Lao PDR

Mine Action

Last updated: 17 November 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (extent of contamination unknown), cluster munition remnants (massive contamination, but extent unknown), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline: 1 August 2020
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty

Summary

Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) is massively contaminated with cluster munition remnants, but the scale of contamination is unknown. In April 2017, the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) reported confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) of 352km2, although contamination is significantly higher, international operators believe it is likely less than 2,000km2. In 2016, Lao PDR committed to a nationwide non-technical and technical survey with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination by the end of 2021. In 2016, over 230km2 of land was surveyed, with a total of 180.2km2 confirmed to be contaminated, a sharp increase on the previous year. In 2016, 27.12km2 of land was cleared, a significant reduction compared to the previous four years. However, the number of submunitions destroyed during survey, clearance, and roving tasks increased to 106,636 submunitions, the most recorded in any year, surpassing the 2015 total of 100,022.

The extent of landmine contamination is not known, but the remote location of many of the mined areas mean that they are currently not a clearance priority.

Recommendations for action

  • Lao PDR should expedite implementation of nationwide non-technical survey and technical survey to reach an evidence-based estimate of the extent of cluster munition contamination.
  • National authorities should establish clear standards for the conduct of non-technical and technical survey.
  • The authorities should streamline memorandum of understanding procedures to facilitate timely use of donor funds and efficient deployment of operator’s survey and clearance assets.
  • Lao PDR should ensure sustained national funding of the sector.

Mine contamination

Lao PDR is contaminated by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines left by the Indochina conflict of the 1960s and 1970s, however the extent is not known. All sides in the war in the 1970s laid antipersonnel mines, particularly along borders and around military bases and airfields. A Handicap International (HI) survey in 1997 found mines in all 15 provinces it surveyed, contaminating 214 villages.[1] In the past, clearance operators have estimated Lao PDR may have 1,000 mined areas.[2]

The remote location of many of these areas means that mines have little impact and are not a clearance priority. Of 133,349 items of explosive remnants of war (ERW) destroyed by operators in 2016, only 112 (0.08%) were mines.[3] The National Regulatory Authority (NRA), however, has stated that antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were “used in abundance” and observed that “with a steady expansion of land use ‘mined areas’ will become areas for growing concern.”[4]

The NRA said widely used “gravel mines” had all degraded but remaining mine types included United States (US)-manufactured M14 blast antipersonnel mines, M16 bounding fragmentation mines, M18 claymore mines, and M15 and M19 antivehicle mines, and Soviet and Chinese antipersonnel mines, POMZ fragmentation mines, and Soviet-era TM41, TM46, and TM57 antivehicle mines.[5]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Lao PDR has the world’s highest level of contamination by unexploded submunitions as a result of the Indochina War of the 1960s and 1970s. The US conducted one of the heaviest aerial bombardments in history, dropping more than two million tons of bombs between 1964 and 1973,[6] including more than 270 million submunitions (known locally as bombies). Clearance teams have found 29 types of submunitions, including most commonly BLU 26, 24/66, and 63.[7]

Lao PDR does not have a reliable estimate of contamination by cluster munition remnants. The NRA reports that 14 of the country’s 17 provinces are contaminated by UXO, with nine heavily affected. In 2016, it embarked on plans for a nationwide survey with the aim of producing an evidence-based assessment of the extent of contamination (see section on Survey in 2016 below) by 2020.[8] The NRA reported the total CHA at 352 km2.[9] International operators believe total cluster munition contamination is likely to amount to less than 2,000km2.[10]

Unexploded submunitions accounted for 84% of all items cleared in 2016, a higher proportion for the third successive year that reflects the increased focus on cluster munitions in survey and clearance. In 2014, unexploded submunitions made up about two-thirds of all items cleared and in 2015, about three-quarters.[11] The NRA has identified submunitions as responsible for close to 30% of all incidents.[12] Submunitions are also said to be the type of ERW most feared by the population.[13] The UNDP has in the past reported that “economic opportunities in tourism, hydroelectric power, mining, forestry and many other areas of activity considered main engines of growth for the Lao PDR are restricted, complicated and made more expensive” by submunition contamination.[14]

Other explosive remnants of war

The NRA reports that 14 of Lao PDR’s 17 provinces are contaminated by UXO, nine of which are heavily affected.[15] Heavy contamination from ERW includes both air-dropped and ground-fired UXO, though the extent of contamination is not known. Clearance operators have reported the presence of at least 186 types of munitions in Lao PDR.[16] These range from 20lb fragmentation bombs to 2,000lb general-purpose bombs, and sometimes bigger items.[17] Other major causes of incidents are artillery shells, grenades, mortars, and rockets.[18]

Program Management

The NRA has an interministerial board composed of 22 representatives from government ministries.[19] A 2015 decree specifies that the NRA “has a government budget included in the general budget” of the board’s president.[20] A parliamentary election in March 2016 led to leadership changes, including the retirement of the NRA chairman. In September 2016, the government transferred the NRA and the mine action sector back under the control of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare, where it previously had been until 2011. The reasons for the change were not known. The draft of a new decree formalizing changes to the NRA board was submitted for approval by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare in April 2017.[21]

The NRA said it reviewed its structure in 2016 and plans to develop a network of regional offices in light of preparations for a nationwide survey and in order to increase its ability to coordinate survey activities at a provincial level, including the management of information and conduct of quality assurance. The NRA intended to trial increased support in three provinces.[22]

In 2015, the UNDP appointed one technical advisor to serve the NRA and national operator UXO Lao. Sterling International, funded by the US Department of State, provided a technical advisor supporting quality management and operations at the NRA, a second adviser supporting UXO Lao, and a third adviser providing support to both organizations as required.[23]

Strategic planning

The government adopted UXO clearance as a ninth Millennium Development Goal in 2010, targeting removal of all UXO from priority agricultural land by 2020.[24] In 2013, the government identified 64 priority areas planned to become small rural townships, 167 focal sites to consolidate and “stabilize” remote rural communities, and more than 1,680 priority projects.[25] Although progress is not measured against these targets they remain as a reference point for the sector.

Strategic goals were set out in the “Safe Path Forward 2” plan, as revised in June 2015, when the NRA set a number of specific targets for the remaining five years up to the clearance deadline of 2020. These included non-technical survey of 3,860 villages, pursuing technical survey, keeping clearance as a priority of the government’s poverty eradication program, bringing down the number of casualties to less than 40 a year, and providing medical care, vocational training, and economic support to 1,500 UXO victims.[26]

Plans for technical and non-technical survey

In March 2016 the NRA issued a paper entitled, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” committing to a nationwide non-technical and technical survey to be completed by the end of 2021, with a view to producing Lao PDR’s first baseline estimate of cluster munition contamination.[27] The planned survey underscored the focus on tackling the threat of cluster munitions rather than general battle area clearance.[28] It superseded many of the targets set out in the “Safe Path Forward 2” plan.

The paper calls for the completion of non-technical survey of all villages in the 14 cluster munition-affected provinces within four years, at an estimated cost of US$6.84 million, and technical survey of all evidence points within five years (by the end of 2021), at a projected cost of $20 million.

Once technical survey is 30% complete; the government should be able to provide an estimate of total cluster munition contamination. Survey will be conducted mostly by international NGOs and UXO Lao, possibly with some involvement of the Lao PDR army in non-technical survey. The paper also states that the government expects that international humanitarian operators will cease conducting clearance after technical survey has been completed.[29]

The NRA set out amended targets in a sector working group meeting in November 2016. These called for non-technical survey of 3,160 villages between 2017 and 2019 at an estimated cost of $5.6 million and completion of technical survey in 2,700 villages in five years (2017–2021) at a cost of $69.7 million.[30] As of May 2017, no detailed plan, priorities, or timelines for conducting the survey had been decided. Operators were due to submit bids to the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) in August 2017 and to start work in January 2018.[31]

The plan outlined at the Working Group also targeted clearance for 2017–2021 of 45km2 a year, far in excess of current clearance rates (see table on Battle area clearance in 2016 below). The plan called for spending on clearance of $57 million.[32]

Information management

Sterling International issued a report that said analysis of data in the NRA International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database found errors affecting up to 9,300 entries, or 14% of the 67,000 entries on the database. It was believed that the errors could affect 22% of the area recorded in the database as cleared or technically surveyed. The errors included operators’ misreporting of coordinates and mistaken entry of reports into IMSMA. Other errors included use of the wrong GPS format or the wrong map datum, putting many tasks in the wrong location. Sterling found that the errors occurred mostly in UXO Lao reporting and mostly between 2004 and 2010, but that it affected “many” organizations.[33]

Operators

Operators in 2016 included five humanitarian operators—one national and four international—as well as several international and national commercial operators.

UXO Lao, working in nine provinces, continued as the biggest operator employing around 1,400 staff, including 80 clearance teams, 15 technical survey teams, and nine non-technical survey teams.[34]

The HALO Trust, conducted survey and clearance in four of Savannakhet province’s most contaminated districts (Nong, Phine, Sepon, and Vilabouly) with a total of 240 staff. HI, worked in Savannakhet province with 54 staff. Mines Advisory Group (MAG), conducted survey and clearance in Xieng Khouang province and cleared CHAs identified by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) in Khamouane province with 332 staff. NPA, with 268 staff, conducted survey mainly in three southern provinces of Attapeu, Saravane, and Sekong, and supported UXO Lao in Luang Prabang.[35]

Lao PDR has accredited 15 commercial companies but in 2016 reported clearance by only seven. International commercial operators include Auslao UXO Clearance, BACTEC (Battle Area Clearance, Training, Equipment and Consultancy), Milsearch, and Munitions Management Group (MMG). National commercial operators that have been accredited include ASA Power Engineering, GREAT Company, Lao BSL UXO Clearance, Lao Uneod Cooper, OUMMA UXO Clearance, PSD, SBH, Sengphet UXO Clearance, and XTD UXO Clearance. Two local commercial companies newly accredited in 2016 were L&B UXO Clearance and Longlo Lao UXO Clearance.[36]

The Lao PDR armed forces had five humanitarian teams.[37] Its teams were reportedly preparing to start work in 2016 in Xaisomboun, Bolikhamxay, and Khamouane provinces but no clearance was reported.[38] Separately, Lao PDR army engineers not involved with humanitarian teams and not coordinated by the NRA were reportedly due to start clearance of UXO that was holding up construction work on the US$6 billion Laos-China high speed railway.[39]

Land Release (mines)

No systematic mine clearance was conducted during 2016, though operators destroyed a total of 112 antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. Of the total, 10 were destroyed during UXO clearance operations, 35 during roving tasks, 15 in the course of non-technical survey, and seven in technical survey.[40]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

In 2016, the UXO sector continued to focus on survey in order to make a credible determination of the extent of Lao PDR’s contamination, and to provide a basis for evidence-based survey.

The total area surveyed was reported as 229.71km2, however this figure does not include UXO Lao, which did not report survey results. The amount of land confirmed as hazardous in 2016—180.2km2—was close to 80% higher than in 2015, based on operator data (see table below).[41] By contrast, land released by clearance amounted to 27km2 in 2016 (see table on Battle area clearance in 2016 below), a drop of more than one-third from clearance in 2015 and 60% less than two years previously.

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Cluster munition-focused survey led by international operators continued to increase in 2016. International operators surveyed nearly 230km2 in 2016, 45% more land than the previous year, while the 139km2 they confirmed as hazardous more than doubled the 2015 result. UXO Lao provided no data on the areas surveyed and number of CHAs identified in 2016.

Technical survey of cluster munition-suspected area in 2016[42]

Operator

Area surveyed (km2)

CHAs identified

Area confirmed (km2)

HALO Trust

30.41

365

9.04

HI

34.18

185

13.73

MAG

62.19

105

46.26

NPA

102.93

404

69.91

UXO Lao

N/R

N/R

41.26

Total

229.71

1,059

180.20

Note: N/R = Not reported.

The NRA reports that a total of 28,674 submunitions were destroyed during technical survey in 2016.[43]

Operators continued to refine their cluster munition survey methodology in a bid to accelerate operations. MAG and NPA, partnering in Khamouane province, trialed a process of “chequerboarding” in which teams finding items in one survey box skipped the immediate neighboring box and surveyed the box next to that. Operators believed this may be applicable in areas of heavy contamination such as Xieng Khouang province with multiple, overlapping strikes and large CHA polygons, but less applicable in areas with more scattered strikes. After testing this procedure in the first half of 2016, as well as different survey team sizes and configurations, MAG said productivity rose 30% per day per team in the course of the year from eight to 10 50m x 50m boxes, depending on the site and terrain, to 12 to 14 boxes.[44]

At the same time NPA modified its Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) approach in 2016 to put more emphasis on desk assessment and non-technical survey. The Evidence Point Polygon (EPP) mapping pioneered by MAG, which uses historical operations data to map and define contaminated areas, has supported this process.

NPA started a review of villages surveyed between 2011 and 2017 in Attapeu, Saravane, and Sekong, which was due for completion by July 2017, and expected to go back and resurvey several hundred villages. NPA’s internal quality management concluded teams had not made sufficient use of historical data in some villages. It amended procedures to include analysis of non-technical survey data by senior information management and operations staff and changed team structures to strengthen quality management.[45]

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

The sharp fall in area clearance from 41.30km2 in 2015 to 27.12km2 in 2016 was most pronounced in the results of commercial companies, which cleared little more than a quarter of the area they cleared in the previous year. Humanitarian operators recorded a 19% fall in area cleared in 2016 when the sector focused increasingly on survey, but the rewards of evidence-based clearance were apparent in a much smaller drop (8%) in the number of items they destroyed.

Battle area clearance in 2016[46]

Operator

Area cleared (km2)

Submunitions destroyed

Bombs destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

Mines destroyed

Humanitarian

HALO Trust

1,432,835

2,109

0

1,200

0

HI

64,685

302

0

302

0

MAG

5,031,422

4,717

4

186

0

NPA

647,788

1,168

0

33

0

UXO Lao

16,733,714

36,765

17

8,863

8

Subtotal

23,910,444

45,061

21

10,584

8

Commercial

BACTEC

46,656

1

0

39

0

Lao BSL

3,900

12

1

13

0

Milsearch

310,350

39

0

32

0

MMG

1,543,052

184

3

862

1

OUMMA

889,000

193

1

0

0

SBH

3,046 ,534

62

0

1

1

XTD

415,360

0

0

0

0

Subtotal

3,208,318

491

5

947

2

Total

27,118,762

45,552

26

11,531

10

 

UXO Lao continued working in the nine most contaminated provinces (Attapeu, Champasak, Houaphan, Khamouane, Luang Prabang, Saravane, Savannakhet, Sekong, and Xieng Khouang), however its area clearance dropped in 2016, falling 15% compared to the previous year.[47]

HALO, after increasing the number of teams from eight to 10 and adding new equipment, increased the amount of land it cleared in Savannakhet province by one-third to 1.4km2.[48]

MAG remained the international operator with the largest area clearance operation working in three districts of Xieng Khouang. In Khamouane province, it cleared CHAs identified in survey conducted by NPA. But the ending of two grants in late 2015 and early 2016 meant that by the end of the year it was operating with only half the number of BAC teams it had in 2015, and the area it cleared was almost one-third less than the previous year.[49]

HI shifted the focus of its small number of teams from clearance to technical survey and the area cleared fell sharply as a result from 0.5km2 (500,000m2) in 2015 to 64,155m2 in 2016.[50]

NRA data on roving operations showed the number of submunitions destroyed was 40% higher than the previous year, but significant discrepancies with results reported by operators in both years left the outcome uncertain.[51]

Roving clearance operations in 2016[52]

Operator

Submunitions destroyed

Bombs destroyed

Other UXO destroyed

Mines destroyed

HALO

5,075

15

1,222

0

HI

2,308

27

1,295

5

MAG

5,595

4

988

0

Milsearch

13

0

1

0

NPA

11,410

3

826

0

UXO Lao

8,009

31

1,641

30

Total

32,410

80

5,973

35

 

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lao PDR is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 August 2020.

Lao PDR will need to apply for a deadline extension given the extent of its cluster munition contamination, but is expected to present an evidence-based estimate of the extent of contamination as a result of its proposed national survey. Plans for conducting the survey and accelerating clearance will depend on the level of international donor support. (See the Support to Mine Action profile for more details.)

Five-Year Summary of Clearance

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2016

27.12

2015

41.30

2014

67.78

2013

64.86

2012

54.42

Total

255.48

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.


[1] HI, Living with UXO, National Survey on the Socio-Economic Impact of UXO in Lao PDR (Vientiane/Brussels, 1997), p. 7.

[2] Interview with Michael Hayes, Programme Manager, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Vientiane, 5 February 2004.

[3] “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from NRA, 19 May 2017.

[4] NRA, “UXO types: Mines,” undated.

[5] Ibid.

[6] “US bombing records in Laos, 1964–1973, Congressional Record,” 14 May 1975.

[7] NRA, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2009,” Vientiane, undated but 2010, p. 13; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2013), Form F.

[8] Interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, Director, NRA, Vientiane, 4 May 2016; and NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.

[9] Information provided by Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, 27 April 2017.

[10] Interviews with international operators, Vientiane, 3–7 May 2016.

[11] “Sector Achievements” for 2015 and 2014, received from the NRA, Vientiane, 4 July 2016, and 11 May 2015.

[12] NRA, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2012,” Vientiane, undated but 2013, p. 5.

[13] Interview with Jo Durham, author of “Post-Clearance Impact Assessment,” Vientiane, 10 November 2011.

[14] “Hazardous Ground, Cluster Munitions and UXO in the Lao PDR,” UNDP, Vientiane, October 2008, p. 8.

[15] Interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 4 May 2016; and NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.

[16] Landmine Action, “Explosive remnants of war and mines other than anti-personnel mines, Global Survey 2003–2004,” March 2005, p. 104.

[17] NRA, “UXO types: Bombs,” undated.

[18] NRA, “National Survey of UXO Victims and Accidents, Phase 1,” Vientiane, 2009, p. 39.

[19] NRA, “UXO Sector Annual Report 2009,” Vientiane, May 2009, p. 14; and Government Decree No. 43, “On the appointment of the NRA Board,” (Unofficial translation) 3 February 2015; and interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 28 April 2015.

[20] Government Decree No. 43, “On the appointment of the NRA Board,” (Unofficial translation) 3 February 2015; and interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 28 April 2015.

[21] Interviews with Allan Poston, Technical Adviser, UNDP, 26 April 2017; and with Phoukhieou Chanthasomboune, NRA, 27 April 2017.

[22] Information provided by Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, 27 April 2017.

[23] Interviews with Allan Poston, UNDP, Vientiane, 6 May 2016; and with Nils Christensen, UXO Portfolio Manager, UNDP, Vientiane, 6 May 2016.

[24] “Laos: new MDG to tackle UXOs,” IRIN, 12 November 2010.

[25] Interviews with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 13 June 2013; and with and Phil Bean, NRA, Vientiane, 12 June 2013.

[26] Interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 4 May 2016.

[27] NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016.

[28] Interview with Allan Poston, UNDP, Vientiane, 6 May 2016.

[29] NRA, “From Survey to Safety, Quantifying and Clearing UXO Contamination in Lao PDR,” March 2016, pp. 1–3.

[30] “Survey and clearance plan for UXO/mine action sector in Lao PDR, 2017−2021,” presentation by Phommachanh Khammanichanh, NRA, 8 November 2016.

[31] Interviews with Allan Poston, UNDP, Vientiane, 24 and 26 April 2017.

[32] “Survey and clearance plan for UXO/mine action sector in Lao PDR, 2017−2021.”

[33] “Data errors on IMSMA,” Nigel Orr, Technical Adviser, Sterling International, 26 April 2017.

[34] Interviews with Jonas Zachrisson, Country Director, NPA, 24 April 2017; and with Thipasone Soukhathammavong, National Programme Director, UXO Lao, Vientiane, 26 April 2017.

[35] Emails from Susanna Smale, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 11 May 2017; from Kim Warren, Head of Mission, HI, 22 March 2017; from Simon Rea, Country Director, MAG, 19 May 2017; and from Thanalat Samalavong, NPA, 26 May 2017; (for UXO Lao) “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from NRA, 19 May 2017; and interviews with Jonas Zachrisson, NPA, 24 April 2017; and with Thipasone Soukhathammavong, UXO Lao, Vientiane, 26 April 2017.

[36] Information provided by Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, 27 April 2017.

[37] “Progress and Plans of Lao People’s Army,” presentation by Lao Army Humanitarian Team, 8 November 2016.

[38] Interview with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 27 April 2017.

[39] Souksakhone Vaenko, “Army deployed to clear UXO for Laos-China railway,” Vientiane Times, 6 January 2017.

[40] “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from NRA, 19 May 2017.

[41] The NRA reported 101.48km2 confirmed as hazardous in 2015 and 113.41km2 in 2016 but its data included major discrepancies with operators’ results. The NRA did not record any survey activity by HALO Trust and reported NPA confirmed 12.14km2 as hazardous area.

[42] Data provided by Susanna Smale, HALO Trust, 11 May 2017; by Kim Warren, HI, 22 March 2017; by Simon Rea, MAG, 19 May 2017; and by Thanalat Samalavong, NPA, 26 May 2017; and (for UXO Lao) “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from NRA, 19 May 2017.

[43] “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from NRA, 19 May 2017.

[44] Email from Simon Rea, MAG, 11 April 2017; and Skype interview, 25 April 2017.

[45] Emails from Jonas Zachrisson, NPA, 17 March and 23 May 2017; and interview, 24 April 2017.

[46] “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from NRA, 19 May 2017.

[47] Interview with Thipasone Soukhathammavong, UXO Lao, Vientiane, 26 April 2017; and with Phoukhieo Chanthasomboune, NRA, Vientiane, 27 April 2017.

[48] Email from Susanna Smale, HALO Trust, 22 March 2017; and Skype interview, 25 April 2017.

[49] Email from Simon Rea, MAG, 11 April 2017; and Skype interview, 25 April 2017.

[50] Email from Kim Warren, HI, 22 March 2017.

[51] “Sector Achievements 2016,” received from the NRA, 19 May 2017.

[52] NRA data on HALO Trust roving operations in 2016 included items reported by HALO as destroyed during technical survey.