United States

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 08 August 2016

Summary: Non-signatory the United States (US) rarely comments publicly on the question of its accession to the convention, but in November 2015 elaborated its views upon abstaining from the vote on a UN resolution on the convention. Unlike other non-signatories, the US has never participated as an observer in a meeting of the convention. In 2015 and 2016, US officials continued to express concern about and/or condemn new use of cluster munitions, particularly in Syria.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but with the exception of a single 2009 strike in Yemen, has not used them since 2003 in Iraq. There has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in its military operation against forces of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. A 2008 Department of Defense policy requires that the US not use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018.

The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007. Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales, exporting or transferring CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons to seven countries including Saudi Arabia. The CBU-105 is the only cluster munition that the US claims to meet the 1% UXO standard, although this has been called into question after documented CBU-105 failures in Yemen from Saudi-led coalition attacks. US export law requires that recipients of US cluster munitions must agree not to use them in civilian areas, but evidence of civilian harm from cluster munition attacks by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen since April 2015 has raised questions about whether this requirement is being met. The US suspended cluster munition deliveries to Saudi Arabia in May 2016.

The US appears to have made significant progress in removing cluster munitions from its active stockpile and destroying them through demilitarization, though there is a lack of detailed information from the Department of Defense on the process.

Policy

The United States of America has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The US has privately acknowledged the “important contributions” made by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but its government officials—from political leaders to diplomatic representatives—rarely comment publicly on the question of US accession to the convention.[1] However in November 2015, the US articulated its views in brief remarks explaining why it abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2] A total of 139 states including many non-signatories voted in favor of this non-binding resolution on 7 December2015, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[3] Only Russia and Zimbabwe voted against it.

According to the statement delivered by US disarmament representative, Ambassador Robert Wood, the US abstained because it considered the resolution as only being applicable to states that are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and “the United States is not a party to this convention and as such is not bound by its provisions.”

The statement asserts that cluster munitions remain “an integral part of U.S. force capabilities.” It finds that cluster munitions “with a low unexploded ordnance, UXO, rate provide key advantages against certain types of legitimate military targets and can produce less collateral damage than high explosive, unitary weapons” when “used properly in accordance with international humanitarian law.”

The US statement highlights the July 2008 Department of Defense policy directive on cluster munitions issued under President George W. Bush that the Obama administration has continued to implement without review or amendment. According to this policy, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% UXO rate.[4] The statement also explained how “the United States does not transfer cluster munitions to other countries except those that meet the 1% UXO rate” in accordance with US law.

The US noted that “the lawfulness of the use of a type of weapon under international law…depends upon whether the weapon is prohibited” and concluded:

The United States does not accept by this or any other standard that the Convention on Cluster Munitions represents an emerging norm or reflects customary international law that would prohibit the use of cluster munitions in armed conflict.

The US Department of State’s website section on cluster munitions states that the US sees “demonstrated military utility” in cluster munitions, asserts their “elimination from U.S. stockpiles would put lives of its soldiers and those of its coalition partners at risk,” and claims that “cluster munitions can often result in much less collateral damage than unitary weapons.”[5]

According to a US Department of Defense “Laws of War Manual” issued in June 2015, “the United States has determined that its national security interests cannot be fully consistent with the terms of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[6] In a May 2016 letter, a senior Department of Defense official stated that:

The Department recognizes that the use of cluster munitions requires careful consideration prior to employment but sees cluster munitions as legitimate weapons with clear military utility. They are effective weapons, providing distinct advantages against a range of targets. When they are used correctly in the appropriate circumstances, they can result in less collateral damage than most unitary weapons.[7]

The US is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and opposed the negotiation of a legally binding CCW protocol on cluster munitions until June 2007, after the Oslo Process to create the Convention on Cluster Munitions got underway.[8] The US then became one of the most ardent proponents of a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions, working intensively to forge agreement on a draft text. That initiative ended in November 2011, when states at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference failed to reach consensus on adopting a draft cluster munitions protocol.[9] Since 2011, the US has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions. The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.[10]

The US did not participate, not even as an observer, in the 2007–2008 diplomatic Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11] However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the process in order to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[12] According to the Congressional Research Service report, “U.S. officials were concerned that early versions of the [draft treaty text] would prevent military forces from non-states parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations.”[13]

The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015.

The US appears to have made significant progress in the implementation of the 2008 policy, despite a lack of public information from the Department of Defense (see Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling sections below). Under the policy, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” had to be removed from active inventories not later than 19 June 2009 and demilitarized as soon as practicable.[14]

Recent Congressional initiatives concerning US policy and practice on cluster munitions include:

  • On 16 June 2016 an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act introduced by Representatives John Conyers (D-MI), Raul Grijalva (D-AZ), Keith Ellison (D-MN), and Jim McGovern (D-MA) to prevent US funds from being used “to transfer or authorize the transfer of any cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia,” was narrowly defeated in the US House of Representatives by a vote of 204 to 216.[15]
  • On 6 January 2015, US Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) and Senator Patrick D. Leahy (D-Vermont) reintroduced the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, Bill S. 28, while Representative Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) reintroduced the House equivalent, H.R. 157. The legislation reflects the US policy that comes into effect at the end of 2018 prohibiting US use of cluster munitions to munitions that result in 1% or more UXO, but goes further by prohibiting their use in areas where civilians are known to be present.[16] The legislation, which also requires a clearance plan if the US uses cluster munitions, was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.

US NGOs continue to campaign for the US to ban cluster munitions and accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[17] The Cluster Munition Coalition US has called for the 2008 policy on cluster munitions to be reviewed with the objective of identifying and overcoming any remaining obstacles to US accession to the convention.[18] The CMC has warned the US against using cluster munitions in any military operation in Syria and called on it to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[19]

Responses to new use of cluster munitions

In the course of 2015 and the first half of 2016, the US continued to make statements and support resolutions expressing concern at or condemning new use of cluster munitions:

  • On 23 March 2016, the US voted in favor of a Human Rights Council resolution that “condemns the Syrian authorities’ use of…cluster munitions.” It voted for five previous Human Rights Council resolutions in 2014 and 2015 that contained similar language condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[20]
  • On 16 March 2016, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution condemning the “unlawful and indiscriminate violence against civilian populations” perpetrated by the Syrian government including its use of cluster munitions.[21]
  • On 9 February 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which he said is “killing innocent women and children.”[22]
  • On 23 December 2015, the US voted in favor of a UNGA resolution condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria. It voted for three previous UNGA resolutions in 2013–2014 containing similar language condemning cluster munition use in Syria.[23]
  • On 21 October 2015, an Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson criticized apparent Russian use of cluster munitions in Syria, stating that “attacks using these imprecise weapons only continue to cause unnecessary suffering.”[24] On 28 October, Colonel Steve Warren called Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Syria “irresponsible,” adding that “these munitions have a high dud rate, they can…hurt civilians, and they’re just, you know, not good.”[25] On 29 June 2015, the US voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that also expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and called on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate.”[26]

On 17 March 2015, Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-Maryland) reintroduced the Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act, which “strongly condemns the…targeting of civilian populations…with cluster bombs.” The bill passed a vote in the Senate by unanimous consent on 14 July 2015.[27] As of 20 July 2016, it was still being considered by the House of Representatives. The use of cluster munitions in Yemen since a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states began its military operation in late March 2015 has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations.[28] Since May 2015, State Department officials have repeated that the US is looking at reports that the coalition has used US cluster munitions and said “we share the concerns regarding unintended harm to civilians caused by the use of cluster munitions.”[29]

On 9 September 2015, in response to questions about Saudi coalition attacks in Yemen involving the use of US-supplied cluster munitions, State Department spokesperson John Kirby said that “there is an end-use requirement there for how they’re used,” and that “we have vehicles at our disposal should they not be used appropriately.”[30] In May 2016, amid further reports of cluster munition use in civilian areas in Yemen, the White House placed a hold on cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia (see Transfer section below).

The US is not a party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but in June 2014, the Obama administration announced an immediate ban on US production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines and a ban on US use of antipersonnel mines, except in Korea.[31] The White House described the new policy as part of a package of measures to enable future US accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since 2009, the US has become a regular observer at Mine Ban Treaty meetings.

Use

The US used cluster munitions in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); Iraq (2003); and Yemen (2009).[32]

The last time the US used cluster munitions was on 17 December 2009, when at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, were used in attack on an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” at al-Ma‘jalah in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen that killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children.[33] Cluster munition remnants were never cleared and have killed four more civilians and wounded 13 others since the attack, most recently in January 2012.[34] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly responded to the reported use and neither has denied US responsibility for the attack.[35]

Until the policy requiring the use of cluster munitions that result in 1% or less UXO comes into effect at the end of 2018, any cluster munition use that exceeds the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[36] There does not appear to have been any US use of cluster munitions since Yemen in December 2009.

There has been no evidence to indicate that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition operation against the non-state armed group of Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014.[37] A spokesperson for the US Air Forces Central Command informed The Washington Post on 26 July 2016 that: “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[38]

The US has provided logistical and other support to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that has used cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015.

A 2014 Congressional Research Service report that found the US has not used cluster munitions since 2003 suggested that, “For subsequent military operations, where cluster munitions would otherwise have been the weapon of choice, Congress might review what types of weapons were substituted in place of cluster munitions and how effective they were in achieving the desired tactical results.”[39]

Production

Since 2005, all submunitions produced by the US must have a failure rate of less than 1%, according to policy issued in 2001 by Secretary of Defense William Cohen.[40] The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.[41] Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales (see Transfer section below).

In the past, before the adoption of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.

The Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense continue research and development activities at the applied research level to develop alternatives to cluster munitions as well as improve the reliability of existing submunitions and develop new types of submunitions.[42]

The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW) is one weapon the Army is developing to replace cluster munitions. The Department of Defense’s 2017 budget includes funds to support the acquisition of 1,068 GMLRS-AW, with a total procurement objective of 43,560 warheads.[43] Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor, is also under contract with the US Army to produce 740 GMLRS-AW for foreign military sales.[44]

A 2016 report by PAX identifies 74 US financial institutions that hold investments in companies known to produce cluster munitions. Of the 10 largest investors worldwide, eight are US-based institutions.[45]

Transfer

While the historical record is incomplete, in the past the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom (UK).[46] In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided information showing a transfer to the US in 1991 of one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb.[47]

The US first instituted a moratorium on the export or transfer of cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO standard in a 2007 appropriations bill at the initiative of Senator Leahy. The moratorium was extended the following year as the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, but again the restrictions only applied to that fiscal year.[48] The 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act contained similar restrictions as the previous appropriations bills; it prohibited the provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”[49]

The same export moratorium language was included in the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act signed into law by President Obama on 16 December 2009.[50] Similar export moratorium language has been included in the annual budget in each subsequent year.[51]

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—the US government agency that administers weapons transfers—issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the memorandum, “the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).”[52]

Recent sales and deliveries

Congressional notifications show that since 2008 the US has concluded agreements to sell CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons to seven countries:

  • India (510 CBU-105 announced in 2008 for estimated $375 million)[53]
  • UAE (an unknown number of CBU-105 announced in 2007)[54]
  • Saudi Arabia (1,300 CBU-105 announced in 2010)[55]
  • Saudi Arabia (404 CBU-105 announced in 2011)[56]
  • Taiwan (64 CBU-105 announced in 2011)[57]
  • Oman (32 CBU-105 announced in 2012)[58]
  • South Korea (367 CBU-105 announced 2012 and 2 CBU-105 announced in 2015)[59]
  • Singapore (3 CBU-105 announced in 2014).[60]

CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon are manufactured for each sales order by Textron Systems Corporation of Wilmington, Massachusetts in accordance with the delivery schedule. Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) in Hopkins, Minnesota makes the rocket motor specifically for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon. While Textron is the manufacturer, the CBU-105 is assembled at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, described as the Department of Defense's “premier bomb and warhead loading facility.”[61]

In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official stated that the end-use provision of its 2012 agreement with Saudi Arabia and “in a handful of other cases…is incomplete.” The provision states that the purchaser agree the CBU-105 “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present” but failed to include the rest of the legislatively-mandated phrase “or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.” According to the official, the Department of Defense is currently pursuing an amendment to the agreement to “remedy this specific error.”[62]

The first use of US-manufactured and -supplied CBU-105s by a recipient in 2015 and the first half of 2016 has raised questions about whether the transfer requirements are being met. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has documented six instances of CBU-105 use in Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition since April 2015. In at least three attacks, it found that some submunitions or “skeet” did not disperse from the BLU-108 canister or dispersed but did not explode, failing to function as intended and exceeding the 1% UXO rate.[63] Furthermore, Amnesty International and HRW have both documented cluster munition use by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in areas in which civilians are known to be present.[64] None of these documented CBU-105 attacks in Yemen have involved armored vehicles, nor have damaged or destroyed armored vehicles been documented at the strike locations.

In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended transfers of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen. According to Foreign Policy, a senior US official said the administration acknowledged reports that the weapons had been used “in areas in which civilians are alleged to have been present or in the vicinity” and added, “We take such concerns seriously and are seeking additional information.”[65] While the suspension decision has not been issued publicly by the Obama administration, Human Rights Watch independently confirmed it with senior White House and Congressional contacts.[66]

In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official confirmed that “Saudi Arabia has purchased and received 1,300 CBU-105 munitions.” He said a request by Saudi Arabia for an additional 404 CBU-105s notified to Congress in June 2011 “is currently under review.” The official affirmed that, “Saudi Arabia has not violated end-use provisions related to the sale or transfer of U.S.-manufactured cluster munitions based on recent U.S. assessments.” The official noted Saudi Arabia’s acknowledgment that it used CBU-105s once in Yemen, in April 2015. However, he also said, “The Department is aware of the Saudi-led coalition’s alleged use of cluster munitions in armed conflict in Yemen, including in areas in which civilians are alleged to have been present or in the vicinity.”[67]

The US CMC welcomed the decision to suspend US cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia and called for it to be made permanent and extended to cover all cluster munition transfers to any country.[68] Local activists in Providence, Rhode Island have been demonstrating at Textron’s company headquarters since April 2016, demanding that it cease its production of cluster munitions. On 16 June 2016, a congressional legislative amendment to prevent US funds from being used “to transfer or authorize the transfer of any cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia” was narrowly defeated by a vote of 204 to 216.[69]

The Saudi-led coalition has used three other types of US-made cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO rate and are no longer exported by the US, but it is not known when the munitions were acquired.[70] In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official said that, “The United States has not conditioned the sale of new cluster munitions on a recipient foreign country’s commitment to retire older cluster munitions after 2018.”[71] He also said the Department of Defense, “does not have full knowledge of which countries maintain [cluster munition] stockpiles.”

According to the 2008 policy, before 2018 the Department of Defense “may, consistent with U.S. law and policy, seek to transfer cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO rate provided that the receiving foreign government agrees not to use these cluster munitions after 2018.” It is unclear what, if any, transfers have occurred under this provision.

In May 2016, the CEO of Textron responded to questions raised by the use of the CBU-105s in Yemen. He found that “in the event that any individual munition does not identify a target the munition is disabled either by self-destructing in the air or by disarming itself on the ground.” He said that the presence of remnants “demonstrates that a munition did not locate a target vehicle while in the air, and then disarmed itself on the ground—exactly as designed and with no threat to civilians.”[72]

Yet as HRW has pointed out “a dud must still be considered hazardous regardless of the technical fix.”[73] That means they should not be handled or approached by anyone other than a trained technician. As the 2008 policy states, “self-deactivated submunitions will still be considered UXO.”

On 3 June 2016, a State Department spokesperson told press that the US has “reminded the Saudis of their obligations under end use provisions” required with respect to US-supplied cluster munitions.[74]

Stockpiling

An October 2004 Department of Defense report to the US Congress detailed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types containing about 728.5 million submunitions, as listed in the following table. However, that number does not appear to be a full account of cluster munitions available to US forces, as it apparently does not include US cluster munitions stocks located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[75]

US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[76]

Type

Number of submunitions per munition

Munitions in active inventory

Submunitions in active inventory

Munitions in total inventory

Submunitions in total inventory

Rocket

ATACMS 1

950

1,091

1,036,450

1,304

1,238,800

ATACMS 1A

400

405

162,000

502

200,800

M26 MLRS

644

369,576

238,006,944

439,194

282,840,936

M26A1 MLRS

518

4,128

2,138,304

4,128

2,138,304

M261 MPSM

9

74,591

671,319

83,589

752,301

Total

449,791

242,015,017

528,717

287,171,141

Projectile

M449 APICM

60

27

1,620

40

2,400

M449A1 APICM

60

24

1,440

49

2,940

M483/M483A1

88

3,336,866

293,644,208

3,947,773

347,404,024

M864

72

748,009

53,856,648

759,741

54,701,352

M444

18

30,148

542,664

134,344

2,418,192

Total

4,115,074

348,046,580

4,841,947

404,528,908

Bomb

Mk-20 Rockeye

247

58,762

14,514,214

58,762

14,514,214

CBU-87 CEM

202

99,282

20,054,964

99,282

20,054,964

CBU-103 CEM WCMD

202

10,226

2,065,652

10,226

2,065,652

CBU-97 SFW

10

214

2,140

214

2,140

CBU-105 SFW WCMD

10

1,986

19,860

1,986

19,860

CBU-105 SFW P3I WCMD

10

899

8,990

899

8,990

AGM-154A JSOW-A

145

669

97,005

1,116

161,820

Total

172,038

36,762,825

172,485

36,827,640

 

Grand Total

4,736,903

626,824,422

5,543,149

728,527,689

 

The 2004 list remains the most detailed public account of US cluster munition stocks. In the period since the US provided slightly amended totals, but no detailed breakdown. In 2011, it stated the stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[77] In 2009, a US official said the stockpile was comprised of “more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions.”[78]

According to one report, “the Pentagon estimates that ‘upward of 80 percent of U.S. cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile.’”[79]

Stockpile destruction

When it issued the 2008 policy, the Department of Defense committed to destroy more than 99.9% of its cluster munition stocks by the end of 2018, as only a tiny fraction of stocks—the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons—meet the less than 1% percent failure rate requirement.

The 2008 policy required that the services and combatant commands remove all cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements from the active inventory by June 2009. It is unclear if the US completed the process of removing cluster munitions from the active stockpile by this date, as the Department of Defense has provided limited information on the process or the cluster munitions being demilitarized for eventual destruction.

A December 2015 presentation by a US Army stated that there are currently, 136,000 tons of cluster munitions in the demilitarization account (B5A), which it said represents 28% of the total demilitarization stockpile.[80] It did not indicate the type, but described the munitions as “rounds,” which indicates artillery-delivered DPICM. According to the presentation, an additional 272,000 tons “remain in service accounts which would require disposal.”

These numbers indicate a total of 408,000 tons of US cluster munitions are being demilitarized for destruction under the 2008 policy directive. By comparison, Germany stockpiled the highest number of cluster munition stocks of any State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions prior to completing destruction in November 2015. It destroyed 573,000 cluster munitions and 62 million submunitions, which is the equivalent of approximately 50,000 tons or 12% of total US stockpile.

Previously, in February 2015, the army disclosed that 474,726 tons of cluster munitions were being destroyed: “approximately 221,502 tons of cluster munitions in the demil [demilitarization account] stockpile” and “an additional 250,224 tons are expected to be added into the [demilitarization account] no later than FY 2018 to ensure compliance with the Cluster Munitions Policy.”[81]

Between 2000 and 2012, the US destroyed 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) on average per year, at an annual cost of $7.2 million.[82]

US company General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems describes its US-based demilitarization facility as “the largest cluster munitions disposal facility in the world.”[83] In 2013 and 2015, the company was awarded contracts to demilitarize US cluster munitions and other weapons.[84] In June 2014, General Dynamics completed the destruction of Canada’s stockpile of 12,597 M483A1 projectiles and 1,108,536 DPICM submunitions at its facility outside Joplin, Missouri.[85]

Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The Army requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[86]

In February 2016, the army announced its plan to modify 183 expired ATACM missiles, replacing the warheads with unitary weapons compliant with the 2008 policy.[87]

Foreign stockpiling and transit

The US appears to have removed its cluster munition stocks from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[88] The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[89]

US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in a number of countries, including Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:

  • In Afghanistan, the “United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions,” according to a December 2008 cable.[90]
  • Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany, according to a December 2008 cable.[91]
  • In Israel, US cluster munitions are “considered to be under U.S. title” until they are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime. A cable on the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG) states that “U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[92]
  • Italy, Spain, and Qatar are identified in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[93]
  • Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them,” according to a December 2008 cable.[94]
  • The US might be storing clusters munitions in Kuwait, according to a May 2007 cable.[95]


[1] In a February 2009 cable, the US commended Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre for the “successful conclusion” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Describing the Oslo Process as “an impressive effort,” the cable notes that “U.S. concerns over interoperability were dismissed as alarmist and it took high-level USG intervention to ensure that the treaty did not harm our ability to operate with NATO allies.” “Part III: Norwegian FM [Foreign Minister] Støre: The World at His Feet,” US Department of State cable 09OSLO116 dated 13 February 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[2] Statement of the US, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015.

[3]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[4] The memorandum on Department of Defense policy is dated 19 June but was not formally released until 9 July 2008. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008.

[5] US Department of State webpage, “Cluster Munitions,” undated. Emphasis in original.

[6] The Manual paraphrases a 2009 statement by US State Department legal advisor Harold Hongju Koh at a Convention on Conventional Weapons meeting that “We realize many delegations here are parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). However, many States, including the United States, have determined that their national security interests cannot be fully ensured consistent with the terms of the CCM.” Statement of US, CCW Protocol V meeting, Geneva, 9 November 2009, in Department of Defense Office of General Counsel, “Department of Defense Laws of War Manual,” June 2015, section 6.13.4.

[7] Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, from Brian P. McKeon, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 20 May 2016.

[8] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in November 2006, the US position was that new international law on cluster munitions was unnecessary as states should apply existing laws “rigorously” and focus on the implementation of Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, to which it is party. See Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.

[9] Throughout the negotiations, the US supported the main tenants of the proposed protocol, including an exemption for cluster munitions meeting a manufacturer-stated 1% failure rate and several optional safeguards; a prohibition on use and transfer of all cluster munitions produced before 1980; and a 12-year transition period during which states could continue to use all cluster munitions.

[10] An April 2014 report by the Congressional Research Service noted “doubts that CCW efforts to develop a cluster munitions protocol will be viable.” Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2014, pp. 6–7.

[11] For details on US policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.

[12] The diplomatic cables also show how the US has worked extensively to influence national implementation legislation and interpretation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including on issues of foreign stockpiling and transit. As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions originating from 100 locations for the period from 2003 to 2010. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reviewed a total of 57 US diplomatic cables on cluster munitions from 24 locations, cables released by Wikileaks as

[13] Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2014.

[14] Secretary of Defense Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008. The US has not reported any details on the removal of stocks, or whether the undertaking has been completed.

[15] 164 Democrats and 40 Republicans voted for the proposal, while 200 Republicans and 16 Democrats voted against it. US Congress, House Report 114-623 – Providing for further consideration of the Bill (H.R. 5293) making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2017, and for other purposes. Ammedment 40, 15 June 2016. See also, vote results on Amendment 40, 16 June 2016.

[16] The draft legislation was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, 2015 (S. 28), and the House Armed Services Committee, Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, 2015 (H.R. 157). Neither bill has moved to a further stage in the legislative process.

[17] Since January 2014, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has chaired the US Campaign to Ban Landmines and also the US NGO activities on US cluster munition policy and practice on behalf of the CMC. In early 2015, separate websites were launched for the US Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition US. See, Cluster Munition Coalition US, “US must commit to no cluster bomb use,” 2 April 2015.

[18] The coalition also called on the US to start participating as an observer in regular meetings of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, starting with the First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015.

[19] CMC, “Say no to possible US use of cluster munitions in Syria intervention,” 28 August 2013.

[20]The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 31/17, 23 March 2016; “The grave and deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 30/10, 1 October 2015; “The grave and deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 29/L.4, 2 July 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution 28/20, 27 March 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution 26/23, 27 June 2014; and “The continuing grave deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution 25/23, 28 March 2014.

[21] Expressing the sense of Congress condemning the gross violations of international law, 2016 (H.Con.Res. 121).

[22] US State Department, “Remarks With Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry,” 9 February 2016.

[23]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 70/234, 23 December 2015. The US voted in favor of similar resolutions on 15 May and 18 December 2013, and on 18 December 2014.

[24] US Department of Defense, “Transcript of Department of Defense Press Briefing by Colonel Warren,” 21 October 2015.

[25] Ibid.

[26] The five permanent members of the UN Security Council voted for the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.

[27] Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act, 2015 (S. 756).

[28] See, for example, John Hudson, “U.S.: Saudis Can Use Cluster Bombs in Yemen, But Only if They’re Extra Careful,” Foreign Policy, 4 May 2015.

[29] US State Department, “Transcript of Department of State Daily Press Briefing,” 4 May 2015. The reporter asked, “Why is it so important to use them or to continue to sell them? Is it just a money-making thing for arms manufacturers? I mean, there are clearly a lot of problems with them. Why is it U.S. policy to sell them – to transfer them at all, given the fact that you can’t guarantee this 1 percent rate? And some might argue that even 1 percent is too much.”

[30] US State Department, “Transcript of Department of State Daily Press Briefing,” 9 September 2015.

[31] Statement of the US, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014. See also, HRW, “US: A Step Closer to Landmine Treaty,” 6 October 2014.

[32] For historical details on the use of cluster munitions by the US, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), p. 262. See also the Timeline of Use contained in Cluster Munition Monitor 2016’s Ban Policy Overview.

[33] The remnants in the photographs included images of the propulsion system, a BLU-97 submunition, and the payload ejection system, the latter of which is unique to the TLAM-D cruise missile. Amnesty International, “Images of Missile and Cluster Munitions Point to US Role in Fatal Attack in Yemen,” 7 June 2010. See also “U.S. missiles killed civilians in Yemen, rights group says,” CNN, 7 June 2010.

[34] The most recent casualty was on 24 January 2012, when a boy brought home a BLU-97 submunition that exploded, killing his father and wounding the boy and his two brothers. Those affected by the cluster munition strike on al-Ma‘jalah have not received any compensation for the casualties caused or damaged property. See HRW, “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda,” 22 October 2013.

[35] In December 2010, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable dated 21 December 2009 that acknowledged the US had a role in the 17 December strike; the cable said that Yemeni government officials “continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement, such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites, could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S.” See, “ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] looks ahead following CT operations, but perhaps not far enough,” US Department of State cable SANAA 02230 dated 21 December 2009, released by Wikileaks on 4 December 2010.

[36] Combatant Commander is the title of a major military leader of US Armed Forces, either of a large geographical region or of a particular military function, formerly known as a commander-in-chief.

[37] In September 2015, the US Department of Defense listed eight Operation Inherent Resolve coalition members conducting US-led airstrikes in Iraq: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatory Jordan and States Parties Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Netherlands, and the UK. It listed nine coalition nations participating in US-led airstrikes in Syria: Convention on Cluster Munitions non-signatories Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and UAE, as well as States Parties Australia, Canada, and France. Department of Defense, “Airstrikes Hit ISIL Terrorists in Syria, Iraq,” 30 September 2015.

[38] Email from Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Writer, The Washington Post, 27 July 2016. See also, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Despite denial, ‘growing evidence’ Russia is using cluster bombs in Syria, report says,” The Washington Post, 28 July 2016.

[39] Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2014, p. 6.

[40] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001. In other words, submunitions that reach “full rate production,” i.e. production for use in combat, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 must meet the new standard. According to an October 2004 Pentagon report to Congress on cluster munitions, submunitions procured in past yearsare exempt from the policy, but, “Future submunitions must comply with the desired goal of 99% or higher submunition functioning rate or must receive a waiver.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004, p. ii.

[41] For details on the production of cluster munitions by the US from 2005 to 2007, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 257–258; and ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada: October 2010), p. 263.

[42] For example, see US Air Force, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number PE 0602602F: Conventional Munitions,” February 2011, p. 6; US Army, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602624A: Weapons and Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 5; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602000D8Z: Joint Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 13.

[43] Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President's Budget Submission,” February 2016.

[44] See, US Department of Defense Contract Announcement, No. CR-104-15, 3 June 2015; and US Department of Defense Contract Announcement, No. CR-095-16, 19 May 2016.

[45] PAX, Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility (Utrecht, June 2016), p. 27; and PAX, Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility, Key Findings (Utrecht, June 2016), p. 8. The report identifies investments by US financial institutions in Hanwha, Orbital ATK, Poongsan, and Textron, all companies known to produce cluster munitions.

[46] US-supplied cluster munitions have been used in combat by Colombia, by Israel in Lebanon and Syria, by Morocco in Western Sahara and possibly Mauritania, by the UK and the Netherlands in the former Yugoslavia, and by the UK in Iraq. In July 2013, mine clearance operators in Yemen shared photographic evidence with the Monitor of cluster munition remnants, including several types of US-manufactured submunitions, in Saada governorate in northwestern Yemen near the border with Saudi Arabia. The contamination apparently dates from conflict in 2009–2010 between the government of Yemen and rebel Houthi forces, but it is not possible to determine definitively the actor responsible for the use.

[47] Monitor notes on Chilean air force document signed by Chair of the Joint Chief of Staff of the Air Force, “Exports of Cluster Bombs authorized in the years 1991–2001,” dated 23 June 2009, taken during Monitor meeting with Juan Pablo Jara, Desk Officer, Ministry of National Defense, Santiago, 11 April 2012.

[48] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008 (P.L. 110-161).

[49] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8).

[50] Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-117).

[51] See, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2012 (P.L. 112-74); Continuing Appropriations Resolution, 2013 (P.L. 112-175); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013 (P.L. 113-6); Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2014 (P.L. 113-76); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015 (P.L. 113-235); and Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113).

[52] It also stated that the CBU-107 Passive Attack Weapon, which contains non-explosive rods, is not captured by the ban. DSCA, “Guidance on the Sale of Cluster Munitions, DSCA Policy 11-33,” Memorandum, Washington, DC, 19 May 2011.

[53] DSCA News Release, “India – CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 08-105, Washington, DC, 30 September 2008.

[54] The contract for the sale was signed in November 2007. Textron Inc., “Q2 2010 Earnings Call Transcript,” 21 July 2010; and Textron Defense Systems, “Textron Defense Systems and UAE Armed Forces Sign Sensor Fuzed Weapon Contract,” Press Release, 13 November 2007. Also, the US Congress was notified in June 2007 of a proposed commercial sale of “technical data, defense services, and defense articles to support the sale of the Sensor Fuzed Weapons” to the UAE. Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, US Department of State to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives (Transmittal No. DDTC 017-07), 7 June 2007.

[55] DSCA news release, “Saudi Arabia – F-15SA Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 10-43, Washington, DC, 20 October 2010. The completion date for this transfer was the end of 2015. US Department of Defense Contract Announcement, No. 593-13, 20 August 2013.

[56] DSCA news release, “Saudi Arabia – CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 10-03, Washington, DC, 13 June 2011.

[57] These were to be included as associated parts in the sale of F-16A/B aircraft. DSCA news release “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – Retrofit of F-16A/B Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 11-39, 21 September 2011.

[58] Arms Sales Notification, Department of Defense, Transmittal No. 12-66, 31 December 2012.

[59] DSCA Press Release, “Republic of Korea – CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 12-23, Washington, DC, 4 June 2012; and Arms Sales Notification, Department of Defense, Transmittal No. 15-33, 21 July 2015.

[60] Arms Sales Notification, Department of Defense, Transmittal No. 13-67, 21 January 2014.

[61] Kevin Jackson, “Visit brings flashbacks for Army energy executive,” AMC, 22 April 2014.

[62] Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, from Brian P. McKeon, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 20 May 2016.

[63] HRW, “Yemen: Saudis Using US Cluster Munitions,” 6 May 2016.

[64] HRW, “Technical Briefing Note: Cluster Munition Use in Yemen,” 14 February 2016; and Amnesty International, “Children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb minefield in Yemen,” 22 May 2016.

[65] John Hudson, “White House blocks transfer of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia,” Foreign Policy, 27 May 2016.

[66] HRW, “US: Stop Providing Cluster Munitions,” 2 June 2016.

[67] Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, from Brian P. McKeon, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 20 May 2016.

[68] CMC US, “Ban all transfers, not just to Saudi Arabia,” 28 May 2016.

[69] 164 Democrats and 40 Republicans voted for the proposal, while 200 Republicans and 16 Democrats voted against it.

[70] The cluster munitions include CBU-87, CBU-58, and M77 submunitions from a ground-launched M26 rocket.

[71] Nevertheless, US officials have not confirmed whether all 1300 CBU-105s have already been transferred to Saudi Arabia.

[72] Scott Donnelly, “Setting the record straight on Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” The Providence Journal, 30 May 2016.

[73] Mary Wareham, HRW, “On Cluster Munitions, a Tentative Step Toward Sanity,” The Huffington Post, 6 June 2016.

[74] US State Department, “Transcript of Department of State Daily Press Briefing,” 3 June 2016.

[75] The 2004 report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.” Under the War Reserve Stocks for Allies program, munitions are stored in foreign countries, but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and allied forces in the event of hostilities. In 1994, the stockpile, including WRSA, consisted of 8.9 million cluster munitions containing nearly 1 billion submunitions. See US Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, “Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Study,” April 1996.

[76] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. This accounting appears to exclude holdings of TLAM-D cruise missiles, a weapon found on some US Navy surface and submarines, which deliver BLU-97 submunitions. US Navy Fact File, “Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” 14 August 2014. The 2004 Department of Defense report also does not include artillery-fired SADARM cluster munitions (thought to number 715).

[77] Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011. In a 2011 presentation to CCW delegates, the US claimed that “around two million” cluster munitions would be captured by a CCW proposal to ban the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.

[78] The statement said the US has estimated the cost of destroying the stockpile using current demilitarization capabilities at $2.2 billion. Statement of US, Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to CCW Protocol V, Geneva, 9 November 2009.

[79] Daniel Wasserbly, “Army Warhead Program to Reduce Dud Rate for Cluster Munitions,” InsideDefense.com, 21 July 2008, quoted in Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2014, p. 5.

[80] Rickey Peer, US Army, “Joint Munitions Command (JMC) Overview, Conventional Ammunition Demil Program,” Global Demil Symposium, 8 December 2015, Slide 5.

[81] Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President's Budget Submission,” February 2015.

[82] Figures and averages are compiled from annual editions of Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2012.

[83] See, General Dynamics website, “About Munition Services,” undated.

[84] On 18 February 2015, General Dynamics was awarded a $9.3 million contract to demilitarize 3,248 cluster bomb units and other high explosive cartridges. See, Department of Defense, “Contracts,” Release No. CR-031-15, 18 February 2015. On 29 August 2013, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems was awarded a $11.7 million contract for the destruction of 49,387 rounds of Improved Conventional Munitions and 5,192 Cluster Bomb Units. The contract was for $11,714,490. Department of Defense, “Contracts,” No. 625-13, 29 August 2013.

[85] Canada reported in 2015 that General Dynamics in Joplin was “one of two companies that were compliant from 6 bidders.” It stated Canada’s demilitarization strategy was to award a service contract through an open completion to a company that had demilitarized the same cluster munitions within the last five years, from US stockpiles. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2015.

[86] Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” February 2011, pp. 729–730.

[87] Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President's Budget Submission,” February 2016.

[88] The official stated: “After the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Norway discussed with the USA the issue of their stockpile of cluster munitions on Norwegian territory. Norway offered to destroy these cluster munitions together with our own stockpiles. However, the USA decided to remove their stocks, something which happened during the spring of 2010.” Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2012. According to a US cable dated 17 December 2008, the US stockpile in Norway was thought to consist of “2,544 rounds” of “D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)” and “2,528 rounds” of “D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM.” See, “Norway Raises Question Concerning US Cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08OSLO676 dated 17 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[89] Section 8 of the UK’s legislation states that its foreign secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In November 2011, UK officials stated that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory. Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, Written Answers (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1 November 2011), Column 589W.

[90]Demarche to Afghanistan on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 2 December 2010.

[91] A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, then-Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM [Cluster Munitions] in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” See, “MFA Gives Reassurances on Stockpiling of US Cluster Munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011. See also, “Demarche to Germany Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125631 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[92]Cluster Munitions: Israeli’s Operational Defensive Capabilities Crisis,” US Department of State cable 08TELAVIV1012 dated 7 May 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[93]Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011.

[94]Consultations with Japan on Implementing the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.

[95] The cable contains the text of a message sent from a US military advisor to UAE authorities concerning a transfer of “ammunition immediately via US Air Force aircraft from Kuwait stockpile to Lebanon.” About the items to be transferred, the cable states: “The United States will not approve any cluster munitions or white phosphorus.” See “Follow-up on UAE Response to Lebanese Request for Emergency Aid,” US Department of State cable 07ABUDHABI876 dated 24 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.