Azerbaijan

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 02 August 2017

Summary: Non-signatory Azerbaijan states that it cannot consider accession to the convention until its territorial dispute with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and other occupied territories is resolved. Azerbaijan has not participated in a meeting of the convention, but voted in favor of a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2016.

Azerbaijan is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but inherited a stockpile of cluster munitions from the Soviet Union. There is credible evidence that cluster munitions were used in Nagorno-Karabakh in April 2016. Armenia and Azerbaijan have accused each other of using cluster munitions, and both denied it.

Policy

The Republic of Azerbaijan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Azerbaijan says it cannot join the convention until the conflict with Armenia is resolved, including the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan last commented on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in August 2010, when a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official expressed support for the convention, but said Azerbaijan cannot join “at this stage” because of the “ongoing occupation” by Armenia of Nagorno-Karabakh and “seven areas adjoining regions” of Azerbaijan.[1]

In December 2016, Azerbaijan voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[2] Azerbaijan also voted in favor of the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[3]

Azerbaijan participated in some of the Oslo Process meetings that led to the creation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[4]

Unlike other non-signatories, Azerbaijan has not participated as an observer in any of the convention’s meetings. It was invited to, but did not attend the convention’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016.

Azerbaijan has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[5]

Azerbaijan is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty or the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Azerbaijan is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it inherited a stockpile of cluster munitions from the Soviet Union. Jane’s Information Group has reported that RBK-250, RBK-250-275, and RBK-500 cluster bombs are in service with the country’s air force.[6] RBK-250 bombs with PTAB submunitions were observed among the abandoned Soviet-era ammunition stockpiles located near the village of Saloğlu in the northwestern part of the country in 2005.[7]

Azerbaijan received 50 Extra surface-to-surface missiles from Israel for its Lynx multi-barrel rocket launchers in 2008–2009.[8] According to the manufacturer’s previous product information sheet, the Extra missile can have either a unitary or submunition warhead, but the variant acquired by Azerbaijan is not known.[9] The manufacturer also stated that the Lynx rocket launch system is “capable of firing various artillery rockets & tactical missiles, including GRAD, LAR, EXTRA and DELILAH-GL precision attack weapon.”[10]

Azerbaijan also possesses Grad 122mm and Smerch 300mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads.[11] Azerbaijan acquired 12 Smerch 300mm surface-to-surface rocket launchers from Ukraine in 2007–2008.[12]

Use

There is credible evidence that at least two types of ground-fired cluster munition rockets were used in Nagorno-Karabakh during the first week of April 2016, during fighting across the line of contact separating local Armenian-backed separatists and Azerbaijani forces. Ground fighting was confined to areas close to the line of contact, but Azerbaijan launched artillery and rockets more than 10 kilometers into Nagorno-Karabakh from 1 April until 5 April 2016, when a ceasefire went into effect.[13]

On 8 April 2016, the HALO Trust began emergency clearance operation in cooperation with Nagorno-Karabakh’s Emergency Situations Service and within 10 days reported the clearance and destruction of close to 200 unexploded M095 DPICM-type submunitions near the villages of Nerkin Horatagh and Mokhratagh, close to the town of Martakert in northeast Nagorno-Karabakh.[14] HALO also found remnants of Israeli-produced LAR-140 surfaced-fired rockets, which deliver the M095 DPICM submunitions.[15] The cluster munitions were reportedly fired from Azerbaijan.[16]

Media documented the remnants of the cargo section of 9M55K 300mm Smerch rockets in the southeast of Hardut district near the borders with Azerbaijan and Iran.[17] Correspondents from Russian media outlet Sputnik photographed remnants of the cargo section of a 9M55K-series Smerch rocket in a cemetery outside the village of Shukyurbeyli in Hadrut region. According to the report filed on 6 April 2016, Azerbaijan fired the Smerch rockets on the night of 4 April.[18]

Azerbaijan and Armenia have both denied using cluster munitions in the brief conflict and accused the other side of using cluster munitions against civilians. Cluster Munition Monitor was not able to conduct an independent investigation to make a conclusive determination about responsibility for this cluster munition use.

On 28 April 2016, a spokesperson from Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that “Cluster munitions used by the Armenian troops against the civilian Azerbaijani population living densely along the line of contact aimed at intentional destruction of manpower, do not bear any military goal and serve solely to perpetrate mass killings among the civilians. Unexploded cluster ordinances [sic] are source of threat for the lives and property of civilians for a long period of time.”[19] Azerbaijan media published a photograph on 27 April 2016 showing an item it alleged was a “POM-1” cluster munition used by Armenia.[20] However, the photographs do not show cluster munitions, but rather the coolant bottle for a thermal site used on an antitank guided missile system.



[1] Statement by Elchin Huseynli, Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Baku, 2 August 2010. The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines organized this roundtable meeting on the mine and cluster munition problem in Azerbaijan and globally. “Azerbaijan will not join the UN Convention on the prohibition of cluster munitions,” Zerkalo (newspaper), 3 August 2010; and Letter No. 115/10/L from Amb. Murad N. Najafbayli, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the UN in Geneva, 10 May 2010.

[2]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.

[3]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[4] For details on Azerbaijan’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 188.

[5]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 70/234, 23 December 2015. Azerbaijan voted in favor of similar resolutions in 2013–2014.

[6] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 835.

[7] Human Rights Watch visit to Saloğlu, May 2005.

[8] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Arms Transfers Database.” Recipient report for Azerbaijan for the period 1950–2011, generated on 15 May 2012. According to SIPRI, the Azerbaijani designation for the Lynx multiple rocket launchers are Dolu-1, Leysan, and Shimsek.

[9] Israel Military Industries, “Product Information Sheet: Extra Extended Range Artillery,” undated, p. 3.

[10] IMI Systems, “LYNX - Advanced Artillery Rockets & Autonomous Launching System,” undated.

[11] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 88; and Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition, 15 January 2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008).

[12] SIPRI, “Arms Transfers Database.” Recipient report for Azerbaijan for the period 1950–2011, generated on 15 May 2012.

[13] HALO Trust, “HALO Begins Emergency Clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “NK’s Emergency Situations Service & HALO have destroyed 200+#clustermunitions since clearance resumed in #Karabakh,” 9:14am, 20 April 2016, Tweet.

[14] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO's assessment of new #clustermunition contamination is underway near Mokhratagh village, Martakert, #Karabakh,” 6:39am, 14 April 2016, Tweet; and HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “Rapid assessment of new #clustermunition strikes in #Karabakh has allowed HALO to establish the footprint (extent),” 8:19am, 6 May 2016, Tweet.

[15] HALO NagornoKarabakh (@HALO_NK), “HALO starts emergency clearance of #clustermunition(s) in Nerkin Horatagh village, Martakert, #Karabakh,” 6:19am, 12 April 2016, Tweet.

[16] Roberto Travan, “Nagorno-Karabakh, A 25-Year Border War Reignites With Religion,” La Stampa, republished in English by World Crunch, 11 June 2016.

[17] Murad Gazdiev (@MuradoRT), “@MarkHiznay South-East of Hardut. Right where NKR, Azerbaijan and Iran borders cross. Exact coordinates in pic,” 1:37am, 5 April 2016, Tweet; and Alexandru Cociorvel (@AlexandruC4), “Azerbaijani "cluster bomb" that fell on NKR last night. Patches of burned ground all around  http://caucasus.liveuamap.com/en/2016/5-april-azerbaijani-cluster-bomb-that-fell-on-nkr-last-night …,” 11:22am, 5 April 2016, Tweet.

[18]Traces of war in Karabakh,” Sputnik, 4 April 2016.

Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 23 October 2017

Policy

The Republic of Azerbaijan has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. It has stated that it supports the goals of the treaty, including a comprehensive ban, but that it “cannot accede to the Ottawa Convention without settlement of the armed conflict, restoration of territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and having a threat of hostility resumption, even though Azerbaijan stopped planting of additional mines…Therefore adherence to the Ottawa Convention will be possible only after the final settlement of the conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia.”[1]

Still, Azerbaijan has demonstrated support for the treaty. It has voted in favor of the annual UN General Assembly resolution promoting universalization of the treaty every year since 2005, including Resolution 74/34 in 2016. Azerbaijan submitted voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency reports in 2008 and 2009. While the reports have details about mine clearance, victim assistance, and mine risk education, they do not include any information on Azerbaijan’s stockpiled antipersonnel mines.

Azerbaijan did not attend the 2014 Mine Ban Treaty Review Conference in Maputo, or the 15th Meeting of States Parties in Santiago in November–December 2016. It last attended a Meeting of States Parties in 2010.

Azerbaijan is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, and use

The disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh is contaminated by landmines, remnants from the Nagorno-Karabakh War fought from 1992–94 between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan has stated on several occasions that it does not produce or export antipersonnel mines.[2] Azerbaijan’s landmine stockpile is a legacy of the Soviet era, but the types and quantities in the stockpile is not known.

Officials have stated that Azerbaijan has not used antipersonnel mines since the end of open conflict with Armenia in 1994. They have also said that while Azerbaijan does not intend to use antipersonnel mines in the future, it does not rule out the possibility.[3] Azerbaijan apparently has not taken any specific legal measures to prohibit production, trade, or use of antipersonnel mines.



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period June 2000–November 2008), Form A.

[2] Ibid. In June 2005, Azerbaijan said that it is “unilaterally committed to non producing and non accumulating” of antipersonnel mines. Statement of Azerbaijan, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 13 June 2005.

[3] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 844. See also, Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for the period June 2000–November 2008), Form A.

Mine Action

Last updated: 13 December 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (heavy contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), other unexploded ordnance (UXO), and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Non-signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty

At the end of 2015, almost 70km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination was suspected in areas under government control in the Republic of Azerbaijan. No update on the total mine contamination was provided for the end of 2016. In 2016, 1.47km2 was reduced by technical survey and 0.83km2 was cleared, with the destruction of two antivehicle mines, but no antipersonnel mines. This was a decrease from 2015. During battle area clearance (BAC), 17 antipersonnel mines were destroyed.

No cluster munition contamination has been reported since 2011 in areas under government control.

There is mine and cluster munition contamination in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, including new cluster munition contamination occurring in 2016 (see Nagorno-Karabakh’s Mine Action profile for details).

Recommendation for action

  • Azerbaijan should report on its plans and timelines for clearance of all known or suspected mined areas under its effective control.

Contamination

Mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination in Azerbaijan is the consequence of the 1988–1994 armed conflict with Armenia—which saw landmines laid by both sides—and ammunition abandoned by the Soviet army in 1991. The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh (see separate report on Nagorno-Karabakh). Apart from Nagorno-Karabakh, the adjoining districts of Gubadly, Jabrayil, Kelbajar, Lachin, and Zangilan, and parts of Aghdam, Fizuli, and Tartar are under the control of Armenian forces, and are suspected to contain mines and UXO.[1]

In government-controlled areas of Azerbaijan, no cluster munition contamination has been reported since clearance last took place in 2011. However, there are significant quantities of cluster munition remnants in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, including new contamination occurring in 2016 (see Nagorno-Karabakh’s Mine Action profile for details).

Mine contamination

The precise extent of contamination from antipersonnel mines in Azerbaijan is unknown, as Armenian forces currently occupy a significant area of the country where considerable contamination exists. The area suspected to contain antipersonnel mine contamination in Azerbaijan as of the end of 2016 has not been publicly reported. At the end of 2015, 69.9km2 of area was suspected to contain antipersonnel mines.[2] The extent of contamination in areas occupied by Armenia is unknown, although the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has suggested that contamination may cover between 350km2 and 830km2, and contain between 50,000 and 100,000 mines.[3]

Cluster munition contamination

In government-controlled areas of Azerbaijan, no cluster munition contamination has been reported since clearance last took place in 2011. However, there are significant quantities of cluster munition remnants in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, including new contamination occurring in 2016 (see Nagorno-Karabakh’s Mine Action profile for details).

The precise extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants is unknown as Armenian forces currently occupy a significant area of the country where the contamination exists. There may also be some minimal contamination in territory under government control.

In 1988, a decision by the parliament of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Province to secede from Azerbaijan and join Armenia led to hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan from 1988 to 1994. Large quantities of cluster munitions were dropped from the air during the conflict.

In 2007, the Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzCBL) surveyed cluster munition contamination in the non-occupied border regions of Azerbaijan. It concluded that cluster munitions (among other ordnance) had been used in the Aghdam and Fizuli regions.[4] In 2006 and 2007, remnants were found in and around warehouses at a former Soviet ammunition storage area located at Saloglu in the Agstafa district, where clearance was completed in July 2011.[5]

In addition, significant cluster munition remnants have been identified in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.[6] On 1 April 2016, intense fighting broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh along the frontline pitting Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces against those of Azerbaijan. While ground fighting was confined to areas close to the Line of Contact, artillery fire penetrated more than 10km into Nagorno-Karabakh, and included the use of cluster munitions, which resulted in an estimated 2km2 of new cluster munition contamination in Nagorno-Karabakh.[7] No cluster munition contamination has been reported on the Azerbaijan-controlled side of the Line of Contact.A ceasefire was agreed upon on 5 April 2016 (see the separate report on Nagorno-Karabakh).

Other explosive remnants of war

Other areas are confirmed or suspected to contain ERW, which include both UXO and AXO. These include former military testing areas, including the former Soviet firing and training ranges at Jeyranchel in the Agstafa region and in Kirdagh; and a former shooting range in Ganja.[8]

Program Management

ANAMA reports to the deputy prime minister as head of the State Commission for Reconstruction and Rehabilitation.[9] In April 1999, ANAMA established the Azerbaijan Mine Action Program, a joint project of the government of Azerbaijan and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).[10] A joint working group, established in December 1999 and consisting of representatives from various ministries, provides regular guidance to ANAMA.[11]

ANAMA is tasked with planning, coordinating, managing, and monitoring mine action in the country. It also conducts demining along with two national operators
it contracts: Dayag-Relief Azerbaijan (RA) and the International Eurasia Press Fund (IEPF).[12] No commercial company is active in mine action in Azerbaijan.

ANAMA manages the mine action program visits headquarters based in Baku, the regional office in Fizuli, and regional training center in Goygol, and three operational centers located in Aghjabedi, Agstafa, and Terter.[13]

The UNDP provides support to ANAMA, and will continue to do so until 2019, as part of a project to support
the institutional capacity of ANAMA for mine/UXO clearance, risk education, and victim assistance.[14]

Strategic planning

ANAMA is integrated into the State Social and Economic Development program.[15] The current mine action strategy is for 2013–2018.[16] ANAMA’s long-term strategy is to clear the occupied territories as and when they become released.[17]

Legislation and standards

As of June 2017, Azerbaijan was still in the process of adopting a mine action law, with draft legislation under review by the Cabinet of Ministers.[18] Once adopted, it will regulate mine action in Azerbaijan, governing issues such as licensing, accreditation, quality assurance (QA), and tender procedures.[19]

Azerbaijan also has its own National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), which were adopted in 2001 and subsequently revised in 2003, 2004, and 2010.[20]

Operators

As of the end of 2016, ANAMA employed 619 operational and administrative staff and had 44 mine detection dogs (MDDs) and six demining machines.[21] Included in this capacity are two national demining NGOs, IEPF and RA, which are contracted for mine clearance. Together they employ 172 operational and administrative staff. ANAMA also has an MDD breeding and training center.[22]

Quality management

In 2016, one battle area site required re-clearance (83,125m2), with 29 items of UXO and 87 related components found to have been missed by the original clearance.[23]

Land Release (mines)

The total mined area released by clearance and technical survey in 2016 was almost 2.3km2,[24] a reduction compared to the almost 5.36km2 of clearance and technical survey in 2015.[25]

Survey in 2016 (mines)

A total of almost 1.47km2 was reduced by technical survey in 2016, of which 0.93km2 was reduced by technical survey using mechanical assets,[26] and 0.54km2 by technical survey using MDDs.[27]

Clearance in 2016 (mines)

Azerbaijan cleared almost 0.83km2 of mined area in 2016, comprising 0.65km2 of manual clearance and 0.18km2 of mine clearance with the support of MDDs. During clearance only two antivehicle mines were destroyed (see table below).[28] This is a significant decrease in area cleared compared to 2015, when AMAMA cleared almost 1.5km2 of mined land; 1.04km2 through manual clearance and 0.45km2 with MDD support.[29]

Besides the mined area along the confrontation line (in the accessible territories of the Nagorno-Karabakh region), ANAMA conducts manual mine clearance operations around former military facilities.[30]

Mine clearance in 2016[31]

Operator

Mined areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed*

AV mines destroyed*

UXO destroyed*

ANAMA CT

3

148,115

0

0

0

IEPT

4

342,134

0

2

2

RA

4

338,009

0

0

0

Total

11

828,258

0

2

2

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle mine.
* Table includes the items destroyed only during mine clearance and not technical survey.

Battle area clearance and EOD spots tasks

AMAMA tasks its emergency response team (ERT) or the national NGOs—depending on the location of the call-out—to respond to EOD requests from the local community, government bodies, and international humanitarian organizations.[32] ANAMA reported that EOD tasks were conducted daily following the short but intense fighting pitting Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh forces against those of Azerbaijan in April 2016.[33] ANAMA, IEPF, and RA responded to a total of 811 requests in 2016, during which they found 5,404 explosive items in 26 regions of Azerbaijan.[34]

Furthermore, during 2016 ANAMA completed the second phase of the three-phase Azerbaijan National Action Plan (NAP)/NATO PfP Trust fund project, at the former artillery shooting range in Jeyranchel, in the Agstafa region, along the Azerbaijan-Georgian border.[35] ANAMA also continued implementation of the Ganja and Kirdagh UXO clearance projects of former military testing ranges. During ERW clearance in 2016, ANAMA cleared 100 sites, totaling 50.5km2, during which it destroyed 17 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, and 30,201 items of ERW; IEPF cleared 22 sites, totaling nearly 12km2, during which it destroyed 2,237 items of ERW; and RA cleared 24 sites, totaling nearly 3.2km2, during which it destroyed 665 items of ERW.[36]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

No land containing cluster munition remnants was reported to have been released by clearance or survey in territory under government control in 2016.[37]

Progress towards completion

Over the last five years, 15.4km2 of mined area
has been cleared in Azerbaijan, but mine clearance output has decreased sharply over the last two years (see table below).

Mine clearance in 2012–2016[38]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

0.83

2015

1.49

2014

4.80

2013

4.63

2012

3.65

Total

15.4

 

Currently, 90% of mine action in Azerbaijan is state funded.[39]

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

 



[1] Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2014,” p. 7.

[2] Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Officer, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

[3] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 5.

[4] AzCBL, “Information Bulletin,” January 2008.

[5] ANAMA, “Saloglu Project,” undated.

[6] Interview with Nazim Ismayilov, Director, ANAMA, Baku, 2 April 2010; see also Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Mines Action Canada, Ottawa, 2009), p. 188.

[7] Email from Andrew Moore, Caucasus and Balkans Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 26 May 2016; and HALO Trust, “HALO Trust begins emergency clearance in Karabakh,” 19 April 2016.

[8] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 16.

[9] Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Azerbaijan,” March 2012, Executive Summary.

[10] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 11.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 11.

[14] UNDP, “UNDP Mine Action Programme: Azerbaijan,” April 2016.

[15] Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

[16] Email from Parviz Gidayev, ANAMA, 20 May 2015; and ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 10.

[17] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2014,” p. 5; and GICHD, “Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Azerbaijan,” March 2012, Executive Summary.

[18] Email from Sabina Sarkarova, Public Relations Officer, ANAMA, 5 June 2017.

[19] Email from Parviz Gidayev, ANAMA, 20 May 2015; and ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2014.”

[20] Email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

[21] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 11.

[22] Ibid., pp. 12 and 14.

[23] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 25.

[24] Ibid., pp. 13, 14, and 16.

[25] ANAMA, “ANAMA Monthly Report for August 2016.”

[26] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 16.

[27] Ibid., p. 14; and ANAMA, “ANAMA Monthly Report for January 2017.”

[28] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 13; and ANAMA, “ANAMA Monthly Report for January 2017.”

[29] ANAMA, “ANAMA Monthly Report for August 2015,” and “ANAMA Monthly Report for August 2016”; and email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

[30] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” p. 13.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid., pp. 9 and 16.

[33] Ibid., p. 17.

[34] Ibid., p. 18.

[35] Ibid., p. 16.

[36] Ibid.

[37] ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2017,” undated; and email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 5 June 2017.

[38] See Landmine Monitor and Mine Action Review reports on clearance in Azerbaijan covering clearance in 2012–2015.

[39] G. Ahmadov, “Advocating Mine Action to Government of Azerbaijan,” Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email from Tural Mammadov, ANAMA, 19 October 2016.

Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 16 December 2013

In 2012, the government of the Republic of Azerbaijan contributed US$10.4 million to mine action through the Azerbaijan National Agency of Mine Action (ANAMA); this is approximate to the amount contributed in 2011. This amount also represents one of the largest contributions in terms of percentage that a national government contributes to its own mine action program. Since 2008, the government of Azerbaijan has contributed 82% of the total cost of the program.

International support in 2012 was slightly more than the five-year average of $1.9 million. The NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, combined with $257,816 from Norway, contributed $1,784,733 specifically towards the clearance of the former Soviet-era training base at Jeyranchel on the Georgia-Azerbaijan border.

International contributions in 2012[1]

Donor Country

Sector

National currency

Amount ($)

NATO PfP Fund

Clearance

$1,526,917

1,526,917

UNDP

Clearance

$300,000

300,000

Norway

Clearance

NOK1,500,000

257,816

Australia

Victim assistance

A$50,000

51,795

Slovenia

Victim assistance

$11,766

11,766

Total

 

 

2,148,294

 

Summary of contributions in 2008–2012[2]

Year

National contributions ($)

International contributions ($)

2012

10,421,508

2,148,294

2011

10,203,713

1,649,243

2010

8,997,993

2,190,927

2009

8,086,793

2,176,208

2008

6,312,500

1,723,262

Total

44,022,507

9,887,934

 

 



[1] Australia, Convention on Conventional Weapons Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, Form B, 28 March 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire by Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2013; International Trust Fund Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2012,” Slovenia, 2013, p. 36; ANAMA, “Annual Report 2012,” Baku, p. 5. Average exchange rate for 2012: NOK5.8181=US$1 and A$1=US$1.0359. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 3 January 2013.

[2] See Landmine Monitor reports 2008–2011; and ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: Azerbaijan: Support for Mine Action,” 19 September 2012.

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 27 October 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

2,439 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (383 killed; 2,056 injured)

Casualties in 2016

14 (2015: 22)

2016 casualties by survival outcome

2 killed; 12 injured (2015: 3 killed; 19 injured)

 

The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzCBL) recorded 14 casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan (excluding Nagorno Karabakh); two people were killed (one civilians and one military personnel) and 12 were injured (six civilians and six military). All casualties were male. The mine/ERW casualties in 2016 occurred in nine incidents in the regions of Fizuli, Goranboy, Qazakh, Aghdam, Tovuz, Aghstafa, and Sumqayit city.[1]

The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) recorded four mine/ERW casualties for 2016; one person killed and three injured.[2]

The variation in past annual casualty figures reported by key actors is due to differing collection methodologies. ANAMA collects casualty data through a network of district representatives and from media reports. Only incidents that occur in mine/ERW hazard areas and can be verified are recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). The AzCBL gathers information in affected districts (except the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic) from its regional coordinators, civil and military hospitals, and rehabilitation centers, as well as from the local media.[3]

The total number of casualties from mines/ERW in Azerbaijan is unknown. From 1999 when it first started recording casualty data to the end of 2013, the AzCBL identified 451 casualties (100 killed; 338 injured; 13 unknown). According to the informal information available to the AzCBL, there have been some 3,000 mines/ERW casualties in Azerbaijan, including almost 500 people killed. Most of the mines/ERW casualties occurred in 1991–1994, during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[4]

ANAMA reported a total of 2,439 mine/ERW casualties (383 killed; 2,056 injured) in Azerbaijan from the early 1990s to the end of 2016.[5]



[1] Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, Director, AzCBL, 10 January 2017.

[2] ANAMA, “Monthly Report July 2017,” undated but 2017.

[3] ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010).

[4] See past profiles for Azerbaijan on the Monitor website; and email from Hafiz Safikhanov, AzCBL, 15 January 2014.

[5] ANAMA, “Monthly Report July 2017,” undated but 2017.

Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 11 March 2016

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2014

2,440 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (384 killed; 2,056 injured)

Casualties in 2014

25 (2013: 13)

2014 casualties by outcome

6 killed; 19 injured

 

The Azerbaijan Campaign to Ban Landmines (AzCBL) recorded 25 casualties from mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) on the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan (excluding Nagorno Karabakh); six people were killed (two civilians and four military personnel) and 19 were injured (seven civilians and twelve military). All casualties were male. The mine/ERW casualties occurred in 15 incidents (nine antipersonnel mine; four antivehicle mine and two unexploded ordnance, UXO) in the regions of Fizuli, Kazakh, Ter-Ter, Tovuz, Goychay, Sadarak, Sumgait and Baku city (in a military training area). It is possible that other casualties may have occurred for which reporting was not available.[1] In 2013, AzCBL recorded 13 mine/ERW casualties from incidents which occurred in the regions of Gazakh, Ter-Ter, Tovuz, and Absheron, as well as at a military training area in Baku.[2]

The Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) recorded 22 mine/ ERW casualties for 2014; six people were killed (two civilians and four soldiers) and 16 injured (five civilians and eleven soldiers). All casualties were male.[3] ANAMA recorded eight casualties for 2013.[4]

Variation in past annual casualty data reported by key actors is due to differing collection methodologies. ANAMA collects casualty data through a network of district representatives and from media reports. Only incidents that occur in mine/ERW hazard areas and can be verified are recorded in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). AzCBL gathers information in affected districts (except the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic) from its regional coordinators, civil and military hospitals, and rehabilitation centers, as well as from the local media.[5]

The total number of casualties from mines/ERW in Azerbaijan is unknown. From 1999 when it first started recording casualty data to the end of 2013, AzCBL identified 451 casualties (100 killed; 338 injured; 13 unknown). According to the informal information available to AzCBL, there have been some 3,000 mines/ERW casualties in Azerbaijan, including almost 500 people killed. Most of the mines/ERW casualties occurred in 1991–1994 during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[6]

ANAMA reported a total of 2,415 mine/ERW casualties (378 killed; 2,037 injured) in Azerbaijan from the early 1990s to the end of 2014.[7]

Victim Assistance

At least 1,843 mine/ERW survivors were known to be still living in Azerbaijan as of the end of 2010, when data was last cross-checked.[8]

Victim assistance coordination

ANAMA is the government focal point for victim assistance. Implementation of the Mine Victim Assistance (MVA) Strategy of the Azerbaijan Mine Action Program was coordinated through the MVA Working Group, led by ANAMA, which included national NGOs, the Azerbaijan Red Crescent Society (AzRCS), and other relevant organizations.[9] Victim assistance was carried out within the broader UNDP- and ANAMA-agreed project “Further expansion of mine action capacity in Azerbaijan” (2011–2015).[10]

The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population (MLSPP) and the Ministry of Health are responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities more generally.[11]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Regional centers for the rehabilitation of persons with disabilities existed in 14 municipalities of Azerbaijan.[12] The MLSPP provided rehabilitation and prostheses through these regional rehabilitation centers and through the Rehabilitation Center of Invalids of the Republic in Baku.

AzCBL continued to raise awareness among survivors and persons with disabilities about their rights and current relevant legislation. It also assisted mine/ERW survivors in the Fizuli, Beylaqan, and Imishli regions directly by providing professional legal assistance and supporting survivors through the legal processes necessary to access ongoing benefits and support. This legal assistance had not previously been available in those regions. Eighteen people with disabilities received legal advice organized in the frame of the project. The beneficiaries included landmine survivors, disabled people of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and veterans (former Soviet Union) with disabilities from armed conflict in Afghanistan.[13]

National legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. There was no legislation mandating access to public or other buildings for persons with disabilities, and most buildings were not accessible.[14]

Azerbaijan ratified the CRPD and its Optional Protocol on 28 January 2009.



[1] Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, Director, AzCBL20 March 2015.

[2] Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, Director, AzCBL, 15 January 2014; and “Mine explosions killed 4, injured 9 in Azerbaijan last year,” 16 January 2014.

[3] Data provided by Vagif Sadigov, ANAMA, 19 March 2015.

[4] ANAMA, “Monthly Report June 2014,” undated but 2014.

[5] ICBL, Landmine Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010).

[6] See past profiles for Azerbaijan on the Monitor website; and email from Hafiz Safikhanov, AzCBL, 15 January 2014.

[7] ANAMA, “Monthly Report September 2014,” undated but 2014; and data provided by Vagif Sadigov, ANAMA, 19 March 2015.

[8] ANAMA, “Mine Victim Assistance, one of the pillars of the Humanitarian Mine Action.” undated. The total was calculated by ANAMA through victim assistance projects and crosschecking of the casualty database.

[9] Interview with Imran Safaraliyev, Mine Victim Assistance Officer, ANAMA, 28 February 2011; AzRCS, “Annual Report 2012,” Baku (undated), p. 37; and ANAMA, “Mine Victim Assistance, one of the pillars of the Humanitarian Mine Action”.

[11] United States (US) “2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Azerbaijan,” Washington, DC, 25 June 2015..

[13] Email from Hafiz Safikhanov, AzCBL, 23 January 2014.

[14] US Department of State, “2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Azerbaijan,” Washington, DC, 25 June 2015.