Sudan

Mine Action

Last updated: 25 November 2016

Contaminated by: landmines (medium contamination), cluster munition remnants (extent of contamination unclear), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). 

Article 5 Deadline: 1 April 2019
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

At the end of 2015, the Republic of Sudan had a total of 21.5km2 of areas suspected or confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines, of which 2.8km2 were confirmed mined areas. In 2015 1.67km2 of land was cleared, only 0.4km2 of which was cleared of antipersonnel mines, the remainder was battle area clearance (BAC). This was a decrease compared with 2014, which was attributed to a reduction in funding.

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Sudan is not known, and no survey or clearance operations for cluster munition remnants took place in 2015. There have been reports of new use of cluster munitions in 2015. 

Recommendations for action 

  • Sudan should regularly update Mine Ban Treaty States Parties on access to, and progress in, clearing Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, as security conditions permit.
  • Sudan should conduct survey to determine the extent of cluster munition contamination.
  • Sudan should re-establish conditions that allow international mine action organizations to conduct land release in Sudan.
  • Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology. Sudan should ensure that reporting disaggregates submunitions from other UXO.
  • Sudan should develop a resource-mobilization strategy for its mine action program.

Contamination

Mine and explosive remnant of war contamination (see below for cluster munition contamination.)

At the end of 2015, Sudan had 112 areas containing antipersonnel mines covering a total of just under 21km2. According to the Sudanese National Mine Action Center (NMAC), of this total 2.8km2 is confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines, while 18.1km2 is suspected to contain antipersonnel mines.[1] A further 39 areas suspected to contain antivehicle mines cover a total size of nearly 6km2, as set out in the table below.[2] 

Mine contamination as at end 2015[3]

Type of contamination

Confirmed hazardous areas

Area (m2)

Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs)

Area (m2)

Antipersonnel mines

63

2,799,054

49

18,115,237

Antivehicle mines

0

0

39

5,951,369

Total

63

2,799,054

88

24,066,606

 

Sudan’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination results from decades-long conflict since its independence in 1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and other explosive weapons were used heavily by all parties to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that has since claimed thousands of victims.[4] In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, ending the civil war and ultimately leading to the independence of the south in July 2011. However, since South Sudan’s independence, conflicts have again broken out in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states and in the Abyei region, leading to new contamination from UXO.

As at the end of 2015, Sudan’s total estimated remaining mine and ERW contamination affected 10 of its 18 states: Blue Nile; Central, East, North, South, and West Darfur; Gadaref; Kassala; Red Sea; and South Kordofan. Of these, five were affected by antipersonnel mines: South Kordofan, Kassala, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and Gadaref, as set out in the table below. Contamination was largely concentrated in South Kordofan, followed by Kassala, and Blue Nile states, with Red Sea and Gadaref states each containing 10,000m2 or less antipersonnel mine contamination remaining at the end of the year. In May 2016, Gadaref state was announced free of known mine and ERW contamination.[5] No mine contamination has been reported in Darfur, where the main threat is from UXO.[6]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015[7]

Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Blue Nile

4

219,663

5

905,583

South Kordofan

48

2,182,548

36

15,615,710

Kassala

4

203,970

6

1,576,744

Red Sea

0

0

1

7,200

Gadaref

7

192,873

1

10,000

Total

63

2,799,054

49

18,115,237

Note: CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas; SHAs = suspected hazardous area.

There are several reports of use of antipersonnel mines in 2011, 2012, and 2013 that the Monitor has been unable to confirm (see the Mine Ban Policy country profile for more details). 

Since South Sudan’s independence, new conflicts in Abyei and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, have resulted in increased UXO contamination in Sudan.[8] The IMSMA database does not hold data on contamination in Abyei due to armed conflict and restricted access to the area.[9]

At the end of 2015, a total of 2,631 hazardous areas had been registered in the IMSMA database since 2002, of which the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported 2,398 had been released through various clearance methods, leaving a total of 233 hazardous areas with a size of just over 32.1km2 remaining to be addressed. In 2015, 97 new hazardous areas were registered and 87 areas cleared, with an additional 540km of roads assessed.[10]

Dozens of persons were killed and injured by mines and ERW in 2015 (see Sudan’s Casualties and victim assistance profile for further details).

Mine and ERW contamination continues to pose a daily threat to the lives of civilians in Sudan and also has a significant detrimental impact on the socio-economic development of local communities. NMAC reported that, in 2015, nomads and farmers were particularly at risk from the threat of mines and ERW, along with returning internally displaced persons.[11] In the Abyei area, the UN has on repeated occasions expressed concern over the threat of mines and ERW and the impact of contamination in obstructing the safe return of displaced persons and preventing safe migration.[12] The presence of mines and ERW also hinders provision of humanitarian assistance and access to the conflict-affected states.[13]

While no mine contamination is reported in Darfur, contamination from ERW continues to pose a serious threat to civilians, to peacekeepers from the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and to the delivery of humanitarian aid. ERW in Darfur includes unexploded air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and mortar shells, and grenades.[14]

Cluster munition contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Sudan is not known. There have been reports of new use of cluster munitions as recently as 2015, as well as in 2012.[15] The most current estimate of contamination dates back to June 2011, when the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) reported nine areas remained suspected to be contaminated with unexploded submunitions, after 81 areas had been released (see the table below).[16] 

Cluster munition-contaminated areas as at June 2011[17]

State

Open

Closed

Total

Kassala

7

2

9

South Kordofan

2

68

70

Blue Nile

0

9

9

Northern Darfur

0

1

1

Southern Darfur

0

1

1

Total

9

81

90

 

In June 2016, however, NMAC, which assumed full national ownership for implementing mine action activities upon UNMAO’s closure in June 2011, stated that no cluster munition-contaminated areas were “recorded as remaining hazards to be cleared.”[18] It reported that no separate survey or clearance operations for cluster munition remnants occurred in 2015 and stated that no cluster munitions had been found in all mine action activities “to date.”[19]

UNMAS, which resumed lead responsibility within the UN system for mine action coordination in Sudan in 2015, also confirmed that no cluster munition survey or clearance had occurred during that year and stated that no new reports of cluster munition contamination had been recorded in the national database.[20]

In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have sporadically air-dropped several types of cluster munitions in its civil war with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).[21]

In 2013–2015, the UN published reports of evidence of use of cluster munitions in Darfur, the stockpiling of RBK-500 cluster munitions and AO-2.5RT submunitions by the Sudanese air force, and fluctuating stock levels indicative of use for operations or for training.[22]

In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state. Each attack involved air-dropped RBK-500 cluster munitions containing AO-2.5RT submunitions[23] (see Sudan’s Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for more details).

Program Management 

The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action program, with responsibility for coordinating all mine clearance, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies. In January 2015, UNMAS, which had opened an emergency program in Sudan in 2002, reassumed the lead in UN mine action efforts in Sudan and its role in providing assistance and technical support to NMAC, after a one-year handover to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 2014.[24]

In 2016, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) continued to monitor the activities of the Sudanese armed forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Abyei, which it has done since the 2011 outbreak of heavy conflict in the area.[25] As UNISFA does not have a mandate to conduct mine clearance, UNMAS continued its UN Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes the identification and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone around Abyei and facilitating access by assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.[26]

In the Darfur region, under the umbrella of UNAMID, the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) works in direct support of UNAMID priorities.[27] In 2012, UNAMID contracted The Development Initiative (TDI), a commercial company, to assess, survey, mark, identify, and clear contamination in all five Darfur states.[28] In 2015, TDI’s contract ended and it was replaced by Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) (formerly MineTech International, MTI) for 2015/2016.[29] Mine action in Darfur is funded through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.[30]

Strategic planning

Sudan has a multi-year National Mine Action Plan for 2013–2019. According to NMAC, the plan was designed in light of the overall security situation in Sudan and the capacity for mine action and available demining assets. The plan includes details of operations for addressing contamination in all affected states by year, with a focus on the eastern states of Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea, and parts of Blue Nile. When security permits, work will start accordingly in South Kordofan and the remainder of Blue Nile.[31]

NMAC reported that an annual operational plan for 2015 was developed, which included objectives, inputs and outputs, timeframes, and budgets, in accordance with the multi-year National Mine Action Plan and in consultation with relevant stakeholders. In May 2016, however, NMAC said it was not possible to implement the activities according to the plan, primarily due to lack of funding and the security situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.[32] 

Operators

National demining operators are JASMAR for Human Security, National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), and Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO).[33] In 2015, a total of six manual clearance teams and one mine detection dog (MDD) team were deployed for mine action operations. This was a reduction in capacity from 2014, when NMAC reported that in addition to the six manual clearance teams, three MDD teams and a mechanical team were also operational.[34] 

The only international operator to carry out clearance activities in 2015 was TDI, which carried out explosive ordnance destruction (EOD) tasks in Darfur in support of UNAMID, and deployed four multi-task teams (MTTs) totaling approximately 66 people.[35] In 2015, TDI reported continuing efforts to train national demining teams. TDI’s MTT contract, which was up for re-tender in 2015, was won by DML for 2015–2016.[36]

In 2015, no international NGOs conducted demining in Sudan. One international NGO, Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan), carried out risk education, along with national NGOs FPDO and JASMAR for Human Security. In 2015, NMAC called for other international NGO operators to undertake mine action in Sudan.[37] Previously, two international mine clearance NGOs with programs in Sudan closed down operations owing to government restrictions that impeded their operations.[38] DanChurchAid (DCA) ended its operations in 2012.[39] In June 2012, the Sudanese government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) ordered Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and six other NGOs that provided humanitarian aid to leave Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea states in eastern Sudan.[40] Following months of negotiations with HAC and donors, MAG ended its operations in Sudan, leaving in early 2013.[41] 

Standards

In May 2015, NMAC stated that a review of the NMAS was ongoing and that a new version would be published on its website after their approval.[42] A year later, in May 2016, NMAC reported that the NMAS had been finalized but were awaiting final approval. According to NMAC, draft standards are shared with all partners and mine action operators during their accreditation process. The draft standards do not contain a specific chapter on cluster munitions.[43]

Information management 

NMAC reported that database clean-up began in January 2013 as part of preparations to transfer to an upgraded version of IMSMA. It expected the process to have no effect on areas reported as cleared in the database but would affect the amount of canceled areas recorded, which it said “will be incorporated into the database and in turn will minimize the difference reflected between areas cleared and the size of total hazards closed.” In 2016, NMAC confirmed that a committee had been formed with UNMAS to finalize the clean-up and that work was ongoing.[44] As noted above, Sudan’s IMSMA database does not contain information on the disputed Abyei area.[45] 

In June 2016, UNMAS reported that the new version of IMSMA will finally be imported to Sudan after an embargo issue, which was due to its geographical information system (GIS) function, had been resolved with the support of the US Embassy in Khartoum and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). It stated that Sudan should receive the new IMSMA version and complete the data clean-up process by the end of 2016.[46] 

Land Release (Mines and ERW)

According to NMAC, overall land release in Sudan significantly decreased in 2015 compared to 2014, with only 1.67km2 released in 2015, compared to 4.22km2 in 2014. The decrease was ascribed to reduced funding for mine action and a corresponding reduction in the number of teams deployed.[47] NMAC does not publicly disaggregate clearance by operator.

The total of 1.67km2 released in 2015, all by clearance, included only 0.4km2 of mined area containing antipersonnel mines; the remainder was battle area and was cleared. Thus, no land was released by survey. This is compared to the release of 3.7km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination in 2014, including 2.8km2 by clearance and technical survey, and a further 0.9km2 canceled by non-technical survey.[48] 

Survey in 2015 (mines and ERW)

As noted above, no land was released in Sudan by survey in 2015. However, NMAC reported that the national demining units confirmed that 12 SHAs with a total size of 210,691m2 were contaminated with antipersonnel mines.[49] In 2014, 1.2km2 was released through survey, including nearly 0.9km2 through non-technical survey and 0.3km2 by technical survey.[50]

Clearance in 2015 (mines and ERW)

According to NMAC, 423,158m2 of mined areas was released by clearance in 2015, including just over 278,000m2 by manual clearance, 30,000m2 by mechanical clearance, and a further 115,000m2 by MDDs. The majority of clearance (nearly 253,000m2) occurred in Kassala state, while an average of approximately 57,000m2 cleared in Blue Nile, Gadaref, and Red Sea states. A total of 28 antipersonnel mines were destroyed (all in Gadaref state), along with 23 antivehicle mines, and 61,329 items of UXO.[51]

In 2015, NMAC reported a total of nearly 1.25km2 of BAC: 65,250m2 of sub-surface clearance and 1.18km2 of surface clearance. This was an increase from 2014, when NMAC reported total BAC of 0.57km2.[52] 

While NMAC’s records do not disaggregate land-release figures between different operators, TDI reported that its “output remained steady” in 2015 and productivity continued to be enhanced by greater independence of TDI teams from UNAMID escorts and a switch to escorts from the Sudanese armed forces and local police, which allowed teams more freedom of movement and a greater ability to reach SHAs. It stated that the Sudanese armed forces and police escorts provided excellent support for its teams during the year.[53] 

From June 2011 through the first half of 2015, ongoing conflict prevented mine action activities from being carried out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In Darfur, which is heavily affected by UXO, EOD tasks could only be carried out in certain accessible areas due to ongoing instability.[54] Land-release operations were only possible in Kassala and the eastern states, where the security situation remained stable. Demining operations resumed in Gadaref state in December 2015, with the objective of declaring Gadaref state free of mines and ERW, which was achieved in May 2016.[55]

In accordance with Sudan’s national mine action strategic plan, as soon as the security situation improves mine clearance is scheduled to restart in the conflict-affected areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.[56] Positively, in June 2015, FPDO was deployed to conduct land release in South Kordofan, while JASMAR and the NDU also commenced land release in Blue Nile state, with Swiss funding.[57] Sudan reported, however, that access for clearance and survey operations remained limited in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states due to insecurity.[58] 

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

No cluster munition clearance occurred in 2015 and no new cluster munition contamination was recorded in the IMSMA database.[59] Since June 2011, ongoing conflict has prevented mine action activities from being carried out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. NMAC reported that as soon as the security situation improves, mine clearance would restart.[60] 

Deminer Safety

There were no reported accidents involving mine action personnel in 2015. However, one national demining NGO was attacked in 2015, resulting in the loss of a vehicle but no personnel were harmed.[61]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance 

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2019. Sudan is not on track to meet this extended deadline. 

Despite hopeful prospects in June 2011 for completion of Sudan’s Article 5 clearance obligations by its original deadline of 1 April 2014,[62] a combination of factors were asserted for the failure to do so: funding shortfalls; ongoing instability; lack of access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states; (formerly) prioritization of clearance in areas now within South Sudan; discovery of new hazardous areas; and the departure of international NGOs. In 2013, Sudan requested and was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline.[63] The table below summarizes progress in clearance over the past five years.

Land release in 2011–2015 (km2)[64]

Year

Area cleared

Release by NTS and TS

Total area released

2015

0.42

0

0.42

2014

2.47

1.18

3.65

2013

0.77

9.61

10.38

2012

0.55

0

0.55

2011

1.49

0.15

1.64

Total

5.7

10.94

16.64

Note: NTS = non-technical survey; TS = technical survey.

According to UNMAS and NMAC, as of December 2015, a total of 95.3km2 of dangerous areas had been released and 37,898km of roads verified and cleared. A total of 10,026 antipersonnel mines, 3,154 antivehicle mines, and 62,327 items of UXO were destroyed in the process.[65] 

In its extension request, Sudan planned to clear all contaminated areas in the states of Darfur, Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea by 2016, when clearance is due to begin in Blue Nile and Kordofan states.[66] In addition, Sudan is scheduled to continue the general mine action assessment (GMAA) in areas requiring survey or resurvey. Sudan indicated that GMAA would be completed in Blue Nile and South Kordofan within six months of the survey beginning (dependent on an improved security situation).[67] 

After demining operations resumed in December 2015, in May 2016, Gadaref state was announced as being free of all known mine and ERW contamination.[68] 

In 2016, NMAC stated that a number of international NGOs had expressed an interest in working in Sudan, which it said would further strengthen national capacity and deliver standardized quality of survey and clearance activities. With more qualified mine action operators and higher output, NMAC said it believed that Sudan could meet its Article 5 deadline for clearance of antipersonnel mine contamination of 1 April 2019 in a “timely manner.”[69]

Sudan has also indicated that it expected to fill the gap created by the departure of international mine action operators by: maintaining and increasing the capacity of the National Demining Units (NDUs) through further training; engagement of FPDO and JAMSAR in survey and clearance operations: and more quality assurance visits to the field.[70] In 2013, NMAC accredited FPDO and JAMSAR to conduct land release.[71]

According to its extension request plan, in 2015, Sudan expected to cancel a total of 1km2 through non-technical survey and releasing a further 5km2 through technical survey and clearance.[72] It did not meet these targets, releasing only 0.4km2 through clearance.[73] Under the plan, Sudan expected to cancel a further 0.7km2 of contamination through non-technical survey and release 3.3km2 through technical survey and clearance in 2016.[74] 

Sudan’s ability to meet its Article 5 extension request milestones remains heavily dependent upon improvement in the security situation of the heavily affected states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where access remains restricted and UXO contamination continues to increase.[75] In 2015, Sudan also cited the frequent movement of internally displaced persons, continued finding of additional hazards, the high-metallic content in mined areas, and the rainy season as additional hindrances to meeting its extension request targets.[76] Other significant factors that continue to impede Sudan’s progress include a lack of funding and the lack of clearance capacity formerly provided by international mine clearance operators.

Similarly, in Abyei and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, UNMAS reported significant challenges, including: commitment from the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to implementing UN Security Council resolutions on Abyei; ongoing conflict and increased contamination; regional insecurity and curtailed freedom of movement; and the rainy season from June to the end of September, during which demining operations are not possible.[77] 

Due to the challenges it faced to implement mine action activities planned under its extension request for 2015, NMAC again recommended revisions to its extension request plan and the amount of suspected or confirmed mined areas to be released in 2016–2019. In its latest Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2016, NMAC revised upward the planned number of mined areas to be released per year: from 12 to 43 in 2016; from 15 to 35 in 2017; from 17 to 24 in 2018; and from three to 10 in 2019, due to its failure to meet its ambitious target of 61 areas in 2015.[78]

According to NMAC, in 2015, the government of Sudan provided the equivalent of US$1 million for mine action in the country by paying all NMAC staff salaries, and covering the operational cost of NMAC, and some of the deployment costs of the NDUs. This is a significant increase from 2014, when the government reportedly contributed a total of SDG3 million (equivalent to almost US$0.5 million).[79] In May 2016, NMAC reported funding for the mine action program had become a key item within the Sudanese national budget.[80]

In May 2016, UNMAS reported that if the necessary funding was secured by mid-2016, all remaining known mine and ERW contamination could be addressed, allowing for the declaration of Sudan’s eastern states as free from landmines by the end of 2017.[81]

 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, Chief of Operations, NMAC, 9 May 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form C, p. 8.

[2] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[3] Ibid.; and from Ghasan Ibrahim Mohamed, Operations Assistant, NMAC, 8 September 2016.

[4] UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), “About UNMAS in Sudan,” updated May 2016.

[5] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[6] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Forms C and F.

[7] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[8] Human Rights Watch, “Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States,” 6 December 2012; “Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan,” All Africa, 10 August 2013; and UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” August 2013, p. 10.

[9] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.

[10] NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2015.

[11] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[12] UN Security Council Resolutions 2104 (2013), and 2205 (2015).

[14] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Darfur,” updated February 2016.

[15] See, Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 23 August 2014; Human Rights Watch, “Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States,” 6 December 2012; “Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan,” All Africa, 10 August 2013; and UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” August 2013, p. 10.

[16] The locations are based on a review of sites in the UNMAO database by Mine Action Review.

[17] Email from Mohamed Kabir, Chief Information Officer, UNMAO, 27 June 2011.

[18] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 8 June 2016.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 2 June 2016.

[21] V. Wiebe and T. Peachey, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, Ch. 4; Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (May 2007), p. 55; and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 23 August 2014. See also, UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014; and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26.

[22] “Report of the Panel of Experts on Sudan established pursuant to resolution 1591 (2005),” UN doc. S/2014/87, 11 February 2014, pp. 23 and 91; and “Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur,” UN doc. S/2015/378, 26 May 2015, p. 12.

[23] See, Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” updated 23 August 2014. In 2012, use of cluster munitions was alleged in Troji and Ongolo villages in South Kordofan in February and April. In 2015, Human Rights Watch published evidence that Sudanese government forces used RBK-500 cluster munitions in attacks on villages in Delami and Um Durein counties in South Kordofan’s Nuba mountains in February and March. In May 2015, the Sudanese air force was reported to have used cluster bombs, whose submunitions failed to explode as intended, in an attack on the town of Kauda in South Kordofan. The munitions used in all of the attacks contained AO-2.5 RT submunitions.

[24] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNMAS, 13 June 2016.

[25] UNISFA, “UNISFA Mandate,” undated.

[26] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Abyei,” updated May 2016; UNISFA, “UNISFA Mandate,” undated; and UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” August 2013, p. 10. UN Security Council Resolution 2287 (2016) renewed the mandate of UNISFA again in May 2016 (until 15 November 2016), repeating the obligation for the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to continue to facilitate UNMAS’s deployment to ensure the freedom of movement of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism, and the identification and clearance of mines in the Abyei area and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone.

[27] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Sudan,” updated August 2014.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Email from Stephen Saffin, Chief Operating Officer, TDI, 30 May 2016.

[30] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Sudan,” updated January 2016.

[31] Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, pp. 28–33.

[32] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[33] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 2 June 2016.

[34] Emails from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016; and from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.

[35] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 6 April 2015; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, p. 16; and email from Stephen Saffin, TDI, 30 May 2016.

[36] Email from Stephen Saffin, TDI, 30 May 2016.

[37] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, p. 16.

[38] ICBL, “ICBL Comments on Sudan’s Article 5 Extension Request,” May 2013.

[39] DCA, “Previous Programmes: Sudan,” undated.

[40] “Sudan causes frustration among NGOs,” News 24, 13 June 2012.

[41] MAG, “MAG departs Sudan after six years of work to remove remnants of conflict,” 7 March 2013.

[42] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, p. 12.

[43] Emails from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016, and 8 June 2016.

[44] Ibid., 8 June 2016.

[45] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNDP, 11 May 2015.

[46] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNMAS, 2 June 2016.

[47] Ibid., 9 May 2016.

[48] NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” June 2015. Sudan’s IMSMA database reports list land released through technical survey as “canceled” and land released through non-technical survey as “canceled GMAA (General Mine Action Assessment).” According to NMAC, a total of 122,341m2 was also processed as “overlap” as part of area confirmation of clearance in 2015. Email from Ghasan Ibrahim Mohamed, NMAC, 8 September 2016.

[49] Email from Ghasan Ibrahim Mohamed, NMAC, 8 September 2016.

[50] NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” June 2015.

[51] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 12. According to NMAC, a total of 122,341m2 was processed as “overlap” as part of area confirmation of clearance in 2015. Email from Ghasan Ibrahim Mohamed, NMAC, 8 September 2016.

[52] NMAC, “ISMSA Monthly Report,” December 2015.

[53] Email from Stephen Saffin, TDI, 30 May 2016.

[54] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F.

[55] NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2015; and email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[56] Ibid; and NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2015.

[57] Email from Javed Habibulhaq, UNMAS, 7 October 2015.

[58] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 15.

[59] Ibid.; and from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 8 June 2016.

[60] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, pp. 14–15.

[61] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[62] Statement of Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 22 May 2012.

[63] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 25 November 2013, p. 3.

[64] NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2015.

[65] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Sudan,” updated January 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 16. Database clean-up in 2015 identified that four items of UXO destroyed had mistakenly been reported as antipersonnel mines. Thus the figures reported for antipersonnel mines destroyed as at end 2014 and end 2015 are correct: 10,002 mines were reported as destroyed at the end of 2014: in 2015, a further 28 were destroyed, and four were subtracted from the total as misreported UXO, bringing the total to 10,026. Email from Ghasan Ibrahim Mohamed, NMAC, 8 September 2016.

[66] Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 61.

[67] Ibid., p. 31.

[68] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Sudan,” updated May 2016.

[69] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[70] Mine Ban Treaty Revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 30 July 2013, p. 32.

[71] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form A, p. 4.

[72] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 15. NMAC noted significant progress in the number of minefields closed and land released through technical survey and non-technical survey compared with the number of SHAs addressed, demonstrating “the positive impact of using land release policy.”

[73] NMAC, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2015.

[74] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 15.

[75] ICBL-CMC, “ICBL Comments on Sudan’s Article 5 Extension Request,” May 2013; and Human Rights Watch, “Under Siege: Indiscriminate Bombing and Abuses in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States,” 6 December 2012; “Unexploded Ordnance Kill 13 People in South Kordofan,” All Africa, 10 August 2013; and UNMAS, “UNMAS Annual Report 2012,” August 2013, p. 10.

[76] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F, p. 14.

[77] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Abyei,” updated May 2016.

[78] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Form F, p. 19.

[79] Ibid. (for 2014), Form A, p. 15.

[80] Email from Ahmed Elser Ahmed Ali, NMAC, 9 May 2016.

[81] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Sudan,” updated May 2016.