Summary: Non-signatory Sudan has expressed interest in joining the convention, but has not taken any steps toward accession. Sudan has participated as an observer in nearly all of the convention’s meetings, including the First Review Conference in September 2015. It voted in favor of a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015.

There is no evidence to indicate that Sudan has produced or exported cluster munitions, but it has imported and stockpiles them. Sudan has used air-dropped cluster bombs several times in Southern Kordofan province since 2012, most recently in May 2015. Sudanese government and military deny possessing and using cluster munitions. In June 2015, the UN Security Council called on the government of Sudan to immediately investigate the use.

Policy

The Republic of Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Sudan has expressed its intent to join the ban convention since 2010.[1] It has not taken any steps toward accession. Officials have indicated that Sudan will only join under certain geopolitical circumstances, namely, “if bordering countries follow suit.”[2]

In September 2015, Sudan said that its “continued presence at annual conferences and at the Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions is clear evidence of Sudan’s long standing concern about the negative humanitarian effects of cluster munitions and [belief in] the nobility of the goals which the Convention seeks to realize.”[3]

On 7 December 2015, Sudan voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which calls on states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[4] Sudan did not explain why it supported the non-binding resolution, which 139 states voted in favor of, including many non-signatories.

Sudan participated in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions and joined the consensus adoption of the convention at the conclusion of the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[5] At the convention’s Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008, Sudan expressed its intent to sign as soon as possible, after completing logistical and other measures.[6]

Sudan participated as an observer in in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015, where it responded to reports that it recently used cluster munitions (see section on Use below). It has attended nearly all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties as well as intersessional meetings in 2011–2015.[7]

Sudan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981, but is not party as it never ratified.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has no indications of any past production or export of cluster munitions by Sudan. A Sudan Mine Action Office representative reiterated in April 2014 that Sudan does not produce, stockpile, or use cluster munitions.[8]

Sudan, however, appears to have imported cluster munitions in the past and recent reports of use, arms stocks, and contamination and clearance of cluster munition remnants indicate that Sudan still stockpiles cluster munitions and used them as recently as May 2015.

A February 2014 report by a UN Panel of Experts published photographs taken in March 2013 that showed several Soviet-made RBK-500 series cluster bombs lying in the open alongside other weapons at El Fasher airport in North Darfur state, where Sudan’s armed forces maintain a forward operating base. The report stated that the “Panel has evidence of previous use of cluster munitions in Darfur. Render-safe operations have taken place on such munitions as recently as 2012. The Panel does not, however, have evidence of the exact dates of use of the munitions. It continues to investigate.” The panel reported that it “observed fluctuating stock levels at the ammunition storage area, indicative of the routine use (for either operations or training) and resupply of ammunition into Darfur by the national armed forces.”[9]

Jane’s Information Group reports that KMGU dispensers, which deploy submunitions, are in service with the country’s air force.[10] Sudan also possesses Grad, Egyptian-produced Sakr, and Chinese-produced Type-81 122mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads.[11]

Use

Sudan’s military has repeatedly denied using cluster munitions, but reports show Sudan has used air-dropped cluster bombs in Southern Kordofan province several times since 2012, most recently in May 2015.[12]

Bordering South Sudan, the state has experienced fighting between the Sudan armed forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army North (SPLM-N) since mid-2011, when South Sudan became an independent state. According to Sudan Consortium, a civil society monitoring project, at least 23 cluster bombs were dropped in Delami, Umdorein, and Alburam (Tobo) counties in 2015.[13]

In June 2015, Nuba Reports—a network of local journalists in the Nuba Mountains where Southern Kordofan is located—published a video showing the remnants of RBK-500 cluster bombs containing AO-2.5 RT submunitions that it said was filmed in Kauda after a government attack on the town on 27 May 2015. It described Kauda as “the rebel capital” and as the base of the SPLM-N, the political opposition movement in Southern Kordofan. According to Nuba Reports, the Sudanese air force dropped four cluster bombs on Kauda at around 7:30am, but none exploded on impact, leaving failed munitions and unexploded submunitions. Two days later SPLM-N soldiers removed and “rolled the bomblets into a hole, covered them with dirt, and marked them with thorn bushes.”[14]

In May 2015, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a report detailing evidence indicating the Sudanese air force was responsible for two cluster munition attacks in Southern Kordofan, in February and March 2015, that used the same type of cluster munition. Local witnesses informed HRW that government aircraft dropped two bombs on Tongoli village in Delami county on 6 March 2015, and four bombs on Rajeefi village in Um Durein county in late February 2015.[15] HRW documented remnants of the RBK-500 cluster bombs containing AO-2.5 RT submunitions, which also failed to function as intended.

In various media outlets, Sudanese Army spokesperson, Col. Alswarmy Khalid, denied responsibility for the cluster munition use and described the HRW research as “fabricated and baseless.”[16] Geneva-based representatives also denied the cluster munition use in a May 2015 meeting with CMC representatives.[17] At the convention’s intersessional meetings in June 2015, more than two-dozen states expressed concern at or condemned new use of cluster munitions, including nine that specifically referenced the evidence of new use in Sudan.[18] The UN, the ICRC, and the CMC also condemned the use of cluster munitions in Sudan.

At the First Review Conference in September 2015, Sudan exercised its right of reply to respond to statements criticizing its reported use of cluster munitions. Sudan informed the meeting:

This is an accusation that has already been made and the Ministry of Defense of Sudan denied it at the time. It is known that these delegations, which have sought to condemn Sudan, based their facts on what was stated in the 2015 Cluster Munition Monitor report, which is a non-governmental report produced by Human Rights Watch, Danchurch and Handicap International. These are organizations that have an extensive history of conveying false information that is biased against Sudan, its people and its government. My country’s delegation would like to correct this…and to dispute the report’s sources, as well as its motivations, and to call on the organizations which stand behind this report to investigate its accuracy and to produce conclusive evidence of Sudan’s use of cluster munitions at any point in time.[19]

At the First Review Conference, States Parties adopted the Dubrovnik Declaration, which affirms: “We are deeply concerned by any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, including in Cambodia, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen. We condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[20]

The use of cluster munitions in Sudan in the first half of 2015 received strong media coverage, provoked public outcry, and was condemned by at least 23 states in national statements or resolution votes.[21]

In June 2015, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution that—for the first time on Sudan—contained specific language on cluster munitions “expressing concern at evidence, collected by AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), of two air-delivered cluster bombs near Kirigiyati, North Darfur, taking note that UNAMID disposed of them safely, and reiterating the Secretary-General’s call on the Government of Sudan to immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions.”[22] After the resolution was adopted, Sudan’s representative informed the UN Security Council session that Sudan objects “strenuously” to the paragraph’s inclusion, but did not indicate if Sudan would undertake its own investigation into the use of cluster munitions.[23]

Previous Use

Nuba Reports alleged that two cluster bombs were dropped from government aircraft on the village of Lado in Southern Kordofan on 18 April 2013, but Cluster Munition Monitor was not able to independently confirm the report.[24]

In May 2012, The Independent newspaper in the United Kingdom (UK) published photos showing a failed RBK-500 cluster bomb containing unexploded AO-2.5RT submunitions in Ongolo, Southern Kordofan that residents said a government aircraft dropped on the settlement on 15 April 2012.[25]

An independent journalist found unexploded submunitions in the village Troji identified as Chinese Type-81 dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) that local residents said were used by the government of Sudan in an attack on the town on 29 February 2012.[26] The Monitor was not able to independently confirm when the cluster munitions were used or by whom.

These incidents resulted in increased international attention, including calls by the CMC and others for Sudan to investigate the allegations, but Sudanese officials offered denials in various venues.[27] Numerous independent sources have documented the presence of cluster munitions remnants that indicate Sudanese government forces sporadically used air-dropped cluster munitions in southern Sudan between 1995 and 2000, including Chilean-made PM-1 submunitions.[28] Landmine Action photographed a Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings in Yei in October 2006. Additionally, clearance personnel in Sudan have identified a variety of submunitions, including the Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, United States-produced M42 and Mk-118 (Rockeye), and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5.[29]

Policy

The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004.[1]

Sudan adopted the Sudan Mine Action Law by Presidential Decree #51 on 31 March 2010.[2] The act is comprised of 29 articles divided into four chapters. Chapter four includes Mine Ban Treaty obligations, including the prohibition on antipersonnel mine use and stockpiling, clearance of contaminated areas, risk education, victim assistance, and transparency reporting. It also includes penalties for violations.[3]

Sudan submitted its twelfth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in April 2015.[4]

Sudan attended the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2015, where it spoke on victim assistance. Sudan attended the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique in June 2014, where it provided detailed information about its mine clearance operations.

Sudan is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Sudan signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on 10 April 1981, but has not ratified it.

Production and transfer

Sudan has declared that it “never produced” antipersonnel mines.[5] It has repeatedly stated that it has not produced or exported antipersonnel mines.[6]

Use

There have been no confirmed instances of government forces using antipersonnel mines since Sudan became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2004, but there were several reports of use of antipersonnel mines in Sudan in 2011, 2012, and 2013 that the Monitor has been unable to confirm.

It is clear from evidence and testimony from various sources that in the southern part of the country antipersonnel mines are available for use, but the Monitor has not seen definitive evidence about what forces may have used antipersonnel mines. There is also a lack of clarity about whether antipersonnel mines or antivehicle mines, or both, have been used. In its Article 7 reports and statements the government of Sudan has provided little to no official information on the mine use allegations, which it has denied responsibility for.

On 22 July 2014, Mustafa Tambur, spokesperson for the Sudan Liberation Movement (Abdel Wahid al-Nur, SLM-AW), told Radio Dabanga that the Sudanese government had planted landmines in the Kutum locality in North Darfur. Heavy rainfall allegedly revealed 23 antipersonnel mines in the Fonu area near Kutum. Tambur also demanded that the international community call on the Sudanese Government to stop using landmines.[7]

On 14 August 2014, the Leaders of the both factions of the Sudan Liberation Movement—Mini Minawi, leader of the SLM-MM[8] and Abdol Wahid, leader of the SLM-AW[9]—met in Geneva to sign Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment to ban antipersonnel landmines. Abdol Wahid told Radio Dabanga that this agreement brought Sudan closer to fighting the deadly landmine contamination in Darfur. Mini Minawi also told the radio station that this commitment was “an importance step” within this humanitarian framework.[10] With the two main factions of the SLM signing Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, all four main non-state armed groups actively operating in Sudan have pledged to refrain from using antipersonnel landmines.[11]

On 29 August 2013, a delegation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), comprised of Deputy Chairman Abdelaziz Alhilu and Secretary General Yasir Arman, signed Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment, thereby agreeing to prohibit the use, production, and transfer of antipersonnel mines, to cooperate in humanitarian mine action activities, and to destroy its stockpiles. Upon signing, Alhilu said, “In compliance with our pledge, we will destroy all [antipersonnel] mines in our possession as soon as possible. These mines were captured during military operations.”[12] During Geneva Call’s third meeting of signatories to the Deed of Commitment, spokesperson of the SPLM-N’s delegation, Mubarak Ardol, stated that the SPLM-N will invite all interested parties to witness the public destruction of the landmines the group has acquired during “military operations over the past four year[s].” He also added that the SPLM-N’s delegation proposed adding a fourth protocol to the Deed of Commitment concerning humanitarian assistance in war zones.[13]

Stockpiling and destruction

Sudan reported completion of destruction of its stockpile of 10,566 antipersonnel mines on 31 March 2008, just ahead of its 1 April 2008 treaty-mandated deadline. The reported size and composition of Sudan’s stockpile, as well as the number of mines to be retained for training purposes, have varied.[14] At the Second Review Conference in 2009, Sudan stated that a total of 10,656 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed (possibly a typographical error from the 10,566 mentioned above).[15] However, Sudan declared in April 2012 and again in April 2013 that a total of 13,371 stockpiled antipersonnel mines were destroyed in Khartoum in 2007.[16]

In 2009, Sudan reported the discovery of arms caches including antipersonnel mines at various locations of southern Sudan that were subsequently destroyed in Blue Nile state in 2008.[17]

Mines retained for training purposes

In its April 2015 Article 7 report, Sudan stated that it is retaining a total of 1,938 mines, the same amount as reported since 2009.[18] In 2009, Sudan reported a reduction in the number of mines retained for training from 4,997 to 1,938 mines.[19] Each year since 2009, Sudan has reported the transfer of 75 “Type 35” plastic mines from the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) to the UN Mine Action Office “for training purposes,” but the total number of mines retained for training has remained unchanged.[20] Sudan has not disclosed the intended purposes or actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties at Mine Ban Treaty Review Conferences held in 2004 and 2009.

Contaminated by: landmines (medium contamination), cluster munition remnants (extent of contamination unclear), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). 

Article 5 Deadline: 1 April 2019
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

At the end of 2015, the Republic of Sudan had a total of 21.5km² of areas suspected or confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines, of which 2.8km² were confirmed mined areas. In 2015 1.67km² of land was cleared, only 0.4km² of which was cleared of antipersonnel mines, the remainder was battle area clearance (BAC). This was a decrease compared with 2014, which was attributed to a reduction in funding.

Recommendations for action 

• Sudan should regularly update Mine Ban Treaty States Parties on access to, and progress in, clearing Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, as security conditions permit.
• Sudan should conduct survey to determine the extent of cluster munition contamination.
• Sudan should re-establish conditions that allow international mine action organizations to conduct land release in Sudan.
• Continued efforts should be made to ensure reporting and recording of mine action data according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology. Sudan should ensure that reporting disaggregates submunitions from other UXO.
• Sudan should develop a resource-mobilization strategy for its mine action program.

Contamination

Mine and explosive remnant of war contamination (see below for cluster munition contamination.)

At the end of 2015, Sudan had 112 areas containing antipersonnel mines covering a total of just under 21km². According to the Sudanese National Mine Action Center (NMAC), of this total 2.8km² is confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines, while 18.1km² is suspected to contain antipersonnel mines.[1] A further 39 areas suspected to contain antivehicle mines cover a total size of nearly 6km², as set out in the table below.[2] 

Mine contamination as at end 2015[3]

Sudan’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination results from decades-long conflict since its independence in 1956. Twenty years of civil war, during which mines and other explosive weapons were used heavily by all parties to the conflicts, resulted in widespread contamination that has since claimed thousands of victims.[4] In January 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, ending the civil war and ultimately leading to the independence of the south in July 2011. However, since South Sudan’s independence, conflicts have again broken out in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states and in the Abyei region, leading to new contamination from UXO.

As at the end of 2015, Sudan’s total estimated remaining mine and ERW contamination affected 10 of its 18 states: Blue Nile; Central, East, North, South, and West Darfur; Gadaref; Kassala; Red Sea; and South Kordofan. Of these, five were affected by antipersonnel mines: South Kordofan, Kassala, Blue Nile, Red Sea, and Gadaref, as set out in the table below. Contamination was largely concentrated in South Kordofan, followed by Kassala, and Blue Nile states, with Red Sea and Gadaref states each containing 10,000m² or less antipersonnel mine contamination remaining at the end of the year. In May 2016, Gadaref state was announced free of known mine and ERW contamination.[5] No mine contamination has been reported in Darfur, where the main threat is from UXO.[6]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province as at end 2015[7]

Note: CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas; SHAs = suspected hazardous area.

There are several reports of use of antipersonnel mines in 2011, 2012, and 2013 that the Monitor has been unable to confirm (see the Mine Ban Policy country profile for more details). 

Since South Sudan’s independence, new conflicts in Abyei and in Blue Nile and South Kordofan states, have resulted in increased UXO contamination in Sudan.[8] The IMSMA database does not hold data on contamination in Abyei due to armed conflict and restricted access to the area.[9]

At the end of 2015, a total of 2,631 hazardous areas had been registered in the IMSMA database since 2002, of which the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported 2,398 had been released through various clearance methods, leaving a total of 233 hazardous areas with a size of just over 32.1km² remaining to be addressed. In 2015, 97 new hazardous areas were registered and 87 areas cleared, with an additional 540km of roads assessed.[10]

Dozens of persons were killed and injured by mines and ERW in 2015 (see Sudan’s Casualties and victim assistance profile for further details).

Mine and ERW contamination continues to pose a daily threat to the lives of civilians in Sudan and also has a significant detrimental impact on the socio-economic development of local communities. NMAC reported that, in 2015, nomads and farmers were particularly at risk from the threat of mines and ERW, along with returning internally displaced persons.[11] In the Abyei area, the UN has on repeated occasions expressed concern over the threat of mines and ERW and the impact of contamination in obstructing the safe return of displaced persons and preventing safe migration.[12] The presence of mines and ERW also hinders provision of humanitarian assistance and access to the conflict-affected states.[13]

While no mine contamination is reported in Darfur, contamination from ERW continues to pose a serious threat to civilians, to peacekeepers from the UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), and to the delivery of humanitarian aid. ERW in Darfur includes unexploded air-delivered bombs, rockets, artillery and mortar shells, and grenades.[14]

Cluster munition contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Sudan is not known. There have been reports of new use of cluster munitions as recently as 2015, as well as in 2012.[15] The most current estimate of contamination dates back to June 2011, when the UN Mine Action Office (UNMAO) reported nine areas remained suspected to be contaminated with unexploded submunitions, after 81 areas had been released (see the table below).[16] 

Cluster munition-contaminated areas as at June 2011[17]

In June 2016, however, NMAC, which assumed full national ownership for implementing mine action activities upon UNMAO’s closure in June 2011, stated that no cluster munition-contaminated areas were “recorded as remaining hazards to be cleared.”[18] It reported that no separate survey or clearance operations for cluster munition remnants occurred in 2015 and stated that no cluster munitions had been found in all mine action activities “to date.”[19]

UNMAS, which resumed lead responsibility within the UN system for mine action coordination in Sudan in 2015, also confirmed that no cluster munition survey or clearance had occurred during that year and stated that no new reports of cluster munition contamination had been recorded in the national database.[20]

In the 1990s, Sudanese government forces are believed to have sporadically air-dropped several types of cluster munitions in its civil war with the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A).[21]

In 2013–2015, the UN published reports of evidence of use of cluster munitions in Darfur, the stockpiling of RBK-500 cluster munitions and AO-2.5RT submunitions by the Sudanese air force, and fluctuating stock levels indicative of use for operations or for training.[22]

In 2012 and 2015, use of cluster munitions was recorded in five separate attacks on villages in South Kordofan state. Each attack involved air-dropped RBK-500 cluster munitions containing AO-2.5RT submunitions[23] (see Sudan’s Cluster Munition Ban Policy profile for more details).

Program Management 

The Sudanese National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and NMAC manage Sudan’s mine action program, with responsibility for coordinating all mine clearance, including accreditation and certification of mine clearance agencies. In January 2015, UNMAS, which had opened an emergency program in Sudan in 2002, reassumed the lead in UN mine action efforts in Sudan and its role in providing assistance and technical support to NMAC, after a one-year handover to the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in 2014.[24]

In 2016, the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) continued to monitor the activities of the Sudanese armed forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in Abyei, which it has done since the 2011 outbreak of heavy conflict in the area.[25] As UNISFA does not have a mandate to conduct mine clearance, UNMAS continued its UN Security Council-mandated role in Abyei, which includes the identification and clearance of mines in the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone around Abyei and facilitating access by assessing and clearing priority areas and routes.[26]

In the Darfur region, under the umbrella of UNAMID, the Ordnance Disposal Office (ODO) works in direct support of UNAMID priorities.[27] In 2012, UNAMID contracted The Development Initiative (TDI), a commercial company, to assess, survey, mark, identify, and clear contamination in all five Darfur states.[28] In 2015, TDI’s contract ended and it was replaced by Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) (formerly MineTech International, MTI) for 2015/2016.[29] Mine action in Darfur is funded through assessed peacekeeping funds for UNAMID.[30]

Strategic planning

Sudan has a multi-year National Mine Action Plan for 2013–2019. According to NMAC, the plan was designed in light of the overall security situation in Sudan and the capacity for mine action and available demining assets. The plan includes details of operations for addressing contamination in all affected states by year, with a focus on the eastern states of Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea, and parts of Blue Nile. When security permits, work will start accordingly in South Kordofan and the remainder of Blue Nile.[31]

NMAC reported that an annual operational plan for 2015 was developed, which included objectives, inputs and outputs, timeframes, and budgets, in accordance with the multi-year National Mine Action Plan and in consultation with relevant stakeholders. In May 2016, however, NMAC said it was not possible to implement the activities according to the plan, primarily due to lack of funding and the security situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.[32] 

Operators

National demining operators are JASMAR for Human Security, National Units for Mine Action and Development (NUMAD), and Friends of Peace and Development Organization (FPDO).[33] In 2015, a total of six manual clearance teams and one mine detection dog (MDD) team were deployed for mine action operations. This was a reduction in capacity from 2014, when NMAC reported that in addition to the six manual clearance teams, three MDD teams and a mechanical team were also operational.[34] 

The only international operator to carry out clearance activities in 2015 was TDI, which carried out explosive ordnance destruction (EOD) tasks in Darfur in support of UNAMID, and deployed four multi-task teams (MTTs) totaling approximately 66 people.[35] In 2015, TDI reported continuing efforts to train national demining teams. TDI’s MTT contract, which was up for re-tender in 2015, was won by DML for 2015–2016.[36]

In 2015, no international NGOs conducted demining in Sudan. One international NGO, Association for Aid and Relief Japan (AAR Japan), carried out risk education, along with national NGOs FPDO and JASMAR for Human Security. In 2015, NMAC called for other international NGO operators to undertake mine action in Sudan.[37] Previously, two international mine clearance NGOs with programs in Sudan closed down operations owing to government restrictions that impeded their operations.[38] DanChurchAid (DCA) ended its operations in 2012.[39] In June 2012, the Sudanese government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) ordered Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and six other NGOs that provided humanitarian aid to leave Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea states in eastern Sudan.[40] Following months of negotiations with HAC and donors, MAG ended its operations in Sudan, leaving in early 2013.[41] 

Standards

In May 2015, NMAC stated that a review of the NMAS was ongoing and that a new version would be published on its website after their approval.[42] A year later, in May 2016, NMAC reported that the NMAS had been finalized but were awaiting final approval. According to NMAC, draft standards are shared with all partners and mine action operators during their accreditation process. The draft standards do not contain a specific chapter on cluster munitions.[43]

Information management 

NMAC reported that database clean-up began in January 2013 as part of preparations to transfer to an upgraded version of IMSMA. It expected the process to have no effect on areas reported as cleared in the database but would affect the amount of canceled areas recorded, which it said “will be incorporated into the database and in turn will minimize the difference reflected between areas cleared and the size of total hazards closed.” In 2016, NMAC confirmed that a committee had been formed with UNMAS to finalize the clean-up and that work was ongoing.[44] As noted above, Sudan’s IMSMA database does not contain information on the disputed Abyei area.[45] 

In June 2016, UNMAS reported that the new version of IMSMA will finally be imported to Sudan after an embargo issue, which was due to its geographical information system (GIS) function, had been resolved with the support of the US Embassy in Khartoum and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). It stated that Sudan should receive the new IMSMA version and complete the data clean-up process by the end of 2016.[46] 

Land Release (Mines and ERW)

According to NMAC, overall land release in Sudan significantly decreased in 2015 compared to 2014, with only 1.67km² released in 2015, compared to 4.22km² in 2014. The decrease was ascribed to reduced funding for mine action and a corresponding reduction in the number of teams deployed.[47] NMAC does not publicly disaggregate clearance by operator.

The total of 1.67km² released in 2015, all by clearance, included only 0.4km² of mined area containing antipersonnel mines; the remainder was battle area and was cleared. Thus, no land was released by survey. This is compared to the release of 3.7km² of antipersonnel mine contamination in 2014, including 2.8km² by clearance and technical survey, and a further 0.9km² canceled by non-technical survey.[48] 

Survey in 2015 (mines and ERW)

As noted above, no land was released in Sudan by survey in 2015. However, NMAC reported that the national demining units confirmed that 12 SHAs with a total size of 210,691m² were contaminated with antipersonnel mines.[49] In 2014, 1.2km² was released through survey, including nearly 0.9km² through non-technical survey and 0.3km² by technical survey.[50]

Clearance in 2015 (mines and ERW)

According to NMAC, 423,158m² of mined areas was released by clearance in 2015, including just over 278,000m² by manual clearance, 30,000m² by mechanical clearance, and a further 115,000m² by MDDs. The majority of clearance (nearly 253,000m²) occurred in Kassala state, while an average of approximately 57,000m² cleared in Blue Nile, Gadaref, and Red Sea states. A total of 28 antipersonnel mines were destroyed (all in Gadaref state), along with 23 antivehicle mines, and 61,329 items of UXO.[51]

In 2015, NMAC reported a total of nearly 1.25km² of BAC: 65,250m² of sub-surface clearance and 1.18km² of surface clearance. This was an increase from 2014, when NMAC reported total BAC of 0.57km².[52] 

While NMAC’s records do not disaggregate land-release figures between different operators, TDI reported that its “output remained steady” in 2015 and productivity continued to be enhanced by greater independence of TDI teams from UNAMID escorts and a switch to escorts from the Sudanese armed forces and local police, which allowed teams more freedom of movement and a greater ability to reach SHAs. It stated that the Sudanese armed forces and police escorts provided excellent support for its teams during the year.[53] 

From June 2011 through the first half of 2015, ongoing conflict prevented mine action activities from being carried out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states. In Darfur, which is heavily affected by UXO, EOD tasks could only be carried out in certain accessible areas due to ongoing instability.[54] Land-release operations were only possible in Kassala and the eastern states, where the security situation remained stable. Demining operations resumed in Gadaref state in December 2015, with the objective of declaring Gadaref state free of mines and ERW, which was achieved in May 2016.[55]

In accordance with Sudan’s national mine action strategic plan, as soon as the security situation improves mine clearance is scheduled to restart in the conflict-affected areas of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.[56] Positively, in June 2015, FPDO was deployed to conduct land release in South Kordofan, while JASMAR and the NDU also commenced land release in Blue Nile state, with Swiss funding.[57] Sudan reported, however, that access for clearance and survey operations remained limited in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states due to insecurity.[58] 

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

No cluster munition clearance occurred in 2015 and no new cluster munition contamination was recorded in the IMSMA database.[59] Since June 2011, ongoing conflict has prevented mine action activities from being carried out in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. NMAC reported that as soon as the security situation improves, mine clearance would restart.[60] 

Deminer Safety

There were no reported accidents involving mine action personnel in 2015. However, one national demining NGO was attacked in 2015, resulting in the loss of a vehicle but no personnel were harmed.[61]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance 

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2019. Sudan is not on track to meet this extended deadline. 

Despite hopeful prospects in June 2011 for completion of Sudan’s Article 5 clearance obligations by its original deadline of 1 April 2014,[62] a combination of factors were asserted for the failure to do so: funding shortfalls; ongoing instability; lack of access in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states; (formerly) prioritization of clearance in areas now within South Sudan; discovery of new hazardous areas; and the departure of international NGOs. In 2013, Sudan requested and was granted a five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline.[63] The table below summarizes progress in clearance over the past five years.

Land release in 2011–2015 (km²)[64]

Note: NTS = non-technical survey; TS = technical survey.

According to UNMAS and NMAC, as of December 2015, a total of 95.3km² of dangerous areas had been released and 37,898km of roads verified and cleared. A total of 10,026 antipersonnel mines, 3,154 antivehicle mines, and 62,327 items of UXO were destroyed in the process.[65] 

In its extension request, Sudan planned to clear all contaminated areas in the states of Darfur, Gadaref, Kassala, and Red Sea by 2016, when clearance is due to begin in Blue Nile and Kordofan states.[66] In addition, Sudan is scheduled to continue the general mine action assessment (GMAA) in areas requiring survey or resurvey. Sudan indicated that GMAA would be completed in Blue Nile and South Kordofan within six months of the survey beginning (dependent on an improved security situation).[67] 

After demining operations resumed in December 2015, in May 2016, Gadaref state was announced as being free of all known mine and ERW contamination.[68] 

In 2016, NMAC stated that a number of international NGOs had expressed an interest in working in Sudan, which it said would further strengthen national capacity and deliver standardized quality of survey and clearance activities. With more qualified mine action operators and higher output, NMAC said it believed that Sudan could meet its Article 5 deadline for clearance of antipersonnel mine contamination of 1 April 2019 in a “timely manner.”[69]

Sudan has also indicated that it expected to fill the gap created by the departure of international mine action operators by: maintaining and increasing the capacity of the National Demining Units (NDUs) through further training; engagement of FPDO and JAMSAR in survey and clearance operations: and more quality assurance visits to the field.[70] In 2013, NMAC accredited FPDO and JAMSAR to conduct land release.[71]

According to its extension request plan, in 2015, Sudan expected to cancel a total of 1km² through non-technical survey and releasing a further 5km² through technical survey and clearance.[72] It did not meet these targets, releasing only 0.4km² through clearance.[73] Under the plan, Sudan expected to cancel a further 0.7km² of contamination through non-technical survey and release 3.3km² through technical survey and clearance in 2016.[74] 

Sudan’s ability to meet its Article 5 extension request milestones remains heavily dependent upon improvement in the security situation of the heavily affected states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan, where access remains restricted and UXO contamination continues to increase.[75] In 2015, Sudan also cited the frequent movement of internally displaced persons, continued finding of additional hazards, the high-metallic content in mined areas, and the rainy season as additional hindrances to meeting its extension request targets.[76] Other significant factors that continue to impede Sudan’s progress include a lack of funding and the lack of clearance capacity formerly provided by international mine clearance operators.

Similarly, in Abyei and the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, UNMAS reported significant challenges, including: commitment from the governments of Sudan and South Sudan to implementing UN Security Council resolutions on Abyei; ongoing conflict and increased contamination; regional insecurity and curtailed freedom of movement; and the rainy season from June to the end of September, during which demining operations are not possible.[77] 

Due to the challenges it faced to implement mine action activities planned under its extension request for 2015, NMAC again recommended revisions to its extension request plan and the amount of suspected or confirmed mined areas to be released in 2016–2019. In its latest Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2016, NMAC revised upward the planned number of mined areas to be released per year: from 12 to 43 in 2016; from 15 to 35 in 2017; from 17 to 24 in 2018; and from three to 10 in 2019, due to its failure to meet its ambitious target of 61 areas in 2015.[78]

According to NMAC, in 2015, the government of Sudan provided the equivalent of US$1 million for mine action in the country by paying all NMAC staff salaries, and covering the operational cost of NMAC, and some of the deployment costs of the NDUs. This is a significant increase from 2014, when the government reportedly contributed a total of SDG3 million (equivalent to almost US$0.5 million).[79] In May 2016, NMAC reported funding for the mine action program had become a key item within the Sudanese national budget.[80]

In May 2016, UNMAS reported that if the necessary funding was secured by mid-2016, all remaining known mine and ERW contamination could be addressed, allowing for the declaration of Sudan’s eastern states as free from landmines by the end of 2017.[81]

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2015, three donors contributed US$2.7 million for mine action operations in the Republic of the Sudan through UNMAS. This represents an increase of approximately $2 million from 2014.[1]

International contributions: 2015[2]

Since 2011, Sudan received over $15 million in international support to mine action activities, with contributions fluctuating from less than $600,000 in 2014 to $6 million in 2011.

Sudan estimated that $2.2 million would be needed for land release in 2013–2014, while an additional $19 million would be needed in 2014–2015 out of a total of $67 million for the period 2014–2019.[3]

Summary of contributions: 2011–2015[4]