Zimbabwe

Mine Action

Last updated: 22 November 2016

Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (heavy), antivehicle mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Article 5 deadline: 1 January 2018

(Not on track to meet deadline)

As of July 2015, the Republic of Zimbabwe had confirmed mine contamination of almost 74km2. Just more than 4.1km2 of land was released in 2015; 3.74km2 by clearance and technical survey, and an 0.4km2 canceled by non-technical survey (NTS). This compared to 0.61km2 reduced by clearance and technical survey in 2014. However, annual overall land release declined from 151.5km2, due to the completion of a large amount of NTS in 2014 that canceled huge swathes of suspected hazardous area (SHA), along with a shift in focus towards clearance and technical survey activities.

Recommendations for action

  • Zimbabwe should revise estimates of the size of remaining mine contamination on the basis of ongoing survey and set a realistic but ambitious target for completion of all mine clearance.
  • Continued efforts should be made to ensure that all operators are using appropriate land-release methodologies and standards.
  • Increased resources should be allocated to build national information management capacity within the Zimbabwe Mine Action Center (ZIMAC). Greater efforts should be made to improve the quality of the data in the national mine action database, to reconcile data with operators’ records, and to ensure more accurate national reporting.
  • Zimbabwe should develop a resource mobilization plan and clarify how financial resources will be used to meet its extension request targets.
  • With neighboring Mozambique having declared completion of mine clearance in September 2015, surplus clearance equipment could be used to assist clearance of the remaining mined areas on Zimbabwe’s side of the border as soon as possible.

Contamination

In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report for 2015, Zimbabwe reported more than 73km2 of confirmed mined area remaining at the end of 2015. In October 2016, however, in a response to questions over inconsistencies in the figures provided in the Article 7 report, ZIMAC stated that the total contamination remaining at the end of 2015 was in fact 74,829,822m2 (74.8km2).[1]

This was an increase from the 62km2 reported for the end of 2014, which Zimbabwe stated was primarily the result of further survey and mapping of the Sango Border to Crooks Corner minefield.[2]

Mine contamination as of end 2015[3]

Location

Confirmed areas

Area (m2)

Musengezi to Rwenya[4]

4[5]

27,445,059

Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner

2

25,986,616

Rusitu to Muzite Mission

1

15,000,000

Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest

5

4,690,316

Lusulu

1

56,000

Total

13

73,177,991

 

Zimbabwe’s contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is antipersonnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during the conflict of decolonization. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with six distinct major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, laid by the Rhodesian army.[6] Initially, antipersonnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometer of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire.” Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional fragmentation mines protected by antipersonnel mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire.[7] Antivehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.[8]

ZIMAC released updated figures for the remaining contamination of 73,924,128m2, as of 1 July 2016.[9] As of October 2016, remaining contamination comprised of five minefields, referred to as: Musengezi to Rwenya, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner, Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Lusulu. The Burma Valley minefield was completed in February 2015 and a former SHA at Kariba was cleared of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in June 2013.[10]

HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), the two NGOs conducting mine action in Zimbabwe in 2015, have reported that the remaining minefields are located close to populated areas and have considerable humanitarian, social, and economic impacts on communities.[11] HALO reported that in areas where it operates in the northeast of Zimbabwe, mines continue to block access to residential land, inhibit cross-border trading, deny small-scale farmers access to agricultural land, and separate communities from primary water sources, adversely affecting sanitation and livestock production. The threat to livestock is particularly severe and results in a heavy socio-economic impact as livestock is a major investment commodity in rural Zimbabwe.[12]

Zimbabwe has reported that the clearance of mined areas generates opportunities for agriculture, business, and tourism, as well as for the construction of schools and clinics. It also allows the safe return of households that have been displaced and relocated to Mozambique as a result of the mine threat.[13] In February 2016, NPA completed clearance of a mined area in which a number of farms and a jam factory were located, and was continuing to work on clearance around a border post which will allow for increased access and movement of people and goods between Zimbabwe and Mozambique, as well as enabling the maintenance of an important railroad and gas pipeline which is currently hindered by the presence of mines.[14]

In 2015, there were eight antipersonnel mine casualties. Four were boys, one was a civilian man, and three were deminers. The deaths of 35 cattle were also reported. (See Casualties and Victim Assistance profile for further details.)

Program Management

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ) is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC was established in 2000 within the Ministry of Defence as the focal point and coordination center of all mine action in the country. ZIMAC is mandated to report to NAMAAZ.[15]

In 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the government of Zimbabwe to train ZIMAC personnel and to provide metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits.[16] ZIMAC subsequently developed a joint strategy with the government of Zimbabwe and the ICRC as a follow-up to the 2012 cooperation agreement, which was extended to the end of 2015. In 2015, the ICRC continued its support to ZIMAC with the provision of equipment and trainings and refresher courses for key staff.[17]

In its latest Article 5 deadline extension request, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.[18] At the end of 2015, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints.[19]

Operators

ZIMAC and, since 2013, HALO and NPA, conduct land release. Under its current extension request, Zimbabwe has stated that mined areas will be surveyed and cleared with support from HALO and NPA, as follows: HALO is tasked to survey and clear the Musengezi to Rwenya, Rushinga, and Mukumbura mined areas; NPA is assigned survey and clearance of the Rusitu to Muzite Mission, Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest, and Burma Valley mined areas; and the Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS) are responsible for survey and clearance of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner and Lusulu mined areas.[20]

At the start of 2015, HALO had 12 eight-strong manual demining sections, which it increased to 13 in April, with a total of 104 deminers.[21] Its operations focused on clearance in Mashonaland Central and technical survey tasks in Mashonaland East. NPA reached its maximum operating capacity at the end of the year with five eight-person teams, and an additional team was added in January 2016.[22] ZIMAC reported that the NMCS had a capacity of three troops of 117 deminers as of December 2015.[23]

ZIMAC is accrediting two additional international demining operators, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and APOPO for operations in 2017.[24]

Strategic planning

In 2016, ZIMAC reported that it was revising the national strategic mine action plan in accordance with its Article 5 extension request targets, which is expected to be submitted as part of a new request in March 2017.[25] NPA reported that, in 2015, ZIMAC identified priorities for survey and clearance together with operators and noted that cooperation, dialogue, and joint planning between ZIMAC and operators had significantly improved during the year.[26]

Standards

In June 2016, it was reported that the national mine action standards were under review, with support from the ICRC.[27] Revisions included reducing the size of fade-out clearance requirements from 10 meters to five on reinforced ploughshare minefields, which would reduce area clearance by one half.[28]

Information management

Information management began to improve as a result of capacity building for ZIMAC staff provided primarily by the ICRC in 2014.[29] In 2015, the provision and sharing of data also improved.[30]

However, Zimbabwe’s Article 7 transparency report for 2015 contained numerous inconsistencies and contradictory or wrongly calculated figures. The information management system for mine action (IMSMA) database also contained inflated or outdated baseline contamination estimates.[31] In October 2016, ZIMAC stated that it was working to correct the errors.[32]

In 2016, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and HALO were supporting use of the IMSMA database.[33] In April 2016, ZIMAC reported that “efforts are now at an advanced stage” on the creation of a functional IMSMA database, and that basic training of two staff officers in information management had been completed.[34]

Information management staff were trained in 2015 in the use of a digital recording and mapping system, the DEDUCT Observer application.[35] NPA stated it had been sending ZIMAC daily electronic updates on survey and clearance outputs through the DEDUCT system since November 2015.[36]

Deminer safety

Three deminers working for HALO have been injured. The accidents took place during the course of landmine clearance and were superficial, with the deminers able to return to work.[37]

Land Release

A total of just more than 4.1km2 of antipersonnel mined area was released by HALO and NPA in 2015, including 3.74km2 by clearance and technical survey, and an additional 0.4km2 canceled by NTS.[38] This is a six-fold increase in the total mined area released by clearance and technical survey reported in 2014 (approximately 0.61km2). However, considerably less land was released overall compared to 2014, largely due to a significant amount of cancelation of 151km2 by NTS in 2014.[39]

Survey in 2015

A total of more than 3.4km2 of mine contamination was released by survey in 2015, the cancelation of 0.4km2 through NTS and reduction of 3.0km2 through technical survey, while confirming a further 0.15km2 as mined.

In 2015, NPA reported increased use of technical survey in land release efforts by NPA and ZIMAC, and the introduction of combined NTS and technical survey activities.[40]

Mine survey in 2015[41]

Operator

SHAs canceled

Area canceled (m²)

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by technical survey (m2)

HALO (Mashonaland Central)

0

0

4

150,418

550,924

HALO (Mashonaland East)

0

0

0

0

293,587

NPA (Manicaland–Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill)

0

10,379

0

0

51,617

NPA (Manicaland–Burma Valley)

0

393,249

0

0

104,282

NMCS

0

0

0

0

2,023,646

Total

 

403,628

4

150,418

3,024,056

Note: N/R = not reported.

Clearance in 2015

In 2015, a total of almost 0.71km2 of mined area was cleared; destroying 7,528 antipersonnel mines and 17 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[42] This is an increase of 0.49kmfrom 2014.[43]

NPA had two tasks during the year: the Burma Valley minefield and the Border Streams area of the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest minefield, both in Manicaland province. In March 2015, NPA completed clearance of the Burma Valley minefield, which was officially handed over to local communities in July.

Mine clearance in 2015[44]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared

(m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

HALO (Mashonaland Central)

13

381,783

6,233

0

8

HALO (Mashonaland East)

2

13,026

34

0

6

NPA (Manicaland)

0

160,061

951

0

0

NPA (Burma Valley)

1

8,020

15

0

0

NMCS

0

150,886

295

0

3

Total

16

713,776

7,528

0

17

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Progress in 2016

In February 2016, NPA completed clearance of its Border Streams task, and, as of January, had started on three new tasks within the Sheba Forest to Leacon Hill minefield.[45] In January–September 2016, NPA reported destroying more than 3,400 antipersonnel mines while releasing nearly 516,000m2 of contaminated land (56% through technical survey and 44% through manual clearance).[46]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted an Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it has submitted three subsequent extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The current extension until 1 January 2018 is to enable further survey and clearance, but Zimbabwe is not committing itself to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period, nor will it manage to do so.

Zimbabwe has reported that three primary factors have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations since becoming a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty: inadequate funding for demining from the government; insufficient demining equipment; and the impact of sanctions “imposed by some potential donors.” However, Zimbabwe reported that many of these conditions have no longer affected it since 2014 in light of the support it is currently receiving from international organizations.[47] In its latest extension request, Zimbabwe enumerated possible risks and assumptions that could impede it from achieving future extension request milestones, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, administrative delays, and a lack of funding.[48]

Under the current three-year extension, Zimbabwe
has undertaken “to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.”[49] The purpose of the extension period is also to complete survey of all remaining areas and to clear approximately 4km2 of mined area.[50] Zimbabwe intends to meet the following annual milestones: clearance of 1.23kmin 2015;[51] development of a national strategic plan on the basis of survey results in 2015; clearance of 1.28km2 in 2016; and clearance of 1.51kmin 2017; and the submission of a new clearance plan in 2017.[52]

In its 2013 extension request, Zimbabwe forecasted that activities planned over the course of its three-year extension request will cost a total of almost US$13 million, with $2.875 million to be provided by the government of Zimbabwe and more than $10 million to be sought from international donors through partner organizations.[53] In granting the extension request, States Parties urged Zimbabwe to develop a resource-mobilization strategy at the earliest possible moment.[54]

As of late 2015, HALO was optimistic that Zimbabwe was on track to meet its 1 January 2018 extension request targets for further survey and clearance in light of the significant amount of area canceled through NTS since the start of 2014.[55] Zimbabwe exceeded its extension request clearance target of 1.23km2 in 2015, and in June 2016, HALO confirmed that Zimbabwe would meet its 2016 target of 1.28km2.[56] Neither HALO nor NPA, though, expressed confidence as to when Zimbabwe, based on present operational capacity and productivity rates, could fully complete antipersonnel mine clearance unless significantly more funding is made available to all operators.

While a new national mine action strategic plan will be finalized in March 2017, in July 2016, NPA indicated its belief that the 2025 target date for completion of clearance could be feasible, but highly dependent on funding and the number of teams that could be deployed.[57] HALO would need to expand its 2015 capacity of 150 staff “by a factor of five or six in order to get the job done in ten years.” It added, however, that using mechanical assets could improve productivity in areas with high metal contamination and/or deeply buried mines.[58]

ZIMAC reported that the added capacity from MAG and APOPO, whose operations were anticipated to start in January 2017, would increase productivity and reduce the time needed to complete clearance.[59]

 

The Monitor gratefully acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review supported and published by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which conducted mine action research in 2016 and shared it with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015); and, emails from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 22 July 2016, and 14 October 2016.

[2] Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015). On p. 6 of the Article 7 transparency report it states “in the last report Sango Border to Crooks Corner Minefield had a remaining area of 13,600,000m2 and the total remaining area in Zimbabwe was 62,443,206m2. Further survey and exact mapping has resulted in an increase in the remaining area known to contain mines in the Sango Border to Crooks Corner Minefield to 25,986,616m2 which translated to the total area known to contain mines to rise to 73,177,991[m2].” However, based on these figures, the total area would amount to 74,829,822m2, not 73,177,991m2.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), pp. 5, 13–15, and 23. In the report, Zimbabwe also stated that “as of 31 December 2015, there were 8 areas in Zimbabwe known to contain antipersonnel mines totalling 73,177,991m2.” In a separate table in Annex I to the report, ZIMAC reported a different set of figures stated to be “based on NTS reports 2015” and “further edited after the 2016 further survey report.” It again reported a total of 73,177,991m2 of contamination remaining, however the breakdown of figures provided in the table appeared to contain errors and add up to 69,698,602m2. An additional set of figures for contamination and estimated dates of completion was also included, which indicated a total of 74,068,412m2 remained to be addressed.

[4] The Musengezi to Rwenya minefield includes the areas of Rushinga (reported as 2,500m2) and Mukumbura (reported as 125,962m2) and Mukumbura Encirclement (reported as 7,500m2). Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 5.

[5] HALO previously reported a total of 187 contaminated areas remaining in its areas of operations on the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield at the end of 2014. In 2015, HALO stated that while Musengezi to Rwenya is one long minebelt over 400km long, it had sectioned its areas of operations into 187 areas, with the rationale of being able to report incremental progress on land release, rather than having to wait for the completion of the entire minefield. ZIMAC reports the Musengezi to Rwenya minefield as one minefield with three sections of contaminated area (Rushinga, Mukumbura, and Mukumbura Encirclement), which it counts as a total of four mined areas and includes the 187 contaminated areas reported by HALO. Interview with Tom Dibb, Programme Manager, HALO, in Harare, 30 June 2016; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 5; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[6] Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary (received 31 December 2013), p. 1.

[7] HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated; Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary; and Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyze requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.

[8] HALO, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated.

[9] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 22 July 2016.

[10] Email from Learnfirst Musiza, Operations Manager, NPA, 19 October 2015; Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 6; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[11] Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.

[12] HALO Trust, “HALO clears over 5,000 mines in Zimbabwe,” Press release, undated but March 2015. 


[13] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 10–11 and p. 17. 


[14] Interview with Claus Nielsen, Programme Manager, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[15] Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7. 


[16] ICRC, “Zimbabwe: Living with the dread of an invisible enemy,” 29 November 2013.


[17] ICRC, ICRC Annual Report 2015, p. 243. Prior to initiating operations in 2015, ZIMAC’s mine clearance unit received basic protective equipment, and 15 team leaders and instructors were given refresher courses by the ICRC.

[18] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 6. Zimbabwe made the same commitment in its (second) extension request of 2010. 


[19] ICRC, ICRC Annual Report 2015, p. 243.

[20] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 4; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 27.

[21] Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, in Harare, 30 June 2016.

[22] Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[23] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), Annex 1, “Zimbabwe Mine Action Workplan for 2015–2017,” p. 24. ZIMAC reported that as of October 2016, the NMCS’ capacity had increased to five teams of 14 nine-person sections, with a total of 126 deminers. Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 7; and interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO, in Harare, 30 June 2016; and with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[25] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 32; and interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO, in Harare, 30 June 2016; and with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[26] Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[27] Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, in Harare, 30 June 2016.

[28] Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[29] Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.

[30] Interview with Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, in Mutare, 29 June 2016.

[31] For example, ZIMAC reported the total area released in the Burma Valley minefield as 806,000m2, which according to NPA, and later confirmed by ZIMAC, may have been based on an old rapid-response clearance estimate of the initial size of contamination. NPA reported, based on its records, a total of 636,821m2 was addressed before the release of Burma Valley, of which 393,249m2 was canceled, 104,282m2 reduced through technical survey, and 139,290m2 cleared. Interviews with Fanuel Chitiyo, Information Management Officer, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016; and with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[32] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2015), p. 7.

[35] More information about the DEDUCT Observer app can be found at: https://itunes.apple.com/us/app/deduct-observer/id970381497?mt=8.

[36] Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[37] Response to questionnaire from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 3 March 2016.

[38] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; and from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016; and interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016. The Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2015 does not provide complete land release data.

[39] Different and inconsistent figures were reported in Zimbabwe’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2014. Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015.

[40] Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[41] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; and from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016; and interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016. NPA reported that all land canceled by NPA was of confirmed mined area, not SHA.

[42] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; and from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016; and interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016.

[43] Responses to questionnaires by Tom Dibb, HALO, 28 April 2015; and by Learnfirst Musiza, NPA, received by email from Chris Natale, NPA, 29 April 2015; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2014), Form F; and Annex 1, “Zimbabwe Mine Action Workplan for 2015–2017,” p. 1. It reported the NMCS as clearing just over 0.15km2 in 2014.

[44] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO, 11 July 2016; and from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016; and interview with Fanuel Chitiyo, NPA, Mutare, 29 June 2016. HALO indicated that it was reporting areas where clearance had been completed by had not yet been formally released or handed over to communities. Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 16 October 2016.

[45] Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[46] Email from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 7 September 2016.

[47] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 5.

[48] Ibid., p. 7.

[49] Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014.

[50] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6. 


[51] This is composed of 432,000m2 in Musengezi to Rwenya minefield, 550,000m2 in Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield, and 250,000m2 in Rusitu to Muzite Mission minefield. Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request Executive Summary, 23 – 27 June 2014, p. 5.

[52] Ibid., pp. 5–6.

[53] Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 23 – 27 June 2014, p. 6.

[54] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, p. 7; and Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 22. In 2013, the government of Zimbabwe reported contributing US$800,000 to its mine action program. A breakdown of this contribution has not been provided. In 2012, Zimbabwe received international assistance for mine action for the first time since 1999.

[55] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO, 17 October 2015.

[56] Interview with Tom Dibb, HALO, in Harare, 30 June 2016.

[57] Interview with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[58] HALO, “Zimbabwe: The Solution,” undated.

[59] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 14 October 2016.