Summary: Non-signatory Turkey supports the convention’s humanitarian objectives, but has not taken any steps toward accession. It has participated in every meeting of the convention and has condemned new use of cluster munitions. Yet Turkey abstained from voting on a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. Turkey states that it has not used or exported cluster munitions and has not produced them since 2005. It has imported cluster munitions and possesses a stockpile.

Policy

The Republic of Turkey has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkey has expressed support for the humanitarian objectives of the convention, but generally has not elaborated on its position concerning accession. In March 2009, it informed the Monitor that “for the time being” Turkey could not consider accession as its primary aim was to fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, to which it is a State Party.[1] Turkey concluded the destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines in 2011, after missing the initial stockpile destruction deadline.

On 7 December 2015, Turkey abstained from the vote on the first UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[2] Turkey did not explain the reason for its abstention on the non-binding resolution, which 140 states adopted, including many non-signatories.

Turkey attended several of the diplomatic conferences of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, it participated only as an observer in the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and did not sign at the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008.[3]

Turkey participated as an observer in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015, but did not make any statements. It has attended every Meeting of States Parties of the convention and intersessional meetings held in Geneva in 2013–2015.

Turkey has condemned the use of cluster munitions on several occasions.[4] It has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2015.[5]

CMC member the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey works to garner domestic support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkey is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). Turkey supported efforts to conclude a CCW protocol on these weapons and munitions. The CCW in 2011 failed to agree to a new protocol on cluster munitions, effectively ending deliberations on the topic and leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons.

Use

In March 2009, Turkey informed the Monitor that it is “not making use of cluster munitions.”[6] Since then, officials continued to affirm that Turkey has not and does not use cluster munitions.[7] There is some evidence to indicate cluster munitions were used at least once in the past, in 1994.[8]

A United States (US) Department of State cable from February 2008 made public by Wikileaks in May 2011, states that “there exists a de facto moratorium on the use of cluster munitions by the Turkish armed forces [but] Turkey’s military doctrine continues to call for the use of cluster munitions in the event of an ‘all out war.’”[9]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

In the past, Turkey produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions. It stockpiles cluster munitions, but has not disclosed information on the types or quantities possessed.

In June 2010, Turkey informed the Monitor that it “does not use, transfer, produce or import cluster munitions.”[10] Officials continue to state that Turkey “no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.”[11]

At least two Turkish companies have produced ground-delivered cluster munitions:

• Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK) has produced an extended range M396 155mm artillery projectile containing self-destructing M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[12] It has also produced M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions, under license from the US.[13]
• Roketsan has produced the TRK-122 122mm rocket, which contains 56 M85 DPICM submunitions.[14]

Turkey sold 3,020 TRK-122 122mm rockets to the United Arab Emirates in 2006–2007.[15]

The US supplied Turkey with 3,304 Rockeye cluster bombs, each containing 247 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995.[16] In 1995, the US announced that it would provide Turkey with 120 ATACMS missiles with submunitions for its M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers.[17] Turkey also possesses US-supplied M26 rockets, each with 644 submunitions, for its MLRS. In 2004, the US announced its intent to transfer to Turkey two CBU-103 Combined Effects Munitions cluster bombs, each with 202 submunitions, and two AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOW), each with 145 submunitions.[18] In 2005, it announced the proposed sale of another 50 CBU-103 and 50 JSOW.[19]

Slovakia reported the export of 380 AGAT 122mm rockets, each containing 56 submunitions, to Turkey in 2007.[20]

Chile’s Ministry of National Defense has provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of four CB-250 cluster bombs to Turkey in 1996.[21]

Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (massive contamination), antivehicle mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 

Article 5 Deadline: 1 March 2022
(Not on track to meet deadline)

In 2015, the Republic of Turkey continued to operationalize the newly established Turkish Mine Action Centre (TURMAC), and to implement its March 2015 workplan for mine clearance. However, no land release was conducted in 2015. In June 2016, mine clearance operations, managed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP), commenced for Phase 1 of the European Union (EU) Eastern Border Mine Clearance project.

Turkey’s most recent Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for 2015) states that preparation of a national mine action strategy by TURMAC was underway, and that the plan would be submitted to the Council of Ministers by the end of 2016.

Recommendations for action 

• Turkey should move forward, without delay, with the clearance of non-border areas.
• TURMAC should provide additional details of ongoing survey of eastern border areas, and also provide information on how and when it will address the huge contamination in the eastern region that is not specified in its March 2015 workplan.
• TURMAC should re-consider its decision not to begin clearance on the Syrian border, where minefields under Turkish jurisdiction pose a risk to civilians fleeing fighting across the border.
• TURMAC should ensure application of best practice in land release, prioritizing technical survey over full clearance, to accurately determine the actual contaminated area.
• Turkey should report on plans for clearance of mined areas under its control in northern Cyprus, in order to meet all of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations.
• Turkey and Cyprus should both heed the UN Secretary General’s call to facilitate access to all mined areas inside and outside the buffer zone to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.[1]

Contamination

Turkey has almost 173km² of confirmed mined area across 3,080 areas. A further 701 areas are suspected to be mined, but the area they cover and the number of mines that may lie within them is unknown.[2] The baseline area of mine contamination was unchanged between the end of 2014 and the end of 2015.

Mine contamination as of end 2015[3]

Note: SHAs = suspected hazardous areas; CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas.

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as IEDs. The great majority of antipersonnel mines are found along its borders, and were laid in 1955–1959. All along the 911km border with Syria is mined, and the mined area is on average 350 meters wide. The estimated size of the Syrian border minefields is 144.29km². They are estimated to account for two-thirds of the mines and close to 90% of the remaining mined area in the country. There are also mined areas on some sections of the border with Armenia (1.10km²), Iran (21.33km²), Iraq (2.86km²), and Azerbaijan.[4] Its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are mine-free. A further 873 mined areas covering a total of 3.11km² have been identified in “areas other than borders.”[5] Mines were also laid around military installations.[6] 

Government forces emplaced landmines during the 1984–1999 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. These mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[7] In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, non-state armed groups have also emplaced mines and IEDs, rendering the clearance process more complex.[8]

Eighteen of the 81 provinces in Turkey still contain mined areas. The reported contamination includes 157,251m² of mined area cleared in 2014, but not yet deducted from the total because mine clearance units of the Turkish armed forces had not yet been accredited by the newly established TURMAC.[9]

The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by terrorist activities and the presence of suspected mined areas. Furthermore, fewer mines are expected along the Syrian border than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as a result of wildfires.[10]

Contamination by province as of end 2015[11]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.* Some mined areas also intersect with Turkey’s border with Azerbaijan.[12]

The estimate of the number of antipersonnel mines in CHAs decreased by 1,532 in 2015. Turkey explained that this is due to destruction of antipersonnel mines by “explosions caused by various reasons” and “discoveries” in minefields located along the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Syria.[13]

In its Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in March 2013, Turkey had estimated that a total of 3,520 confirmed and suspected mined areas covered almost 215km². This estimate was provisional as the size of the (then) 346 suspected mined areas was unknown.[14] In March 2015, Turkey revised the figures to a total of 3,080 mine-contaminated CHAs covering almost 173km² and 701 SHAs.[15] The area of contamination and the number of emplaced mines are not known for the 701 SHAs, therefore the total estimated contaminated area is likely to be significantly larger. The new mine contamination data was a result of corrections to minefield registers, details of which are provided in the 2015 Article 7 report and updated workplan.[16]

Mine contamination in Turkey has both a humanitarian and economic impact. Up to 80% of mined areas along the Syrian border are on arable land, which cannot be used. The risk to livestock is widespread, especially where fencing is damaged. Mined areas have also prevented access for development activities.[17]

The Landmine Monitor identified at least 34 new mine/ERW casualties in 2015. (For further details see the Casualties and Victim Assistance country profile).

Cyprus

The Island of Cyprus is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, mostly in areas currently under Turkish control (for further details see the separate report on Cyprus).

Program Management

In January 2015, Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws” was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly; the law entered into force on 3 February 2015. It aims to define the modalities and provide the basis regarding functions, jurisdictions, and responsibilities of the National Mine Action Center (NMAC), which will carry out humanitarian clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO).[18] The law entitles the NMAC to elaborate policies for this clearance; plan and steer related activities; monitor their implementation; and carry out the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic and foreign institutions.[19]

The NMAC was established on 3 February 2015 under the Ministry of National Defense, and called the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC).[20] A director was appointed in August 2015.[21] As of February 2016, core staff had been recruited and the center was in the initial stages of becoming operational.[22] However, the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016 resulted in the dismissal of TURMAC’s director. In late August 2016, Colonel Aydin Imren was appointed as the new head of TURMAC.[23]

Until TURMAC becomes fully functional, mine action activities remain largely decentralized and divided between various national authorities in Turkey. The Turkish armed forces currently conduct clearance activities in non-border areas and around military installations. Mine clearance along the eastern borders is managed by the UNDP as part of the EU Integrated Border Management Project, in coordination with TURMAC, the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish land forces.[24]

To address the humanitarian and border management challenges posed by mine contamination, the EU, UNDP, and the Turkish government launched a project in May 2015, entitled “Technical assistance for socioeconomic development through demining and increasing the border surveillance capacity at the Eastern borders of Turkey.”[25] The UNDP provides technical assistance and capacity-building to TURMAC, the Ministry of Interior, and the Turkish General Staff for implementation of the project and for Turkey’s demining program.[26] The UNDP is also responsible for managing the contractors for mine clearance and quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) within the scope of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, and ensuring certification and standards verification.[27]

Strategic planning

Turkey has still to develop a national mine action strategy. In March 2015, Turkey reported that following the official inauguration of TURMAC, a national mine action strategy for 2016–2022 would be prepared in 2015 and submitted to the Council of Ministers.[28] However, the strategy was delayed until after the general elections in Turkey, which took place in November 2015.[29] The attempted coup in July 2016 further delayed the strategy. Turkey’s most recent Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for 2015) stated that preparation of a national mine action strategy by TURMAC was underway, and that the plan would be submitted to the Council of Ministers by the end of 2016.[30]

Turkey submitted a workplan in March 2015 in its Article 7 report for 2014.[31] It reported that the workplan would be finalized after TURMAC develops a national mine action plan, and that further revisions were possible due to ongoing investigation and survey of mined areas in the border regions.[32] The following is a summary of Turkey’s plans by region.

Syrian border

Turkey has stated that clearance will not begin along the Syrian border until after the conflict ends.[33] Previously, in its Article 5 deadline extension request, Turkey had accorded priority to clearing the Syrian border. Officials observed it is also the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion.[34]

Eastern borders

According to the 2015 workplan, mine clearance along the eastern borders will be carried out as part of the EU Integrated Border Management Project in two phases, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in a joint project with the UNDP.[35] Phase 1 of the project, scheduled for 2015–2017, was expected to result in the clearance of 223 mined areas over an area of just under 11.67km² and the destruction of 189,863 antipersonnel mines.[36] Phase 2 of the project is scheduled for 2017–2019, but the number of mined areas and total area to be cleared is yet to be determined, subject to continuing surveys.[37]

In February 2016, Turkey reported that the demining tender had been awarded to DENEL-MECHEM (Mechem), as part of a consortium in which national operators would be sub-contracted by Mechem.[38] Phase 1 of the project was officially announced in April 2016, with clearance operations beginning in June. It was scheduled to be completed by December 2017.[39]

Southeastern/Iraqi border

Clearance along the southeastern/Iraqi border is not scheduled to commence until 2019, after completion of Phases 1 and 2 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.[40] Clearance of the 969 mined areas, totaling just over 2.86km², is scheduled to take place in 2019–2021, with the destruction of 79,017 antipersonnel mines. This represents all known mine contamination in this region.[41]

Non-border areas

To date, mine clearance in non-border areas has been conducted only on a very limited scale, for instance to clear paths in case of urgent need.[42] At the time of its 2015 updated workplan, Turkey estimated that all mined areas in non-border areas would be cleared in 2015–2021, totaling 3.1km².[43] It was planned that the Turkish armed forces would conduct some clearance, with the remainder to be determined in the mine action plan, once established.[44] In this region, Turkey prioritizes mine clearance activities based on areas used for military operations; areas with low or no terrorist threat; and areas where the local population may benefit from agriculture and livestock.[45]

Legislation and standards

As of October 2016, the UNDP and the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was assisting TURMAC to formulate new national mine action standards based upon International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and the currently existing national standards, the Syrian Border Mine Clearance Standards (SBMCS), and the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Standards (EBMCS).[46]

Quality management

Following an international competitive tender process, a contract for QA/QC services was awarded to RPS-Explosive Engineering Services by the UNDP in March 2016. In April 2016, the UNDP and TURMAC completed the accreditation of RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, and the company then began the accreditation process for the mine clearance contractor, Mechem, under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.[47]

Information management

As of February 2016, TURMAC was assessing its information management needs, with the support of the UNDP and the GICHD.[48] Plans to have an IMSMA database operational by the end of 2016 were delayed following the attempted coup, and as of September 2016, the UNDP is maintaining a project database to record all operational data related to the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project until the national database can be established by TURMAC.[49] Due to national security concerns, much of the minefield data remains classified, presenting a challenge to mine action information management in Turkey.[50]

Land Release

No land was released by survey or clearance in 2015, but 1,531 antipersonnel mines were destroyed “due to explosions caused by various reasons” in the minefields along the borders with Armenia, Iran, and Syria.[51] The corresponding area of land released/cleared was not reported, and some clearance operations, for example along the Syrian border, were to meet military objectives only and to allow safe movement of troops, but not to release a contaminated area. The lack of any land release in 2015 compares unfavorably to 2014 when 157,251m² of land was cleared by the Turkish armed forces on the Iranian border and in non-border areas.[52]

Progress in 2016

Mechem’s clearance operations began in June 2016. As of September 2016, manual clearance operations were taking place along the Armenian border, in mapped and fenced minefields on flat terrain.[53] Capacity as of September was 120 deminers and 30 mine detection dogs (MDDs), as well as a MineWolf 330. However, the MDDs had not yet been accredited.[54]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Turkey is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey is not on track to meet this deadline.

Turkey’s original Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014. In March 2013, Turkey submitted a request for an eight-year extension to its deadline until 2022 to complete clearance of all mined areas. Turkey stated that the envisaged timeframe was subject to revision pending progress with tenders and clearance activities on the ground.[55]

In its 2013 request, Turkey cited a number of circumstances that had impeded it from carrying out mine clearance activities, including: delays in the establishment of a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) and NMAC, which will supervise clearance activities; adverse weather conditions allowing clearance to be conducted for only five or six months a year; security problems posed by the continuation of the terrorist threat; mined territory contaminated with metal residues resulting from the fight against terrorism; uncertainties about the mine-free status of some areas due to the irregular completion of registration forms; and topographical challenges. According to Turkey, the eastern and southeastern borders and non-border areas are the most complicated to address due to topographical difficulties.[56]

In granting the 2013 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties recalled the number of efforts to be carried out during 2013–2014, crucial to the success of the implementation of Turkey’s plan, and requested that Turkey report to the Third Review Conference in June 2014 on: the tendering processes for clearance along Turkey’s border with Syria, and the results of any related demining efforts and annual milestones of expected progress; the tendering processes for the clearance of areas along Turkey’s eastern borders; developments in the establishment of NMAA and NMAC; and progress in clearance of mined areas in non-border areas.[57] Turkey did not provide an update on clearance progress at the Third Review Conference, but did subsequently submit a workplan in March 2015.[58] This plan only addresses a small portion (10%) of overall mine contamination, and it is unclear how and when the remaining contamination will be addressed. The preliminary observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, produced for the intersessional meetings in June 2015 noted that “that Turkey’s plan at present suggests that it will not be able to complete implementation of Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 by its deadline in 2022.”[59]

Turkey revealed in its 2013 extension request that since 1998 it had only cleared a total of 1.15km² of mined area, close to three-quarters of which took place in one year (2011), with destruction of 760 antipersonnel mines and 974 antivehicle mines. In addition, military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.[60]

Turkey’s total mine clearance to date only amounts to a tiny fraction (less than 1%) of its overall mine contamination, and more than 11 years after becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty, Turkey has only made very marginal progress in addressing mine contamination.

Mine clearance in 2011–2015[61]

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2015, the Republic of Turkey provided US$25,000 through the ITF (International Trust Fund) Enhancing Human Security for victim assistance activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[1]

Turkey is also affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[2] Between 1998–2012, Turkey has reported contributing approximately 68.7 million Turkish Lira (approximately $30 million) to its own mine clearance efforts.[3] Turkey has not reported the amounts contributed since then. Turkey indicated that a budget for its mine clearance operations would be developed when its national mine action center becomes operational.[4]

In 2014, the European Union (EU) contributed €19,800,000 ($26,328,060) for clearance activities in the eastern border regions, as part of an integrated border management project.[5] Turkey did not receive international funding in 2015.

Action points based on findings

• Make adequate prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities a priority in the mine-affected regions.
• Begin coordination of victim assistance obligations with the input of the General Directorate of Services for the Disabled and Elderly in the Ministry of Family and Social Policies.
• Plan and coordinate victim assistance in accordance with Mine Ban Treaty Maputo Action Plan commitments

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Turkey is responsible for landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors. Turkey has made a commitment to victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Turkey ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 28 September 2009.[1]

Casualties Overview

Monitor analysis of media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) and a report published by Human Rights Watch identified at least 28 new mine/ERW casualties in 2014 in Turkey. Of the total, 27 were civilians; the majority of civilian casualties were children (19). One recorded casualty was security personnel.[2] The 2014 total represents a slight increase from the number of casualties reported in 2013 but it remains a significant decrease from the 69 new casualties identified in Turkey from IMFT reporting in 2012.[3]

Included in the total for 2014 were 19 mine casualties from Syria (four killed and 15 injured) in incidents in the Turkish border minefields while crossing from Syria into Turkey. Six casualties among people fleeing from Syria to Turkey were recorded in 2013, with eight recorded the year before. At least 15 of the Syrian casualties were children. Syrians make up 64% of all casualties identified in Turkey in 2014.

Initial emergency medical care for the injured who survive is provided in the Suruç Public Hospital. Depending on their medical needs, they may also be transferred to the Şanlıurfa Mehmet Akif İnan Training and Research Hospital. The exact number of people killed and injured by landmines on the border minefields was not known due to a lack of accurate reporting. According to one of the doctors in the Suruç Public Hospital’s Department of General Surgery, “The mine incidents are reported in the hospital records as ‘wound due to firearms’…Still, I can say that the number of incidents and victims is much greater than the numbers mentioned in the press.”[4] Media reports also indicate the total number of Syrian casualties along the Syria-Turkey border could be much higher than reported with large numbers of displaced persons residing in the minefield.[5]

The government of Turkey reported that there were 26 casualties (one killed; 25 injured) in 2014.[6] This represented an increase from the eight casualties reported in 2013. No specific details on civilian status, sex, or age were provided in the reporting.

In its Article 5 deadline Extension Request of March 2013, Turkey provided information on antipersonnel mine casualties occurring between 2004 and the end of 2012: 882 military personnel (260 killed; 622 injured) and 168 civilians (56 killed; 112 injured). Turkey also included disaggregated information on the age and sex of civilian casualties for a similar time period (10 years); of the total civilian casualties reported, 15 were female and 50 were children.[7] In contrast, Monitor reporting, which included IMFT data for the period from 2004 to the end of 2012, counted more than twice the number of civilian mine/ERW casualties; 377 civilian casualties of 979 casualties recorded in total.

The total number of mine/IED/ERW casualties in Turkey is unknown. Turkey had reported 4,271 mine/ERW casualties, including 871 people killed and 3,400 injured, as of the end of 2012.[8] However, according to a media report in April 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had recorded 6,360 mine casualties since 1984; 1,269 people were killed (625 security personnel; 644 civilians) and another 5,091 people were injured (with the number of civilians compared to security personnel injured not reported) in mine incidents.[9] In 2007, a demining specialist reported at least 10,000 mine casualties (mostly civilians) along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s (more than 3,000 killed and 7,000 injured).[10] The Monitor analysis of the period of 2010–2014 found 273 new casualties (74 killed; 199 injured).[11]

Victim Assistance

More than 5,000 people were reported to have been injured by mines in Turkey since 1984.[12]

Victim assistance in 2014

No significant changes in the accessibility or quality of services were reported for 2014. In its Article 7 report, the Government of Turkey reported that 58 mine/ERW survivors received assistance in the form of indemnity, salary, or a job, however, this report only covers treatment received by survivors at military medical facilities.[13] Mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities in affected areas did not have access to the same level of services as other persons with disabilities in larger cities in Turkey.[14]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No efforts to assess the needs of mine/ERW survivors in Turkey were reported in 2014. There was no system in place to collect data on mine survivors or their needs. The IMFT collected the most comprehensive information available through media scanning and crosschecking with other organizations and local sources.

The European Commission (EC) continued to report that a lack of broader data and research on persons with disabilities remained a barrier to informed policymaking in Turkey.[15]

The Diyarbakir Lawyer’s Bar Association and the Human Rights Association collected information on mine/ERW casualties in the affected regions; information collected included details on the needs of the survivors and families.[16]

In 2006, Turkey had reported that it was initiating a program of transition to an international injury classification system that would include mines and ERW.[17] No further progress on this transition was reported as of end 2014.

Victim assistance coordination

The Ministry of Family and Social Policies through its Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General is the government entity responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities.[18] Turkey has never had government victim assistance coordination.

A delegation of the ICBL and IMFT discussed victim assistance with a deputy undersecretary of the Ministry of Family and Social Policy in March 2013, underlining Turkey’s victim assistance commitments, the links with the CRPD, and the related responsibilities of the ministry. The deputy undersecretary agreed that the role of victim assistance focal point fitted with the work of the ministry’s department of persons with disabilities and also the social welfare department, which is responsible for pensions and other payments.[19]

In 2014, IMFT met with the Group Deputy Chairpersons of the political parties and the Head of the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights at the Parliament to discuss Turkey’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty. IMFT provided a number of suggested actions including the initiation of the mine risk education in schools.[20]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting on victim assistance is updated annually by Turkey but only covers treatment received by survivors at military medical facilities. Turkey’s Article 7 report for 2014 states that 14 survivors completed rehabilitation and medical care, while services to 28 were ongoing. Article 7 (and Convention on Conventional Weapons Article 13) reporting did not include information on services available to civilian mine/ERW survivors at civilian facilities.[21] Turkey did not make statements on victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2013 or at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo.

Survivor inclusion and participation

Survivors reported that they were not included in the planning or implementation of services relevant to their needs.[22] The Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General had not engaged survivors and was not familiar with the issue of victim assistance or specific needs in mine affected areas.[23]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[24]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

A study of examples of surgical intervention after mine injures of varying severities by the Medical Association Diyarbakir emphasized the time-sensitivity of emergency medical care; the study emphasized that longer intervals between injury and surgery corresponded to more severe levels of amputation. Among the study group, the average time to receive first medical care was nine hours; 13 of 186 survivors recorded in the study died due to infection.[25]

All persons with disabilities have the right to access the free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. Those without social insurance can apply for a special “green card” to be eligible for services. However, in practice those persons with disabilities eligible for the green card medical insurance still contributed to part of their medical expenses, eliminating the availability of free services.[26] Regulations in the Healthcare Application Notice, issued by the Social Security Organization of Turkey, restricted access to medicines, equipment, and mobility devices for persons with disabilities, even when deemed necessary by medical professionals.[27]

Healthcare facilities in towns in the mine-affected regions (other than the largest cities) are underfunded, have inadequate staff levels and equipment, and often were not able to address survivors’ emergencies or ongoing medical needs.[28]

Initial emergency medical care for Syrian refugees injured in Turkey has been provided locally. However, the hospitals were not accurately distinguishing landmine casualties from other war victims in their patient profiles.[29] In the refugee camps near Suruç, mine survivors could receive medical assistance from volunteer healthcare workers, but there were only two ambulances and both were also used for transporting goods.[30] Turkey provides emergency medical care for Syrians but costs involving physical rehabilitation, mobility aids, and plastic surgery are not covered so refugees have to rely on donors and humanitarian organizations. Turkey received around 2,500 injured Syrians (including landmine, cluster munition, and ERW survivors) a month in 2014.[31]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

There was a significant need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services to be established in other mine/ERW-affected provinces. There was also a need to establish facilities that could address the needs of child survivors. Holders of the green card could only apply for new prostheses every five years. This was detrimental to the rehabilitation of child mine/ERW survivors who require frequent replacements while growing.[32]

The Dicle University Research Hospital prosthetics center was the only such center for all mine-affected regions. In 2014, it was still open but had effectively ceased to operate; this eliminated the only free option for prosthetics for civilian mine/ERW survivors. Use of the facility declined in 2008 when it began to provide services only to those having the state-provided green cards for the disadvantaged. In addition, the lack of assistance for transportation or accommodation expenses for survivors coming to the center from distant provinces limited access.[33]

In the absence of a free rehabilitation center, in order obtain prostheses, mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities face complicated procedures to apply for poor quality prosthetics available through the national health system. Even this assistance is out of reach to many mine/ERW survivors due to the geographical distance and their poverty levels.[34]

Laws and policies

Civilian survivors could apply for compensation through Law 5233, the Law on the Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the Fight Against Terrorism. The Diyarbakir Lawyers’ Bar Association continued to help mine/ERW survivors access benefits to which they were entitled, such as compensation under Law 5233, and to promote victim assistance. Survivors have called for a review of the compensation process to ensure timely and appropriate outcomes.[35]

In 2014, the Turkish parliament ratified legislation on the establishment of the National Mine Action Center. As of December 2015, the National Mine Action Center was established and had a mandate to coordinate victim assistance. It was in the process of building that capacity.[36]

A need for specific policies to address the social support needs of child mine/ERW survivors was identified in 2009.[37] No progress was reported by the end of 2014. Children with disabilities faced difficulties in accessing affordable and inclusive education services. The monitoring, evaluation, and inspection of private special education and rehabilitation services required particular attention.[38]

The constitution permits positive discrimination for persons with disabilities, although the principle is not adequately reflected in policy measures. Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in access to healthcare, employment, education, transportation, and in the provision of state services; however, the law was not enforced effectively.[39] On 6 February 2014, the Turkish parliament amended national laws to bring state obligations in line with international definitions and standards.[40] Persons with disabilities continued to face serious difficulties in accessing employment in the private sector, though there is a limited upward trend in the public sector. Turkey lacked a comprehensive strategy to fund commitments to create physical accessibility. Physical barriers to public buildings and all relevant facilities still existed. Deadlines for public institutions’ mandatory compliance to provide accessible services were extended or postponed.[41] Diyarbakir, the largest city in the mine-affected regions, has become increasingly physically accessible due to the work of local disabled persons’ organizations and the local government.[42]