Senegal

Mine Action

Last updated: 17 November 2016

Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (light contamination)

Article 5 Deadline: 1 March 2021
(Unclear if on track to meet deadline)

There is no accurate assessment of the extent of mine contamination, though at the end of 2015 the Republic of Senegal reported that 1.6km2 of confirmed and suspected contamination remained to be addressed. Survey activities recommenced in 2015, but no clearance of antipersonnel mines was conducted. 

Recommendations for action

  • Senegal should complete non-technical survey (NTS) as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a more complete and accurate estimate of its mine threat. It should record suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) on the basis of demonstrable evidence and with specific size estimates.
  • Senegal should prioritize clearance and technical survey in areas readily accessible that clearly evidence the existence of mines.
  • The Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS) should take immediate action to improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations, as well as to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action program.
  • CNAMS should engage the Senegalese armed forces to participate in mine action activities and provide information on the location of mined areas and other resources to support clearance.
  • Senegal should report regularly and transparently on its clearance efforts and results, including in the annual Article 7 transparency reports. 

Contamination 

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination. As at the end of 2015, Senegal reported that 83 areas with a size of nearly 1.6km2 of confirmed and suspected contamination remained to be addressed. Of this, a total of 56 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a total size of 465,127m2 had been identified, along with a further 27 SHAs whose extent had not been defined.[1] Of the 216 localities that Senegal reported as still requiring survey in June 2015, by the end of the year, 67 had been canceled by non-technical survey and five confirmed as mined. The 144 areas remaining to be surveyed covered a total area of just over 1.56km2.[2]

Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye and Ziguinchor) out of 45 still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province at end 2015[3]

Department

CHAs

Size (m2)

SHAs

Size (m2)

Bignona

10

52,690

8

N/K

Goudomp

32

330,669

2

N/K

Oussouye

9

77,240

4

N/K

Ziguinchor

5

4,528

13

N/K

Total

56

465,127

27

N/K

Note: N/K = Not known

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

Mine contamination is said to pose a great risk to local residents, seriously hindering the socio-economic development of Casamance, and limiting access to agricultural land.[4] Senegal reported that demining of Gouraf village in Ziguinchor department had allowed more than 120 families to return and livelihood activities to resume in 2015.[5]

Program Management

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by CNAMS. Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.[6]

Strategic planning 

Senegal’s latest Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in June 2015, included plans for survey and clearance in 2016–2020. The request projects that remaining non-technical survey in the 216 localities would be carried out in 2016–2017, though without explaining how the insecurity reported in 111 of these areas, which is said to have prevented survey activities from being conducted in previous years, would be overcome. In August 2016, CNAMS reported that its extension request plan would be updated annually based on the results of the peace process, but did not provide any details on any further developments.[7] 

Concerning technical survey and clearance, the plan projects that:

  • In January 2016–June 2017: operations would be conducted in Goudomp;
  • In October 2016–December 2016: operations would be conducted in Oussouye;
  • In October 2016–December 2018: operations would be conducted in Ziguinchor; and
  • In October 2016–June 2020: operations would be conducted in Bignona.

Operators

Handicap International (HI) initiated a new 14-month project in July 2015 for NTS of 80 localities and technical survey over some 53,000m2.[8] It deployed 24 demining personnel and a team with two mine detection dogs (MDD) for technical survey on paths/roads.[9] It was the only international mine action operator in Senegal in 2015.[10]

In 2014, NPA withdrew from Senegal as a result of “government-imposed limitations on demining activities,” which had prevented it from deploying demining resources where the necessary clearance could be done safely, and from undertaking NTS in areas suspected to be contaminated but which had not been surveyed.[11] In 2015, Mechem ended its operations in Senegal due to lack of funding. 

Land Release

A total of just over 911,000m2 of SHA was released by survey activities. No mine clearance occurred in Senegal in 2015. Senegal did not report on the extent of any land release in 2014.

HI began surveying in December 2015. By the end of the year, HI reported having canceled 19 SHAs with a size of 908,00m2 and reducing a further 3,043m2 by technical survey.[12] According to CNAMS, five CHAs with a total size of just over 14,670m2 were confirmed by the survey.[13] This compared to NTS of 209 localities in 2014, when HI’s operations focused only on NTS activities.[14]

Progress in 2016

As at the end of August 2016, HI had reduced an additional 29,156m2 through technical survey in Diagnon, in Ziguinchor department.[15]

Deminer safety

There were no reported demining accidents in 2015.[16] As a result of a serious security incident in 2013, to help ensure deminer safety, Senegal assigned a national contact committee to meet MFDC leaders and discuss, among a number of topics, areas that could safely be cleared on a case-by-case basis. Whenever a specific agreement is reached, CNAMS says that it issues task orders for that area.[17] Armed men had kidnapped 12 deminers working for Mechem in the village of Kaïlou (Ziguinchor department). All were later released safely, although nine were held for 70 days.[18] The government ordered a halt to all demining activities, a suspension that lasted until November 2013.[19]

Inconsistency in clearance task orders since 2013

Task orders issued by CNMAS have been criticized as they assign clearance assets to areas not known to be affected by mines.[20] In November 2013, Mechem was tasked to clear sections of National Road 6 (Route nationale 6, RN6) and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6.[21] According to HI, only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sindone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the IMSMA database, and the quarries had never been recorded as suspected or confirmed mined areas.[22]

Additionally, reports indicated that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases.[23] But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed—as they are under the control of the Senegalese armed forces—they have not been cleared nor considered as a priority for demining operations. Some areas are confirmed as contaminated: these include the village of Djirack, in which operations were planned to start in 2016. Others remain as either SHAs or as credible, if unrecorded and unconfirmed, reports of contamination by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack.[24] Some clearance around military installations was carried out by HI in 2007–2012 in Darsalam and Gonoum, during which 177 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in cooperation with the Senegalese armed forces, and by Mechem in 2013 in Mpack, during which 136 antipersonnel mines were destroyed (representing all the mines found that year).[25]

In August 2016, CNAMS reported that in its criteria for prioritizing tasks, emphasis was put on the level of security, the economic importance of the area, the desire of populations to return to areas, and the social cohesion of communities.[26] It reported that “indeed, there is a significant amount of land demined in relation to the number of mines discovered,” while noting that “it must be remembered that the main interest is to remove suspicion and to make accessible to local populations land which had formerly been abandoned.”[27]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance 

In December 2015, the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties granted Senegal a second extension to its Article 5 deadline, for a period of five years. Senegal is obligated to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.

Senegal’s previous Article 5 clearance deadline was set to expire on 1 March 2016 under its first extension request, approved in 2008. In June 2015, Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2021. 

In granting the second extension request, States Parties noted that Senegal “did not have clear knowledge of the size and location of areas that will warrant mine clearance” as well as its commitment “to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure which may result in implementation proceeding much faster and in a more cost-effective manner.”[28] Previously, Senegal reported release of about 730,725m2 and the destruction of 383 mines in 2008–2013. Most of these results were achieved between February 2012 and May 2013 with 548,137m2 cleared, representing three-quarters of the total and 259 mines destroyed.[29]

In its latest extension request, Senegal noted as circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations: general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; the eight-month suspension of operations in 2013; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years.[30] Senegal has also noted that security conditions and lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner.[31] 

However, while Senegal recorded a significant increase in clearance productivity in 2012–2013, the way CNAMS has allocated tasks after the 2013 kidnapping has been criticized for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.[32]

Senegal’s extension request foresees expenditure of some $11.5 million to support its mine action program, of which $6.4 million would be allocated to technical survey and clearance. Senegal has pledged to contribute to about 30% of the total to cover the running costs of its program (approx. $3.3 million).[33]

There may be political obstacles to the implementation of a five-year workplan for 2016–2020. Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing peace talks and would first be approved by MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials.[34] In that context, in 2015, talks between an MFDC faction (Front Sud) and Senegal were reportedly underway concerning the restarting of demining in at least seven villages in Nyassia (Ziguinchor department). The process was, though, interrupted following clashes between the Front Sud and the Senegalese army in April 2015.[35]

While continuing to state that demining operations must be approved by the MFDC, CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action center.[36] There is no explanation in the action plan presented in Senegal’s second extension request of how peace negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reflection Group on Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réflexion sur la Paix en Casamance, GRPC) will include the issue of mine clearance.

In an August 2015 report, NPA criticized CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators and the armed forces in particular, which could provide the specific locations of mined areas. According to NPA, there is overwhelming evidence that laying of landmines by rebel forces was sporadic, while the Sudanese armed forces placed hundreds, if not thousands, of mines around military outposts in Casamance. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS was preventing dialogue between parties, including the spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.[37] 

In August 2016, CNAMS did not provide any indication that any discussions with MFDC had occurred. It stated that there was no formal entity in charge of liaising between CNAMS and the GRPC, and that dialogue would be entertained through “supervisory authorities.”[38]

Survey activities are planned to start in 2016, although more than half of the concerned areas are said to be inaccessible due to insecurity. Senegal has not provided details on whether or not the conditions in some of these areas have changed and if surveyors can effectively access them.

CNAMS reported it had three priorities for 2016 towards meeting Senegal’s 2021 Article 5 deadline: agreement of all parties to the conflict on the principle of clearance of mined areas; access to conduct NTS in the 144 communities not yet surveyed; and mobilization of resources to enable increased demining productivity.[39] It also stated that demining of 44,000m2 in Goudomp department was planned to start in early October 2016, funded by the national government.[40]

 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, CNAMS, 22 August 2016. According to the program manager of a former operator in Senegal, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), it was rare that the size of the area was recorded when an SHA was identified. Both NPA and CNAMS reported that entire villages were recorded as SHAs purely on the basis that they were located in former conflict areas. Emails from Chris Natale, former Programme Manager Senegal, NPA, 15 September 2016; and from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 13 September 2016.

[2] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.

[3] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[4] M. Millecamps, “Sénégal: en Casamance les mines font encore des victimes” (“Senegal: mines are still claiming victims in Casamance”), TV5 Monde, 2 February 2015; and Handicap International (HI), “Senegal: country situation,” undated.

[5] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.

[6] These committees meet three times in a year in Ziguinchor, and twice a year in Sédhiou and Kolda, bringing together local authorities, civil society, and NGO operators to coordinate demining activities.

[7] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[8] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] NPA, “Humanitarian Disarmament in Senegal,” undated; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor blog entry, 7 April 2014.

[12] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

[13] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[14] Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016. In 2014, HI conducted NTS along a main road, the RN6, identifying 17 paths as mined areas over a total length of 17,070m, and nine other SHAs covering 22,694m2. Surveyors also identified 29 abandoned villages containing at least one SHA near the RN6. Email from Nicolas Charpentier, Senegal Programme Director, HI, 6 July 2015.

[15] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016. CNAMS misreported this figure as land cleared, as well as land released through technical survey. Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form D.

[16] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

[17] Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.

[18] In March 2013, clearance operations were progressing rapidly as a consequence of the new demining capacity brought by Mechem and NPA. As they approached MFDC-controlled areas, a faction of the rebel group called publicly for a halt to humanitarian demining on the ground that clearance teams had reached a “red line beyond which operators’ safety could not be guaranteed.” Joint Press Release from MFDC, CNAMS, Geneva Call, the Sao Domingos Prefect, and APRAN-SDP, 20 March 2013.

[19] Interview with Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, in Geneva, 1 April 2014.

[20] HI, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in land release,” April 2014.

[21] HI, “Déminage Humanitaire en Casamance: progression du processus de remise à disposition des terres” (“Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in the process of land release”), April 2014; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor blog entry, 7 April 2014.

[22] HI, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in land release,” April 2014.

[23] K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor blog entry, 7 April 2014.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Email from Luc Sambou, Mine Coordinator, HI, 8 May 2014; and K. Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor blog entry, 7 April 2014.

[26] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Analysis of Senegal’s request for a second Article 5 deadline Extension Submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 1.

[29] Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, pp. 11–13.

[30] Ibid., p. 22.

[31] Ibid.

[32] K. Millett, ““Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor blog entry, 7 April 2014.

[33] Ibid., p. 28.

[34] H. Sagna, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations still deadlocked,” Enquête+, 17 June 2015.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[37] A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, “Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal,” IRIN, 3 August 2015.

[38] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid.