Palestine

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 29 June 2016

Summary: Palestine acceded to the convention on 2 January 2015 and became a State Party on 1 July 2015. Palestine has stated that it does not possess any cluster munitions and says there had never been any use of cluster munitions in the Occupied Palestinian Territories by Israeli forces.

Policy

The State of Palestine acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 2 January 2015 and became a State Party on 1 July 2015.

It is not clear if Palestine will undertake legislative or other measures to implement the convention. Two Palestinian factions exercise authority within the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), the Fatah-led government in the West Bank and the government of Hamas in Gaza.

As of 30 May 2016, Palestine has not yet provided its initial Article 7 transparency measures report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which was originally due by 27 December 2015.

Palestine did not participate in any meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

In November 2012, the UN General Assembly voted to recognize Palestine as a non-member observer state. Palestine was not able to accede to the convention under its previous UN status designation as a “non-member entity.”[1]

Palestine acceded after participating as an observer in meetings of the convention since 2010.[2] It attended three of the convention’s Meeting of States Parties as an observer, in 2010, 2011, and 2013, and also participated in the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2013 and 2014.

Palestine participated as a State Party in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015. In an address to the high-level segment of the meeting, Palestine said that it acceded to the convention “because of our belief in a global peace that opens cultures between peoples and promotes a respect for mankind.”[3] Palestine expressed its support for the convention’s objectives of cluster munition stockpile destruction, clearance of explosive remnants, and victim assistance.

Palestine has not elaborated its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention, such as the prohibitions on transit, assistance during joint military operations with states not party that may use cluster munitions, foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, investment in the production of cluster munitions, and on the retention of cluster munitions for training and development purposes.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

In November 2010, a government representative informed the Monitor that Palestine does not possess any cluster munitions and that there had never been any use of cluster munitions in the OPT by Israeli forces.[4]

 


[1] When Palestine deposited its instrument of accession with the UN in New York in January 2015, Canada provided the UN with a communication objecting to the accession because “‘Palestine’ does not meet the criteria of a state under international law and is not recognized by Canada as a state.” According to the communication, “Canada reiterates that ‘Palestine’ does not meet the criteria of a state under international law and is not recognized by Canada as a state. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion, the Permanent Mission of Canada wishes to note its position that in the context of the purported Palestinian accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, ‘Palestine’ is not able to accede to this convention, and that the Convention on Cluster Munitions does not enter into force, or have an effect on Canada’s treaty relations, with respect to the ‘State of Palestine.’” See communication of Canada here.

[2] The first meeting on cluster munitions that Palestine attended was an international meeting on cluster munitions held in Santiago, Chile in June 2010.

[3] Statement of Palestine, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015.

[4] Meeting with Col. Mohammad A.M. Ghanayiem, Palestinian Ministry of Interior, Vientiane, 9 November 2010.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 17 December 2012

Mine Ban Policy

Governance of the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), including Gaza and parts of the West Bank, is assigned to the Palestinian National Authority (PA). Two Palestinian factions, Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in the West Bank, both claim to be the legitimate governing authority of the OPT. Neither faction has made any recent public statements on its policy toward banning antipersonnel mines.

The Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the UN attended the intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in June 2011. In 2009, the PA-Fatah had sent a representative to the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva, its first participation in meetings related to the Mine Ban Treaty since the First Meeting of States Parties in Mozambique in May 1999.

In September 2012, the OPT submitted a voluntary Article 7 report. The report states that a Higher Committee for Mine Action, within the Ministry of Interior, was established in 2012 as an interministerial body, which is currently developing and adapting legislation with regards to mine action. In February 2012, the Higher Committee mandated and allocated resources to the Palestinian Mine Action Centre (PMAC) to coordinate all mine action related aspects in the West Bank. [1] The PMAC was established in April 2012.[2]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has not found any allegations of use of antipersonnel mines or mine-like devices by any Palestinian entity in recent years.[3]

In its voluntary transparency report, the OPT states that it does not possess a stockpile of antipersonnel mines, that it does not retain any mines for training purposes, and will only transfer mines for destruction. The report also states that it has never had production facilities for antipersonnel mines. The report lists mined areas and provides information on the status of its risk education and victim assistance programs.[4]

In February 2012, the Israeli Army seized and surrounded land belonging to a Palestinian family in the southern West Bank town of Surif by placing yellow warning signs, claiming that the land was mine-ridden and that the area was a closed military zone. The owner claimed that the area was cleared of mines by the PA more than 20 years before; the owner said the mines had been laid by the Israeli Army when the area was used for military training.[5]

In June 2012, the UN conducted training in landmine removal for three weeks. The training was held in Jericho under the auspices of the Interior Ministries Palestinian Centre for Mine Action, and trained members of the public security forces.[6]

 



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report, covering period until 1 August 2012, submitted to the Depository in September 2012, http://bit.ly/OPOXmb.

[2] “The Palestinian Mine Action Center (PMAC),”On the Record, 26 June 2012, http://bit.ly/Rl8YX2.

[3] Palestinian militias have produced and used command-detonated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits use of victim-activated IEDs and booby-traps, which function as antipersonnel mines, but does not prohibit use of command-detonated IEDs. Media and other reports are not always clear whether devices involved in explosive incidents in the OPT are victim-activated or command-detonated, and reports often use a number of terms interchangeably, citing the use of bombs, landmines, booby-traps, and IEDs.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report, covering period of until 1 August 2012, submitted to the Depository in September 2012, http://bit.ly/OPOXmb.

[5] “Israeli Land Mines Still Pose Problems for Palestinian Communities,” Palestinian Solidarity Project, 29 February 2012, http://bit.ly/zHG5NJ.

[6]UN experts train Palestinian security to remove land mines,” Palestine TV, Ramallah (re-broadcast in English language translation on Mosaic News), 25 June 2012, http://bit.ly/PselhV.


Mine Action

Last updated: 25 November 2016

Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (medium contamination), antivehicle mines, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) 

The State of Palestine has almost 20km2 of mined area, of which 0.4km2 is confirmed. Clearance in the West Bank is largely constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorization granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct or oversee mine clearance operations. Land release was conducted by the HALO Trust. The total mined area released by clearance in 2015 was 63,411m2, and 0.16km2 was confirmed through survey. In Gaza, UNMAS interventions were conducted to reduce the threat and impact of ERW.

Mine Contamination

In Palestine, hazards encompass minefields, military training zones, and areas of confrontation where many explosive devices are left behind.

A 2013 survey by the Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC) found that Palestine has mined areas covering a total of 19.9km2.[1] A HALO Trust survey of the West Bank in 2012 identified 90 minefields, 13 of which were laid by the Jordanian military in 1948–1967, while the remaining 77 were laid by the Israeli military along the Jordan River after the 1967 war.[2] All minefields, including those laid by the Jordanian military, are under Israeli military control.[3]

According to HALO, as of the end of January 2016, more than 0.4km2 of confirmed mined area exists across nine minefields in Palestinian-controlled territory and two minefields are in no-man’s-land between the West Bank and Israel and located west of the separation barrier in an Israeli-controlled area. All 11 minefields (see table below) were laid by the Jordanian army.[4]

Confirmed mine contamination as of end January 2016*[5]

Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (m2)

Antipersonnel mines

3

53,084

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines

8

383,526

Total

11

436,610

Note: CHA = confirmed hazardous area. 

Five of the 12 governorates in the West Bank still contain mined areas as of the end of January 2016, as set out in the table below.[6] The governorate of Bethlehem is now mine-free, after clearance of the sole remaining minefield was completed on 22 January 2016.[7]

Contamination by governorate as of 31 January 2016*[8]

Governorate

CHAs

Area (m2)

Jenin

4

89,056

Tulkarm

1

37,810

Qalqilya

2

89,726

Ramallah

2

189,934

Hebron

2

30,084

Total

11

436,610

 

Most mined areas are located in Area C (see below) along the border with Jordan, which covers approximately 60% of the West Bank and is under full Israeli control for security, planning, and construction.[9]

According to the UN, of the estimated total of 90 minefields in the West Bank, those in more “central areas”—the governorates of Hebron, Jenin, Qalqiliya, and Tulkarm—are priorities for clearance.[10]

In addition to posing a risk to civilians, mines affect the socio-economic development of Palestinian communities. All mined areas are located in, or close to, populated areas,[11] mostly on privately owned agricultural and grazing land or along roads used daily by communities; and are either poorly marked or not marked at all. Yet they are accessible to the population, and in some cases, are even under cultivation.[12]

Other Explosive Remnants of War 

Palestine is also contaminated with explosive remnants of war (ERW) though the precise nature and extent of the problem are not known. Hostilities between Israel and Gaza in 2008–2009, 2012, and 2014 resulted in significant ERW contamination. While much of the visible surface contamination has been removed, items of ERW still contaminate Gaza. According to UNMAS, this subsurface contamination complicates and delays reconstruction efforts and poses a danger to internally displaced people (IDPs) returning home.[13]

Program Management 

Mine action is subject to the 1995 Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, under which the West Bank is divided into three areas: Area A is under full Palestinian civilian and security control; Area B is under full Palestinian civil control and joint Israeli-Palestinian security control; and Area C refers to areas where Israel has full control of security, planning, and construction.[14] Clearance operations must therefore be coordinated with the Israeli government.[15]

An authorization from the Palestinian Authority’s prime minister on 25 March 2012 set up the Palestine Mine Action Center (PMAC), appointed its director, and created a Higher Committee for Mine Action as an interministerial body, with 27 members representing the ministries of education, foreign affairs, health, intelligence, interior, justice, and military liaison, as well as the police and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society. The Higher Committee for Mine Action, which serves as the national mine action authority, is tasked to develop mine action legislation and allocate resources for the sector.[16] PMAC, which is located in the Ministry of Interior in Ramallah, is mandated to coordinate all aspects of mine action in the West Bank. It receives technical advice from UNMAS.[17] The committee has established a number of sub-committees to deal with technical issues, risk education, legal affairs, foreign affairs, and health and safety.[18]

PMAC currently has 11 employees[19] and is staffed with personnel from the Palestinian National Security Forces, Civil Police, and Civil Defense. PMAC also has a team of 30 that have been trained by UNMAS for demining, but who are not yet equipped to do so, and there remains no agreement with Israel on this matter.[20] The Civil Police have an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) unit with 42 personnel in Bethlehem, Hebron, Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah, and Tulkarm, who conduct rapid response to locate and remove items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[21]

UNMAS reports that its intervention in Gaza seeks to reduce the threat and impact of ERW on peace and security, humanitarian relief, and socio-economic development in Gaza by addressing the following needs in 2016–2017: (i) protection of civilians from ERW threats; (ii) support to reconstruction through ERW risk mitigation measures and EOD support; and (iii) emergency preparedness to respond to escalation in conflict.[22]

Strategic planning

There is no strategic mine action plan for Palestine. In recent years, UNMAS has worked to build consensus among Israeli, Palestinian, and international stakeholders regarding a modus operandi for clearance operations in the central West Bank, and for Israel to authorize demining.[23]

Operators

To date, Israel has not authorized demining operations by Palestinian deminers and no clearance operation has been conducted by PMAC.[24] In September 2013, however, the Israeli National Mine Action Authority (INMAA) gave formal authorization for HALO Trust to clear two of the 11 minefields deemed high priority by PMAC.[25] Following INMAA authorization, HALO Trust began mine clearance in the West Bank in April 2014.[26] HALO works under the auspices of both the Israeli and Palestinian mine action authorities.[27]

In 2015, HALO employed 23 manual deminers, and mechanical assets deployed included three front-loading shovels, an armored excavator, and a rock crusher.[28]

In Gaza, UNMAS partnered with UNDP’s Rubble Removal project to support post-conflict reconstruction. It reported that by the end of the project in March 2016, UNMAS support had allowed UNDP to clear 1 million tons of rubble from heavily contaminated areas without any ERW accidents. UNMAS also conducted assessments of hazardous areas.[29]

Standards

HALO’s standing operating procedures (SOPs) are approved by INMAA and are based on national standards. Once a year, HALO Trust submits its SOPs, including any necessary amendments, to INMAA for approval.[30] 

Quality management

HALO’s work in the West Bank complies with the Israeli Standard Institute for Standards, in particular ISOs 9001, 14001, and 18001. HALO carried out its own internal quality control (QC), conducted by senior program staff, and complies with the ISO standards and HALO’s SOPs.[31] In addition, as required by INMAA, 4CI Security, an external INMAA-certified quality assurance (QA)/QC company, is contracted to monitor HALO’s clearance in accordance with Israeli National Mine Action Standards.[32]

Land Release

The total mined area released by clearance in 2015 was 63,411m2,[33] compared with 21,832m2 in 2014.[34] No land was canceled by non-technical survey in 2015. 

Survey in 2015

HALO reported that in 2015 it surveyed seven mined areas across three governorates totaling 156,950m2, set out in the table below.[35] These sites were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) already recorded in PMAC’s database and on maps; the survey was intended to more accurately delineate the boundaries of the areas. HALO survey data is based on its joint site visits with PMAC and INMAA, combined with information provided by PMAC, INMAA, and local landowners.[36]

HALO Trust survey of mined areas in 2015[37]

Province/area

Areas confirmed as mined

Area confirmed (m²)

Jenin

4

89,056

Tulkarm

1

37,810

Hebron

2

30,084

Total

7

156,950

 

Clearance in 2015

In 2015, HALO cleared 63,411m2 of mined area in the Qalqiliya and Bethlehem governorates in the West Bank, with the destruction of 434 antipersonnel mines, 23 antivehicle mines, and one item of UXO.[38]

HALO Trust mine clearance in 2015[39]

Province

Governorate

Areas released

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

a-Nabi Elyas

Qalqiliya

1

41,255

238

23

0

Husan

Bethlehem

1

22,156

196

0

1

Total

 

2

63,411

434

23

1

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

In 2015, HALO continued clearing the minefield at a-Nabi Elyas, which it had begun in April 2014. The minefield was laid in 1965 by the Jordanian military with Belgian PRB M35 antipersonnel mines and British MkV antivehicle mines; of an estimated 1,400 mines in total, many were known to remain dangerous. Where mines had become deeply buried by soil movement, the plastic PRB M35s could not be found with metal detectors. In such conditions, HALO used armored mechanical equipment to fully excavate contaminated soil and ensure all deeply buried mines were found and destroyed.[40] HALO reported that during clearance, in certain areas it was necessary to excavate to a greater depth than planned and also to include areas outside the minefield, due to land being littered with contaminated soil from the minefield.[41] Clearance was completed in November 2015.[42]

In June 2015, HALO began clearing the Husan minefield, in the governorate of Bethlehem. This minefield had been partially cleared by Quadro in 2013 and HALO cleared the remainder.[43] Clearance of the minefield was completed on 22 January 2016.[44]

The 63,411m2 cleared by HALO in 2015 marks a significant increase on the 12,226m2 of mine clearance in 2014. Land cleared by HALO was declared free of mines by INMAA, which allowed the military to cancel the “closed military area” order, which in turn allowed landowners to return to the cleared areas.[45]

Israel has not authorized demining operations by Palestinian deminers and no clearance operations were conducted by PMAC in 2014[46] or 2015.[47]

During the UNDP/UNMAS Rubble Removal project in Gaza between the end of 2014 and March 2016, 347 items of ERW were cleared.[48]

Progress towards completion

In March 2015, PMAC’s director stated that clearance of antipersonnel mines would be completed in five years, if there were no constraints by the occupation.[49] To date, though, very little progress has been made in releasing mined areas in the West Bank, with less than 0.1km2 cleared over the last five years (see table below). Clearance in the West Bank is largely constrained by political factors, including the lack of authorization granted by Israel for Palestine to conduct or oversee mine clearance operations. However, HALO began mine clearance operations in April 2014, and is continuing to complete clearance of priority sites in the West Bank.

Mine clearance in 2011–2015[50]*

Year

Area cleared (m2)

2015

63,411

2014

21,832

2013

7,000

2012

0

2011

0

Total

92,243

 

PMAC does not have its own budget, and the Palestinian authority only provides funding for the salary of PMAC employees and the PMAC office.[51]

 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.


[1] Email from Brig. Joma Mousa, Director, PMAC, 31 March 2014.

[2] HALO Trust, “West Bank, The problem,” undated.

[3] Emails from Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 24 June 2015, and 23 October 2015; and from Sonia Pezier, Junior Programme Officer, UNMAS, 14 April 2015.

[4] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 24 June 2015.

[5] Ibid., 19 July 2016. The table no longer contains data for the a-Nabi Elyas and Husan minefields, since clearance was completed on 17 November 2015 and 22 January 2016, respectively.

[6] Ibid. There were inconsistencies between PMAC and HALO’s data on the number and location of mined areas. As at end 2015, PMAC reported 16 mined areas, totalling 0.61km2. Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016. Their list, though, appears to contain inaccuracies.

[7] Email from Ronen Shimoni, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.

[8] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016. There were inconsistencies between PMAC and HALO’s data on the number, area, and location of confirmed mined areas. PMAC reported four confirmed mined areas in Jenin totaling 126,140m2; one in Tulkarem totaling of 13,070m2; four in Qalqailya totalling 154,426m2; two in Ramallah totaling 141,332m2; two in Jerusalem totaling 74,914m2; one in Bethlehem of 22,267m2; and one in Hebron of 32,152m2. Email from the Planning Department PMAC, 5 May 2016. Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.

[9] Email from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS, Jerusalem, 5 July 2012; and “UNMAS 2013 Annual Report,” undated but 2014.

[10] Ibid.; and UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[11] Emails from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS, 14 April 2015; from Brig. Joma Abdeljabbar, PMAC, 12 March 2015; and from Tom Meredith, HALO, 11 May 2015; and UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[12] Emails from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS, 14 April 2015; and from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015; and UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[13] UNMAS “State of Palestine,” undated.

[14] Email from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 July 2012.

[15] Emails from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS, 14 April 2015; and from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015; and UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[16] Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 19 July 2012; and from Imad Mohareb, Planning Department, PMAC, 31 March 2013.

[17] Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012; and UN, “2012 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects,” New York, 2013.

[18] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

[19] Email from Brig. Joma Abdeljabbar, PMAC, 12 March 2015.

[20] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

[21] Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS Jerusalem, 5 and 19 July 2012.

[22] UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

[25] UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[26] Ibid.; and email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 11 May 2015.

[27] HALO, “West Bank,” undated.

[28] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.

[29] UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Emails from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 11 May 2015; and from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.

[33] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.

[34] Ibid., 11 May 2016. HALO Trust previously reported 12,226m2 of clearance in 2014, but it was subsequently found that this only included manual clearance and excluded 9,606m2 of mechanical clearance that also took place. The correct revised total for 2014 is 21,832m2. Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.

[35] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016. No survey data was reported by PMAC for 2015, likely due to the fact HALO was re-surveying confirmed areas already in PMAC’s database.

[36] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

[37] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016. No survey data was reported by PMAC for 2015, likely due to the fact HALO was re-surveying CMAs already in PMAC’s database.

[38] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 22 September 2016. Clearance data reported by HALO contained inconsistencies with data reported by PMAC and INMAA. PMAC reported HALO as having cleared 85,117m2 in total, destroying 690 antipersonnel mines, 64 antivehicle mines, and 62 items of UXO. Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016. INMAA reported HALO as having cleared 93,000m2 in total, destroying 379 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines, and one item of UXO. Email from Michael Heiman, Director of Technology and Knowledge Management, INMAA, 19 September 2016.

[39] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 22 September 2016. There were discrepancies between HALO’s data, and that provided by PMAC and INMAA, likely due to differences in reporting period between stakeholders. PMAC reported HALO clearance of two areas as totaling 85,117m2, with the destruction of 690 antipersonnel mines, 64 antivehicle mines, and 62 items of UXO. Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016. INMAA reported HALO clearance of two areas as totaling 93,000m2, with the destruction of 379 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines, and one UXO. Email from Michael Heiman, INMAA, 19 September 2016.

[41] Emails from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, HALO Trust, 22 October 2015; and from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 22 October 2015.

[42] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.

[43] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 23 October 2015.

[44] Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 27 September 2016.

[45] Email from Tom Meredith, HALO Trust, 19 July 2016.

[46] Interview with David Bax, Programme Manager, UNMAS, in Geneva, 17 February 2015.

[47] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.

[48] UNMAS, “State of Palestine,” undated.

[49] Email from Brig. Joma Abdeljabbar, 12 March 2015.

[50] See ICBL Landmine Monitor reports on Palestine in 2011–2014. HALO Trust previously reported 12,226m2 of clearance in 2014, but it was subsequently found that this only included manual clearance and excluded 9,606m2 of mechanical clearance that also took place. The correct revised total for 2014 is 21,832m2. Email from Ronen Shimoni, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.

[51] Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 9 May 2016.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 13 December 2016

(Special note: This profile updated with new information after the publication of Landmine Monitor 2016.)

In 2015, ten donors contributed US$3.8 million toward mine action in the State of Palestine, about $5 million less than in 2014.[1]

The largest contribution was provided by the United States (US) with three additional donors—the European Union (EU), Italy and Japan—each contributing more than $500,000. Contributions from these donors accounted for more than three-quarters of all international assistance received by Palestine in 2015.

Contributions for victim assistance (totaling $114,201) from Slovenia and the OPEC Fund for International Development (OFID) went through the ITF Enhancing Human Security.

International contributions: 2015[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount ($)

US

Clearance and risk education

$1,000,000

1,000,000

EU

Clearance

€800,000

887,680

Italy

Clearance and risk education

€500,000

554,800

Japan

Clearance

¥60,525,000

500,000

Netherlands

Clearance

€280,000

310,688

United Kingdom

Clearance

£200,000

305,680

Luxembourg

Clearance

€80,750

89,600

Slovenia

Victim assistance

€74,201

74,201

OFID

Victim assistance

N/A

40,000

Poland

Various

€31,543

35,000

Total

 

 

3,797,649

 

Since 2011, Palestine has received more than $19 million in international assistance for mine action, half of which was provided in 2014.

Summary of international contribution: 2011–2015[3]

Year

Amount ($)

2015

3,797,649

2014

9,071,124

2013

1,427,489

2012

2,390,358

2011

2,426,612

Total

19,113,232

 


[1] Italy, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, May 2016; Japan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2016; Netherlands, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2016; Poland, Convention on Conventional Weapons Protocol II Annual Report, Form E, 30 March 2016; United Kingdom, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 29 April 2016; response to Monitor questionnaire by Robert Steinmetz, Expert in Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 May 2016; ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2015,” April 2016, p. 22; and email from Katherine Baker, Foreign Affairs Officer, Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 12 September 2016; and from Frank Meeussen, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Export Control, European External Action Service, 22 November 2016. [Note, footnote amended 15 December 2016.]

[2] Average exchange rate for 2015: €1=US$1.1096; £1=US$1.5284; ¥121/05=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2016.

[3] See previous Monitor reports. 


Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 30 January 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2015

3,618

Casualties in 2015

74 (2014: 69)

2015 casualties by outcome

6 killed; 68 injured (2014:13 killed; 56 injured)

2015 casualties by device type

72 explosive remnants of war (ERW); 2 unknown devices

 

In 2015, 74 mine/ERW casualties were recorded for the State of Palestine; of which almost half were children (36). Of the 74 casualties that occurred in Palestine in 2015, 67 were recorded in Gaza and seven in the West Bank.[1]

The Palestinian Mine Action Center (PMAC), which was reestablished in 2012 and collected information on incidents in the West Bank, managed casualty data updates during 2013.[2] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Palestine collected and managed casualty data updates for the Gaza Strip.

The 2015 data represented an increase from the 69 ERW casualties identified in 2014 and a continued spike in casualties following the destruction in Gaza caused by 50 days of conflict in mid-2014, also referred to as Operation Protective Edge; with 49 casualties reported in 2013,[3] 35 in 2012,[4] 24 in 2010, and 46 casualties reported for 2009, following Operation Cast Lead.[5]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Palestine is not known; at least 3,475 casualties had been reported by the end of 2013. Defense for Children International Palestine (DCI/PS) recorded more than 2,500 mine/ERW casualties occurring between 1967 and 1998.[6] Between 2000 and the end of 2012, the Monitor identified 975 casualties (153 killed; 809 injured; and 13 unknown).[7]

Victim Assistance

There were at least 1,253 mine/ERW survivors in Palestine.[8]

Palestine reported that there was no specific strategic framework for victim assistance in place in the country. Mine/ERW survivors received the same support as other persons with disabilities. This support is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs,[9] in partnership with the various ministries and institutions of civil society and with relevant authorities, guided by the National Strategy of Disability Rights 2013–2016.[10]

The Ministry of Health continued to be responsible for the rehabilitation sector in the Gaza Strip. The International Coordination Department (ICD) coordinates cooperation between the ministry and international organizations working in the field of physical rehabilitation in the Gaza Strip.[11]

Persons with disabilities in Palestine were often overlooked and underrepresented in development and relief efforts. Since the 2014 conflict, the situation in Palestine has continued to deteriorate. Vulnerable Palestinians faced increasing difficulty in accessing electricity, education, and healthcare, and struggled to meet basic needs. Key infrastructure was destroyed and many hospitals were not equipped. Unemployment increased as did restrictions on the movement of goods and people.[12]

The Artificial Limb and Polio Center (ALPC), managed by the Municipality of Gaza, is the only center of its kind in Gaza that provides prosthetic and orthotic services. Services are provided free of charge. The ICRC, with the support of the Norwegian Red Cross, continued to support the ALPC.[13] In 2015, 3,070 people received rehabilitation services, including prosthetics, at the ALPC, which continued improving its operations with technical/material support from the Norwegian Red Cross/ICRC. Staff in direct contact with patients were trained in providing basic psychosocial care and referrals to other providers. Some 120 persons with disabilities, including ALPC patients, were coached in wheelchair basketball at sessions co-organized by the Palestinian Paralympic Committee.[14]

Handicap International (HI) provided post-emergency operations to improve access to essential services for persons with disabilities in Gaza. HI also promoted the inclusion of isolated persons with disabilities, improved access to essential services, and gave support for disabled peoples’ organizations and multidisciplinary rehabilitation services, including rehabilitation and psychosocial support services.[15]

In 2016, existing rehabilitation services in Gaza did not meet the needs of amputees. The Palestinian Medical Relief Society estimated that all providers of rehabilitation services in the Gaza Strip combined were only able to address some 15% of the rehabilitation requirements of the population. Many organizations, registered as rehabilitation services providers, were not active in the sector. Al-Wafa hospital, the main rehabilitation hospital in Gaza, was bombed in 2014. The rehabilitation system was already weak and unstable before the war and since its destruction, there has been no central body in charge of coordination between the Palestinian healthcare system and other NGOs and centers providing services. This lack of coordination results in some services being duplicated at times, while others were not provided. Other factors contributing to the deterioration in rehabilitation services were the lack of adequate funding on the part of the Palestinian Authority. Medical treatment available to amputees in the Gaza Strip was of poor quality. Hastily performed amputations often resulted in a stump that cannot fit a prosthesis.[16]

Assistance for persons with physical disabilities was supported by the efforts of UN agencies and NGOs.[17]

In 2016, ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF) continued a school-based psychosocial program and a project promoting community-based rehabilitation in Gaza. ITF delivered rehabilitation materials, including prosthetic components, to three centers in Gaza: ALPC, Palestinian Forum for Promoting Community Development Palestine Avenir for Childhood Foundation (PACF), and Democratic Empowerment (PALFD).[18]

The Palestine Trauma Centre in Gaza offered support from psychologists, psychiatrists, and specialist trauma counselors.[19]

The Palestinian Disability Law was ratified in 1999.



[1] Emails from Planning Department, Palestinian Mine Action Center (PMAC), 15 March 2016; and from Jean-Guy Lavoie, Chief of Operations, UNMAS Palestine, 22 March 2016.

[2] Emails from Celine Francois, Programme Officer, UNMAS, Jerusalem, 5 September 2013; and from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS Palestine, 24 June 2014.

[3] Emails from Planning Department, PMAC, 2 April 2015; and from Sonia Pezier, UNMAS Palestine, 7 April 2015.

[4] Email from Imab Mohareb, PMAC, 4 October 2012.

[5] Emails from Celine Francois, UNMAS, 22 July 2011; from Ayed Abu Eqtaish, Program Manager, Defense for Children International Palestine (DCI/PS), 26 July 2011; and from Brig. Omran Sulaiman, PMAC, 25 September 2012. In addition to the 16 casualties reported by the Monitor for 2010, another eight mine/ERW casualties (one killed; seven injured) in the West Bank for 2010 were added to the previous 2010 total based on the PMAC casualty data updates provided in 2012. The rise in casualties in Gaza in 2009 was attributed to contamination by explosive remnants during and following Operation Cast Lead, which ended on 18 January 2009.

[6] DCI/PS, “The Problem of Landmines, Unexploded Ordnance and Munitions Remnants in the Palestinian Territories: A Seminar Report,” 25–26 March 1998, p. 14.

[7] See previous editions of the Monitor at on the Monitor website. Information for 1999 was not available.

[8] Including 320 people injured before 2000 identified through a random sample survey and 809 people injured since 2000. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, and previous country reports and profiles on Palestine.

[11] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, pp. 80–81.

[12] HI, “Palestine 2016,” August 2016.

[13] ICRC PRP, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, pp. 80–81.

[14] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, May 2016, p. 497

[15] HI, “Palestine 2016,” August 2016.

[17] See for example, “Caring for and Working with People with Disabilities,” This Week in Palestine, Issue 221, September 2016.

[18] ITF, “Annual Report 2015,” Ljubljana, 2016, pp. 105–106; and ITF, “Activities: Gaza strip,” undated.

[19] The Palestine Trauma Centre, “Palestine Trauma Centre (UK): Annual Report 2016,” undated; and “Palestine Trauma Centre (PTC-Gaza): Muslim Aid Project,” undated.