Angola

Mine Action

Last updated: 31 October 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (massive contamination), cluster munition remnants (light/unclear contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Deadline: 1 January 2018
(Eight-year extension requested)

Signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Summary

Landmines: The Republic of Angola submitted its second extension request in March 2017 for the period 2018 to 2025. It reported that 103.97km2 of confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and 141.06 km2 of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remained to be addressed. A non-technical survey is ongoing to clarify the extent of the remaining challenge.[1] Land release results for 2016 were only available from international operators. They reported cancelation of 136km2, reduction of 1.2km2 through technical survey, and clearance of 1.2km2. A total of 1,350 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during mine clearance and spot task operations. Funding and capacity for clearance continued to decrease in 2016.

Cluster munition remnants: The extent to which Angola is affected by cluster munition remnants remains unclear. A small threat may exist from either abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions. Two unexploded submunitions were found in 2016.

Recommendations for action

  • Angola should continue efforts to work more closely with operators to improve the national mine action database so as to be able to plan effectively and to report accurately on land release.
  • Angola should clarify and empower the management structure of the national mine action program, including the roles, responsibilities, and funding of the two mine action entities.
  • Angola should increase its international advocacy to attract donors and reverse the decline in international funding for mine action, and to compensate for the loss of national resources due to the financial crisis following the oil price crash in June 2014. It should update its national resource mobilization strategy accordingly, to ensure timely clearance in line with its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations.

Mine Contamination

In its latest Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in May 2017, Angola reported a total of 1,461 contaminated areas remaining to be addressed, including 1,074 CHAs covering a total of almost 104km2 and 387 SHAs covering an estimated 141km2.[2] But the results of the nearly completed nationwide re-survey, which have resulted in the cancelation on average of 90% of SHA, suggest that the 141km2 of suspected contamination will decrease to approximately 14km2 of confirmed contamination.[3] All 18 provinces contain mined areas.

The new estimate of contamination is a considerable decrease from the last reported estimate of almost 129km2 of CHA and 356km2 of SHA, dating back to mid-2014.[4]

Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico. Landmines affect some of the poorest and most marginalized communities in the country, including those experiencing chronic food insecurity.[5] In 2016, remaining contamination was predominately located in rural, underdeveloped areas.[6] Mines continue to have a significant socioeconomic impact for these communities and impede the return of the displaced and block access to land and water.[7]

Much of the land released by mine action is used for agriculture, which is of critical importance for acutely poor communities reliant on subsistence farming. But the lack of safe land also has implications for larger-scale agricultural production as Angola seeks to diversify its sources of national income. The National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) confirmed in 2017 that the government was developing a new strategy of economic diversification, including expansion of agriculture, livestock, tourism, and mining industries, and that the presence of mines was a serious impediment across many of these areas.[8]

Historically, humanitarian demining efforts in Angola have focused on urban and peri-urban areas due to security concerns in the countryside during the years of conflict, and in response to the needs of growing town-based populations thereafter. The HALO Trust reported in 2017 that many of the cities and towns in Angola had witnessed significant urban expansion, following reconstruction enabled by mine clearance. At the same time, rural populations have been largely left without support to deal with mine contamination, which for hundreds of communities means living beside minefields, with the daily threat of mines, despite the end of the conflict 15 years ago.[9]

In 2017, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) reported additional pressure on land use in Moxico province due to natural population growth and an increase in reverse migration, wherein people are returning to rural areas from coastal areas and the provincial capital owing to the high costs of urban living. The intent of many is to engage in subsistence farming to improve familial food security.[10] Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) reported that released land in its areas of operations was rapidly being put to use by local communities for agriculture and the construction of housing and communal institutions such as clinics, schools, churches, and police stations.[11]

There is also a significant problem with explosive remnants of war (ERW), especially UXO.

Cluster Munition Contamination

It is unclear when, or by whom, cluster munitions were used in Angola during the decades of armed conflict that ended in 2002.

The extent to which Angola is affected by cluster munition remnants also remains unclear. While there are no areas of confirmed contamination, there may remain abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions. In August 2016, HALO found two Alpha submunitions in Cunene province, which were reported by local residents to a HALO survey team during re-survey operations.[12] A number of damaged bomb casings were also found but according to HALO, it was unclear if the bombs had been fired at a target in the area or if they were jettisoned after an unsuccessful mission and the bomblets scattered on the ground.[13]

In 2011, HALO and the National Institute for Demining (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD) affirmed that unexploded submunitions remained in Cuando Cubango province.[14] In May 2017, however, HALO reported that the submunition find in 2016 was an isolated case and that it had not encountered anything similar in more than 20 years of survey across eight of Angola’s 18 provinces,[15] apart from 12 unexploded submunitions found and destroyed in 2012.[16]

As of April 2017, the majority of clearance operators had not found cluster munition remnants in more than nine years.[17] In May 2017, NPA and MAG confirmed they did not encounter any cluster munition remnants in their operations in 2016.[18] In June 2016, Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) reported that it had not encountered cluster munition remnants in nearly 10 years of operations, including near Jamba, an area in the southeast of the province where contamination might have been expected.[19]

More typical of cluster munition remnants destruction has been the disposal of old or unserviceable cluster munitions identified by HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which were earmarked for destruction by the Angolan Armed Forces. Between 2005 and 2012, HALO WAD teams reported destroying a total of 7,284 submunitions.[20] In May 2016, HALO indicated that it had not been asked by the military to do any further destruction of cluster munition stockpiles since 2012.[21]

Program Management

Angola’s national mine action program is managed by two mine action structures. The National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH) serves as the national mine action center, reporting to the Council of Ministers. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies. Under the vice-governor of each province, CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices determine annual objectives.

The other mine action body, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), was established in 2005 to manage Angola’s national development plan and is chaired by the Minister of Social Assistance and Reintegration. It supports mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority and is the coordination body for activities conducted by the national public operators (the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD), and the Police Border Guard).[22]

In 2002, in order to separate coordination and operational responsibilities, Angola established the INAD, which is responsible for conducting demining, verification, and the provision of training under the auspices of the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration.

Strategic planning

In May 2017, Angola submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline for a further period of eight years, until 2025. The extension request does not contain a detailed workplan or annual clearance targets, but it suggests that clearance could gradually phase out, with clearance of less-contaminated provinces completed first.[23]

Previously, following a request by the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Angola elaborated a workplan for 2014–2017 based on the preliminary results of its national survey, which projected that 327 confirmed mined areas covering about 35.5km2 would be cleared by the end of 2017.[24] From March 2012 to April 2017 Angola reported the clearance of a total of 303 areas over 23.8km2 and 717km of road by humanitarian operators.[25]

Operators

Three international NGOs conducted humanitarian demining in Angola in 2016: HALO, MAG, and NPA.[26] National NGOs included the Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS), Demining and Humanitarian Assistance Organization (ODAH), Union for the Rights to Education, Health and Safety for the Unemployed (UDESSD), and Associação Terra Mãe (ATM).

According to HALO, from 2008 to 2016, the total number of operational personnel of international and national operators fell by 89%.[27] In 2016, the loss of funding from the European Union (EU) Development Fund for demining impacted all international operators with demining effectively coming to a halt in five provinces (Bié, Benguela, Cunene, Kwanza Sul, and Kwanza Norte).[28]

HALO’s operations have focused on clearing mined areas in four provinces: Benguela, Bié, Huambo, and Kuando Kubango. In 2016, however, its demining activities were largely confined to the central province of Huambo and around the heavily mined town of Cuito Cuanavale in Kuando Kubango province, due to reduced funding and capacity.[29]

In 2016, NPA continued to work in rural, underdeveloped areas of Malanje and Zaire provinces. After the completion of its EU-funded project in Zaire in May 2016, NPA’s operations continued in Malanje only. A landmine incident affecting four children in the vicinity of Malanje town led to five previously unsuspected hazardous areas being identified and ultimately the discovery that areas of three municipalities had never been surveyed, or only to a limited extent due to poor access. This delayed NPA’s plans to move operations to Uige province.[30] NPA worked in partnership with international demining NGO APOPO.[31]

In 2016, MAG continued its systematic re-survey of Moxico province, which it completed in June 2017.[32]

HALO’s capacity in 2016 included an average of 315 staff, a reduction of 85 compared to 2015. It deployed an average of 16 manual demining teams; two combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and marking teams; and a new mechanical demining team to operate a DIGGER D-250 tilling machine acquired during the year. The loss of EU funding caused a significant drop in capacity in January 2016, with nine manual teams having to be made redundant. Demining operations were stopped in Bié province and partially suspended in Kuando Kubango. Funding was secured from the United States (US) and Switzerland, which enabled 10 manual demining teams and the mechanical team to be deployed in Huambo province, and a further six manual demining teams in Kuando Kubango.[33]

NPA employed an average of 58 deminers in 2016, fluctuating based on project funding between a high of 78 in March–April and a low of 42 in September–October. The organization also deployed a combined team equipped for non-technical survey, risk education, and EOD spot tasks. It maintained a mechanical capacity of two MineWolf machines and four Casspirs and a team of five operators. NPA also continued its partnership with APOPO during the year, which employed eight mine detection rat handlers and two mechanical operators, and four deminers from October 2016 to operate a brush-cutter machine.[34]

In 2016, MAG deployed a total of four manual demining teams, an EOD team, a non-technical survey team, a community liaison team, and a mechanical clearance and support team. However, due to lack of funding, at the end of the year its capacity was reduced by two manual demining teams. It was given a MineWolf 240 by a former international operator, but the machine was only operational for two months before the rainy season curtailed its deployment. MAG reported, though, that based on two months of results, vast improvements in output were expected with its future deployment.[35]

Collectively, the four CED operators—the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the
Police Border Guard—are working in all 18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritized by national infrastructure development plans.[36]

A number of commercial companies[37] operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.[38]

Information management

Angola’s mine action program has been plagued with difficulties in information management for more than a decade, impeding efforts to achieve a comprehensive, accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, from 2007 to its last reported figures in 2014, Angola has made widely different and conflicting claims of the extent of its mine problem. Two issues are at the crux of Angola’s inability to construct a reliable mine action database: on the one hand, CNIDAH’s database does not match NGOs’ own records, while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) format.[39] Operators have persistently raised concerns about inaccurate data, inconsistency and unreliability of information, internal issues within CNIDAH, and lengthy delays in updating data.[40]

In February 2016, IMSMA New Generation (NG) was installed with the assistance of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). Subsequently, all operators reported investing significant time and resources working with and supporting CNIDAH to update the database and reconcile inconsistencies between the database and operator records. According to MAG, initially the introduction of IMSMA NG exacerbated delays in updating the database as parties struggled to learn the new system, but later the database began to be managed effectively by CNIDAH with regular updating.[41] HALO questioned the timing of the switch to IMSMA NG, which occurred during the middle of the accelerated country-wide re-survey efforts in preparation for the Article 5 extension request.[42] NPA reported in 2017 that there were positive trends and changes with the launch of the new version and assistance from GICHD to resolve discrepancies. Notably, NPA reported that it expected cancelation of a total of more than 10km2 of SHA and CHA in its areas of operations from the database purely through clean-up.[43]

In addition, HALO reported it had provided CNIDAH with a simple means to produce Geographic Information System (GIS)-based minefield maps for all remaining SHAs and CHAs, on a country-wide or province–by-province basis, in PDF formats, a functionality that the new version of IMSMA does not offer.[44] Its results from the re-surveys of Cunene and Namibe were electronically transferred and updated in the IMSMA NG database in February 2017 in collaboration with CNIDAH and the GICHD, along with web-based maps with satellite imagery provided through a HALO partnership with GIS mapping company ESRI.[45]

In Angola’s extension request, CNIDAH reported that efforts were underway to harmonize its database with CED data, but stated that further work on use and management of data was needed with respect to INAD, which is the guardian of the IMSMA database for the CED, the Demining Brigades of the Security Unit of the President of the Republic, the Angolan Armed Forces, and the Angola Border Guard Police.[46]

Quality management

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to handover of land to beneficiaries.[47]

In 2016, HALO indicated that QA at provincial level was generally weak, due to lack of funding and support. It stated that in its areas of operations worksite visits were minimal, although handover of task sites cleared by HALO had happened informally to allow beneficiaries to make timely use of their land.[48] NPA reported that CNIDAH conducted QC on several of its tasks during the year, while MAG stated that the CNIDAH team visited its operations regularly.[49]

Land Release (mines)

National re-survey

As of May 2017, when Angola submitted its Article 5 deadline extension request, it reported that re-survey had been completed in 12 provinces (Benguela, Bié, Cunene, Huambo, Huila, Kuando Kubango, Kwanza Norte, Kwanza Sul, Malanje, Namibe, Uige, and Zaire) and was ongoing in three (Bengo, Luanda, and Moxico), leaving a further three provinces (Cabinda, Lunda Norte, and Lunda Sul) to be addressed.[50]

While Angola’s latest Article 5 extension request sets the deadline for completion of the re-survey by 2017, as of September 2017, it was unlikely that it would be completed by the end of the year.[51] MAG reported that it began non-technical survey operations in Lunda Sul in June 2017 and Lunda Norte in July.[52]

Land release in 2016 (mines)

In 2016, according to operator records, there was an 11km2 increase in the amount of land canceled by non-technical survey from 136km2 in 2016 compared with 125km2 in 2015. This resulted from accelerated efforts to complete re-survey in preparation for the submission of the extension request. However, there were sharp decreases in the amount of land released through clearance and technical survey during the year, from 7.2km2 in 2015 to 2.4km2 in 2016, as funding and capacity for clearance continued to decrease.[53]

Survey results for 2016 (mines)

International operators reported canceling just over 136km2 of SHA through non-technical survey in 2016, and reducing a further 1.2km2 through technical survey, while confirming as contaminated 155 mined areas with a total size of nearly 7.8km2 (see table below).[54] This is compared to 2015 when nearly 125km2 of SHA was canceled through non-technical survey, 3.1km2 reduced through technical survey, and 274 areas with a total size of nearly 18km2 confirmed as mined.[55]

Mined area survey in 2016[56]

Operator

SHAs canceled

Area canceled (m²)

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

HALO (Bié)

0

0

0

0

52,856

HALO (Cunene)

123

109,603,523

35

2,690,287

0

HALO (Huambo)

1

647,534

5

246,708

199,853

HALO (Kuando Kubango)

0

0

4

262,860

187,221

HALO (Namibe)

8

3,244,895

3

253,790

0

MAG (Moxico)

73

22,769,701

102

3,964,777

201,980

NPA (Malanje)

4

72,365

6

378,550

435,657

NPA (Zaire)

0

0

0

0

121,145

Total

209

136,338,018

155

7,796,972

1,198,712

Note: TS = technical survey

Following the completion of a full re-survey of Huila and Kwanza Sul provinces in 2015, HALO was requested by CNIDAH to re-survey Cunene and Namibe provinces in 2016. According to HALO, both provinces had previously been surveyed by Santa Barbera, a German international organization, during the 2004–2007 Landmine Impact Survey (LIS), and a high number of SHAs were recorded. Despite demining in both provinces in 2007–2015, the national database did not accurately reflect remaining contamination.[57]

Upon conclusion of re-survey of Cunene province, HALO was able to cancel 97% of all previously recorded hazardous areas, reducing the number of areas recorded in the database from 143 SHAs and 25 CHAs to just 35 CHAs with a total size of just under 2.7km2. A significant amount of cancelation was due to areas of ERW contamination erroneously recorded as mined areas during the LIS. These were identified and destroyed by HALO. In Namibe province, HALO canceled 92% of all previously recorded hazardous areas, leaving a total of three CHAs covering 0.25km2 to be cleared. HALO reported that these three areas were legacy minefields near a government prison facility at Bantiaba, which the provincial government now wished to have cleared.[58]

In 2016, MAG canceled 22.8km2 by non-technical survey and reduced a further 0.2km2 through technical survey, while confirming as mined nearly 4km2.[59] In 2016, NPA canceled 0.07km2 through non-technical survey and reduced close to an additional 0.6km2 through technical survey.[60]

In 2016, NPA also reported that database clean-up in August 2016 resulted in cancelation of almost 8km2 of hazardous area in the provinces of Malanje, Uige, Kwanza Norte, and Zaire. It reported that a further 3.25km2 was canceled as a result of database clean-up in 2017.[61]

MAG’s re-survey of Moxico province identified a total of 244 tasks with a total size of more than 13.5km2 remaining. This marked the end of a three-year process to re-survey the province in which a total of 221 tasks were canceled and 108km2 canceled or reduced.[62]

Clearance results in 2016 (mines)

As set out in the table below, international NGO operators reported clearing a total of just over 1.2km2 of mined area in 2016, destroying in the process 1,255 antipersonnel mines, 1,071 antivehicle mines, and 86 items of ERW.[63] This is less than a third of clearance output in 2015, when operators cleared a total of 4.1km2 of mined area.[64]

Mine clearance in 2016[65]

Operator

Province

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO/AXO destroyed

HALO

Bié

3

33,227

0

0

2

Huambo

16

307,590

23

7

0

Huila

1

4,567

7

0

20

Kuando Kubango

12

459,175

982

964

3

MAG

Moxico

2

156,185

88

98

16

NPA

Malanje

10

231,566

155

0

45

Zaire

1

6,598

0

2

0

Total

 

45

1,198,908

1,255

1,071

86

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle

In addition, NPA reported destroying 11 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, and 88 items of ERW in spot tasks in 2016.[66] MAG destroyed a further 54 antipersonnel mines, 10 antivehicle mines, and 584 items of UXO in EOD spot tasks.[67] HALO reported completing 200 EOD spot tasks, during which 30 antipersonnel mines, seven antivehicle mines, and 1,572 items of ERW were destroyed.[68]

In March 2016, HALO launched a “Mine Impact Free Huambo” initiative, with the aim of completing clearance of Huambo province by 2018. With support from a consortium of partners including the US, Switzerland, and Japan, along with the Canton of Bern and DIGGER Foundation, HALO aimed to deploy 10 demining teams and a DIGGER D-250 tilling machine to complete clearance of Huambo within three years.[69]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

No land containing cluster munition contamination was reported to have been released by clearance or survey in 2016.

After finding the two Alpha bomblets in August 2016, HALO was planning to carry out limited battle area clearance around the reported area until fade-out. They were intending to perform this work, subject to funding, in July or August 2017, during Angola’s dry season when items can be more easily seen.[70] The area where the bomblets were found was being re-surveyed by HALO as part of efforts to improve the records in the national IMSMA database. No cluster munition specific survey is planned.[71]

Deminer safety

HALO reported that on 12 April 2016 one of its deminers initiated a Type 72 antipersonnel blast mine while excavating in a minefield in Huambo province, resulting in minor injuries.[72]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2012, Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 January 2018. Angola will not meet this deadline and has submitted a request for a further eight-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, through to the end of 2025.

While the request contains a realistic estimate of remaining contamination, it does not contain a workplan or projections and targets of areas to be addressed per year, or a corresponding detailed budget. It also fails to reflect the updated and improved data from the national database and contains inconsistencies between key figures in the narrative text and in the supporting annexes, as well as calculation errors and lengthy, inscrutable tables of data in Word format.[73]

Angola’s previous extension request submitted in March 2012 was presented as an “interim period” during which efforts would be undertaken to better estimate the extent of the contamination and sort out database issues through a national survey and a mapping project to geographically represent the extent of contamination.[74] The 2012 request listed the size of the country, the different mine-laying techniques used, the fact that the locations and number of mines were not recorded, and lack of resources as the main reasons for Angola’s inability to comply with its initial deadline. Another significant impeding factor noted was Angola’s information management problems.[75] The 2017 extension request also identifies a number of areas which could hamper progress and the achievement of the 2025 clearance deadline, including a lack of financial resources, weak institutional and operational capacity, withdrawal or decrease in capacity of NGOs, and unforeseen outbreaks and/or disasters.[76]

Under the 2017 extension request, nationwide re-survey is to be completed before the end of 2017 and clearance by the end of 2025. However, as of September 2017, it was more likely that the national re-survey could be completed before the end of 2018.

The government of Angola has provided significant funding for demining, but almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects, and it has faced severe budget cuts following the crash in oil prices. Clearance of rural areas has typically not been funded by the government, and assistance from international demining organizations has been vital to clear poor and rural areas.[77] Despite not funding mine action by international operators directly in 2016, the government continued to make available in-kind support, such as free use of land for office compounds, and institutional incentives such as tax exemptions on the import of goods.[78] At the same time, operators raised concerns that complicated, expensive, and lengthy visa processes and lengthy and costly bureaucratic procedures for customs clearance could hamper the provision of international assistance.[79] Under Article 6(8) of the Mine Ban Treaty, parties receiving international assistance are required to cooperate “with a view to ensuring the full and prompt implementation of agreed assistance programs.”

Operators have repeatedly raised serious concerns over an apparent lack of political interest or will from States Parties or international donors to support humanitarian demining operations in Angola, perhaps over perceptions about Angola’s status as a middle-income country.[80] However, the relatively brief boom in commodity prices and subsequent national economic crisis brought on by the fall of oil prices, which has resulted in a decrease in government revenue by more than half, severe budget cuts, and double-digit inflation, are jeopardizing the sustainability and existence of demining in the country.[81]

On 8 March 2017, International Women’s Day, HALO launched a project for “100 women in demining in Angola,” seeking to re-start demining in Benguela province, which stopped in 2014 due to lack of funding, despite 80 minefields remaining. In June 2017, training of the first two teams of female deminers began, with funding provided by the Swiss foundation World Without Mines.[82]

Prior to Angola’s submission of its latest Article 5 extension request in May 2017, the various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, have made it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola over the years. Additionally, data from the CED and commercial companies has not been made available. Angola has also failed to submit any updated annual Article 7 transparency reports since 2014.

According to the second extension request, in the period from the submission of its previous extension request of March 2012 through to April 2017, Angola reported that a total of 303 areas over 23.8km2 and 717km of road were cleared by humanitarian operators, along with the destruction of more than 15,600 antipersonnel mines, 900 antivehicle mines, and 2,830 items of UXO.[83]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted some mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

 



[1] “Second Article 5 extension request to the Ottawa Mine Ban Treaty, 2018–2025, Angola,” The National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH), 3 March 2017.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 5.

[3] Ibid.; and Portia Stratton and Chris Loughran, “Issue Brief: Time to Change Course, Angola and The Ottawa Treaty,” Mines Advisory Group (MAG), April 2017.

[4] Figures as of June 2014. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013), Form C.

[5] Email from Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 11 May 2016; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[6] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[7] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 19.

[9] Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[10] Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[11] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[12] The Alpha bomblet was developed in Rhodesia in 1970 and later in South Africa in the 1980s. It was produced to be incorporated into the CB470 cluster bomb, which contained 40 Alpha submunitions each and were designed to be dropped from baskets or “hoppers” in the bomb bays of bomber aircraft. Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and Weapons Systems, “CB470,” undated.

[13] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 3 May 2017.

[14] Interview with Jose Antonio, Site Manager, Cuando Cubango, HALO Trust, and Coxe Sucama, Director, INAD, in Menongue, 24 June 2011.

[15] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 3 May 2017.

[16] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 19 March 2013.

[17] According to reports from NGO operators in the national database at CNIDAH, cluster munition remnants ceased to be found in significant numbers after 2008, with the exception of HALO reporting finding and destroying 12 submunitions in 2012. Prior to this, as of February 2008, NPA reported clearing 13 submunitions in Kwanza Sul province; MAG reported clearing 140 submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO reported clearing 230 submunitions in Bié province. Email from Mohammad Qasim, UN Development Programme (UNDP)/CNIDAH, 22 February 2008. NPA reported finding no cluster munition remnants during its operations in northern Angola, with the exception of a small number of submunitions found in 2008. Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) reported that no cluster munition remnants had been discovered in its areas of operations in southeast Angola from 1997 through to May 2016. MAG’s Technical Operations Manager reported that the program had not found any cluster munition remnants since his arrival in 2013. Emails from Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, NPA, 11 May 2016; from Kenneth O’Connell, Technical Director, MgM, 5 May and 15 June 2016; from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Bill Marsden, Regional Director, East and Southern Africa, MAG, 18 May 2016.

[18] Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 3 May 2017; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 3 May 2017.

[19] Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 15 June 2016.

[20] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 19 March 2013.

[21] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 18 May 2016.

[22] Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017.

[23] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 19.

[24]Angola: Eliminação completa das minas e remanescentes da guerra ainda é longo – diz CNIDAH” (“CNIDAH says complete elimination of mines and remnants of war will take a long time”), ANGOP, 13 March 2015.

[25] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, pp. 5 and 11.

[26] MgM ended operations in November 2015 upon completion of its last task in Kuando Kubango, which formed part of an EU-funded project. In July 2017, MgM reported that it was seeking funding to continue work in the National Parks in Kuando Kubango province, which are to be included into the KAZA Trans-Frontier Conservation area. MgM was the only operator demining in the parks; it was on shutdown during 2016 while funding was sought to continue operations and redeploy equipment. Email from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 4 July 2017.

[27] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email, 1 October 2017.

[28] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails, 17 May and 17 October 2016. The EU has been a major donor in Angola. In 2013, its office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million ($25 million) for mine action in 2013–2017. After delays that have slowed demining operations, €18.9 million ($25 million) was finally provided through the 10th European Development Fund. However, during the tendering process for the 11th extension of the European Development Fund grant in 2015, a process run by the Angolan Ministry of Planning, the ministry decided that funding demining was not a priority, despite pleas from CNIDAH. Support for demining from the 10th European Development Fund ended in 2016.

[29] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[30] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and from Jeannette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[33] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[34] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[35] Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[36] CNIDAH, “Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period,” June 2014, p. 6.

[37] Including: Yola Comercial, Fragilpe, Kubuila, Prodminas, Mavaarum, OJK, VDS, PAFRA, Anglowest, Sedita, Teleservice, and Grupo Everest. CNIDAH, “Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period,” June 2014. According to CNIDAH, a total of 25 commercial companies conducted demining activities from 2012–2016. Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 17.

[38] Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.

[39] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.

[40] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017, and 11 May 2016; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017, and 17 October 2016; and from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.

[41] Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[42] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[43] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[44] Questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 12.

[47] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016.

[48] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[49] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[50] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, pp. 5 and 10.

[51] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[52] Email from Jeannette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[53] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017, and 11 May 2016; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017, and 17 October 2016; from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.

[54] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[55] Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016, and 17 October 2016; from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.

[56] Response to questionnaire Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

[57] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[60] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[61] Ibid., and 29 September 2017.

[62] Email from Jeannette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[63] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

[64] Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016, and 17 October 2016; from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016.

[65] Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016, and 17 October 2016; from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Kenneth O’Connell, MgM, 5 May 2016. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

[66] Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May and 29 September 2017.

[67] Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[68] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 3 May 2017.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[74] Statement of Angola, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Standing Committee on Mine Action, Geneva, 23 May 2012.

[75] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 30 October 2012.

[76] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 22.

[77] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[78] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[79] Ibid.; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[80] Stratton and Loughran, “Issue Brief: Time to Change Course, Angola and The Ottawa Treaty,” MAG, April 2017; and response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[81] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2016.

[82] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[83] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, pp. 5 and 11.