Summary: Non-signatory Ukraine has not taken any steps to accede to the convention. It has participated as an observer in several of the convention’s meetings, most recently in 2014. Ukraine abstained from voting on a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015.

Ukraine is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but inherited a large stockpile from the Soviet Union and sees military utility in cluster munitions. From mid-2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire, the armed forces of the government of Ukraine as well as Russian-backed armed opposition groups used ground-launched cluster munition rockets in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in eastern Ukraine. The government of Ukraine has repeatedly denied using cluster munitions in the attacks.

Policy

Ukraine has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Ukraine has acknowledged the long-term and deadly consequences of cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention.[1] Ukraine informed the Monitor in 2012 that it “considers cluster munitions to be legal weapons which remain an important component of Ukraine’s defense capabilities.”[2] Government officials have denied evidence that Ukraine used cluster munition rockets in the country’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 until February 2015. Ukraine has also stated that, if using its own resources alone, it would not be able to destroy the large stockpile of cluster munitions that it inherited from the Soviet Union within the eight-year stockpile destruction deadline required by the Convention on Cluster Munitions[3] (see Stockpiling and destruction section below).

Ukraine has expressed a preference for cluster munitions to be tackled through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to which it is a party.[4] Yet Ukraine has not reviewed or amended its position since the CCW’s failure in 2011 to agree on a draft protocol on cluster munitions, which effectively ended CCW deliberations on the matter. The CCW failure has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument to specifically address the weapons.

Unlike most non-signatories, Ukraine abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 7 December 2015, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[5] Ukraine did not explain why it abstained on the non-binding resolution that 140 states voted to adopt.

Ukraine participated in several meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 as an observer.[6]

Ukraine participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010–2011 and 2014. It was invited to, but did not attend the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015.

Ukraine has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2015.[7]

Ukraine is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Production and transfer

Ukraine is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. In November 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine was not producing new cluster munitions, and would not export or import the weapons from any other country.[8]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine inherited a large stockpile of cluster munitions from the break-up of the Soviet Union. During a CCW meeting on cluster munitions in April 2011, Ukraine provided information on the types of its stockpiled cluster munitions.

Cluster munitions of the armed forces of Ukraine[9]

Ukraine stated that cluster munitions constitute 35% of its stockpile of conventional weapons, totaling two million tons of ammunition. Of these cluster munitions, 34% were produced before 1980. Another 36% were produced between 1981 and 1992 and “are planned to be stockpiled and might be used.” The remaining 30% contain antivehicle landmines.[10]

Ukraine has reported the destruction of an average of 10,000–20,000 tons of cluster munitions annually. It has concluded that it could take 60 years to destroy the stockpiles that are currently slated for destruction.[11]

Use

In 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine would not use cluster munitions except to defend itself from outside aggression.[12] In the past, Ukraine has called for a moratorium on the use of what it has described as “inaccurate and unreliable” cluster munitions.[13]

Previous use in 2014–2015

The first evidence that cluster munitions were being used in the conflict in eastern Ukraine appeared in Donetsk province in early July 2014 in media reports and social media postings. Field research conducted by Human Rights Watch in October 2014 and a follow-up investigation in January–February 2015 confirmed the use of cluster munitions by both Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces.[14] An Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission also reported cluster munition rocket attacks.

As of 1 July 2016, no cluster munition rocket attacks had been recorded since the ceasefire went into effect on 16 February 2015. Both parties to the conflict used two types of ground-fired cluster munitions in 2014 until the February 2015 ceasefire:

• The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a minimum range of 20 kilometers and a maximum range of 70 kilometers, and delivers 72 9N235 submunitions.
• The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35 kilometers and delivers 30 9N235 submunitions or 30 9N210 submunitions.

The Smerch and Uragan cluster munition rockets are fired from dedicated launch tubes mounted on eight-wheeled vehicles. The 9N210 and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions are designed to self-destruct a minute or two after being ejected from the rocket.[15]

As the following list shows, cluster munitions were used in dozens of urban and rural locations of Ukraine’s two eastern provinces in the period from July 2014 until the February 2015 ceasefire, with some places hit multiple times.[16] Cluster munition rockets were used in attacks on Donetsk city and at least seven towns and villages throughout Donetsk province, including Artemivsk, Hrodivka, Ilovaisk, Komsomolske, Kramatorsk, Makiievka, Slavyansk, and Starobesheve. Cluster munition rockets have been used in attacks on Luhansk City and at least two towns in Luhansk province: Novosvitlivka and Stakhanov.

There is no evidence indicating that cluster munitions were used elsewhere in Ukraine, for example, in Crimea.

Human Rights Watch and international media such as The New York Times recorded numerous unexploded submunitions, indicating a significant number may have failed to self-destruct as intended. They also documented several Smerch and Uragan cluster munition rockets that malfunctioned shortly after launch, fell to the ground, and still contained their full payload of submunitions. As of July 2016, neither party to the conflict has taken responsibility for the use of cluster munitions in 2014 and 2015.

Since October 2014, Ukraine has consistently denied its use of cluster munitions and blamed the attacks on pro-Russian separatist groups.[17] Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavlo Klimkin acknowledged the “serious accusations…deserve the deepest investigation.”[18] At the Convention on Conventional Weapons in November 2014, Ukraine denied using cluster munitions.[19] At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2015, Ukraine continued to allege that “Russia-guided illegal armed groups” and members of the Russian armed forces carried out Uragan and Smerch rocket attacks in eastern Ukraine.[20]

Russia has repeatedly drawn attention to Ukraine’s use of cluster munitions, but has not itself acknowledged or taken any responsibility for cluster munition rocket attacks by the separatist rebels backed by Russia.[21]

The cluster munition rocket attacks in Ukraine have attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from at least 32 states and the European Union.[22] In 2015 and the first half of 2016, countries continued to issue statements and use various fora to express concern at the cluster munition use in Ukraine.

• At Convention on Cluster Munitions meetings in Geneva in June 2015, two-dozen states condemned recent use of cluster munitions, of which 12 referred to the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine.[23]
• At the First Review Conference in September 2015, States Parties adopted the Dubrovnik Declaration, which affirms: “We are deeply concerned by any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, including in Cambodia, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen. We condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[24] During the meeting, a dozen states specifically expressed concern at or condemned cluster munition use in Ukraine.[25]
• During the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2015, states including Costa Rica, Norway, Ireland, and the Netherlands expressed concern at the use of cluster munition use in Ukraine.[26] The UNGA resolution adopted on 7 December 2015 expresses “strong concern regarding recent allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world.”

States at the OSCE’s Permanent Council in Vienna have asked the OSCE mission to collect information and report on evidence of the use of prohibited cluster munitions.[27] In 2015, states responded to the OSCE mission’s reports detailing cluster munition rocket attacks.[28] Russia welcomed the mission’s “detailed analysis” of the use of cluster munitions.[29]

A November 2014 report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine and urged the reports of use “be investigated promptly and thoroughly.”[30]

Policy

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999 and ratified on 27 December 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2006.

Ukraine has not enacted national legislation, including penal sanctions, to enforce the prohibitions of the Mine Ban Treaty domestically as required in Article 9. It has reported existing regulations under national implementation measures, as well as a 2012 law to ratify an agreement with a NATO agency to destroy stockpiles.[1]

Ukraine submitted its tenth Article 7 transparency report on 1 April 2016, covering calendar year 2015.

Since the Second Review Conference in 2009, Ukraine has attended almost all treaty meetings, including the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2015 and the intersessional Standing Committee meetings held in May 2016. Ukraine did not attend the Third Review Conference of the Mine Ban Treaty in Maputo in June 2014.

Ukraine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). It submitted a national annual report for Amended Protocol II, but has not submitted a national annual report for Protocol V.

Production and transfer

Ukraine has declared that it “has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines.”[2] It has not produced antipersonnel mines since its independence.[3] Ukraine is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Its 1999 moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, formally in place through 2003, in practice stayed in effect until the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Ukraine in 2006.

Use

Landmines appear to be a part of the conflict between government forces and Russian-backed separatists that erupted in early 2014 initially in Crimea, then in the provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine. There is significant evidence present at different locations that antipersonnel mines of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s are available to combatants and unconfirmed reports of emplaced antipersonnel mines being found in the field. Ukraine has accused Russian forces of laying antivehicle and antipersonnel mines on Ukrainian territory.

Since 2014, the government of Ukraine stated that it had not used antipersonnel landmines in the conflict and accused Russian forces of laying landmines in Ukraine.[4] In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed forces or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions.[5]

In February 2016, Ukraine informed the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance that “its Armed Forces are authorized to use mines in command-detonate mode, which is not prohibited under the Convention. All mines planted in command-detonate mode are recorded, secured and access is restricted.”[6]

Ukrainian civilian and military officials have accused separatist non-state armed groups (NSAGs) of using antipersonnel mines, including victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs). At the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of the States Parties in December 2015, Ukraine stated that there were mined areas in territory under its jurisdiction but not under its control. In addition to those areas, it said that “sabotage acts are carried out on its territory which is under the control of Ukraine, including mining territory and infrastructure.”[7]

In November 2015, an officer from the General Staff informed soldiers that separatist NSAGs were using landmines attached to fish hooks and fishing lines to snag the clothing of soldiers as they moved through wooded areas, thereby detonating nearby mines.[8] In May 2016, two Ukrainian army engineers in Donetsk region were injured by an antipersonnel mine as they were checking the area for explosives.[9]

In September 2016, Ukraine’s Department of Defense Intelligence reported that pro-Russian separatists had laid POM-2 antipersonnel mines.[10] Later that month, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine reported the presence of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines that it said were preventing the SMM representatives from traveling from Pervomaisk toward Zolote, between Mykolaiv province and Luhansk province.[11]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines and has therefore been in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty ever since.[12] The requirement to destroy almost six million PFM-type antipersonnel mines was a key obstacle that prevented Ukraine from rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty.[13] For years, Ukraine repeated at nearly every formal and informal Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it would depend on international support for the destruction of its stockpiles.[14]

The types and quantities of antipersonnel mines Ukraine has reported in its stockpile have varied over the years. The highest total of 6,664,342 mines of nine different types was detailed in Landmine Monitor Report 2006.[15]

In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2015, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 5,564,429 antipersonnel mines: 5,414,728 PFM-type and 149,096 POM-2 remotely-delivered mines, and 605 OZM-4 hand-emplaced bounding fragmentation mines.[16] Ukraine also reported the destruction of 19,944 mines in 2015.[17] It declared the destruction of 576 mines in 2014, 332,352 mines in 2013, 22,604 mines in 2012, and 9,890 mines in 2011.[18] From 1999 to 2010, Ukraine destroyed significant quantities of stockpiled antipersonnel mines using both its own resources and international assistance.[19]

At the May 2016 intersessional meetings, Ukraine stated that on 19 October 2015, an additional agreement was reached among the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, NATO Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the resumption of destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines. Within the context of this agreement, a total of 642,960 PFM-1 mines are slated to be destroyed between 2015 and the end of 2016; 233,496 were destroyed by 1 May 2016.[20]

Contaminated by: landmines (extent of contamination unknown), cluster munition remnants (extent of contamination unknown), and other explosive remnants of war.

Article 5 deadline: 1 June 2016
(Deadline missed without extension request—Ukraine is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty) 

Not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 

Ukraine has made progress towards establishing a mine action law and national mine action program. Survey and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance in government-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine is now taking place. However, Ukraine missed its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline, and has not yet submitted an Article 5 extension request. It is therefore in serious violation of the Mine Ban Treaty. 

Recommendations for action

• Ukraine should request an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline without further delay.
• Ukraine should take all necessary measures to protect civilians from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).
• Ukraine should establish an operational national mine action center (NMAC) under civilian control.
• Ukraine should establish a centralized database to collate information on mine, cluster munition remnant, and other ERW contamination resulting from the ongoing conflict.
• Ukraine should continue to undertake survey to identify the extent and impact of antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants (in particular in Donetsk and Luhansk), and conduct clearance as soon as possible.

Contamination

Mine contamination

In the first half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean Peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. Firm evidence exists that mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts,[1] including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until the cessation of hostilities.

Prior to the current conflicts, Ukraine was affected by mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from combat in World War I. Ministry of Defense engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of any mine threat is not known.

In its latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report (for 2015), Ukraine reports that exact information is not available on known or suspected areas containing antipersonnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, and no further information is provided on the nature or extent of the contamination, other than the fact that mined areas are being cleared in Donetsk and Luhansk.[2] At the 2015 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Ukraine asserted that approximately 8% of the territory in eastern Ukraine is contaminated with antipersonnel mines and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[3] It appears that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea may actually have been either “phony minefields” or areas containing trip-flares.[4] 

In 2015 and 2016, numerous antipersonnel and antivehicle mines have been identified in Ukraine, including the following types: OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines that can function as antipersonnel mines depending on the type of fuze used, MON (50, 90, 100, and 200) directional antipersonnel mines, TM62 antivehicle mines, PDM-1M anti-landing mines equipped with fuzes capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, blast PMN type antipersonnel, and POM2 antipersonnel mines.[5] (See Mine Ban Policy profile for further details).

Cluster munition contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Amid the violence that erupted in Ukraine in 2014, both government and anti-government forces have used cluster munitions in 2014 and 2015. These have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions[6] (see Ukraine’s 2016 Cluster Munition Ban policy profile for details).

Ukraine has reported that many unexploded submunitions contaminate the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,[7] with the most intensive use in and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk oblast.[8] In 2016, Ukraine estimated, highly improbably, that total contamination by explosive ordnance (including cluster munition remnants) covered more than 7,000km².[9] Ukraine cannot accurately estimate the extent of cluster munition contamination until survey is completed.[10]

Other ERW contamination 

Ukraine is also affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from World Wars I and II[11] and Soviet military training and stockpiles. In February 2016, Ukraine reported that 32 former military firing ranges and many other areas contaminated with explosive objects from past wars covered 1,500km².[12] These figures have not changed since April 2015.[13]

Socio-economic and humanitarian impact of mines, cluster munition remnants, and other ERW

Mines, cluster munition remnants, and other ERW are reported to have resulted in hundreds of casualties since July 2014 (see Ukraine’s 2016 Casualties and Victim Assistance profile for further details).

In addition to posing a serious risk to human life, mines and ERW also have a detrimental socio-economic impact, preventing safe use of agricultural land for crops or grazing land for livestock—two major sources of livelihood.[14] Indeed, mines and booby-traps are said to have been laid deliberately to block access to essential infrastructure as well as to forested areas where people gather wood to heat their homes.[15] Those living in conflict-affected areas, especially around the contact line, are among the most vulnerable, including the elderly, persons with disabilities, and the poor. To heat homes in the winter, people must go into the forest. This is said to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.[16] The risks posed by mines and booby-traps are particularly acute for people living in towns and settlements near the contact line, as well as the 23,000 people who cross the contact line every day.[17]

Explosive contamination also poses a particular risk to the internally displaced and returning refugees, especially in areas fought over previously and which are now away from the front line.[18]

Program Management

In 2013, the Ministry of Defense’s “Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action” was tasked with coordinating demining nationally and serving as the secretariat to the national mine action authority in Ukraine.[19]

As at May 2016, Ukraine was in the process of passing mine action legislation that would list the executive bodies involved in mine action in Ukraine, regulate the national mine action authority, and mandate development of a priority action plan.[20] The Mine Action Bill was sent to the Cabinet in late 2015, endorsed in February 2016, and then submitted by the Cabinet for parliamentary approval.[21] A change of Cabinet in April 2016 resulted in the bill needing re-endorsement, after which it will be re-submitted for parliamentary approval.[22] On 26 July 2016, it was reported that “The Cabinet of Ministers will soon consider a draft law on mine action.”[23] 

While responsibility for mine action coordination currently falls principally to the National Security and Defense Council and the Ministry of Defense, several other ministries are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the National Police and National Guard), the Security Services, State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU) (formerly known as the Ministry of Emergencies), the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Infrastructure, and the State Border Service.[24]

The demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces, in Kamianets-Podilsky, mainly focuses on building the military’s capacity for explosive ordinance disposal (EOD), including training and testing of methods and equipment, quality assurance (QA), and provision of EOD, counter-IED, and demining specialists.[25] Experts from NATO provide training and advice at the center, and in December 2015, several units from Canada were training deminers alongside Ukrainian experts.[26] All Ukrainian armed forces engineering units are involved in humanitarian demining in eastern Ukraine and not solely EOD spot tasks. Furthermore, the engineering units are responsible for the destruction of all ERW and mines detected by SESU and clearance NGOs.[27]

SESU has organizational control of humanitarian demining and is generally responsible for clearance. It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Centre” in 2015 in Kiev. The center’s remit includes coordination of SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response EOD teams) involved in technical and non-technical survey (NTS), demining, internal quality control (QC) of SESU units, information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as risk education.[28]

In addition, SESU has a training center near Merefa, in the Kharkiv region, and the Special Transport Service has a center in Chernihiv, both of which are focused largely on EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).[29] Furthermore, SESU has initiated establishment of a Regional Centre for Humanitarian Demining, based in Lysychansk in Luhansk region. The new center is intended to ensure trained SESU deminers can be sent to affected areas in Donetsk and Luhansk under Ukrainian control.[30] 

International support to program management

In 2016–2018, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator, with Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assistance, was planning to provide policy and legal support to Ukraine, including for the establishment of a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority and center and underpinned by national standards.[31] The OSCE Project Coordinator and GICHD are also supporting Ukraine’s use of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA); demining training program; and have provided equipment and supplies.[32]

At the request of the government of Ukraine, the UN conducted a mine action needs assessment mission on 23 January–5 February 2016. The aim of the mission was to assess the impact of contamination by mines and ERW and make technical recommendations for further humanitarian responses. The joint mission was composed of technical experts from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[33]

The UN-led humanitarian coordination system also has a mine action sub-cluster, established in 2015, which sits under the Global Protection Cluster.[34] UNDP, Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Handicap International (HI) are members, and in addition, the OSCE Project Coordinator, and the ICRC, also attend meetings.[35] 

Strategic planning

The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State Program for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–2014.[36] The program foresaw clearance of 15km² over five years with the destruction of 500,000 items of ERW. As of June 2016, the government was in the process of developing a state program on mine action for 2017–2021, which will cover all areas of mine action.[37]

Ukraine has developed a plan for humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in areas it can access safely. The main goals for 2015 were demining of populated areas, security during rehabilitation of infrastructure, and clearance of unexploded ordnance (UXO) from agricultural areas.[38] These remained Ukraine’s goals for 2016, while, in addition, local government authorities have been helping to prioritize clearance tasks based on humanitarian criteria.[39]

Standards

A special instruction for the identification, render-safe, and disposal of explosive items, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), was approved by the General Staff of the Ukrainian armed forces on 1 August 2014.[40] In Ukraine, all national standards must be approved by the Ukrainian Scientific and Research Training Center of Standardization, Certification and Quality, which is the National Standardization Authority in Ukraine.[41] Ukraine adopted IMAS as a “trial national regulatory acts” on 1 September 2016, under National Standardization Authority Order no. 230 of 8 August 2016.[42]

Operators

A number of ministries and government agencies deploy units to undertake clearance and disposal of ERW and mines, including the Ministry of Defense, SESU, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (National Police and National Guard), the Security Service, the State Special Transport Service, and the State Border Service.[43] 

The Ministry of Defense is responsible for all areas where the military are permanently stationed as well as for the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone in Donbass, the east of Ukraine that covers both the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Ministry’s Engineering Division conducts spot clearance of UXO. The State Border Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea. The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Special Transportation Service is responsible for demining national infrastructure (e.g. railways and roads). The Ministry of Internal Affairs has an engineering department that conducts EOD, in particular of IEDs.[44] SESU has organizational control of humanitarian demining and is generally responsible for clearance.

As of February 2015, the Ministry of Defense was deploying 25 manual clearance teams totaling 125 deminers, two explosive detection dog (EDD) teams, 15 demining robots, and four BMR-2 armored demining machines.[45] As of April 2015, the Ministry of Internal Affairs deployed 27 units totaling nearly 200 people. Forty per cent of capacity is dedicated to humanitarian demining and ERW clearance in areas contaminated as a result of former conflicts.[46]

As of February 2016, in eastern Ukraine, SESU was deploying 30 pyrotechnic/demining teams (150 people, 60 vehicles); the armed forces of Ukraine were deploying 52 EOD teams (260 people, 86 vehicles), and the State Transport Service were deploying 5 EOD teams (25 people, 10 vehicles).[47] Ukroboronservice, a state enterprise whose activities include arms manufacture, also has a “humanitarian demining” section.[48] As of May 2016, Ukroboronservice was not conducting clearance operations in Ukraine.[49]

During the ongoing conflict SESU suffered severe losses to its buildings and vehicles.[50] Since then, DDG has secured equipment for four SESU pyrotechnic teams, which includes vehicles, detectors, and personal protective equipment. DDG trained the four teams in the use of the demining equipment and how to conduct operations in accordance with IMAS, in addition to providing life-support training to SESU medics associated with the teams.[51] A similar project is also being implemented by the OSCE Project Coordinator[52] and by NATO.[53]

Three international demining organizations—DDG, FSD, and HALO—were operating in Ukraine as of May 2016.[54] DDG began risk education in late 2014 in Donbass, and in February 2016 it began to conduct NTS.[55] As of May 2016, DDG was deploying three survey teams, comprising 11 personnel, including one driver and two managers.[56] DDG Ukraine has its head office in Kiev, and operations offices in Severodonetsk and Mariupol.[57]

HALO Trust launched its program in November 2015 and began with a rapid assessment of mine and UXO contamination in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (oblasts).[58] In early 2016, HALO Trust began conducting NTS, mine clearance, and BAC.[59] HALO’s capacity as of September 2016 was eight clearance teams (each with 11 deminers, one driver, and one team leader) and four NTS teams.[60] HALO was employing 119 Ukrainian staff, providing training and management expertise while local capacity was being developed.[61]

As of September 2016, FSD had been undertaking risk education activities in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In addition, with funding secured from Canada, FSD was preparing to commence mine clearance and/or BAC, with the aim of initiating clearance operations in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk by early 2017.[62] 

Quality management

The draft mine action law envisages a national mine action center with a QA function.[63] In the meantime, quality management (QM) of government clearance operations is overseen by the demining center of the Ukrainian armed forces.[64]

Information management

In 2015, IMSMA was piloted by GICHD and SESU in four regions of Ukraine.[65] In November and December, IMSMA training was conducted for 10 regional operators, and SESU plans to expand use to 24 regional operators, grouped into eight regional centers (Volyn, Carpathian, Podolsky, Tauric, Dniprovskyi, Eastern Poliskyi, and Central) and the Operational Centre in Kiev.[66]

As of October 2016, three government departments in Ukraine were using IMSMA: SESU, the Ministry of Defense, and the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Interior. SESU is working with data from its demining teams. The Ministry of Defense is working to create a national database of contamination data from all NGOs engaged in humanitarian demining in Ukraine.[67] It is also setting up a national database of contamination data from all national entities and government departments involved in mine action in Ukraine.[68]

Land Release

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups.[69] Clearance of ERW in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions is typically reactive, taking place soon after attacks or when a report of contamination is received from the local community.[70] Once identified, munitions are marked on the ground, and their position fixed and reported to the local authorities.[71] Devices are either destroyed in situ or removed to storage areas or compounds.[72]

SESU clearance has been slower in rural areas than in towns and cities.[73] In February 2016, SESU reported that, since the beginning of fighting in 2014, it had cleared around 140km² across the whole country, and disposed of more than 202,000 explosive objects.[74] NTS is helping to identify contaminated land, especially in liberated areas.[75] The Ukrainian armed forces are responsible for clearing ERW in areas close to the front lines and former military positions.[76] In December 2015, the working group of the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine agreed 12 priority areas for humanitarian demining.[77]

In areas controlled by pro-Russian rebel groups, separatists are said to be also clearing ERW and mines. In Donetsk, former SESU personnel, now organized under the separatist Donetsk People’s Republic, are undertaking the bulk of clearance around Donetsk city. Personnel are organized into regular shifts, with clearance conducted both day and night.[78]

The Ukrainian authorities and the pro-Russian rebels are, to varying degrees, recording written logs of emergency call-outs and clearance operations,[79] but data is not always disaggregated into weapon type.[80] Clearance data is not available from pro-Russian separatist groups, and an accurate picture is not available of the scale of ERW clearance being undertaken in eastern Ukraine and of remaining cluster munition contamination.

Progress in 2016

In early 2016, HALO Trust began conducting NTS in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk around the contact line, and up to 15km from the front line (contact line).[81] These are primarily areas of conflict in 2014 and early 2015, before the contact line settled in its current position.[82] NTS aimed to provide a clearer picture of remaining contamination and to support the planning and prioritization of clearance.[83] 

HALO Trust began mine clearance and BAC in March 2016. Planned clearance is prioritized in consultation with local stakeholders, but generally HALO’s clearance is in response to requests from village and district councils.[84] In August 2016, HALO received permission to begin working within the 15km buffer zone around the contact line. The two-year project will include survey and clearance of high-priority sites to support safe cultivation, rebuilding of homes, and reconstruction of infrastructure.[85] Clearance of a minefield in the village of Pavlopil, 20km northeast of the city of Mariupol, and 1.5km from the contact line, began in September in response to an appeal from the local community.[86] NTS and clearance within the buffer zone is reported to be slow due to access restrictions, but HALO hoped the process would speed up as and when the situation stabilized.[87] All clearance sites are surveyed by HALO prior to the start of work, to ensure there is an IMSMA hazard report for each site.[88]

Currently HALO only undertakes manual clearance, but as soon as funding permits, it plans to import armored plant machinery to assist in clearing urban/semi-urban areas with rubble.[89] All teams are trained and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all expected threats in the conflict zone, as NTS has yet to determine the proportion of different types of hazard.[90] Items discovered by HALO are destroyed by the Ministry of Defense, as only the Ukrainian armed forces are permitted to use explosives in the conflict zones.[91] HALO’s demining work in Ukraine is conducted in coordination with the Ukrainian authorities and international organizations. During the course of 2016, clearance capacity was set to expand as more local deminers are trained.[92]

DDG also began NTS in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in early 2016 up to 60km from the current contact line, depending on the location of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and access granted by the relevant authorities.[93] Initial areas tasked were due for completion in the summer and additional areas have been requested.[94] DDG was scheduled to complete NTS by the end of October 2016.[95]

As of September 2016, the HALO Trust and DDG survey had collectively identified antivehicle mines (TM-57 and TM-62—both plastic and metal series—and PTM series); antipersonnel mines (OZM-72 fragmentation mines, and MON, PMN, and POM series); improvised fragmentation mines and booby-trapped ERW (mainly tripwire-initiated systems connected to conventional munitions); cluster munitions (9N series) and remnants; rockets from multiple launch rocket systems (PG series); and unexploded mortar shells and grenades.[96]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. As of September 2016, Ukraine had not yet submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request, and was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine should inform States Parties of the location of mined areas, and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. Ukraine needs to both request and be granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline by the other States Parties, preferably at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago, Chile in November-December 2016. 

At the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties (30 November to 4 December 2015), Ukraine reported that it did not have access to some mined areas. According to the final report of the meeting, “Ukraine emphasized that it was fully aware of the need for strict compliance with the obligations under the Convention and notified its intention to seek an extension of the period of Ukraine’s implementation of Article 5. The official, duly compiled, request would be soon submitted to the States Parties for their consideration.”[97]

On 30 March 2016, though, Ukraine deposited an official communication to the other Mine Ban Treaty States Parties via the UN Secretary General, noting that it did not have full control over parts of its territory—namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.[98] However, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 specifies that a State Party is responsible for clearing mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Therefore, suspected or confirmed mined areas that are under Ukraine’s control or under Ukraine’s jurisdiction (even if it does not have control or physical access to those areas), should all be covered in an extension request. Furthermore, Ukraine’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty still fully apply, including with regard to Article 5, irrespective of the fact that Ukraine is currently engaged in armed hostilities. 

Russia is not a State Party or Signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty. Nonetheless, Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.[99] 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

(Special note: This profile updated with new information after the publication of Landmine Monitor 2016.)

In 2015, seven donors contributed US$13.3 million toward mine action in Ukraine, this represents a 99% increase from 2014 when four donors provided $6.7 million.[1] There was no international support reported in 2012–2013.

Germany reported contributing a total of $515,964 for the destruction of Ukraine’s PFM-1 landmines through the NATO Support Agency in 2015. Ukraine missed its June 2010 deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines, and has repeatedly asserted that its capacity to complete its stockpile destruction in a timely manner was dependent on support provided by international partners.[2]

International contributions: 2015[3]

Casualties

Casualties Overview

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Ukraine in 2014 is not known; totals presented here are based on aggregate numbers in media reporting. In March 2015 it was reported that at least 42 children were killed and 109 were injured by mines/ERW in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine since March 2014. UNICEF stated that “The number of children killed and maimed by mines and unexploded ordnance would be significantly higher if we include non-government controlled areas.”[1] In January 2016, a media report stated that between 2 June 2014 and 28 December 2015, 261 people had been killed and 479 injured by mines/ERW.[2] Representatives of Ukraine also reported almost 200 mine/ERW casualties (45 people killed and 150 injured) in the first half of 2015. Some 95% of those casualties were military personnel.[3] In July 2015, the ICRC tweeted “Almost every day, people are killed and maimed by #mines and explosive war remnants in eastern #Ukraine.”[4]

As of 31 December 2015 Ukraine had not submitted a CCW Protocol V Article 10 report for calendar year 2013; therefore the number of annual casualties in 2013 due to explosive remnants of war (ERW) leftover from World War II remained unknown.

The Monitor has recorded at least 2,135 (1,824 killed; 311 injured) in the Ukraine to the end of 2014.[5] The UN reported that more than 1,500 civilians were killed in Ukraine between 1945 and 1995 in mine/ERW incidents. Another 130 people were killed during clearance operations in the same period.[6] The Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) reported that between 1996 and 2008 there were 229 ERW casualties (100 killed; 129 injured), including 59 children, due to “handling of devices.”[7]

Cluster munition casualties[8]

Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that during the use of cluster munitions in 2014 “cluster munitions killed at least 6 people and injured dozens” in Ukraine.[9] HRW reporting for 2015 included 66 cluster munition casualties that occurred during attacks.[10]

Victim Assistance

The total number of mine/ERW survivors in Ukraine is not known, although there are reported to be hundreds of casualties from the conflict in eastern Ukraine.[11] Prior to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, media reports indicated that tampering with ERW was a significant cause of casualties.[12] Many mine survivors are thought to be veterans of the Soviet Army, injured during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

Many persons with injuries, impairment or disabilities did not have access to any form of assistance from government or NGOs due to reduced mobility, increased vulnerability and emergency humanitarian needs related to the security situation.

Coordination

Disability issues, including physical rehabilitation, the provision of prosthetics and assistive devices to survivors, as well as employment and other economic inclusion activities are the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Policy.[13] The Ministry of Health was responsible for emergency and long-term medical care.[14]

Inclusion and participation of survivors

Ukraine stated that “we believe that after recovery, many victims of anti-personnel mines are actively involved in charitable and volunteer organizations in Ukraine, which are aimed at helping victims.” Survivors were actively involved as advisers to the heads of central executive authorities, as well as members of public councils at state agencies that are responsible for the rehabilitation and assistance to victims of war, including landmine survivors.[15]

Assistance

The National Society of the Red Cross conducted first-aid training for volunteers in violence-affected areas in 2014. More than 100 first-aid providers received training in Donetsk, Kharkiv and Lugansk with ICRC support and 200 doctors attended war-surgery seminars in Donetsk, Lugansk, Mariupol and Slovyansk. More than 2,100 people benefited from repairs to several hospitals. Medical facilities in Donetsk, Lisychansk and Slovyansk received surgical equipment supplies. Health structures in Donetsk, including the medical service of one armed group, also received ad hoc donations of medical supplies.[16]

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) provided supplies and medicines for healthcare consultations, and provided individual counselling sessions. MSF ceased activities in the self-proclaimed Luhansk People's Republic (LPR) in September 2015 and in Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) in October 2015.[17]

A special NATO trust fund for prosthetics for soldiers was agreed between Ukraine and NATO in September 2015.[18] The trust fund aims to provide military assistance in physical rehabilitation (including prosthetics) for injured soldiers, as well as for the establishment of an appropriate physical rehabilitation system in Ukraine.[19] This significantly expands Ukraine’s capacity to assist landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities due to weapons. The trust fund was expected to finance assistance both in Ukraine and abroad. Measures were also being taken to provide professional, social and psychological rehabilitation of landmine victims, including family members of casualties. A monitoring mechanism for people in need of prosthetic limbs identified 386 people by November 2015. Since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine to November 2015, a state budget was provided for prosthetic devices for 146 people, and another 48 people were in the process of receiving prostheses.[20]

In 2015 Handicap International was developing a project to enhance the capacity of health, social and collective structures in in order to address the needs of conflict affected people. The project also promotes the inclusion and protection of persons with disability to improve national capacity.

Laws and policies

Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to health care, and the provision of other state services. These provisions were not effectively applied. Legislation requires that public buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities. However this was not adequately enforced and most buildings remained inaccessible, restricting the ability of such persons to participate in society. Consequently, access to services remained difficult.[21]

By law employers must set aside a quota of 4% of employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. It was reported that many people employed to fill the quota requirement received minimal salaries, but did not actually work at the companies of employment. Legislation also requires employers to take into account the individual needs of employees with disabilities. Generally these laws were not enforced. State employment centers lacked resources to place students with disabilities in appropriate jobs. On 19 November 2014, the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced People came into effect. The law provides 880 hryvnia ($55) per month for persons with disabilities.[22]

Ukraine ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities on 4 February 2010.