Mali
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Summary: State Party Mali ratified the convention on 30 June 2010 and has expressed its intent to enact national implementation legislation for the convention. It has participated in almost every annual Meeting of States Parties of the convention. Mali states that it has never used or stockpiled cluster munitions and is not known to have produced or transferred them, but it has yet to make a definitive statement as it has not submitted its transparency report for the convention, which was due in May 2011.
Policy
The Republic of Malisigned the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 30 June 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 December 2010.
Since 2012, Mali has stated that ongoing instability in the country has prevented its planned incorporation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions into domestic law.[1] In 2013, Mali said a process to enact implementing legislation for the convention had been “violently interrupted by the political crisis” in the country.[2]
As of 30 May 2016, Mali had not yet submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which was originally due 30 May 2011.
Mali actively participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and advocated for a total ban on cluster munitions without exception and with immediate effect.[3]
Mali has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, but it did not attend the First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015. Mali participated in the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva once, in June 2011, and has attended regional workshops on cluster munitions, most recently in Lome, Togo in May 2013.
On 7 December 2015, Mali voted in favor of the first UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[4]
Mali has not yet elaborated its views on certain important issues regarding interpretation and implementation of the convention, such as the prohibition on foreign stockpiling or transit of cluster munitions, the prohibition on investment in cluster munition production, or the retention of cluster munitions for research or training purposes.
On the issue of the prohibition on assistance with acts prohibited under the convention during joint military operations with states not party (interoperability), during the negotiations Mali argued against the inclusion of provisions on interoperability, cautioning that they must not undermine the very purpose of the convention.[5]
Mali is party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling
Mali has stated several times that it has never used or stockpiled cluster munitions.[6] It is not known to have produced or transferred the weapons.[7]
In May 2013, a government official stated that despite the difficult and serious security situation, the government of Mali was not using cluster munitions, had never done so, and did not possess a stockpile.[8]
[1] Mali first reported in 2011 that the process to draft new legislation to implement the convention’s provisions had been initiated. Statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meeting, Session on Victim Assistance, Geneva, 28 June 2011. Notes by the CMC.
[2] Statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 11 September 2013. See also, statement of Mali, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 23 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). In January 2012, an armed conflict began between the Malian government and its allies, and opposition armed groups in the north of the country. In January 2013, the French military began operations in cooperation with the government of Mali to help re-take areas in the north of the country. Military personnel from African Union states have also been deployed as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA).
[3] For details on Mali’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 115–116.
[4] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.
[5] Statement of Mali, Committee of the Whole on Article 1, Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, 27 May 2008. Notes by Landmine Action.
[6] Statement of Mali, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. Notes by AOAV; statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 12 September 2012; and statement of Mali, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.
[7] Email from Amadou Maiga, West African Journalists for Security and Development Network, 19 July 2010.
[8] Statement of Mali, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. Notes by AOAV.
Mine Ban Policy
Mine ban policy overview
|
Mine Ban Treaty status |
State Party |
|
National implementation measures |
Adopted in 2000 |
|
Transparency reporting |
Not since 2005 |
|
Key developments |
In 2013 and 2014, there were numerous reports of the use of antivehicle mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by armed opposition groups participating in the armed conflict |
The Republic of Mali signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 2 June 1998, and became a State Party on 1 March 1999.
National implementation measures adopted in 2000 include penal sanctions and fines.[1] Mali last submitted an Article 7 transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty in 2005.[2]
Mali attended the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique in June 2014, but made no statements. It has participated in several Meetings of States Parties of the Mine Ban Treaty, but not since 2011.
Production, transfer, and stockpiling
Mali has never produced or exported antipersonnel landmines. In 1998, it destroyed a stockpile of 7,127 antipersonnel mines, together with 5,131 antivehicle mines.[3] In 2003, Mali reported that it retained 600 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, but it has never reported any use of these mines.[4]
Use
Mali stated in 2001 that it had never used antipersonnel mines and that there had been no reports of use by government forces or Tuareg rebels.[5]
In January 2012, an armed conflict began in the north of the country between the Malian government and its allies versus armed opposition groups allied with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). In January 2013, the French military began operations in cooperation with the government of Mali to help to re-take areas in the north of the country. Military personnel from African Union states deployed as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali, while the UN deployed the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.
In 2013 and 2014, there were several reports indicating the use of either antivehicle mines or IEDs by armed opposition groups participating in the armed conflict. Between November 2013 and July 2014 there were several antivehicle mines incidents that caused civilian casualties, including aid workers and UN peacekeepers.[6]
In July 2012, a non-state armed group called the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa claimed it had laid antipersonnel mines near the city of Gao. After several apparent landmine casualties near Gao in early 2013, Mali’s Minister of Foreign Affairs accused AQIM of using antipersonnel mines.[7] The ICBL described the reported landmine use as “disturbing.”[8] However, no antipersonnel mines were ever recovered from the area.
[1] Two legal texts, an ordinance, and a decree prohibit the development, manufacturing, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, offer, import, export, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines. Breach of the legislation is punishable with a maximum of life imprisonment and a fine of between CFA500,000 and CFA3 million (approximately US$1,150 to $6,900). Ordinance No. 049/P-RM on the Implementation of the Convention, adopted on 27 September 2000; and Decree No. 569/P-RM on the Application of the Ordinance, adopted on 15 November 2000. An interministerial National Commission for a Total Ban on Landmines was established in June 2002 to take responsibility for the mine issue. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 341.
[2] Mali’s initial Article 7 report was due 27 August 1999 and submitted 17 May 2001. Additional reports were provided on 31 July 2003, 15 September 2004, and 8 July 2005.
[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 17 May 2001.
[4] Ibid., Form D, 31 July 2003. Mali initially reported in 2001 that it retained 2,000 antipersonnel and 1,000 antivehicle mines for training purposes. In 2003, it reported having consumed 1,400 antipersonnel mines and 700 antivehicle mines during training activities.
[5] Statement of the Ministry of Defense, Seminar on the Universalization and Implementation of the Ottawa Convention in Africa, Bamako, 16 February 2001.
[6] See, for example: “Officials: 4 people killed in landmine explosion in northern Mali,” TheWashington Post, 5 November 2013; “Land mine injures 5 Chadian peacekeepers patrolling in northern Mali,” Fox News, 20 January 2014; “Two aid workers injured in landmine explosion in Mali,” World Bulletin, 27 February 2014; and “Land mine kills UN peacekeeper in northern Mali,” Grand Island Independent, 1 July 2014.
[7] Jeffery Schaffer, “AP Interview: Mali Wants Help Against Land Mines,” Associated Press, 4 February 2013. For example, on 4 February 2013 the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) stated that two civilians had died in an explosion involving a landmine or an IED on the road between Kidal, Anefis, and North Darane. “UN: 2 civilians killed by land mines in north Mali,” Associated Press (Timbuktu), 4 February 2013.
[8] ICBL Press Release, “Landmine Use in Malian Conflict Disturbing,” 12 February 2013.
Mine Action
Contamination and Impact
Mines
The Republic of Mali has a problem with antivehicle mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the north of the country but (as of March 2013) no reports had confirmed the presence of antipersonnel mines.[1]Mali has not submitted a Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report since 2005 and at that time declared that there were no areas containing antipersonnel mines on its territory.[2]
In September 2009, Mali reported the presence of 80 mined areas in the regions of Tombouctou and Kidal, particularly along the roads between Tinza and Abubaza,[3] and it repeated this information in September 2010, suggesting limited progress in demining; however, the extent of the threat is not known.[4]
The upsurge in conflicts in Mali in 2012 resulted in reports of mine laying around the northern town of Gao by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and an offshoot, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).[5] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) said in March 2013 that it had received reports of antivehicle mines in the Kidal region being cleared towards Tin and Zaotene, and could only provide evidence of antivehicle mines.[6]
Cluster munition remnants and other explosive remnants of war
Mali has significant explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid, freedom of movement, and efforts to stabilize and rebuild the economy in the aftermath of its civil war. Aerial attacks, artillery bombardments, and ground fighting in central and northern Mali left extensive unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance ranging from grenades, mortars, and rockets to artillery shells and aircraft bombs. The towns of Diabaly, Douentza, Konna, and Gao were reportedly among the worst affected.[7]
Handicap International (HI) conducted a rapid assessment of the area around Segou and Mopti in January 2013 and concluded there was three to four months of work for approximately four explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.[8]
As of March 2013, there was no evidence of contamination involving cluster munitions, but the UN reported multiple threats from IEDs.[9]
Mine Action Program
Key institutions and operators
|
Body |
Situation on 1 January 2013 |
|
National Mine Action Authority |
None |
|
Mine action center |
None |
|
International demining operators |
HI, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) |
|
National demining operators |
Malian Armed Forces |
Mali set up the National Commission for the Total Ban of Antipersonnel Mines (Commission Nationale pour l’Interdiction Totale des Mines Antipersonnel, CNITMA) in June 2002 with the participation of three ministries (Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Security) to serve as the national mine action authority.[10] By the start of 2013, it did not appear to be functioning.
UNMAS established a presence in Mali in November 2012 to coordinate international mine action operators and by the end of March 2013 had five international and two national staff. Sweden’s MSB provided support in the form of an Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) and two EOD teams. Other operators were preparing to deploy survey and clearance teams.[11]
Land release
Demining in Mali has been carried out by the army’s two engineering teams using manual clearance methods and their own standing operating procedures. It has not reported in any detail on clearance in recent years and no data was available for clearance in 2012.
In the first quarter of 2013, UNMAS provided EOD training to International Mine Action Standard (IMAS) Level 2 for 14 army engineers and 16 personnel from other Malian national security organizations.[12]
Compliance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Mali was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2009. Mali has never declared a problem with antipersonnel mines and did not request an extension to its Article 5 deadline.
[1] Email from Charles Frisby, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Mali Programme Manager, 29 March 2013.
[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the period 1 May 2004 to 1 May 2005), Form C.
[3] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Second African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Dakar, Senegal, 2–4 November 2009.
[4] GICHD, “Mali: Overview of information on mine action and ERW including submunitions,” Third African Francophone Seminar on Mine and ERW Action, Nouakchott, Mauritania, 27–30 September 2010.
[5] “Al Qaeda has mined access to key northern town: Tuareg rebels,” Agence France Presse, 2 July 2012.
[6] Email from Charles Frisby, UNMAS, 29 March 2013.
[7] “Abandoned munitions endanger lives in Mali,” IRIN, 19 March 2013; and “Malians return to deadly ground,” Handicap International (HI), 31 July 2013.
[8] Email from Charles Frisby, UNMAS, 29 March 2013.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Presentation of Mali, “Lutte anti mines au Mali” (“Fight against mines in Mali”), Seminar of African Francophone Actors of Mine and ERW Action, Contonou, Benin, 20–22 October 2008.
[11] Email from Charles Frisby, UNMAS, 29 March 2013.
[12] Ibid.
Support for Mine Action
Recent and ongoing armed conflict in the Republic of Mali has created a problem of contamination by weapons and explosives. At the request of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) deployed mine action staff to Mali in January 2013 in order to conduct an emergency assessment of the situation with regards to explosive threats and in support of Security Council Resolution 2085 (2012).[1]
In 2012, four donors contributed US$7,681,063 to Mali to begin a mine action program. Japan, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) provided funding through UNMAS while Sweden provided the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency with SEK10.6 million ($1.56 million) to train the Malian Defense and Security Forces in explosive ordnance disposal.[2]
International contributions: 2012[3]
|
Donor |
Sector |
National currency |
Amount ($) |
|
Japan |
Various |
¥478,920,000 |
6,000,000 |
|
Sweden |
Clearance |
SEK10,600,000 |
1,565,246 |
|
France |
Various |
€50,000 |
64,295 |
|
UK |
Clearance |
£32,500 |
51,522 |
|
Total |
|
|
7,681,063 |
[1] UNMAS website, programs, “About UNMAS in Mali.”
[2] Ibid.
[3] Japan, Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 28 March 2013; Sweden, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 25 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Richard Bolden, Policy Analyst Mine Action, Arms Exports and ATT, DD, 7 May 2013; France, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2013. Average exchange rate for 2012: ¥79.82=US$1; SEK6.7721=US$1; €1=US$1.2859; and £1=US$1.5853. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.
Casualties and Victim Assistance
The Republic of Mali is responsible for survivors of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) and has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.
Mali ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 7 April 2008.
Casualties
Casualties Overview
|
All known casualties by end 2015 |
467 mine/ERW casualties between 2006 and 2015 |
|
Casualties in 2015 |
167 (2014: 144) |
|
2015 casualties by outcome |
30 killed; 137 injured (2014: 23 killed; 121 injured) |
|
2015 casualties by device type |
45 antivehicle mine; 31 ERW; 29 undefined mine types; 45 victim-activated improvised explosive device (IED), 17 unknown explosive device type |
The Monitor identified 167 mine/ERW casualties in Mali in 2015.[1] The majority of the casualties, 57%, were civilians (94 of 166 casualties where the civilian status was known).[2] Children (42) made up 45% of all civilian casualties for which the age was known (94). Another 72 casualties were security forces or armed personnel: 10 Malian military forces, 14 French military personnel, and 39 United Nations peacekeepers from the Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) including troops from Cambodia (two), Chad (four), Niger (eight), Senegal (eight) and 17 MINUSMA personnel with the troop contributing country not reported. For another nine military/security force casualties no other details were recorded. The majority of incidents occurred in the regions of Gao and Kidal.
The 167 casualties in 2015 represented an increase from the 144 casualties identified in 2014. The 2015 mine/ERW casualty total continued on similar levels since a sharp rise in the number of casualties compared to previous years reported for 2013 and 2014.[3] In 2013, the number of civilian casualties rose in northern Malian communities and also among the population displaced by conflict.[4] In 2014, there was a dramatic increase in casualties among security forces, particularly UN peacekeepers.[5]
Most casualties were reported by UNMAS. The Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) recorded casualties from antivehicle mines, including suspected antivehicle mines. In one case the device type differed from UNMAS reporting.[6]
The Monitor identified a total of 467mine/ERW casualties (109 people killed and 358 injured) in Mali from 1999 to 2015, all of which occurred after 2006. Of that total, 90% of all the recorded casualties occurred since the current conflict began in 2012.
Victim Assistance
Assessing needs
In 2015, Handicap International (HI) increased its activities and conducted a community-based needs assessment for mine/ERW survivors and the families of casualties (indirect victims) to inform the development of community action plans. The assessment specially included the needs of children.[7]
Coordination
There was no national coordination of victim assistance in Mali. UNMAS implemented a victim assistance program in the north.
The Ministry of Solidarity, Humanitarian Action, and the Reconstruction of the North is responsible for the protection of the rights of persons with disabilities. Other key actors related to victim assistance activities included: the Ministry of Health, the Civil Protection Central Service, the National Orthopedic Centre of Mali (Centre National d'Appareillage Orthopédique , CNAOM), the Regional Orthopedic and Functional Rehabilitation Centres (Centres Régionaux d'Appareillage Orthopédique et de Rééducation Fonctionnelle, CRAORFs), and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs).[8] Persons with disabilities have access to basic healthcare, however protecting the rights of persons with disabilities was not a priority and few resources were available.[9]
Mali did not report on victim assistance in it’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for calendar year 2015, nor in Form H of its Convention on Cluster Munitions Report for 2015.[10]
Due to increased conflict during 2013 most NGOs working with persons with disabilities suspended their programs.[11] HI, was able to resume some operations in 2014. In September 2014, HI, with the support of UNMAS, began implementing a project to assist survivors of incidents caused by explosive hazards, as well as other persons with disabilities, in the regions of Gao and Timbuktu, which are heavily affected by explosive weapons, including mines/ERW.[12]
Medical care
In 2015, the people of Mali were left with little or no basic healthcare as conflict and fighting between armed groups impeded humanitarian access and resulted in a lack of medical supplies and qualified personnel.[13]
The ICRC covered costs of weapon-wounded patients at Gao hospital; supported Kidal referral center, which saw an influx of weapon-injured people; and provided a one-off donation of bandaging materials for weapon-wounded persons at the referral center in the town of Ménaka.[14] In 2015, the Gao hospital was “in a state of chaos” and unable to provide care due to the impact of the conflict, while there was the greatest need for emergency medical care for injured persons. The hospital was restored to operational conditions with support from the ICRC.[15] Three times as many mine/ERW survivors were the among injured and sick who received medical services at the Gao regional hospital and other ICRC-supported medical centers compared to 2014 (at least 38 in 2015, and 18 in 2014). The Gao hospital continued to receive substantial ICRC support.[16] The ICRC suspended staff travel outside of towns in the north following an attack on one of its vehicles in March 2015. The three-month restriction reduced services for conflict-affected persons. The ICRC opened its delegation in Mali in 2013 in response to conflict and other situations of violence.[17]
Facilitators from Handicap International’s (HI) travelling risk education teams taught village-level emergency first response methods for the care of casualties from explosives, including reassuring the survivor and providing first aid.[18]
Rehabilitation including prosthetics
Due to the critical security and economic situations in 2013, the physical rehabilitation sector was severely disrupted, leading to the closing of regional orthopedic and rehabilitation centers and difficulties in paying staff. Rehabilitation activities at national centers began to resume in 2014.[19] HI signed an agreement with the CNAOM for the care of ERW survivors in Timbuktu and Gao regions resulting in the allocation of orthopedic equipment and raw materials to strengthen the existing CRAORFs. An ICRC rehabilitation project also contributed to improvements for persons with disabilities at the CNAOM, with imported raw materials for orthopedic devices. In 2015, 95% of planned activities were carried out at the CNAOM.[20]
The ICRC provided 15 prosthesis to mine/ERW survivors in 2015, a slight increase from 13 in 2014.[21] In 2015, the ICRC provided support to the Father Bernard Verspieren rehabilitation center (Centre Père Bernard Verspieren, CPBV) in Bamako operated by the Rehabilitation and Guidance Center for persons with disabilities on Comprehensive Therapeutic Support (Programme de Réadaptation d’Orientation des personnes Handicapées d’Encadrement Thérapeutique Elargi, PROPHETE), and three new rehabilitation centers including one in Timbuktu.[22] Due to the security situation, the ICRC took over support to the Father Bernard Verspieren Center from Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD). The SFD provided raw materials to the center before the handover to the ICRC.[23]
In 2015, HI supported and reinforced the capacities of the two regional rehabilitation centers in Northern Mali—in Timbuktu and Gao—with materials and technical advice, covered rehabilitation expenses for victims, and assessed the needs of ERW survivors. As a result, 160 survivors received services, a significant increase compared to the 40 survivors assisted in 2014.[24] Both rehabilitation centers were adapted to respond to the specific needs and vulnerabilities of children.[25]
Social and economic inclusion
HI implemented inclusive education and employment projects for persons with disabilities and provided support to DPOs.[26] The ICRC held sporting events for persons with disabilities in their communities.[27]
Laws and policies
There was no specific legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities or mandating physical accessibility to public buildings.[28] In June 2016, an advocate for the rights of women with disabilities in Mali reported that Malian women with disabilities often face multiple forms of discrimination due to their gender and being persons with disabilities. Poverty, illiteracy, high unemployment, a high probability of gender-based violence, psychological issues, and stigma were highlighted as serious problems. The government of Mali must take steps to create effective national laws and implement legislation and programs in order to address the rights of all persons with disabilities, and specifically for women and girls.[29]
[1] Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 December 2015; Geneva Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents Map,” undated; casualty data sent by email from Claude Mushid, Database Officer, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Mali, 2 February 2016; and email from Donat Blugeon, C-IED Officer, UNMAS Mali, 25 February 2016.
[2] For one casualty the civilian status was not reported.
[3] Five mine casualties were identified in 2011, no casualties in 2010, and six ERW casualties in 2009. See previous country reports and country profiles on the Monitor website.
[4] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), “Priority actions and humanitarian needs analysis: A re-evaluation prompted by intensified conflict in central and northern Mali in January 2013,” 11 March 2013, pp. 13–14.
[5] Monitor media monitoring; and emails from Claude Mushid, UNMAS Mali, 12 February 2015; and Donat Blugeon, UNMAS Mali, 13 February 2015.
[6] For 2015, the GICHD recorded 62 casualties of antivehicle mines and another 14 casualties of suspected antivehicle mines (undefined mine types) from media-reported incidents for which the mine type was not confirmed. GICHD, “Anti-Vehicle Mine Incidents Map,” undated; and casualty data provided by email from Ursign Hofmann, Policy Advisor, GICHD, 11 July 2016. There were some differences between GICHD and UNMAS data available to the Monitor: in one incident the GICHD recorded four people killed and 27 injured by an antivehicle mine, whereas UNMAS recorded four killed and 28 injured by a victim-activated IED.
[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Lamine Touré, HI, 1 August 2016.
[8] UNMAS, “Victim Assistance for Mine/ERW Victims and Other People with Disabilities in Affected Communities in North Mali,” 2015.
[9] United States (US) Department of State, “2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali,” Washington, DC, 13 April 2016.
[10] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form J; and Convention on Cluster Munition Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form H.
[11] HI reported closing their activities in northern Mali due to the conflict. Email from Benoit Couturier, HI Mali, 16 April 2014. See also, US Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014.
[12] UNMAS, “Assistance to victims of explosive hazards in northern Mali: Gao and Timbuktu regions,” 8 December 2015.
[13] Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), “MSF international activity report 2015,” July 2016.
[14] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 171.
[15] ICRC, “Mali: ICRC enables Gao hospital to provide life-saving treatment for community,” 11 January 2016.
[16] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 173.
[17] Ibid., pp. 168–169.
[18] HI, “Mali: Teaching Risk Education in Post-Conflict Areas,” undated.
[19] “National Orthopaedic Centre of Mali (CNAOM): Resumption of activities” (“Centre National d’Appareillage Orthopédique du Mali (CNAOM) : Reprise des activités”), Maliweb, 26 March 2014.
[20] “Centre national d’appareillage orthopédique du Mali : Le budget 2016 revu en baisse à l’ordre de 2%” (“National Center orthopedic of Mali: The 2016 budget revised down to around 2%”), Abamako, 10 February 2016.
[21] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 173.
[22] Ibid., p. 171.
[23] ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, pp. 8, 13.
[24] HI, “Mali 2015,” August 2015; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Lamine Touré, HI, 1 August 2016.
[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohamed Lamine Touré, HI, 1 August 2016.
[27] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 171.
[28] US Department of State, “2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali,” Washington, DC, 13 April 2016.
[29] Gender and Mine Action Program (GMAP), “Persons with Disabilities living in a conflict: Mali,” 20 July 2016.