Summary: Non-signatory the United States (US) rarely comments publicly on the question of its accession to the convention, but in November 2015 elaborated its views upon abstaining from the vote on a UN resolution on the convention. Unlike other non-signatories, the US has never participated as an observer in a meeting of the convention. In 2015 and 2016, US officials continued to express concern about and/or condemn new use of cluster munitions, particularly in Syria.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but with the exception of a single 2009 strike in Yemen, has not used them since 2003 in Iraq. There has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in its military operation against forces of the Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq. A 2008 Department of Defense policy requires that the US not use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018.

The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007. Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales, exporting or transferring CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons to seven countries including Saudi Arabia. The CBU-105 is the only cluster munition that the US claims to meet the 1% UXO standard, although this has been called into question after documented CBU-105 failures in Yemen from Saudi-led coalition attacks. US export law requires that recipients of US cluster munitions must agree not to use them in civilian areas, but evidence of civilian harm from cluster munition attacks by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen since April 2015 has raised questions about whether this requirement is being met. The US suspended cluster munition deliveries to Saudi Arabia in May 2016.

The US appears to have made significant progress in removing cluster munitions from its active stockpile and destroying them through demilitarization, though there is a lack of detailed information from the Department of Defense on the process.

Policy

The United States of America has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The US has privately acknowledged the “important contributions” made by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but its government officials—from political leaders to diplomatic representatives—rarely comment publicly on the question of US accession to the convention.[1] However in November 2015, the US articulated its views in brief remarks explaining why it abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[2] A total of 139 states including many non-signatories voted in favor of this non-binding resolution on 7 December2015, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[3] Only Russia and Zimbabwe voted against it.

According to the statement delivered by US disarmament representative, Ambassador Robert Wood, the US abstained because it considered the resolution as only being applicable to states that are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and “the United States is not a party to this convention and as such is not bound by its provisions.”

The statement asserts that cluster munitions remain “an integral part of U.S. force capabilities.” It finds that cluster munitions “with a low unexploded ordnance, UXO, rate provide key advantages against certain types of legitimate military targets and can produce less collateral damage than high explosive, unitary weapons” when “used properly in accordance with international humanitarian law.”

The US statement highlights the July 2008 Department of Defense policy directive on cluster munitions issued under President George W. Bush that the Obama administration has continued to implement without review or amendment. According to this policy, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% UXO rate.[4] The statement also explained how “the United States does not transfer cluster munitions to other countries except those that meet the 1% UXO rate” in accordance with US law.

The US noted that “the lawfulness of the use of a type of weapon under international law…depends upon whether the weapon is prohibited” and concluded:

The United States does not accept by this or any other standard that the Convention on Cluster Munitions represents an emerging norm or reflects customary international law that would prohibit the use of cluster munitions in armed conflict.

The US Department of State’s website section on cluster munitions states that the US sees “demonstrated military utility” in cluster munitions, asserts their “elimination from U.S. stockpiles would put lives of its soldiers and those of its coalition partners at risk,” and claims that “cluster munitions can often result in much less collateral damage than unitary weapons.”[5]

According to a US Department of Defense “Laws of War Manual” issued in June 2015, “the United States has determined that its national security interests cannot be fully consistent with the terms of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.”[6] In a May 2016 letter, a senior Department of Defense official stated that:

The Department recognizes that the use of cluster munitions requires careful consideration prior to employment but sees cluster munitions as legitimate weapons with clear military utility. They are effective weapons, providing distinct advantages against a range of targets. When they are used correctly in the appropriate circumstances, they can result in less collateral damage than most unitary weapons.[7]

The US is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and opposed the negotiation of a legally binding CCW protocol on cluster munitions until June 2007, after the Oslo Process to create the Convention on Cluster Munitions got underway.[8] The US then became one of the most ardent proponents of a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions, working intensively to forge agreement on a draft text. That initiative ended in November 2011, when states at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference failed to reach consensus on adopting a draft cluster munitions protocol.[9] Since 2011, the US has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions. The Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.[10]

The US did not participate, not even as an observer, in the 2007–2008 diplomatic Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[11] However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the process in order to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[12] According to the Congressional Research Service report, “U.S. officials were concerned that early versions of the [draft treaty text] would prevent military forces from non-states parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations.”[13]

The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015.

The US appears to have made significant progress in the implementation of the 2008 policy, despite a lack of public information from the Department of Defense (see Use, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling sections below). Under the policy, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” had to be removed from active inventories not later than 19 June 2009 and demilitarized as soon as practicable.[14]

Recent Congressional initiatives concerning US policy and practice on cluster munitions include:

• On 16 June 2016 an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act introduced by Representatives John Conyers (D-MI), Raul Grijalva (D-AZ), Keith Ellison (D-MN), and Jim McGovern (D-MA) to prevent US funds from being used “to transfer or authorize the transfer of any cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia,” was narrowly defeated in the US House of Representatives by a vote of 204 to 216.[15]
• On 6 January 2015, US Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) and Senator Patrick D. Leahy (D-Vermont) reintroduced the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act, Bill S. 28, while Representative Jim McGovern (D-Massachusetts) reintroduced the House equivalent, H.R. 157. The legislation reflects the US policy that comes into effect at the end of 2018 prohibiting US use of cluster munitions to munitions that result in 1% or more UXO, but goes further by prohibiting their use in areas where civilians are known to be present.[16] The legislation, which also requires a clearance plan if the US uses cluster munitions, was referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.

US NGOs continue to campaign for the US to ban cluster munitions and accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[17] The Cluster Munition Coalition US has called for the 2008 policy on cluster munitions to be reviewed with the objective of identifying and overcoming any remaining obstacles to US accession to the convention.[18] The CMC has warned the US against using cluster munitions in any military operation in Syria and called on it to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[19]

Responses to new use of cluster munitions

In the course of 2015 and the first half of 2016, the US continued to make statements and support resolutions expressing concern at or condemning new use of cluster munitions:

• On 23 March 2016, the US voted in favor of a Human Rights Council resolution that “condemns the Syrian authorities’ use of…cluster munitions.” It voted for five previous Human Rights Council resolutions in 2014 and 2015 that contained similar language condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[20]
• On 16 March 2016, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution condemning the “unlawful and indiscriminate violence against civilian populations” perpetrated by the Syrian government including its use of cluster munitions.[21]
• On 9 February 2016, Secretary of State John Kerry expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, which he said is “killing innocent women and children.”[22]
• On 23 December 2015, the US voted in favor of a UNGA resolution condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria. It voted for three previous UNGA resolutions in 2013–2014 containing similar language condemning cluster munition use in Syria.[23]
• On 21 October 2015, an Operation Inherent Resolve spokesperson criticized apparent Russian use of cluster munitions in Syria, stating that “attacks using these imprecise weapons only continue to cause unnecessary suffering.”[24] On 28 October, Colonel Steve Warren called Russia’s use of cluster munitions in Syria “irresponsible,” adding that “these munitions have a high dud rate, they can…hurt civilians, and they’re just, you know, not good.”[25] On 29 June 2015, the US voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that also expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and called on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate.”[26]

On 17 March 2015, Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-Maryland) reintroduced the Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act, which “strongly condemns the…targeting of civilian populations…with cluster bombs.” The bill passed a vote in the Senate by unanimous consent on 14 July 2015.[27] As of 20 July 2016, it was still being considered by the House of Representatives. The use of cluster munitions in Yemen since a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states began its military operation in late March 2015 has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations.[28] Since May 2015, State Department officials have repeated that the US is looking at reports that the coalition has used US cluster munitions and said “we share the concerns regarding unintended harm to civilians caused by the use of cluster munitions.”[29]

On 9 September 2015, in response to questions about Saudi coalition attacks in Yemen involving the use of US-supplied cluster munitions, State Department spokesperson John Kirby said that “there is an end-use requirement there for how they’re used,” and that “we have vehicles at our disposal should they not be used appropriately.”[30] In May 2016, amid further reports of cluster munition use in civilian areas in Yemen, the White House placed a hold on cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia (see Transfer section below).

The US is not a party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty, but in June 2014, the Obama administration announced an immediate ban on US production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines and a ban on US use of antipersonnel mines, except in Korea.[31] The White House described the new policy as part of a package of measures to enable future US accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since 2009, the US has become a regular observer at Mine Ban Treaty meetings.

Use

The US used cluster munitions in Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); Iraq (2003); and Yemen (2009).[32]

The last time the US used cluster munitions was on 17 December 2009, when at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, were used in attack on an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” at al-Ma‘jalah in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen that killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children.[33] Cluster munition remnants were never cleared and have killed four more civilians and wounded 13 others since the attack, most recently in January 2012.[34] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly responded to the reported use and neither has denied US responsibility for the attack.[35]

Until the policy requiring the use of cluster munitions that result in 1% or less UXO comes into effect at the end of 2018, any cluster munition use that exceeds the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[36] There does not appear to have been any US use of cluster munitions since Yemen in December 2009.

There has been no evidence to indicate that the US or its partners have used cluster munitions in the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition operation against the non-state armed group of Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014.[37] A spokesperson for the US Air Forces Central Command informed The Washington Post on 26 July 2016 that: “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[38]

The US has provided logistical and other support to the Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that has used cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015.

A 2014 Congressional Research Service report that found the US has not used cluster munitions since 2003 suggested that, “For subsequent military operations, where cluster munitions would otherwise have been the weapon of choice, Congress might review what types of weapons were substituted in place of cluster munitions and how effective they were in achieving the desired tactical results.”[39]

Production

Since 2005, all submunitions produced by the US must have a failure rate of less than 1%, according to policy issued in 2001 by Secretary of Defense William Cohen.[40] The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.[41] Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales (see Transfer section below).

In the past, before the adoption of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.

The Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense continue research and development activities at the applied research level to develop alternatives to cluster munitions as well as improve the reliability of existing submunitions and develop new types of submunitions.[42]

The Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW) is one weapon the Army is developing to replace cluster munitions. The Department of Defense’s 2017 budget includes funds to support the acquisition of 1,068 GMLRS-AW, with a total procurement objective of 43,560 warheads.[43] Lockheed Martin, the prime contractor, is also under contract with the US Army to produce 740 GMLRS-AW for foreign military sales.[44]

A 2016 report by PAX identifies 74 US financial institutions that hold investments in companies known to produce cluster munitions. Of the 10 largest investors worldwide, eight are US-based institutions.[45]

Transfer

While the historical record is incomplete, in the past the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United Kingdom (UK).[46] In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided information showing a transfer to the US in 1991 of one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb.[47]

The US first instituted a moratorium on the export or transfer of cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO standard in a 2007 appropriations bill at the initiative of Senator Leahy. The moratorium was extended the following year as the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, but again the restrictions only applied to that fiscal year.[48] The 2009 Omnibus Appropriations Act contained similar restrictions as the previous appropriations bills; it prohibited the provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”[49]

The same export moratorium language was included in the 2010 Consolidated Appropriations Act signed into law by President Obama on 16 December 2009.[50] Similar export moratorium language has been included in the annual budget in each subsequent year.[51]

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—the US government agency that administers weapons transfers—issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the memorandum, “the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).”[52]

Recent sales and deliveries

Congressional notifications show that since 2008 the US has concluded agreements to sell CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons to seven countries:

• India (510 CBU-105 announced in 2008 for estimated $375 million)[53]
• UAE (an unknown number of CBU-105 announced in 2007)[54]
• Saudi Arabia (1,300 CBU-105 announced in 2010)[55]
• Saudi Arabia (404 CBU-105 announced in 2011)[56]
• Taiwan (64 CBU-105 announced in 2011)[57]
• Oman (32 CBU-105 announced in 2012)[58]
• South Korea (367 CBU-105 announced 2012 and 2 CBU-105 announced in 2015)[59]
• Singapore (3 CBU-105 announced in 2014).[60]

CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon are manufactured for each sales order by Textron Systems Corporation of Wilmington, Massachusetts in accordance with the delivery schedule. Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) in Hopkins, Minnesota makes the rocket motor specifically for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapon. While Textron is the manufacturer, the CBU-105 is assembled at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant, described as the Department of Defense's “premier bomb and warhead loading facility.”[61]

In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official stated that the end-use provision of its 2012 agreement with Saudi Arabia and “in a handful of other cases…is incomplete.” The provision states that the purchaser agree the CBU-105 “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present” but failed to include the rest of the legislatively-mandated phrase “or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.” According to the official, the Department of Defense is currently pursuing an amendment to the agreement to “remedy this specific error.”[62]

The first use of US-manufactured and -supplied CBU-105s by a recipient in 2015 and the first half of 2016 has raised questions about whether the transfer requirements are being met. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has documented six instances of CBU-105 use in Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition since April 2015. In at least three attacks, it found that some submunitions or “skeet” did not disperse from the BLU-108 canister or dispersed but did not explode, failing to function as intended and exceeding the 1% UXO rate.[63] Furthermore, Amnesty International and HRW have both documented cluster munition use by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in areas in which civilians are known to be present.[64] None of these documented CBU-105 attacks in Yemen have involved armored vehicles, nor have damaged or destroyed armored vehicles been documented at the strike locations.

In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended transfers of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen. According to Foreign Policy, a senior US official said the administration acknowledged reports that the weapons had been used “in areas in which civilians are alleged to have been present or in the vicinity” and added, “We take such concerns seriously and are seeking additional information.”[65] While the suspension decision has not been issued publicly by the Obama administration, Human Rights Watch independently confirmed it with senior White House and Congressional contacts.[66]

In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official confirmed that “Saudi Arabia has purchased and received 1,300 CBU-105 munitions.” He said a request by Saudi Arabia for an additional 404 CBU-105s notified to Congress in June 2011 “is currently under review.” The official affirmed that, “Saudi Arabia has not violated end-use provisions related to the sale or transfer of U.S.-manufactured cluster munitions based on recent U.S. assessments.” The official noted Saudi Arabia’s acknowledgment that it used CBU-105s once in Yemen, in April 2015. However, he also said, “The Department is aware of the Saudi-led coalition’s alleged use of cluster munitions in armed conflict in Yemen, including in areas in which civilians are alleged to have been present or in the vicinity.”[67]

The US CMC welcomed the decision to suspend US cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia and called for it to be made permanent and extended to cover all cluster munition transfers to any country.[68] Local activists in Providence, Rhode Island have been demonstrating at Textron’s company headquarters since April 2016, demanding that it cease its production of cluster munitions. On 16 June 2016, a congressional legislative amendment to prevent US funds from being used “to transfer or authorize the transfer of any cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia” was narrowly defeated by a vote of 204 to 216.[69]

The Saudi-led coalition has used three other types of US-made cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO rate and are no longer exported by the US, but it is not known when the munitions were acquired.[70] In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official said that, “The United States has not conditioned the sale of new cluster munitions on a recipient foreign country’s commitment to retire older cluster munitions after 2018.”[71] He also said the Department of Defense, “does not have full knowledge of which countries maintain [cluster munition] stockpiles.”

According to the 2008 policy, before 2018 the Department of Defense “may, consistent with U.S. law and policy, seek to transfer cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO rate provided that the receiving foreign government agrees not to use these cluster munitions after 2018.” It is unclear what, if any, transfers have occurred under this provision.

In May 2016, the CEO of Textron responded to questions raised by the use of the CBU-105s in Yemen. He found that “in the event that any individual munition does not identify a target the munition is disabled either by self-destructing in the air or by disarming itself on the ground.” He said that the presence of remnants “demonstrates that a munition did not locate a target vehicle while in the air, and then disarmed itself on the ground—exactly as designed and with no threat to civilians.”[72]

Yet as HRW has pointed out “a dud must still be considered hazardous regardless of the technical fix.”[73] That means they should not be handled or approached by anyone other than a trained technician. As the 2008 policy states, “self-deactivated submunitions will still be considered UXO.”

On 3 June 2016, a State Department spokesperson told press that the US has “reminded the Saudis of their obligations under end use provisions” required with respect to US-supplied cluster munitions.[74]

Stockpiling

An October 2004 Department of Defense report to the US Congress detailed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types containing about 728.5 million submunitions, as listed in the following table. However, that number does not appear to be a full account of cluster munitions available to US forces, as it apparently does not include US cluster munitions stocks located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[75]

US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[76]

The 2004 list remains the most detailed public account of US cluster munition stocks. In the period since the US provided slightly amended totals, but no detailed breakdown. In 2011, it stated the stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[77] In 2009, a US official said the stockpile was comprised of “more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions.”[78]

According to one report, “the Pentagon estimates that ‘upward of 80 percent of U.S. cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile.’”[79]

Stockpile destruction

When it issued the 2008 policy, the Department of Defense committed to destroy more than 99.9% of its cluster munition stocks by the end of 2018, as only a tiny fraction of stocks—the CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons—meet the less than 1% percent failure rate requirement.

The 2008 policy required that the services and combatant commands remove all cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements from the active inventory by June 2009. It is unclear if the US completed the process of removing cluster munitions from the active stockpile by this date, as the Department of Defense has provided limited information on the process or the cluster munitions being demilitarized for eventual destruction.

A December 2015 presentation by a US Army stated that there are currently, 136,000 tons of cluster munitions in the demilitarization account (B5A), which it said represents 28% of the total demilitarization stockpile.[80] It did not indicate the type, but described the munitions as “rounds,” which indicates artillery-delivered DPICM. According to the presentation, an additional 272,000 tons “remain in service accounts which would require disposal.”

These numbers indicate a total of 408,000 tons of US cluster munitions are being demilitarized for destruction under the 2008 policy directive. By comparison, Germany stockpiled the highest number of cluster munition stocks of any State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions prior to completing destruction in November 2015. It destroyed 573,000 cluster munitions and 62 million submunitions, which is the equivalent of approximately 50,000 tons or 12% of total US stockpile.

Previously, in February 2015, the army disclosed that 474,726 tons of cluster munitions were being destroyed: “approximately 221,502 tons of cluster munitions in the demil [demilitarization account] stockpile” and “an additional 250,224 tons are expected to be added into the [demilitarization account] no later than FY 2018 to ensure compliance with the Cluster Munitions Policy.”[81]

Between 2000 and 2012, the US destroyed 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) on average per year, at an annual cost of $7.2 million.[82]

US company General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems describes its US-based demilitarization facility as “the largest cluster munitions disposal facility in the world.”[83] In 2013 and 2015, the company was awarded contracts to demilitarize US cluster munitions and other weapons.[84] In June 2014, General Dynamics completed the destruction of Canada’s stockpile of 12,597 M483A1 projectiles and 1,108,536 DPICM submunitions at its facility outside Joplin, Missouri.[85]

Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The Army requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[86]

In February 2016, the army announced its plan to modify 183 expired ATACM missiles, replacing the warheads with unitary weapons compliant with the 2008 policy.[87]

Foreign stockpiling and transit

The US appears to have removed its cluster munition stocks from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[88] The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[89]

US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks show that the US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in a number of countries, including Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait:

• In Afghanistan, the “United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions,” according to a December 2008 cable.[90]
• Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany, according to a December 2008 cable.[91]
• In Israel, US cluster munitions are “considered to be under U.S. title” until they are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime. A cable on the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG) states that “U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[92]
• Italy, Spain, and Qatar are identified in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[93]
• Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them,” according to a December 2008 cable.[94]
• The US might be storing clusters munitions in Kuwait, according to a May 2007 cable.[95]

Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

The US expressed its intent to accede to the treaty in September 2014, when President Barack Obama said, “We’re going to continue to work to find ways that would allow us to ultimately comply fully and accede to the Ottawa Convention.”[1]

During 2014, the US announced new landmine policy measures banning US production and acquisition of antipersonnel mines as well as halting US use of the weapons outside of the Korean Peninsula. Officials also articulated a new aspiration for the US to accede to the treaty, with one describing the fact “we are now articulating our desire to be able to accede” as a notable policy adjustment.[2]

On the occasion of the 4 April 2015 International Day for Mine Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, Secretary of State John Kerry said the 2014 policy steps "reflect America’s continued commitment to a powerful global humanitarian movement that has helped prevent the loss of innocent lives” and said they have “brought us one step closer to the goal of a world free from anti-personnel landmines.”[3] Kerry affirmed, “we continue our efforts to pursue solutions that may ultimately allow us to accede to…the international treaty that prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.”

The US has reiterated its 2014 landmine policy several times since it was announced. At the Convention on Conventional Weapons in November 2014, the US said it will continue to find ways that will enable it to comply with and ultimately accede to the Mine Ban Treaty.[4] In late March 2015, the US reported that it is “aligning our APL [antipersonnel landmine] policy outside the Korean Peninsula with the key requirements of the Ottawa Convention.”[5] A Department of State fact sheet issued for 2015 Mine Action Day referred to the “ultimate goal” of US accession to the Mine Ban Treaty.[6]

The 2014 policy was announced in two parts. A 23 September 2014 policy announcement committed the US to not use antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and not to assist, encourage, or induce other nations to use, stockpile, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines outside of Korea.[7] This followed a 27 June 2014 policy foreswearing future production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines that also announced a Defense Department study or “high fidelity modeling and simulation effort” of alternatives to antipersonnel mines to “ascertain how to mitigate the risks associated with the loss” of antipersonnel mines.[8]

The 2014 policy announcement followed more than two decades of efforts by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and NGOs organized under the US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL). The US was the first country to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines in September 1994 and it participated in the Ottawa Process that led to the creation of the treaty, but did not sign it in 1997. The Clinton administration set the goal of joining in 2006. However, in 2004 the Bush administration announced a new policy that rejected both the treaty and the goal of the US ever joining.[9]

It is unclear if President Obama will announce further measures before leaving office in January 2017. The USCBL has urged President Obama to prepare and send the accession package for the Mine Ban Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.[10]

It is not known how the 2014 landmine policy will be codified, but previous landmine policies announced in 1996, 1998, and 2004 were all issued as presidential directives.

Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference in Cartagena in 2009, the US has attended every Meeting of States Parties as an observer, as well as the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and intersessional meetings in June 2015.

On 11 December 2014, the US abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 69/34 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has done since 1997. It was one of only 17 countries to abstain.

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It submitted its annual national report for Amended Protocol II on 26 March 2015, as required under Article 13. The report states that the 2014 policy steps taken by the US “are not required under Amended Protocol II” and confirms that antipersonnel mines stockpiled for use in Korea “remain compliant with the technical specifications required” of the protocol.[11]

Use

The Monitor has long reported that the last confirmed US use of antipersonnel mines was in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991.[12] However, as part of the June 27 policy announcement, the US acknowledged using one antipersonnel mine in Afghanistan in 2002.[13] There were reports in 2009 and 2010 of US forces in Afghanistan using Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[14] However, these munitions are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty if used in command-detonated mode.[15]

The US continues to stockpile antipersonnel landmines for use in Korea. According to the 2014 policy, “the unique circumstances on the Korean Peninsula and our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea preclude us from changing our anti-personnel landmine policy there at this time.”

Two concerns regarding Korea have emerged as sticking points during the US policy review. One relates to the arrangement for a joint combined command structure that would put a US general in charge of South Korean military forces in the event of active hostilities, and the potential problems that might cause if the US were party to the Mine Ban Treaty but South Korea were not. In October 2014, US and South Korean officials agreed to delay return of wartime control of South Korean forces to its government until those forces are better prepared to deter North Korea.[16] A second concern is the possible need for the US to use antipersonnel mines in the event of an invasion by North Korea.

The landmines already emplaced in and near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea are the responsibility of South Korean forces and not the US. In August 2015, tensions between North and South Korea rose after South Korea and the UN Command in South Korea alleged that North Korea laid antipersonnel landmines in the southern section of the DMZ that maimed two South Korean soldiers on patrol on 4 August.[17] Major General Koo Hong-mo of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff described the mine-laying incident as “unthinkable for a normal military.”[18]

Numerous retired military officers have questioned the utility of antipersonnel landmines in South Korea and elsewhere, citing the overwhelming technological superiority of other weapons in the US-South Korean arsenal in comparison with North Korea’s as sufficient to compensate for not using mines. In addition, a former commander of US forces in South Korea, the late Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth, said in 1997 that antipersonnel landmines’ “minimal” utility to US forces is “offset by the difficulty…[they] pose to our brand of mobile warfare…Not only civilians, but US armed forces, will benefit from a ban on landmines. US forces in Korea are no exception.”[19]

The need for the Department of Defense study has been questioned by the USCBL, which stated that for more than a decade “the US has spent more than one billion dollars on the development and production of systems that could be considered alternatives to antipersonnel mines.”[20] A New York Times editorial on the 2014 policy observed, “the Pentagon could easily draw up plans for South Korea that exclude American landmines.”[21]

Transfer

US law has prohibited all antipersonnel mine exports since 23 October 1992, through a series of multi-year extensions of the moratorium.[22]

Before 1992, the US exported antipersonnel landmines including more than 5.6 million antipersonnel mines to 38 countries between 1969 and 1992. Deminers in at least 28 mine-affected countries have reported the presence of US-manufactured antipersonnel mines, including non-self-destructing and self-destructing/self-deactivating types.

Production

The last US antipersonnel mines were produced in 1997.[23] The US prohibited production of antipersonnel mines in 2014. Under the policy, the US has foresworn future production or acquisition of antipersonnel landmines.[24] Officials also said the Defense Department would conduct a detailed study of alternatives to antipersonnel mines and the impact of making no further use of the weapon. No more information has been released on the study or its status, as of October 2015.

No victim-activated munitions have been funded in the procurement or the research and development budgets of the US Armed Services or Defense Department in years. Related programs on the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition and the IMS Scorpion once had the potential for victim-activated features (thereby making them antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty), but were made to be strictly “man-in-the-loop” or command-detonated and therefore permissible under the treaty.[25]

Stockpiling

As part of the 2014 policy announcements, the Department of Defense disclosed that the US has an “active stockpile of just more than 3 million anti-personnel mines in the inventory.”[26] This represents a significant reduction from the previous total reported in 2002 of approximately 10.4 million antipersonnel mines.[27]

The US stockpile consists mostly of remotely-delivered mines that are scattered over wide areas by aircraft or tube artillery and equipped with self-destruct features designed to blow the mine up after a pre-set period of time, as well as self-deactivating features. The active stockpile consists of the following types and quantities:

US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in 2010[28]

Note: * The accounting for GATOR includes CBU-89 [22], CBU-104 [22], and CBU-78 [15] air-dropped bombs.

The shelf-life of existing antipersonnel mines stockpiled by the US decreases over time in part because batteries embedded inside the mines deteriorate as they age. The new policy precludes the US from extending or modifying the life of the batteries inside the existing stockpile.[29]

A Defense Department spokesperson stated in 2014 that the existing antipersonnel mine stocks “will start to decline in their ability to be used about [sic]—starting in about 10 years. And in 10 years after that, they’ll be completely unusable.”[30]

Stockpile destruction

The 2014 policy commits the US to destroy its antipersonnel mine stockpiles “not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea.” In April 2015, Secretary of State Kerry said the US “will begin destroying its anti-personnel landmine stockpiles not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea.”[31]

All US stocks of weapons containing antipersonnel mines as well as munitions containing a mix of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines that are not required for Korea must be removed from stocks located in the US, on supply ships, and in storage facilities overseas, then transported to a destruction facility.

Greater transparency is needed on the types and quantities of antipersonnel landmines to be destroyed and their inventory status as well as on implementation of the 2014 policy’s stockpile destruction requirement, including timeline and cost.[32] While no overview is publicly available, it appears that US antipersonnel mines stocks not required for Korea are being destroyed.

In December 2014, the US Army announced that Expal USA—the US subsidiary of Spanish defense company Expal—had won a contract to destroy Gator and Volcano mines at its facility in Marshall, Texas.[33] The contract’s estimated completion date is June 2020 according to Maxam, the multinational company that owns Expal.[34]

To destroy the ADAM mines, the US Army contracted General Atomics to build a special “munitions cryofracture demilitarization facility” at the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma.[35] The mines are destroyed through disassembly and then a cryofracture process that “freezes, fractures, punches, and exposes the energetic material prior to delivering it to the incineration system,” a rotary kiln furnace.[36]

Since 2011, at least 96 M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munitions and 40 M74 antipersonnel mines as well as other “problematic munitions” have been destroyed in a static detonation chamber built to destroy US stocks of chemical weapons.[37]

Retention

In 2011, the US said a small quantity of “persistent mines” (non self-destructing) had been retained for demining and counter-mine testing and training.[38]

In 2015, the United States (US) contributed more than $119 million to 33 countries (21 States Parties, 11 states not party, and one signatory) and one area.[1]

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lao PDR received the largest contributions, with a combined total of $54.7 million, representing 46% of total US funding in 2015.

US support to mine action was distributed among the following regions: East and South Asia and the Pacific ($53.3 million, 45%), the Middle East and North Africa ($33 million, 28%), Sub-Saharan Africa ($13.9 million, 12%), Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia ($13.5 million, 11%), and the Americas ($5.5 million, 4%).

The US allocates the majority of its mine action funding through the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). Additional funding is allocated through the Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID.

Contributions by recipient: 2015

From 2011–2015, the US contribution for mine action totaled approximately $617 million, with an annual contribution averaging $123 million; this represents one-quarter more than the $497.5 million provided in the previous five-year period from 2006–2010.[2]

It is the seventh consecutive year that the US support has totaled more than $100 million.

Summary of contributions: 2011–2015[3]

In 2016, the US announced new funding to support mine action efforts in:

• Colombia: as part of the Global Demining Initiative, co-led with Norway, which aims at mobilizing funding to support demining efforts in Colombia. The US made a pledge of $36 million for 2017;[4]
• Iraq: in July, at the Pledging Conference in Support of Iraq in Washington, the US announced $45 million in new funding over 2016–2017 to support humanitarian clearance operations in Iraq;[5] and,
• Lao PDR: in September, the US announced it would provide $90 million over three years to support unexploded ordinance (UXO) survey and clearance operations as well as victim assistance projects.[6]