Senegal

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 15 July 2015

Five-Year Review: State Party Senegal ratified the convention on 3 August 2011 and views existing legislation as sufficient to enforce its implementation of the convention. Senegal has participated in all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties and it has elaborated its views on certain important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation. Senegal has condemned new use of cluster munitions. In its initial transparency report for the convention provided in 2014, Senegal confirmed it has never used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions and has not retained any for research or training.

Policy

The Republic of Senegalsigned the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008 and ratified on 3 August 2011. The convention entered into force for Senegal on 1 February 2012.

Senegal has reported that “it is not necessary to put in place legislation or regulation because Senegal is not a country affected by cluster munitions.”[1] It lists its 2010 ratification legislation under national implementation measures.[2] Previously, in 2012 and 2013, government officials indicated that Senegal was considering enacting specific legislation to enforce the provisions of the ban convention in domestic law.[3]

Senegal provided its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 October 2012, and submitted an annual updated report on 2 April 2014.[4] As of 8 July 2015, Senegal had not provided the updated report for calendar year 2014, which was due by 30 April 2015.

Senegal actively participated in the Oslo Process that created the convention and sought a total and immediate ban on cluster munitions with no exceptions.[5]

Senegal has continued to actively engage in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties to the convention, including the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San José, Costa Rica in September 2014. Senegal has attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, including those held in June 2015. It has participated in regional workshops on the convention, most recently in Lomé, Togo in May 2013.

At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014, Senegal called on states that have not yet done so, especially from Africa, to accede to the convention and implement its provisions.[6] At the UN General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2014, Senegal encouraged states to join the convention before its First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015.[7] Senegal expressed its support for the convention again at the end of the 2014 UNGA First Committee, describing it as a significant advancement for the protection of civilians and in strengthening international humanitarian law.[8]

In September 2014, Senegal said it “condemns recent use of cluster munitions in certain parts of the world” and called for the weapons’ destruction to create a world free of cluster munitions.[9] Senegal has voted in favor of recent UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 69/189 on 18 December 2014, which expressed “outrage” at the continued use.[10] 

Senegal is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Senegal has elaborated its views on a number of important issues relating to the interpretation and implementation of the convention. In 2012, Senegal stated its view that assistance with acts prohibited under the convention during joint military operations with states not party is prohibited by the convention. Senegal said that its commitment to humanitarian disarmament prevents it from participating in any military operations using cluster munitions.[11]

In 2011, Senegal stated that it considers foreign stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions a violation of the convention. On the issue of investment in cluster munition production, Senegal expressed its view that investment in cluster munitions would similarly be prohibited by the convention.[12]

In September 2014, Senegal affirmed that it considers the transfer and foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions, as well as the investment in cluster munition production, to constitute violations of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[13]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Senegal has reported that it has never used, produced, transferred, or stockpiled cluster munitions.[14] It has not retained any cluster munitions for training or research purposes.[15]



[2] Senegal’s National Assembly unanimously approved Law No. 14/2010 to ratify the convention on 23 June 2010. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 3 October 2012.

[3] CMC meeting with Abdoulaye Bathily, First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Senegal to the UN in Geneva, in Lomé, 22 May 2013; response to Monitor questionnaire from Amb. Papa Omar Ndiaye, Director, Senegal National Centre for Mine Action (CNAMS), 17 April 2012; and meeting with Amb. Ndiaye, CNAMS, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 18 April 2012.

[4] The initial report covered the period from 26 April 2011 to 26 April 2012, while the 2 April 2014 update is for calendar year 2013.

[5] For details on Senegal’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 149–150.

[6] Statement of Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2 September 2014.

[7] Statement of Senegal, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 8 October 2014.

[8] Ibid., 21 October 2014.

[9] Statement of Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2 September 2014. Monitor translation.

[10] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/189, 18 December 2014. Senegal voted in favor of similar resolutions on 15 May and 18 December 2013.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Amb. Ndiaye, CNAMS, 17 April 2012.

[12] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Meïssa Niang, Director, Control Research and Legislation of the Ministry of Armed Forces of Senegal, 3 February 2011.

[13] Statement of Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2 September 2014.

[14] Statement of Senegal, Lomé Regional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 23 May 2013. Notes by Action on Armed Violence; statement of Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, Oslo, 12 September 2012; response to Monitor questionnaire by Col. Niang, Control Research and Legislation of the Ministry of Armed Forces of Senegal, 3 February 2011; and statement of Senegal, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[15] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Forms C, 3 October 2012 and 2 April 2014.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 02 November 2011

Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty

Mine Ban Treaty status

State Party

National implementation measures

Legislation enacted on 3 August 2005

Transparency reporting

15 June 2011

Key developments

Senegal reported using mines for training purposes for the first time since 2006

Policy

The Republic of Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified it on 24 September 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. On 3 August 2005, the President signed a national implementation law.[1] The law makes production, purchase, sale, stockpiling, transfer, and use of antipersonnel mines a criminal offense.[2]

Senegal submitted its annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report on 15 June 2011, covering calendar year 2010. It submitted 11 previous reports.[3]

Senegal attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, where it made statements on victim assistance, mine clearance, extension requests by Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania, and on the evaluation of the Implementation Support Unit (ISU). At the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2011, Senegal made statements on its progress towards meeting its mine clearance deadline, victim assistance, and the ISU/Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining agreement.

Senegal is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines, but has never submitted an annual transparency report as required under Article 13. It is also party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Production, transfer, stockpiling, retention, and use

Government authorities claim that Senegal has never used antipersonnel mines inside or outside the country.[4] Senegal has consistently stated in its Article 7 reports that it has never produced, possessed, or stockpiled mines.

In April 2010, Senegal reported that 28 mines were used in training during 2009. These mines had been collected from demining operations or taken from rebel stockpiles discovered in the field. Twenty-four mines were destroyed during training activities by the armed forces and four mines were defuzed and stored by the NGO Handicap International (HI) for training purposes.[5] Previously Senegal had only reported the use of mines for training in one year, 2006.[6]

Sporadic armed conflict in the Casamance region of Senegal continued between government forces and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC).[7] There have not been any allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by the MFDC in this reporting period (from May 2010 to May 2011), but use of antivehicle mines by armed groups resulted in civilian and military deaths and injuries.[8]

In March 2009, an MFDC representative who claimed to speak on behalf of all factionstold the Monitor, “For the time being we don’t need mines, but [possible future use] will entirely depend on the government. Mines are a defensive tool for us. The state has obliged us to use mines and to go to war.”[9]

Previously, in March and April 2006, the Salif Sadio faction of the MFDC fled Senegal and laid both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines in northern Guinea-Bissau.[10] There were also credible allegations of use of antipersonnel mines by MFDC rebels in Senegal in 1999 and 2000.[11] In 2010, the Sadio faction stated to the Swiss NGO Geneva Call that they did not use antipersonnel mines but would not rule out use of the weapon in the future. The faction admitted to using antivehicle mines. Geneva Call also held a meeting with the Kassolol faction of the MFDC at which the leaders of the faction confirmed their agreement in principle to enable the “gradual implementation” of humanitarian demining.[12]

 



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 April 2006. Previously, Senegal reported that violations of the Mine Ban Treaty were punishable under national constitutional law and the 2001 penal code.

[2] Articles 5 and 6 of the law include penal sanctions of a prison term of five to 10 years, a fine of XAF1 million to 3 million (US$2,170 to $6,510) for individuals, and a fine of XAF30 million to 50 million ($65,100 to $108,500) for legal entities. Average exchange rate for 2009: XAF1=US$0.00217. Oanda, www.oanda.com.

[3] Senegal submitted previous Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports on 30 April 2010, 30 April 2009, 30 April 2008, 30 April 2007, 8 May 2006, 9 June 2005, 2 June 2004, 6 May 2003, 22 April 2002, 27 March 2001, and 1 September 1999.

[4] However, it appears certain that Senegalese forces used antipersonnel mines in Guinea-Bissau in 1998, to support government troops against a self-proclaimed military junta. Such use would have occurred after Senegal signed the Mine Ban Treaty, but before its entry into force for the government. See Landmine Monitor Report1999, pp. 76–79.

[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2010. Senegal reported that the armed forces used the following types and quantities: 10 MI AP DV; 10 MI AP ID; one PRB M35, one M 969, and two PMN. HI used two MAPS and two PRB M35. 

[6] In April 2007, Senegal reported that 24 antipersonnel mines were used for training purposes before their destruction in August and September 2006. It stated that the mines were either taken from demining operations or discovered among rebel stockpiles, and that the defuzed mines were used to instruct deminers. The mines were 10 MI AP DV; 10 MI AP ID; two PMN; one M 969; and one PRB M35. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 30 April 2007.

[7] The MFDC has had at least three military factions, with shifting leaders and some infighting. Some MFDC leaders signed a peace accord with the government in December 2004, but further negotiations on its implementation have not taken place. The agreement acknowledged the scourge of antipersonnel mines and called for humanitarian demining in Casamance. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 505.

[8] In November 2010, a civilian bus struck an antivehicle mine in Sindian district of Bignona killing the driver and a passenger and another eight persons were injured. In March 2011 an antivehicle mine injured five Senegalese soldiers in Tendine, in an area under the control of the MFDC. “Veille de Tabaski meurtrière dans la région de Ziguinchor: 3 morts, des dizaines de blessés” (“Eve of Tabaski deadly in Ziguinchor region: 3 dead, dozens injured”), Ziguinchor news, 19 November 2010, www.scoopsdeziguinchor.com; and “Casamance – Un Vehicule Militaire Saute Sur Une Mine: 5 soldats grièvement blesses” (“Casamance – A military vehicle detonates a mine: five soldiers seriously injured”), Le Quotidien (Senegal), 7 March 2011, www.africatime.com.

[9] Interview with Daniel Diatta, Representative of the Secretary-General, MDFC, Ziguinchor, 20 March 2009. See Landmine Monitor Report 2008, p. 607.

[10] For details, see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 463–464.

[12] Geneva Call, “Annual Report 2010,” p. 18.


Mine Action

Last updated: 11 December 2017

Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (light contamination)

Article 5 Deadline: 1 March 2021
(Not on track to meet deadline)

There is no accurate assessment of the extent of mine contamination. The Republic of Senegal has provided inconsistent reports of remaining contamination as of the end of 2016. In 2016, 29,350m2 was cleared and 20 antipersonnel mines were destroyed.

Recommendations for action

  • Senegal should complete non-technical survey as soon as possible and, where security allows, establish a more complete and accurate estimate of its mine threat. It should record suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) on the basis of demonstrable evidence and with specific size estimates.
  • Senegal should prioritize clearance and technical survey in areas readily accessible that clearly evidence the existence of mines.
  • The Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS) should take immediate action to improve transparency and to facilitate dialogue between all actors concerned by land release operations, as well as to restore confidence among donors and international operators in its mine action program.
  • CNAMS should engage the Senegalese Armed Forces to participate in mine action activities and provide information on the location of mined areas and other resources to support clearance.
  • Senegal should report regularly and transparently on its clearance efforts and results, including in the annual Article 7 transparency reports.

Contamination

Senegal has still to establish an accurate assessment of the extent of its mine contamination. In 2016–2017, it continued to report inconsistent figures for the amount of confirmed and suspected contaminated areas remaining, as it had in previous years.

According to the CNAMS, as of 31 December 2016, a total of 81 areas of antipersonnel mine contamination remained to be addressed, of which 61 were confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) with a total size of 305,486m2 and 20 were SHAs with an unknown size.[1] In addition, as in 2015, Senegal reported that 144 areas still remained to be surveyed, including 127 areas in Bignona department, four in Oussouye, and 13 in Ziguinchor.[2]

In April 2017, however, CNAMS also reported that 52 CHAs, of which 41 were CHAs covering a total of 529,027m2 and 11 CHAs with an unknown size, remained to be addressed.[3]

Previously, at the end of 2015, CNAMS had reported 83 areas of confirmed and suspected contamination with a size of nearly 1.6km2. Of this, a total of 56 were CHAs with a total size of 465,127m2 had been identified, and 27 were SHAs whose extent had not been defined.[4] However, in its 2017 Article 7 report, Senegal gave a different account, stating that that at the end of 2015, a total of 47 CHAs with a total size of 233,840m2 remained to be addressed, along with 20 SHAs with an unknown size.[5]

Four departments (Bignona, Goudomp, Oussouye, and Ziguinchor) out of the total of 45 in Senegal still contain confirmed or suspected mined areas. The affected departments are located in the Casamance region of Senegal, between Gambia to the north and Guinea-Bissau to the south.

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province (as at end 2016)[6]

Department

CHAs

Size (m2)

SHAs

Size (m2)

Bignona

19

34,690

11

N/K

Goudomp

25

162,994

0

N/K

Oussouye

13

77,240

4

N/K

Ziguinchor

04

30,562

5

N/K

Total

61

305,486

20

N/K

Note: N/K = not known.

In 2016, Handicap International (HI) conducted non-technical survey for the first time in 80 localities near the northwestern portion of the Senegal-Gambia border in the Casamance region, which had formerly been inaccessible for mine action operations due to security concerns. Five new SHAs were established as a result of the survey. A further 11 localities in Bignona in the northwest were tasked for non-technical survey in April 2016. The survey confirmed seven areas as mined, one in the district of Niaguis in Ziguinchor region, a second in the district of Nyassia in the department Ziguinchor, and a further five in the district of Niagha, in the department of Goudomp, in Sedhiou region.[7]

According to HI, given the historical evidence of frequent clashes and rebel bases in the area, the identification of SHAs in northwest Casamance suggests a high probability that other areas of contamination will be found as survey progresses further east, nearer to the northern border.[8] The extent of contamination is better known in the south of Casamance, where previous survey in the region has identified several SHAs, between the Guinea-Bissau border and the Casamance River to the north and Atlantic Ocean to the west.[9]

Mine contamination in Senegal is the result of more than 30 years of fighting between the armed forces and a non-state armed group, the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC). Sporadic fighting with some factions of the MFDC has continued despite a ceasefire in place since 2004.

In 2016, mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination continued to pose a threat to local residents in the Casamance region, seriously hindered socio-economic development, prevented the return of displaced populations, and limited access to agricultural land and livelihood activities.[10]

Program Management

The National Commission for the Implementation of the Ottawa Convention serves as the national mine action authority for Senegal. Demining operations in Casamance are coordinated by the Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre National d’Action Antimines, CNAMS). Regional mine action coordination committees have been established in Kolda, Sédhiou, and Ziguinchor departments.

Strategic planning

Senegal submitted an updated workplan in accordance with its Article 5 extension request in May 2017 for the remainder of its extension period, until 1 March 2021. The plan contains a list of all known or suspected contaminated areas and establishes annual targets for the amount of contamination to be addressed. However, there are inconsistencies in its reporting on the total contamination remaining and the size of projected annual milestones for land release. Additionally, Senegal’s extension request is until March 2021, but the plan does not contain details of work to be carried out after 2018.

According to the updated workplan, Senegal would address 17 CHAs with a total size of approximately 169,771m2 in 2017; and 24 CHAs with a size of 343,856m2 and 11 CHAs with an unknown size, along with non-technical survey of the remaining 144 areas, in 2018; and any areas confirmed as CHA by survey activities in 2019–2020.[11] This would appear to indicate that at least 513,626m2 of CHA will be addressed; however, according to Senegal’s most recent Article 7 transparency report, only about 305,000m2 of CHA remained as of the end of 2016. Senegal has alternatively reported that a total of 41 CHAs with a combined size of 529,023m2 would be addressed in 2017–2018, along with 11 SHAs of unknown sizes; and that the 144 unsurveyed areas will be subjected to non-technical survey in 2019. It has estimated the remaining contaminated area to cover a total of 1.3km2.[12]

The workplan does not include a detailed budget to accompany planned activities, nor does it include a resource mobilization plan to account for how external funding will be secured.

Standards

There were no significant developments regarding Senegal’s national mine action standards in 2016. According to HI, the standards have not been updated since 2013.[13]

Operators

In 2016, HI deployed a total of 15 deminers and 14 support personnel, two mine detection dogs (MDDs), and a mechanical excavator, which was introduced for the first time in 2016. HI stopped using the MDDs in December 2016 “due to lack of performance.”[14] HI remained the only international mine action operator in Senegal in 2016 and as of September 2017 was preparing to end its demining operations in the country due to lack of funding.[15]

Land Release

The total mined area reported released by HI in Senegal in 2016 was 147,650m2: just under 118,300m2 through survey and 29,350m2 by clearance, with the destruction of 20 antipersonnel mines. In comparison, HI released 911,000m2 by survey in 2015, including just over 908,000m2 through non-technical survey and a further 3,000m2 by technical survey, but no antipersonnel mine clearance occurred.

CNAMS has reported that 21 CHAs with a size of just over 101,370m2 were released by either clearance or technical survey between 2015 and 31 March 2017, with the destruction of 22 mines.[16]

Survey

HI initiated a new 14-month project in July 2015 for non-technical survey of 80 localities and technical survey covering some 53,000m2.[17]

In 2016, HI reported confirming two mined areas with a combined size of 29,350m2, including one area in Niaguis, Ziguinchor department with a size of 14,000m2 (22,162m² were subsequently cleared) and one area in Goudomp, Sédhiou department with a size of 15,350m2. It also canceled seven SHAs with a total size of 62,235m2 in Goudomp through non-technical survey. A total of 56,061m2 was reduced by technical survey.[18] CNAMS did not, however, report that any non-technical survey was carried out in 2016.[19]

Previously, nearly 911,000m2 of SHA was released by survey activities in 2015. HI, which began surveying in December 2015, reported that as of 31 December 2015, it had already canceled 19 SHAs with a size of 908,000m2 and reduced a further 3,043m2 by technical survey.[20]

Clearance

In 2016, HI cleared the two areas confirmed in Niaguis and Goudomp with a combined size of 29,350m2, destroying 19 antipersonnel mines in Niaguis, and one antipersonnel mine and two antivehicle mines in Goudomp. HI attributed the increased clearance output in 2016, along with the significant increase in land released by technical survey, to its ability to carry out additional technical survey tasks with six-months of funding provided by a government of Senegal grant, and the use of a mechanical excavator to support manual demining.[21]

In its updated 2016–2021 workplan, CNAMS reported that nine areas with a size of 58,414m2 were cleared in 2016, and one antipersonnel mine destroyed.[22] However, it reported differing totals that 58,594m2 was cleared in 2016, with the destruction of 19 antipersonnel mines, while also reporting separately that a total of 56,061m2 was cleared with the destruction of 18 antipersonnel mines and one antivehicle mine.[23]

No antipersonnel mines were cleared in Senegal in 2015. CNAMS has given conflicting accounts that two areas with a size of 29,156m2 were cleared in 2015, while also stating that a total of 3,043m2 was cleared during the year; however, no antipersonnel mines were reportedly found according to either report.[24]

Inconsistency in clearance task orders since 2013

Senegal has been criticized for issuing task orders assigning clearance assets to areas not known to be affected by mines. It has also been accused of failing to clear considerable mine contamination in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases, despite being readily accessible and under the control of the Senegalese Armed Forces.

In November 2013, Mechem was tasked to clear sections of National Road 6 (Route nationale 6, RN6) and a dozen laterite quarries used in a project to renovate the RN6, in areas not known to be affected by mines.[25] However, Senegal cited its politico-security situation to justify deployment of its clearance assets in areas where the safety of its demining teams could be guaranteed.[26] According to HI, when task orders were given in November 2013, only one polygon crossed by the RN6 in Sindone Lagoua (20km from Ziguinchor) was recorded as an SHA in the IMSMA database, and the quarries had never been recorded as suspected or confirmed mined areas.[27]

Additionally, reports indicated that considerable mine contamination may lie in unmarked minefields around former and active Senegalese military bases.[28] But since the resumption of clearance operations and even though most of the military bases can be readily accessed—as they are under the control of the Senegalese Armed Forces—they have not been cleared nor even considered as a priority for demining operations. Some areas are confirmed as contaminated: these include the village of Djirack, in which operations were planned to start in 2016, though this did not occur, reportedly for logistic and security reasons.[29] Others remain as either SHAs or as credible, if unrecorded and unconfirmed, reports of contamination by local populations, such as in Badème, Basséré, Kouring, and Santhiaba Mandjack.[30]

However, in August 2017, CNAMS reported that it has already demined around all the military bases, with the help of the army where that was necessary.[31] HI has reported, that its teams cleared 22,162m² in Boutoute-Djibanar in connection with a former army base between 24 April 2015 and 23 December 2016, destroying “around” 19 antipersonnel mines. Some clearance around military installations was also carried out by HI in 2007–2012 in Darsalam and Gonoum, during which 177 antipersonnel mines were destroyed in cooperation with the Senegalese Armed Forces, and by Mechem in 2013 in Mpack, during which 136 antipersonnel mines were destroyed (representing all the mines found that year).[32]

In August 2016, CNAMS reported that in its criteria for prioritizing tasks, emphasis was put on the level of security, the economic importance of the area, the desire of populations to return to areas, and the social cohesion of communities.[33] It reported that “indeed, there is a significant amount of land demined in relation to the number of mines discovered,” while claiming that “it must be remembered that the main interest is to remove suspicion and to make accessible to local populations land which had formerly been abandoned.”[34]

In 2017, HI reported that task criteria were developed according to the results of the non-technical survey carried out by HI in 2014, and updated information from further survey in 2016 and priorities reported by the local communities.[35] It reported, however, that more than 50% of areas cleared in 2016 had no evidence of antipersonnel mine contamination.[36]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the five-year extension granted by States Parties in 2015), Senegal is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021.[37]

Senegal’s previous Article 5 clearance deadline was set to expire on 1 March 2016 under its first extension request, approved in 2008. In June 2015, Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2021. In granting the second extension request in December 2015, States Parties noted that Senegal “did not have clear knowledge of the size and location of areas that will warrant mine clearance” as well as its commitment “to undertake technical survey activities and to develop a cancellation procedure which may result in implementation proceeding much faster and in a more cost-effective manner.”[38] Previously, Senegal reported release of about 730,725m2 and destruction of 383 mines in 2008–2013. Most of these results were achieved between February 2012 and May 2013 with 548,137m2 cleared, representing three-quarters of the total and 259 mines destroyed.[39]

In its latest extension request, Senegal noted as circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations: circumstances impeding compliance with its international legal obligations include general insecurity; MFDC reticence to agree to demining operations; the eight-month suspension of operations in 2013; ongoing concerns over deminer safety; and a decrease in technical and financial resources in recent years.[40] Senegal has also stated that security conditions and lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner.[41]

While Senegal recorded a significant increase in clearance productivity in 2012–2013, the way CNAMS has allocated tasks after the 2013 kidnapping has been criticized for directing resources and clearance assets to areas without credible risk of mine contamination, while requests from operators to conduct survey prior to deploying clearance assets were denied.[42]

Senegal’s 2015 extension request foresees expenditure of some US$11.5 million to support its mine action program, of which US$6.4 million would be allocated to technical survey and clearance. Senegal has pledged to contribute to about 30% of the total to cover the running costs of its program (approx. $3.3 million).[43] Senegal’s updated workplan for 2016–2021 does not, though, include a detailed budget for activities scheduled under its annual targets. It notes that Senegal’s own annual contribution in 2015–2016 was nearly $1.8 million and that external funding of $781,478 was provided by the United States (US) to HI.[44]

In its Article 7 report for 2016, Senegal reported that FCFA 500 million (some $850,000) would be assigned for mine action from the national budget annually.[45] According to CNAMS, its operating costs are included in the national budget, but reported that resources allocated for 2015 were not able to be mobilized until late 2016, due to complex procurement procedures. No national budget allocation for mine action operations had been recorded for 2017, it said.[46]

There may be political obstacles to the implementation of a five-year workplan for 2016–2020. Senegal has regularly indicated that all demining operations would be conducted within the framework of the ongoing peace talks and would first be approved by MFDC in meetings with Senegalese officials.[47] At the same time, CNAMS has stated that talks with the MFDC are made by authorities in Dakar exclusively, and not by the mine action center.[48] There is no explanation in the action plan presented in Senegal’s second extension request of how peace negotiations conducted in Dakar by the Reflection Group on Peace in Casamance (Groupe de Réflexion sur la Paix en Casamance, GRPC) will include the issue of mine clearance.

In August 2017, CNAMS reiterated that the implementation of the revised workplan and the feasibility of the 2021 mine clearance deadline are based on the assumption that the GRPC obtains the MFDC’s agreement on the inclusion of demining activities in the peace process, in order to allow for the rapid deployment of demining teams.[49] In the workplan, CNAMS stated that it was unable to provide detailed updates on the development of the peace process as it is not a member of the GRPC negotiation group. However, it reported that events in the Gambia had improved the security situation in the north of Casamance, particularly in the department of Bignona, allowing significant numbers of displaced persons to return. It expected that the continued evolution of the peace process would ensure better security conditions and improve access for mine clearance in planned locations.[50]

Previously, in 2015, NPA criticized CNAMS for obstructing dialogue between operators and the armed forces in particular, which could provide the specific locations of mined areas. Other stakeholders echoed that CNAMS was preventing dialogue between parties, including the spokesperson of the MFDC, who stated that there was a complete lack of communication with members of CNAMS.[51]

In August 2017, CNAMS had reiterated its three priorities for meeting Senegal’s 2021 Article 5 deadline: agreement of all parties to the conflict on the principle of clearance of mined areas; access to conduct non-technical survey in the 144 communities not yet surveyed; and mobilization of resources to enable increased demining productivity.[52]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D; and email from Ibrahima Seck, Head of Operations and Information Management, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D; and CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017.

[3] CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017.

[4] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016. According to the program manager of a former operator in Senegal, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), it was rare that the size of the area was recorded when an SHA was identified. Both NPA and CNAMS reported that entire villages were recorded as SHAs purely on the basis that they were located in former conflict areas. Emails from Chris Natale, former Programme Manager Senegal, NPA, 15 September 2016; and from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 13 September 2016.

[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.

[6] Ibid.; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[7] Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April and 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo, Chief of Operations, and Jean-Michel Mathiam, Project Manager, HI.

[8] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.

[9] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[10] Emails from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017; and from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.

[11] CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D. The workplan states that the 17 SHAs to be addressed in 2017 have a total size of “169,770.825m2”and the 24 CHAs to be addressed in 2018 have a size of “343,856.451m2.” Senegal’s 2017 Article 7 report states, however, that 17 areas with a size of “158,150.79m2” will be addressed in 2017.

[12] Statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017. At the meeting, Senegal reported that the 41 CHAs had a combined size of 529,022m2.

[13] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.

[14] Ibid., and 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo and Jean-Michel Mathiam, HI.

[15] Ibid.

[16] CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017; and statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017. At the intersessional meetings, Senegal reported that a total of 433 mines had been destroyed but did not indicate the timeframe to which this referred.

[17] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

[18] Emails from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April and 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo and Jean-Michel Mathiam, HI.

[19] “Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation (Chile, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and Zambia),” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017; and CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[20] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 1 September 2016.

[21] Ibid., 19 April 2017.

[22] “Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation (Chile, Costa Rica, Switzerland, and Zambia),” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8–9 June 2017.

[23] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D; statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D; CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017; and statement of Senegal, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Committee on Article 5 Implementation, Geneva, 8 June 2017.

[25] HI, “Déminage Humanitaire en Casamance: progression du processus de remise à disposition des terres” (“Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in the process of land release”), April 2014; and Kathryn Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine & Cluster Munition blog, 7 April 2014.

[26] Email from Col. Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 13 May 2014.

[27] HI, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: progress in land release,” April 2014.

[28] Kathryn Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine & Cluster Munition blog, 7 April 2014.

[29] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 26 September 2017, incorporating input from Jason Mudingay Lufuluabo and Jean-Michel Mathiam, HI.

[30] Kathryn Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine & Cluster Munition blog, 7 April 2014.

[31] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[32] Ibid.; and from Luc Sambou, Mine Coordinator, HI, 8 May 2014.

[33] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Email from Julien Kempeneers, HI, 19 April 2017.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Senegal’s previous Article 5 clearance deadline expired on 1 March 2016 under its first extension request approved in 2008. Despite repeatedly asserting its intention, as late as June 2014, not to seek a second extension period and to complete clearance within this deadline, in June 2015 Senegal submitted a request to extend its Article 5 clearance deadline until March 2021.

[38] Analysis of Senegal’s request for a second Article 5 deadline extension submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 1.

[39] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, June 2015, pp. 11–13.

[40] Ibid., p. 22.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Kathryn Millett, “Clearance and Compliance in Casamance: is Senegal doing all it should?” Landmine & Cluster Munition blog, 7 April 2014.

[43] Analysis of Senegal’s request for a second Article 5 deadline extension submitted by the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 17 November 2015, p. 28.

[44] CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017.

[45] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.

[46] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[47] H. Sagna, “Humanitarian demining in Casamance: negotiations and operations still deadlocked,” Enquête+, 17 June 2015.

[48] Statement of ICBL, Mine Ban Treaty 14th Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 2 December 2015; and email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 22 August 2016.

[49] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.

[50] CNAMS, “Updated Workplan for Senegal’s Article 5 Extension 2016–2021,” April 2017.

[51] A. Grovestins and A. Oberstadt, “Why landmines keep on killing in Senegal,” IRIN, 3 August 2015.

[52] Email from Ibrahima Seck, CNAMS, 18 August 2017.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 05 October 2015

The government of the Republic of Senegal has identified some 480,000m2 (0.48km2) of confirmed mined areas and 12 suspected mined areas, and has also reported that survey was still required in 216 localities.[1] In June 2015, Senegal submitted a request to extend its mine clearance deadline until 2021.

Senegal’s mine action program did not receive international funding in 2014. In 2013, Senegal received US$2.4 million in international assistance from five donors. More than 80% ($2 million) of international contributions were earmarked for clearance.

The decline of international support can be explained by the stagnation of land release results in recent years despite the significant amount of support provided ($7.7million was allocated to clearance work in 2012–2013), as well as Senegal’s apparent reluctance to conduct clearance in areas readily accessible, following the abduction of deminers in March 2013. This situation has led to the departure of one operator and a number of major donors (the European Union, Germany, and Norway) in 2014.[2]

Senegal reported contributing about US$3.9 million to its mine action program between 2007–2014, although all funding was allocated to salary and operations expenses.[3]

In its most recent extension request, Senegal estimated that a budget of $11.5 million would be needed to support its mine action program until 2021, of which $6.5 million would be allocated to land release operations (57%), almost $700,000 to victim assistance (6%), and some $400,000 to risk education (4%). Senegal has planned to provide approximately $3.3 million, about 30% of the total, to cover the running costs of its program.[4] Senegal also noted that lack of funding could affect its ability to complete clearance in a timely manner.[5]

Summary of contributions: 2010–2014[6]

Year

National contributions ($)

International contributions ($)

Total contributions ($)

2014

N/R

0

0

2013

650,000

2,430,466

3,080,466

2012

230,000

5,717,886

5,947,886

2011

230,000

0

230,000

2010

230,000

897,830

1,127,830

Total

1,340,000

9,046,182

10,386,182

Note: N/R = not reported



[2] For more details see, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor,  “Country profile: Senegal: Mine Action”; and Norwegian People’s Aid, “Countries we work in: Senegal,” undated, last accessed September 2015.

[4] Ibid., p. 28.

[5] Ibid.

[6] See previous Monitor reports.


Last updated: 04 December 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

849 (188 killed; 648 injured; 13 unknown)

Casualties in 2016

0 (2015: 2)

2016 casualties by outcome

0 (2015: 1 killed; 1 injured)

 

No new mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties were reported in the Republic of Senegal in 2016.[1] However, casualties continued to occur in 2017. On 30 August 2017, three persons were injured, including a baby, when their cart drove over a mine in Casamance.[2]

In 2015, the Monitor identified two mine casualties in Senegal.[3] The 2015 total had represented a significant decrease from previous years.[4] This decrease can be explained by a general decrease in casualties among combatants. In 2011 and 2012, there was an increase in mine casualties among military or security forces, while in 2013, just two of the eight casualties were military, and in 2014, none of the casualties were combatants. Fluctuations in the security situation in Casamance have resulted in variable annual mine casualty rates in Senegal over the last several years.[5] Following an intensification of violence since 2011, violence decreased since 2013, explaining the decline in casualties among combatants over the period.[6]

With reduced support for demining in Senegal[7] and new mines previously reported having been laid,[8] it is feared that numbers of victims of mine/ERW may increase.[9]

The Monitor identified at least 849 casualties (188 killed; 648 injured; 13 unknown) between 1988 and the end of 2016.[10] This included 592 civilian casualties and 244 military casualties.[11] As of 31 December 2016, the Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre national d’action antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS) registered a total of 826 casualties (187 killed; 639 injured) of which 590 were civilians and 236 were military.[12] Since 2005, all reported casualties have been caused by mines.[13]



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016); and interviews with Barham Thiam, Director, Senegalese National Mine Action Center (Centre national d’action antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS), Geneva, 9 June 2017; and with Sarani Diatta, Solidarity Initiative for Development Actions (Initiative Solidaire des Actions de Développement, ISAD), Ziguinchor, 20 May 2017.

[2]Sénégal: une mine explose en Casamance” (“Senegal: a mine explodes in Casamance”), RFI, 5 September 2017.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 14 June 2016; and Monitor media monitoring from 1 January to 31 December 2015.

[4] Fifteen casualties were identified in 2014, eight in 2013, and 24 in 2012. See previous Monitor reports on Senegal for details.

[5] There were 18 casualties recorded in 2006, one in 2007, 24 in 2008, two in 2009, four in 2010, 32 in 2011, 24 in 2012, eight in 2013, 15 in 2014, and two in 2015. See previous Monitor reports on Senegal for details.

[6] The election of a new president in 2012 and increased international pressure, especially from the United States (US), who launched a Casamance peace initiative in October 2012 and appointed a US Casamance advisor in February 2013, contributed to the intensification of peace talks between the government and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance, MFDC) under the mediation of the Sant’Egidio Christian community. “Gambia: U.S. Casamance Advisor Ends Visit,” All Africa (online newspaper), 19 September 2013; email from Mamady Gassama, Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association sénégalaise des victimes de mines, ASVM), 5 May 2014; “Casamance: Salif Sadio dit observer un ‘cessez-le-feu unilateral,’” Agence France Presse, (Sant’Egidio), 30 April 2014; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, May 2016.

[7]Sénégal: Les Casamançais inquiets de perdre le soutien des ONG pour le déminage” (“Senegal: The people of Casamance are concerned about losing NGO support for mine clearance”), All Africa/Radio France Internationale, 2 March 2014; “Sénégal: Les bailleurs de fonds arrêtent le déminage en Casamance” (“Senegal: Donors stop mine clearance in Casamance”), All Africa/Fahamu, 2 March 2014; “Pourquoi les mines antipersonnel continuent de tuer au Sénégal” (“Why antipersonnel mines continue to kill in Senegal”), IRIN News, undated; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, May 2016, p. 237.

[8] ICRC, “Annual Report 2014,” 12 May 2015, p. 234; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, May 2016, p. 237.

[9] Interview with Alphouseyni Gassama, Protection Officer, UNICEF, Ziguinchor, 29 April 2015.

[10] In 2011, in its statement at the Mine Ban Treaty Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration on 23 May 2012 in Geneva, the government of Senegal announced that there had been 800 casualties since 1988. The Monitor identified 24 new casualties in 2012, eight in 2013, 15 in 2014, and two in 2015.

[11] The civilian/military status of 13 casualties is unknown.

[12] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016).

[13] The last confirmed casualties from ERW occurred in 2005. ICBL, Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine-Free World.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 06 October 2017

Action points based on findings

  • Ensure the sustainability of physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support in the Casamance region.
  • Ensure regular and effective coordination on victim assistance with all stakeholders and adopt new victim assistance plan.
  • Work on developing economic inclusion projects for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) victims in the Casamance region.
  • Ensure the inclusion of mine/ERW survivors in the planning of victim assistance.
  • Ensure the sustainability of psychological support services for mine/ERW victims and other persons with disabilities in the Casamance region.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Senegal is responsible for a significant number of survivors of landmines and ERW who are in need. Senegal has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Senegal ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 7 September 2010.

Victim Assistance

By the end of 2016, there were at least 648 mine/ERW survivors in Senegal (439 civilian and 209 military survivors).

Victim assistance since 2015

Most mine/ERW survivors in Senegal live in the Casamance region where services are much more limited than elsewhere in the country.

Senegal reported on several occasions that it is committed to victim assistance, but at the same time acknowledged that needs were not being met due to a lack of resources. The government relied on international and national NGOs, including the former Senegalese Association of Mine Victims (Association sénégalaise des victimes de mines, ASVM), renamed Solidarity Initiative for Development Actions (Initiative Solidaire des Actions de Développement, ISAD), Handicap International (HI), and the ICRC to implement activities. Years of conflict and continued intermittent violence devastated infrastructure and prevented access to services.

In 2015, the president of Senegal launched a new “Equality of Chances Card” (carte d’égalité des chances) aimed at providing all insured persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW victims, with access to health and a range of services.[1]

Since 2015, a number of activities in support of mine/ERW survivors stopped, including outreach activities by the Kenya Psychiatric Center[2] and the Academic Centre for Educational and Professional Orientation (Centre académique de l’orientation scolaire et professionnelle, CAOSP).[3] Due to a lack of financial support and supplies, the Regional Orthopedic Appliance Centre (Le Centre régional d'appareillage orthopédique, CRAO), was unable to meet the demand.[4] Since 2013, the ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD)’s (in January 2017 renamed MoveAbility) partnership in Senegal was put on hold pending a renewed commitment from the authorities concerned.[5]

Victim assistance in 2016

In 2016, with the improving security situation in Casamance, more and more internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, mainly from Gambia, returned to their homes; certain areas, however, remained inaccessible because of security concerns, including mines in areas bordering Guinea-Bissau.[6]

Throughout 2016, emergency medical care was limited. Response times varied depending on the location of the incident and the army provided assistance. Ziguinchor regional hospital was the only medical center in a position to provide emergency medical care to mine victims.[7] Follow-up medical care was only available in the three regional hospitals (Ziguinchor, Kolda, and Sédhiou), which had sufficient capacity but had equipment that only worked intermittently and experienced shortages of supplies.[8] These three hospitals and their satellite centers have signed agreements with the National Mine Action Centre (Centre national d’action antimines au Sénégal, CNAMS) to provide rehabilitation services to mine/ERW victims. However, the hospitals are unable to provide these services due to shortages of raw material.[9]

Assessing victim assistance needs

No structured needs assessments surveys were conducted in 2016. However, CNMAS collected information on mine victims in an ongoing manner in conjunction with other assistance activities.[10] The last needs assessments surveys were undertaken in 2013 by CNAMS, ISAD, and HI.[11]

Victim assistance coordination[12]

Government coordinating body/focal point

CNAMS for civilian survivors; Foundation for Disabled Veterans for military survivors

Coordinating mechanism

CNAMS, Regional Coordination Committee (Comité régional de concertation, CRC) in the Casamance region with ISAD, and victim assistance service providers

Plan

National Victim Assistance Action Plan 2010–2014 (Plan d’action national pour l’assistance aux victimes, 2010–2014, PANAV)

 

In 2016, no coordination and planning meetings on victim assistance that included all stakeholders were held.[13] CNAMS held several bilateral meetings with NGOs as well as the ICRC.[14] In 2016, no meetings of the CRC were reported. The CRC, established in 2011, brings together CNAMS with local and international organizations working in the region under the chairmanship of the governor of the Casamance region.[15] However, the focus of the CRC is on mine action more broadly and since its inception, national organizations noted that while victim assistance was sometimes discussed and debated during these meetings, the CRC was not fulfilling its coordination role.[16] Regular informal meetings took place in 2016 between representatives of CNAMS and of ISAD.[17]

Senegal’s PANAV included a mechanism for monitoring and evaluating progress in its implementation, though no reports had been made available that compared victim assistance progress against the PANAV through the end of 2016. CNAMS launched a mid-term evaluation of the PANAV and its impact in 2013.[18] The results of this evaluation were finalized and made public in 2014[19] and two key recommendations were made: 1) to decentralize the support provided to health facilities in order to ensure that victims in rural areas can also benefit from those services; 2) strengthen psychological support to mine/ERW victims.[20] No funding was available in 2016 to conduct the final evaluation of the PANAV, which in turn hindered the development of a new victim assistance plan.[21]

Senegal did not provide updates on victim assistance at Mine Ban Treaty international meetings in 2016. Senegal submitted its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for calendar year 2016, which includes information on victim assistance.[22]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

In 2016, mine/ERW survivors and their representative organizations were not involved in victim assistance planning.[23]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities in 2016

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

CNAMS

Government

Funding for materials and equipment to Ziguinchor Regional Hospital, for educational support and supplies, and for individual economic inclusion. Support to mine victims travelling to Guinea-Bissau for prosthetic services

CRAO, Orthopedic Department

Government

Medical care and physical rehabilitation

Kenya Psychiatric Center, Kenya Hospital

Government

Psychological support

Casamance Rural Development Support Project (PADERCA)

Government

Social and economic inclusion

Academic Centre for Educational and Professional Orientation (Centre académique de l’orientation scolaire et professionnelle, CAOSP)

Government

Education and social inclusion of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW victims

ISAD

National NGO

Referrals for medical care and physical rehabilitation; economic inclusion; mine risk education; advocacy; and peer support

National Association of Disabled Veterans (Association nationale des anciens militaires invalides du Sénégal, ANAMIS)

National NGO

Referrals for medical care, economic inclusion, and peer support among disabled veterans; advocacy to increase government support for economic inclusion and improved housing conditions

HI

International NGO

Inclusive education; professional insertion (vocational training and income-generating activities); advocacy on rights and participation of persons with disabilities in the social and economic sphere

UNICEF

International organization

Support for programs to help children access education and physical rehabilitation, through CDPE

ICRC

International organization

Support for prosthetics and rehabilitation in Guinea Bissau for survivors from Senegal

 

On 30 April 2015, the president of Senegal launched an initiative titled the “Equality of Chances Card” (“carte d’égalité des chances”). It targets all persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW victims, so that they can receive healthcare and rehabilitation services at a reduced cost if they subscribe to a health insurance. The initiative also encompasses improved access to education, vocational training, transports, benefits, and employment. As of February 2017, over 20,000 persons with disabilities had received an equality of chances card.[24]

In 2016, the physical rehabilitation center in Ziguinchor had difficulty in meeting the demand for orthotic devices due to deteriorating working tools and a constant shortage of materials.[25] Therefore, the ICRC signed an agreement with CNAMS to send people from Senegal for rehabilitation abroad. Within the framework of this project, ISAD was responsible for covering the costs of the accommodation, transport, and food of beneficiaries traveling to Guinea Bissau to be treated.[26] As of June 2017, 63 survivors had received new prosthetics in Guinea-Bissau.[27]

Psychological support services provided by the Kenya Psychiatric Center decreased significantly in 2016 and through 2017. The SNP-funded project between ISAD and the CNAMS ended and specialists of the center were no longer able to visit and provide group support to mine/ERW victims in host communities. The center also stopped providing ergotherapy services due to a lack of funding.[28] The Kenya Psychiatric Center was the only facility providing psychological support to mine/ERW survivors and other persons with disabilities for all regions of Casamance.[29]

In 2016, due to funding shortages the CAOSP was not able to provide services in the villages of origin of child victims of mines/ERW.[30] In the Dakar and Ziguinchor regions, HI trained teachers in inclusive education for children with disabilities.[31] In 2016, UNICEF funding was channeled through the Departmental Committee for the Protection of the Child (Comité Départemental de Protection de l’enfant, CDPE). However, as a result of the unreasonable length and difficulty of administrative processes under the CDPE, projects for children with disabilities were limited.[32]

HI supported the development of companies run by persons with disabilities in the regions of Dakar, Kolda, and Ziguinchor.[33]

The government provided grants, managed vocational training in regional centers, and offered funding for persons with disabilities to establish businesses.[34]

Senegalese law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to healthcare, transport, the judicial system, and the provision of other state services. Senegal did not enforce these provisions adequately in 2016.[35] The law also mandates accessibility for persons with disabilities, but there remained a lack of infrastructure to assist them.[36]



[1]Action sociale : 24.355 cartes d’égalité des chances distribuées” (“Social action: 24,355 Equality of Chances Cards distributed”), Le Soleil, 1 February 2017; and email from Faly Keita, Casamance Coordinator, HI, 4 October 2017.

[2] Interview with Dr. Adama Koundoule, Psychiatrist, Kenya Psychiatric Center, Ziguinchor, 13 April 2017.

[3] Interview with Yahya Diop, Director, CAOSP, 5 April 2017.

[4] Interview with Djibril Ba, CRAO, Ziguinchor, 5 May 2017.

[5] ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD), “Mid-Term Report 2013,” Geneva, 2013, p. 6; and ICRC SFD “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014, p. 12.

[6] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 222.

[7]Casamance/Recrudescence des accidents par mines : L’ASVM exprime un cri de cœur et charge les autorités étatiques,” Scoops de Ziguinchor (online newspaper), 10 March 2013; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 18 June 2015, and 28 September 2017.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 28 September 2017.

[9] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 28 September 2017.

[10] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khady Badji, CNAMS, 1 June 2017.

[11] Responses to Monitor questionnaires by Sarani Diatta, ISAD, 10 April 2014; by Luc Sambou, HI, 5 May 2014; by Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 18 June 2015; and by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 18 June 2015.

[12] Statement of Senegal on Victim Assistance, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012; statement of Senegal on Victim Assistance, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2013; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 23 April 2014, and 18 June 2015; by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 18 June 2015; by Diogoye Sene, CNAMS, 13 May 2013; by Benoit Couturier and Luc Sambou, HI, 12 April 2013; by Luc Sambou, HI, 5 May 2014; and by Souleymane Diallo, ISAD, 5 March 2013; and interview with Alphouseyni Gassama, UNICEF, Ziguinchor, 5 April 2013.

[13] Interview with Sarani Diatta, ISAD, 20 May 2017.

[14] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khady Badji, CNAMS, 1 June 2017.

[15] Statement of Senegal on Victim Assistance, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2012; responses to Monitor questionnaire by Diogoye Sene, CNAMS, 13 May 2013; by Benoit Couturier and Luc Sambou, HI, 12 April 2013; and by Souleymane Diallo, ISAD, 5 March 2013; and interview with Alphouseyni Gassama, UNICEF, Ziguinchor, 5 April 2013.

[16] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 18 June 2015; and interview with Sarani Diatta, ISAD, 20 May 2017.

[17] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 28 September 2017.

[18] Statement of Senegal on Victim Assistance, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 4 December 2013; and responses to Monitor questionnaire by Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 23 April 2014; and by Luc Sambou, HI, 5 May 2014.

[19] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 18 June 2015; and by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 18 June 2015.

[20] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 14 June 2016.

[21] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Khady Badji, CNAMS, 1 June 2017.

[22] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016).

[23] Interview with Sarani Diatta, ISAD, 20 May 2017.

[24]Action sociale : 24.355 cartes d’égalité des chances distribuées” (“Social action: 24,355 Equality of Chances Cards distributed”), Le Soleil, 1 February 2017; and email from Faly Keita, HI, 4 October 2017.

[25] Interview with Djibril Ba, CRAO, Ziguinchor, 5 May 2017.

[26] Interview with Sarani Diatta, ISAD, 24 June 2016.

[27] Interview with Sarani Diatta, ISAD, 20 May 2017; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 224.

[28] Interview with Dr. Adama Koundoule, Kenya Psychiatric Center, Ziguinchor, 13 April 2017.

[29] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mamady Gassama, ISAD, 28 September 2017.

[30] Interview with Yahya Diop, CAOSP, 5 April 2017.

[31] HI, “Country Card Senegal,” August 2016.

[32] Interview with Sarani Diatta, ISAD, Ziguinchor, 20 May 2017.

[33] HI, “Country Card Senegal,” August 2016.

[34] United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2016: Senegal,” Washington, DC, March 2017, p. 22.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Barham Thiam, CNAMS, 14 June 2016.