Summary: Non-signatory Ukraine has not taken any steps to accede to the convention. It has participated as an observer in several meetings of the convention, most recently in 2014, but abstained from voting on a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2016.

Ukraine is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it sees military utility in the weapons and possesses a large stockpile of cluster munitions that it inherited from the Soviet Union. In 2014–2015, the armed forces of the government of Ukraine and Russian-backed armed opposition groups used ground-launched cluster munition rockets in Donetsk and Luhansk provinces in eastern Ukraine. The government of Ukraine has repeatedly denied that it used cluster munitions in the attacks.

Policy

Ukraine has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Ukraine has acknowledged the deadly long-term consequences of cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention.[1] In 2012, Ukraine told the Monitor that it “considers cluster munitions to be legal weapons which remain an important component of Ukraine’s defense capabilities.”[2] Government officials have denied evidence that Ukraine used cluster munition rockets in the country’s eastern provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 until a February 2015 ceasefire (see Use section below).

Ukraine has stated that, if using its own resources alone, it would not be able to destroy the large stockpile of cluster munitions that it inherited from the Soviet Union within the eight-year deadline required by the Convention on Cluster Munitions[3] (see Stockpiling and destruction section below).

In December 2016, Ukraine abstained from the vote on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[4] Ukraine also abstained from the vote on the first UNGA resolution on the convention in December 2015.[5]

Ukraine attended several meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and participated as an observer in the formal negotiations in Dublin in May 2008.[6]

Ukraine participated as an observer in the convention’s Meetings of States Parties in 2010, 2011, and 2014. It has not attended any meetings of the convention since then, such as the Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016.

Ukraine has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2016.[7]

Ukraine is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and in the past expressed a preference for cluster munitions to be addressed through this framework.[8] Ukraine has not reviewed or amended its position on cluster munitions since the CCW’s failure in 2011 to agree to a draft protocol on cluster munitions. The failure effectively ended CCW deliberations on cluster munitions and has left the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument to specifically address the human suffering caused by these weapons.

Production and transfer

Ukraine is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions. In November 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine was not producing cluster munitions and did not import them.[9]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine inherited a large stockpile of cluster munitions after the break-up of the Soviet Union. At a CCW meeting on cluster munitions in April 2011, Ukraine provided information on the types of its stockpiled cluster munitions, as detailed in the following table.

Cluster munitions of the armed forces of Ukraine[10]

In the April 2011 statement, Ukraine said that cluster munitions constituted 35% of its stocks of conventional weapons, which totaled two million tons of ammunition. Of these cluster munitions, 34% were produced before 1980, while another 36% were produced between 1981 and 1992 and “might be used.” The remaining 30% contained antivehicle landmines.[11]

Ukraine has reported the destruction of an average of 10,000–20,000 tons of cluster munitions annually and estimated that it could take 60 years to destroy the stockpiles that are currently slated for destruction.[12]

Use

Ukraine last used cluster munitions in the east of the country in 2014–2015, but, despite continued hostilities, there has no evidence or allegations of new use by any party since a February 2015 ceasefire went into effect. Previously, in 2010, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official said that Ukraine would not use cluster munitions except to defend itself from outside aggression.[13] In the past, Ukraine has called for a moratorium on the use of what it has described as “inaccurate and unreliable” cluster munitions.[14]

Previous use in 2014–2015

Field research conducted by Human Rights Watch in October 2014 and a follow-up investigation in January–February 2015 confirmed the use of cluster munitions by both Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed anti-government forces since July 2014.[15] An Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) monitoring mission has also reported the cluster munition rocket attacks.

Both parties to the conflict used two types of ground-fired cluster munitions in 2014 until the February 2015 ceasefire:

• The 300mm 9M55K-series Smerch (“Tornado”) cluster munition rocket, which has a minimum range of 20 kilometers and a maximum range of 70 kilometers, and delivers 72 9N235 submunitions.
• The 220mm 9M27K-series Uragan (“Hurricane”) cluster munition rocket, which has a range of 10–35 kilometers and delivers 30 9N235 submunitions or 30 9N210 submunitions.

The Smerch and Uragan cluster munition rockets are fired from dedicated launch tubes mounted on eight-wheeled vehicles. The 9N210 and 9N235 fragmentation submunitions are designed to self-destruct a minute or two after being ejected from the rocket.[16] A significant number of submunitions used in 2014–2015 failed to self-destruct as designed. Several Smerch and Uragan cluster munition rockets malfunctioned shortly after launch and fell to the ground, still containing their full payload of submunitions.

Cluster munitions were used in dozens of urban and rural locations of Ukraine’s eastern border provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk from July 2014 until the February 2015 ceasefire, with some places hit multiple times.[17] Cluster munition rockets were used in attacks on Donetsk city and at least seven towns and villages throughout the province.[18] Cluster munition rocket attacks were recorded in Luhansk City and the towns of Novosvitlivka and Stakhanov.

There is no evidence indicating that cluster munitions were used elsewhere in Ukraine, for example, in Crimea.

Neither party to the conflict has accepted responsibility for using cluster munitions in 2014 and 2015.

Ukraine has consistently denied its use of cluster munitions and blamed the attacks on pro-Russian separatist groups.[19] Minister of Foreign Affairs Pavlo Klimkin acknowledged the “serious accusations…deserve the deepest investigation.”[20] At the CCW in November 2014, Ukraine denied using cluster munitions.[21] At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2015, Ukraine continued to allege that “Russia-guided illegal armed groups” and members of the Russian armed forces carried out Uragan and Smerch rocket attacks in eastern Ukraine.[22]

Russia has repeatedly drawn attention to Ukraine’s use of cluster munitions, but has not itself acknowledged or taken any responsibility for cluster munition rocket attacks by the separatist rebels backed by Russia.[23]

The use of cluster munitions in Ukraine attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from at least 32 states and the European Union.[24] At Convention on Cluster Munitions intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2015, two-dozen states condemned the use of cluster munitions, of which 12 referred specifically to the use of cluster munitions in Ukraine.[25] At the First Review Conference in September 2015, States Parties adopted the Dubrovnik Declaration, which affirms: “We are deeply concerned by any and all allegations, reports or documented evidence of the use of cluster munitions, including in Cambodia, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukraine and Yemen. We condemn any use of cluster munitions by any actor.”[26] During the meeting, a dozen states specifically expressed concern at or condemned cluster munition use in Ukraine.[27]

During the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2015, states including Costa Rica, Norway, Ireland, and the Netherlands expressed concern at the use of cluster munition use in Ukraine.[28]

States at the OSCE’s Permanent Council in Vienna asked the OSCE mission to collect information and report on evidence of the use of prohibited cluster munitions.[29] In 2015, states responded to the OSCE mission’s reports detailing cluster munition rocket attacks.[30] Russia welcomed the mission’s “detailed analysis” of the use of cluster munitions.[31]

Policy

Ukraine signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 24 February 1999 and ratified it on 27 December 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2006.

Ukraine has not enacted national legislation, including penal sanctions, to enforce the prohibitions of the Mine Ban Treaty domestically as required in Article 9. It has reported existing regulations under national implementation measures, as well as a 2012 law to ratify an agreement with a NATO agency to destroy stockpiles.[1]

Ukraine submitted its eleventh Article 7 transparency report on 1 April 2017, covering calendar year 2016.

Since the Second Review Conference in 2009, Ukraine has attended almost all treaty meetings, including the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago in November–December 2016 and the intersessional meetings held in June 2017. Ukraine did not attend the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014.

Ukraine is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war (ERW). Ukraine submitted its latest national annual report for Amended Protocol II in November 2016, and submitted a national annual report for Protocol V in October 2016.

Production and transfer

Ukraine has declared that it “has not made and does not produce antipersonnel mines.”[2] It has not produced antipersonnel mines since its independence.[3] Ukraine is not known to have exported antipersonnel mines. Its 1999 moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines, formally in place through 2003, in practice stayed in effect until the Mine Ban Treaty entered into force for Ukraine in 2006.

Use

Landmines continue to be used in the conflict between government forces and Russian-supported separatists that erupted in early 2014, initially in Crimea and later in the Donetsk and Luhansk provinces of eastern Ukraine. Landmine Monitor has received no information that Ukrainian government forces have used antipersonnel mines in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty in 2016–2017.[4]

Since 2014, the government of Ukraine has stated that it has not used antipersonnel mines in the conflict and has accused Russian-supported forces of laying landmines in Ukraine.[5] In December 2014, Ukrainian government officials stated that “no banned weapons” had been used in the “Anti-Terrorist Operations Zone” by Ukrainian armed forces or forces associated with them, such as volunteer battalions.[6] In February 2016, Ukraine informed the Mine Ban Treaty Committee on Cooperative Compliance that “its Armed Forces are authorized to use mines in command-detonate mode, which is not prohibited under the Convention. All mines planted in command-detonate mode are recorded, secured and access is restricted.”[7]

At the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2015, Ukraine stated that there were mined areas in territory under its jurisdiction but not under its control. In addition to those areas, it said that “sabotage acts are carried out on its territory which is under the control of Ukraine, including mining territory and infrastructure.”[8]

Ukraine’s statement at the 2017 intersessional meetings claimed that 397 people were killed or injured by “improvised explosive devices” since the beginning of the conflict in April 2014, and another 89 people were killed or injured by antipersonnel mines.[9]

HALO Trust identified 1,653 military and civilian casualties on both sides of the contact line, caused by mines and ERW. Using remote accident mapping technology, HALO Trust was able to conduct this preliminary technical survey to identify contamination in inaccessible areas. They identified at least 135 villages, out of the 873 assessed, which were contaminated by landmines.[10]

There is significant evidence present at different locations that antipersonnel mines of Soviet-origin with production markings from the 1980s as well as antipersonnel mines with production markings from the 2000s, indicating Russian origin, are stockpiled and used by Russian-supported separatists.[11] Ukrainian armed forces and the security services continue to confiscate caches of antipersonnel landmines along the front line, including MON-50 directional mines,[12] MON-90 directional mines,[13] PMN-1 and PMN-2 blast mines,[14] and POM-2 scatterable mines.[15] Ukrainian soldiers were killed or wounded by antipersonnel mines in 2017 on 2 October, 11 August, 15 July, and on 9 May.[16] In September 2016, Ukraine’s Department of Defense Intelligence reported that separatists had laid POM-2 antipersonnel mines.[17] Later that month, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine reported the presence of antivehicle and antipersonnel mines that it said were preventing the SMM representatives from traveling from Pervomaisk toward Zolote, between Mykolaiv province and Luhansk province.[18] In April 2017, an international OSCE observer was killed and two others injured by an antivehicle mine in Luhansk Region.[19]

In November 2015, an officer from the General Staff informed soldiers that separatists were using landmines attached to fish hooks and fishing lines to snag the clothing of soldiers as they moved through wooded areas, thereby detonating nearby mines.[20] In May 2016, two Ukrainian army engineers in the Donetsk region were injured by an antipersonnel mine as they were checking the area for explosives.[21]

Stockpiling and destruction

Ukraine missed its 1 June 2010 treaty-mandated deadline for the destruction of all stockpiled antipersonnel mines and has therefore been in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty ever since.[22] It has not provided a timeline of when it will complete the destruction of its stockpile and be in compliance with its obligation. The requirement to destroy almost six million PFM-type antipersonnel mines was a key obstacle that prevented Ukraine from rapidly ratifying the Mine Ban Treaty.[23] For years, Ukraine repeated at nearly every formal and informal Mine Ban Treaty meeting that it would depend on international support for the destruction of its stockpiles.[24]

The types and quantities of antipersonnel mines Ukraine has reported in its stockpile have varied over the years. The highest total of 6,664,342 mines of nine different types was detailed in Landmine Monitor Report 2006.[25]

In its Article 7 report for calendar year 2016, Ukraine declared a stockpile of 4,911,589 antipersonnel mines: 4,761,888 PFM-type and 149,096 POM-2 remotely-delivered mines, and 605 OZM-4 hand-emplaced bounding fragmentation mines.[26] Ukraine reported the destruction of 652,840 mines in 2016, an increase from 19,944 destroyed mines in 2015.[27] It declared the destruction of 576 mines in 2014, 332,352 mines in 2013, 22,604 mines in 2012, and 9,890 mines in 2011.[28] From 1999 to 2010, Ukraine destroyed significant quantities of stockpiled antipersonnel mines, using both its own resources and international assistance.[29]

At the May 2016 intersessional meetings, Ukraine stated that on 19 October 2015, an additional agreement was reached among the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, NATO Support and Procurement Agency, and the Pavlograd Chemical Plant for the resumption of the destruction of stockpiles of PFM-type antipersonnel mines.[30]

Contaminated by: landmines (extent of contamination unknown), cluster munition remnants (extent unknown), improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and other explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Article 5 deadline: 1 June 2016
(Deadline missed without extension request—Ukraine is in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty)

Not a signatory to the Convention on Cluster Munitions

Summary

Ukraine has made progress towards establishing a mine action law and national mine action program. Survey and clearance of mines and unexploded ordnance in government-controlled areas of eastern Ukraine is now taking place. However, Ukraine missed its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline, and has not yet submitted an Article 5 extension request. It is, therefore, in serious violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Most land release activities in Ukraine are not systematically recorded. In November 2016, the Global Protection Cluster reported that 6.2km² of land contaminated by explosive hazards had been confirmed, and 4.6km² of suspected contaminated area had been identified. A total of 0.57km² of land was confirmed to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants, all by the HALO Trust. HALO Trust cleared 0.19km² of cluster munition-contaminated land, destroying 50 submunitions.

Recommendations for action

• Ukraine should request an extension to its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 clearance deadline without further delay.
• Ukraine should take all necessary measures to protect civilians from mines and ERW.
• Ukraine should establish an operational national mine action center (NMAC) under civilian control.
• Ukraine should establish a centralized database to collate information on landmines, cluster munition remnants, and other ERW contamination resulting from the ongoing conflict.
• Ukraine should continue to undertake survey to identify the extent and impact of antipersonnel mines and cluster munition remnants (in particular in Donetsk and Luhansk), and conduct clearance as soon as possible.

Mine Contamination

Ukraine is contaminated by antipersonnel mines as a result of the ongoing conflict that broke out in 2014. In the first half of 2014, armed violence erupted between Ukrainian government forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Crimean peninsula and in the east of the country in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions (oblasts). Firm evidence exists that mines have been used in the resultant armed conflicts,[1] including by Ukrainian armed forces, though the full nature and extent of contamination is likely to remain unclear until an effective cessation of hostilities.

Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall extent of mine contamination until surveys have been completed.[2] The area inside the 15km buffer zone is believed to be heavily contaminated with mines and ERW, but access to the buffer zone for humanitarian survey and clearance operations is severely limited on the government side, and there is no access for humanitarian demining in areas not controlled by the government.[3] In August 2017, as in 2016, Ukraine stated, highly improbably, that approximately 7,000km² of the Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts were contaminated with mines and ERW.[4] In its latest Article 7 report (for 2016), Ukraine reported that non-technical survey by NGOs identified mined areas in Lemans, Slavyansk, and Volnovansky districts in the Donetsk region, and Popasnyansky district, in Luhansk region.[5] In May 2016, Ukraine reported that it was possible that mines have been laid in occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Kherson province, and Donetsk.[6] At the 2015 Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings, Ukraine asserted that approximately 8% of the territory in eastern Ukraine is contaminated with antipersonnel mines and IEDs.[7] It appeared that reports of minefields being emplaced to demarcate border areas after the annexation of the Crimea may actually have been either “phoney minefields” or areas containing trip-flares.[8]

In 2015 and 2016, numerous antipersonnel and antivehicle mines have been identified in Ukraine, including the following types: OZM-72 bounding fragmentation mines that can function as antipersonnel mines depending on the type of fuze used, MON (50, 90, 100, and 200) directional antipersonnel mines, TM62 antivehicle mines, PDM-1M anti-handling mines equipped with fuzes capable of being activated by the unintentional act of a person, blast PMN type antipersonnel, and POM2 antipersonnel mines.[9] (See Mine Ban Policy profile for further details.)

Prior to the current conflicts, Ukraine was affected by residual contamination of mines and other ordnance, mostly as a result of heavy fighting between German and Soviet forces in World War II, but also from combat in World War I. Ministry of Defense engineering units partially cleared affected areas in the mid-1970s, suggesting that a problem may remain, but the location and extent of any mine threat is not known.

Cluster Munition Contamination

The extent of contamination from cluster munition remnants in Ukraine is not known. Amid the violence that erupted in Ukraine in 2014, evidence suggests that both government and anti-government forces have used cluster munitions. These have included surface-fired Smerch (Tornado) and Uragan (Hurricane) cluster munition rockets, which deliver 9N210 and 9N235 antipersonnel fragmentation submunitions[10] (see Ukraine’s 2016 Cluster Munition Ban policy profile for details).

Ukraine has reported that many unexploded submunitions contaminate the Donetsk and Luhansk regions,[11] with the most intensive use of cluster munitions in and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetsk region.[12] Ukraine cannot reliably estimate the overall extent of cluster munition contamination until surveys have been completed.[13] The heaviest mine and ERW contamination is believed to be inside the 15km buffer zone between the warring parties, but access to this area for survey and clearance operations is severely limited.[14]

HALO Trust identified 0.6km² of cluster munition contamination through non-technical survey in 2016 in the Nykolskyi district of Donetsk and the Svativskyi district of Luhansk.[15]

Other explosive remnants of war

Ukraine is affected by unexploded ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) remaining from World Wars I and II[16] and Soviet military training and stockpiles. In February 2016, Ukraine reported that 32 former military firing ranges and the many other areas contaminated with explosive objects from past wars covered 1,500km².[17] These figures are the same as those put forward in April 2015.[18]

Impact of mines and ERW

Mine and ERW contamination is reported to pose a serious risk to human life, and to have a detrimental socio-economic impact, affecting agricultural and grazing land—two major sources of livelihood, disrupting essential services provision and hampering freedom of movement.[19] Mines and booby-traps are said to have been laid deliberately to block access to essential infrastructure as well as to forested areas where people gather wood to heat their homes.[20] Those living in conflict-affected areas, especially around the contact line, are among the most vulnerable, including the elderly, persons with disabilities, and the poor. To heat homes in the winter, people go into the forest to collect firewood. This is said to have resulted in many fatalities and injuries.[21]

Contamination at both formal and informal civilian crossing points is a particular concern.”[22] According to a September 2017 Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) report, between 16 May and 15 August 2017, there was an increase in the numbers of people travelling across the contact line, on average 36,000 people each day.[23] Explosive contamination pose a particular risk to the internally displaced and returning refugees, especially in areas fought over previously and which are now away from the front line.[24] At least 785 mine (including victim-activated IEDs) and ERW casualties occurred in 2016. (See Ukraine’s casualty profile for details.)

Program Management

In 2013, the Ministry of Defense’s Department of Environmental Safety and Mine Action was tasked with coordinating demining nationally and serving as the secretariat to the national mine action authority in Ukraine.[25]

While all areas of mine action in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, including humanitarian demining operations, are planned, coordinated, and controlled by the Ministry of Defense,[26] several other ministries are also involved in the sector, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs (under which sits the State Emergency Services of Ukraine (SESU), formerly known as the Ministry of Emergencies); the Security Services; the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons; the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Infrastructure; and the State Border Service.[27]

SESU has organizational control of humanitarian demining and is generally responsible for clearance. It established a “Special Humanitarian Demining Center” in 2015 in Kiev. The center’s remit includes coordination of SESU pyrotechnical teams (akin to rapid-response explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams) involved in technical and non-technical survey, demining, internal quality control (QC) of SESU units, information management, and handover of land cleared by SESU to local authorities, as well as risk education.[28]

In addition, SESU has a training center near Merefa, in the Kharkiv region, and the Special Transport Service has a center in Chernihiv, both of which are focused largely on EOD and battle area clearance (BAC).[29] SESU has begun to build a Regional Center for Humanitarian Demining, based in Lysychansk in Luhansk region. The new center will deploy trained SESU deminers to affected areas in Donetsk and Luhansk that are under Ukrainian control.[30]

The demining center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Kamyanets-Podilsky, focuses on building the military’s capacity for EOD, including training and testing of methods and equipment, quality assurance (QA), and provision of EOD, counter-IED, and demining specialists.[31]

The Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons[32] implements a set of measures aimed at reducing the social, economic, and environmental impact of explosive objects; and coordinates the implementation of mine action activities aimed at reducing harm to civilians from the use of explosive objects (including cluster munition remnants and mines).[33]

International support to program management

In 2016–2018, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project Coordinator, with Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) assistance, is providing policy and legal support to Ukraine, including for the establishment of a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority and center and underpinned by national standards.[34] The OSCE Project Coordinator and GICHD are also supporting Ukraine’s use of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA). In addition, the OSCE Project Coordinator is implementing two projects that are working to enhance the capacities of mine action training centers by revising the curriculum, training national instructors, and supporting modernization of demining equipment.[35]

Experts from NATO provide training and advice at the armed forces’ demining center.[36] The Canadian government is helping to build Ukraine’s humanitarian demining capacity in eastern Ukraine, as part of a two-year project to support the development of policies, practices, and institutions; the provision of training; the creation of a digital map showing hazards and cleared areas; and the procurement of modern equipment.[37]

At the request of the government of Ukraine, the UN conducted a mine action needs assessment mission on 23 January–5 February 2016. The aim of the mission was to assess the impact of mines and ERW and make technical recommendations for further humanitarian responses. The joint mission was composed of technical experts from the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS).[38] The key findings of the UN mission were that:

• The humanitarian impact of ERW is high, with two to five accidents each week and the ERW contamination covers a huge area;[39]
• ERW clearance capacities exist in Ukraine, but they need to be re-oriented away from their current activities of responding to call-outs for World War II bombs. They now need to undertake activities like surveys and information management;[40]
• The understanding of humanitarian mine action needs to be addressed at all levels of government. At present the focus is only on military mine clearance but it needs to be extended to risk education, surveys, victim assistance, and information management;[41] and
• The establishment of a civilian oversight and policy-making body for national mine action activities was recommended.[42]

The UN-led humanitarian coordination system also has a mine action sub-cluster, established in 2015, which sits under the Global Protection Cluster.[43] The UNDP, Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Handicap International (HI) are members, and in addition, the OSCE Project Coordinator, and the ICRC, also attend meetings.[44]

Legislation

As of June 2017, Ukraine was in the process of passing mine action legislation that would identify the executive bodies involved in mine action in Ukraine, regulate the national mine action authority, and mandate the development of a priority action plan.[45]

Two draft bills (5189 dated 28 September 2016, and 5189-1 dated 12 October 2016) were submitted to the parliament’s Committee on National Security and Defense.[46] On 7 June 2017, the committee recommended that the Ukrainian parliament reject both draft bills.[47] The committee then established an interdepartmental working group for the elaboration of a new draft law on mine action, chaired by Member of Parliament Andriy Teteruk. The working group will conduct open discussions with key stakeholder on considerations to be taken into account, along with the other draft bills. A roundtable was held at the parliament on 19 September, attended by key national and international stakeholders.[48]

The lack of a legal framework for mine action has the potential to deter donors from funding activities, and also has a bearing on the legal status of demining organizations in the country in terms of registration as well as application for end-user certificates for demining equipment and explosives.[49]

Strategic planning

The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State Program for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–2014.[50] The program planned clearance of 15km² over five years with the destruction of 500,000 items of ERW.

Following an order from the prime minister of Ukraine on 30 November 2015, the Department of Environmental Protection and Mine Action developed a draft order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “On Approval of the Concept of the State Program for Mine Action in Ukraine for 2017–2021.” This concept was announced by the Ministry of Defense in February 2016,[51] and, as of July 2017, was on hold pending progress with the draft mine action law.[52] In the meantime, Ukraine continues to work from an annual plan.[53]

In October 2016, the GICHD organized the first workshop on strategic planning, in partnership with the OSCE Project Coordinator and the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).[54] As of June 2017, next steps in strategic planning were under consideration, related to progress in the draft mine action law.[55]

Ukraine has developed a plan for humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, in areas it can access safely. The main goals for 2015 were demining of populated areas; security during rehabilitation of infrastructure; and clearance of UXO from agricultural areas.[56] These remained Ukraine’s goals for 2016, while, in addition, local government authorities have been helping to prioritize clearance tasks based on humanitarian criteria.[57]

Ukraine reported that as of November 2016, its main efforts were aimed at demining essential support systems of the population in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, namely power lines, gas and water pipelines, heating plants, as well as highways and railways. These tasks are carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, SESU, and the State Special Transport Service.[58] According to Ukraine, due to regular violations of the Minsk Agreements by illegal armed groups, and the continuation of firing on their part, it is only possible to plan the clearance of the liberated territories for short periods of time.[59]

Standards

A special instruction for the identification, render-safe, and disposal of explosive items, based on the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), was approved by the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on 1 August 2014.[60] Development of national standards in Ukraine has taken place with support from the GICHD, the OSCE Project Coordinator, and DCAF.[61] All national standards must be approved by the Ukrainian Scientific and Research Training Center of Standardization, Certification and Quality, which is the National Standardization Authority.[62] Ukraine adopted IMAS as “trial national regulatory acts” on 1 September 2016, under National Standardization Authority Order 230 of 8 August 2016.[63]

On 28 August 2017, the Ministry of Defense announced the creation of a working group/sub-committee for the development of national standards, within the Technical Committee TK176 of the Ministry of Defense, on standardization of defense products.[64] The sub-committee has 28 members, including representatives of government ministries and international humanitarian demining organizations.[65]

Quality management

The draft mine action law envisages a national mine action center with a QA function.[66] In the meantime, quality management (QM) of government clearance operations is overseen by the demining center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.[67] Both DDG and HALO Trust are conducting internal QM.[68]

Janus Global Operations (JGO) carried out a two-month project for HALO Trust in 2017, during which it trained members of the demining center of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, in Kamyanets-Podilsky on QM techniques, including QA of humanitarian demining using manual and mechanical methods as well as mine detection dogs; BAC; and EOD. The 12 Ukrainian military members and employees trained by JGO will now be able to perform QA for the national mine action authority/center.[69]

Information management

In cooperation with the OSCE Project Coordinator and GICHD, SESU began using the IMSMA database.[70] In 2015, IMSMA was piloted by the GICHD and SESU in four regions of Ukraine.[71] HALO Trust is also supporting the OSCE Project Coordinator to set up IMSMA.[72]

As of October 2016, three government departments in Ukraine were using IMSMA: SESU, the Ministry of Defense, and the State Special Transport Services of the Ministry of Infrastructure. There are two functioning IMSMA databases for internal and external operational planning, monitoring, reporting, and archiving of contamination and clearance data in Ukraine. One is managed by SESU and the other by the Ministry of Defense, which collects and analyses all mine action data from national operators and NGOs.[73] The databases are reportedly complementary, as they are separated based on region, thematic area, and operational purpose.[74] The Ministry of Defense reported that it plans to create a national IMSMA server.[75]

In June 2017, the GICHD reported that it had conducted an information management assessment which will serve as a basis to develop a roadmap for future collaboration with SESU and Ministry of Defense.[76]

Operators

In 2016, the national authorities engaged in clearance operations were: SESU, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ministry of Internal Affairs (National Police and National Guard), the State Special Transport Service, the Security Service, and the State Border Service.[77] Three international humanitarian organizations conducted mine action operations: DDG, FSD, and HALO Trust. One national organization, Demining Team of Ukraine, was also active.

As of February 2016, SESU was deploying 30 pyrotechnic/demining teams (150 people, 60 vehicles) in eastern Ukraine.[78] A Commission on Humanitarian Demining of SESU coordinates the activities of SESU pyrotechnic teams and determines SESU’s priorities.[79] In December 2015, Ukraine reported that during the ongoing conflict SESU had suffered severe losses to its buildings and vehicles.[80] Since then, DDG has secured equipment for four SESU pyrotechnic teams, which includes vehicles, detectors, and personal protective equipment. DDG trained the four teams to use the demining equipment and conduct operations in accordance with IMAS, in addition to providing life-support training to SESU medics associated with the teams.[81] A similar project is also being implemented by the OSCE Project Coordinator [82] and by NATO.[83]

The Armed Forces of Ukraine deployed 52 EOD teams (260 people; 86 vehicles).[84] In addition to overall coordination of humanitarian demining in the Donetsk and Luhansk region, the Ministry of Defense is also responsible for all areas where the military are permanently stationed as well as for the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) zone in Donbass. The ministry’s Engineering Division conducts UXO spot clearance. All Ukrainian Armed Forces engineering units are involved in demining in eastern Ukraine as well as EOD spot tasks. The units are also responsible for destroying all ERW and mines detected by SESU and clearance NGOs.[85]

The State Border Service conducts demining in areas under its control on land and in the sea. The Ministry of Infrastructure’s Special Transportation Service is responsible for demining national infrastructure (e.g. railways and roads) and deployed five EOD teams (25 people; 10 vehicles).[86] The Ministry of Internal Affairs has an engineering department that conducts EOD, in particular of IEDs.[87]

Ukroboronservice, a state enterprise whose activities include arms manufacture, also has a humanitarian demining section.[88] As of June 2017, Ukroboronservice was not known to be conducting clearance operations in Ukraine.[89]

DDG began to conduct non-technical survey in government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in February 2016.[90] As of May 2017, DDG was deploying one multi-task team (MTT) capable of non-technical survey and visual, surface BAC. DDG Ukraine currently primarily runs its operations out of offices in Severodonetsk, but also from Mariupol, and has its head office in Kiev.[91]

HALO Trust launched its program in November 2015 and began with a rapid assessment of mine and UXO contamination in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.[92] In early 2016, HALO began conducting non-technical survey, mine clearance, and BAC in government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk regions, more than 15km from the contact line.[93] HALO’s capacity as of the end of 2016 was 91 deminers.[94] As of October 2017, HALO’s total staff had increased to 220.[95] All teams are trained and equipped for both mine clearance and BAC, and for all expected threats in the conflict zone, as non-technical survey has yet to determine the proportion of different types of hazard.[96] Since the first quarter of 2017, HALO has recruited and trained women to become the first female humanitarian deminers in Ukraine.[97]

The FSD started operations in Ukraine in early 2015 with risk education in conflict-affected areas in the east of the countries, run from its operational headquarters in Slaviansk and supported from its administrative headquarters in Kiev. The FSD subsequently gained accreditation for survey and clearance operations, and has had survey teams operating in eastern Ukraine since early 2017, including a full mine clearance and EOD capacity, which works closely with regional security forces to clear munitions from conflict-affected areas.[98]

In addition, a Ukrainian organization, “Demining Team of Ukraine” is active in demining in eastern Ukraine.[99]

As of November 2016, Ukraine put its demining capacity in Donetsk at 58 mine clearance teams, numbering up to 300 people and 88 pieces of equipment.[100]

Land Release (mines)

Since the outbreak of fighting in eastern Ukraine, clearance of mines and ERW has been undertaken by both Ukrainian government authorities and separatist groups,[101] and international clearance operators have subsequently begun non-technical survey and clearance in government-controlled areas.

In February 2016, SESU reported that, since the beginning of fighting in 2014, it had cleared around 140km² across the whole country, and disposed of more than 202,000 explosive objects.[102] The Ukrainian Armed Forces are responsible for clearing ordnance in areas close to the front lines and former military positions.[103]

Survey in 2016

According to the Global Protection Cluster report published in November 2016, “non-technical survey is being conducted together with international partners on the territory of approximately 3,000,000 hectares, out of which 460 hectares [4.6km²] have been identified as Suspected Hazardous Areas and 620 hectares [6.2km²] as Confirmed Hazardous Areas [CHA]. A total of 294 dangerous explosives have been identified so far.”[104] The 4.6km² of suspected hazardous area (SHA) and 6.2km² of CHA are the same size areas as those recorded by Ukraine through non-technical survey in 2016, for “suspicious territory” and “dangerous territory” respectively.[105] No detail was provided on which operators conducted this survey.

In early 2016, HALO Trust began conducting non-technical survey in government-controlled areas of Ukraine around the contact line, and up to 15km from the front-line.[106] These are primarily areas where conflict occurred in 2014 and early 2015, before the contact line settled in its current position. Access closer to the contact line will depend on the security situation.[107] Through its non-technical survey in 2016, HALO Trust confirmed 19 areas as mined, totaling almost 2km².[108]

DDG also began non-technical survey in government-controlled areas in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in early 2016 up to 60km from the current contact line, depending on the location of SHAs and access granted by the relevant authorities.[109]

Clearance in 2016

In 2016, clearance data was not available for national operators. Of the international operators, only HALO conducted mine clearance. Through its mine clearance operations in 2016, HALO cleared a total area of 52,887m², in nine mined areas, with the destruction of four antipersonnel mines and 12 items of UXO (see table below).[110]

HALO Trust mine clearance in 2016[111]

Note: AP = antipersonnel.

HALO Trust began mine clearance and BAC in March 2016. Planned clearance is prioritized in consultation with local stakeholders, but generally HALO Trust’s clearance is in response to requests from village and district councils.[112] HALO Trust’s primary concern is to reduce the number of mine and ERW incidents, and tasks are prioritized based on the greatest level of humanitarian threat. Any history of incidents is assessed, along with the extent of contamination and the proximity of the mines to the closest population, how often the land is used, and the density of mines in the area.[113] No mines were discovered in three of the nine clearance tasks in 2016.[114] Items discovered by HALO Trust are destroyed by the Ministry of Defense, as only the Ukrainian Armed Forces are permitted to use explosives in the conflict zones.[115]

As of May 2017, HALO Trust and DDG survey had collectively identified antivehicle mines (TM-57 and TM-62 (both plastic and metal series) and PTM series); antipersonnel mines (OZM-72 fragmentation mines, and MON, PMN, and POM series); improvised fragmentation mines, and booby-trapped ERW (mainly tripwire-initiated systems connected to conventional munitions); cluster munitions (9N series) and remnants; rockets from multiple launch rocket systems (PG series); and unexploded mortar shells and grenades.[116]

Update in 2017 (mines)

As of May 2017, HALO Trust was conducting non-technical survey in 11 districts of Donetsk region (Bakhmutskyi, Dobropilskyi, Kostantynivskyi, Lymanskyi, Marinskyi, Nikolskyi, Oleksandrivskyi, Pokrovskyi, Slovianskyi, Velykonovosilkivskyi, and Yasynuvatskyi) and four districts of Luhansk region (Bilovodskyi, Markivskyi, Milovskyi, and Stanychno-Luhanskyi); and was conducting mine clearance in the Lymanskyi and Slovyanskyi districts of Donetsk region and the Bilovodskyi and Stanychno-Luhanskyi districts of Luhansk region.[117] HALO liaises closely with local authorities directly or through Civil-Military Co-operation Unit (CIMIC) to identify high-priority tasks and the needs of impacted communities across Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The vast majority of HALO Trust operations were outside the 15km buffer zone, although on a few occasions, following requests from local authorities, HALO was given permission to conduct non-technical survey and clearance near inhabited settlements as close as 2km from the current Line of Contact.[118] As of October, HALO Trust had received permission to clear four separate sites within the buffer zone and to conduct non-technical survey in and around 20 settlements.[119]

As of May 2017, DDG had commenced non-technical survey in six regions of Ukraine, in order to assess the presence, nature, and extent of mines and ERW in conflict-affected communities in these areas.[120]

Since the beginning of 2017, the FSD has also initiated non-technical survey in eastern Ukraine, in addition to clearance operations approximately 40km from the contact line.[121]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

Survey (cluster munition remnants)

Through its non-technical survey in 2016, HALO confirmed a total of 572,958m² as contaminated with cluster munition remnants. This comprised 95,692m² confirmed in one area in Zoria village in Nykolski district in the Donetsk region and 477,266m² confirmed in two areas in Svatove village, Svativskyi district, in the Luhansk region.[122]

No cluster munition remnants were encountered during DDG’s non-technical survey in 2016.[123]

Clearance (cluster munition remnants)

It is not known how much cluster munition-contaminated land was cleared by the various Ukrainian authorities.

Through its cluster munition clearance operations in 2016, HALO cleared a total area of 199,639m². This comprised 80,917m² cleared, with four submunitions destroyed, in one area in Zoria village in Nykolski district in the Donetsk region; and 118,722m² cleared, with 46 submunitions and 86 other items of UXO destroyed, in two areas in Svatove village in the Svativskyi district of the Luhansk region.[124]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, Ukraine was required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 June 2016. As of September 2017, Ukraine had not yet submitted an Article 5 deadline extension request, and was in violation of the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine should inform States Parties of the location of mined areas, and undertake to destroy or ensure the destruction of all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible. Ukraine needs to both request and be granted an extension to its Article 5 deadline by the other States Parties at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in December 2017.

At the Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2015, Ukraine reported that it did not have access to some mined areas. According to the final report of the meeting, “Ukraine emphasized that it was fully aware of the need for strict compliance with the obligations under the Convention and notified its intention to seek an extension of the period of Ukraine’s implementation of Article 5. The official, duly compiled, request would be soon submitted to the States Parties for their consideration.”[125]

On 30 March 2016, though, Ukraine deposited an official communication to the other Mine Ban Treaty States Parties via the UN Secretary-General, noting that it did not have full control over parts of its territory—namely the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the city of Sevastopol, and certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine.[126] However, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 specifies that a State Party is responsible for clearing mined areas under its jurisdiction or control. Therefore, suspected or confirmed mined areas that are under Ukraine’s control or under Ukraine’s jurisdiction (even if it does not have control or physical access to those areas), should all be covered in an extension request. Furthermore, Ukraine’s obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty still fully apply, including with regard to Article 5, irrespective of the fact that Ukraine continues to be engaged in an armed conflict.

At the Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in 2016, Ukraine reiterated its commitment to implement its obligations under the Mine Ban Treaty, including Article 5. It stated, “We are looking forward to closely engaging with the Article 5 Committee and the ISU in the beginning of 2017 in order to elaborate a way forward and find an appropriate solution to the unique situation and security challenges that Ukraine has been facing since February 2014.”[127]

At the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings on 8–9 June 2017, Ukraine expressed that it believed it to be unfair that other states had a 10-year deadline under Article 5, but Ukraine only had a two-year deadline (i.e. from the date of the new contamination in February 2014 until June 2016). Ukraine reiterated that it was demining areas under its control, but could not identify all areas where mines are known to be emplaced. Ukraine stated that it could submit an Article 5 extension request, but that the States Parties’ decision should acknowledge that February 2014 was the date when mine contamination appeared; that contamination was due to the “Russian aggression”; and that Ukraine would start implementing Article 5 once the integrity of the whole territory is restored.[128] Ukraine also reported that it had prepared a draft rational response for states where contamination appears after entry into force but before the Article 5 clearance deadline.[129]

Russia is not a party or signatory to the Mine Ban Treaty. Nonetheless, Russia has obligations under international human rights law to clear mines as soon as possible, in particular by virtue of its duty to protect the right to life of every person under its jurisdiction, in any areas of Ukraine over which it exercises effective control.[130]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the mine action research in 2017, including on survey and clearance, and shared all its resulting landmine and cluster munition reports with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2016, 11 donors contributed US$8.8 million toward mine action in Ukraine, this represents a 19% decrease from 2015 when seven donors provided $10.8 million.[1]

Ukraine also received in-kind assistance from France valued at €175,000 ($193,760) for the purchase of demining equipment.[2]

International contributions: 2016[3]

International contributions to mine action in Ukraine have totaled some $26 million since 2014, representing an average of $8.7 million per year. There was no international support reported in 2012–2013.

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[4]

Casualties Overview

In 2016, the Monitor identified 785 mine/ERW casualties in Ukraine.[1] Most casualties, 435 (or at least 55%), were military, 219 were civilian, and another 28 were deminers; the civil status of 103 casualties was unknown. At least 611 were male and 41 were female; the sex of 133 casualties was unknown. The majority of casualties, 618, were adults (581 men and 37 women) and 30 were children (26 boys and four girls); the age group of 133 casualties was unknown.

The 785 casualties identified in 2016 was a slight increase on the updated 2015 casualty total of 706, and a significant increase on the 158 casualties identified in 2014.[2] The total number of casualties in 2013 is unknown. For 2016, the annual casualty total was based on Monitor analysis of data provided by the HALO Trust,[3] Danish Demining Group (DDG), the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), and Action on Armed Violence (AOAV).[4]

Some records lacked sufficient detail to enable a comparison between incident reports provided by two or more sources that were recorded within a one-hour drive on approximately the same date.[5] However, the absence of a national casualty surveillance system means that, overall, the number of casualties recorded is probably an under representation of the actual total. HALO reported that while it assessed that the data for government controlled areas was fairly accurate, in non-government controlled areas casualties were underreported, as HALO knows or suspects that there were other casualties that they could not record.[6]

Ninety-five casualties were caused by improvised mines. HALO reported that these were mainly grenades activated by tripwires.[7]

The Monitor has recorded at least 3,635 (2,387 killed; 1,248 injured) in Ukraine to the end of 2016.[8] The UN reported that more than 1,500 civilians were killed in Ukraine between 1945 and 1995 in mine/ERW incidents. Another 130 people were killed during clearance operations in the same period.[9] The Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) reported that between 1996 and 2008 there were 229 ERW casualties (100 killed; 129 injured), including 59 children, due to “handling of devices.”[10] The Monitor recorded 1,776 casualties (657 killed and 1,119   injured) from 2009 through 2016.

Cluster munition casualties[11]

The Monitor has recorded 76 cluster munition casualties in Ukraine; 72 casualties during attacks and four due to unexploded submunitions.[12]

The total number of mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors in Ukraine is not known, although there are reported to be hundreds of casualties from the conflict in eastern Ukraine.[1] In December 2017, Ukraine stated that since 2014 there were “1,796 landmine casualties in eastern Ukraine, including 238 civilians killed and another 491 injured.”[2] Prior to the conflict in eastern Ukraine, media reports indicated that tampering with ERW was a significant cause of casualties.[3] Many mine survivors are thought to be veterans of the Soviet Army, injured during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–1989).

Victim assistance commitments

Ukraine is responsible for landmine and ERW survivors. Ukraine has made a commitment to victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Ukraine ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 4 February 2010.

Ukrainehas reported that victim assistance is among key government priorities.[4] However, as of December 2017, Ukraine had not specificallyindicatedthat it chooses to be recognizes as being among the Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that have significant number—hundreds or thousands—of landmine survivors for which they must provide care.

Many persons with injuries, impairment, or disabilities did not have access to any form of assistance from government or NGOs due to reduced mobility, increased vulnerability, and emergency humanitarian needs related to the security situation.

Assessing the needs

The UN mine action sub-cluster was developing a new mine victim questionnaire that was being prepared by UNICEF representation in Ukraine together with real actors in this field such as Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Social Policy, State Emergency Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as NGOs and organizations such as the ICRC, HALO Trust, Danish Demining Group (DDG), and the Swiss Foundationfor Mine Action (FSD).[5]

Coordination

Disability issues, including physical rehabilitation, the provision of prosthetics and assistive devices to survivors, as well as employment and other economic inclusion activitiesare the responsibility ofthe Ministry of Social Policy.[6] The Ministry of Health was responsible for emergency and long-term medical care.[7]

Ukraine did not make statements on victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2017, nor at the Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in December 2017. Ukraine did refer to victim assistance in its general statements at Mine Ban Treaty meetings in 2014–2017. Ukraine did not include form J or information on Victim Assistance in its Article 7 report for calendar year 2016.

Inclusion and participation of survivors

Survivors were actively involved as advisers to the heads of central executive authorities, as well as members of public councils at state agencies that are responsible for the rehabilitation and assistance to victims of war, including landmine survivors.[8]

Assistance

The ICRC supported 77 hospitals structures and also clinics on both sides of the front line and donated supplies to treat injuries. In non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions, ICRC supplies supported blood banks. Fifteen health facilities resumed or continued operations following ICRC repair works.[9]

A specific NATO trust fund for prosthetics for soldiers was agreed between Ukraine and NATO in September 2015.[10] The trust fund aims to provide military assistance in physical rehabilitation (including prosthetics) for injured soldiers, as well as for the establishment of an appropriate physical rehabilitation system in Ukraine.[11] This significantly expands Ukraine’s capacity to assist landmine survivors and other persons with disabilities due to weapons.[12] The project began implementation in early 2016 by supporting service personnel and delivery of rehabilitation equipment. The first occupational therapy kitchen in Ukraine and the first wheelchair workshop in a governmental institution were delivered in 2016.[13]

Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) teams provide support to vulnerable people, including persons with disabilities, facing difficulty in accessing care as a result of the conflict. HI also built local and national level capacities of health services.[14]

In the non-government-controlled areas of the Donetsk and Lugansk regions the tense security situation hampered access to rehabilitation services. Access to rehabilitation services was difficultfor persons with disabilitiesin rural areas, and particularly those living near the front lines, primarily due to the lack of public transportation. Physical rehabilitation services are accessible to people in the cities of Donetsk and Lugansk. At the end of 2016, in Donetsk the ICRC was the only humanitarian organization still active; and in Lugansk the Czech NGO People in Need was the only active organization remaining other than the ICRC. The orthopedic center in the city of Donetsk produced prostheses and orthoses using ICRC-provided materials. Although the ICRC restored a dormitory at the Donetsk center, due to there being no nurses to manage the accommodations, the dormitory was reportedly only being used only as a gait-training area. When it became clear that the ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP) would not be given access to the physical rehabilitation center in Lugansk, in early 2016 it moved to Donetsk where prospects for delivering assistance appeared to be preferable. However, access to the Donetsk center remained limited to just the office area through the year.[15]

ITF: Enhancing Human Security (ITF) supported psychosocial rehabilitation for 240 severely traumatized children from eastern Ukraine (Donbass region) by mid-2017, with plans to engage an additional 160 children in need in the program by the end of 2018. ITF has also organized physical rehabilitation for one conflict casualty.[16]

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) supported doctors and medical facilities close to the fighting, as well as basic healthcare and medicines mainly through mobile clinics. MSF also offered psychological support to populations living along the frontline. By September 2017 MSF was running four mobile clinics consisting of a doctor, a nurse, and a psychologist. The mobile clinics cover at least 22 separate locations, and also visit additional three locations in eastern Ukraine to psychological support only.[17]

Laws and policies

Legislation prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, and the provision of other state services. These provisions were not effectively applied. Legislation requires that public buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities. Disability rights advocacy groups maintained that, despite the legal requirements, most public buildings remained inaccessible to persons with disabilities, restricting the ability of such persons to participate in society. Access to employment, education, healthcare, transportation, and financial services remained difficult.[18] The ICRC reported that on the whole, buildings and facilities are comparatively inaccessible to persons with disabilities because of the lack wheelchair ramps, elevators, and similar aids.[19]

By law employers must set aside a quota of 4% of employment opportunities for persons with disabilities. It was reported that many people employed to fill the quota requirement received minimal salaries but did not actually work at the companies of employment. Legislation also requires employers to take into account the individual needs of employees with disabilities. Generally these laws were not enforced. On 19 November 2014, the Law on the Protection of Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced People came into effect. The law provides 880 hryvnia (US$55) per month for persons with disabilities.[20] In September 2016, the parliament adopted legislation to harmonize legislation with international standards with respect to the rights of persons with disabilities.[21]