Russian Federation

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 09 August 2016

Summary: Non-signatory Russia acknowledges the humanitarian risks associated with cluster munitions, but insists on the military utility of the weapons and rejects the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Russia rarely comments publicly on the question of acceding, but did elaborate its critical view of the convention in November 2015 upon voting against a UN resolution on the convention. Russia has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention, but not since 2012.

Russia—as well as the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russian aircraft participating in a joint military operation in Syria since September 2015 have apparently used cluster munitions. Russian-backed armed opposition groups used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine from 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire. Russia also used cluster munitions in Georgia in 2008.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia has stated that “cluster munitions still preserve their status of non-prohibited weapon” and “cannot be abandoned yet” due to their “defensive role.”[1] Since 2010, it has conceded on several occasions that cluster munitions cause serious humanitarian harm, but also argued that the humanitarian risks associated with their use can be overcome through technical improvements and “appropriate” use.[2]

Russian government officials—from high-level political leaders to diplomatic representatives—rarely comment publicly on the question of Russia’s accession to the convention. However, in November 2015, Russia elaborated its views in remarks explaining why it voted, along with Zimbabwe, against a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.” A total of 139 states, including many non-signatories, voted in favor of this non-binding resolution on 7 December 2015.[3]

In an explanation of its vote, Russia was clear in its rejection of the Convention on Cluster Munitions: “The Oslo Convention is a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control.”[4] It expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but maintained that it does not agree with the approach taken by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] Russia went so far as to say that “the Oslo Convention merely declares a ban on cluster munitions but in actual fact is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions,” and claimed, “What is happening now regarding the Oslo Convention is the result of extremely unconstructive actions by a group of States resolved to undermine it.”[6]

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[7] That initiative failed in November 2011, effectively ending the CCW’s deliberations on cluster munitions. Since then, Russia has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions. The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[8] When the convention was opened for signature in December 2008, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “We are against unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions.” It described cluster munitions as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[9]

Russia has shown limited interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, participating as an observer in the convention’s annual Meetings of States Parties in 2010 and 2011, as well as its intersessional meetings in 2012. It did not make any statements at these meetings and has not participated in any meetings of the convention since 2012. Russia has been selective in the concern it has expressed at new use of cluster munitions. Russia made several statements criticizing the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine after July 2014, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement accusing the government of Ukraine of using cluster munitions in civilian areas.[10] At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security on 23 October 2014, Russia expressed its “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population,” in reference to Ukraine.[11] The next day Russia told a UN Security Council debate on the situation in Ukraine that “there is an alarming and growing number of civilian victims, including children, as the result of…prohibited munitions, including cluster bombs.”[12] Russia has expressed concern over the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and asked OSCE monitors to investigate.[13]

Yet Russia has not acknowledged or taken any measures to address the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine (see Use section below).

In June 2015, Russia voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and called on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate.”[14] In May 2014, it voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[15]

Russia has not expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Yemen in 2015. On 23 December 2015, it voted against UNGA Resolution 70/234 condemning the continued use of cluster munitions in Syria, as it has done on similar resolutions since 2013.[16]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, a number of states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[17]

According to international technical reference materials, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

  • Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
  • Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
  • Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).[18]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at least 35 states, including 22 that are not yet States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions:[19] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Georgia,[20] Guinea, India,[21] Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[22] Libya,[23] Mongolia, Poland,[24] Romania, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,[25] Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[26] Russian cluster munitions have been identified in Sudan, although the government of Sudan has denied having a stockpile.[27] RBK series bombs containing a variety of submunition types appear to account for the majority of cluster munitions used in Syria by the Syrian government and possibly by Russian forces.[28]

The 12 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities, as listed in the following table.[29]

The types of cluster munitions produced in the USSR or Russia that have been declared by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are detailed in the following table:

Stockpiled Soviet/Russian cluster munitions declared by States Parties[30]

Type of cluster munition

Cluster munition

Submunition

States declaring stockpiles (quantity of cluster munitions)

Bomb

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

PTAB-2.5M

Bulgaria (488), Croatia (9), Moldova (14), Hungary (17), Mozambique (199), Peru (657), Slovakia (20)

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh

AO-1SCh

Bulgaria (238), Croatia (5), Moldova (24), Côte d’Ivoire (68), Mozambique (9), Peru (388)

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

AO2.5RT

Bulgaria (201), Moldova (16), Peru (198), Czech Republic (191), Slovakia (50)

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5M

SHOAB-0.5M

Bulgaria (36)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5

PTAB-10.5

Moldova (8), Slovakia (23)

RBK-500-255 PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Moldova (16)

RBK-500-355 AO-10

AO-10

Slovakia (22)

Dispenser

BKF AO-2.5RT

AO-2.5RT

Bulgaria (3,086), Slovakia (63)

BKF PTAB-2.5

PTAB-2.5

Bulgaria (1,957), FYR Macedonia (1,438), Slovakia (72)

Projectile

3-O-13

O-16

Moldova (834)

Missile

9N123K

9N24

Bulgaria (8)

Rocket

9M27K

9N210

Moldova (473)

 

Stockpiling

Russia has acknowledged possessing a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” and has stated that the disposal of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions types would be time-consuming and result in “a significant financial expenditure.”[31] At the Fourth CCW Review Conference in November 2011, Russia stated that the size of its cluster munitions stockpile is similar to that of the United States (US), which had a reported 5.5 million cluster munitions.[32]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[33] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[34]

Type

Caliber

Carrier name

Number of submunitions

Submunition type

Projectile

 

120mm

(unknown)

30

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-23

42

Dual-purpose

152mm

3-O-13

8

Dual-purpose

203mm

3-O-14

24

Fragmentation

240mm

3-O-8

14

Fragmentation

Dispenser

BKF ODS 35

8

FAE

BKF AO-2.5RT

96

Fragmentation

BKF PTAB-1M

248

HE/AT

BKF PTAB-2.5

96

HE/AT

Bomb

PROSAB-250

90

HE

RBK-250 ZAB 2.5

48

Incendiary

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M

42

HE/AT

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5RT

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-2.5-2RTM

60

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 AO-1SCh

150

Fragmentation

RBK 250-275 PTAB 2.5M

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT

126

Fragmentation

RBK-500-255 PTAB-10.5A

30

HE/AT

RBK-500-375 AO-10

30

HE/AT

RBK-500 AO-2.5RTM

108

Fragmentation

RBK-500 PTAB-1M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5

75

HE/AT

RBK-500 PTAB 2.5M

268

HE/AT

RBK-500 SHOAB-0.5

565

Fragmentation

RBK-500 BETAB

12

Anti-runway

RBK-500 SPBE

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-D

15

SFW

RBK-500 SPBE-K

15

SFW

RBK-500 OFAB-50UD

10

Fragmentation

RBK-500 ZAB 2.5

51

Incendiary

 

RBK-500 ZAB 2.5SM

54

Incendiary

 

Rocket

122mm

Grad (9M218)

45

Dual-purpose

 

122mm

Grad (9M217)

2

SFW

 

220mm

Uragan (9M27K)

30

9N210 fragmentation

 

220mm

Uragan (9M27K1)

30

9N235 fragmentation

 

300mm

Smerch (9M55K)

72

9N235 fragmentation

 

300mm

Smerch (9M55K1)

5

SFW

 

300mm

Smerch (9M55K5)

600

Dual-purpose

 

Missiles

9K52 Luna-M with 9N18K

42

9N22 Fragmentation

 

9M79 Tochka with 9N123K

50

9N24 Fragmentation

 

Note: FAE=fuel air explosive; HE/AT=high explosive antitank; SFW=sensor-fuzed weapon 

Use

Use in Syria

Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Syria since beginning its joint military operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but its response is unconvincing. There is growing evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia City in Syria. There is compelling evidence that Russia is using cluster munitions in Syria and/or directly participating with Syrian government forces in attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates such as Aleppo, Homs, and Idlib, and on armed opposition groups.

Russia’s joint military operation with Syria has seen the first use of two more types of cluster munitions. Advanced air-dropped RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs containing SPBE sensor fuzed submunitions have been used since October 2015, and ground-launched 3-O-8 cluster munition projectiles containing O-10 submunitions have been used since December 2015.[35]

A remarkable number of cluster munitions appear to have been used and failed, given the high numbers of unexploded AO-2.5RT/RTM and ShOAB-0.5 submunitions from RBK-series bombs recorded after attacks.

Several air-dropped RBK-series cluster munitions used since 30 September 2015 bear markings showing they were produced from 1989 into the early 1990s, particularly the RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs, which appear to have been manufactured in 1990 and 1991. This appears to be a noticeable shift from before the Russian intervention, when production markings on the cluster bombs used in Syria showed they were produced in the 1970s and 1980s.[36]

The United Kingdom and US have said that Russia is using cluster munitions in Syria, including in a 16 June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq. Photographs released by the forces attacked show RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munition remnants.[37] The US Department of Defense claimed that Russian forces conducted the attack.[38] In a statement, the Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for the attack, but did not address the reported use of cluster munitions.[39]

It is challenging to determine conclusively if Russian or Syrian government forces are responsible for individual attacks, as they use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out offensives together. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used.[40]

In December 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[41]

Russia has voted against multiple UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently Human Rights Council Resolution 32/25 on 1 July 2016.[42]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 140 states.[43] Of these countries, more than 40 have made national statements condemning the use in Syria, including by the foreign ministers of Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.[44] In February 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which he said is “killing innocent women and children.”[45]

Previous use

Russian-backed separatists used cluster munition rockets in January and early February 2015 in eastern Ukraine, hitting at least three villages in government-controlled areas.[46] Ukrainian government forces were responsible for several cluster munition rocket attacks in October 2014.[47] Russia expressed concern at Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but did not comment on cluster munition attacks by opposition forces.[48]

Russia used cluster munitions in an August 2008 conflict with Georgia, including AO-2.5RTM and 9N210 submunitions, delivered by RBK aerial bombs and Uragan ground rockets, respectively. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[49] Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[50] The Netherlands has sought accountability and investigation into the death of Dutch journalist Stan Storimans, who was killed by a Russian cluster munition strike in Georgia in August 2008.[51]

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions in 1943 against German armed forces during World War II and from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan.[52] Russian forces also used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[53]



[1] Statement of the Russian Federation, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 24 November 2011. Notes by Human Rights Watch (HRW).

[2] Statement by Amb. Anatoly I. Antonov, Head of the Russian Delegation, CCW Meeting of the High Contracting Parties, Geneva, 25 November 2010. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Before 2010, Russia argued that the humanitarian problems associated with cluster munition use are “mythical” and asserted that submunitions can be accurately targeted to minimize civilian damage. Presentation of the Russian Federation, “Cluster Weapons: Real or Mythical Threat,” CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 2–12 August 2005, p. 3.

[3]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[4] “Statement of the Russian Federation,” UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015. UN, “Record of First Committee 24th meeting,” A/C.1/70/PV.24, 4 November 2015.

[5]  “Statement of the Russian Federation,” UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015; and UN, “Record of First Committee 24th meeting,” A/C.1/70/PV.24, 4 November 2015.

[6] “Statement of the Russian Federation,” UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015; and UN, “Record of First Committee 24th meeting,” A/C.1/70/PV.24, 4 November 2015.

[7] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in 2006, Russia stated, “We cannot accept the logic of restrictions or even bans on ammunition artificially and groundlessly declared as the most ‘dangerous weapons.’ This path would lead us to a stalemate. It could only result in a split and weaken the [CCW] and its Protocols.” Statement by Anatoly I. Antonov, Director, Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, CCW Third Review Conference, Geneva, 7 November 2006.

[8] Russia attended a regional meeting held during the Oslo Process as an observer (in Brussels in October 2007). For details on Russia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 230–235.

[9] “Russia explains refusal to join cluster bombs convention,” Interfax: Russia & CIS Military Newswire, 8 December 2008. Similar language was used in a September 2009 letter to the CMC. See, letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the CMC, 18 September 2009. Unofficial translation by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[10] David McHugh, “Troops in Ukraine strike back at rebels; Putin pushes truce,” Boston Globe, 4 July 2014. On 25 July 2014, a senior commander of the Russian General Staff expressed concern that Ukrainian forces were using cluster munitions in civilian areas. See, “Ukraine used phosphorous incendiaries, cluster bombs against cities – Russian military,” RT, 25 July 2014.

[11] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 23 October 2014.

[13] Statement of Russia, Meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, 11 July 2014.

[14] The five permanent members of the UN Security Council voted in favor of the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.

[15] The resolution noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” and called for “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.” UN Security Council, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), Extends Mandate of Mission In South Sudan, Bolstering Its Strength to Quell Surging Violence,” SC11414, 27 May 2014.

[16]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/70/234, 23 December 2015 Russia voted against similar resolutions on 15 May and 18 December 2013, and on 18 December 2014.

[17] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[18] The primary sources for information on Russian companies that produce cluster munitions are Jane’s Air Launched Weapons and Jane’s Ammunition Handbook. Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket details the numerous types of rockets it produced.

[19] Unless otherwise footnoted with supplementary information, the source is Jane’s Information Group.

[20] The Georgian Ministry of Defense reports having RBK-500 cluster munitions and BKF blocks of submunitions that are carried in KMG-U dispensers, but told HRW that their shelf-lives have expired and they are slated for destruction. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Georgian Ministry of Defense, 12 February 2009.

[21] In February 2006, India bought 28 launch units for the 300mm Smerch multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) fitted with dual purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) and sensor-fuzed submunitions. “India, Russia sign $500mn [sic]rocket systems deal,” Indo-Asian News Service (New Delhi), 9 February 2006.

[22] In 1995, Kuwait was the first export customer for the Russian produced 300mm Smerch MLRS fitted with DPCIM and sensor-fuzed submunitions, buying 27 launch units. “Kuwait to get smart submunitions for Smerch MRL,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 21 April 1995.

[23] HRW observed PTAB submunitions at the abandoned ammunitions storage depot at Mizdah during a visit in March 2012. See, HRW, “Statement on Explosive Remnants of War in Libya and Implementation of CCW Protocol V,” 25 April 2012. In addition, deminers from the Mines Advisory Group encountered dud PTAB submunitions about 20 miles from Ajdjabiya. See, CJ Chivers, “More Evidence of Cluster-Bomb Use Discovered in Libya,” At War blog, 13 February 2012.

[24] The Polish air force possesses “BKF expendable unit loader with anti-tank, incendiary and fragmentation bomblets, imported from USSR.” Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Director, Security Policy Department, Poland Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 10 March 2009.

[25] Presentation of Ukraine, “Impact of the CCW Draft Protocol VI (current version),” on Ukraine’s Defense Capacity, CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 30 March 2011.

[26] The Houthi Administration in Saada Governorate provided VICE News with still photographs showing remnants of Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs with its associated antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions. Multiple emails from Ben Anderson, Correspondent and Producer, VICE News, May 2014.

[27] For example, independent journalist Aris Roussinos filmed and photographed a failed RBK-500 AO-2.5RT cluster bomb near the village of Ongolo in South Kodorfan in April 2012. See, HRW, “Sudan: Cluster Bomb Found in Conflict Zone,” 25 May 2012.

[29] Bulgaria, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, FYR Macedonia, Moldova, Mozambique, Peru, and Slovakia.

[30] All information in this table was extracted from Article 7 reports submitted so far by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and is available here. The RBK-250 bombs containing ZAB series incendiary submunitions are not covered by the Convention on Cluster Munitions because they contain incendiary submunitions.

[31] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 12 November 2009. Notes by Landmine Action.

[32] Statement of the Russian Federation, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 18 November 2011. Notes by HRW. An October 2004 report to the US Congress by the US Department of Defense disclosed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions containing about 728.5 million submunitions.

[33] Letter from Sergey Ryabkov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to HRW, 20 March 2009.

[34] The data in this table comes from the following sources: Publishing House “Arms and Technologies;” and Information Centre of Defence Technologies and Safety, “The XXI Century Encyclopedia, ‘Russia’s Arms and Technologies,’ Volume 12: Ordnance and Munitions,” CD Version 2006; Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air–Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 414–415, and 422–432; Leland S. Ness and Anthony G. Williams, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2007–2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2007), pp. 572, 597–598, 683, 703–706, 715–716, and 722–723; US Defense Intelligence Agency, “Improved Conventional Munitions and Selected Controlled-Fragmentation Munitions (Current and Projected),” partially declassified and made available to HRW under a Freedom of Information Act request; and “Russia’s Arms Catalog: Volume IV, Precision Guided Weapons and Ammunition, 1996–1997,” Military Parade: Moscow, 1997, pp. 138–139, 148–152, 373–392, 504, and 515–516. This research has been supplemented by information found on the Splav State Research and Production Enterprise corporate website.

[36] Markings on the RBK-series air-dropped bombs and their submunitions, as well as a comparison with the Soviet manuals for the weapons, show the cluster munitions used in Syria until September 2015 were manufactured at Soviet state munitions factories in the 1970s and early 1980s.

[37] The New Syrian Army (@NSyA_Official), “Russians are lying with E-conference & more updates on our FB page. http://facebook.com/The.NSAy.Official/posts/255901281444601 …#NSyA #RuAF #لسنا_وحدنا,” 19 June 2016, 1:18pm. Tweet.

[40] Amnesty International, “Syria: Russia’s shameful failure to acknowledge civilian killings,” 23 December 2015; and HRW, “Russia/Syria: Daily Cluster Munition Attacks,” 8 February 2016.

[41] Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, “Russian Defence Ministry commented on briefing of Amnesty International,” 23 December 2015.

[42]The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 32/25, 1 July 2016. Russia voted against a similar resolution on 23 March 2016.

[43] A total of 143 countries have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria via national statements and/or by endorsing resolutions or joint statements. They include 93 States Parties and signatories (Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovia (BiH), Botswana, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Mozambique, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Palau, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, the UK, and Uruguay) and 51 non-signatories (Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Dominica, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, Gabon, Georgia, Greece, Israel, Jordan, Kiribati, South Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the US, Vanuatu, and Yemen).

[44] National statements condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria have been made by Australia, Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Togo, Turkey, and the US.

[45] US Department of State, “Remarks by Secretary Kerry and Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry,” YouTube.com, 9 February 2016.

[47] HRW, “Ukraine: Widespread Use of Cluster Munitions,” 20 October 2014.

[48] Statement of Russia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 23 October 2014.

[50] Ibid; and see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 232–233.

[51] The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided Russian authorities with a report by an independent commission that investigated the incident and concluded that a Russian cluster munition strike killed Storimans. “Verslag onderzoeksmissie Storimans” (“Storimans commission of inquiry report”), 24 October 2008.

[52] Mennonite Central Committee, “Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons,” June 1999, p. 5. Additionally, cluster munitions were also used by various forces in several conflicts that resulted from the breakup of the Soviet Union in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The degree of involvement of Russian forces in the use of cluster munitions is not known but cannot be discounted.

[53] Mennonite Central Committee, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, Chapter 3.