South Sudan

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 04 August 2017

Summary: Non-signatory South Sudan has expressed interest in acceding to the convention since it became an independent state in July 2011 and its Council of Ministers considered the accession package in 2015. South Sudan has participated as an observer in several meetings of the convention, most recently in September 2015.

South Sudan states that it has not used or produced cluster munitions and denies stockpiling them. Remnants of air-dropped cluster bombs were discovered outside the town of Bor in early 2014, after fighting between government forces and opposition fighters. South Sudan denied this use of cluster munitions, as did Uganda, which was providing air-support to the government at the time.

Policy

The Republic of South Sudan has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

South Sudan has expressed its support for the convention and intent to join since it became an independent state on 9 July 2011. As of January 2016, only administrative procedures reportedly remained to be completed to conclude the accession.[1] In September 2015, South Sudan informed States Parties that the government was working States Parties that the government ” the convention.[2]

South Sudan abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2016 that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[3] It was absent from the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[4]

South Sudan participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2011–2012 and 2014 as well as the First Review Conference in 2015. It has also attended regional workshops on the convention, most recently in Kampala, Uganda, in May 2015.[5]

South Sudan joined the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 November 2011 through a rarely used process of “succession.”[6] It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

The Monitor has seen no evidence to indicate past use, production, export, or stockpiling of cluster munitions by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) prior to the country becoming an independent state.

South Sudan stated in 2011 that it does not stockpile cluster munitions.[7] In 2014, South Sudan again stated that it “does not produce nor possess any cluster munitions” and declared, “we do not intend to acquire or use cluster bombs.”[8]

Use

In February 2014, evidence emerged showing that in the period since mid-December 2013 cluster munitions were used outside of Bor, the capital of Jonglei State, during fighting between opposition forces loyal to South Sudan’s former Vice President Riek Machar and Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government forces backed up with air-support provided by Uganda, a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. UN mine action personnel found the remnants of at least eight RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and an unknown quantity of intact unexploded AO-1SCh submunitions by a major road 16 kilometers south of Bor in an area not known to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants before mid-December 2013.[9]

Both South Sudanese and Ugandan forces are believed to possess fixed wing aircraft and helicopters capable of delivering these types of cluster munitions, while South Sudan’s opposition forces are not believed to possess any means of delivery.

South Sudan denied using cluster munitions in the conflict and also denied Ugandan use of the weapons.[10] In September 2014, South Sudan described the use as an “unfortunate incident” and pledged not to use cluster munitions. It said that a joint investigation conducted with the UN could not determine who used the cluster munitions found in Bor.[11]

At the same meeting, Uganda denied that its armed forces possess cluster bombs and stated that Uganda did not use the weapons in South Sudan.[12] In September 2015, Uganda reiterated that it does not “use, produce, stockpile or transfer cluster munitions.”[13]

The use of cluster munitions in South Sudan received strong media coverage as well as public outcry and condemnations or expressions of concern by at least 30 countries as of July 2016.[14] In May 2014, UN Security Council members unanimously adopted a resolution on South Sudan that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei State and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[15]

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon condemned the new use of cluster munitions in South Sudan without indicating who was responsible for the use.[16] The CMC condemned the use of cluster munitions and called for an immediate investigation.[17]

No other cluster munition use has been documented in South Sudan since it became independent in 2011. Prior to independence, numerous independent sources documented cluster munition remnants including unexploded submunitions in what is now South Sudan, indicating that the armed forces of Sudan sporadically used air-dropped cluster munitions there between 1995 and 2000.[18]



[2] Statement of South Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 8 September 2015.

[3]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.

[4]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[6] According to the UN Office of Legal Affairs, the Mine Ban Treaty took effect for South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the date of state independence and succession. In 2011, a South Sudan representative told the CMC that the government would consider accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions after joining the Mine Ban Treaty. CMC meeting with South Sudan delegation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, in Beirut, 14 September 2011. Notes by the CMC.

[7] Statement of South Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011.

[8] Statement of South Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 3 September 2014.

[9] UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, pp. 26–27.

[10] See, Jacey Fortin, “The Bad Bomb: Cluster Munitions, Cold Cases And A Case of Blame Game in South Sudan,” International Business Times, 12 March 2014.

[11] Statement of South Sudan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 3 September 2014.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Statement of Uganda, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015.

[14] The following states have expressed concern at and/or condemned the use of cluster munitions in South Sudan: Argentina, Australia, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Czech Republic, Ecuador, France, Guatemala, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, South Korea, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Rwanda, Slovenia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the United States (US). The statements were made at the convention’s meetings and at the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security and UN Security Council.

[15] The 15 states were the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) and 10 non-permanent members: Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, South Korea, and Rwanda. See, UN Security Council press statement, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), extends mandate of mission in South Sudan,” 27 May 2014. See also, CMC, “Cluster munition use in South Sudan,” 31 December 2014.

[16] Statement of UN Secretary-General on South Sudan, 12 February 2014. In May 2014, the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) director informed the CMC that cluster munitions were used in South Sudan, but it was not possible to determine who was responsible for the use. Email from UNMAS, 13 May 2014.

[17] CMC, “Cluster munition use in South Sudan,” 31 December 2014.

[18] Virgil Wiebe and Titus Peachey, “Clusters of Death: The Mennonite Central Committee Cluster Bomb Report,” July 2000, ch. 4. Landmine Action photographed a Rockeye-type cluster bomb with Chinese language external markings in Yei in 2006. Additionally, clearance personnel in Sudan have identified a variety of submunitions, including the Spanish-manufactured ESPIN 21, US-produced M42 and Mk-118 (Rockeye), and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5. Handicap International, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 55.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 20 October 2015

Policy

Less than six months after becoming an independent state on 9 July 2011, the Republic of South Sudan joined the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 November 2011 through the rarely used process of “succession.” According to the UN Office of Legal Affairs, the Mine Ban Treaty took effect for South Sudan on 9 July 2011, the date of state independence and succession.[1]

In December 2012, South Sudan reported that it was aware of its obligations under Article 9 of the Mine Ban Treaty to “take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress” any prohibited activity.[2] In its 2013, 2014, and 2015 transparency reports, South Sudan reported that it is aware of its Article 9 obligation, but has not yet taken any legal measures.[3]

South Sudan submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 2012 and provided annual updated reports in April 2013, 2014, and August 2015.[4]

South Sudan has participated in every Mine Ban Treaty Meeting of States Parties, including the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in December 2013. It attended the treaty’s Third Review Conference in June 2014. South Sudan has participated in every intersessional Standing Committee meeting held in Geneva since 2012, including those held in April 2014.

Use

In August 2014, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) accused the South Sudanese government of emplacing landmines along routes used by civilians fleeing to Sudan in the Greater Upper Nile Region.[5] The SPLM also accused government forces of placing landmines near villages in Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states. In response, spokesperson for the South Sudanese armed forces, Joseph Marier, stated that the South Sudanese army had destroyed all stocks of landmines they had previously possessed.[6]

In March 2015, a report released by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) claimed that an officer in the South Sudanese army confirmed the use of antipersonnel landmines around Nassir during a meeting the same month. The report called on the Special Envoys from South Sudan to IGAD to “take urgent and robust action” to address these allegations, and that the government swiftly remove the landmines in Nassir and take appropriate action against the implicated officers. The ICBL condemned the alleged use in a letter to Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of South Sudan, and called on the government to confirm or deny the allegations.[7] A spokesperson for the South Sudanese army denied claims of use, stating, “we are using barbed wire to make fences, not landmines.”[8]

In March 2015, Riek Machar, former South Sudanese Vice President and leader of opposition forces, sent a letter to the UN requesting a field survey of the Upper Nile State due to the claims of use by government forces of landmines, cluster munitions, and booby traps throughout the region.[9] In the same month, Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO) spokesperson Col. Lony T. Ngunden, claimed that the South Sudanese government imported landmines from Uganda and placed them near several towns in northern South Sudan.[10]

Non-state armed groups

In April 2015, the government’s South Sudanese Demining Commission accused the SPLM of landmine use. Simon Jundi Both, acting executive director for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO) Mine Action Program called these allegations unsubstantiated.[11]

In June 2015, Aweil West County Commissioner Garang Kuac Ariath, testified to the Northern Bahr al Ghazal State’s Legislative Assembly on security concerns in his county. In his testimony, he accused rebel forces of deploying landmines in the Achana and Nyinbouli areas.[12]

Production and transfer

South Sudan has declared that “There are not and never have been anti-personnel mine production facilities in South Sudan.”[13] It has also reported that it “does not have capability or an amenity for the production of the anti-personnel mine and has no intension [sic] whatsoever to produce them in the future.”[14]

There is no information available on past transfers.

Stockpiling and destruction

In accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of the Mine Ban Treaty, the deadline for South Sudan to destroy any stockpiles of antipersonnel mines was 9 July 2015.

Before independence, the southern-based rebel movement the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) stockpiled and used antipersonnel mines.[15]

In December 2012, South Sudan reported that it had destroyed 10,566 stockpiled antipersonnel mines and also reported the discovery of previously unknown stocks of antipersonnel mines in former camps of the Sudan Armed Forces, stating that it had discovered four PMN antipersonnel mines that would be destroyed. It listed 30 different types of antipersonnel mines that have been destroyed in the course of mine clearance operations.[16]

In April 2013, South Sudan declared that the government destroyed 6,000 stockpiled antipersonnel mines in March 2008 and no longer had a stockpile.[17] The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) issued a letter confirming that the previously reported statement made by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Eleventh Meeting of the State Parties in 2012, regarding discovery of new stockpiles of antipersonnel mines, was made in error.[18]

In April 2014, South Sudan again reported that 6,000 antipersonnel mines have been destroyed from stocks and said “South Sudan does not have any stockpiles of antipersonnel mine, all identified or discovered Antipersonnel Mine stockpiles have been destroyed by the competent authority in March 2008.”[19]

South Sudan is not retaining any antipersonnel mines for training.[20] This has been confirmed in its Article 7 reports.[21] South Sudan has also stated that “it has no intention to retain some anti-personnel landmines for the purpose of training and research development.”[22]



[1] See, “South Sudan,” on the Mine Ban Convention website. The Republic of the Sudan signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 13 October 2003, becoming a State Party on 1 April 2004. Under the “succession” process, a newly independent state may declare that it will abide by a treaty that was applicable to it prior to its independence.

[2] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, December 2012. In Sudan, a Mine Action Law adopted by Presidential Decree #51 on 31 March 2010 prohibits antipersonnel mines and includes penalties for violations.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2013; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2014; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, August 2015.

[4] The initial report covers the period from 11 July 2011 to 1 September 2012, while the report provided in April 2013 is for the period from September 2012–April 2013, the report provided in April 2014 covers calendar year 2013, and the report submitted in August 2015 covers calendar year 2014.

[5]South Sudan rebels accuse government of planting landmines,” Sudan Tribune, 13 August 2014.

[8] Ilya Gridneff, “South Sudan Army’s Lan-Mine Use Escalates War, Monitor Says,” Bloomberg, 30 March 2015.

[9] Ibid.

[13] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, April 2013. In November 2011, South Sudan informed States Parties that it does not possess facilities for the production of landmines. Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 28 November 2011. Notes by the ICBL.

[14] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, April 2014.

[15] In 1996, the SPLM/A declared a moratorium on antipersonnel mine use and reasserted its pledge to not use mines in 1999. See Landmine Monitor Report 2000, p. 182. The SPLM/A subsequently signed the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment in 2001. See Landmine Monitor Report 2002, p. 575. In January 2002, the SPLM/A and the government of Sudan signed the Nuba Mountains cease-fire agreement in which both parties agreed to stop using mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2003, p. 534. In 2005, the SPLM/A entered into a Sudanese government of national unity and was bound by the obligations of the Mine Ban Treaty. See Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 652–653.

[16] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Forms B and H, December 2012.

[17] Ibid., Forms B and D, April 2013. The report did not mention the four newly-discovered mines declared in 2012.

[18] Email from Lance Malin MBE, Programme Manager for South Sudan, UNMAS, 14 October 2013.

[19] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, April 2014.

[20] Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Eleventh Meeting of States Parties, Phnom Penh, 28 November 2011. Notes by the ICBL.

[21] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, December 2012; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, April 2014.

[22] Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, June 2014.


Mine Action

Last updated: 11 December 2017

Contaminated by: landmines (heavy contamination), cluster munition remnants (medium contamination), and other unexploded ordnance (UXO).

Article 5 Deadline: 9 July 2021
(Not on track to meet deadline)

Non-signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

As of the end of 2016, the Republic of South Sudan had a total of nearly 92km2 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs), of which just over 82km2 were suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. Of mined areas, 17.2km2 were released through cancelation, 0.07km2 through reduction, and nearly 2.6km2 through clearance, with the destruction of 585 antipersonnel mines. Nearly 8km2 was released through battle area clearance (BAC). Overall, land release doubled compared to 2015 due to a large increase in land canceled through non-technical survey. However, about half of the amount of mined area was cleared, due to the deteriorating security situation.

At the end of 2016, it had nearly 4.6km2 of areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants, a decrease on the 6.5km2 suspected at the end of 2015. Nearly 3.5km2 of cluster munition-contaminated land was cleared in 2016, double the 1.4km2 cleared in 2015. This was despite a resurgence in violence that forced the closure of mine action operations in the second half of 2016. A decision was made to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks, due to the need to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-related activities. A total of 3,045 submunitions were destroyed and 0.9km2 of land was confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants.

Recommendations for action

  • South Sudan should increase its financial support for operational mine action. Greater support should also be provided to the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) to build its capacity to develop effective mine action plans and policies.
  • Continued efforts should be made to ensure accurate reporting by operators of mine action data and recording according to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) land-release terminology.
  • South Sudan should develop a resource mobilization strategy and initiate policy dialogue with development partners on long-term support for mine action.
  • South Sudan should ensure that every effort is made to identify and address all cluster munition remnants on its territory as soon as possible.
  • Operator and national reporting formats should disaggregate submunitions from other UXO.

Mine and ERW Contamination

South Sudan is heavily contaminated by antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and other explosive weapons that were employed during nearly 50 years of Sudanese civil war in 1955–72 and 1983–2005. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in January 2005 led to the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. Following two years of independence and relative peace in South Sudan, heavy fighting erupted in the capital city, Juba, on 15 December 2013, commencing a new multi-dimensional conflict across the country.

According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as of the end of 2016, South Sudan had a total of 254 areas suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, covering a total area of nearly 82.3km2, as set out in the table below.[1]

Mine and Explosive Remnants of War contamination (as at end 2016)[2]

Type of contamination

SHAs

Area (m2)

Antipersonnel mines

254

82,278,885

Antivehicle mines

74

1,539,818

Cluster munition remnants

142

4,584,943

Other UXO

247

3,535,684

Total

717

91,939,329

Note: SHAs = suspected hazardous areas.

Nine of South Sudan’s (formerly 10) states contain suspected mined areas, with Central Equatoria the most heavily contaminated, followed by Eastern Equatoria and Jonglei, according to UNMAS (see table below).[3]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by former state (as at end 2016)[4]

Province

SHAs

Area (m2)

Central Equatoria

135

3,765,919

Eastern Equatoria

58

4,978,522

Jonglei

32

30,724,553

Lakes

2

23,500

North Bahr El Ghazal

1

80,100

Upper Nile

8

39,173,413

Warrap

1

8,400

West Bahr El Ghazal

4

2,829,933

Western Equatoria

13

694,545

Total

254

82,278,885

 

The full extent of South Sudan’s explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination remains unknown. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) continue to be identified, while the existing threat
is being compounded by the renewed heavy fighting since December 2013, which continues to result in new UXO contamination, particularly in Greater Equatoria, Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states.[5] UNMAS reported that an average of 160 previously unknown hazardous areas were discovered each month in 2016.[6] Ongoing and increasing insecurity persisted in greatly limiting access to many areas of the country, severely impeding efforts to confirm or address contamination, particularly in the Greater Upper Nile region (Jonglei, Unity, and Upper Nile states).[7]

Cluster Munition Contamination

At the end of 2016, South Sudan had a total of 142 areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants, with a total size estimated at nearly 4.6km2.[8] This compares to the end of 2015, when 116 areas were suspected to contain cluster munition remnants covering a total of more than 6.5km2.[9] Areas of cluster munition contamination from decades of pre-independence conflict continued to be identified in 2016, and the threat was compounded by the fighting that broke out in December 2013.[10] In 2016, an additional 66 cluster munition-contaminated areas were identified, of which 11 were cleared during the year.[11]

Eight of the 10 states in South Sudan have areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants (see table below), with Central, Eastern, and Western Equatoria remaining the most heavily contaminated.[12] Cluster munition remnants have been found in residential areas, farmland, pastures, rivers and streams, on hillsides, in desert areas, in and around former military barracks, on roads, in minefields, and in ammunition storage areas.[13]

Cluster munition contamination by province (at end 2016)[14]

State

SHAs with cluster munition remnants

Area (m2)

Central Equatoria

52

1,350,521

East Equatoria

67

2,500,805

Jonglei

3

60,958

Lakes

1

525

Unity

2

99,000

Upper Nile

2

0

West Bahr El Ghazal

2

120,000

West Equatoria

13

453,134

Total

142

4,584,943

 

From 1995 to 2000, prior to South Sudan’s independence, Sudanese government forces are believed to have air dropped cluster munitions sporadically in southern Sudan. Many types of submunitions have been found, including Spanish-manufactured HESPIN 21, US-manufactured M42 and Mk118 (Rockeyes), Chilean-made PM-1, and Soviet-manufactured PTAB-1.5 and AO-1SCh submunitions.[15]

UNMAS discovered evidence of new cluster munition contamination in February 2014, south of Bor in Jonglei state.[16] Evidence indicated the cluster munitions had been used in previous weeks during the conflict between opposition forces supporting South Sudan’s former Vice President Riek Machar and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) government forces, which received air support from Uganda.[17] (See South Sudan’s cluster munition ban policy profile for further details.)

Impact of ERW, including cluster munition remnants and landmines

At the start of 2017, almost eight million people in South Sudan were living with the constant threat of the presence of mines and ERW, including more than 2.3 million South Sudanese who have been forced to become internally displaced since the outbreak of fighting in 2013. According to UNMAS, surveys of internally displaced persons identified a fear of ERW as among the most significant reasons for their inability to return home.[18] UNMAS has claimed that the socio-economic cost of mines and ERW in South Sudan in terms of interrupted agricultural production, food insecurity, halted commerce, and the lack of freedom of movement is “incalculable.”[19] Mine and ERW contamination continued to limit access to agricultural land and increased food insecurity, at a time when nearly four million South Sudanese were facing famine. During 2016, UNMAS documented numerous examples of cluster munition and munitions preventing the delivery of food and other humanitarian aid.[20]

Program Management

The National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) is responsible for coordination, planning, and monitoring of mine action in South Sudan.[21]

The UN Security Council Resolution 1996 of 2011 tasked UNMAS with supporting South Sudan in demining and strengthening the capacity of the NMAA. UNMAS (with the NMAA) has been overseeing mine action across the country through its main office in Juba, and sub-offices in Bentiu, Bor, Malakal, and Wau.[22] UNMAS is responsible for accrediting mine action organizations, drafting national mine action standards, establishing a quality management system, managing the national database, and tasking operators.[23] The NMAA takes the lead on victim assistance and risk education.[24]

While it is planned that eventually NMAA will assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, South Sudan’s National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 notes that the government did “not have the financial and technical capacity to support its mine action program. UN agencies, development partners, and international organizations will need to support the program in providing technical and financial assistance.”[25]

In May 2014, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2155 in response to the conflict that broke
out in December 2013. The resolution, which marked a significant change from Resolution 1996, focuses on four areas: protecting civilians, creating the conditions for humanitarian access, reporting and investigating human rights violations, and supporting the Cessation of Hostilities agreements. Significantly, most capacity development for government institutions is no longer part of the mission’s mandate.

The NMAA reported that the transition from UN to national ownership was in limbo and progress towards achieving this goal had effectively stopped. The NMAA said it lacked the basic means to fulfil its functions.[26]

Strategic planning

Following the expiry of the 2012–2016 National Mine Action Strategy, the NMAA, in close collaboration with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and with support from UNMAS, started developing South Sudan’s new national mine action strategy in 2017. A first strategy stakeholder workshop was organized in Juba in August 2017 to agree on the mine action program’s vision, mission, goals, and objectives. The new national strategy will be finalized by 2018. There were no significant changes in 2016 to the existing strategic plan for 2012–2016, which was developed by the NMAA with assistance from the GICHD and UNMAS.[27] The main objectives of the plan were to ensure that:

  • South Sudan is in a position to comply with all international instruments related to mines and ERW and can conduct and manage the national mine action program.
  • The scope and location of the mine and ERW contamination are fully recorded, and all high-impact contaminated areas are identified, prioritized, cleared, and released.
  • The national mine action program contributes to poverty reduction and socio-economic development by being mainstreamed into development program.[28]

Operators

Four international demining NGOs operated in South Sudan in 2016: DanChurchAid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Four commercial companies also conducted demining: G4S Ordnance Management (G4S), Mechem, Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML, formerly MineTech International, MTI), and The Development Initiative (TDI). No national demining organizations were involved in clearance in 2016.[29]

According to UNMAS, at its peak in 2016, mine action capacity in South Sudan included 62 technical teams, the bulk of which was in commercial companies, along with six mechanical assets, and one team supported by mine detection dogs (MDDs). However, this capacity lay idle in the second half of 2016, after conflict resurged in Juba and insecurity spread across the country. As of September 2017, survey and clearance capacity had not returned to the levels prior to the July 2016 crisis, and according to UNMAS, remained dependent on the re-establishment of secure operating conditions.[30]

UNMAS assigns mine action tasks to operators. In 2016, MAG began deploying Multi-Task Teams (MTTs) with mechanical support from a PT-300D mine clearance machine, a MineWolf 330, and three Bozena machines that allowed for a sizeable increase in the scale of its operations on large-area clearance tasks, and a corresponding increase in monthly output of BAC. Its staff level rose to a total of 200, a significant increase in capacity from 2015. Two MTT and one MineWolf team under UN contracts were demobilized, however, after the cancelation of the contracts in September 2016 due to insecurity.[31] In 2017, MAG was continuing to concentrate operations in Terekeka state, Central Equatoria due to ongoing nationwide insecurity.[32]

DDG began a cluster munition-clearance task at the end of 2015 and deployed one team of eight deminers on the BAC task in January 2016. Following completion of this task, DDG changed its operational focus to responding to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) callouts.[33] Due to the spread and intensification of conflict in the Equatoria region, DDG was forced to shut down all clearance operations across Western, Central, and Eastern Equatoria in April 2016, following the attack on its staff. It resumed operations in Unity and Upper Nile states two weeks later; however, work remained suspended across the Equatoria region as of June 2017.[34]

NPA changed its operations to deploy smaller, more mobile teams focusing on non-technical and technical survey, with support from its MDDs, and for emergency EOD. Teams were re-accredited and a new operations base opened in Juba, although the teams could not be deployed because of the security situation.[35] NPA reassessed the viability of its program in South Sudan, with no signs of improvement in security conditions and in the wake of an internal restructuring following an incident involving missed mines in an area of its operations in 2015, and took the decision to close the program indefinitely in November 2016.[36]

Standards

While there were no changes to the National Technical Standards and Guidelines (NTSGs) for mine action in South Sudan during 2016, according to UNMAS, revisions to the NTSGs that were implemented from October 2015 were a factor which contributed to more efficient land release.[37] The NTSGs are jointly monitored by UNMAS and the NMAA.[38]

Quality management

UNMAS reported carrying out external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) operations throughout 2016 on all mine action operators in South Sudan.[39]

Due to constraints on the movement of UN staff due to increasing security concerns, at the end of 2016, UNMAS contracted a private company, Janus Global Operations, to conduct external QA/QC on behalf of UNMAS in South Sudan.[40]

Land Release (mines and ERW)

In 2016, nearly 20km2 of mined area was released through survey and clearance, including more than 2.6km2 through clearance and technical survey, and a further 17.2km2 through non-technical survey.[41] Nearly 8km2 was also released through BAC. In total, nearly 27.8km2 was released back to local communities, with the destruction of 585 antipersonnel mines, 200 antivehicle mines, and 20,190 items of UXO. In addition, 1,272km of roads were opened through route assessment and verification.[42] This was despite a resurgence of violence that resulted in mine action operations being suspended for much of the second half of 2016 and a dramatic reduction in areas across the country where operations could safely be carried out.[43]

Overall land release in South Sudan doubled in 2016, from close to 14km2 in 2015 to 28km2 in 2016, due to a large increase in land canceled through non-technical survey and an increase in BAC. The amount of mined area reduced by technical survey and cleared, however, fell from 5.1km2 in 2015 to 2.6km2 in 2016, in large part due to a significant decrease in the amount of mechanical clearance and technical survey. This was a result of the deterioration of the security situation and greater restrictions on safe movement.[44] There was a corresponding decrease in 2016 in the number of mines and UXO destroyed, down from the 1,715 antipersonnel mines, 473 antivehicle mines, and 27,395 items of UXO destroyed in 2015, and also a reduction in the amount of road opened through route assessment and verification, from that of just over 3,000km in 2015.[45]

Survey in 2016 (mines and ERW)

As summarized in the table below, in 2016, a total of 18 mined areas covering just under 17.2km2 were canceled through non-technical survey, and almost 71,400m2 was reduced by technical survey. In addition, 30 areas covering nearly 1.8km2 were confirmed as mined, according to UNMAS records.[46]

As noted above, this is a significant increase in land canceled through non-technical survey as compared with 2015, when 33 mined areas covering just under 4.4km2 were canceled. UNMAS reported that the nearly fourfold increase in area cancellation in 2016 was due to a greater emphasis on the role of community liaison officers in obtaining accurate survey data from informants.[47] At the same time, as with the reduction in clearance output, the amount of land reduced by technical survey fell by nearly half, compared to the reduction of nearly 145,000m2 by technical survey in 2015. The amount of land confirmed as mined also decreased in 2016, from 145 areas comprising nearly 3.5km2 the previous year.[48]

Mined area survey in 2016[49]

Operator

SHAs canceled

Area canceled (m²)

SHAs confirmed as mined

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

DCA

0

0

1

200,396

0

DDG

0

0

0

0

2,060

G4S

6

2,238,894

13

557,096

2,324

MECHEM

2

563,194

2

41,808

0

MAG[50]

1

750,034

6

185,833

0

DML

7

279,292

2

51,528

67,015

TDI

1

13,257,399

6

796,941

0

UNMAS

1

77,489

0

0

0

Total

18

17,166,302

30

1,833,602

71,399

Note: TS = technical survey

Clearance in 2016 (mines and ERW)

A total of 74 mined areas covering nearly 2.6km2 were released by clearance in 2016, with the destruction of 585 antipersonnel mines and 200 antivehicle mines (see table below).[51] This is nearly half of the amount cleared in 2015, which UNMAS had reported as the highest ever total land reduced through technical survey and cleared since the inception of humanitarian mine clearance in South Sudan in 2004.[52] According to UNMAS, the reduction in mine clearance in 2016 was caused by the deteriorating security situation.[53]

Mine clearance in 2016[54]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

MAG[55]

11

380,479

38

4

325

MECHEM

6

74,199

2

9

203

DCA

2

1,655

19

10

815

G4S

28

697,898

373

101

14,620

DDG[56]

2

0

6

0

626

DML

18

924,602

127

52

139

TDI

7

495,711

13

24

416

NPA[57]

0

1,179

7

0

1

Total

74

2,575,723

585

200

17,145

Note: AP = antipersonnel: AV = antivehicle.

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Nearly 3.5km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released in 2016, more than double the amount in 2015, when just over 1.4km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was released.[58] This was despite the reduction in mine action activities in 2016 due to the resurgence in violence. UNMAS attributed the increase to a shift in most mine clearance teams to cluster munition tasks, an improvement in the efficiency of land release and revisions to the NTSGs.[59] The decision to deploy the bulk of capacity on cluster munition tasks was taken in response to a need to clear areas for humanitarian access and for UN mission-directed activities.[60]

Survey in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Just over 0.9km2 of land was confirmed as contaminated with cluster munition remnants in 2016 (see table below).[61] This compares to 1.35km2 confirmed as cluster munition contaminated and 500m2 canceled by non-technical survey in 2015.[62]

Cluster munition survey in 2016[63]

Operator

SHAs confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

DCA

1

22

DDG

3

45,823

G4S

18

491,525

MECHEM

6

22,500

MAG

18

233,654

NPA

5

26,025

TDI

4

98,673

Total

55

918,222

 

Clearance in 2016 (cluster munition remnants)

Just under 3.5km2 of cluster munition-contaminated area was cleared in 2016, with the destruction of more than 3,000 submunitions, as shown in the table below.[64] This is a significant increase from 2015, when almost 1.4km2 was cleared with 1,200 submunitions destroyed.[65]

In addition, in 2016, seven operators (DCA, G4S, MAG, Mechem, DML, NPA, and TDI) conducted BAC of almost 8km2 and closed a total of 2,210 spot tasks, destroying nearly 20,200 items of UXO in the process.[66] This is also a significant increase, compared to an output of 4.5km2 of BAC in 2015.[67]

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2016[68]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

G4S

24

2,599,207

1,378

MAG

7

176,242

603

MECHEM

7

601,242

328

MTI

1

45,210

447

TDI

1

51,035

289

Total

40

3,472,936

3,045

 

Deminer safety

On 12 April 2016, two members of DDG’s EOD team were killed by gunmen when their vehicle was ambushed as they travelled to the field from their base in Yei, Central Equatorial state, for a routine EOD call-out.[69] The outbreak of violence across the Equatorial states in July 2016 affected many operators, including MAG, which experienced an ambush during evacuation to Nimule, on the Ugandan border, resulting in the death of one national medic and gunshot wounds to three other staff. Two ambulances were set on fire and a large proportion of the team’s equipment was lost.[70]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

In accordance with Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, South Sudan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 9 July 2021. South Sudan is not on track to meet this deadline.

UNMAS has highlighted the serious obstacles posed to mine action operations by ongoing fighting and insecurity, lack of access to contaminated areas, and new UXO contamination, along with continuing significant challenges from lack of infrastructure and access to vast areas of the country, and the unpredictable rainy seasons.[71] Given the current security situation, UNMAS stated in 2017 that it is not likely that South Sudan can meet its July 2021 Article 5 deadline.[72]

Mine clearance in 2012–2016[73]

Year

Area cleared or reduced (km2)

2016

2.65

2015

5.10

2014

2.72

2013

4.33

2012

4.20

Total

19.00

 

In total, UNMAS has reported that, from 2004 to end 2016, more than 13,580 hazards have been addressed, over 1,175km2 of land has been released (canceled, reduced, and cleared), and 27,573km of roads opened, with nearly 31,253 antipersonnel mines, 5,735 antivehicle mines, and 902,360 items of UXO destroyed.[74]

While operators raised concerns over the lack of government funding for the NMAA and mine action activities in the country, according to UNMAS, the Transitional Government of National Unity in South Sudan paid the salaries of the staff of the NMAA in 2016.[75] In December 2016, at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, South Sudan requested support for the NMAA to enable it to undertake QA/QC and field visits, for training in areas of concern such as information management and operations, and for institutional capacity-building and office hardware and supplies as well as transportation.[76]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Emails from Robert Thompson, Chief of Operations, UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS), 18 April 2017; and from Tim Lardner, Programme Manager, UNMAS, 21 September 2017. UNMAS reported that discrepancies in the total figures for antipersonnel mine contamination as of end 2016, taking into account contamination released and confirmed during 2016, versus that which was reported at end 2015, were likely the result of a period of data reconciliation during the year.

[2] Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 and 21 September 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form C.

[3] Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017; and from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form C. According to UNMAS, the most heavily affected provinces are those with the highest number of SHAs, rather than those with the largest recorded total area size of contamination, as the size of contamination can change dramatically through the process of technical survey.

[4] Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 18 September 2017.

[5] Ibid., 14 October 2016.

[6] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.

[7] UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan.”

[8] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017.

[9] Ibid., 21 April 2016.

[10] Ibid., 19 April 2017; and UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan,” January 2017.

[11] UNMAS also later reported that a total of 69 areas were identified in 2016, and that of these, 14 were cleared during the year. It did not respond to requests for clarification. Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April and 7 June 2017.

[12] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017. 


[13] South Sudan, “National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, 2012, pp. 4–6, 9.

[14] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017.

[15] Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: South Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 23 August 2014. See also, UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014; and UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26. 


[16] UNMAS, “Reported use of Cluster Munitions South Sudan February 2014,” 12 February 2014. See also, UNMISS, “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, p. 26. 


[17] On 7 February 2014, UNMAS UXO survey teams discovered remnants of RBK-250-275 cluster bombs and unexploded AO-1SCh submunitions on the Juba-Bor road, south of Bor in Jonglei state. The RBK-type cluster munitions are air-delivered weapons, dropped by fixed-wing aircraft or helicopters. Both Uganda and South Sudanese government forces are believed to possess aircraft that can deliver these weapons, whereas opposition forces do not. UNMISS, “Conflict in South Sudan: A Human Rights Report,” 8 May 2014, pp. 26–27; and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: South Sudan: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 16 August 2014.

[18] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; and UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan,” January 2017.

[19] UNMAS, “2016 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan,” undated but 2016.

[20] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; and UNMAS, “2017 Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: South Sudan,” January 2017.

[21] Government of the Republic of South Sudan, “South Sudan De-Mining Authority,” undated.

[22] Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 4 October 2017.

[23] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, 2012, p. iv.

[24] Response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 24 May 2013.

[25] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, February 2012, p. iii. 


[26] Interview with Jurkuch Barach Jurkuch, NMAA, in Geneva, 6 September 2017.

[27] Information provided by Åsa Masselberg, Advisor, Strategic Management, GICHD, 21 September 2017.

[28] South Sudan, “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” Juba, 2012, p. v.

[29] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017. MTI changed its name to DML on 3 August 2015. Dynasafe, “History of MineTech,” undated.

[30] Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.

[31] Email from Bill Marsden, Regional Director East and Southern Africa, MAG, 11 May 2017.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Email from William Maina, DDG, 1 May 2017.

[34] Ibid., 2 May and 5 June 2017.

[35] Emails from Frédéric Martin, Programme Manager, NPA, 5 April and 4 May 2017.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Emails from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.

[41] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.

[42] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016.”

[43] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.

[44] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016.”

[45] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015.”

[46] Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.

[47] Ibid.

[48] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015”; and email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.

[49] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017; and from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.

[50] MAG reported canceling two areas with a size of 64,000m2. It did not report confirming any area as mined, nor reducing any area through technical survey. Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.

[51] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.

[52] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2015”; email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form C.

[53] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.

[54] Ibid.; and from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 7 September 2017.

[55] MAG reported clearing a total of five areas with a size of 451,830m2 and destroying 26 antipersonnel mines, two antivehicle mines, and 112 items of UXO. Email from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017.

[56] DDG reported clearing two areas with the destruction of six antipersonnel mines; it did not report figures for the size of the areas cleared or other munitions destroyed. Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.

[57] NPA reported processing 54,773m2 of land in 2016, however, it said no tasks were completed and no area was released for use. It reported finding and destroying nine antipersonnel mines, 12 submunitions, and two items of UXO. Emails from Frédéric Martin, NPA, 5 April and 4 May 2017.

[58] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017, and 21 April 2016. 


[59] Ibid., 19 April 2017.

[60] Ibid., 7 June 2017.

[61] Ibid., 19 April 2017.

[62] Ibid., 21 April 2016.

[63] Ibid., 19 April 2017.

[64] Ibid.

[65] Ibid., 21 April 2016.

[66] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report December 2016.”

[67] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 21 April 2016.

[68] Ibid., 19 April 2017.

[69] Email from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017; and Danish Refugee Council, “Two national employees have lost their lives in South Sudan,” 12 April 2016.

[70] Emails from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017, and 21 October 2016.

[71] UNMAS, “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated March 2015; and UNMAS “About UNMAS in South Sudan,” updated May 2016.

[72] Email from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 18 April 2017.

[73] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2014”; and response to questionnaire by Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 30 March 2015; and emails, 14 October 2016, and 18 April 2017.

[74] UNMAS, “IMSMA Monthly Report – December 2016.”

[75] Emails from Robert Thompson, UNMAS, 19 April 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 11 May 2017; and from William Maina, DDG, 2 May 2017.

[76] Statement of South Sudan, Mine Ban Treaty 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 30 November 2016.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 12 November 2017

In 2016, six donors contributed US$6.5 million for mine action activities in the Republic of South Sudan.[1]

The largest contributions came from the United Kingdom (UK) ($2.4 million) and Denmark ($1.6 million), which provided about 60% of all support in 2016.

South Sudan also received in-kind assistance from Switzerland valued at CHF270,000 ($274,167) for clearance activities.[2]

International contributions: 2016[3]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount ($)

UK

Clearance and risk education

£1,748,592

2,370,216

Denmark

Clearance and risk education

DKK10,750,000

1,597,895

Japan

Clearance and risk education

¥98,445,960

906,000

Netherlands

Clearance, risk education and victim assistance

€738,200

817,335

Norway

Clearance

NOK4,500,000

536,123

United States

Clearance and risk education

$300,000

300,000

Total

   

6,527,569

 

In 2012–2016, international assistance toward mine action activities in South Sudan totaled some $65 million. Since 2013, there was a continuous decline in international funding, with contributions decreasing from $20.4 million in 2013 to $6.5 million in 2016 (a 68% decrease).

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[4]

Year

International contributions ($)

2016

6,527,569

2015

8,691,534

2014

10,777,200

2013

20,391,553

2012

18,982,515

Total

65,370,371

 



[1] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Ditte Bjerregaard, Head of Section, Stabilization and Security Policy, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 June 2017; Japan, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017; response to Monitor questionnaire by Olivia Douwes, Policy Officer, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 June 2017; email from Ingrid Schoyen, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2017; United Kingdom, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 30 April 2017; and email from Steve Costner, Deputy Office Director, Weapons Removal and Abatement, United States (US) Department of State, 30 October 2017.

[2] Switzerland, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 28 April 2017. Average exchange rate for 2016: CHF0.9848=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017.

[3] Average exchange rate for 2016: DKK6.7276=US$1; €1=US$1.1072; ¥108.66=US$1; NOK8.3936=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 4 January 2017.

[4] See previous Monitor reports. Totals for international support in 2014 and 2013 have been rectified as a result of revised US funding data. Total for 2012 has also been rectified as a result of database clean-up.


Casualties

Last updated: 16 June 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

At least 4,917 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (1,360 killed; 3,557 injured) since 1964

Casualties occurring in 2016

43 (2015: 76)

2016 casualties by survival outcome

13 killed; 30 injured (2015: 19 killed; 57 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

1 antipersonnel mine; 3 antivehicle mines; 3 cluster munitions; 29 ERW; 7 unknown

 

In 2016, the Monitor identified 43 mine/ERW casualties in the Republic of South Sudan.[1] Of the total casualties, 41 were civilians and two were deminers. Among casualties recorded for 2016, 37 were male and six were female; 27 were adults (23 men and four women), and 16 or 37% were children (14 boys and two girls).

The total of 43 casualties identified in 2016 was much less than the 76 identified in 2015.[2] However, the 76 casualties identified in 2015 were nearly double the number reported in 2014 (38).[3] South Sudan attributed the increase in casualties in 2015 to population movements.[4]

The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) reported that there is no formal data collection system in place in South Sudan, and as of March 2017, such a system is unlikely to be developed due to the huge humanitarian problems faced in the country. The figures, particularly the more recent ones, are substantially unreliable and most likely significantly underestimate the problem.[5]

A total of 4,917 mine/ERW casualties (1,360 killed; 3,557 injured) were reported in South Sudan from 1964 through the end of December 2016.[6]

Casualties continued to be reported in 2017. In February one girl was injured by an antipersonnel mine, and a boy and a girl were killed by an ERW grenade.[7]

Cluster munition casualties

At least 91 cluster munition casualties have been reported in South Sudan. In 2016, three unexploded cluster submunition casualties were reported by UNMAS. As of December 2016, 75 casualties caused by unexploded submunitions (23 killed and 52 injured), were reported, the majority occurring in 2009 or before.[8] A further 16 casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes in South Sudan have been reported.[9]



[1] Email from Tim Lardner, Programme Manager, UNMAS South Sudan, 17 March 2017.

[2] The Landmine and Cluster Munition report for 2016 reported that there were 75 casualties in 2015. This figure has been revised to 76, based on updated data received by email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS South Sudan, 17 March 2017.

[3] UNMAS South Sudan, “IMSMA Monthly Report,” December 2015.

[4] South Sudan, Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form J.

[5] Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS South Sudan, 17 March 2017.

[6] Ibid., and 21 March 2017.

[7] Email from Tim Lardner, UNMAS South Sudan, 17 March 2017.

[8] Ibid.; and see South Sudan’s 2015 Casualty and Victim Assistance country profile.

[9] Handicap International (HI), Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 56; and Titus Peachey and Virgil Wiebe, “Chapter IV: Cluster Munition Use in Sudan,” Clusters of Death (The Mennonite Central Committee: July 2000), pp. 79–85. The casualties during cluster munition strikes were reported in locations including Akak, Bahr el Ghazal, Nimule, Magwi county, and Yei county in South Sudan in the period 1995–2000.


Casualties and Victim Assistance

Last updated: 09 October 2017

Summary action points based on findings

  • Expand programs in line with significant unmet needs.
  • Improve economic inclusion opportunities for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors and other persons with disabilities, which have remained low since 2012.
  • Adopt and implement the proposed national disability policy.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of South Sudan is responsible for a significant number of landmine survivors, cluster munition victims, and survivors of other ERW who are in need. South Sudan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Victim Assistance

As of the end of 2016, 3,557 mine/ERW survivors had been identified in South Sudan.[1] In 2011, the Ministry of Gender, Child and Social Welfare (MGCSW) estimated that there were a total of some 50,000 mine/ERW victims, including survivors, their families, and the immediate family members of people killed.[2]

Victim assistance since 2015

As a result of decades of conflict, mine/ERW survivors in South Sudan have lacked basic services of all kinds. The limited services available have been almost entirely provided by international organizations. Emergency medical care has been inadequate to address the needs of mine/ERW survivors and others wounded as a result of the armed conflict, a situation worsened by the high number of casualties caused by the outbreak of violence at the end of 2013. Continuing medical care reaches just a fraction of the population. Despite the very challenging security situation, there have been some improvements in the availability of physical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors.

Economic inclusion initiatives for mine/ERW survivors implemented by national organizations, including survivor associations and disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) fell away in mid-2012 when international funding through the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) ended. Psychological support for mine/ERW survivors is entirely absent in South Sudan. This significantly reduced, among other things, economic inclusion opportunities for mine/ERW survivors. The South Sudan Landmine Victims Association (SSLMVA) reported a decline in availability of services across all pillars of victim assistance.

The South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016 included victim assistance . The Victim Assistance Coordination Group changed its name to the Victim Assistance and Disability Working Group, expressing closer ties with disability rights frameworks, while steps were taken to integrate victim assistance and disability into the work of all relevant government ministries.

In December 2013, a violent conflict began, and continued through 2016, causing a protracted crisis and disrupting victim assistance efforts. Nearly 2 million people have been displaced by the current conflict, and previous conflicts; many reside in UN “protection-of-civilians” sites. Another million people fled to neighboring countries. Basic commodities are unavailable and security concerns have limited the ability of humanitarian organizations to provide goods and services.[3] Rural areas with poor roads and little infrastructure as well as NGOs restricted in compounds and other accessibility restrictions, such as some sites only accessible by World Food Programme (WFP) planes, further impeded service delivery.[4]

South Sudan is characterized by a continuum between emergency and development with regular chronic crises, periods of stability, and periods of massive emergency.

Victim assistance in 2016

In 2016, the ongoing conflict caused widespread displacement and hindered the provision of services to survivors. The government of South Sudan reports a lack of funding for victim assistance programming and services for persons with disabilities. In addition, UNMAS did not have victim assistance included in its mandate for South Sudan.[5] However, incremental increases have been seen in several areas that need to be built upon.

Assessing victim assistance needs

No assessments of the needs of survivors were carried out by the government of South Sudan or other actors in 2016. Before the current outbreak of violence, several needs assessment projects were conducted.

Victim assistance coordination[6]

Government coordinating body/focal point

Director General of Social Welfare within the MGCSW

Coordinating mechanism

Coordination forum co-chaired by the Director General of the MGCSW and the Director of Victim Assistance, National Mine Action Authority

Plan

South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016

 

The Coordination Forum for Victim Assistance, co-chaired by the MGCSW and the National Mine Action Authority, had a monthly meeting scheduled for 2016, but only seven meetings were formally held due to time constraints for the participants. The meetings provided an opportunity to share information among stakeholders and identify tasks in the case that funding became available.[7] Other meetings were held by stakeholders for the planning of specific events, such as the 3 December celebration of the International Day of Persons with Disability.[8]

In 2016, no progress was made toward the first victim assistance objectives of the Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016.[9] The three victim assistance objectives were:

  • Establish an information system for persons with disabilities to provide reliable, systematic, and comprehensive information on persons with disabilities, including landmine and ERW victims;
  • Accede to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) by the end of 2013[10] and adopt the necessary national laws to protect the rights of landmine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities; and
  • Ensure equal access to rehabilitation, psychosocial (including peer support), and socio-economic inclusion services for all landmine and ERW victims, as well as women, girls, boys, and men with disabilities.[11]

South Sudan did not make victim assistance-related statements at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago, Chile, or at the June 2017 intersessional meetings. South Sudan’s Article 7 report included some information on victim assistance in Form J, but did not report on activities related to the Maputo Action Plan as expected.[12]

Inclusion and participation in victim assistance

Representatives of DPOs were included in the meetings of the Coordination Forum on Victim Assistance. Landmine survivors and persons with disabilities also participate in the National Commission for Widows, War-Wounded and Orphans, and are members of local development committees and DPOs. There is no federation of DPOs or national disability council.[13] A person with a disability was appointed to the National Constitutional Review Commission, but the individual has not seen any proposed interventions accepted by the commission.[14]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[15]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2016

MGCSW

Government

Referrals for rehabilitation and prosthetic services; small business training; micro-grants for business start-up, psycho-social counseling; management of the Physical Rehabilitation Center, Juba (PRC)

Increase in economic inclusion activities and counseling activities; increased geographic coverage; increased number of PRC beneficiaries

NMAA

Government

Victim assistance coordination

Ongoing

Ministry of Social Development of Central Equatoria and Lakes States

Government

Physical rehabilitation through the Rumbek Center and the Nile Assistance for the Disabled Center in Juba

Ongoing

Central Equatorial State Government

Government

Physical rehabilitation and psychosocial counseling through the Juba Rehabilitation Center (national referral center)

Ongoing

Light for the World

International NGO

Community-based rehabilitation (CBR); accessibility

Increased number of persons supported by CBR; development of sign language dictionary

Handicap International (HI)

International NGO

Basic rehabilitation services; training for health professionals in rehabilitation; needs assessment; referrals for victim assistance services; awareness-raising and advocacy on disability rights

Increased economic inclusion and psychological support activities

Organization of Volunteers for International Cooperation (OVCI)

International NGO

Community-based rehabilitation in Kator and Munuki districts, Juba, occupational therapy

Ongoing

ICRC

International organization

Emergency first-aid to conflict casualties and capacity-building for health centers’ emergency response; support for national Rehabilitation Reference Center (Juba) and Rumbek Rehabilitation Center; Physical Rehabilitation Unit in Wau

Increased number of beneficiaries of rehabilitation services. Launched orthopedic referral clinic in Waat

 

Emergency and continuing medical care

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued to be a key provider of emergency medical care and surgical services in South Sudan. The ICRC supports several clinics that provide primary health services; the ICRC runs three hospital-based surgical teams and two “roving” surgical teams.[16] The ICRC also provided supplies and logistical support to hospitals and health centers. It also specifically tracks and reports on weapon-wounded patients, including landmine and ERW casualties who are treated at ICRC-supported facilities.[17]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

The ICRC provided free services to persons with disabilities at three rehabilitation centers, which in 2016, collectively served more persons with disabilities than in 2015. The ICRC also established an orthopedic referral center at a health clinic it supports in Waat. At the Juba and Rumbek centers, infrastructure improvements mean they are now physically accessible. The Juba clinic hired more staff to increase production. In Wau, the ICRC rehabilitation center added a center for orthopedic production.[18]

HI improved access to basic rehabilitation services and provided training to health, rehabilitation, and social professionals. HI also established a rehabilitation room at Bor Hospital and distributed mobility devices at the hospital, as well as in remote communities. Beneficiaries also receive livelihood support. HI trained health workers in Yei town on physical rehabilitation and continued to support rehabilitation activities at Yei hospital and two health clinics. HI also provided support for some persons to receive rehabilitation services in Juba from the ICRC-supported facilities.[19]

Light for the World continued to run its CBR program in South Sudan benefiting thousands of people.[20]

Economic inclusion

HI, with support from UNMAS, provided training to hundreds of mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities on small business management. Trainees also received micro-grants to launch their enterprises.[21] While working jointly with local organizations, HI used the personalized social support approach to individually case-manage assistance to each beneficiary. HI increased skills training and small grants’ distribution for persons with disabilities and mine/ERW survivors to strengthen the livelihoods component of the project in response to needs identified during the implementation stage.[22]

The MGCSW reported increases in vocational training programs for survivors and persons with disabilities as well as work placement activities and small grants for income generation.[23]

Psychological support and social inclusion

The MGCSW supports the deployment of psychosocial counselors via a CBR program.[24]

In Juba, HI worked on the structure of the national level mental health policy and to the capacities of professionals through training courses and guidance. This project included assistance through the provision of technical resources to the psychiatric unit of Juba Teaching Hospital, under the supervision of the Ministry of Health and detention authorities of Juba prison.[25] HI also hosted awareness-raising sessions to combat stigma and encourage the inclusion of persons with disabilities. HI also support the construction of ramps and adapted toilets in to make five service providers in Yei town physically accessible.[26]

The ICRC supported a wheelchair basketball team that promoted the rights of persons with disabilities. In partnership with the South Sudan Wheelchair Basketball Association, the ICRC hosts weekly basketball games and the ICRC sponsored a coaching session from a US-based wheelchair basketball coach, who had previously supported wheelchair basketball programs in Afghanistan.[27]

Light for the World started an inclusive football team for women and girls with and without disabilities at the Mahad POC camp as part of its CBR program.[28]

Laws and policies

As of 1 September 2017, South Sudan had not signed the CRPD. In 2016, South Sudan launched the National Disability and Inclusion Policy,[29] which had been in development since 2011.[30] The policy has yet to be funded and in August 2017, the MGCSW was drafting the national plan through which it will implement the policy.[31]



[1] See previous editions of the Landmine Monitor. 

[2] MGCSW, “Victim Assistance Report Southern Sudan for the year 2010 and 2011. Southern Sudan Presentation, On States Party Meeting As From 20 To 24th June, 2011,” provided by Nathan Wojia Pitia Mono, Director General, MGCSW, in Geneva, 24 June 2011.

[3] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 195.

[4] HI, “South Sudan 2016,” November 2016.

[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

[6] Ibid.; and response to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, Director General of Social Welfare, MGCSW, 7 August 2017.

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017.

[8] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Stephen Okwen Agwet, MGCSW, 14 August 2017.

[9] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017; and from Stephen Okwen Agwet, MGCSW, 14 August 2017.

[10] Originally a goal that was aimed to be achieved by the end of 2012. South Sudan has yet to accede to the Convention.

[11] “South Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Plan 2012–2016,” June 2012, p. vii.

[12] Committee on Victim Assistance, “Preliminary Observations,” 8 June 2017.

[13] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017; and from Stephen Okwen Agwet, MGCSW, 14 August 2017.

[14] Coalition of Organisations of Persons with Disabilities (South Sudan Association of the Visually Impaired), South Sudan UPR Report–2016, undated.

[15] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017; and from Stephen Okwen Agwet, MGCSW, 14 August 2017; ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” undated; HI, “South Sudan,” undated; and Light for the World, “South Sudan,” undated.

[16] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” undated, pp. 196–197.

[17] Ibid., p. 200.

[18] Ibid., p. 197.

[19] HI, “South Sudan,” undated.

[20] Light for the World, “South Sudan,” undated.

[21] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Omar Gamdullaev, Victim Assistance Project Manager, HI, 3 April 2016.

[22] HI, “South Sudan 2016,” November 2016.

[23] Responses to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017; and from Stephen Okwen Agwet, MGCSW, 14 August 2017.

[24] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017; and from Stephen Okwen Agwet, MGCSW, 14 August 2017.

[25] HI, “South Sudan 2016,” November 2016.

[26] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Omar Gamdullaev, HI, 3 April 2016.

[28] Light for the World, “Activity Report 2016/2017,” p. 13.

[29] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017.

[30] Response to Monitor questionnaire from Nathan Pitia, MGCSW, 10 May 2013. 

[31] “National disability policy launched,” Juba Monitor, 4 December 2016; and response to Monitor questionnaire from Charles Opoka Okumu, MGCSW, 7 August 2017.