Contaminated by: landmines (extent of contamination unknown), cluster munition remnants (extent unknown), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Article 5 deadline: 1 June 2016
(Deadline missed without extension request—Ukraine is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty)

Not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Summary

Ukraine has made progress towards establishing a mine action law and national mine action program. Survey and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance in government-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine is now taking place. However, Ukraine missed its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline, and has not yet submitted an Article 5 extension request. It is, therefore, in serious violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Most land release activities in Ukraine are not systematically recorded. In November 2016, the Global Protection Cluster reported that 6.2km² of land contaminated by explosive hazards had been confirmed, and 4.6km² of suspected contaminated area had been identified. A total of 0.57km² of land was confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, all by the HALO Trust. HALO Trust cleared 0.19km² of cluster munition-contaminated land, destroying 50 submunitions.

Recommendations for action

• Ukraine should request an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline without further delay.
• Ukraine should take all necessary measures to protect civilians from mines and ERW.
• Ukraine should establish an operational national mine action center (NMAC) under civilian control.
• Ukraine should establish a centralized database to collate information on landmines, cluster munition remnants, and other ERW contamination resulting from the ongoing conflict.
• Ukraine should continue to undertake survey to identify the extent and impact of antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants (in particular in Donetsk and Luhansk), and conduct clearance as soon as possible.

Mine Contamination

Ukraine is contaminated by antipersonnel mines as a result of the ongoing conflict that broke out in 2014. In the first half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Firm evidence exists that mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts,[1] including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities.

Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall extent of mine contamination until surveys have been completed.[2] The area inside the 15km buffer zone is believed to be heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, but access to the buffer zone for humanitarian survey and clearance operations is severely limited on the government side, and there is no access for humanitarian demining in areas not controlled by the government.[3] In August 2017, as in 2016, Ukraine stated, highly improbably, that approximately 7,000km² of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts were contaminated with mines and ERW.[4] In its latest Article 7 report (for 2016), Ukraine reported that non-technical survey by NGOs identified mined areas in Lemans, Slavyansk, and Volnovansky districts in the Donetsk region, and Popasnyansky district, in Luhansk region.[5] In May 2016, Ukraine reported that it was possible that mines have been laid in occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kherson province, and Donetsk.[6] At the 2015 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Ukraine asserted that approximately 8% of the territory in eastern Ukraine is contaminated with antipersonnel mines and IEDs.[7] It appeared that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea may actually have been either “phoney minefields” or areas containing trip-flares.[8]

In 2015 and 2016, numerous antipersonnel and antivehicle mines have been identified in Ukraine, including the following types: OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines that can function as antipersonnel mines depending on the type of fuze used, MON (50, 90, 100, and 200) directional antipersonnel mines, TM62 antivehicle mines, PDM-1M anti-handling mines equipped with fuzes capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, blast PMN type antipersonnel, and POM2 antipersonnel mines.[9] (See Mine Ban Policy profile for further details.)

Prior to the current conflicts, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from combat in World War I. Ministry of Defense engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of any mine threat is not known.

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Amid the violence that erupted in Ukraine in 2014, evidence suggests that both government and anti-government forces have used cluster munitions. These have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions[10] (see Ukraine’s 2016 Cluster Munition Ban policy profile for details).

Ukraine has reported that many unexploded submunitions contaminate the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,[11] with the most intensive use of cluster munitions in and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk region.[12] Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall extent of cluster munition contamination until surveys have been completed.[13] The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the warring parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations is severely limited.[14]

HALO Trust identified 0.6km² of cluster munition contamination through non-technical survey in 2016 in the Nykolskyi district of Donetsk and the Svativskyi district of Luhansk.[15]

Other explosive remnants of war

Ukraine is affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from World Wars I and II[16] and Soviet military training and stockpiles. In February 2016, Ukraine reported that 32 former military firing ranges and the many other areas contaminated with explosive objects from past wars covered 1,500km².[17] These figures are the same as those put forward in April 2015.[18]

Impact of mines and ERW

Mine and ERW contamination is reported to pose a serious risk to human life, and to have a detrimental socio-economic impact, affecting agricultural and grazing land—two major sources of livelihood, disrupting essential services provision and hampering freedom of movement.[19] Mines and booby-traps are said to have been laid deliberately to block access to essential infrastructure as well as to forested areas where people gather wood to heat their homes.[20] Those living in conflict-affected areas, especially around the contact line, are among the most vulnerable, including the elderly, persons with disabilities, and the poor. To heat homes in the winter, people go into the forest to collect firewood. This is said to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.[21]

Contamination at both formal and informal civilian crossing points is a particular concern.”[22] According to a September 2017 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report, between 16 May and 15 August 2017, there was an increase in the numbers of people travelling across the contact line, on average 36,000 people each day.[23] Explosive contamination pose a particular risk to the internally displaced and returning refugees, especially in areas fought over previously and which are now away from the front line.[24] At least 785 mine (including victim-activated IEDs) and ERW casualties occurred in 2016. (See Ukraine’s casualty profile for details.)

Program Management

In 2013, the Ministry of Defense’s Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action was tasked with coordinating demining nationally and serving as the secretariat to the national mine action authority in Ukraine.[25]

While all areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, including humanitarian demining operations, are planned, coordinated, and controlled by the Ministry of Defense,[26] several other ministries are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (under which sits the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), formerly known as the Ministry of Emergencies); the Security Services; the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons; the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Infrastructure; and the State Border Service.[27]

SESU has organizational control of humanitarian demining and is generally responsible for clearance. It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Center” in 2015 in Kiev. The center’s remit includes coordination of SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and non-technical survey, demining, internal quality control (QC) of SESU units, information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as risk education.[28]

In addition, SESU has a training center near Merefa, in the Kharkiv region, and the Special Transport Service has a center in Chernihiv, both of which are focused largely on EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).[29] SESU has begun to build a Regional Center for Humanitarian Demining, based in Lysychansk in Luhansk region. The new center will deploy trained SESU deminers to affected areas in Donetsk and Luhansk that are under Ukrainian control.[30]

The demining center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Kamyanets-Podilsky, focuses on building the military’s capacity for EOD, including training and testing of methods and equipment, quality assurance (QA), and provision of EOD, counter-IED, and demining specialists.[31]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons[32] implements a set of measures aimed at reducing the social, economic, and environmental impact of explosive objects; and coordinates the implementation of mine action activities aimed at reducing harm to civilians from the use of explosive objects (including cluster munition remnants and mines).[33]

International support to program management

In 2016–2018, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator, with Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assistance, is providing policy and legal support to Ukraine, including for the establishment of a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority and center and underpinned by national standards.[34] The OSCE Project Coordinator and GICHD are also supporting Ukraine’s use of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In addition, the OSCE Project Coordinator is implementing two projects that are working to enhance the capacities of mine action training centers by revising the curriculum, training national instructors, and supporting modernization of demining equipment.[35]

Experts from NATO provide training and advice at the armed forces’ demining center.[36] The Canadian government is helping to build Ukraine’s humanitarian demining capacity in eastern Ukraine, as part of a two-year project to support the development of policies, practices, and institutions; the provision of training; the creation of a digital map showing hazards and cleared areas; and the procurement of modern equipment.[37]

At the request of the government of Ukraine, the UN conducted a mine action needs assessment mission on 23 January–5 February 2016. The aim of the mission was to assess the impact of mines and ERW and make technical recommendations for further humanitarian responses. The joint mission was composed of technical experts from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[38] The key findings of the UN mission were that:

• The humanitarian impact of ERW is high, with two to five accidents each week and the ERW contamination covers a huge area;[39]
• ERW clearance capacities exist in Ukraine, but they need to be re-oriented away from their current activities of responding to call-outs for World War II bombs. They now need to undertake activities like surveys and information management;[40]
• The understanding of humanitarian mine action needs to be addressed at all levels of government. At present the focus is only on military mine clearance but it needs to be extended to risk education, surveys, victim assistance, and information management;[41] and
• The establishment of a civilian oversight and policy-making body for national mine action activities was recommended.[42]

The UN-led humanitarian coordination system also has a mine action sub-cluster, established in 2015, which sits under the Global Protection Cluster.[43] The UNDP, Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Handicap International (HI) are members, and in addition, the OSCE Project Coordinator, and the ICRC, also attend meetings.[44]

Legislation

As of June 2017, Ukraine was in the process of passing mine action legislation that would identify the executive bodies involved in mine action in Ukraine, regulate the national mine action authority, and mandate the development of a priority action plan.[45]

Two draft bills (5189 dated 28 September 2016, and 5189-1 dated 12 October 2016) were submitted to the parliament’s Committee on National Security and Defense.[46] On 7 June 2017, the committee recommended that the Ukrainian parliament reject both draft bills.[47] The committee then established an interdepartmental working group for the elaboration of a new draft law on mine action, chaired by Member of Parliament Andriy Teteruk. The working group will conduct open discussions with key stakeholder on considerations to be taken into account, along with the other draft bills. A roundtable was held at the parliament on 19 September, attended by key national and international stakeholders.[48]

The lack of a legal framework for mine action has the potential to deter donors from funding activities, and also has a bearing on the legal status of demining organizations in the country in terms of registration as well as application for end-user certificates for demining equipment and explosives.[49]

Strategic planning

The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State Program for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–2014.[50] The program planned clearance of 15km² over five years with the destruction of 500,000 items of ERW.

Following an order from the prime minister of Ukraine on 30 November 2015, the Department of Environmental Protection and Mine Action developed a draft order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “On Approval of the Concept of the State Program for Mine Action in Ukraine for 2017–2021.” This concept was announced by the Ministry of Defense in February 2016,[51] and, as of July 2017, was on hold pending progress with the draft mine action law.[52] In the meantime, Ukraine continues to work from an annual plan.[53]

In October 2016, the GICHD organized the first workshop on strategic planning, in partnership with the OSCE Project Coordinator and the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).[54] As of June 2017, next steps in strategic planning were under consideration, related to progress in the draft mine action law.[55]

Ukraine has developed a plan for humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in areas it can access safely. The main goals for 2015 were demining of populated areas; security during rehabilitation of infrastructure; and clearance of UXO from agricultural areas.[56] These remained Ukraine’s goals for 2016, while, in addition, local government authorities have been helping to prioritize clearance tasks based on humanitarian criteria.[57]

Ukraine reported that as of November 2016, its main efforts were aimed at demining essential support systems of the population in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, namely power lines, gas and water pipelines, heating plants, as well as highways and railways. These tasks are carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, SESU, and the State Special Transport Service.[58] According to Ukraine, due to regular violations of the Minsk Agreements by illegal armed groups, and the continuation of firing on their part, it is only possible to plan the clearance of the liberated territories for short periods of time.[59]

Standards

A special instruction for the identification, render-safe, and disposal of explosive items, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), was approved by the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on 1 August 2014.[60] Development of national standards in Ukraine has taken place with support from the GICHD, the OSCE Project Coordinator, and DCAF.[61] All national standards must be approved by the Ukrainian Scientific and Research Training Center of Standardization, Certification and Quality, which is the National Standardization Authority.[62] Ukraine adopted IMAS as “trial national regulatory acts” on 1 September 2016, under National Standardization Authority Order 230 of 8 August 2016.[63]

On 28 August 2017, the Ministry of Defense announced the creation of a working group/sub-committee for the development of national standards, within the Technical Committee TK176 of the Ministry of Defense, on standardization of defense products.[64] The sub-committee has 28 members, including representatives of government ministries and international humanitarian demining organizations.[65]

Quality management

The draft mine action law envisages a national mine action center with a QA function.[66] In the meantime, quality management (QM) of government clearance operations is overseen by the demining center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[67] Both DDG and HALO Trust are conducting internal QM.[68]

Janus Global Operations (JGO) carried out a two-month project for HALO Trust in 2017, during which it trained members of the demining center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Kamyanets-Podilsky on QM techniques, including QA of humanitarian demining using manual and mechanical methods as well as mine detection dogs; BAC; and EOD. The 12 Ukrainian military members and employees trained by JGO will now be able to perform QA for the national mine action authority/center.[69]

Information management

In cooperation with the OSCE Project Coordinator and GICHD, SESU began using the IMSMA database.[70] In 2015, IMSMA was piloted by the GICHD and SESU in four regions of Ukraine.[71] HALO Trust is also supporting the OSCE Project Coordinator to set up IMSMA.[72]

As of October 2016, three government departments in Ukraine were using IMSMA: SESU, the Ministry of Defense, and the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Infrastructure. There are two functioning IMSMA databases for internal and external operational planning, monitoring, reporting, and archiving of contamination and clearance data in Ukraine. One is managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyses all mine action data from national operators and NGOs.[73] The databases are reportedly complementary, as they are separated based on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.[74] The Ministry of Defense reported that it plans to create a national IMSMA server.[75]

In June 2017, the GICHD reported that it had conducted an information management assessment which will serve as a basis to develop a roadmap for future collaboration with SESU and Ministry of Defense.[76]

Operators

In 2016, the national authorities engaged in clearance operations were: SESU, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs (National Police and National Guard), the State Special Transport Service, the Security Service, and the State Border Service.[77] Three international humanitarian organizations conducted mine action operations: DDG, FSD, and HALO Trust. One national organization, Demining Team of Ukraine, was also active.

As of February 2016, SESU was deploying 30 pyrotechnic/demining teams (150 people, 60 vehicles) in eastern Ukraine.[78] A Commission on Humanitarian Demining of SESU coordinates the activities of SESU pyrotechnic teams and determines SESU’s priorities.[79] In December 2015, Ukraine reported that during the ongoing conflict SESU had suffered severe losses to its buildings and vehicles.[80] Since then, DDG has secured equipment for four SESU pyrotechnic teams, which includes vehicles, detectors, and personal protective equipment. DDG trained the four teams to use the demining equipment and conduct operations in accordance with IMAS, in addition to providing life-support training to SESU medics associated with the teams.[81] A similar project is also being implemented by the OSCE Project Coordinator [82] and by NATO.[83]

The Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed 52 EOD teams (260 people; 86 vehicles).[84] In addition to overall coordination of humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, the Ministry of Defense is also responsible for all areas where the military are permanently stationed as well as for the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone in Donbass. The ministry’s Engineering Division conducts UXO spot clearance. All Ukrainian Armed Forces engineering units are involved in demining in eastern Ukraine as well as EOD spot tasks. The units are also responsible for destroying all ERW and mines detected by SESU and clearance NGOs.[85]

The State Border Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea. The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Special Transportation Service is responsible for demining national infrastructure (e.g. railways and roads) and deployed five EOD teams (25 people; 10 vehicles).[86] The Ministry of Internal Affairs has an engineering department that conducts EOD, in particular of IEDs.[87]

Ukroboronservice, a state enterprise whose activities include arms manufacture, also has a humanitarian demining section.[88] As of June 2017, Ukroboronservice was not known to be conducting clearance operations in Ukraine.[89]

DDG began to conduct non-technical survey in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in February 2016.[90] As of May 2017, DDG was deploying one multi-task team (MTT) capable of non-technical survey and visual, surface BAC. DDG Ukraine currently primarily runs its operations out of offices in Severodonetsk, but also from Mariupol, and has its head office in Kiev.[91]

HALO Trust launched its program in November 2015 and began with a rapid assessment of mine and UXO contamination in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[92] In early 2016, HALO began conducting non-technical survey, mine clearance, and BAC in government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, more than 15km from the contact line.[93] HALO’s capacity as of the end of 2016 was 91 deminers.[94] As of October 2017, HALO’s total staff had increased to 220.[95] All teams are trained and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all expected threats in the conflict zone, as non-technical survey has yet to determine the proportion of different types of hazard.[96] Since the first quarter of 2017, HALO has recruited and trained women to become the first female humanitarian deminers in Ukraine.[97]

The FSD started operations in Ukraine in early 2015 with risk education in conflict-affected areas in the east of the countries, run from its operational headquarters in Slaviansk and supported from its administrative headquarters in Kiev. The FSD subsequently gained accreditation for survey and clearance operations, and has had survey teams operating in eastern Ukraine since early 2017, including a full mine clearance and EOD capacity, which works closely with regional security forces to clear munitions from conflict-affected areas.[98]

In addition, a Ukrainian organization, “Demining Team of Ukraine” is active in demining in eastern Ukraine.[99]

As of November 2016, Ukraine put its demining capacity in Donetsk at 58 mine clearance teams, numbering up to 300 people and 88 pieces of equipment.[100]

Land Release (mines)

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups,[101] and international clearance operators have subsequently begun non-technical survey and clearance in government-controlled areas.

In February 2016, SESU reported that, since the beginning of fighting in 2014, it had cleared around 140km² across the whole country, and disposed of more than 202,000 explosive objects.[102] The Ukrainian Armed Forces are responsible for clearing ordnance in areas close to the front lines and former military positions.[103]

Survey in 2016

According to the Global Protection Cluster report published in November 2016, “non-technical survey is being conducted together with international partners on the territory of approximately 3,000,000 hectares, out of which 460 hectares [4.6km²] have been identified as Suspected Hazardous Areas and 620 hectares [6.2km²] as Confirmed Hazardous Areas [CHA]. A total of 294 dangerous explosives have been identified so far.”[104] The 4.6km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and 6.2km² of CHA are the same size areas as those recorded by Ukraine through non-technical survey in 2016, for “suspicious territory” and “dangerous territory” respectively.[105] No detail was provided on which operators conducted this survey.

In early 2016, HALO Trust began conducting non-technical survey in government-controlled areas of Ukraine around the contact line, and up to 15km from the front-line.[106] These are primarily areas where conflict occurred in 2014 and early 2015, before the contact line settled in its current position. Access closer to the contact line will depend on the security situation.[107] Through its non-technical survey in 2016, HALO Trust confirmed 19 areas as mined, totaling almost 2km².[108]

DDG also began non-technical survey in government-controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in early 2016 up to 60km from the current contact line, depending on the location of SHAs and access granted by the relevant authorities.[109]

Clearance in 2016

In 2016, clearance data was not available for national operators. Of the international operators, only HALO conducted mine clearance. Through its mine clearance operations in 2016, HALO cleared a total area of 52,887m², in nine mined areas, with the destruction of four antipersonnel mines and 12 items of UXO (see table below).[110]

HALO Trust mine clearance in 2016[111]

Note: AP = antipersonnel.

HALO Trust began mine clearance and BAC in March 2016. Planned clearance is prioritized in consultation with local stakeholders, but generally HALO Trust’s clearance is in response to requests from village and district councils.[112] HALO Trust’s primary concern is to reduce the number of mine and ERW incidents, and tasks are prioritized based on the greatest level of humanitarian threat. Any history of incidents is assessed, along with the extent of contamination and the proximity of the mines to the closest population, how often the land is used, and the density of mines in the area.[113] No mines were discovered in three of the nine clearance tasks in 2016.[114] Items discovered by HALO Trust are destroyed by the Ministry of Defense, as only the Ukrainian Armed Forces are permitted to use explosives in the conflict zones.[115]

As of May 2017, HALO Trust and DDG survey had collectively identified antivehicle mines (TM-57 and TM-62 (both plastic and metal series) and PTM series); antipersonnel mines (OZM-72 fragmentation mines, and MON, PMN, and POM series); improvised fragmentation mines, and booby-trapped ERW (mainly tripwire-initiated systems connected to conventional munitions); cluster munitions (9N series) and remnants; rockets from multiple launch rocket systems (PG series); and unexploded mortar shells and grenades.[116]

Update in 2017 (mines)

As of May 2017, HALO Trust was conducting non-technical survey in 11 districts of Donetsk region (Bakhmutskyi, Dobropilskyi, Kostantynivskyi, Lymanskyi, Marinskyi, Nikolskyi, Oleksandrivskyi, Pokrovskyi, Slovianskyi, Velykonovosilkivskyi, and Yasynuvatskyi) and four districts of Luhansk region (Bilovodskyi, Markivskyi, Milovskyi, and Stanychno-Luhanskyi); and was conducting mine clearance in the Lymanskyi and Slovyanskyi districts of Donetsk region and the Bilovodskyi and Stanychno-Luhanskyi districts of Luhansk region.[117] HALO liaises closely with local authorities directly or through Civil-Military Co-operation Unit (CIMIC) to identify high-priority tasks and the needs of impacted communities across Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The vast majority of HALO Trust operations were outside the 15km buffer zone, although on a few occasions, following requests from local authorities, HALO was given permission to conduct non-technical survey and clearance near inhabited settlements as close as 2km from the current Line of Contact.[118] As of October, HALO Trust had received permission to clear four separate sites within the buffer zone and to conduct non-technical survey in and around 20 settlements.[119]

As of May 2017, DDG had commenced non-technical survey in six regions of Ukraine, in order to assess the presence, nature, and extent of mines and ERW in conflict-affected communities in these areas.[120]

Since the beginning of 2017, the FSD has also initiated non-technical survey in eastern Ukraine, in addition to clearance operations approximately 40km from the contact line.[121]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Survey (cluster munition remnants)

Through its non-technical survey in 2016, HALO confirmed a total of 572,958m² as contaminated with cluster munition remnants. This comprised 95,692m² confirmed in one area in Zoria village in Nykolski district in the Donetsk region and 477,266m² confirmed in two areas in Svatove village, Svativskyi district, in the Luhansk region.[122]

No cluster munition remnants were encountered during DDG’s non-technical survey in 2016.[123]

Clearance (cluster munition remnants)

It is not known how much cluster munition-contaminated land was cleared by the various Ukrainian authorities.

Through its cluster munition clearance operations in 2016, HALO cleared a total area of 199,639m². This comprised 80,917m² cleared, with four submunitions destroyed, in one area in Zoria village in Nykolski district in the Donetsk region; and 118,722m² cleared, with 46 submunitions and 86 other items of UXO destroyed, in two areas in Svatove village in the Svativskyi district of the Luhansk region.[124]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. As of September 2017, Ukraine had not yet submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request, and was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine should inform States Parties of the location of mined areas, and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. Ukraine needs to both request and be granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline by the other States Parties at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in December 2017.

At the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2015, Ukraine reported that it did not have access to some mined areas. According to the final report of the meeting, “Ukraine emphasized that it was fully aware of the need for strict compliance with the obligations under the Convention and notified its intention to seek an extension of the period of Ukraine’s implementation of Article 5. The official, duly compiled, request would be soon submitted to the States Parties for their consideration.”[125]

On 30 March 2016, though, Ukraine deposited an official communication to the other Mine Ban Treaty States Parties via the UN Secretary-General, noting that it did not have full control over parts of its territory—namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.[126] However, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 specifies that a State Party is responsible for clearing mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Therefore, suspected or confirmed mined areas that are under Ukraine’s control or under Ukraine’s jurisdiction (even if it does not have control or physical access to those areas), should all be covered in an extension request. Furthermore, Ukraine’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty still fully apply, including with regard to Article 5, irrespective of the fact that Ukraine continues to be engaged in an armed conflict.

At the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2016, Ukraine reiterated its commitment to implement its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, including Article 5. It stated, “We are looking forward to closely engaging with the Article 5 Committee and the ISU in the beginning of 2017 in order to elaborate a way forward and find an appropriate solution to the unique situation and security challenges that Ukraine has been facing since February 2014.”[127]

At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings on 8–9 June 2017, Ukraine expressed that it believed it to be unfair that other states had a 10-year deadline under Article 5, but Ukraine only had a two-year deadline (i.e. from the date of the new contamination in February 2014 until June 2016). Ukraine reiterated that it was demining areas under its control, but could not identify all areas where mines are known to be emplaced. Ukraine stated that it could submit an Article 5 extension request, but that the States Parties’ decision should acknowledge that February 2014 was the date when mine contamination appeared; that contamination was due to the “Russian aggression”; and that Ukraine would start implementing Article 5 once the integrity of the whole territory is restored.[128] Ukraine also reported that it had prepared a draft rational response for states where contamination appears after entry into force but before the Article 5 clearance deadline.[129]

Russia is not a party or signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty. Nonetheless, Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.[130]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.