Summary: Non-signatory Jordan says it supports the convention, but it has not taken any steps to join it. Jordan has participated in several meetings of the convention, most recently in 2012, and voted in favor of a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2016.

Jordan is not known to have used or produced cluster munitions, but it has imported them and is believed to have a stockpile. Jordan is participating in a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that has used cluster munitions in Yemen since March 2015.

Policy

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Jordan has expressed its support for the convention and its interest in joining on several occasions, but has not taken any steps towards accession. Jordan’s last statement on the matter was in September 2012, when Prince Mired Ben Raad Zeid al-Hussein informed States Parties that “We realize and appreciate the importance of the Convention on Cluster Munitions even though we are not yet a State Party. Hopefully circumstances will change some time in the not too distant future and we will be able to join.”[1] Prince Mired, who has served as special envoy for the Mine Ban Treaty, informed States Parties in 2010 that Jordan supports the convention “from the sidelines” and has “yet to decide if and when we can join.”[2]

Jordan participated in two meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but did not attend the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, even as an observer.[3] Jordan attended an international conference on cluster munitions in Santiago, Chile, in June 2010.

Jordan participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010–2012. It was invited to, but did not attend the Sixth Meeting of States Parties to the convention in September 2016.

In December 2016, Jordan voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[4] Jordan also voted in favor of the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[5]

As a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (UNSC), Jordan expressed concern at the use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine in October 2014, describing the use of “such internationally prohibited weapons” as “a violation of the provisions of international law and a dangerous development that imperils the lives of citizens.”[6] It voted in favor of a June 2015 UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern over evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[7] Jordan has also voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2016.[8]

Jordan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

Jordan is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it imported them and possesses a stockpile. Jordan has not disclosed information on the numbers or type of its stockpiled cluster munitions.

The United States (US) transferred 31,704 artillery projectiles (M509A1, M483) containing more than 3 million dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions to Jordan in 1995.[9] According to US export records, Jordan also imported 200 CBU-71 and 150 Rockeye cluster bombs at some point between 1970 and 1995.[10] Jordan is also reported to possess the Hydra-70 air-to-surface unguided rocket system, but it is not known if the ammunition types available to it include the M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition rocket.[11]

Use

Jordan is not known to have used cluster munitions, but since March 2015 it has participated in a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states against Houthi forces (Ansar Allah) in Yemen that has used cluster munitions.

Jordan has not commented publicly on this use of cluster munitions, but a statement by the “Coalition Forces Supporting Legitimacy in Yemen” published by the Saudi Press Agency in December 2016 states:

“International law does not ban the use of cluster munitions. Some States have undertaken a commitment to refrain from using cluster munitions by becoming party to the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions. Neither the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia nor its Coalition partners are State Parties to the 2008 Convention, and accordingly, the Coalition’s use of cluster munitions does not violate the obligations of these States under international law.”[12]

Contaminated by: mines (medium contamination) and explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Article 5 deadline: 1 May 2012
(Needs to submit an extension request)

Although the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had declared completion of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations in 2012, it has subsequently identified uncleared mine contamination. It has therefore proceeded with verification efforts. As of the end of 2016, the total area in need of verification for missing mines was almost 5.7km² of land in two parts of the country, in the northern borders and the Jordan Valley. Jordan has not yet submitted a new Article 5 deadline extension request to cover the period through to the completion of its demining efforts. In 2016, Jordan reported the release of just under 1.36km² of land.

Recommendations for action

• Jordan should, without further delay, request a new extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline for the period through to completion of all demining to humanitarian standards.
• Jordan should commit more national resources to its land release program and increase the number of teams deployed for verification and demining.

Contamination

Jordan is contaminated by mines and ERW. Contamination is primarily the result of the 1948 partition of Palestine, the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, the 1970 civil war, and the 1975 confrontation with Syria. Military training ranges and cross-border smuggling have added to the ERW problem.

Jordan declared that it had fulfilled its Article 5 clearance obligations on 24 April 2012, having determined that no areas under its jurisdiction or control remained in which antipersonnel mines were known or suspected.[1]

However, in formally declaring completion of its Article 5 obligations at the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012, Jordan noted that: “While all mined areas that Jordan had made every effort to identify were cleared by 24 April 2012, Jordan, as a responsible State Party, has proceeded with verification efforts in two parts of the country, with these verification efforts having resulted in the discovery of additional mined areas.”[2] This pertains first to the need for verification in the Jordan Valley, as earlier clearance by the Jordanian Armed Forces’ Royal Engineering Corps (REC) did not comply with national and international standards and was not subject to quality control; and second, to verification that is needed along Jordan’s northern border, due to a considerable discrepancy (estimated to be more than 10,000 mines[3]) between the recorded number of emplaced mines and the number actually cleared. The difference is said to be due to the migration of mines outside identified areas due to flooding and terrain fluctuations, detonations,[4] and unrecorded clearance operations by the army or by smugglers.[5]

As of the end of 2016, the total area in need of verification for missing mines was just more than 5.68km², across a total of 92 areas. This comprised 2.8km² across 74 areas in the Jordan valley and 2.8km² across 18 areas in the northern borders.[6]

With respect to the Jordan Valley, Jordan reported in its December 2012 declaration of Article 5 completion that 5km² remained to be verified in an effort expected to take two years.[7] As of May 2013, the estimated area requiring verification had fallen to 4.4km²,[8] before rising to 4.6km² in June 2014,[9] and to 4.85km² as of the end of 2014.[10] In its 2015–2020 National Plan, Jordan reported that 5.4km² remained to be sampled, verified, and released according to national standards.[11] As of the end 2015, 4.2km² across 95 areas remained in need of verification in the Jordan Valley.[12] Most recently, Jordan reported that, as at the end of 2016, 2.8km² across 74 areas still needed verification in the Jordan Valley.[13]

The Jordan Valley is highly fertile, and many affected areas still awaiting verification could be used for agriculture once they are released. Completion of verification and clearance would also help to reduce the threat to local communities, contribute to the government’s poverty reduction strategy, and help demilitarize border areas, supporting peacebuilding efforts.[14]

With respect to the northern borders, in its 2012 Article 5 Declaration of Completion, Jordan reported that some 6.9km² remained to be verified, and that the process being undertaken by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) had been delayed for security reasons.[15] NPA’s verification procedure involved a mixture of visual inspection of areas adjacent to the mine belt, ground preparation with mechanical assets, and limited involvement of manual deminers, with full technical survey of areas where evidence and experience pointed to a risk of contamination.[16] By May 2013, the estimated area needing verification had been reduced to around 5km², but operations by NPA were halted in February 2013 because of the security situation.[17] In its 2015–2020 National Plan, Jordan reported that 3.7km² remained to be verified and inspected by quality control (QC) teams.[18]

Most recently, Jordan reported that, as of the end of 2016, just more than 2.8km² across 18 areas along the northern borders still needed verification;[19] this is the same area reported for the end of 2015.[20] Verification operations in the north remained suspended as of April 2017, due to the ongoing Syrian crisis.[21]

Program Management

The National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) is responsible for coordinating, accrediting, regulating, and quality-assuring all mine action organizations, as well as for fundraising.[22] It is also responsible for ensuring mine action is integrated into the country’s wider development strategies.[23] The NCDR’s board of directors includes representatives of the Jordanian armed forces, the government, NGOs, landmine survivors, and the media.[24]

Strategic planning

The NCDR’s 2010–2015 National Plan, published in June 2010, aimed to complete clearance of all known mines, including 65,000 mines from the northern border, by May 2012, and to clear all ERW by December 2012.[25] Jordan had planned to complete verification and clearance in the Jordan Valley by the end of 2015, but later said the date of completion would depend on available resources.[26]

The NCDR’s current 2015–2020 National Plan aims to verify, sample, and release the remaining 5.4km² in the Jordan Valley within 36 months (by the end of 2017), by deploying six manual clearance teams and one mechanical demining team at a projected cost of US$2 million.[27] In April 2017, the NCRD reported that it was not on target to complete verification of the Jordan Valley by the end of 2017, and that it would update its workplan in 2018.[28] Resuming verification and release of the remaining 3.7km² along the northern border with Syria will depend on the security situation but, according to the plan, would require one year’s work with three manual teams and one mechanical team, at an expected cost of US$1 million.[29] The plan also aims to eliminate all ERW contamination by 2017.[30] The NCDR prioritizes areas in need of development for verification.[31]

In addition, Jordan’s national plan reports that the NCDR will transition from a national institution focusing largely on its own mine clearance, to one that will concentrate on assisting other conflict-affected countries to overcome the challenges of mine action and ERW removal.[32]

Operators

The verification and demining operations in Jordan are conducted by the NCDR and REC. Since October 2015, Jordan has deployed four operational teams, totaling 35 deminers. This represents a doubling of capacity compared to the two operational teams, totaling 17 deminers, deployed previously.[33]

Land Release

In 2016, Jordan released just under 1.36km² of land. Manual operations verified and released 21 areas in the Jordan Valley, destroying 100 antipersonnel mines, three antivehicle mines, and 49 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO).[34]

The land released in 2016 was double the 0.65km² released in 2015, progress that was attributed to the significant increase in operational capacity in 2016.[35]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Given Jordan’s recognition that mined areas remain, and the continued discovery and clearance of mines in areas it has verified, Jordan still has outstanding Article 5 survey and clearance obligations.

Jordan declared completion of its Article 5 obligations on 24 April 2012, just ahead of its 1 May 2012 treaty deadline, in accordance with the three-year extension request granted by States Parties in 2008. It submitted its formal declaration of completion to the Twelfth Meeting of States Parties in December 2012.[36] On announcing completion, however, Prince Mired acknowledged that “a residual risk could remain in areas where landmines have been emplaced,”[37] and noted that verification efforts had resulted in the discovery of additional mined areas.[38] The verification efforts, which are ongoing in the Jordan Valley, and which are currently suspended along the northern border due to insecurity, continue to result in the discovery and clearance of mined areas.[39]

In August 2016, Jordan stated that its Article 5 issue would be discussed during the next Mine Ban Treaty Meeting of States Parties,”[40] which was held in Santiago, Chile, from 28 November to 2 December 2016. This did not occur, however, and in April 2017, Jordan reported that it was not planning to submit an Article 5 extension request.[41]

According to its 2015–2020 National Plan, Jordan would need three years to finish the verification process, aiming for completion by December 2017.[42] However, the head of the NCDR has reported that Jordan is not on target to meet this completion date, given that the plan assumed a capacity of six national teams from 1 January 2015, which is less than current capacity.[43] The doubling of operational capacity in October 2015, from two teams to four resulted in a doubling of the area of land verified and released in 2016, compared to 2015.[44] However, it is still short of the six teams specified in Jordan’s 2015–2020 National Mine Action Plan.[45] Furthermore, resumption and completion of verification along the northern borders is also contingent on an improvement in the security situation, and as of April 2017 verification activities remained suspended.[46] The NCDR plans to issue an updated workplan in 2018.[47]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2016, international contributions toward mine action in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan totaled US$498,541.[1]

Jordan officially declared completion of its Article 5 obligations in April 2012, but also acknowledged that a residual risk remained, and that continuing verification of previously cleared land and other suspected areas was ongoing.[2]

International government contributions: 2016[3]

In 2012–2016, Jordan received more than $8 million in international assistance for mine action. International funding has gradually declined from more than $8 million in 2010 to less than $500,000 in 2016.

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[4]