Georgia

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 03 August 2017

Summary: Non-signatory Georgia last commented on the convention in 2010, when it said it could not consider accession until the security environment in the region improved. Georgia has participated in one meeting of the convention, in 2012, and it abstained from the vote on a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2016.

Georgia is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. It imported cluster munition rockets from Israel in 2007, which it used a year later during its conflict with Russia over South Ossetia. Georgia also inherited stocks of cluster munitions from the Soviet Union and destroyed a stockpile of 844 RBK-series cluster bombs containing over 320,000 submunitions in 2013.

Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Georgia last elaborated its views on accession to the convention in an April 2010 response to Cluster Munition Monitor from its UN representative in Geneva.[1] Georgia expressed support for “the spirit” of the convention, but said it could not join as “the bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security situation in the region has not changed much and has even worsened security-wise.” Georgia concluded “that does not leave us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conventions until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.”

In December 2016, Georgia abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[2] Georgian officials told the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) that the Georgia representative voted according to instructions from capital.[3] Georgia also abstained from the vote on the first UN resolution on the convention in December 2015.[4]

Georgia participated in some meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[5] It attended an international conference on cluster munitions in Santiago, Chile, in June 2010.

Georgia has participated as an observer in one meeting of the convention: the Third Meeting of States Parties in Oslo, Norway, in September 2012. It was invited to, but did not attend the convention’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016.

Georgia has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2015.[6] It has voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in March 2017.[7]

Georgia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgia is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions.

Georgia acquired Mk-4 160mm surface-to-surface rockets equipped with cluster munition payloads (each rocket contains 104 M85-type submunitions) from Israel in 2007.[8]

Georgia inherited a stockpile of air-dropped cluster bombs from the Soviet Union.[9] In 2013, it destroyed 844 RBK-series cluster bombs and 320,375 submunitions as part of a project to destroy obsolete weapons supported by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP).[10] The last RBK-series bombs were destroyed by open detonation at the Vaziani military firing range outside Tbilisi on 12 July 2013.

Cluster munitions destroyed in Georgia[11]

Type

Quantity of munitions

Quantity of submunitions

RBK-250-275 AO-1SCh, each containing 150 submunitions

179

26,850

RBK-250 PTAB-2.5M, each containing 30 submunitions

8

240

RBK-500 ShOAB-0.5, each containing 565 submunitions

469

264,985

RBK-500 AO-2.5RT, each containing 108 submunitions

99

10,692

RBK-500 PTAB-1, each containing 268 submunitions

61

16,348

RBK-500 PTAB-2.5, each containing 50 submunitions

21

1,050

RBK-500 PTAB-10.5A, each containing 30 submunitions

7

210

Total

844

320,375

 

Use

Georgian forces used Mk-4 cluster munition rockets during an August 2008 conflict with Russia over the break-away region of South Ossetia. Georgia’s Ministry of Defense said that it used 24 volleys with 13 Mk-4 rockets in each.[12] It acknowledged that the Georgian armed forces used cluster munitions against the Russian forces near the Roki tunnel.[13] Human Rights Watch (HRW) researchers found remnants of Georgian-fired cluster munitions in civilian areas in the north of Gori district, south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[14]



[1] Letter No. 8/37-02 from Amb. Giorgi Gorgiladze, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 30 April 2010.

[2]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015. It however voted in support of the draft resolution during the first round of voting in UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security on 4 November 2015. “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution AC.1/70/L.49/Rev.1, 11 November 2015.

[3] ICBL-CMC meeting with Salome Imnadze, Senior Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in New York, New York, October 2016.

[4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.

[5] For details on Georgia’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 205–207.

[6]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 71/203, 19 December 2016. Georgia voted in favor of similar resolutions in 2013–2015.

[7]The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” HRC Resolution 34/26, 24 March 2017.

[8] Submission of Georgia, UN Register of Conventional Arms, Report for Calendar Year 2007, 7 July 2008.

[9] In 2004 and 2007, Jane’s Information Group reported that the Georgian air force had KMGU and RBK-500 cluster bombs. The Ministry of Defense of Georgia told HRW in February 2009 that it still had RBK-500 cluster bombs and BKF blocks of submunitions delivered by KMGU dispensers, but that their shelf-lives have expired and they were slated for destruction. First Deputy Minister of Defense Batu Kutelia said its air force planes were not fitted to deliver these air-dropped weapons. See, HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 207.

[10] Bombs containing incendiary submunitions and cartridges containing antivehicle mines were also destroyed. Email from the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 3 May 2014.

[11] “Time schedule for cluster bomb disposal: Attachment 1.4,” undated but provided by the Press Office of the OSCE Secretariat, 7 May 2014. Other weapons destroyed included 99 RBK-500 ZAB-2.5SM and 35 RBK-250 ZAB-2.5 incendiary bombs, as well as 310 BKF cartridges containing PTM-1G scatterable antivehicle landmines.

[12] “Some Facts,” attachment to email from David Nardaia, Director, Analytical Department, Ministry of Defense, 18 November 2008. The rockets would have carried 32,448 M85 submunitions.

[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Response to Human Rights Watch inquiry about the use of M85 bomblets,” 2 September 2008.

[14] For more information see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), p. 206; and HRW, “A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008,” April 2009, p. 57. The Ministry of Defense of Georgia said in February 2009 that it was investigating the possibility of “failure of the weapons system.” During the conflict, Abkhazian and Russian forces moved into the upper Kodor Gorge and retook it from Georgian forces. Abkhazia has asserted that Georgia fired large numbers of cluster munitions with M095 submunitions from LAR-160 rockets in the Kodor Valley. Email from Maxim Gunjia, Deputy Foreign Minister of Abkhazia, 24 August 2009. The deputy foreign minister provided photographs of submunitions and containers. The M095 is described as an M85-type submunition. The Monitor has not been able to independently investigate and confirm this information.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 23 October 2017

Policy

Georgia has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty. Over the years, Georgia has frequently stated its general support for a ban on antipersonnel mines, and has voted in favor of every annual UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution calling for universalization of the treaty since 1997.

Georgia has not been a frequent participant at Mine Ban Treaty meetings, but did not attend the Meeting of States Parties in Santiago in November–December 2016. Its last statement at such a meeting was in 2007, when it told States Parties that it “fully shares the principles and objectives” of the treaty, that it “is well aware that the negative humanitarian impact of landmines far outweighs their military value,” and that it “tries to make its possible contribution in facilitation of the process of elimination and eradication of this threat.”[1] In the past, Georgia has insisted that its inability to fulfill the treaty’s obligations in disputed territories not controlled by the government—Abkhazia and South Ossetia—prevents it from acceding.[2] In a meeting with the Monitor in June 2011, a Georgian government official stated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was beginning to consider the mine issue.[3]

Campaigners in Georgia participated in the Lend Your Leg global action on 18 February 2012 when NGOs and the Ministry of Sport and Tourism organized a backgammon tournament with survivors of landmines.[4]

Georgia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and joined CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines on 8 June 2009 and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war on 22 December 2008. It had previously stated it could not adhere to Amended Protocol II for the same reasons given for not joining the Mine Ban Treaty.[5]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Georgia does not produce, import, or export mines.[6]

Georgia inherited what is believed to be a small stockpile of antipersonnel mines from the Soviet Union.[7] The Ministry of Defense completed an inventory of its antipersonnel mine stockpile in 2010, but did not make information on the size and composition of the stockpile publicly available. The ministry does not plan to destroy its stocks, but commits to safeguard them in a way to avoid dissemination or transfer to another state or non-state actors.[8]

Use

Georgia has had an official moratorium on the use of antipersonnel mines in place since September 1996.[9] In April 2007, a representative from the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs told States Parties, “Since that time [1996] corresponding official structures of Georgia have been strictly refraining from use of antipersonnel mines. I have the chance to confirm my country’s firm resolution to keep this commitment in the future.”[10]

Despite its repeated denial of past use, it appears that Georgian armed forces used antipersonnel mines every year from 2001 to 2004, as well as in 2006, mostly in the Upper Kodori Gorge area adjoining the breakaway region of Abkhazia.[11] Opposition forces and Russian peacekeepers also alleged that Georgian forces laid mines in South Ossetia in 2006 and 2007, but the Monitor was not able to confirm the allegations.[12] There were additional allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by both Georgia and Russia during the heavy fighting related to South Ossetia in August 2008. Each side denied the allegations, and investigations by Human Rights Watch did not find evidence of new use of antipersonnel mines.[13]

South Ossetia

South Ossetia is a breakaway region of Georgia that shares a border and has very close ties with Russia.[14] South Ossetian officials have not made any public statements about a mine prohibition and have not taken any unilateral steps to ban antipersonnel mines. Prior to the 2008 conflict, South Ossetia was judged to have only a minor mine problem, and there is no evidence that either side used antipersonnel mines during the conflict. In May 2009, South Ossetian authorities reportedly recovered mines from a cache in Yeredvi village, which they alleged were from Georgia.[15]



[1] Statement by George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[2] Statement of Georgia, Mine Ban Treaty Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 21 September 2006. In an April 2010 letter to the Monitor, Georgia stated that it “has expressed its support to the spirit of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Cluster Munition Conventions, but the bitter reality on the ground with reference to the security situation in the region did not allow us to adjoin the mentioned conventions. Unfortunately the situation has not changed much and has even worsened security-wise that does not leave us any option other than to stay reluctant to join the conventions until the credible changes occur in the security environment of the region.” “Updated information from the Government of Georgia for annual publication Landmine Monitor Report 2010,” (No. 8/37-02) provided by email from Amb. Giorgi Gorgiladze, Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, 30 April 2010.

[3] Interview with David Kapanadze, Senior Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Georgia to the UN in Geneva, Geneva, 21 June 2011.

[5] Statement by George Dolidze, Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation, Geneva, 23 April 2007.

[6] CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 25 September 2010, p. 8.

[7] ICBL meeting with David Sikharulidze, Ministry of Defense, Tbilisi, 25 May 2005. In August 2007, Georgia said that it had recovered an undisclosed number of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines from a former Russian army base in Akhalkalaki. Pavel Belov, “Russians Leave Cesium and Landmines Behind in Georgia,” Kommersant, 17 August 2007.

[8] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Ministry of Defense, 31 March 2010.

[9] The moratorium was proclaimed by President Eduard Shevdarnadze at the UN in September 1996 and has been repeated by officials many times since. See, Landmine Monitor Report 1999, p. 792; and Note Verbale to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 17 January 2001.

[10] Statement by George Dolidze, Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 23 April 2007. Georgia made similar statements previously.

[12] See, Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 826–827.

[14] For background on South Ossetia, see Human Rights Watch, “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia,” January 2009, pp. 16–20.

[15] “Terrorist cache with arms found in S. Ossetia – minister,” Interfax (South Ossetia), 21 May 2009.


Mine Action

Last updated: 13 December 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (light contamination) and unexploded ordnance (UXO) (extent of contamination unknown), possibly including cluster munition remnants.[1]

Not a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

At the end of 2016, Georgia had at almost 2km2 of known mined areas in addition to two areas of unknown size, a level unchanged since the end of 2015. In 2016, 7,406m2 of mined area was cleared and 70,052m2 reduced through technical survey. A total of 19 antipersonnel mines were destroyed and 18,877m2 was confirmed as mined. The technical survey which commenced in July 2015 of the Red Bridge minefield was suspended one month later. As of May 2017, the survey had not been permitted to resume.

In 2016, two submunitions were found and destroyed, and reports were made of further suspected contamination. Prior to this, Georgia had been believed to be free of cluster munition contamination, following clearance in 2014, with the possible exception of South Ossetia.

Recommendation for action

  • Georgia should continue to engage in political dialogue with Azerbaijan, to enable full clearance of the Red Bridge border minefield.

Mine Contamination

Georgia has almost 2km2 of mined area across seven minefields, as set out in the table below.[2] This includes Osiauri village, in Kashuri district, which is in a military zone and Khojali mountain, in Mestia district, on the Administrative Boundary Line (ABL) with the Abkhazia region, where the size of mined and battle areas is not known. Contamination comprises both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines.

 

Mine contamination (as of end 2016)[3]

Region

District

Village

Contamination

Mined areas

Area (m2)

Kvemo Kartli

Marneuli

Kachagani (Red Bridge)

AP and AV mines

1

1,863,813

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Barisakho 1, Barisakho 2

AP mines

2

4,275

Mtskheta-Mtianeti

Dusheti

Kadoeti*

AP and AV mines

1

23,783

Imereti

Terjola

Chognari (former military base)

AP and AV mines, and UXO

1

62,034

Shida Kartli

Kashuri

Osiauri (Military zone)

AP mines

1

N/K

Samegrelo Zemo Svaneti

Mestia

Khojali**

AP mines

1

N/K

Total

     

7

1,953,905

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle; UXO = unexploded ordnance; N/K = not known.
* Located at the ABL with South Ossetia. As of May 2017, HALO Trust did not have access to the minefield.
** Khojali minefield is located on a mountain at the ABL with Abkhazia. As of May 2017, HALO Trust did not have access to the minefield.


Georgia has mined areas around former Soviet military bases, along its international borders, and as a result of conflict with the breakaway region of South Ossetia. Historically, the bulk of the mine problem in Georgia resulted from mines placed around former Russian military bases.[4]

As of the end of 2016, Georgia had some 1.95km2 of mined area across seven minefields (see table above).[5] This includes an unfenced 7km-long minefield at the “Red Bridge” border crossing between Azerbaijan and Georgia.[6] The Red Bridge minefield is Georgia’s largest minefield and the last major minefield not in the vicinity of a functioning military establishment.[7]

There may also be mined areas in South Ossetia as a result of the 1990–1992 Georgian-Ossetian war, and the more recent 2008 conflict with Russia. HALO Trust has planned to conduct non-technical survey in South Ossetia, but, to date, has not been granted access. South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO demining operators.

Antipersonnel mine contamination in Georgia has a social, economic, and humanitarian impact. Mined areas are accessible by local populations, and at the Red Bridge minefield, for example, territory is used for herding cattle.[8]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Following clearance of a cluster munition-contaminated area in 2014, Georgia, including Abkhazia, was believed to be free of contamination from cluster munition remnants, with the possible exception of South Ossetia, which is occupied by Russia and inaccessible to both the Georgian authorities and international NGO clearance operators.

In 2016, however, Georgia reported the discovery of two submunitions, destroyed by the State Security Agency of Georgia, as part of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) call-outs in the Shida Kartli region.[9] In April and July 2016, local communities in this region of Georgia reported finding several submunitions since clearance was completed.[10] As of May 2017, HALO Trust was in the process of conducting non-technical survey to investigate each of the call-outs. Several more submunitions had been discovered by July 2017 during non-technical survey,[11] and technical survey may be needed to determine the nature of the contamination: whether it belongs to previously undiscovered contaminated areas, whether it results from missed items in previously cleared areas, or whether it is a result of items being picked up and moved by local people.[12]

Prior to the recently identified submunitions, the last cluster munition contamination was discovered and cleared in 2014, during HALO operations along the Administrative Boundary Line, also in the Shida Kartli region.[13]

Furthermore, Georgia has reported that its National Mine Action Authority has not been able to conduct quality assurance/quality control in Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (in South Ossetia), and that whether these regions are indeed free of cluster munition remnants is dependent on the quality of earlier clearance.[14]

Cluster munition contamination resulted from the conflict over South Ossetia in August 2008, in which both Georgian and Russian forces used cluster munitions. After the end of the conflict and through December 2009, HALO cleared some 37km2 in Georgian-controlled territory of submunitions and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).[15] In May 2010, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) completed clearance of its tasked areas.[16]

HALO Trust believes that the August 2008 conflict was likely to have resulted in some cluster munition contamination in South Ossetia, but it has no way of determining the level of possible contamination, or what, if any, clearance may have been conducted.[17]

Other explosive remnants of war

Following the 2008 conflict with Russia, there was evidence of UXO in South Ossetia, although its extent remains unclear. In addition, UXO contamination in Georgia persists in former firing ranges.[18]

Program Management

The Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Center (ERWCC) is the Georgian Mine Action Authority, under the State Military Scientific Technical Center—known as “DELTA”—an entity within the Ministry of Defense. It is tasked to coordinate and execute action to address the ERW threat.[19] The primary task of the ERWCC is to coordinate mine action in Georgia, including quality assurance/quality control, and to facilitate the creation and implementation of Georgian National Mine Action Standards, in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).[20] The ERWCC was established with the support of the international NGO Information Management and Mine Action Programs (iMMAP).[21]

Strategic planning

Georgia has identified clearance of the Red Bridge minefield as one of its key strategic mine action priorities.[22]

Standards

Georgian National Mine Action Standards and National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) have been drafted in accordance with IMAS and as of September 2017 were awaiting completion in coordination with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[23] Once finalized, the NTSGs will be translated and sent to parliament for approval.[24]

Quality management

Under the control of DELTA, the ERWCC now conducts quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC).[25] iMMAP has also conducted training on quality management for the QA/QC section of ERWCC, the Joint Staff of the Georgian Armed Forces, and DELTA.

Operators

HALO Trust conducts clearance in Georgia, but NGOs are not permitted to clear land belonging to the military.[26] HALO Trust employed three teams of seven deminers in 2016,[27] trained in both mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) and deployed as required.[28] While the number of demining teams increased due to the mine clearance task at Chognari, where HALO also deployed three demining machings, BAC capacity decreased as the Udabno BAC task is due to be completed in 2017.[29] HALO did not conduct cluster munition clearance in 2016. However, it was conducting cluster munition survey (both non-technical and technical) in 2017, and will conduct necessary clearance.[30]

At the request of the government of Georgia, the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) Trust Fund has supported Georgia in addressing its ERW problem from the August 2008 conflict. In 2010, a NATO Trust Fund project planned to provide support to establish long-term local capacity for the ERWCC in clearance and victim assistance.[31] As part of the project, 66 members of the Georgian Army Engineers Brigade were trained in demining, BAC, and EOD.[32] Since March 2015, these engineers have been conducting EOD of abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and UXO at the former ammunition storage facility at Skra.[33]

Land Release

In 2016, HALO Trust cleared 7,288m2 of mined area, and a further 70,052m2 was reduced by technical survey in the Chognari minefield.[34] At the end of 2015, there was a reported 96,582m2 of mine contamination in Chognari, and at the end of 2016, there was 62,034m2.[35] There is therefore a discrepancy between the land release results and the size of contamination.

In 2015, no mine clearance took place.

Survey in 2016

HALO Trust started operations at the Chognari minefield in March 2016, initially conducting non-technical survey, and then beginning technical survey in April.[36] In total in 2016, 70,052m2 was reduced through technical survey and 18,877m2 was confirmed as mined.[37]

The Chognari minefield is part of a former Soviet military base in the Imereti region. It was previously under military restriction, but has since been handed over by the government for clearance.[38] Chognari was also the site of an uncontrolled explosion in the 1990s; in addition to the minefield around the perimeter of the base, the site is also contaminated by UXO.[39]

The base threatens the lives and livelihoods of more than 4,500 villagers who live nearby and use the area for grazing their livestock. Once cleared, the Georgian government also plans to build a waste processing facility on the site, which is expected to employ more than 130 people.[40] In addition, certain areas at Chognari will be used to build a water reservoir to supply drinking water to the city of Kutaisi, which has a population of 300,000.[41]

Georgia previously reported plans to start clearance
of the Red Bridge minefield in 2015.[42] However, while Georgian and Azerbaijani representatives met in 2015 to discuss demining the minefield,[43] only survey was permitted. HALO Trust conducted non-technical survey between 1 and 3 July, and then began technical survey on 4 July 2015. However, the Azerbaijani military located on the other side of the border subsequently demanded that technical survey operations be halted one month later, on 4 August 2015.[44] As of September 2017 survey had not been permitted to resume, and despite many requests to the government of Georgia, HALO Trust had not been granted permission to the task.[45]

Clearance in 2016

In 2017, HALO Trust cleared 7,288m2 of mined area and destroyed 19 antipersonnel mines at the Chognari minefield—part of a former Soviet base.[46] Clearance of the Chognari minefield was planned to be completed in 2017.[47]

Although HALO Trust is not operating at Red Bridge, its operational staff periodically visit the site in order to help keep the local community and Border Police aware of the mine threat there. In October 2016, HALO Trust identified one cattle incident, which occurred in August the same year. At the same time, based on information from a member of the local community, HALO identified a TM-62 antivehicle mine in the area adjacent to the minefield, located almost 700 meters from the border with Azerbaijan. The organization expressed its readiness to destroy the mine, but the Border Police informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and on the following day, the Ministry’s EOD team destroyed the mine. HALO Trust immediately asked permission to deploy its team, but permission was not granted.[48]

Progress in 2017

HALO Trust started new mine clearance operations in April 2017, near the ABL in the Tskhinvali region, which will help ensure safe access to agricultural land.[49]

Progress towards completion

Between 2009 and the end of 2012, using international funding HALO Trust cleared five minefields with humanitarian impact and identified a sixth.[50] In 2013 and 2014, HALO Trust focused on clearing former firing ranges. In 2015, HALO Trust briefly focused on technical survey of the Red Bridge minefield before the survey was forced to halt, and did not undertake any mine clearance. In 2016, HALO began survey and clearance of the Chognari minefield, which it expected to finish clearing in 2017. It is not known if any of the restricted military areas has been cleared of mines.

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] The extent is unknown as contamination may exist in South Ossetia, which is inaccessible to the Georgian authorities and international clearance operators.

[2] Email from Irakli Chitanava, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017. There were differences between the data reported by HALO Trust and by DELTA for two areas; DELTA reported 2,579,593m2 of mined area at Kirach Mughanlo (Red Bridge) and 8,169m2 at Chognari. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, Head of Division, State Military Scientific Technical Centre – DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[3] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017. There were differences between the mine-contamination data reported by HALO Trust and the data provided by DELTA for two areas. DELTA reported 2,579,593m2 of mined area at Kirach Mughanlo (Red Bridge) and 8,169m2 at Chognari. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, 3 April 2017.

[4] Email from Irakli Kochashvili, Deputy Head, International Relations and Euro-Atlantic Integration Department, Ministry of Defense, 6 September 2009.

[5] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[6] Interview with George Dolidze, Director, Department of Security Policy and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009.

[7] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[8] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[9] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2017.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 9 July 2015.

[14] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[15] Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre, “Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC) in Facts and Figures,” November 2009, p. 17.

[16] Email from Jonathon “Gus” Guthrie, Programme Manager, NPA, 27 May 2010.

[17] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 11 March 2016.

[18] Ibid., 23 June 2015; and interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[19] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[20] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[21] iMMAP, “Establishing the New Georgian Explosive Remnants of War Coordination Centre (ERWCC),” Press release, 25 February 2009; E. M. Hasanov and P. Nevalainen, “Mine-action Challenges and Responses in Georgia,” Journal of ERW and Mine Action, Issue 15.3 (Fall 2011); and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 20 June 2016.

[22] Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[23] Ibid.; and from Nick Smart, Regional Director, Europe, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[24] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.

[25] Response to Cluster Munition Monitor questionnaire by Tom Meredith, Desk Officer, HALO Trust, 21 August 2012.

[26] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[27] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[28] Email from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[29] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[30] Ibid.

[31] NATO, “NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia,” January 2012; and emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015, and 20 June 2016.

[32] Estonia, Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V Article 10 Report, 2 April 2012; NATO/PfP Trust Fund Project in Georgia Fact Sheet, January 2012; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 6 July 2015.

[33] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016; and email, 3 April 2017.

[34] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[35] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 1 and 18 October 2016; and from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust 19 October 2016.

[36] Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 15 June 2016; and from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016.

[37] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017. There is a discrepancy with survey data reported by DELTA, in which 387,756m2 was reported as reduced, and 8,169m2 as confirmed. Email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017. It is thought that the reason for the discrepancy is that DELTA’s data also includes BAC.

[38] Interview with Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, Thornhill, 28 April 2016.

[39] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Andrew Moore, HALO, 18 October 2016.

[40] HALO Trust, “New funding for clearance in Georgia,” 10 March 2016; and email from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[41] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[42] Interview with George Dolidze, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in Geneva, 28 May 2009; and response to Mine Action Monitor questionnaire by Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 June 2015.

[43] Interview with Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, in Geneva, 19 February 2016.

[44] Emails from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 18 October 2016; from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[45] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Emails from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017; and from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017.

[48] Email from Irakli Chitanava, HALO Trust, 2 May 2017.

[49] Emails from Oleg Gochashvili, DELTA, 3 April 2017; and from Nick Smart, HALO Trust, 11 October 2017.

[50] Email from Andrew Moore, HALO Trust, 30 August 2012.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 12 November 2017

In 2016, two donors contributed some US$390,000 toward mine action operations in Georgia, this represents a decrease of nearly 60% from 2015.[1]

Georgia has never reported contributions to its own mine action operations.

International contributions: 2016[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount

Amount (US$)

Japan

Clearance

¥37,596,360

346,000

Czech Republic

Clearance

€44,000

48,717

Total

   

394,717

 

Since 2012, international contributions to mine action activities in Georgia totaled some $5.5 million, and decreased by more than 75% dropping from $1.7 million in 2012 to less than $400,000 2016.

Summary of international contributions: 2012–2016[3]

Year

Total contributions ($)

% change from previous year

2016

394,717

-59

2015

957,792

-26

2014

1,289,199

+17

2013

1,098,128

-37

2012

1,740,788

35

Total

5,480,624

 

 



[1] Czech Republic, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 25 April 2017; and Japan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017.

[2] Average exchange rate for 2016: €1=US$1.1072; ¥108.66=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017.

[3] See previous Monitor reports. Total for international support in 2015 has been rectified as a result of revised United States funding data.


Casualties

Last updated: 27 October 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

At least 1,307 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties

Casualties in 2016

0 (2015: 2)

2016 casualties by survival outcome

0 (2015: 1 killed; 1 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

0

 

No mine/ERW casualties were identified in Georgia in 2016. In 2015, the Monitor identified two new civilian antivehicle mine casualties in Georgia, in South Ossetia.[1] This represents a similar low rate of casualties to recent years.

The ICRC and the Georgian Red Cross Society (GRCS), collected casualty data. GRCS volunteers, supported by the ICRC, collected data on 1,307 mine/ERW victims as of August 2017 (226 killed; 1,081 injured).[2] ICRC/GRCS data identified mine/ERW casualties, or victims, in 10 regions of Georgia: Tbilisi, Kvemo Kartli, Shida Kartli, Imereti, Samegrelo, Svaneti, Samtskhe, Javakheti, Kakheti, and Achara. The data indicated that males made up 85% of mine/ERW casualties, while 15% were female. Civilians made up 57% of the casualties with 43% military—combatants at the time of their incident or engaged in police/law enforcement duties. Casualties were caused by mines, ERW, and improvised mines (victim-activated improvised explosive devices).[3]

ICBL Georgian Committee (ICBL-GC) had collected information on 921 mine/ERW casualties as of the end of 2013, but had not resumed data collection or updated the database as of October 2017.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

In Georgia, there have been at least 70 casualties due to cluster munitions; all were reported in 2008, including 61 casualties during strikes and nine due to unexploded submunitions.[5]



[1]One man killed in an explosion of an anti-tank mine in Tskhinvali,” REGNUM, 20 May 2015.

[2] Email from Nino Burtikashvili, Deputy Secretary General, GRCS, 29 August 2017.

[3] Ibid., 17 August 2017.

[4] Emails from Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 28 July 2014, and 16 June 2017.

[5] Human Rights Watch (HRW), A dying practice: use of cluster munitions by Georgia and Russia in August 2008 (New York: HRW, April 2009), pp. 40 and 57. Russian cluster munition strikes on populated areas killed 12 civilians and injured 46. Georgian cluster munitions killed at least one civilian and injured at least two more when they landed on or near the towns of Tirdznisi and Shindisi.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 04 December 2017

Georgia is responsible for landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other types of explosive remnants of war (ERW). Georgia has made a commitment to provide victim assistance through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).[1] The total number of survivors in Georgia is unknown, though it is estimated to be more than 700.[2]

Assessing victim assistance needs

The Georgia Red Cross Society (GRCS) continued to collect data on the needs of mine/ERW casualties and their families with the aim of “gaining a comprehensive picture of those needs and formulating an effective response.” With ICRC support, data collection by the National Red Cross Society continued in Georgia, including in Abkhazia, to assess the socio-economic needs of mine/ERW victims and formulate an appropriate response. An additional GRCS staff member was trained to update and maintain the mine-action database.[3]

During 2016 and through 2017, the United States (US) provided ongoing support for the development of prosthetic rehabilitation capabilities in Georgia.[4]

Victim assistance coordination

There is no victim assistance coordination mechanism in Georgia. The Ministry of Labor, Health and Social Affairs coordinates disability issues, including those related to the mine/ERW survivors who have official disability status.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Rehabilitation Center for Persons with Disabilities

Government

Prosthetics services

ORTHOGEORGIA

Private

Prosthetics services

Georgian Foundation For Prosthetic Orthopedic Rehabilitation (GEFPOR)

National NGO

Prosthetics services

Association of Disabled Women and Mothers of Disabled Children (DEA)

National NGO

Educational support for children and adults with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, socio-economic inclusion, legal advice, and awareness-raising

ICBL-GC

National NGO

Assistance to survivors and their families, awareness-raising

ICRC

International organization

Data collection; economic inclusion, emergency assistance, awareness-raising, support to persons with disabilities

International Organization for Migration (IOM) and ITF Enhancing Human Security (ITF)

International organizations

Socio-economic support, including microloans; awareness-raising

 

The ICRC continued to assist survivors through micro-economic initiatives in Georgia.[5] This assistance was supplemented by business training, provided with help from the GRCS.[6]

In South Ossetia, 19 disabled persons accessed physical rehabilitation services and/or obtained assistive devices with ICRC financial assistance. The ICRC also supported awareness-raising activities on the hazardousness of mine/ERW. These activities included a football match for mine/ERW victims featured on television, an ICRC film, and a radio interview with a representative of the ICRC.[7]

In 2016, the ICBL-GC conducted a joint economic inclusion project for persons with disabilities with two other NGOs operating in Georgia. The project was funded by the European Union. Through this project, the ICBL-GC and its partners registered over 500 persons with disabilities in their job seekers database, including some mine/ERW survivors.[8]

GEFPOR fitted prostheses to 61 new patients, three of whom were mine/ERW victims.[9] In September 2015, the construction of a new premises for GEFPOR was completed, having been initiated in 2013. The center was officially opened in November 2016.[10]

The ITF focused on raising the awareness of Georgian representatives about mine action, and in particular mine victim assistance, in order to encourage the creation of national capacities.[11] Established in 2009, the joint IOM and ITF economic inclusion project for mine/ERW was implemented as a pilot program until 2012. The second phase of this program concluded in 2015.[12] The project aimed to improve the standard of living of mine/ERW victims and their families through enhanced employability, greater access to seed funding for starting/expanding their own business, and through improved socio-economic support.[13]

There was a continuing lack of psychological support and social reintegration activities in Georgia.

The law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities; however, these provisions were not effectively enforced and social, educational, and employment discrimination against persons with disabilities remained a problem.[14] In 2014, Georgia adopted a law on the elimination of all forms of discrimination.[15] Legislation required access to buildings for persons with disabilities and stipulated fines for noncompliance. However, very few public facilities or buildings were accessible.[16] Local councils focused on addressing disability-related problems were established in 22 municipalities as part of the government’s 2014–2016 Action Plan on Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities.[17]

Georgia signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 10 July 2009 and ratified it on 13 March 2014.



[2] Email from Narine Berikashvili, Monitor Researcher, 17 June 2010; and interview with Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 12 September 2013.

[3] Email from Nino Burtikashvili, Deputy Secretary General, GRCS, 25 July 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 376.

[4] Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Conventional Weapons National Annual Report (for calendar year 2016).

[5] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 408.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 410.

[8] Email from Maia Buchukuri, ICBL-GC, 20 June 2017.

[9] GEFPOR, “Statistics,” undated.

[10] GEFPOR, “Home,” undated; and ICRC, “Georgia on my mind (and back on its feet),” 2 December 2015.

[11] ITF, “Georgia,” undated.

[12] International Organization for Migration (IOM) Georgia, “Assistance for mine victims,” undated.

[13] ITF, “Annual Report 2013,” Ljubljana, 2014, pp. 60–62.

[14] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Georgia,” Washington, DC, March 2017, p. 39.

[15] Email from Madonna Kharebava, DEA, 8 July 2014.

[16] US Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Georgia,” Washington, DC, March 2017, p. 40.

[17] Ibid., p. 41.