Summary: Non-signatory Turkey supports the humanitarian objectives of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but has not taken any steps to join it. Turkey has participated in every meeting of the convention and has condemned new use of cluster munitions. It abstained from voting on key UN resolutions on the convention in 2015 and 2016. Turkey states that it has not used or exported cluster munitions and has not produced them since 2005. It has imported cluster munitions and possesses a stockpile.

Policy

The Republic of Turkey has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkey has expressed support for the humanitarian objectives of the convention, but generally does not elaborate its position concerning accession. In March 2009, Turkey informed the Monitor that “for the time being” it could not consider accession as its primary aim was to fulfill its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, to which it is a State Party.[1] Turkey completed the destruction of its stockpiled antipersonnel landmines in 2011, after missing the initial stockpile destruction deadline.

On 5 December 2016, Turkey abstained from the vote on the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[2] Turkey did not explain why it abstained from the non-binding resolution or from the vote on a similar UNGA resolution in 2015.[3]

Turkey attended several of the diplomatic conferences of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. However, it participated only as an observer in the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008 and did not sign at the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008.[4]

Turkey participated as an observer in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia, in September 2015, but did not make any statements. It has attended every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016. Turkey also participated in the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2013–2015.

Turkey has condemned the use of cluster munitions on several occasions.[5] It has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2016.[6]

CMC member The Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey works to garner domestic support for the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Turkey is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and in the past supported efforts to conclude a CCW protocol on cluster munitions. In 2011, CCW states failed to agree to a new protocol on cluster munitions, effectively ending deliberations on the topic and leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument dedicated to ending the suffering caused by these weapons.

Use

In March 2009, Turkey informed the Monitor that it is “not making use of cluster munitions.”[7] Since then, officials continued to affirm that Turkey has not and does not use cluster munitions.[8] There is some evidence to indicate cluster munitions were used at least once in the past, in 1994.[9]

A United States (US) Department of State cable from February 2008 made public by Wikileaks in May 2011, states that “there exists a de facto moratorium on the use of cluster munitions by the Turkish armed forces [but] Turkey’s military doctrine continues to call for the use of cluster munitions in the event of an ‘all-out war.’”[10]

Production, transfer, and stockpiling

In the past, Turkey produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions. It stockpiles cluster munitions, but has not disclosed information on the types or quantities possessed.

In June 2010, Turkey informed the Monitor that it “does not use, transfer, produce or import cluster munitions.”[11] Officials continue to state that Turkey “no longer produces, transfers, exports or imports cluster munitions; has not produced cluster munitions since 2005; and has never used cluster munitions in the past.”[12]

At least two Turkish companies have produced ground-delivered cluster munitions:

• Makina ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK) has produced an extended range M396 155mm artillery projectile containing self-destructing M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions.[13] It has also produced M483A1 155mm artillery projectiles with DPICM submunitions, under license from the US.[14]
• Roketsan has produced the TRK-122 122mm rocket, which contains 56 M85 DPICM submunitions.[15]

Turkey sold 3,020 TRK-122 122mm rockets to the United Arab Emirates in 2006–2007.[16]

The US supplied Turkey with 3,304 Rockeye cluster bombs, each containing 247 submunitions, at some point between 1970 and 1995.[17] In 1995, the US announced that it would provide Turkey with 120 ATACMS missiles with submunitions for its M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) launchers.[18] Turkey also possesses US-supplied M26 rockets, each with 644 submunitions, for its MLRS. In 2004, the US announced its intent to transfer to Turkey two CBU-103 Combined Effects Munitions cluster bombs, each with 202 submunitions, and two AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapons (JSOW), each with 145 submunitions.[19] In 2005, it announced the proposed sale of another 50 CBU-103 and 50 JSOW.[20]

Slovakia reported the export of 380 AGAT 122mm rockets, each containing 56 submunitions, to Turkey in 2007.[21]

Chile’s Ministry of National Defense has provided the Monitor with a document detailing the export of four CB-250 cluster bombs to Turkey in 1996.[22]

Contaminated by: antipersonnel mines (massive contamination), antivehicle mines, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Article 5 Deadline: 1 March 2022
(Not on track to meet deadline)

At the end of 2016, the Republic of Turkey had more than 172km² of confirmed mined areas and a further 701 areas suspected to be mined, of unknown size. A national strategic mine action plan for 2017–2019 has been drafted following delays in 2016. As of October 2017, it was awaiting approval from the Council of Ministers. Clearance operations in Phase 1 of the European Union (EU) Integrated Border Management Project commenced in 2016, with the clearance of 0.12km² and the destruction of 9,008 antipersonnel mines. In addition, as part of demining efforts in support of the construction of the Border Security Surveillance System, 3.36km² was cleared, with the destruction of 837 mines. However, quality control procedures had not been completed, so this was not reported in Turkey’s Article 7 report for 2016. No data was provided on areas canceled in 2016. The land release results for 2016 were an increase on 2015, when no land release was conducted.

Recommendations for action

• Turkey should approve the national strategic mine action plan for 2017–2019 and finalize its workplan as soon as possible.
• Turkey should finalize and approve the national mine action standards.
• Turkey should complete the establishment of a national mine action database as soon as possible.
• Turkey should move forward, without delay, with the clearance of non-border areas.
• The Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) should reconsider its decision not to begin clearance on the Syrian border, where minefields under Turkish jurisdiction pose a risk to civilians fleeing fighting across the border.
• Turkey should formally report all its land release results for 2016. This includes all areas cleared in 2016, and the results of the desk assessment of minefield records of the eastern and Syrian borders, including the size of areas canceled.
• Turkey should report on plans for clearance of mined areas under its control in northern Cyprus, in order to meet all of its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations.
• Turkey and Cyprus should both heed the UN Secretary General’s call to facilitate access to all mined areas inside and outside the buffer zone to achieve a mine-free Cyprus.[1]

Contamination

Turkey is contaminated with antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as IEDs, with more than 172km² of confirmed mined area across 3,080 areas, as summarized in the table below. A further 701 areas are suspected to be mined, but the area they cover and the number of mines that may lie within them remain to be quantified.[2] The great majority of antipersonnel mines in Turkey are found along its borders. The mines were laid in 1955–1959 along the entire border with Syria, as well as on some sections of the border with Armenia, Iran, and Iraq in 1992–1995. Mines were also laid around military installations.[3]

Contamination by province (as at end 2016)[4]

Note: SHAs = suspected hazardous areas; CHAs = confirmed hazardous areas; AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle

The baseline mine contamination as of the end of 2016 is slightly lower than that reported for the end of the previous year, as 122,764m² was reported as having been cleared on the border with Iran during 2016.[5] However, no mined area had been formally released by Turkey to date, and Turkey has also not reported on areas reduced and canceled in 2016, which it plans to report “at a future date.”[6]

The number of reported mines in confirmed mined areas decreased by 9,845 during 2016, which Turkey states is the result of destruction of 9,008 antipersonnel on the Iranian border, as part of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance project, and 837 antipersonnel mines destroyed on the Syria border, during construction of a border security surveillance system.[7]

According to Turkey, its western borders with Bulgaria and Greece, as well as the border with Georgia, are mine-free.[8]

Government forces emplaced landmines during the 1984–1999 conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, PKK) in the southeast of the country. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, these mines have been progressively cleared since 1998.[9] In addition to mines laid by Turkish security forces, non-state armed groups (NSAGs) have also emplaced mines and IEDs, rendering the clearance process more complex.[10]

Eighteen of Turkey’s 81 provinces still contain mined areas. The number of mined areas along the Iraqi border, as well as part of the Iranian border, is an estimate, as, according to Turkey, precise calculation is hampered by terrorist activities and the presence of unconfirmed mined areas. In addition, fewer mines are expected along the Syrian border than indicated because of detonations by smugglers and as a result of wildfires.[11]

In Annex II to its updated workplan, Turkey offered a comparison between contamination reported at the time of its 2013 Article 5 extension request and the revised contamination data reported in its 2015 workplan.[12] The comparison showed that in border areas the number
of SHAs rose by 216, while the number of CHAs went down by 118, corresponding to a 41.39km² reduction in CHA between the 2013 extension request and the 2015 workplan. In non-border areas, the number of CHAs increased by 30, with the area of CHA increasing by 0.49km² between the two datasets. In addition, the number of SHAs in non-border areas increased by 139. Mine contamination in Turkey has both a humanitarian and economic impact. Up to 80% of mined areas along the Syrian border are on arable land, which cannot be used. The risk to livestock is widespread, especially where fencing is damaged. Mined areas have also prevented access for development activities.[13]

Northern Cyprus

Turkey’s original Article 5 clearance deadline was 1 March 2014. In 2013, States Parties granted Turkey an eight-year extension until 1 March 2022, for clearance of mines in Turkey, but Turkey did not request additional time for clearance of the areas it controls in northern Cyprus.[14] (See the Cyprus mine action profile for further details of contamination and clearance.)

Program Management

In January 2015, Law No. 6586 on the “Establishment of a National Mine Action Centre and Amendment of Some Other Laws” was adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly; the law entered into force on 3 February 2015. It aims to define the modalities and provide the basis regarding functions, jurisdictions, and responsibilities of the National Mine Action Center (NMAC), which will carry out humanitarian clearance of mines and/or unexploded ordnance (UXO).[15] The law entitles the NMAC to elaborate policies for this clearance; plan and steer related activities; monitor their implementation; and carry out the necessary coordination and cooperation with domestic and foreign institutions.[16]

The NMAC was established on 3 February 2015 under the Ministry of National Defense, and called the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC).[17] A director was appointed in August 2015.[18] As of February 2016, core staff had been recruited and the center was in the initial stages of becoming operational.[19] However, the attempted coup in Turkey in July 2016 resulted in the dismissal of TURMAC’s director. In late August 2016, Colonel Aydin Imren was appointed as the new head of TURMAC.[20] Law 671 of 15 August 2016 and the subsequent enactment of Law 6757 of 9 November 2016 put TURMAC under the Directorate of General Plans and Principles within the Ministry of National Defense.[21]

TURMAC’s capacity-development efforts are being implemented in partnership with the UNDP and the GICHD, as well as other national partners.[22] A capacity needs assessment conducted by the UNDP and the GICHD in October 2016 highlighted several capacity gaps for TURMAC. The assessment is the basis on which TURMAC is developing its capacity for 2017 and beyond.[23] As of June 2017, TURMAC reported that capacity development was progressing as planned.[24] TURMAC reported plans to be fully operational by the end of 2017, after approval of proposed organizational changes and the appointment of required personnel.[25]

Strategic planning

A national strategic mine action plan for 2017–2019 has now been drafted, following delays caused by the general elections in November 2015 and the attempted coup in July 2016.[26] TURMAC reported that the necessary coordination with ministerial bodies was ongoing as of June 2017. Once completed, the strategic plan will be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval, after which it will be published in the Official Gazette. Turkey envisaged this would be completed by the end of 2017.[27] The three-year plan reportedly covers national capacity development, the clearance of mined areas and areas containing UXO, provision of mine risk education, assistance to mine victims, and the Syrian border security surveillance system.[28]

Turkey’s workplan is divided into planned survey and clearance per region and will be finalized after TURMAC has developed a national mine action strategic plan. Further revisions are possible due to ongoing investigation and survey of mined areas in the border regions.[29] As of June 2017, Turkey reported that a survey plan is now included in the Draft National Strategic Mine Action Plan for 2017–2019.[30] The summaries of Turkey’s plans, by region, are reflected below.

Syrian border

Planned mine clearance along the Syria border is on hold and will begin only once the conflict ends.[31] This is with the exception of the demining being conducted to enable the safe construction of a Border Surveillance System which commenced in 2016.[32] In June 2017, TURMAC reported that under the draft strategic mine action plan for 2017–2019, survey of SHAs in Sanliurfa province was scheduled for 2018; and in Sirnak province (in parts of the province bordering Syria) and Hatay province for 2019.[33] Furthermore, survey of CHAs in Gaziantep, Hatay, Kilis, and Mardin provinces were planned for 2017/2018.[34]

Officials observed it is the easiest border to clear because the terrain is flat and there has been minimal displacement of mines as a result of factors such as land erosion.[35] According to Turkey, minefields in this region are clearly mapped, marked, fenced, and well known to the local population.[36]

Military demining teams have been deployed along the Syria border, to enable safe construction of the Border Security Surveillance System, which consists of a 730km-long modular concrete wall and impoundment (supported by a fence), roads, and surveillance system.[37] Demining efforts in support of the construction of the surveillance system also include survey and clearance of areas suspected or confirmed to contain improvised mines and other explosive devices deployed by NSAGs.[38] According to online media sources, the three-meter-high wall is being built behind minefields and deep ditches, and is reinforced with barbed wire and steel fences, and there are also watch towers and around the clock military patrols.[39] The Border Security Surveillance System construction of which began in 2015, was expected to be completed by the end of 2017.[40]

Eastern borders

According to the 2015 workplan, mine clearance along the eastern borders is to be carried out as part of a two-phase EU Integrated Border Management Project, under the supervision of the Ministry of Interior in a joint project with the UNDP.[41] The project, which was launched in May 2015 to address the humanitarian and border management challenges posed by mine contamination, aims to contribute to social and economic development through demining and more secure borders in Eastern Turkey.[42] Phase 1, scheduled for 2015–2017, was expected to result in the clearance of 223 mined areas over an area of just less than 11.67km² and the destruction of 189,863 antipersonnel mines.[43] Phase 2 of the project is scheduled for 2017–2019, but the number of mined areas and total area to be cleared is yet to be determined, and is subject to continuing survey.[44] Under the project, the UNDP is managing the demining operations and quality assurance along the eastern border and supporting capacity development of TURMAC.[45]

In February 2016, Turkey reported that the demining tender had been awarded to Denel MECHEM, as part of a consortium in which national operators would be sub-contracted by MECHEM.[46] Phase 1 of the project was officially announced in April 2016, with clearance operations beginning in June. It was scheduled to be completed by December 2017.[47]

With regard to Phase 2 of the project, Turkey reported that “the contract was ongoing” in cooperation with the UNDP,[48] and that it was expected to be completed in accordance with the planned schedule (i.e. 2017–2019).[49]

Southeastern/Iraqi border

Under the draft strategic mine action plan for 2017–2019, survey is planned of suspected mined area in Sirnak province (in parts of the province bordering Iraq) in 2018 and of confirmed mined area in this province in 2019; and of suspected mined area in Hakkari province in 2019.[50] Clearance along the southeastern/Iraqi border is not scheduled to commence until 2019, after completion of Phases 1 and 2 of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project,[51] and because of the conflict in Syria.[52] Clearance of the 969 mined areas, totaling just over 2.86km², is scheduled to take place in 2019–2021, with the destruction of 79,017 antipersonnel mines. This represents all known mine contamination in this region.[53]

Non-border areas

The draft national mine action plan for 2017–2019 reportedly includes plans for survey of suspected mined area in interior areas of Mardin, Siirt, and Sirnak provinces in 2018, and Hakkari province in 2019; and survey of confirmed mined area in Diyarbakir and Siirt in 2019.[54] Furthermore, TURMAC reported that clearance of non-border areas was also scheduled for 2018 and 2019, but that both survey and clearance may be subject to revision.[55]

Standards

Turkey reported that it had developed a land release policy relating to the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, which will allow for efficient land release. In addition, as of June 2017, national mine action standards (including a national land release policy) had also been drafted and sent to the Turkish Standardization Institute for approval. Of the 19 standards, two have been published and four were expected to the published soon. The remainder were under review and were planned to be finalized by the last quarter of 2017.[56]

Quality management

Following an international competitive tender process, a contract for quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) services was awarded to RPS-Explosive Engineering Services by the UNDP in March 2016. In April 2016, the UNDP and TURMAC completed the accreditation of RPS-Explosive Engineering Services, and the company then began the accreditation process for the mine clearance contractor, MECHEM, under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project.[57]

In addition, TURMAC oversees on-site operations and regularly attends operational working group meetings in the field.[58]

Information management

The UNDP and the GICHD are supporting TURMAC for the establishment of a functioning information management system.[59] The UNDP is maintaining a project database to record all operational data related to the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project until a national mine action database can be established in TURMAC.[60] As of June 2017, 12 TURMAC personnel had undergone Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) training, and IMSMA was expected to be fully operational by January 2018.[61] Due to national security concerns, much of the minefield data remains classified, presenting a challenge to mine action information management in Turkey.[62]

Operators

As of June 2017, mine clearance operations in Turkey were being conducted by MECHEM, under the Eastern Border Mine Clearance project, and by the Turkish Armed Forces along the Syria border, to support construction of the Border Security Surveillance System.[63]

MECHEM, a South African company, which is partnering with national sub-contractor Altay, was awarded the tender for mine clearance under Phase 1 of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance project by the UNDP in December 2015.[64] MECHEM was subsequently accredited, and as of June 2017, was employing 140 deminers. MECHEM did not deploy mine detection dogs (MDDs) in 2016, as the dogs had not yet received accreditation. Accreditation was subsequently granted, and as of June 2017, 30 MDDs were being deployed, along with one MineWolf.[65] As noted above, RPS, a UK company, is contracted for QA and QC.[66]

Demining units of the Turkish Armed Forces have a total operational capacity of 85 deminers, six MDDs, and four machines.[67] As of June 2017, organizational accreditation of the Turkish Armed Forces Demining Units had been completed,[68] but operational accreditation of the military demining troops was ongoing and due to be finalized in 2017.[69]

Land Release

Turkey reported that 122,764m² of mined area had been cleared in 2016 on its border with Iran, as part of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project, but that no mined area had been formally released to date. Turkey also did not provide information on the area of land reduced or canceled in 2016, but stated that this information would “be reported in the following years.”[70]

In addition, Turkey reported that more than 3.36km² of mined area had been cleared on the Syrian border in 2016, to enable safe construction of the Border Security Surveillance System.[71]

Survey in 2016

A comprehensive desk assessment of minefield records of the eastern and Syrian borders was conducted in 2016,[72] but information on area canceled has not yet been reported. According to the observations of the Committee on Article
5 Implementation, produced for the intersessional meetings in June 2017, Turkey indicated that it would provide information on these areas in its 2017 Article 7 report.[73]

Clearance in 2016

MECHEM, with sub-contracting partner Altay, began clearance operation of Phase 1 of the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project in June 2016.[74] As of September 2016, manual clearance operations were reportedly taking place along the Armenian border, in mapped and fenced minefields on flat terrain.[75] However, the only clearance reported by TURMAC as part of the Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project in 2016 was 9,008 antipersonnel mines that were cleared in Igdir province, on the Iran border, releasing 122,764m².[76]

In addition, as part of demining efforts in support of the construction of the Border Security Surveillance System, military demining teams were deployed along the Syria border, and destroyed a further 837 mines in 2016.[77] While the corresponding amount of mined area cleared during the demining operations to enable safe construction of the Border Security Surveillance System was not reported in Turkey’s Article 7 transparency report, TURMAC reported that more than 3.36km² had been cleared long the Syria border in 2016.[78] Clearance data relating to the area of land released along the Syria border, during survey and clearance to support construction of the Border Security Surveillance System, has not been officially reported to-date, as QA/QC procedures had not yet been completed, and the Turkish Armed Forces demining units are not yet accredited operationally.[79]

Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2016[80]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; N/A = not applicable.

No mine clearance was conducted in 2016 along the southeastern/Iraqi border or in non-border areas.[81]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Turkey is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022. Turkey is not on track to meet this deadline.

Turkey’s original Article 5 deadline was 1 March 2014. In March 2013, Turkey submitted a request for an eight-year extension to its deadline until 2022 to complete clearance of all mined areas. Turkey stated that the envisaged timeframe was subject to revision pending progress with tenders and clearance activities on the ground.[82]

In its 2013 request, Turkey cited a number of circumstances that had impeded it from carrying out mine clearance, including: delays in the establishment of an NMAA and NMAC that will supervise clearance activities; adverse weather conditions allowing clearance to be conducted for only five or six months a year; security problems posed by the continuation of the terrorist threat; mined territory contaminated with metal residue resulting from the fight against terrorism; uncertainties about the mine-free status of some areas due to the irregular completion
of registration forms; and topographical challenges. According to Turkey, the eastern and southeastern borders and non-border areas are the most complicated to address due to topographical difficulties.[83]

In granting the 2013 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties recalled the number of efforts to be carried out during 2013–2014, crucial to the success of the implementation of Turkey’s plan, and requested that Turkey report to the Third Review Conference in June 2014 on: the tendering processes for clearance along Turkey’s border with Syria and the results of any related demining efforts and annual milestones of expected progress; the tendering processes for the clearance of areas along Turkey’s eastern borders; developments in the establishment of the NMAA and NMAC; and process in clearance of mined areas in non-border areas.[84] Turkey did not provide an update on clearance progress at the Third Review Conference, but did subsequently submit a workplan in March 2015.[85]

Turkey revealed in its 2013 extension request that since 1998, it had only cleared a total of 1.15km² of mined area, close to three-quarters of which took place in one year (2011), with the destruction of 760 antipersonnel mines and 974 antivehicle mines. In addition, military teams had cleared 24,287 mines, but only to allow safe movement of troops, not to release a contaminated area.[86]

Mine clearance in 2012–2016[87]

Based on the current rate of clearance, Turkey is not on track to complete implementation of Article 5 by its deadline in 2022. TURMAC, however, reports that Turkey is planning to meet its Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2022, but also recognizes potential obstacles, including: the possibility that the demining contractor for the EU Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project will not meet its deadline for Phase 1; potential delays to the project for Phase 2; the fact that political uncertainties in Syria and Iraq may hinder survey and clearance activities on these borders, in addition to NSAGs hindering demining operations in other areas; and weather conditions limiting clearance to no more than seven months a year.[88]

In 2016, the Republic of Turkey provided US$25,000 through the ITF (International Trust Fund) Enhancing Human Security for victim assistance activities in Kosovo.[1]

Turkey is also affected by antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, as well as improvised explosive devices (IEDs).[2] Between 1998–2012, Turkey reported contributing approximately 68.7 million Turkish Lira (approximately $30 million) to its own mine clearance efforts.[3] Turkey has not reported the amounts contributed since then. Turkey indicated that a budget for its mine clearance operations would be developed when its national mine action center becomes operational.[4]

In 2014, the European Union (EU) contributed €19,800,000 ($26,328,060) for clearance activities in the eastern border regions, as part of an integrated border management project.[5] Turkey did not receive international funding in 2015 and 2016.

Casualties Overview

Monitor analysis of media reports collected by the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) identified at least 57 new mine/ERW casualties in 2016 in Turkey.[1] Of the total, 54 were civilians and three were military personnel; the majority of civilian casualties were children (39). [2] At least 15 casualties were female, nine girls and six women; of the 28 male casualties recorded 16 were boys and 11 were men.[3] The 2016 total represents an increase from the 34 new mine/ERW casualties in 2015,[4] 2014, and 2013, but was less than the 69 new casualties identified in Turkey from IMFT reporting in 2012.[5]

The government of Turkey reported that there were 57 antipersonnel mine casualties in 2016, including 14 people killed, and four children among the injured.[6] In 2015, 215 casualties (29 killed; 186 injured) were reported by Turkey.[7] The 2015 total represented a large increase from the 26 casualties reported in 2014.

In its Article 5 deadline Extension Request of March 2013, Turkey provided information on antipersonnel mine casualties occurring between 2004 and the end of 2012: 882 military personnel (260 killed; 622 injured) and 168 civilians (56 killed; 112 injured). Turkey also included disaggregated information on the age and sex of civilian casualties for a similar time period (10 years); of the total civilian casualties reported, 15 were female and 50 were children.[8] In contrast, Monitor reporting, which included IMFT data for the period from 2004 to the end of 2012, counted more than twice the number of civilian mine/ERW casualties; 377 civilian casualties of 979 casualties recorded in total.

The total number of mine/improvised explosive device (IED)/ERW casualties in Turkey is unknown. Turkey had reported 4,602 mine/ERW casualties, including 919 people killed and 3,683 injured, as of the end of 2015.[9] However, according to a media report in April 2010, the Ministry of Internal Affairs had recorded 6,360 mine casualties since 1984; 1,269 people were killed (625 security personnel; 644 civilians) and another 5,091 people were injured (with the number of civilians compared to security personnel injured not reported) in mine incidents.[10] In 2007, a demining specialist reported at least 10,000 mine casualties (mostly civilians) along the Turkish-Syrian border since the 1950s (more than 3,000 killed and 7,000 injured).[11] The Monitor analysis of the period of 2010–2015 found 307 new casualties (79 killed; 228 injured).[12]

Action points based on findings

• Increase coordination of victim assistance obligations with the input of the General Directorate of Services for the Disabled and Elderly in the Ministry of Family and Social Policies.
• Develop a plan and coordinate implementation of victim assistance in accordance with Mine Ban Treaty Maputo Action Plan commitments.
• Make adequate prosthetic and rehabilitation facilities a priority in the mine-affected regions.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Turkey is responsible for landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors. Turkey has made a commitment to victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Turkey ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 28 September 2009.[1]

Victim Assistance

According to past Monitor reporting, more than 5,000 people were reported to have been injured by mines in Turkey since 1984.[2] In 2017, the Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC) indicated that existing records indicated that there had been some 4,000 landmine casualties in Turkey.[3]

Victim assistance since 2015

The first ever national mine action center (Milli Mayın Faaliyet Merkezi, MAFAM) was opened in 2015 based on legislation enacted in January of that year. The MAFAM had a mandate to undertake measures regarding data collection and victim assistance. In September 2016, the MAFAM was changed during widespread restructuring measures of the military.[4] At the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2016 Turkey stated that the Victim Assistance Department of the new TURMAC was working with civilian agencies that are involved in providing assistance to persons with disabilities “to compile comprehensive information on mine victims.”[5]

Assessing victim assistance needs

National NGO the Initiative for a Mine-Free Turkey (IMFT) collected information available on survivors and persons killed through media scanning and crosschecking with other organizations and local sources.

Turkey reported that efforts were being made to create a “ shared database specifically designed for mine victims.” In 2016, a “communication line” was established with relevant ministries and bodies in order to improve information sharing between the General Staff, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Family and Social Policies and other relevant ministries and bodies, and TURMAC. Within a month of each mine/ERW incident the Ministry of Interior, through the gendarmerie and national police, should update TURMAC on the details of the explosion and casualties in the areas under their responsibility. Persons considered official mine victims according to the legislation were to be assisted to attain their legal rights in coordination with the other relevant bodies.[6]

Victim assistance coordination

The Ministry of Family and Social Policies through its Disabled and Senior Citizens Directorate General is the government entity responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors and family members of casualties.[7]

Turkey made statements on victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty’s intersessional meetings in June 2017 and at the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in November 2016.[8] Until 2017, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting on victim assistance was updated annually by Turkey, but only covered treatment received by survivors at military medical facilities.[9]

Survivor inclusion and participation

Survivors were not reported to have been included in the planning or implementation of services relevant to their needs.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities

Emergency and ongoing medical care

Mine/ERW victims who are unable to perform daily activities without assistance receive support for obtaining medicine and medical equipment at no additional cost.[10]

All persons with disabilities have the right to access the free first-aid services at public and private healthcare centers. The General Health Insurance System was implemented in 2015 replacing the “green card” system where those without social insurance can apply for a special “green card” to be eligible for services. According to the General Health Insurance system, income-based premium payment is required.[11]

Severe limitations on access to healthcare were reported in areas where a state of emergency or deteriorated security existed. This impeded or prevented injured persons from reaching assistance. The impact of the security situation included attacks on healthcare transport and personnel and situations when access to emergency medical treatment was obstructed.[12]

Generally, healthcare facilities in towns in the mine-affected regions (other than the largest cities) have been underfunded, had inadequate staffing levels and equipment, and often were not able to address survivors’ emergencies or ongoing medical needs.[13]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

There was a significant need for prosthetics and rehabilitation services to be established in other mine/ERW-affected provinces. The General Health Insurance Systemprovides orthosis, prosthetics, and wheelchairs; however, the provision of these assistive devices is time-bound and limited to one new fitting every five years.[14]

Economic Inclusion

No specific economic inclusion or work programs existed for mine/ERW victims, however, some broader services exist that provide mine/ERW survivors and affected families with monthly payments, employment opportunities, enterprising grant, free job counselling, and courses according to their specific needs.[15]

Laws and policies

The law prohibits discrimination against them in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, the judicial system, and the provision of other state services. Legislation demands that all governmental institutions and businesses provide persons with disabilities access to public areas and public transportation.[16] Accessibility of public services and buildings for persons with disabilities remained low and remained a widespread problem.[17]

The law establishing the Human Rights and Equality Institution confirms the prohibition of direct or indirect discrimination on the basis of disability. However, certain existing legislation actually works against the principles enshrined in the CRPD. Turkey had no mental health laws. Existing fines and the 2018 deadline in the transport sector for fulfilling accessibility criteria need to be complemented by public awareness-raising campaigns and appropriate incentives. There is a lack of quantitative and aggregated data on the participation of persons with disabilities in economic and social life. Significant shortcomings persist over the integration and empowerment of persons with disabilities with respect to their environment, social attitudes, and quality of services.[18]

NGOs that advocate for the rights of persons with disabilities reported that the laws were not enforced effectively. The Ministry of Family and Social Policies operated social service centers assisting vulnerable individuals, including persons with disabilities.[19] Further expansion of one-stop-shops and points of single contact for persons with disabilities was needed, particularly at local level.[20]

All public schools are required by law to accommodate students with disabilities, although disability rights activists reported instances of students with disabilities being refused admission or encouraged to “drop out” of school.[21]

The public sector’s employment rate for persons with disabilities was at around 2 %, and well below its commitments. Persons with disabilities are at high risk of social exclusion and poverty because measures to increase employment had been “ineffective.”[22]