Summary: Non-signatory Russia acknowledges the humanitarian risks associated with cluster munitions, but insists on the military utility of the weapons and rejects the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Russia rarely comments publicly on the question of acceding, but did elaborate its critical view of the convention in November 2015 upon voting against a UN resolution on the convention. Russia has participated as an observer in meetings of the convention, but not since 2012.

Russia—as well as the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russian aircraft participating in a joint military operation in Syria since September 2015 have apparently used cluster munitions. Russian-backed armed opposition groups used cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine from 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire. Russia also used cluster munitions in Georgia in 2008.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia has stated that “cluster munitions still preserve their status of non-prohibited weapon” and “cannot be abandoned yet” due to their “defensive role.”[1] Since 2010, it has conceded on several occasions that cluster munitions cause serious humanitarian harm, but also argued that the humanitarian risks associated with their use can be overcome through technical improvements and “appropriate” use.[2]

Russian government officials—from high-level political leaders to diplomatic representatives—rarely comment publicly on the question of Russia’s accession to the convention. However, in November 2015, Russia elaborated its views in remarks explaining why it voted, along with Zimbabwe, against a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.” A total of 139 states, including many non-signatories, voted in favor of this non-binding resolution on 7 December 2015.[3]

In an explanation of its vote, Russia was clear in its rejection of the Convention on Cluster Munitions: “The Oslo Convention is a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control.”[4] It expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but maintained that it does not agree with the approach taken by the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] Russia went so far as to say that “the Oslo Convention merely declares a ban on cluster munitions but in actual fact is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions,” and claimed, “What is happening now regarding the Oslo Convention is the result of extremely unconstructive actions by a group of States resolved to undermine it.”[6]

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[7] That initiative failed in November 2011, effectively ending the CCW’s deliberations on cluster munitions. Since then, Russia has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions. The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.

Russia did not participate in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[8] When the convention was opened for signature in December 2008, Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “We are against unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions.” It described cluster munitions as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[9]

Russia has shown limited interest in the Convention on Cluster Munitions, participating as an observer in the convention’s annual Meetings of States Parties in 2010 and 2011, as well as its intersessional meetings in 2012. It did not make any statements at these meetings and has not participated in any meetings of the convention since 2012. Russia has been selective in the concern it has expressed at new use of cluster munitions. Russia made several statements criticizing the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine after July 2014, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement accusing the government of Ukraine of using cluster munitions in civilian areas.[10] At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security on 23 October 2014, Russia expressed its “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population,” in reference to Ukraine.[11] The next day Russia told a UN Security Council debate on the situation in Ukraine that “there is an alarming and growing number of civilian victims, including children, as the result of…prohibited munitions, including cluster bombs.”[12] Russia has expressed concern over the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and asked OSCE monitors to investigate.[13]

Yet Russia has not acknowledged or taken any measures to address the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine (see Use section below).

In June 2015, Russia voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and called on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate.”[14] In May 2014, it voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[15]

Russia has not expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Yemen in 2015. On 23 December 2015, it voted against UNGA Resolution 70/234 condemning the continued use of cluster munitions in Syria, as it has done on similar resolutions since 2013.[16]

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, a number of states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[17]

According to international technical reference materials, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

• Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
• Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
• Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).[18]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at least 35 states, including 22 that are not yet States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions:[19] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Georgia,[20] Guinea, India,[21] Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[22] Libya,[23] Mongolia, Poland,[24] Romania, Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,[25] Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[26] Russian cluster munitions have been identified in Sudan, although the government of Sudan has denied having a stockpile.[27] RBK series bombs containing a variety of submunition types appear to account for the majority of cluster munitions used in Syria by the Syrian government and possibly by Russian forces.[28]

The 12 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions that have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities, as listed in the following table.[29]

The types of cluster munitions produced in the USSR or Russia that have been declared by States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions are detailed in the following table:

Stockpiled Soviet/Russian cluster munitions declared by States Parties[30]

Stockpiling

Russia has acknowledged possessing a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” and has stated that the disposal of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions types would be time-consuming and result in “a significant financial expenditure.”[31] At the Fourth CCW Review Conference in November 2011, Russia stated that the size of its cluster munitions stockpile is similar to that of the United States (US), which had a reported 5.5 million cluster munitions.[32]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[33] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[34]

Note: FAE=fuel air explosive; HE/AT=high explosive antitank; SFW=sensor-fuzed weapon 

Use

Use in Syria

Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Syria since beginning its joint military operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but its response is unconvincing. There is growing evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia City in Syria. There is compelling evidence that Russia is using cluster munitions in Syria and/or directly participating with Syrian government forces in attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas of governorates such as Aleppo, Homs, and Idlib, and on armed opposition groups.

Russia’s joint military operation with Syria has seen the first use of two more types of cluster munitions. Advanced air-dropped RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs containing SPBE sensor fuzed submunitions have been used since October 2015, and ground-launched 3-O-8 cluster munition projectiles containing O-10 submunitions have been used since December 2015.[35]

A remarkable number of cluster munitions appear to have been used and failed, given the high numbers of unexploded AO-2.5RT/RTM and ShOAB-0.5 submunitions from RBK-series bombs recorded after attacks.

Several air-dropped RBK-series cluster munitions used since 30 September 2015 bear markings showing they were produced from 1989 into the early 1990s, particularly the RBK-500 SPBE cluster bombs, which appear to have been manufactured in 1990 and 1991. This appears to be a noticeable shift from before the Russian intervention, when production markings on the cluster bombs used in Syria showed they were produced in the 1970s and 1980s.[36]

The United Kingdom and US have said that Russia is using cluster munitions in Syria, including in a 16 June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq. Photographs released by the forces attacked show RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munition remnants.[37] The US Department of Defense claimed that Russian forces conducted the attack.[38] In a statement, the Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for the attack, but did not address the reported use of cluster munitions.[39]

It is challenging to determine conclusively if Russian or Syrian government forces are responsible for individual attacks, as they use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out offensives together. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used.[40]

In December 2015, the Russian Defence Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[41]

Russia has voted against multiple UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently Human Rights Council Resolution 32/25 on 1 July 2016.[42]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 140 states.[43] Of these countries, more than 40 have made national statements condemning the use in Syria, including by the foreign ministers of Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Austria, Belgium, Costa Rica, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the UK.[44] In February 2016, US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which he said is “killing innocent women and children.”[45]

Previous use

Russian-backed separatists used cluster munition rockets in January and early February 2015 in eastern Ukraine, hitting at least three villages in government-controlled areas.[46] Ukrainian government forces were responsible for several cluster munition rocket attacks in October 2014.[47] Russia expressed concern at Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but did not comment on cluster munition attacks by opposition forces.[48]

Russia used cluster munitions in an August 2008 conflict with Georgia, including AO-2.5RTM and 9N210 submunitions, delivered by RBK aerial bombs and Uragan ground rockets, respectively. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[49] Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[50] The Netherlands has sought accountability and investigation into the death of Dutch journalist Stan Storimans, who was killed by a Russian cluster munition strike in Georgia in August 2008.[51]

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions in 1943 against German armed forces during World War II and from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan.[52] Russian forces also used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[53]

The Russian Federation is continuing to progress in clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia, with the aim of completing clearance of most or even all of these two North Caucasus republics by 2018.

Recommendations for action 

• Russia should take the necessary measures to identify the extent and impact of mine contamination (in particular in Chechnya and the North Caucasus) and complete clearance of mined areas to humanitarian standards as soon as possible.
• Russia should be more transparent in detailing the extent of its mine contamination and clearance operations.
• Russia should ensure the protection of civilians from explosive hazards in areas it controls or occupies. 

Contamination

Russia is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mined, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.[3]

Program Management

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES), through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).[4]

Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Center in 2014. The center serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action center as the term is generally understood in mine action.[5]

Clearance of explosive ordnance in 2015 was reportedly undertaken by 6,229 armed forces personnel, using an array of manual and mechanical demining equipment.[6]

Land Release

In its Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II and Protocol V transparency reports for 2015, Russia reported that its armed forces engineering units inspected and checked for explosives in 80 regions, over 622km² of land, 1,222km of road, and in 46 buildings. In total, more than 370,498 explosive objects were destroyed.[7]

Mine clearance operations by the engineering unit of the Russian Ministry of Defense have continued in Russia’s Southern Military District, including Chechnya and Ingushetia.[8] In August 2015, engineers reported completing demining of 1.5km² in Chechnya and Ingushetia over a four-month period, with destruction of around 200 explosive items, including landmines. More than 33km² are said to have been cleared to date in Chechnya and Ingushetia.[9] This includes completion of clearance of two districts of Chechnya, Itum-Kali and Achkhoy-Martan, where more than 20km² have been cleared. The land cleared included 7km² for the construction of the “Veduchi” ski resort in Itum-Kale district, and 0.3km² of land for the construction of a thermal power plant in Grozny.

The next stage of demining, to take place in forested areas, was planned to start in March/April 2016 to clear mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) from more than 70km².[10] Both manual and mechanical assets are being deployed, including the new Uran-6 robotic demining system.[11] The Deputy Chief Engineer of Russia’s armed forces, Colonel Ruslan Alahverdiev, has reportedly promised to complete clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia by 2018. However, in the online media report, it was unclear whether Colonel Alahverdiev was referring only to clearing all roads and forests, or if roads and forests are the only remaining mined areas in Chechnya and Ingushetia.[12]

For 2016, Russia planned to clear 62.7km² of ERW, including 13.9km² in the Western Military District, 28.1km² in the South Military District, and 10.6km² in the Central Military District.[13]

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.