Summary: Non-signatory Yemen said in May 2016 that it is considering acceding to the convention after becoming contaminated by cluster munition remnants during the previous year. Yemen has participated in the convention’s annual meetings, most recently in 2014. It abstained from voting on a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. Yemen is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but apparently used cluster munitions in 2009 and may still have a stockpile.

Since 26 March 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition has conducted a military operation in Yemen against Ansar Allah (Houthi forces) that has seen at least 19 cluster munition attacks involving the use of seven types of air-delivered and ground-launched cluster munitions from three countries.

Policy 

The Republic of Yemen has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Yemen has expressed support for the ban on cluster munitions, but did not comment on its position on joining the convention until May 2016, when a government representative told a diplomatic conference that Yemen is considering accession due to new contamination from recent use of cluster munitions by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states.[1]

Yemen abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 7 December 2015, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[2] Yemen did not explain why it abstained on the non-binding resolution that 139 states voted to adopt, including many non-signatories.

Yemen participated in two meetings of the Oslo Process that produced the convention (Lima in May 2007 and Belgrade in October 2007) and expressed its support for work to prohibit cluster munitions.[3] It did not attend the negotiations of the convention in Dublin in May 2008 or the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008.[4]

Yemen participated as an observer in the convention’s annual Meetings of States Parties in 2011 and 2013–2014, as well as intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2013. It was invited to, but did not attend the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015.

Yemen has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2015.[5]

Yemen is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Yemen is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Evidence that came to light in 2013 and 2014 (detailed below) indicates that Yemen likely used RBK-series cluster bombs in 2009. It may still have a stockpile of the weapons.

Jane’s Information Group reported in 2004 that KMG-U dispensers that deploy submunitions are in service with the country’s air force.[6] Moldova exported 13 220mm Uragan multi-barrel rocket launch systems to Yemen in 1994, and Yemen possesses Grad 122mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers, but it is not known if the ammunition for these weapons includes versions with submunition payloads.[7]

Use

On 26 March 2015, a Saudi Arabia-led coalition began a military operation in Yemen against Ansar Allah (Houthi forces) that was continuing as of 31 July 2016, despite a 10 April 2016 ceasefire agreement.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International have documented evidence of at least 19 cluster munition attacks in the conflict involving the use of seven types of air-delivered and ground-launched cluster munitions from three countries, as the following table shows.

Cluster munitions used in Yemen since April 2015[8]

None of the states participating in the Saudi Arabia-led coalition—Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Pakistan, Qatar, Sudan, UAE—are party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

HRW could not determine who used ground-launched cluster munitions containing “ZP-39” submunitions in Saada in April 2015, but Saudi Arabia and Houthi forces both possess rocket launchers and tube artillery capable of delivering them.[9]

The first recorded cluster munition attack occurred at al-Shaaf in the western part of Saada governorate according to a video uploaded to YouTube on 17 April 2015.[10] A subsequent visit by HRW researchers to al-Amar village, 30 kilometers south of Saada City, confirmed a cluster munition attack on 27 April, including the presence of explosive remnants.[11] The most recently-recorded cluster munition attack was on 15 February 2016 at a cement factory in Amran governornate. These three attacks all involved the use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, the only cluster munition that the US now exports, and only on the condition that they are not used in civilian areas.[12] Both Saudi Arabia and UAE have received CBU-105s from the US.

In Yemen, HRW has found at least three instances in which CBU-105s malfunctioned as their “skeet” or submunitions did not disperse from the BLU-108 canister and did not explode.[13] Under existing US policy, the CBU-105 is required to have a failure rate of less than 1%. HRW also documented evidence showing CBU-105s were used in or near civilian areas, also in apparent violation of US export law.[14]

In August 2015, HRW published the results of a research investigation in northwestern Hajja governorate, which borders Saudi Arabia, showing at least seven cluster munition rocket attacks by coalition forces from late April to mid-July 2015 that claimed dozens of civilian casualties.[15]

On 6 January 2016, coalition forces dropped a US-made CBU-58 cluster bomb containing BLU-63 submunitions on Yemen’s capital Sanaa in an attack documented by HRW, The New York Times, The Washington Post, and others.[16] Markings on the bomb remnants indicate that it was manufactured in 1978. In Saada, HRW and VICE News also documented coalition use of notoriously harmful BLU-97 submunitions delivered by CBU-87 cluster bombs.[17]

Amnesty International researchers documented the use of two types of cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015, apparently by coalition forces. It found the remnants of a Brazil-made ASTROS II cluster munition rocket in Saada from a 27 October 2015 attack, and in May 2016 confirmed the presence of United Kingdom (UK)-made BL-755 cluster munitions remnants in al-Khadra village in Hajja governorate.[18]

Responses to the cluster munition use

In May 2016, Yemen informed a meeting of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that its mine clearance program has been set back by the conflict since March 2015, which has generated new contamination, including from cluster munition remnants.[19]

The government of Saudi Arabia still has not issued a formal statement to confirm or deny the reports that the Saudi-led coalition used cluster munitions multiple times in Yemen.[20] Its principle military spokesperson Brig. Gen. Ahmed Asiri has admitted in media interviews to one instance of use of CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in April 2015 in Hajja governorate, but argued it was not in a populated area and they are not prohibited weapons.[21] In February 2016, The New York Times reported that Saudi officials continue to deny ordering the use of cluster munitions in Yemen.[22]

The UAE has denied using CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons in Yemen.[23] No other coalition member has commented on the coalition’s use of cluster munition in Yemen or responded to a CMC letter calling for an end to the use.

US officials have indicated the US is aware that Saudi Arabia has used cluster munitions in Yemen, including CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons, which are banned by the Convention on Cluster Munitions as they fall under the convention’s definition of a cluster munition.[24] In late May 2016, the Obama administration suspended US cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen.[25]

The use of BL-755 cluster munitions in Yemen marks the first documented use of UK-made cluster munitions since the Convention on Cluster Munitions, to which the UK is party, entered into force in 2010. The UK has denied Saudi use of cluster munitions in Yemen. On 24 May 2016, the UK’s then-Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond told parliament that “there is no evidence yet that Saudi Arabia has used cluster munitions” in Yemen.[26] The UK’s last transfer of BL-755 cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia was in 1989.[27] At the First Review Conference, the UK led an unsuccessful attempt with the support of Australia and Canada to weaken language in the draft Dubrovnik Declaration condemning any use of cluster munitions by any actor.[28]

Brazil has not commented on the evidence that its ASTROS cluster munition rockets have been used by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. In May 2016, HRW provided Brazilian government officials with the research findings, including photographs received from local activists in Hajja governorate that show unexploded submunitions from the rocket attacks.[29]

Since the convention’s intersessional meetings in June 2015, states have continued to express concern at or condemn new use of cluster munitions in Yemen.[30]

At the First Review Conference in September 2015, States Parties adopted the Dubrovnik Declaration, which affirms: “We are deeply concerned by any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, including in Cambodia, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen. We condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[31]

On 12 January 2016, the Netherlands in its capacity as president of the convention’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties expressed its deep concern at reported cluster munition use in Yemen.[32] At the Conference on Disarmament on 29 February 2016, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs Bert Koenders said he was “deeply concerned about reports of the use of cluster munitions in the Yemen conflict” and called on all countries to “refrain from using cluster munitions.”[33]

Previously, Costa Rica as president of the convention’s Fifth Meeting of States Parties and Croatia as president of the First Review Conference both condemned the use of cluster munitions in Yemen.[34]

The UN, the ICRC, and the CMC have condemned the use of cluster munitions in Yemen. On 25 February 2016, the European Parliament (EP) adopted another resolution condemning the Saudi-led coalition airstrikes in Yemen, including the use of cluster bombs. It adopted a similar resolution on 9 July 2015.[35]

Previous use 

Saudi Arabia and the US, and likely the Yemeni government, used cluster munitions in separate attacks in Yemen in 2009.

In late 2009, in Yemen’s Saada governorate, the Saudi Air Force conducted airstrikes and Saudi armed forces intervened on the ground after fighting between the government of Yemen and Ansar Allah intensified and spilled over the border with Saudi Arabia. In July 2013, the Monitor reviewed photographs taken by clearance operators in Saada governorate showing the remnants of unexploded BLU-97 and BLU-61 submunitions as well as DPICM submunitions of an unknown origin.[36] Remnants of CBU-52 cluster bombs were filmed near Saada City.[37] In addition, the Houthi administration in Saada provided VICE News with photographs showing remnants of Soviet-made RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh cluster bombs and associated antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions.[38] Yemen’s Soviet-supplied aircraft are capable of delivering Soviet-made RBK cluster bombs.

On 17 December 2009, the US used at least five ship- or submarine-launched TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, to attack a “terrorist group” training camp in al-Ma‘jalah in the al-Mahfad district of Abyan governorate in southern Yemen. The attack killed 55 people, including 41 civilians living in a Bedouin camp.[39] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly responded to confirm or deny the use.[40] The US has never exported the TLAM-D cruise missile.

A 2010 report of the Yemeni parliament’s investigation into the attack called on the Yemeni government to investigate and “hold accountable those found guilty” of “mistakes that were made causing the deaths of…innocent victims.”[41] The government of Yemen accepted the report’s findings in 2010, but does not appear to have implemented the recommendation to clear the contaminated area and provide compensation for the casualties caused and property damaged. An October 2013 report by HRW found the cluster munition remnants from the 2009 attack at al-Ma‘jalah were never cleared and killed four civilians and wounded 13 more since the strike occurred.[42]

Policy

The Republic of Yemen signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified it on 1 September 1998. It entered into force on 1 March 1999.

Yemen enacted legislation to enforce implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty on 20 April 2005.[1]

Yemen last submitted an annual transparency measures report for the treaty in April 2014.[2]

Yemen has participated in all of the Mine Ban Treaty’s Review Conferences, including the Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique in June 2014. It has attended every Meeting of States Parties of the treaty, such as the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November-December 2015. Yemen has participated in most of the treaty’s intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva.

In May 2016, Yemen told an intersessional meeting of the Mine Ban Treaty that its mine clearance efforts have been hampered by “obstacles,” including new mine-laying and explosive remnants from cluster munitions and other explosive weapons used by a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that began an operation against Houthi forces in Yemen, also known as Ansar Allah, in late March 2015.[3]

Yemen is not a party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It is also not a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and retention

Yemen has stated that it has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.

Yemen reported destruction of the last of its known stockpile of 74,000–78,000 antipersonnel mines in April 2002.[4] An additional 30,000 mines found in November 2006 were destroyed in December 2007.[5]

In 2014, Yemen again reported the retention of 3,760 antipersonnel mines of four types for training and research purposes, the same quantity and types declared retained since 2008.[6] Yemen has never reported on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as was agreed by States Parties in 2004.[7]

Three types of antipersonnel mines produced in the 1980s have been used in Yemen since 2013: PPM-2 mines manufactured in the former East Germany, GYATA-64 mines made in Hungary, and a Bulgarian-made PSM-1 bounding fragmentation mine.[8] The latter type was found in its 1980s-vintage factory packaging in an arms bazaar in the town of Marib in 2015. None of these mines was among the four types of antipersonnel mines that Yemen has reported stockpiling in the past, including for training mine clearance personnel.

The evidence of further use of these antipersonnel mines in 2015 and 2016 suggests either that the 2002 declaration to the UN Secretary-General on the completion of landmine stockpile destruction was incorrect, or that these mines were acquired from another source after 2002.

In a September 2016 letter, Yemen’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sanaa, controlled by the Houthis and the General People’s Congress, alleged that individuals had smuggled weapons, including landmines, into Yemen in recent years, noting that the government had not been able to control its land or sea borders due to instability and fighting.[9]

Use

There was the first confirmed use of antipersonnel mines by a State Party, in Yemen in 2011–2012, and after some initial efforts to address the matter by the current government, it has not been in a position to do so during the ongoing turmoil.

A joint operation by a coalition of states led by Saudi Arabia against Houthi forces, in Yemen was continuing as of October 2016. The Islamist armed group Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also a party to the conflict in Yemen.

New Use

Human Rights Watch (HRW) has reported numerous instances of antipersonnel mine use by Ansar Allah, also called Houthis, and their allied forces loyal to former President Ali Abduallah Saleh in 2015 and 2016. AQAP also appears to be using antipersonnel mines.

Areas in and near the city of Taizz in Taizz governorate that Houthis and allied forces occupied from March 2015 until March 2016 were subsequently discovered to have been mined, including with PPM-2 mines manufactured in the former East Germany.[10] Houthi officials denied using antipersonnel mines in Taizz.[11] A September response by Yemen’s Foreign Ministry affirmed Yemen’s commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty and said that when the conflict ends a committee will be created to investigate the landmine use in Taizz.[12]

In November 2015, HRW reported numerous casualties from landmines, including PPM-2 and Hungarian-made GYATA-64 antipersonnel mines that Houthi forces laid before retreating from Abyan governorate and Aden governorate in July 2015.[13] New use of landmines by Houthi forces was also reported in Marib and Lahj governorates, but the areas remain inaccessible to independent researchers.

In September 2015, the Mine Ban Treaty’s Cooperative Compliance Committee requested to meet with Yemen to discuss continuing mine use. According to the committee’s report, Yemen replied that due to the difficult circumstances faced by the government “it is not able to conduct an investigation for the moment on these new allegations and that due to the lack of adequate information it was unable to attend the meeting.”[14]

Officials reported in May 2016 that large stocks of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines had been recovered from the port city of Mukalla in Hadramout governorate that were allegedly used by AQAP until it was forced out in April 2016. The governor of Hadramout told a regional media outlet that Al-Qaeda forces extensively mined the Dhabah oil terminal.[15]

There has been no evidence to suggest that members of the Saudi Arabia-led coalition have used landmines in their military operations in Yemen.

Previous Use

Houthi forces emplaced PPM-2 mines and a GYATA-64 mines in Aden before withdrawing from the city in July 2015.[16] 

The Houthis may also be responsible for laying new antipersonnel mines, located immediately to the east of Aden. A retired Yemeni deminer told HRW that he witnessed Houthi fighters laying mines on 8 August 2015, shortly after an attack by southern forces that pushed Houthi forces out of an area in Abyan governorate. Deminers cleared 14 PPM-2 antipersonnel mines that they described as “newly laid.”[17]

Yemen’s most recent Article 7 report from 2014 described a “new challenge” in Saada governorate from “new kinds of mines made manually by insurgences [sic] and planted.”[18] In November 2013, the office of Yemen’s prime minister admitted a “violation” of the Mine Ban Treaty occurred in 2011 at Bani Jarmooz, a location north of Sanaa in 2011, during the popular uprising that led to the ousting of then-President Saleh.[19] According to witness testimony and evidence gathered by human rights organizations and media, GYATA-64, PMN, and PMD-6 antipersonnel mines were laid around the camps of the government’s Republican Guards at Bani Jarmooz in late 2011.[20]

Yemen provided Mine Ban Treaty States Parties with an interim report on 29 March 2014 detailing plans for clearance and marking, risk education, and victim assistance at Bani Jarmooz.[21] In June 2014, it informed States Parties that the Military Prosecutor’s Office had begun an investigation to identify those responsible for the mine use at Bani Jarmooz.[22]

However, as of October 2016 the area of Bani Jarmooz is no longer under government control as it was seized by Houthi forces in mid-2014.[23]

Contaminated by: landmines (heavy contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance.

Article 5 deadline: 1 March 2020
(Not on track to meet the deadline) 

Not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions 

The escalation of conflict after March 2015 has resulted in further mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination while at the same time halting systematic mine clearance operations and disrupting prospects for implementing plans set out in the Republic of Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request.

Recommendations for action 

• The Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC) should draw up a plan for the resumption of mine clearance, setting out priorities for survey and clearance.
• YEMAC should increase survey and clearance capacity.
• YEMAC teams should be trained in and apply land release methodologies.

Contamination 

Mine contamination 

Yemen is contaminated with mines from conflicts in 1962–1969 and 1970–1983, the mines that were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and those used in successive conflicts that erupted since 1994.[1] Mine contamination resulted from the 2010 insurgency in northern Saada governorate led by Abdul Malik al-Houthi[2] and the 2011 insurgency around southern Abyan by militants belonging to Ansar al-Sharia, linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.[3] YEMAC reported that insurgents in Saada had laid improvised mines, later clearing some but missing others.[4] In 2011, under former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen’s Republican Guard reportedly laid thousands of mines in the Bani Jarmoz area near Sana’a. The number of mines and extent of area affected remain to be determined. Information provided to YEMAC by local inhabitants in February 2014 suggested 25 villages were impacted.[5] The UN said mines were laid in the conflict that escalated in March 2015 in areas controlled by Houthi rebels and associated forces.[6] (See Yemen’s Mine Ban profile for further details.)

The extent of Yemen’s contamination is not known. Yemen’s second Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in December 2013, stated that 107 mined areas covering some 8km² were confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines, with 438 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) covering a further 338km².[7] It added it had still to survey the governorates of Amran, Hajjah, and Sana’a.[8] Yemen’s most recent Article 7 transparency report, for the year to the end of March 2014, claimed that 20 of Yemen’s 21 governorates are affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines and estimated contamination at almost 433km². Most of the remaining areas were in Abyan, Ibb, and Saada governorates.[9] 

Cluster munition and other ERW contamination 

Yemen was contaminated with ERW, including cluster munition remnants, before 2015, but since the start of the latest conflict on 26 March 2015 the UN has confirmed that intensive air strikes by the Saudi-led coalition have significantly increased contamination and the threat to the civilian population.[10]

YEMAC reported in 2014 it had identified some 18km² of suspected cluster munition hazardous areas in the northern Saada governorate bordering Saudi Arabia, but also knew of other areas of contamination in northwestern Hajjah governorate that it had not been able to survey.[11] Since the start of the latest round of hostilities in March 2015, international observers and researchers reported that the Saudi Arabia-led coalition’s land and aerial bombardments using a variety of cluster munitions had struck many areas of northwestern Yemen. YEMAC has identified heavy cluster munition contamination in Saada governorate as well as additional cluster munition contamination in Amran, Hodeida, Mawit, and Sanaa governorates[12] (see Yemen’s Cluster Munition Ban policy profile for further details). 

Program Management

A National Mine Action Committee (NMAC) is responsible for formulating policy, allocating resources, and developing a national mine action strategy.[13] It is chaired by the Minister of State (a member of the Cabinet), and brings together representatives of seven concerned ministries. The government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi was driven from power in Yemen in February 2015 and moved to Saudi Arabia, putting future mine action institutional arrangements into question.

YEMAC was established in Sanaa in January 1999 as NMAC’s implementing body, with responsibility for coordinating mine action in the country.[14] It is supported by a Regional Executive Mine Action Branch (REMAB) and a national training center in Aden along with another REMAB in al-Mukalla (Hadramout governorate). REMABs are responsible for field implementation of the national mine action plan.

Escalating political turmoil and conflict in Yemen since 2014 together with lack of funding have severely impaired YEMAC’s abilities to discharge its responsibilities.[15] YEMAC became two de facto organizations split between the southern city of Aden, controlled by the Saudi-led coalition and Yemen’s internationally recognized but exiled government, and the capital Sana’a, under the control of the Houthi. Heavy fighting between the two in 2015 severely hampered communications and coordination between YEMAC’s headquarters and its Aden branch.[16] From Sana’a, YEMAC planned to undertake operations in 2016 in five governorates of central and north Yemen (Amran, Hajjah, Sana’a, Saada, and Taiz), depending on security. YEMAC Aden sub-office planned operations in Abyan, Aden, Al Bayda, Lahej, and Taiz, and in and around Mukulla in Hadramout.[17]

The UN Development Programme (UNDP) provides an international technical advisor to work with NMAC and YEMAC to help develop a national strategy, set priorities, and define national standards under a four-year program agreed in 2013 and due to run until the end of February 2017. The project has two national staff in Sana’a and one each in Aden and Saada.[18]

Strategic planning 

Yemen’s 2013 request for a second five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline projected clearance of more than 1.6km² of mined area a year between June 2014 and May 2019, and allowed another year for clearing any additional hazards identified during the extension period. The request called for total expenditure of more than US$65 million over the five years, equivalent to more than $13 million a year, compared with average annual expenditure of less than $2 million over the past five years.[19] These targets, however, were overtaken by the escalating turmoil in 2014 and the conflict that erupted at the end of March 2015.

Yemen has no strategic plan for tackling cluster munition remnants.

Deminer safety 

YEMAC acknowledges that its deminers and explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) personnel are not trained or equipped to deal with cluster munition remnants, an issue highlighted by the death of three personnel in a submunition incident in Hajjah governorate in May 2016.[20]

Land Release

YEMAC conducted some emergency spot clearance in 2015, but conflict and lack of funds disrupted operations and no systematic mine survey and clearance took place. Emergency operations were conducted by small, mobile teams in Sana’a and Amran, focusing on clearing unexploded ordnance in and around schools. Engineers serving with the Saudi-led coalition are also reported to have undertaken some mine clearance, for example at Aden’s Khormaksar airport. Legacy minefields were not considered a priority.[21]

Yemeni mine action officials told Human Rights Watch (HRW) that on 11 July 2015 they began emergency clearance of landmines and ERW from several residential districts of Aden previously controlled by Houthi forces, including Khormaksar, Jaulaa, and Green City in the Dar Saad neighborhood, and Bir Ahmad and Amran in al-Buraika. They said the clearance teams collected more than 140 mines on their first day in Amran. By 12 August 2015, the teams had removed 91 antipersonnel mines of two types from Aden as well as 666 antivehicle mines, 316 improvised explosive devices, and various grenades, shells, and fuzes. The officials also said that their vehicles, protective equipment, and supplies were all looted during the fighting in Aden.[22] 

YEMAC’s activities started to acquire funding and some momentum, recording clearance of 33,888m² in the first half of 2016, most of it in May and June. However, for maximum impact teams focused on small, high-threat spot tasks close to populated areas. In addition, teams were aiming to clear abandoned explosive ordnance and old stockpiles to prevent harvesting. Legacy minefields were not a priority.[23] 

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted in 2014), Yemen is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2020. This is Yemen’s second extension to its Article 5 deadline and it will not meet this new deadline.

Yemen’s second extension request acknowledged from the outset that it was largely “based on speculation” and operations in 2014 fell well short of the extension request target of clearing 1.6km² a year, hampered by insecurity and by an acute shortage of funds.[24] The sharp escalation in conflict after March 2015 has halted systematic mine clearance and reduced YEMAC to emergency clearance of mostly ERW and not mines.

Mine clearance in 2011–2015[25]

Note: N/R = Not reported

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2015, the United States contributed a total of US$2 million to support mine action activities in the Republic of Yemen. This represents an increase of 67% from 2014.[1] Since 2011, international assistance to mine action in Yemen totaled approximately $12 million.

Summary of support: 2011–2015[2]

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Yemen is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Yemen has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Yemen ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 26 March 2009.

Casualties Overview

The Monitor identified 988 casualties (168 killed; 820 injured) from mines, ERW, and unexploded submunitions (mines/ERW) in 2015. The casualties included two boys, six civilian men, three security forces personnel from the United Arab Emirates, and two civilians whose gender was not recorded.[1]

The ICRC reported that 812 persons wounded by mines/ERW were admitted to healthcare facilities in 2015.[2] These casualties were reported to have occurred during the year, and thus were included in the Monitors’ annual global total of persons injured in 2015. The ICRC data was not disaggregated by age or gender; however, the ICRC noted that the majority of casualties were male.[3] Additional casualties were reported in the media and through NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. Information on antivehicle mine casualties from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Anti-Vehicle Mines (AVM) project included 39 casualties of antivehicle mines and 26 casualties of suspected, but not confirmed, antivehicle mines (unknown devices) in the total for 2015.[4]

It is likely that the actual number of casualties in Yemen in 2015 was significantly higher than that recorded. The majority of casualties reported were injured, while it appears that persons killed were significantly under-recorded. Media reports often only covered short periods of time and specific locations and incidents with high numbers of casualties; for example, 98 of the people killed by mines were recorded from mid-July to mid-August in three governorates: Aden, Abyan, and Lahij.[5]

In addition to the casualties recorded by the Monitor for 2015, a media report included an estimate of some 10 people killed and more than 80 injured by “landmine explosions” during a one-week period in Aden in July/August.[6]

The Yemen Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) registered 365 mine/ERW “victims” (293 men, 48 women, 20 boys, and four girls) across 14 governorates in 2015. It was not indicated how many were people killed or how many were injured among the casualties.[7]

The 2015 mine/ERW casualty total (988) represented a vast increase from past years. In 2014, the Monitor identified 24 casualties from mines/ERW from YEMAC casualty data and other sources. The ICRC reported five mine/ERW casualties received treatment in 2014.[8] However, there was likely significant underreporting due to the challenges to data collection caused by the intensified armed conflict.[9] Prior to 2015, the casualty total for 2012 of 263 casualties was the highest annual number recorded by the Monitor for Yemen since research began in 1999 and was due to the conflict and increased population movement in that year.[10]

Through the end of 2015, there were at least 6,854 mine/ERW casualties identified in Yemen.[11] A Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) identified 4,904 casualties through July 2000, of which 2,560 people were killed and 2,344 were injured.[12] In 2010, it was reported in the media that there had been 35,000 mine/ERW casualties in Yemen since 1995.[13]

Cluster munition casualties

In 2015, 104 casualties of cluster munitions were reported in Yemen. Of this total, 94 were casualties of cluster munition attacks: at least 14 people were killed in attacks (including six men, four women, and four children); another 80 people were injured in attacks, including at least five children. In addition, unexploded submunitions injured at least 10 people, including five children.[14] Of the total cluster munition casualties recorded in 2015, 89% (93) were civilians, and the remaining 11 were security forces.

Unexploded submunition casualties continued to be reported into 2016, with at least 16 casualties (six killed and 10 injured) from unexploded submunitions reported to June. Three of those casualties were deminers and the remainder were civilians. The number of cluster munition casualties during extensive cluster munition attacks in 2016 remained uncertain as of mid-July.[15]

Prior to the 2015–2016 use of cluster munitions, a cluster munition attack in Yemen in December 2009 was reported to have killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children.[16] In 2013, it was reported that unexploded submunitions remaining from the 2009 strike had killed four civilians and injured 13, through January 2012.[17]

Victim Assistance

In October 2013, there were at least 3,539 mine/ERW survivors in Yemen, many of them without adequate healthcare or livelihoods.[18] Updated national data on the total number of mine/ERW survivors has not been reported since 2013. However, the Monitor recorded an additional 835 survivors in 2014 and 2015.

Victim assistance during the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014

Each year, the victim assistance department’s program planned to reach a set number of survivors, though it nearly always fell short of meeting its target. Survivors not assisted through this program have faced significant challenges to access assistance due to the centralization of services in urban centers, far from where most survivors are. Women have faced particular challenges since cultural norms generally require that they travel with a male family member.

The Yemen Association of Landmine Survivors (YALS) is the mine action center’s implementing partner for economic reintegration activities. However, in most years, there has not been sufficient funding to implement this component as planned. Psychosocial support has never been included in the victim assistance department’s program and has not been widely available in Yemen. None-the-less, some local NGOs, including YALS, have offered this support when possible, given limited budgets.

Increasing levels of violence and insecurity led to the suspension of the victim assistance program in 2011 and prevented many survivors from traveling to needed services. For example, the Aden Rehabilitation Center, one of only four in the country, suspended its outreach program and its plans to build a new rehabilitation center, with support from ICRC, remained on hold through 2013.

YEMAC reached a significantly larger number of survivors in 2013 than in past years, facilitating their access to medical care and physical rehabilitation. However, as the security situation worsened once again near the end of 2013, most survivors continued to face significant challenges in accessing all needed services. YALS lacked sufficient funding to address the demand for its economic inclusion and psychosocial support programs.

No progress was identified in the implementation of the National Victim Assistance Strategic Plan 2010–2015 and survivors did not participate in the coordination and planning of victim assistance.

Victim assistance in 2015

The conflict in 2015 exacerbated the ongoing lack of services and access to services for survivors. Yemen’s medical system was overwhelmed to the point of collapse in 2015. Survivors lacked healthcare. A large number of survivors and families of casualties had no regular sources of income. As a result, they could not access long-term medical, assistive devices, or rehabilitation due to the high costs.

Assessing victim assistance needs

A survey by the Yemen Mine Action Center (YEMAC) identified 3,539 landmine survivors in Yemen as of October 2013, with 700 amputees on a waiting list for prosthetic devices. At least 755 survivors of armed conflict, including mine/ERW survivors were surveyed in Abyan.[19] In 2015, 365 mine/ERW victims were registered by YEMAC, even though the security situation prevented a victim assistance survey to international standards.[20] The Danish Refugee Council collected some data on mine/ERW casualties while providing referrals to Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) as necessary.[21]

Victim assistance coordination[22]

Ongoing conflict throughout 2015 caused all victim assistance activities including coordination to stop in Yemen. YEMAC delegated coordination with the Ministry of Social Affair’s Disability Fund (MOSUL) to YALS in 2014.[23]

In 2015, no significant progress was made in implementing or replacing the National Victim Assistance Strategic Plan 2010–2014 due to the conflict.

As of 1 July 2016, Yemen had not provided its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2015.

Survivor inclusion

In 2015, the planning and coordination of victim assistance was suspended due to the ongoing conflict.[24] Due to the conflict, up to 100 local disability organizations had ceased operations.[25]

Through YALS, survivors were involved in implementing income-generating projects, collecting data on the needs of other survivors and in distributing emergency food rations and other assistance.[26]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[27]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

Yemen’s medical system was overwhelmed to the point of collapse in 2015. The ongoing conflict dramatically increased demand for emergency and ongoing medical care beyond the capacity of the medical system. In addition to increased demand for emergency medical care, import restrictions and local blockades prevented humanitarian aid, fuel, and medical supplies from reaching populations affected by the conflict.[28] Health facilities were also damaged during the conflict in what were reported to have been targeted attacks. MSF reported multiple attacks on their health facilities.[29] In mid-October 2015, the UN reported that nearly 600 health facilities had ceased operations due to damage or lack of supplies, fuel, and staff. In addition, 27 ambulances had been hijacked and almost 30 health workers killed or injured.[30] In 2015, conflict injured persons, including mine/ERW survivors, struggled to access emergency and ongoing medical care. Women faced additional challenges accessing medical care due to the lack of gender-sensitive services.[31]

The ICRC supported over 100 hospitals and health facilities in 15 governorates with donations of medical and surgical supplies in 2015. The ICRC organized emergency room trauma and war surgery trainings for medical professionals and surgeons from some 20 hospitals.[32] However, the security situation prevented the ICRC from holding a planned first aid training course with YEMAC.[33] MSF managed 11 hospitals or health centers and supported another 18 health centers in Yemen in 2015. In the last five months of 2015, the MSF hospital in Aden provided emergency surgery to more than 80 mine/ERW survivors.[34] The YEMAC referred casualties to three specific hospitals, two in Sana’a and one in Aden, for treatment in 2015.[35]

Physical rehabilitation

Poor security conditions and the lack of service providers were key challenges for access to rehabilitation. A lack of female rehabilitation professionals prevented women from accessing needed services.[36] Gender considerations were included in the composition of YEMAC victim assistance support teams, which included female survey assessors to facilitate the identification and interview of women and girls.[37]

The ICRC continued to provide support to four rehabilitation centers throughout the country. Approximately 27,000 patients received physiotherapy treatment from ICRC-supported centers. The centers also produced more than 650 prostheses. The ICRC continued to sponsor formal prosthetics and orthotics training for six students.[38] The MSF hospital in Aden provided some physiotherapy services to war-injured persons during 2015.[39] Handicap International’s (HI) early rehabilitation activities included the provision of assistive devices and training for healthcare staff.[40] In 2015, HI supported three health facilities in Sana’a to provide physical therapy and delivered more than 636 mobility aid devices.[41] YEMAC provided survivors with 321 wheelchairs and 44 pairs of crutches in 2015 from existing stocks; obtaining materials from outside the country was difficult due to ongoing conflict.[42]

Economic inclusion

In 2015, YALS undertook social and economic inclusion activities, including supporting the education of 57 survivors. The ICRC supplied sewing machines to YALS for economic inclusion activities. However, financial difficulties forced the closure of a YALS sewing workshop in Aden. YALS also distributed emergency food rations to approximately 100 survivors in June 2015.[43]

Psychological support

The conflict has increased the need for psychological support throughout 2015 and into 2016. Services were unable to meet the demand for counselling, peer support, and other mental health services.[44] The MSF-managed hospital in Aden offered some mental health services to conflict-affected persons.[45] HI implemented in-patient psychological support programs for survivors and other war-injured persons at three medical facilities in 2015.[46] Save the Children provided services including psychosocial support to almost 100 survivors in 2015.[47] YALS and a few national NGOs, such as the Arab Human Rights Foundation, continued to provide psychosocial support to mine survivors in some areas of Yemen.[48] A HI project was designed to include psychosocial support activities for persons with disabilities (in particularly conflict-injured individuals and their caregivers) and other potential at-risk groups.[49] In 2015, HI provided 910 persons (493 persons with injuries and 417 caregivers) with psychosocial support.[50]

Water, sanitation, and hygiene

In 2015, three out of four Yemenis struggled to meet their basic water, sanitation, and hygiene needs. Fuel shortages prevented piped water systems from reaching the population and supplies of clean water from water trucks were priced out of reach for most survivors and their families.[51] Water, sanitation, and hygiene kits were among the services provided to survivors and their families by Save the Children.[52]

Laws and policies

Legislation protects the rights of persons with disabilities, but they were poorly enforced and discrimination remained. No national law mandated accessibility of buildings for persons with disabilities.[53]

The Disability Fund in Sanaa, an independent body under Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour supervision, remained operational in some areas of the country despite limitations caused by the conflict. It supported a limited number of mine/ERW survivors to access education and surgery.