Georgia

Mine Action

Last updated: 13 December 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (light contamination) and unexploded ordnance (UXO) (extent of contamination unknown), possibly including cluster munition remnants.[1]

Not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

At the end of 2016, Georgia had at almost 2km2 of known mined areas in addition to two areas of unknown size, a level unchanged since the end of 2015. In 2016, 7,406m2 of mined area was cleared and 70,052m2 reduced through technical survey. A total of 19 antipersonnel mines were destroyed and 18,877m2 was confirmed as mined. The technical survey which commenced in July 2015 of the Red Bridge minefield was suspended one month later. As of May 2017, the survey had not been permitted to resume.

In 2016, two submunitions were found and destroyed, and reports were made of further suspected contamination. Prior to this, Georgia had been believed to be free of cluster munition contamination, following clearance in 2014, with the possible exception of South Ossetia.

Recommendation for action

  • Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the Red Bridge border minefield.

Mine Contamination

Georgia has almost 2km2 of mined area across seven minefields, as set out in the table below.[2] This includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri district, which is in a military zone and Khojali mountain, in Mestia district, on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with the Abkhazia region, where the size of mined and battle areas is not known. Contamination comprises both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

 

Mine contamination (as of end 2016)[3]

Region

District

Village

Contamination

Mined areas

Area (m2)

Kvemo Kartli

Marneuli

Kachagani (Red Bridge)

AP and AV mines

1

1,863,813

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2

AP mines

2

4,275

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Kadoeti*

AP and AV mines

1

23,783

Imereti

Terjola

Chognari (former military base)

AP and AV mines, and UXO

1

62,034

Shida Kartli

Kashuri

Osiauri (Military zone)

AP mines

1

N/K

Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti

Mestia

Khojali**

AP mines

1

N/K

Total

     

7

1,953,905

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle; UXO = unexploded ordnance; N/K = not known.
* Located at the ABL with South Ossetia. As of May 2017, HALO Trust did not have access to the minefield.
** Khojali minefield is located on a mountain at the ABL with Abkhazia. As of May 2017, HALO Trust did not have access to the minefield.


Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases.[4]

As of the end of 2016, Georgia had some 1.95km2 of mined area across seven minefields (see table above).[5] This includes an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[6] The Red Bridge minefield is Georgia’s largest minefield and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.[7]

There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result of the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more recent 2008 conflict with Russia. HALO Trust has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date, has not been granted access. South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO demining operators.

Antipersonnel mine contamination in Georgia has a social, economic, and humanitarian impact. Mined areas are accessible by local populations, and at the Red Bridge minefield, for example, territory is used for herding cattle.[8]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Following clearance of a cluster munition-contaminated area in 2014, Georgia, including Abkhazia, was believed to be free of contamination from cluster munition remnants, with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which is occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO clearance operators.

In 2016, however, Georgia reported the discovery of two submunitions, destroyed by the State Security Agency of Georgia, as part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs in the Shida Kartli region.[9] In April and July 2016, local communities in this region of Georgia reported finding several submunitions since clearance was completed.[10] As of May 2017, HALO Trust was in the process of conducting non-technical survey to investigate each of the call-outs. Several more submunitions had been discovered by July 2017 during non-technical survey,[11] and technical survey may be needed to determine the nature of the contamination: whether it belongs to previously undiscovered contaminated areas, whether it results from missed items in previously cleared areas, or whether it is a result of items being picked up and moved by local people.[12]

Prior to the recently identified submunitions, the last cluster munition contamination was discovered and cleared in 2014, during HALO operations along the Administrative Boundary Line, also in the Shida Kartli region.[13]

Furthermore, Georgia has reported that its National Mine Action Authority has not been able to conduct quality assurance/quality control in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (in South Ossetia), and that whether these regions are indeed free of cluster munition remnants is dependent on the quality of earlier clearance.[14]

Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which both Georgian and Russian forces used cluster munitions. After the end of the conflict and through December 2009, HALO cleared some 37km2 in Georgian-controlled territory of submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[15] In May 2010, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) completed clearance of its tasked areas.[16]

HALO Trust believes that the August 2008 conflict was likely to have resulted in some cluster munition contamination in South Ossetia, but it has no way of determining the level of possible contamination, or what, if any, clearance may have been conducted.[17]

Other explosive remnants of war

Following the 2008 conflict with Russia, there was evidence of UXO in South Ossetia, although its extent remains unclear. In addition, UXO contamination in Georgia persists in former firing ranges.[18]

Program Management

The Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC) is the Georgian Mine Action Authority, under the State Military Scientific Technical Center—known as “DELTA”—an entity within the Ministry of Defense. It is tasked to coordinate and execute action to address the ERW threat.[19] The primary task of the ERWCC is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, including quality assurance/quality control, and to facilitate the creation and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[20] The ERWCC was established with the support of the international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP).[21]

Strategic planning

Georgia has identified clearance of the Red Bridge minefield as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.[22]

Standards

Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) have been drafted in accordance with IMAS and as of September 2017 were awaiting completion in coordination with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[23] Once finalized, the NTSGs will be translated and sent to parliament for approval.[24]

Quality management

Under the control of DELTA, the ERWCC now conducts quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC).[25] iMMAP has also conducted training on quality management for the QA/QC section of ERWCC, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

Operators

HALO Trust conducts clearance in Georgia, but NGOs are not permitted to clear land belonging to the military.[26] HALO Trust employed three teams of seven deminers in 2016,[27] trained in both mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) and deployed as required.[28] While the number of demining teams increased due to the mine clearance task at Chognari, where HALO also deployed three demining machings, BAC capacity decreased as the Udabno BAC task is due to be completed in 2017.[29] HALO did not conduct cluster munition clearance in 2016. However, it was conducting cluster munition survey (both non-technical and technical) in 2017, and will conduct necessary clearance.[30]

At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict. In 2010, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish long-term local capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[31] As part of the project, 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, BAC, and EOD.[32] Since March 2015, these engineers have been conducting EOD of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO at the former ammunition storage facility at Skra.[33]

Land Release

In 2016, HALO Trust cleared 7,288m2 of mined area, and a further 70,052m2 was reduced by technical survey in the Chognari minefield.[34] At the end of 2015, there was a reported 96,582m2 of mine contamination in Chognari, and at the end of 2016, there was 62,034m2.[35] There is therefore a discrepancy between the land release results and the size of contamination.

In 2015, no mine clearance took place.

Survey in 2016

HALO Trust started operations at the Chognari minefield in March 2016, initially conducting non-technical survey, and then beginning technical survey in April.[36] In total in 2016, 70,052m2 was reduced through technical survey and 18,877m2 was confirmed as mined.[37]

The Chognari minefield is part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. It was previously under military restriction, but has since been handed over by the government for clearance.[38] Chognari was also the site of an uncontrolled explosion in the 1990s; in addition to the minefield around the perimeter of the base, the site is also contaminated by UXO.[39]

The base threatens the lives and livelihoods of more than 4,500 villagers who live nearby and use the area for grazing their livestock. Once cleared, the Georgian government also plans to build a waste processing facility on the site, which is expected to employ more than 130 people.[40] In addition, certain areas at Chognari will be used to build a water reservoir to supply drinking water to the city of Kutaisi, which has a population of 300,000.[41]

Georgia previously reported plans to start clearance
of the Red Bridge minefield in 2015.[42] However, while Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss demining the minefield,[43] only survey was permitted. HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 1 and 3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. However, the Azerbaijani military located on the other side of the border subsequently demanded that technical survey operations be halted one month later, on 4 August 2015.[44] As of September 2017 survey had not been permitted to resume, and despite many requests to the government of Georgia, HALO Trust had not been granted permission to the task.[45]

Clearance in 2016

In 2017, HALO Trust cleared 7,288m2 of mined area and destroyed 19 antipersonnel mines at the Chognari minefield—part of a former Soviet base.[46] Clearance of the Chognari minefield was planned to be completed in 2017.[47]

Although HALO Trust is not operating at Red Bridge, its operational staff periodically visit the site in order to help keep the local community and Border Police aware of the mine threat there. In October 2016, HALO Trust identified one cattle incident, which occurred in August the same year. At the same time, based on information from a member of the local community, HALO identified a TM-62 antivehicle mine in the area adjacent to the minefield, located almost 700 meters from the border with Azerbaijan. The organization expressed its readiness to destroy the mine, but the Border Police informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and on the following day, the Ministry’s EOD team destroyed the mine. HALO Trust immediately asked permission to deploy its team, but permission was not granted.[48]

Progress in 2017

HALO Trust started new mine clearance operations in April 2017, near the ABL in the Tskhinvali region, which will help ensure safe access to agricultural land.[49]

Progress towards completion

Between 2009 and the end of 2012, using international funding HALO Trust cleared five minefields with humanitarian impact and identified a sixth.[50] In 2013 and 2014, HALO Trust focused on clearing former firing ranges. In 2015, HALO Trust briefly focused on technical survey of the Red Bridge minefield before the survey was forced to halt, and did not undertake any mine clearance. In 2016, HALO began survey and clearance of the Chognari minefield, which it expected to finish clearing in 2017. It is not known if any of the restricted military areas has been cleared of mines.

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] The extent is unknown as contamination may exist in South Ossetia, which is inaccessible to the Georgian authorities and international clearance operators.

[2] Email from Irakli Chitanava, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017. There were differences between the data reported by HALO Trust and by DELTA for two areas; DELTA reported 2,579,593m2 of mined area at Kirach Mughanlo (Red Bridge) and 8,169m2 at Chognari. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, State Military Scientific Technical Centre – DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[3] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017. There were differences between the mine-contamination data reported by HALO Trust and the data provided by DELTA for two areas. DELTA reported 2,579,593m2 of mined area at Kirach Mughanlo (Red Bridge) and 8,169m2 at Chognari. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, 3 April 2017.

[4] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[5] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[6] Interview with George Dolidze, Director, Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[7] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[8] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[9] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2017.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 9 July 2015.

[14] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[15] Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre, “Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC) in Facts and Figures,” November 2009, p. 17.

[16] Email from Jonathon “Gus” Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 27 May 2010.

[17] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 11 March 2016.

[18] Ibid., 23 June 2015; and interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[19] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[20] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[21] iMMAP, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” Press release, 25 February 2009; E. M. Hasanov and P. Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3 (Fall 2011); and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2016.

[22] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[23] Ibid.; and from Nick Smart, Regional Director, Europe, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[24] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.

[25] Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 21 August 2012.

[26] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[27] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[28] Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[29] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[30] Ibid.

[31] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015, and 20 June 2016.

[32] Estonia, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report, 2 April 2012; NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia Fact Sheet, January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[33] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.

[34] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[35] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 and 18 October 2016; and from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust 19 October 2016.

[36] Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 15 June 2016; and from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.

[37] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017. There is a discrepancy with survey data reported by DELTA, in which 387,756m2 was reported as reduced, and 8,169m2 as confirmed. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017. It is thought that the reason for the discrepancy is that DELTA’s data also includes BAC.

[38] Interview with Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, Thornhill, 28 April 2016.

[39] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 18 October 2016.

[40] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[41] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[42] Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.

[43] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[44] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[45] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[48] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[49] Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017; and from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[50] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 30 August 2012.