remains the same each year, indicating none are being consumed (destroyed) during training or research activities. No other details have been provided about how the mines are being used. Nine States Parties have never reported consuming any mines retained for permitted purposes since the treaty entered into force for them: Burundi, Cape Verde, Cyprus, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Finland, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo.
Article 7 of the Mine Ban Treaty requires that each State Party “report to the Secretary General of the United Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” regarding steps taken to implement the treaty. Thereafter, States Parties are obligated to report annually, by 30 April, on the preceding calendar year.
Only one State Party has not submitted an initial report: Tuvalu (due 28 August 2012).
As of 15 October 2016, only 45% of States Parties had submitted annual reports for calendar year 2015, a slight increase from the previous year (41%). A total of 89 States Parties have not submitted a report for calendar year 2015.
Of this group, 80 States Parties have failed to submit an annual transparency report for two or more years.
No state that is currently not party to the treaty submitted a voluntary report in 2015. In previous years, Morocco (2006, 2008–2011, and 2013), Azerbaijan (2008 and 2009), Lao PDR (2010), Mongolia (2007), Palestine (2012 and 2013), and Sri Lanka (2005) submitted voluntary reports.
 See below for details on use in Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.
 An antipersonnel mine is a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, injure, or kill one or more persons. A mine is a munition designed to be placed under or near the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person or vehicle. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 2. See the Casualties and Victim Assistance chapter for further definitional clarifications.
 For details on extension requests, please see the Contamination and Clearance chapter.
 NSAGs used mines in at least 10 countries in 2014–2015, seven countries in 2013–2014, eight countries in 2012–2013, six countries in 2011–2012, four countries in 2010, six countries in 2009, seven countries in 2008, and nine countries in 2007. NSAGs often use improvised mines, rather than factory-made antipersonnel mines.
 UNAMA, “Afghanistan Mid-year Report 2016 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict,” Kabul, September 2016, pp. 49–50, bit.ly/UNAMA2016midyear. Although overall casualty numbers decreased, pressure-plate IEDs caused 48% of civilian casualties from IEDs in the first half of 2016 compared to 46% in the first half of 2015.
 Acuerdo sobre limpieza y descontaminación del territorio de la presencia de minas antipersonal (MAP), artefactos explosivos improvisados (AEI) y municiones sin explotar (MUSE) o restos explosivos de guerra (REG) en general. Comunicado conjunto #52 entre el Gobierno colombiano y la guerrilla Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), La Habana, 7 March 2015, www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/comunicados/comunicado-conjunto-52-la-habana-7-de-marzo-de-2015.
 July 2015–July 2016 media tracking in Colombia by Camilo Serna, Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas (CCCM), 12 July 2016. Media database of new use, unknown use, and seizures. The database contained 149 incidents. Seventy-nine were attributed to the FARC, 36 to the ELN, one to Los Urabenos, and 33 unattributable. Reports were collected from the following Colombian media sources: El Tiempo, Meridiano, Ejército Nacional, RCN Radio, Caracol Radio, Radio Santa Fe, El País, El Espectador, El Pais, La FM, El Heraldo, La Voz del Cinaruco, La Nación, Pasto Extra, HSB Noticias, and Vanguardia.
 See for example, “ISIS’s latest threat: laying landmines,” IRIN, 6 November 2014, www.irinnews.org/report/100797/isis-s-latest-threat-laying-landmines; and Mike Giglio, “The Hidden Enemy in Iraq,” Buzzfeed, 19 March 2015, www.buzzfeed.com/mikegiglio/the-hidden-enemy-in-iraq#.inr8zj66W.
 “ISIL landmines: Iraq tells civilians to avoid Ramadi,” Al Jazeera, 24 April 2016, www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/civilians-warned-returning-iraq-ramadi-160424150550375.html; and Sophia Jones, “Civilians Risk Landmines And Snipers To Flee Fallujah As U.S.-Backed Iraqi Fighters Battle ISIS,” Huffington Post, 26 May 2016, bit.ly/fallujah26May2016.
 “Mohammed” told HRW that to leave Hawija, his family paid smugglers US$500 to avoid the explosive devices that IS had planted surrounding the city. The smugglers charged $250 each for him and his wife, and nothing for their two children. He said that as they walked through the mine-infested area, “we saw at least three bodies on the ground, killed by mines.” Brahan Hussein, who was part of the same group and had paid the same price to smugglers, said that he saw at least two dead children and a woman on the ground and presumed they had been killed by mines. HRW, “Iraq: ISIS Endangering Civilians in Mosul and Hawija,” 23 October 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/23/iraq-isis-endangering-civilians-mosul-and-hawija.
 Patrick Tucker, “The Apps They Carried: Software, Big Data, and the Fight for Mosul,” Defense One, 17 October 2016, www.defenseone.com/technology/2016/10/apps-they-carried-software-big-data-and-fight-mosul/132409/?oref=d-channeltop.
 US Department of Defense, “Clearing Ramadi Progresses Despite Obstacles, Inherent Resolve Official Says,” 20 January 2016, www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/643727/clearing-ramadi-progresses-despite-obstacles-inherent-resolve-official-says.
 Email exchange with Manuel Gonzal, Security Advisor, Norwegian Refugee Council – Nigeria, 7 March 2016.
 “Nigerian Army Disables Boko Haram Explosives,” Voice of America, 5 August 2015, www.voanews.com/content/nigeria-army-disables-boko-haram-explosives/2903551.html.
 “Bombs, IEDS & Land Mines: Nigeria Army Clear Gwoza -Yamteke Road in Borno (Photos),” Tori.ng, 5 August 2015, www.tori.ng/news/5950/bombs-ieds-land-mines-nigeria-army-clear-gwoza-yam.html.
 Duku Joel Maiduguri, “Military receives equipment to clear Boko Haram landmines in Northeast,” The Nation, 20 August 2016, http://thenationonlineng.net/military-receives-equipment-clear-boko-haram-landmines-northeast/.
 Submission of Ukraine, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 June 2014, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Ukraine-information.pdf; and statement of Ukraine, Intersessional Meeting of the Committee on Cooperative Compliance, Geneva, 26 June 2015, bit.ly/Ukraine26June2015.
 The Military Prosecutor confirmed that an assessment had been undertaken to ensure that stockpiled KSF-1 and KSF-1S cartridges containing PFM-1 antipersonnel mines, BKF-PFM-1 cartridges with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines, and 9M27K3 rockets with PFM-1S antipersonnel mines are not operational, but rather destined for destruction in accordance with the Mine Ban Treaty.
 “In the past day, three soldiers were killed and two wounded,” Ukraine Crisis Media Center, Kiev, 5 May 2016, http://uacrisis.org/ua/42788-oleksandr-motuzyanik-91.
 “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30, 26 September 2016,” OSCE SMM to Ukraine, Kiev, 27 September, 2016, www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/268961.
 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Civilian Victims,” 8 September 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/08/yemen-houthi-landmines-claim-civilian-victims.
 Officials at the Ministry of Human Rights in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and Saleh’s General People’s Congress party, told HRW in late July that the Houthis and allied forces did not use antipersonnel mines. An official with the office of the Supreme Revolutionary Committee, a Houthi body, said in early August that the group did not plant antipersonnel mines in the city of Taizz. He acknowledged Houthi use of antivehicle mines, but said the use was “in military areas” only and claimed that civilian casualties from antivehicle mines were rare. The official alleged that other, unnamed, armed groups in Yemen had used antipersonnel mines.
 HRW, “Yemen: Houthi Landmines Claim Civilian Victims,” 8 September 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/08/yemen-houthi-landmines-claim-civilian-victims.
 HRW, “Yemen: New Houthi Landmine Use,” 18 November 2015, www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/18/yemen-new-houthi-landmine-use.
 Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance (Algeria, Canada, Peru, Sweden), “Report and preliminary observations for 2016 intersessional meetings,” May 2016, bit.ly/MBTCompliance16May2016. On 19 February 2016, the treaty’s compliance committee met with a representative of Yemen, who informed it that in Yemen “the situation remains unchanged and that no new investigations into the alleged use of anti-personnel mines have been conducted. The last investigation took place in 2011 but had to be halted due to the political and security situation, and has not been resumed.”
 Saeed Al Batati, “Tip-offs helped accelerate Al Mukalla liberation,” Gulf News, 9 May 2016, http://m.gulfnews.com/news/gulf/yemen/tip-offs-helped-accelerate-al-mukalla-liberation-1.1821207.
 “Libyan forces battle Islamic State snipers for streets of Sirte,” Reuters (Sirte), 29 July 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-libya-security-sirte-idUSKCN1092E0.
 Olivier Laurent, “Now and Then: Photographing the Battles for Sirte,” Time.com, 25 October 2016, http://time.com/4537800/photographing-battles-for-sirte/.
 RT interviewed and accompanied pro-government Libyan engineers who told him they had found five “bomb factories” that IS operated during its occupation of Sirte. “Death on every corner: RT takes a look behind ISIS bomb-making industry in Sirte,” RT, 8 September 2016, www.rt.com/news/358622-libya-sirte-isis-bomb-whiteman/.
 A video uploaded in August reportedly shows a Libyan army officer clearing a victim-activated improvised explosive device consisting of a 155mm artillery shell main charge and a pressure plate trigger that he described as a “very common design of IED found in Benghazi.” Photographs posted online that month show the clearance of a large pressure plate linked to an artillery shell main charge found at the foot of a stairwell inside a building. The location is not identified. Photographs posted online by the same account on 1 March and reportedly taken in Benghazi show a grenade with a silk wire “booby-trap” discovered by civilians returning home after the Libya National Army liberated the area. See: “Libya Army EOD renders safe an IED in Benghazi - August 2016,” YouTube.com, 25 August 2015, www.youtube.com/watch?v=_HSiBKRwkiU; @JanusThe2, “#Libya Large, blue pressure plate with #artillery shell main charge found at foot of a stairwell and rendered safe,” 3 August 2016, 5:05 AM, Tweet, https://twitter.com/JanusThe2/status/760808847632203776; and @JanusThe2, “Civilian returning home to #Benghazi after LNA liberated the area found this: grenade with silk wire ‘booby-trap’,” 1 March 2016, 12:24 AM, Tweet, https://twitter.com/JanusThe2/status/704582980442923008.
 Htoo Thant, “Tatmadaw insists landmine use kept within reasonable minimum,” Myanmar Times, 13 September 2016, www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/22475-tatmadaw-insists-landmine-use-kept-within-reasonable-minimum.html.
 Guy Dinmore and Wa Lone, “China protests after landmine injures official,” Myanmar Times, 6 January 2016, www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/18337-china-protests-after-landmine-injures-official.html.
 “Local residents call for removal of landmines in Kutkai,” Global New Light of Myanmar, 3 March 2016, www.burmalibrary.org/docs21/GNLM2016-03-03-red.pdf; and, Nyein Nyein, “Ethnic Civilians Demand End to Army Abuses in Shan State,” Irrawaddy, 2 March 2016, www.irrawaddy.com/burma/ethnic-civilians-demand-end-to-army-abuses-in-shan-state.html.
 The TNLA is the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF) which signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment banning antipersonnel landmines in 2007. Since 2014, Geneva Call has been pursuing inquiries about allegations of mine use made against the TNLA. See, “Burma/Myanmar: Geneva Call urges an end to mine use in northern Shan State,” Geneva Call, 14 July 2016, genevacall.org/burmamyanmar-geneva-call-urges-end-mine-use-northern-shan-state/.
 “N.K. seen doubling landmines in DMZ this year: S. Korean military,” Yonhap News Agency, 3 July 2016, english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2016/07/03/0200000000AEN20160703004000315.html
 “N. Korea reportedly laying land mines near landmark bridge,” Stars and Stripes, 26 August 2016, www.stripes.com/news/pacific/n-korea-reportedly-laying-land-mines-near-landmark-bridge-1.425108.
 “North Korea Rejects Landmine Blasts Blame,” Sky News, 14 August 2015, http://news.sky.com/story/north-korea-rejects-landmine-blasts-blame-10349417.
 Presentation given by Pakistani delegation to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, digital recording, 6 April 2016, http://conf.unog.ch/; and Landmine Monitor interview with Pakistani delegation to the CCW Amended Protocol II Meeting of Experts, Geneva, 8 April 2016.
 Email from Raza Shah Khan, Executive Director, Sustainable Peace And Development Organization (SPADO), 28 July 2016; and Tariq Saeed, “Landmine blast in KA killed two FC men,” Pakistan Observer, 23 April 2016, pakobserver.net/landmine-blast-in-ka-killed-two-fc-men/.
 ICBL Press Release, “ICBL publicly condemns reports of Syrian forces laying mines,” 2 November 2011, www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2011/icbl-publicly-condemns-reports-of-syrian-forces-la.aspx.
 “Assad troops plant land mines on Syria-Lebanon border,” The Associated Press, 1 November 2011, www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/assad-troops-plant-land-mines-on-syria-lebanon-border-1.393200.
 “Civilians died due to ISIS landmines explosion in Mazyounet Al Humar village in Aleppo governorate, September 21,” Syrian Network for Human Rights, London, 21 September 2016, bit.ly/sn4hr21Sep2016.
 MSF,“Syria: Siege and Starvation in Madaya,” 7 January 2016, www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/syria-siege-and-starvation-madaya.
 See, “Injured by one of 8,000 landmines in desperate escape bid, Madaya man faces double amputation,” Syria Direct, 5 October 2016, bit.ly/SyriaDirect5Oct2016; “Madaya: Starvation Under Siege,” Syrian American Medical Association, January 2016, p. 1, www.sams-usa.net/foundation/images/Report_Madaya_Starvation_Under_Siege_.pdf; and Monitor email interview with Kristen Gillespie Demilio, Editor-in-Chief, Syria Direct, 7 October 2016.
 Raf Sanchez, “Syrian regime troops struggle to clear explosive booby traps in Palmyra,” The Telegraph, 28 March 2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/03/28/syrian-regime-troops-struggle-to-clear-explosive-booby-traps-in/.
 HRW Press Release, “Syria: Improvised Mines Kill, Injure Hundreds in Manbij,” 26 October 2016, www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/26/syria-improvised-mines-kill-injure-hundreds-manbij.
 “Landmine Explosion Kills 6 Soilders at Niger-Nigerian Border,” Africa News, 8 January 2016, www.africanews.com/2016/01/18/landmine-explosion-kills-6-soilders-at-niger-nigerian-border/; Edwin Kindzeka Moki, “Boko Haram Land Mine Kills 2 in Cameroon Military Convoy,” The Daily Mail, 15 February 2016, www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-3447888/Boko-Haram-land-kills-2-Cameroon-military-convoy.html; Edwin Kindzeka Moki, “Cameroon Vigilantes Hunt for Boko Haram Landmines,” VOA News, 4 March 2016, www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-vigilantes-hunt-for-boko-haram-landmines/3219444.html; “Fighting Boko Haram: Landmine seriously injures 3 Cameroonian service men,” Cameroon Concord, 8 June 2016, bit.ly/CameroonConcord8Jun2016; “Boko Haram landmine kills four Chadian soldiers,” Reuters, 27 August 2016, www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-security-chad-idUSKCN1120KY; and “Boko Haram Landmines Inflict Heavy Toll on Cameroon,” Latin America Herald Tribune, 29 June 2016, www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=2415012&CategoryId=12395. Niger has not filed an updated Article 7 report since 2012, but noted in an Article 5 extension request of March 2016 that new contamination by Boko Haram had occurred. Chad submitted an annual Article 7 report in March 2016, but did not include any information on new contamination. Cameroon has not filed an updated Article 7 report since 2009 and has provided no official information to States Parties on any new contamination.
 The device appears to have been victim-activated, but details of the mechanism were not available to the Monitor. The use was attributed to Dawlah Islamiya, comprised of rogue Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and foreign combatants led by Abdullah Maute. “2 soldiers killed, 5 hurt in landmine blast in Lanao Sur,” Philippine Inquirer, 2 June 2016, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/788832/2-soldiers-killed-5-hurt-in-landmine-blast-in-lanao-sur.
 See for example, Tarek Amara, “Two Tunisians killed in landmine blast near Algerian border: ministry,” Reuters, 30 May 2016, www.yahoo.com/news/two-tunisians-killed-landmine-blast-near-algerian-border-082410754.html.
 “لجيش-الإيراني-يزرع-ألغاما-على-الحدود-مع-كردستان-العراق” (“Iranian army mines the border with Kurdistan Iraq”), Al Araby Algaded, 25 October 2015, bit.ly/AlArabyAlgaded25Oct2015; and “ايران-تزرع-الغاما-على-امتداد-الحدود-مع” (“Iranian mines along border”), Iraq News Agency, 26 October 2015, bit.ly/IraqNewsAgency26Oct2015.
 “Saudi Arabia says guard killed by land mine on Yemen border,” Al Arabiya (AP), 13 July 2016, bit.ly/AlArabiya13July2016; and “Saudi officer killed by landmine on Yemen border,” The New Arab, 24 May 2016, www.alaraby.co.uk/english/news/2016/5/24/saudi-officer-killed-by-landmine-on-yemen-border.
 In 2014, China informed Landmine Monitor that its stockpile is “less than” five million, but there is an amount of uncertainty about the method China uses to derive this figure. For example, it is not known whether antipersonnel mines contained in remotely-delivered systems, so-called “scatterable” mines, are counted individually or as just the container, which can hold numerous individual mines. Previously, China was estimated to have 110 million antipersonnel mines in stockpile.
 There are 51 confirmed current and past producers. Not included in that total are five States Parties that some sources have cited as past producers, but who deny it: Croatia, Nicaragua, Philippines, Thailand, and Venezuela. It is also unclear if Syria has produced antipersonnel mines.
 Additionally, Taiwan passed legislation banning production in June 2006. The 36 States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that once produced antipersonnel mines are Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BiH, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, the UK, and Zimbabwe.
 See the Singapore Technologies Engineering website, www.stengg.com/corporate-governance/sustainability/sustainability-governance. See also, Stop Explosive Investments, “Singapore Technologies Engineering stops production of cluster munitions,” 18 November 2015, bit.ly/STE18Nov2015. Investors received similar letters; and Local Authority Pension Fund Forum, “ST Engineering Quits Cluster Munitions,” 18 November 2015, www.lapfforum.org/press/files/20151118SingaporeTechnologiespressreleasefinal.pdf.
 Letter to PAX from Tan Pheng Hock, President and Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Technologies Engineering Ltd, 11 November 2015.
 Forum on the Arms Trade and Stimson Center, “Tracking arms in conflict: Lessons from Syria and Iraq,” 7 April 2015, www.forumarmstrade.org/uploads/1/9/0/8/19082495/april7_findings_final.pdf. See also, Conflict Armament Research, “Inside Islamic State’s Improvised Weapon Factories in Fallujah,” July 2016, www.conflictarm.com/download-file/?report_id=2391&file_id=2396.
 Letter to HRW from Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 7 September 2016, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/yemeni_mofa_response_to_hrw_landmines_sept_7_2016.pdf.
 Landmine Monitor received information in 2002–2004 that demining organizations in Afghanistan were clearing and destroying many hundreds of Iranian YM-I and YM-I-B antipersonnel mines, date stamped 1999 and 2000, from abandoned Northern Alliance frontlines. Information provided to Landmine Monitor and the ICBL by HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group, and other demining groups in Afghanistan. Iranian antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were also part of a shipment seized by Israel in January 2002 off the coast of the Gaza Strip.
 The 30 accessions include two countries that joined the Mine Ban Treaty through the process of “succession.” These two countries are Montenegro (after the dissolution of Serbia and Montenegro) and South Sudan (after it became independent from Sudan). Of the 132 signatories, 44 ratified on or before entry into force (1 March 1999) and 88 ratified afterward.
 ICBL, “Sri Lanka decides to join Mine Ban Treaty,” 3 March 2016, http://www.icbl.org/en-gb/news-and-events/news/2016/sri-lanka-decides-to-join-mine-ban-treaty.aspx.
 Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Changes to U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Policy,” The White House, 23 September 2014, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/fact-sheet-changes-us-anti-personnel-landmine-policy.
 This includes: Belarus, Bhutan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Finland, FYR Macedonia, Nigeria, Oman, Papua New Guinea, and Turkey.
 The 17 states that abstained were: Cuba, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, the US, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
 Previously, the resolution’s highest number of affirmative votes was 165 in favor in 2013 and 2010, while the lowest number of votes in support was 138 in 2001.
 Uzbekistan voted in favor of the UNGA resolution on the Mine Ban Treaty in 1997.
 Geneva Call, “Iran: a Kurdish armed movement takes official commitments to reinforce the protection of civilian,” Press Release, 28 June 2015, genevacall.org/iran-kurdish-armed-movement-takes-official-commitments-reinforce-protection-civilian/. Geneva Call states that the group is not currently using antipersonnel landmines. It is not known if the group possesses a stockpile or was a past user. While created by Iranian Kurds, the group is carrying out its armed activities in Iraq alongside Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga forces.
 As of October 2015, 45 through the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment, 19 by self-declaration, and four by the Rebel Declaration (two signed both the Rebel Declaration and the Deed of Commitment). See, Geneva Call, “Deed of Commitment,” undated, www.genevacall.org/how-we-work/deed-of-commitment/. Prior to 2000, several declarations were issued regarding the mine ban by NSAGs, some of whom later signed the Deed of Commitment and the Rebel Declaration.
 The committee will also, “When appropriate, in close consultation with the States Parties concerned, clarify the situation, and if as a result it assesses that the concern is credible, make suggestions on steps that the States Parties concerned could take to ensure that the Convention remains strong and effective; For cases where the concern is credible, present preliminary observations at intersessional meetings if need be, and conclusions and recommendations at Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences; Remain transparent and accountable, including by reporting on activities at both intersessional and Meetings of the States Parties or Review Conferences.” “Decisions on the Convention’s Machinery and Meetings,” Maputo, 27 June 2014, p. 5, www.maputoreviewconference.org/fileadmin/APMBC-RC3/3RC-Decisions-Machinery-27Jun2014.pdf.
 Email from Zbigniew Ciolek, Counselor (Disarmament), Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN in Geneva, 25 October 2016.
 The report states that between 13–16 September 2015 Oman destroyed 826 antipersonnel mines: 126 No. 7 dingbat mines; 578 M409 mines; and 122 DM 31 antipersonnel mines. Subsequently, between 20–23 September 2015, Oman destroyed 700 antipersonnel mines: 578 M409 mines and 122 DM31 mines. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (in Arabic), undated, p. 2, bit.ly/MBTOman2016Art7. The report is in a non-standard format of 4 pages.
 Belarus and Greece had a deadline of 1 March 2008, while Ukraine had a deadline of 1 June 2010.
 For information on the status of Greek stockpiles located in Bulgaria, see, www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2016/greece/mine-ban-policy.aspx.
 Angola (972), Zambia (907), Mali (900), Jordan (850), Honduras (826), Mauritania (728), United Kingdom (724), Portugal (694), Italy (620), Germany (590). South Africa (576), Cyprus (500), Bhutan (490), Zimbabwe (450), Togo (436), Nicaragua (435), Slovenia (350), Congo (322), Ethiopia (303), Cote d’Ivoire (290), Uruguay (260), Argentina (212), Lithuania (209), Cape Verde (120), Eritrea (101), Gambia (100), Ecuador (90), Rwanda (65), Senegal (50), Benin (30), Guinea-Bissau (9), Burundi (4).
 Afghanistan, Australia, BiH, Canada, Eritrea, France, Gambia, Germany, Lithuania, Mozambique, Senegal, and Serbia.
 Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei, Burkina Faso , Burundi , Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central Africa Republic, Comoros, DRC, Congo (Rep of), Cook Islands, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Jamaica, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Moldova, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Netherlands, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé & Príncipe, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Suriname, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Yemen, and Zambia.
 A total of nine States Parties submitted reports for 2014 but have not submitted reports for 2015: Burundi, Indonesia, Ireland, Mozambique, Netherlands, Moldova, Serbia, Tajikistan, and Zambia.