Tajikistan

Mine Action

Last updated: 25 November 2016

Contaminated by: landmines (medium contamination) and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). There may be residual contamination by cluster munition remnants. 

Article 5 deadline: 1 April 2020
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 

At the end of 2015, the Republic of Tajikistan had 10.36km2 of confirmed and suspected mined areas, in addition to 2.3km2 of land contaminated by other explosive remnants of war (ERW). In 2015, 0.76km2 of mined land was released by clearance and technical survey, and 0.57km2 was canceled. A humanitarian demining law was ratified in 2016.

The last known area of cluster munition contamination, 446,260m2, was cleared in 2015. There are now no known areas of cluster munition contamination, however, a residual threat may remain. 

Recommendations for action 

  • Tajikistan should, as soon as possible, complete survey of 79 un-surveyed mined areas along the Tajik-Afghan border whose records were made publicly available in September 2013, in order to clarify the actual extent of mine contamination.
  • Tajikistan should finalize its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 completion workplan and its mine action strategic plan, including precise and clear milestones.
  • Tajikistan should develop a resource mobilization strategy to secure funding for mine clearance operations in both the border regions and the Central region.
  • Tajikistan should submit its outstanding annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report for 2015.

Contamination

Mine and ERW contamination (see below for cluster munition contamination)

At the end of 2015, Tajikistan had 5.72km2 of confirmed “accessible” and “executable” mined area across three provinces and 15 districts, as set out in the table below. This excludes another 23 so-called “inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas, which cover an estimated 1.04km2. In addition, an estimated 3.6km2 of mined area still to be surveyed exists across 101 areas. A further 2.3km2 contains ERW only.[1] 

Of the surveyed mined area that can be readily cleared, 60 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) totaling approximately 3.98km2 are along the border with Afghanistan. Minefield records for the 101 un-surveyed areas are also along the Tajik-Afghan border.[2] A further 10 CHAs totaling approximately 1.74km2 are in the Central region. They are located on mountains that are difficult to access, but can be cleared during the region’s relatively brief summer period.[3]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by district as at end 2015[4]

District

Province

Total CHA

Inaccessible CHA

Non-executable CHA

Readily clearable CHA

SHA*

No.

Area (km2)

No.

Area (km2)

No.

Area (km2)

No.

Area (km2)

No.

Area (km2)

Tajik-Afghan border

GBAO** Region

20

2.13

4

0.27

0

0

16

1.86

4

3.6

Khatlon Region

63

2.89

15

0.75

4

0.016

44

2.12

97

Sub-total

 

83

5.02

19

1.02

4

0.016

60

3.98

101

3.6

Central region

GBAO** Region

6

1.22

0

0

0

0

6

1.22

0

0

Direct Rule District

4

0.52

0

0

0

0

4

0.52

0

0

Sub-total

 

10

1.74

 

 

 

 

10

1.74

 

 

Total

 

93

6.76

19

1.02

4

0.016

70

5.72

101

3.6

Note: * The approximate size of the 101 suspected minefields is an estimate, based on desk analysis, and pending further survey.
** Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region.

Nosiri Khusrav district, in the southwestern corner of Khatlon district, was declared mine-free in 2015.[5]

Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–1998; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 2000–2001; and the Central region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a result of the 1992–1997 civil war.[6]

Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon and Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) along the Tajik-Afghan border region (estimated to contain 60,357 antipersonnel mines), and in the Central region.[7] Shuroobod, in the Khatlon region on the Afghan border, is the most heavily mined district, and most of the mines were dropped by helicopter due to the inaccessibility for vehicles and people.[8] In 2013, following a Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) survey, FSD and the Tajikistan Mine Action Center (TMAC, now called the Tajikistan National Mine Acton Center, TNMAC) concluded that no mines remain on the Tajikistan side of the border with Uzbekistan.[9]

There were believed to be 79 un-surveyed minefields as of September 2016.[10] In September 2013, records of 110 previously unrecorded and un-surveyed minefields were made public for the first time. Security constraints were reported to have prevented survey activities in the past.[11] The number of minefields was subsequently confirmed as 107 (not 110).[12] All are located in the provinces of Khatlon and the GBAO along the border with Afghanistan.[13] As of December 2015, 101 un-surveyed minefields were said to remain, covering an estimated 3.6km2.[14] Non-technical survey (NTS) of the minefields began in 2014.[15] Serious challenges have been reported during NTS, due to the extreme inaccessibility of mined areas and one mined area blocking access to others.[16] According to records, these minefields contain 57,189 mines (50,948 blast mines, 4,430 fragmentation mines, and 1,811 “booby-trapped” mines), in addition to 17 munitions employed in booby traps, and 100kg of explosive charges (500 pieces of 200g of TNT).[17]

Mine contamination in Tajikistan constrains development, limits access to grazing and agricultural land, and affects farming, wood gathering, and grazing activities related to rural life, especially in the Central region.[18] The main mine contamination is located along the borders, with a less direct impact on local communities and development, as these are restricted military security zones. However, contamination in these regions affects cross-border trade and security, and has political impact on peacebuilding initiatives with neighboring countries.[19]

Cluster munition contamination 

The last known area of cluster munition contamination was cleared in 2015.[20] However, Tajikistan has stated that submunitions may still be encountered in the future, during other survey and clearance operations.[21] Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) similarly reported that following completion of clearance operations in 2015, cluster munition contamination in Tajikistan is now “virtually non-existent,” but cluster munition remnants may be found in new areas or other hazardous areas.[22] 

Four cluster munition containers were discovered during survey and clearance in 2015, with evidence that the containers had been moved by local people. This, along with the discovery of cluster munition remnants during battle area clearance since 2003, indicates that additional cluster munition contamination may be present close to the area released in 2015. NPA intends to investigate this in 2016, once weather permits.[23] 

Cluster munitions were used during Tajikistan’s civil war in the 1990s, though it is not known who used them. In total, since the start of the mine action program in 2003 until the end of 2015, approximately 750 submunitions were reportedly identified and destroyed in Tajikistan.[24] Prior to 2014, unexploded submunitions were last found in 2011.[25]

The contaminated land that was cleared in 2015 has been used for pasture during the summer months when the snow has melted, and the nearest village is 15km away.[26] The contaminated area was around 200 meters from the nearest suspected mined area.[27] 

Program Management

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL) acts as Tajikistan’s national mine action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government’s socio-economic development policies.[28] 

TNMAC reports to the First Deputy Prime Minister of Tajikistan, who chairs the CIIHL. Since its nationalization in 2014, TNMAC believes its cooperation with national ministries and agencies has improved.[29] 

The Ministry of Defense plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector. With the adoption in July 2013 by the ministry of the Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining (2013–2016), the ministry has sought to focus on three main objectives: to further support demining; to enhance national capacities; and to create the conditions for a sound national mine action program.[30]

While transition to national ownership is considered to have been successful, UNDP’s Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) project will continue until at least the end of 2017 to support the building of sustainable national structures and TNMAC’s technical capacity.[31]

The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) office in Tajikistan has been supporting mine action since 2003. The OSCE’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: to support the development of national demining capacity; and to foster regional cooperation in border management and security.[32]

An agreement on cooperation between the governments of Tajikistan and Afghanistan was signed in 2014, and TNMAC has coordinated with the UN Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (UNMACCA) and Afghanistan’s Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) on land release approaches, NMAS, exchange visits, cross-border projects, victim assistance, and risk education.[33]

Areas for land release are prioritized based on tasks issued by the Tajik government, requests from local authorities, and the capacities of demining agencies. Adverse weather conditions during the winter limit access to some designated priority tasks, as do security restrictions.[34] The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is working with TNMAC and the UNDP to develop a prioritization system and tool for Tajikistan, which will identify distinct criteria and indicators for the separate regions.[35] A two-day prioritization workshop was held in Dushanbe in May 2016 as part of TNMAC/UNDP’s STMAP project, which was also attended by operators, and facilitated by GICHD.[36]

Based on NTS conducted previously by FSD and TNMAC, and also existing minefield records, mine clearance in Tajikistan is mostly focused on areas where contamination has been confirmed.[37]

Strategic planning

The current national mine action strategic plan (NMASP) 2010–2015 expired at the end of 2015.[38] Tajikistan is in the process of developing a new strategy, the “Article 5 completion plan for 2016–2020.” Operators have been consulted during development of the plan,[39] and as of October 2016, it was still being revised.[40]

The draft completion plan seeks to focus on the most heavily mine-contaminated regions, which are along the Afghan border. From June to September, during favorable weather in the high-altitude areas, efforts will focus on the Central region.[41] In conjunction with the government of Tajikistan and the Tajik Border Forces, TNMAC will prioritize land release activities using a district-by-district approach based on the following criteria: mined areas with economic and infrastructure impact; the number of un-surveyed minefield records in each district (those with a larger number of minefields records will be considered a priority for the deployment of NTS teams); and the number of mined areas in each district (a smaller number of minefields will be considered a priority to deploy clearance teams to release the whole district).[42]

As part of the Article 5 completion plan, Tajikistan has defined four different categories of mined areas: CHAs; “inaccessible CHAs”; “non-executable CHAs”; and “un-surveyed minefield records.” CHAs are defined as “An area declared dangerous due to the presence of mines”; inaccessible CHAs are defined as “CHA that is impossible to access by land release teams due to relief (like high mountains, steep slopes, etc.), small river islands, mudflows, and other constraints including security”; non-executable CHAs are defined as “A CHA in which clearance is impossible to execute under current working conditions,” due to sandy soil, depth of items (60cm–70cm), or waterlogged ground.[43] TNMAC expects further inaccessible and non-executable tasks to be identified through NTS or technical survey or during clearance; and that operating teams and TNMAC will agree on common criteria to declare an area/task as inaccessible or non-executable.[44] 

The future phases of Tajikistan’s national mine action program to “completion” were formalized into a “transition and exit strategy” in 2013. The strategy was revised in October 2014, to plan the three-year period from the beginning of 2015 to the end of 2017, and seeks to increase national ownership. The GICHD is assisting the program in this process.[45] 

The annual TNMAC workplan for 2016 was approved by the government in December 2015.[46] However, the annual plan only includes mine survey and clearance, as no known cluster munition-contaminated areas remain.[47] 

Legislation and standards

In 2015, Tajikistan drafted a humanitarian demining law, which covers all aspects of mine action. However, mine clearance NGOs are not believed to have been consulted during the drafting of the law.[48] The law (no. 1338) was ratified by Tajikistan’s parliament on 23 July 2016.[49] The new law was presented to mine action stakeholders in Tajikistan in September 2016, during a workshop hosted by TNMAC.[50]

Tajikistan’s National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS), which have been revised and translated into Russian, were awaiting government approval as of August 2016.[51] The TNMAS predominantly refer to mines, but also cover UXO, including cluster munition remnants.[52]

Operators

The FSD and NPA are the two international demining operators in Tajikistan. NPA reported that the number of operational staff deployed in 2015 fluctuated during the year, with an average of between four and five teams throughout the year; clearance operations were curtailed due to the practical challenges of demining at high altitude in the Central region, while security imposed clearance restrictions on the Afghan border.[53]

In 2015, the Union of Sappers Tajikistan (UST) obtained permission to conduct survey and received a grant from the UNDP for technical and NTS in the south of the country.[54] Until 2015, limitations in Tajikistan’s legislation had prevented UST as a public organization from gaining accreditation for demining activities.[55]

A Humanitarian Deming Group (HDU) under the Ministry of Defense acts as a contractor for the TNMAC, funded by the OSCE.[56]

In 2015, combined FSD, NPA, and Ministry of Defense operational capacity for survey and clearance in Tajikistan was 117 deminers across nine multipurpose teams and one manual clearance team—a marked decrease in capacity compared to 2014. Of this, NPA deployed six multi-purpose teams, totaling 62 personnel in 2015; FSD deployed one manual team, consisting of 13 personnel; and the Ministry of Defense’s HDU deployed three multi-purpose teams, totaling 42 personnel. UST deployed two NTS teams in 2015.[57]

Neither mine detection dogs (MDDs) nor machines were used operationally in 2015.[58] The MDD program ended in early 2015 due to the very limited number of tasks suitable for dogs. Consequently, 18 MDDs were handed over to the Ministry of Interior and to the Border Forces.[59] Similarly, economic use of mechanical assets reached its limit, and by 2015, few tasks remained for demining machines. Moreover, in 2015, machines were prevented from even being deployed due to security constraints along the border with Afghanistan, which blocked access to areas suitable for machine deployment.[60] Most future tasks will require manual clearance.[61]

To undertake cluster munition clearance in 2015, NPA deployed one female demining team comprising eight deminers, one male demining team comprising seven deminers, two team leaders, and two task supervisors.[62]

Land Release (Mines) 

Total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2015 was almost 0.76km2, compared with 1.15km2 in 2014. In addition, almost 0.57km2 was canceled in 2015 by survey while almost 0.4km2 was confirmed as mined.

Survey in 2015 (mines)

In 2015, more than 0.51km2 was reduced by technical survey, and a further 0.56km2 was canceled (see table below).[63] In addition, NPA reported that almost 0.4km2 was confirmed as mined in 2015.

Antipersonnel mine survey in 2015[64]

Operator

District

Province

Area canceled (m2)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

Area confirmed (m2)

NPA

Tavildara

Central Region

242,367

2,656

0

Jirgatol

Central region

126,641

32,343

392,000

Darvoz

GBAO

159,572

111,176

6,000

Nosiri Khusrav

Khatlon

28,912

18,771

0

FSD

Tavildara

Central region

0

180,745

0

MoD

Vanj

GBAO

0

187,527

0

Total

 

 

557,492

514,447

398,000

 

Clearance in 2015 (mines)

In 2015, FSD, NPA, and the MoD/HDG cleared close to 0.25km2 across 23 mined areas (three of which were suspended and not yet completed), destroying 395 antipersonnel mines and 121 items of UXO (see table below).[65] This is a marked decrease from 2014, when 0.65km2 of mine-contaminated area was cleared.[66]

Mine clearance in 2015[67]

Operator

District

Province

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

NPA

Tavildara

Central region

1

4,977

1

0

Jirgatol

Central region

2

31,016

19

0

Darvoz

GBAO

9

88,066

250

20

Vanj

GBAO

1*

2,566

0

6

Nosiri Khusrav

Khatlon

4

22,117

38

0

FSD

Tavildara

Central region

1

19,255

1

10

MoD

Vanj

GBAO

1

71,473

3

81

Vanj

GBAO

2*

3,997

82

4

Nosiri Khusrav

Khatlon

2

1,884

0

0

Total

 

 

23

245,351

394

121

Note: AP = antipersonnel.
* Clearance suspended and not yet completed. 

Nosiri Khusrav district, in the southwestern corner of Khatlon district, was declared mine-free in 2015, following completion of NPA survey and clearance operations over four tasks.[68]

Compared to 2014, far fewer mines were found and destroyed during land release operations in 2015. According to TNMAC this is due to a lower number of clearance operations taking place in Khatlon province—the most heavily mined—owing to the security situation on the Afghan border, along with the lack of opportunity to deploy demining machines.[69]

TNMAC reported that better use is being made of technical survey to collect direct evidence of contamination, and to ensure CHAs do indeed contain mines.[70] NPA reported that despite deploying half the number of teams in 2015 compared to 2014, its output of land released was not less, due to better use of land release techniques over SHAs and CHAs in the Central region and increased cancelation of non-contaminated land.[71]

Due to increased security in northern parts of Afghanistan (along the Tajik border), the Border Forces denied permission for clearance operations in the Khatlon border region—an area that contains nearly three-quarters of all mine contamination in Tajikistan.[72] The Border Forces only permitted NTS operations in Shuroobod district of Khatlon province, to survey some of the 101 previously unrecorded minefields. As such, two additional survey teams were established.[73] As of August 2016, TNMAC was negotiating with the Border Forces for the opportunity to start mine clearance operations in Khatlon region.[74]

Due to the restricted access to the border areas with Afghanistan, operators were instead tasked mainly to tackle remaining contamination in the Central region. However, there is a shorter demining window in this region, due to adverse weather conditions.[75]

Progress in 2016 (mines)

TNMAC was aiming to survey 50 SHAs in the 101 previously unrecorded minefields in 2016.[76] As of September 2016, the number of un-surveyed minefields was believed to have been reduced through NTS to 79.[77]

As security issues in the Khatlon region have persisted into 2016, TNMAC has instead focused all its demining capacity in the Central region, and expected to complete mine clearance in two districts.[78] Furthermore, as a result of the lack of access to clearance tasks, TNMAC is also concentrating more on release of SHAs by reduction of mined area using technical survey and cancelation of non-contaminated land using NTS.

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

In 2015, a SHA was surveyed, and 446,260m2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was subsequently released by clearance.[79]

Survey in 2015 (cluster munition remnants)

In 2014, based on information provided by a member of the local Sagirdasht community, the quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) team from TNMAC found one AO-2.5RT submunition in Darvoz district. The QA/QC team subsequently found other submunitions, covering a total area they estimated at 400,000m2.[80] This estimate was subsequently revised downwards by NPA to 150,000m2, following a field visit in July 2015.[81] However, the revision was subsequently found to be incorrect, due to the imprecise orientation of the SHA polygon, and the estimated size of the SHA, based on the available information, remained at 400,000m2.[82] 

Clearance in 2015 (cluster munition remnants)

In 2015, NPA released 446,260m2 of cluster munition-contaminated land through clearance conducted in July and August (335,181m2 manually cleared and 111,079m2 visually searched). This was the area discovered in 2014 and surveyed in 2015. During clearance, 84 AO-2.5RT submunitions and three pieces of UXO (RPG-7) were destroyed, and four cluster bomb containers were discovered.[83] 

The onset of winter and adverse weather conditions at the high-altitude location of the contaminated site prevented further investigation of this area in 2015. However, NPA planned to conduct an assessment in 2016, in order to confirm or eliminate the possibility of further cluster munition contamination.[84] 

Deminer safety

One mine accident was reported in 2015, which involved a PMN (antipersonnel blast) mine being accidentally detonated during excavation. The accident resulted in an NPA task supervisor losing his eyesight as well as a finger.[85] As a result of the subsequent accident investigation, NPA reviewed and changed its operational structure and equipment.[86]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2009), Tajikistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020. It is not on track to meet its deadline.

The first quarter of each calendar year is typically not conducive for clearance operations, so in order to meet the deadline, clearance would need to be completed by the end of 2019.[87] Current land release output, continued insecurity along its border with Afghanistan, and the inaccessibility and/or operational difficulty of some mined areas, means that Tajikistan will not finish in time.

While TNMAC has claimed that Tajikistan is on track to meet its obligations and complete its Article 5 obligations by the end of 2019,[88] it has acknowledged that this is contingent on sufficient funding, as well as the security situation at the Tajik-Afghan border, both of which could affect its ability to meet the deadline.[89] Moreover, Tajikistan is in the process of finalizing an Article 5 completion plan for 2016–2020 in which it outlines its plans to address only accessible and executable CHAs. “Inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas have been excluded from land release activities during the Article 5 completion period, and will be defined as “residual threat.”[90] This is not compliant with Tajikistan’s Article 5 survey and clearance obligations.

In the Tajik-Afghan border region, after deducting 23 “inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas, 60 CHAs covering some 2.67km2 remain to be addressed under TNMAC’s draft completion plan,[91] while in the Central region, 10 CHAs remain to be addressed, covering 1.74km2. TNMAC predicts that the proportion of land manually cleared and reduced by technical survey will remain the same as the average of the last six years, namely 40% and 33% accordingly. Therefore, it predicts that from the 5.72km2 of total CHA, only 3.83km2 will be subjected to full clearance.[92]

In addition, of the estimated 3.6km2 within the 101 un-surveyed minefield records along the Tajik-Afghan border (as of end 2015), it is assumed that about 20% of mined areas will not be accessible or executable for land release operations, and about 10% will be canceled through NTS.[93] Therefore, it is predicted that 2.52km2 (70%) will be confirmed for survey and clearance, of which 33% (0.82km2) will be reduced by technical survey and the remaining 67% (1.69km2) through full clearance.[94]

If the security situation on the Tajik-Afghan border does not allow for clearance along the border itself, Tajikistan will try to operate in areas at least 1km from the border line. Depending on weather conditions, land release operations in the Khatlon region of the border usually start in February/March; the GBAO part of the border only becomes accessible from May until October; and the Central region from June until September.[95]

In its draft Article 5 completion plan for 2016–2020, Tajikistan estimates that to clear 5.52km2 of CHA (and excluding the 101 un-surveyed minefield records on the Tajik-Afghan border, and “inaccessible” and “non-executable” areas) by the end of 2019, would require about 24 manual clearance teams annually clearing an average total each year of 1.4km2. Alternatively, a lesser, but still increased, capacity of 14 manual clearance team could take approximately seven years (2015–2023), based on current clearance rates.[96]

In the last five years, Tajikistan has cleared a total of 5.59km2 of mined area (see table below), with annual clearance in 2015 at the lowest level yet during this period. This was due to restricted access for clearance in the Afghanistan border region owing to a heightened security situation in Kunduz and other areas in northeast Afghanistan. This resulted in clearance operations originally scheduled for January 2016 being delayed until May. It also saw clearance focusing on the mountainous Central region, where adverse weather means the demining window is much shorter, with additional challenges posed by the need to access remote locations and to ensure medical evacuation.[97]

Mine clearance in 2011–2015[98]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2015

0.25

2014

0.65

2013

1.99

2012

1.10

2011

1.60

Total

5.59

 

The government of Tajikistan supported TNMAC coordination activities with some US$38,000 in 2015–2016; a decrease compared to the US$52,000 provided in 2014. In addition, the government provides in-kind and technical support to the program that it equates to some US$700,000 annually, which has remained constant.[99]

 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and Tajikistan National Mine Acton Center (TNMAC), Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[2] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.; and TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016. The figures are not consistent with TNMAC’s statement at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in May 2016, when it reported contamination as at December 2015 of some 10.3km2, in addition to 2.3km2 of battle area.

[5] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, Country Director, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[6] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 1; and Tajikistan Mine Action Centre (TMAC), “Scope of the Problem,” undated.

[7] TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Emails from Parviz Mavlonkulov, TMAC, 12 March 2014; and from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TMAC, 19 March 2014; and TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[10] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.

[11] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.

[12] Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, and Sebastian Kasack, UN Development Programme (UNDP), in Geneva, 23 June 2015.

[13] TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[14] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015; and TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[15] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 30 September 2015.

[16] TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 1; and email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[19] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[20] Emails from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 6 April 2016; and from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 May 2016.

[21] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 May 2015; and interview in Geneva, 18 February 2016; and email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 6 April 2016.

[22] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 6 April 2016.

[23] Email from Sasa Jelicic, Operations Manager, NPA, 16 June 2016.

[24] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.

[25] Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Abdulmain Karimov, TMAC, 11 June 2013.

[26] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 May 2015.

[27] Email from Daler Mirzoaliev, NPA, 14 July 2015.

[28] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 March 2009, p. 4.

[29] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 May 2015.

[30] Ministry of Defense, “Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining 2013–2016,” Dushanbe, 17 July 2013; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, Mine Action Office, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.

[31] TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[32] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Luka Buhin, OSCE Office in Tajikistan, 8 April 2014.

[33] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[34] Ibid.; and from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[35] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[36] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, and Ahad Mahmoudov, UNDP, in Geneva, 23 June 2015.

[39] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 2 September 2016.

[40] Email from Parviz Mavlonkulov, UNDP, 4 October 2016.

[41] TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 May 2016.

[48] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.

[49] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[50] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.

[51] Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016; and email 19 August 2016.

[52] Interview with Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, in Geneva, 18 February 2016.

[53] Emails from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016, and 18 October 2016.

[54] FSD, “Annual Report 2015,” undated but 2016.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 12 May 2015.

[57] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 19 May 2016; and TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[58] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[59] Ibid., 17 February 2015; statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 25 June 2015; and TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[60] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[61] Statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 19 May 2016.

[62] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 6 April 2016.

[63] Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 8 September 2016. NPA figures are recorded, as these were disaggregated by area canceled and area reduced, whereas TNMAC reported only a combined figure.

[64] Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 8 September 2016. NPA figures disaggregated area canceled and area reduced, whereas TNMAC only reported a combined figure. There was also a discrepancy between NPA and TNMAC data regarding survey data for Nosiri Khusrav district, Khatlon province. NPA reported 28,912m2 as canceled and 18,771m2 as reduced (totaling 47,683m2), whereas TNMAC reported a combined total of 38,748m2. Furthermore, TNMAC did not report the 398,000m2 confirmed as contaminated by NPA.

[65] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[66] Ibid., 10 October 2015. There was a discrepancy between cleared data for Khatlon province reported by NPA (424,097m2) and that reported by TNMAC (377,580m2). Email from Resad Junuzagic, NPA, 7 April 2015. There was also a discrepancy between cleared data for Khatlon province reported by FSD (135,550m2) and by TNMAC (125,229m2). In addition, FSD also reported destroying one antipersonnel mine in Vanj, GBAO. Email from Gulnamo Khudobakhshova, Programme Officer, FSD, 12 May 2015.

[67] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016. However, this is inconsistent with what TNMAC reported for the same period at the 14th Meeting of States Parties in December 2015 (1.8km2 released, and 556 mines and 345 ERW destroyed in 2015) and at the May 2016 intersessional meetings (1.77km2 released, destroying 567 antipersonnel mines and 1,183 ERW). The 14th Meeting of States Parties and intersessional figures are thought likely to include BAC, though this does not account for the difference in the number of mines destroyed.

[68] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[69] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[72] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[73] Ibid.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid.; and from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016; and statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, December 2015.

[76] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[77] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 18 October 2016.

[78] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Ibid., 3 April 2015.

[81] Email from Daler Mirzoaliev, NPA Tajikistan, 14 July 2015.

[82] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 12 May 2016.

[83] Ibid., and 6 April 2016; and from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 May 2016.

[84] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 12 May 2016.

[85] Ibid., 10 August 2016; and from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[86] Email from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016.

[87] TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[88] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.

[89] Ibid.

[90] TNMAC, Draft Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020, 4 October 2016.

[91] Ibid.

[92] Ibid.

[93] Ibid.

[94] Ibid.

[95] Ibid.

[96] Ibid.

[97] Emails from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016; and from Aubrey Sutherland-Pillai, NPA, 10 August 2016; and statement of Tajikistan, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2015.

[98] See Mine Action Review and Landmine Monitor reports on clearance in Tajikistan covering 2011–2014.

[99] Email from Muhabbat Ibrohimzoda, TNMAC, 19 August 2016.