United States
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Summary: Non-signatory the United States (US) rarely commented publicly on the convention or its position on joining it until November 2015, when it abstained from the vote on the first UN resolution on the convention. Unlike other non-signatories, the US has never participated as an observer in a meeting of the convention. However, US officials continued to express concern about and/or condemn new use of cluster munitions, particularly in Syria, in 2016 and the first half of 2017.
The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but, with the exception of a single 2009 strike in Yemen, has not used them since 2003 in Iraq. There has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in the coalition operation it leads against Islamic State (IS) forces in Syria and Iraq. A 2008 Department of Defense policy requires that the US not use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018. By then, all except a tiny fraction of its cluster munitions must be removed from active stockpile for demilitarization and destruction.
The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007. Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales. The CBU-105 is the only cluster munition that the US claims to meet the 1% UXO standard, transferred on the condition that recipients agree not to use them in civilian areas. The US suspended cluster munition deliveries to Saudi Arabia in May 2016 after evidence of civilian harm from the coalition operation in Yemen. Textron Systems, the manufacturer of the CBU-105, announced in August 2016 that it is ending its production of the CBU-105.
Policy
The United States of America has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
The US never commented publicly on the convention or its position on joining it until November 2015, when it made a statement at UN General Assembly (UNGA) upon abstaining from the vote on the first UNGA resolution on the convention.[1] It repeated its remarks again, in October 2016, stating that it:
does not accept that the Convention on Cluster Munitions represents an emerging norm on prohibition and customary international law on the issue of cluster munitions in armed conflict. It strongly remains the US view that when used in accordance with international humanitarian law, cluster munitions with a low unexploded ordnance rate provide key advantages against certain types of legitimate military targets and can produce less collateral damage than high-explosive, unitary weapons.[2]
The statement asserts that cluster munitions remain “an integral part of U.S. force capabilities” and highlights the July 2008 Department of Defense policy directive on cluster munitions issued under President George W. Bush. According to this policy, which the Obama administration implemented without review or amendment, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% UXO rate.[3]
Under the 2008 policy, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” be removed from active inventories and placed in the demilitarization account by 2018 for destruction.[4] In October 2016, the US told the UN that it “does not transfer cluster munitions to other countries except those that meet the 1% UXO rate” in accordance with US law.[5] In May 2016, the Obama administration placed a hold on cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia following evidence of harm from their use in Yemen.[6]
Since taking office in January 2017, the administration of President Donald Trump has not announced a review of the Pentagon’s 2008 directive or otherwise commented on US measures to restrict or prohibit cluster munitions. The 2008 policy continues to be implemented, despite some questionable actions and remarks on cluster munitions such as the following:
- At his 11 January Senate hearing for confirmation as Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson declined to respond to a question by Democrat Senator Jeff Merkley for his views on civilian harm from US cluster munitions used by Saudi Arabia in Yemen.[7]
- At his 12 January Senate hearing for confirmation as Secretary of Defense, James Mattis described cluster munitions as “an integral part of U.S. force capabilities,” asserting that they “generate less collateral damage than high explosive unitary weapons” when used properly. When asked about US policy, Secretary Mattis stated that “identifying and mitigating any vulnerabilities to our defense posture caused by the current cluster munitions policy will be a priority.”[8]
- A handful of commentaries published by media outlets have questioned the need to complete the 2018 goal of demilitarizing almost all US cluster munition stocks by the end of 2018.[9]
- At the beginning of 2017, the US Department of State removed its webpage on cluster munitions, which stated that the US sees “demonstrated military utility” in cluster munitions, asserted their “elimination from U.S. stockpiles would put lives of its soldiers and those of its coalition partners at risk,” and claimed “cluster munitions can often result in much less collateral damage than unitary weapons.”[10] In April 2017, the Department of State reposted the page after stating that it was “archived” as part of standard procedures for old materials.[11]
- A 2 May article on the National Defense Industrial Association’s 2017 Armaments Systems Forum quoted the head of ammunition at Picatinny Arsenal as stating, “We have initiated de-milling all of our cluster munitions, but we have put a hold on that because we don't know what the current administration's position is with regard to the use of cluster munitions.”[12] On 18 May, Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Patrick D. Leahy (D-VT) wrote to Secretary of Defense Mattis requesting confirmation that the US continues to implement the 2008 policy and an update on the status of US stockpile destruction efforts.
The US did not participate, not even as an observer, in the 2007–2008 diplomatic Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[13] However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the process in order to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[14] According to a Congressional Research Service report, “U.S. officials were concerned that early versions of the [draft treaty text] would prevent military forces from non-states parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations.”[15]
The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016.
The US abstained from a follow-up UNGA resolution promoting implementation on the convention in December 2016.[16] Both resolutions call on states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.” The US said it abstained because it considered the resolutions to be “applicable only to those states party to the convention.”[17]
Congressional initiatives concerning US policy and practice on cluster munitions in 2016 and first half of 2017 include:
- In July 2017, Representatives John Conyers (D-Mich.), Justin Amash (R-Mich.), Mark Pocan (D-Wisc.), and Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that seeks to block funds from being used “to transfer or authorize the transfer of cluster munitions to the Government of Saudi Arabia.” A previous amendment in June 2016 was narrowly defeated in the US House of Representatives by a vote of 204 to 216.[18]
- Section 113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 passed by the House of Representatives on 18 May 2017 requests the Department of Defense, in consultation with the Army, “to assess and report to Congress on the capabilities of the Army with respect to…changes in doctrine and war plans consistent with DOD policy on cluster munitions and unintended harm to civilians.”[19]
- On 7 April 2017, a dozen Democrat Senators co-sponsored legislation—S.897—introduced by Senators Feinstein and Leahy to prohibit US use of cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance and encourage the US to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as soon as possible.[20] Representatives Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) and Darrell Issa (R-Vista) introduced companion legislation—H.R. 175—to the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act in the House of Representatives. The legislation reflects the US policy that comes into effect at the end of 2018, but goes further by prohibiting their use in areas where civilians are known to be present and calling on the US to “take all steps necessary to enable it to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as soon as possible.” The legislation has been referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee respectively.
Section 143 of theNational Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, passed by the Senate on 12 August 2016, makes funding for the destruction of US cluster munition stocks dependent on the delivery of a report from the Secretary of Defense by 1 March 2017. Similar to the House version in 2017, it stipulates that the report should “assess and report to Congress on the capabilities of the Army with respect to…changes in doctrine and war plans consistent with DOD policy on cluster munitions and unintended harm to civilians,” and be prepared by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Army.[21]
US NGOs continue to campaign for the US to ban cluster munitions and accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[22] Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) representatives met with US State Department officials in 2016 and the first half of 2017.[23]
Responses to new use of cluster munitions
In the second half of 2016 and first half of 2017, the US continued to make statements and support resolutions expressing concern at or condemning new use of cluster munitions:
- In remarks at a 12 April 2017 press briefing in Moscow with the Russian foreign minister, US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson condemned the Syrian government’s use of “cluster bombs and other types of weapons that are intended to maim and kill in the most horrific ways.”[24]
- On 7 April 2017, Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-Maryland) reintroduced the Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act, which “strongly condemns the…targeting of civilian populations…with cluster bombs.”[25]
- On 24 March 2017, the US voted in favor of a Human Rights Council resolution that “condemns the Syrian authorities’ use of…cluster munitions.”[26]
- On 19 December 2016, the US voted in favor of a UNGA resolution expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[27]
- In September 2016, then-President Obama visited Lao PDR, where he met with victims of US cluster bombs and announced more funding to clear explosive remnants of war and landmines.
- On 16 March 2016, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution condemning the “unlawful and indiscriminate violence against civilian populations” perpetrated by the Syrian government including its use of cluster munitions.[28]
The US is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but in June 2014 banned all US production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines as well as US use of antipersonnel mines, except in Korea.[29] The White House described the new policy package as measures that will enable future US accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since 2009, the US has become a regular observer at Mine Ban Treaty meetings.
The US is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and opposed the negotiation of a legally binding CCW protocol on cluster munitions until June 2007, after the Oslo Process to create the Convention on Cluster Munitions got underway.[30] The US then became one of the most ardent proponents of a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions, working intensively to forge agreement on a draft text. That initiative ended in November 2011, when states at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference failed to reach consensus on adopting a draft cluster munitions protocol.[31] Since 2011, the US has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions and the Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.[32]
Use
In a May 2016 letter, a senior US official said the Department of Defense views cluster munitions as “legitimate weapons with clear military utility. They are effective weapons, providing distinct advantages against a range of targets. When they are used correctly in the appropriate circumstances, they can result in less collateral damage than most unitary weapons.”[33]
Until the policy requiring the use of cluster munitions that result in 1% or less UXO comes into effect at the end of 2018, any cluster munition use that exceeds the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[34] There does not appear to have been any US use of cluster munitions since an attack in Yemen in December 2009, while the last large-scale US use of cluster munitions was at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.
The last time the US used cluster munitions was on 17 December 2009, when at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, were used in attack on an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” at al-Ma‘jalah in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen that killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children.[35] Cluster munition remnants were never cleared and have killed four more civilians and wounded 13 others since the attack, most recently in January 2012.[36] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly responded to the reported use and neither has denied US responsibility for the attack.[37]
According to a US Air Force spokesperson, neither the US nor other members of the international coalition has used cluster munitions in the air war against the non-state armed group of Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and now Libya, that was continuing as of 30 June 2017.[38] A US Air Forces Central Command spokesperson said in July 2016, “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[39]
The US has provided logistical and other support to a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that has used US cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015.
The US used cluster munitions in several conflicts in the past: Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); Iraq (2003); and Yemen (2009).[40]
Alternatives to cluster munitions
The Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense continue research and development activities at the applied research level to develop alternatives to cluster munitions as well as improve the reliability of existing submunitions and develop new types of submunitions.[41]
One such weapon being developed to replace cluster munitions is the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW), developed by Lockheed Martin for the US Army.[42] Another 740 GMLRS-AW are being manufactured for foreign military sales.[43]
Production
Since 2005, all submunitions produced by the US must have a failure rate of less than 1%, according to policy issued in 2001 by Secretary of Defense William Cohen.[44] The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.[45] Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales (see Transfer section below).
In August 2016, CBU-105 manufacturer Textron Systems Corporation announced that it is stopping its production of the weapons, which are manufactured for each sales order in accordance with the delivery schedule.[46]
While the US government has yet to take any steps to prohibit US production of cluster munitions, Textron’s announcement marks the effective end of US cluster munition production as the company was the last manufacturer of these weapons.[47] The CBU-105 was assembled at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma.[48]
Following reports of civilian casualties from the Saudi-led coalition’s use of US cluster munitions in Yemen, public pressure mounted against Textron in the first half of 2016 with demonstrations by local activists, including arrests, outside the company’s headquarters in Providence, Rhode Island.[49]
In a 30 August 2016 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Textron announced it has discontinued production of the CBU-105 because of reduced orders, stating that “the current political environment has made it difficult” to obtain sales approvals from the executive branch and Congress.[50]
In the past, before the adoption of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.
A 2017 report by PAX identifies 85 US financial institutions that hold investments in companies known to produce cluster munitions.[51]
Transfer
Export moratorium language has been included in the annual budget each year.[52] The provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology is prohibited unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”
On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—the US government agency that administers weapons transfers—issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the memorandum, “the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).”[53]
Congressional notifications show that since 2008 the US has concluded agreements to sell CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons to seven countries:
- India—510 CBU-105 announced in 2008 for estimated $375 million;[54]
- Oman—32 CBU-105 announced in 2012;[55]
- Saudi Arabia—1,300 CBU-105 announced in 2010 and 404 CBU-105 in 2011[56]
- Singapore—three CBU-105 announced in 2014;[57]
- South Korea—367 CBU-105 announced 2012 and 2 CBU-105 in 2015;[58]
- Taiwan—64 CBU-105 announced in 2011;[59] and
- United Arab Emirates (UAE)—an unknown number of CBU-105 announced in 2007.[60]
In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official acknowledged that the end-use provision of its 2012 agreement with Saudi Arabia and “in a handful of other cases…is incomplete.” The provision states that the purchaser agree the CBU-105 “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present” but failed to include the rest of the legislatively-mandated phrase “or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.” According to the official, the Department of Defense is currently pursuing an amendment to the agreement to “remedy this specific error.”[61]
The use of US-manufactured and -supplied CBU-105s by a recipient in 2015 and 2016 has raised serious questions about whether the transfer requirements were being met. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented six instances of CBU-105 use in Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in 2015 and 2016.[62] Amnesty International and HRW documented cluster munition use by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in civilian areas and none of these documented CBU-105 attacks in Yemen have involved armored vehicles, nor have damaged or destroyed armored vehicles been documented at the strike locations.[63]
In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended transfers of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen.[64] A Department of Defense official said Saudi Arabia request for the delivery of 404 CBU-105s notified to Congress in June 2011 was “under review.”[65] The US CMC welcomed the decision to suspend US cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia and called for it to be made permanent and extended to cover all cluster munition transfers to any country.[66]
A massive arms deal announced in 2017 between the US and Saudi Arabia does not include the sale of cluster munitions.[67]
Until 2018, the Department of Defense “may, consistent with U.S. law and policy, seek to transfer cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO rate provided that the receiving foreign government agrees not to use these cluster munitions after 2018.” However, no transfers are known to have been made under this provision since 2008.
While the historical record is incomplete, in the past the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom (UK).[68]
In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided information show that Chile transferred one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb to the US in 1991.[69]
Stockpiling
An October 2004 Department of Defense report to the US Congress detailed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types containing about 728.5 million submunitions, as listed in the following table. However, that number does not appear to be a full account of cluster munitions available to US forces, as it apparently does not include US cluster munitions stocks located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[70]
US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[71]
|
Type |
Number of submunitions per munition |
Munitions in active inventory |
Submunitions in active inventory |
Munitions in total inventory |
Submunitions in total inventory |
|
Rocket |
|||||
|
ATACMS 1 |
950 |
1,091 |
1,036,450 |
1,304 |
1,238,800 |
|
ATACMS 1A |
400 |
405 |
162,000 |
502 |
200,800 |
|
M26 MLRS |
644 |
369,576 |
238,006,944 |
439,194 |
282,840,936 |
|
M26A1 MLRS |
518 |
4,128 |
2,138,304 |
4,128 |
2,138,304 |
|
M261 MPSM |
9 |
74,591 |
671,319 |
83,589 |
752,301 |
|
Total |
449,791 |
242,015,017 |
528,717 |
287,171,141 |
|
|
Projectile |
|||||
|
M449 APICM |
60 |
27 |
1,620 |
40 |
2,400 |
|
M449A1 APICM |
60 |
24 |
1,440 |
49 |
2,940 |
|
M483/M483A1 |
88 |
3,336,866 |
293,644,208 |
3,947,773 |
347,404,024 |
|
M864 |
72 |
748,009 |
53,856,648 |
759,741 |
54,701,352 |
|
M444 |
18 |
30,148 |
542,664 |
134,344 |
2,418,192 |
|
Total |
4,115,074 |
348,046,580 |
4,841,947 |
404,528,908 |
|
|
Bomb |
|||||
|
Mk-20 Rockeye |
247 |
58,762 |
14,514,214 |
58,762 |
14,514,214 |
|
CBU-87 CEM |
202 |
99,282 |
20,054,964 |
99,282 |
20,054,964 |
|
CBU-103 CEM WCMD |
202 |
10,226 |
2,065,652 |
10,226 |
2,065,652 |
|
CBU-97 SFW |
10 |
214 |
2,140 |
214 |
2,140 |
|
CBU-105 SFW WCMD |
10 |
1,986 |
19,860 |
1,986 |
19,860 |
|
CBU-105 SFW P3I WCMD |
10 |
899 |
8,990 |
899 |
8,990 |
|
AGM-154A JSOW-A |
145 |
669 |
97,005 |
1,116 |
161,820 |
|
Total |
172,038 |
36,762,825 |
172,485 |
36,827,640 |
|
|
|
|||||
|
Grand Total |
4,736,903 |
626,824,422 |
5,543,149 |
728,527,689 |
|
According to one report, “the Pentagon estimates that ‘upward of 80 percent’ of U.S. cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile.”[72]
The 2004 list remains the most detailed public account of US cluster munition stocks. In the period since, the US provided slightly amended totals, but no detailed breakdown. In 2011, it stated the stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[73] In 2009, a US official said the stockpile was comprised of “more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions.”[74]
Stockpile destruction
The 2008 policy requires that the Department of Defense destroy more than 99.9% of its cluster munition stocks by the end of 2018, as it views only CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons as meeting the less than 1% percent UXO requirement.
All cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements had to be removed by the service and combatant commands from the active inventory by June 2009.
It is unclear if the US completed the process of removing cluster munitions from the active stockpile by this date, as the Department of Defense has provided limited information on the process or the cluster munitions being demilitarized for eventual destruction. In a December 2015 presentation, the US Army stated that that there are currently 136,000 tons of cluster munitions in the demilitarization account known as “B5A,” which it said represents 28% of the total demilitarization stockpile.[75] It did not indicate the type, but described the munitions as “rounds,” which indicates artillery-delivered DPICM. According to the presentation, an additional 272,000 tons “remain in service accounts which would require disposal.”
These numbers indicate a total of 408,000 tons of US cluster munitions are being demilitarized for destruction under the 2008 policy directive. By comparison, Germany in November 2015 completed the destruction of its stockpile of 573,000 cluster munitions and 62 million submunitions, which equated to approximately 50,000 tons. This was the highest number of cluster munition stocks held by any State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but equates to just 12% of total amount stockpiled by the US.
Previously, in February 2015, the army disclosed that 474,726 tons of cluster munitions were being destroyed: “approximately 221,502 tons of cluster munitions in the demil [demilitarization account] stockpile” and “an additional 250,224 tons are expected to be added into the [demilitarization account] no later than FY 2018 to ensure compliance with the Cluster Munitions Policy.”[76]
Between 2000 and 2012, the US destroyed 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) on average per year, at an annual cost of $7.2 million.[77]
US company General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems describes its US-based demilitarization facility as “the largest cluster munitions disposal facility in the world.”[78] In 2013 and 2015, the company was awarded contracts to demilitarize US cluster munitions and other weapons.[79] In June 2014, General Dynamics completed the destruction of Canada’s stockpile of 12,597 M483A1 projectiles and 1,108,536 DPICM submunitions at its facility outside Joplin, Missouri.[80]
Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The Army requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[81]
In February 2016, the army announced its plan to modify 183 expired ATACM missiles, replacing the warheads with unitary weapons compliant with the 2008 policy.[82]
Foreign stockpiling and transit
The US appears to have removed its cluster munition stocks from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[83] The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[84]
The US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in several countries, including Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait. This information is contained in the following US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks in 2010–2011:
- In Afghanistan, the “United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions,” according to a December 2008 cable.[85]
- Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany, according to a December 2008 cable.[86]
- In Israel, US cluster munitions are “considered to be under U.S. title” until they are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime. A cable on the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG) states that “U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[87]
- Italy, Spain, and Qatar are identified in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently, Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[88]
- Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them,” according to a December 2008 cable.[89]
- The US might be storing clusters munitions in Kuwait, according to a May 2007 cable.[90]
[1] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016. The US has privately acknowledged the “important contributions” made by the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but its government officials—from political leaders to diplomatic representatives—rarely comment publicly on the question of US accession to the convention. In a February 2009 cable, the US commended Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre for the “successful conclusion” of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Describing the Oslo Process as “an impressive effort,” the cable notes that “U.S. concerns over interoperability were dismissed as alarmist and it took high-level USG intervention to ensure that the treaty did not harm our ability to operate with NATO allies.” “Part III: Norwegian FM [Foreign Minister] Støre: The World at His Feet,” US Department of State cable 09OSLO116 dated 13 February 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
[2] Statement of the US, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 31 October 2016.
[3] The memorandum on Department of Defense policy is dated 19 June but was not formally released until 9 July 2008. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008.
[4] Secretary of Defense Gates, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DOD Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians,” 19 June 2008.
[5] Statement of the US, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 31 October 2016.
[6] See, CMC, “Ban all transfers, not just to Saudi Arabia,” 28 May 2016.
[7] Tillerson replied that he would “have to examine what our past policy has been. I don’t want to get out ahead, if we’ve made commitments in this area, I don’t want to get out ahead of anyone on that.” Zaid Jilani and Alex Emmons, “Rex Tillerson wants to provide Saudi Arabia with more help to bomb Yemen,” The Intercept, 12 January 2017.
[8] Statement of James Mattis, US Secretary of Defense, Confirmation Hearing Advance Policy Questions, United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, 12 January 2017.
[9] Dan Goure, “Why Trump Should Reject the Convention On Cluster Munitions,” The National Interest, 14 December 2016.
[10] US Department of State webpage, “Cluster Munitions,” undated. Emphasis in original.
[11] See, PM Bureau, DoS (@StateDeptPM), “Thank you for flagging this. The page in question was archived as a matter of process, and can be found at https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c25930.htm … 1/2,” 1:06pm, 13 Apr 2017, Tweet; and PM Bureau, DoS (@StateDeptPM), “The page has now been reposted on the current website, and is accessible at https://www.state.gov/t/pm/wra/c76077.htm … 2/2,” 1:06pm, 13 Apr 2017, Tweet. See also, Chloe Farand, “The US State Department has deleted and archived its page on cluster bombs,” The Independent, 14 April 2017.
[12] Matthew Cox, “Army Concerned Over Ban on Cluster Munitions, Land Mines,” military.com, 2 May 2017.
[13] For details on US policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.
[14] The diplomatic cables also show how the US has worked extensively to influence national implementation legislation and interpretation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, including on issues of foreign stockpiling and transit. As of July 2012, Wikileaks had made public a total of 428 cables relating to cluster munitions originating from 100 locations for the period from 2003 to 2010. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reviewed a total of 57 US diplomatic cables on cluster munitions from 24 locations, cables released by Wikileaks as of early August 2011.
[15] Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2014.
[16] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.
[17] Statement of the US, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015.
[18] 164 Democrats and 40 Republicans voted for the proposal, while 200 Republicans and 16 Democrats voted against it. US Congress, House Report 114-623 – Providing for further consideration of the Bill (H.R. 5293) making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2017, and for other purposes. Ammedment 40, 15 June 2016. See also, vote results on Amendment 40, 16 June 2016.
[19] National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, H.R. 4909. See also, Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2018, H.R. 3219.
[20] The 12 other co-sponsors were Senators Sherrod Brown (D-Ohio), Ben Cardin (D-Md.), Dick Durbin (D-Ill.), Al Franken (D-Minn.), Amy Klobuchar (D-Minn.), Chris Murphy (D-Conn.), Patty Murray (D-Wash.), Bernie Sanders (D-Vt.), Tom Udall (D-N.M.), Sheldon Whitehouse (D-R.I.), Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.). Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act of 2017, S. 897. See also, “Feinstein and Leahy, Joined By Others In Senate And House, Introduce Cluster Munitions Bill,” Political News Wire, 12 April 2017.
[22] Since January 2014, HRW has chaired the US Campaign to Ban Landmines and also the US NGO activities on US cluster munition policy and practice on behalf of the CMC. In early 2015, separate websites were launched for the US Campaign to Ban Landmines and the Cluster Munition Coalition US. See, Cluster Munition Coalition US, “US must commit to no cluster bomb use,” 2 April 2015.
[23] During one meeting, the US officials explained that, according to CBU-105 manufacturer Textron, if all four skeet are still attached to the CBU-105 remnant the munitions never armed and subsequently does not count against the required failure rate. The officials stated that the weapon must be “treated appropriately” like any explosive remnants of war and not handled. They noted that the 2008 Gates policy one percent UXO requirement applies to cluster munitions that “after arming, fail to function.” ICBL-CMC meeting with Steve Costner and Katherine Baker, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA), US Department of State, in Geneva, 19 May 2016.
[24] US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, “Remarks With Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at a Press Availability,” Moscow, 12 April 2017.
[26] “The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 34/26, 24 March 2017. It voted in favor of five previous Human Rights Council resolutions in 2014–2016 that contained similar language condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.
[27] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 71/203, 19 December 2016. The US voted in favor of similar resolutions in 2013–2015.
[28] Expressing the sense of Congress condemning the gross violations of international law, 2016, H.Con.Res. 121.
[29] Statement of the US, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 27 June 2014. See also, HRW, “US: A Step Closer to Landmine Treaty,” 6 October 2014.
[30] At the CCW’s Third Review Conference in November 2006, the US position was that new international law on cluster munitions was unnecessary as states should apply existing laws “rigorously” and focus on the implementation of CCW Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, to which it is party. See, HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 251–260.
[31] Throughout the negotiations, the US supported the main tenants of the proposed protocol, including an exemption for cluster munitions meeting a manufacturer-stated 1% failure rate and several optional safeguards; a prohibition on use and transfer of all cluster munitions produced before 1980; and a 12-year transition period during which states could continue to use all cluster munitions.
[32] An April 2014 report by the Congressional Research Service noted “doubts that CCW efforts to develop a cluster munitions protocol will be viable.” Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2014, pp. 6–7.
[33] Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy, from Brian P. McKeon, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 20 May 2016.
[34] Combatant Commander is the title of a major military leader of US Armed Forces, either of a large geographical region or of a particular military function, formerly known as a commander-in-chief.
[35] The remnants in the photographs included images of the propulsion system, a BLU-97 submunition, and the payload ejection system, the latter of which is unique to the TLAM-D cruise missile. Amnesty International, “Images of Missile and Cluster Munitions Point to US Role in Fatal Attack in Yemen,” 7 June 2010. See also, “U.S. missiles killed civilians in Yemen, rights group says,” CNN, 7 June 2010.
[36] The most recent casualty was on 24 January 2012, when a boy brought home a BLU-97 submunition that exploded, killing his father and wounding the boy and his two brothers. Those affected by the cluster munition strike on al-Ma‘jalah have not received any compensation for the casualties caused or damaged property. See, HRW, “Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda,” 22 October 2013.
[37] In December 2010, Wikileaks released a US Department of State cable dated 21 December 2009 that acknowledged the US had a role in the 17 December strike; the cable said that Yemeni government officials “continue to publicly maintain that the operation was conducted entirely by its forces, acknowledging U.S. support strictly in terms of intelligence sharing. Deputy Prime Minister Rashad al-Alimi told the Ambassador on December 20 that any evidence of greater U.S. involvement, such as fragments of U.S. munitions found at the sites, could be explained away as equipment purchased from the U.S.” See, “ROYG [Republic of Yemen Government] looks ahead following CT operations, but perhaps not far enough,” US Department of State cable SANAA 02230 dated 21 December 2009, released by Wikileaks on 4 December 2010.
[38] Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Why the last U.S. company making cluster bombs won’t produce them anymore,” The Washington Post, 2 September 2016.
[39] Email from Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Writer, The Washington Post, 27 July 2016. See also, Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Despite denial, ‘growing evidence’ Russia is using cluster bombs in Syria, report says,” The Washington Post, 28 July 2016.
[40] For historical details on the use of cluster munitions by the US, see, ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), p. 262. See also the Timeline of Use contained in Cluster Munition Monitor 2017’s Ban Policy Overview.
[41] See for example, US Air Force, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number PE 0602602F: Conventional Munitions,” February 2011, p. 6; US Army, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602624A: Weapons and Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 5; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation Budget Item Justification, Applied Research: Program Element Number 0602000D8Z: Joint Munitions Technology,” February 2011, p. 13.
[42] The Department of Defense’s 2017 budget includes funds to support the acquisition of 1,068 GMLRS-AW, with a total procurement objective of 43,560 warheads. Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President's Budget Submission,” February 2016.
[43] See, US Department of Defense Contract Announcement, No. CR-104-15, 3 June 2015; and US Department of Defense Contract Announcement, No. CR-095-16, 19 May 2016.
[44] Secretary of Defense William Cohen, “Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Subject: DoD Policy on Submunition Reliability (U),” 10 January 2001. In other words, submunitions that reach “full rate production,” i.e. production for use in combat, during the first quarter of fiscal year 2005 must meet the new standard. According to an October 2004 Pentagon report to Congress on cluster munitions, submunitions procured in past yearsare exempt from the policy, but, “Future submunitions must comply with the desired goal of 99% or higher submunition functioning rate or must receive a waiver.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004, p. ii.
[45] For details on US production of cluster munitions in 2005–2007, see, HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 257–258; and ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada: October 2010), p. 263.
[46] “Last US cluster-bomb maker to cease production,” AFP, 1 September 2016.
[47] A rocket motor for the BLU-108 canisters contained in the CBU-105 was manufactured by Orbital ATK (formerly Alliant Techsystems) of Hopkins, Minnesota, but only for that purpose.
[48] Kevin Jackson, “Visit brings flashbacks for Army energy executive,” AMC, 22 April 2014.
[49] US Campaign to Ban Landmines web post, “Ban all transfers, not just to Saudi Arabia,” 28 May 2016.
[50] Majorie Censer, “Textron to discontinue production of sensor-fuzed weapon,” Inside Defense, 30 August 2016.
[51] PAX, Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility (Utrecht, May 2017), p. 27; and PAX, Worldwide investments in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility, Key Findings (Utrecht, May 2017), p. 8. The report identifies investments by US financial institutions in Hanwha, Orbital ATK, Poongsan, and Textron, all companies known to produce cluster munitions.
[52] Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (P.L. 111-8). The same export moratorium language has been included in the annual Consolidated Appropriations Act since then. See, Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016 (P.L. 114-113).
[53] It also stated that the CBU-107 Passive Attack Weapon, which contains non-explosive rods, is not captured by the ban. DSCA, “Guidance on the Sale of Cluster Munitions, DSCA Policy 11-33,” Memorandum, Washington, DC, 19 May 2011.
[54] DSCA news release, “India – CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 08-105, Washington, DC, 30 September 2008.
[55] Arms Sales Notification, Department of Defense, Transmittal No. 12-66, 31 December 2012.
[56] DSCA news release, “Saudi Arabia – F-15SA Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 10-43, Washington, DC, 20 October 2010. The completion date for this transfer was the end of 2015. US Department of Defense Contract Announcement, No. 593-13, 20 August 2013. DSCA news release, “Saudi Arabia – F-15SA Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 10-43, Washington, DC, 20 October 2010. The completion date for this transfer was the end of 2015. US Department of Defense Contract Announcement, No. 593-13, 20 August 2013. DSCA news release, “Saudi Arabia – CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 10-03, Washington, DC, 13 June 2011.
[57] Arms Sales Notification, Department of Defense, Transmittal No. 13-67, 21 January 2014.
[58] DSCA press release, “Republic of Korea – CBU-105D/B Sensor Fuzed Weapons,” Transmittal No. 12-23, Washington, DC, 4 June 2012; and Arms Sales Notification, Department of Defense, Transmittal No. 15-33, 21 July 2015.
[59] These were to be included as associated parts in the sale of F-16A/B aircraft. DSCA news release “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States – Retrofit of F-16A/B Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 11-39, 21 September 2011.
[60] The contract for the sale was signed in November 2007. Textron Inc., “Q2 2010 Earnings Call Transcript,” 21 July 2010; and Textron Defense Systems press release, “Textron Defense Systems and UAE Armed Forces Sign Sensor Fuzed Weapon Contract,” 13 November 2007. Also, the US Congress was notified in June 2007 of a proposed commercial sale of “technical data, defense services, and defense articles to support the sale of the Sensor Fuzed Weapons” to the UAE. Jeffrey T. Bergner, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, US Department of State to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the US House of Representatives (Transmittal No. DDTC 017-07), 7 June 2007.
[61] Letter to Senator Leahy, from Brian P. McKeon, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 20 May 2016.
[62] In at least three attacks, it found that some submunitions or “skeet” did not disperse from the BLU-108 canister or dispersed but did not explode, failing to function as intended and exceeding the 1% UXO rate. HRW, “Yemen: Saudis Using US Cluster Munitions,” 6 May 2016.
[63] HRW, “Technical Briefing Note: Cluster Munition Use in Yemen,” 14 February 2016; Amnesty International, “Children among civilians killed and maimed in cluster bomb minefield in Yemen,” 22 May 2016; and Amnesty International, “Fresh evidence of cluster bombs being used by Saudi coalition forces in Yemen,” 8 March 2017.
[64] According to Foreign Policy, a senior US official said the administration acknowledged reports that the weapons had been used “in areas in which civilians are alleged to have been present or in the vicinity” and added, “We take such concerns seriously and are seeking additional information.” John Hudson, “White House blocks transfer of cluster bombs to Saudi Arabia,” Foreign Policy, 27 May 2016.
[65] Letter to Senator Leahy, from Brian P. McKeon, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, 20 May 2016.
[66] CMC US, “Ban all transfers, not just to Saudi Arabia,” 28 May 2016.
[67] “The Big Problem with President Trump’s Record Arms Deal with Saudi Arabia,” Time, 22 May 2017.
[68] US-supplied cluster munitions have been used in combat by Colombia, by Israel in Lebanon and Syria, by Morocco in Western Sahara and Mauritania, by the UK and the Netherlands in the former Yugoslavia, Saudi Arabia on Yemen, and by the UK in Iraq. In July 2013, mine clearance operators in Yemen shared photographic evidence with the Monitor of cluster munition remnants, including several types of US-manufactured submunitions, in Saada governorate in northwestern Yemen near the border with Saudi Arabia. The contamination apparently dates from conflict in 2009–2010 between the government of Yemen and rebel Houthi forces, but it is not possible to determine definitively the actor responsible for the use.
[69] Monitor notes on Chilean air force document signed by Chair of the Joint Chief of Staff of the Air Force, “Exports of Cluster Bombs authorized in the years 1991–2001,” dated 23 June 2009, taken during Monitor meeting with Juan Pablo Jara, Desk Officer, Ministry of National Defense, Santiago, 11 April 2012.
[70] The 2004 report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. The report lists 626,824,422 submunitions in the “Active Inventory” and 728,527,689 in the “Total Inventory.” Under the War Reserve Stocks for Allies program, munitions are stored in foreign countries, but kept under US title and control, then made available to US and allied forces in the event of hostilities. In 1994, the stockpile, including WRSA, consisted of 8.9 million cluster munitions containing nearly 1 billion submunitions. See US Army Material Systems Analysis Activity, “Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) Study,” April 1996.
[71] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of Defense, “Report to Congress: Cluster Munitions,” October 2004. This accounting appears to exclude holdings of TLAM-D cruise missiles, a weapon found on some US Navy surface and submarines, which deliver BLU-97 submunitions. US Navy Fact File, “Tomahawk Cruise Missile,” 14 August 2014. The 2004 Department of Defense report also does not include artillery-fired SADARM cluster munitions (thought to number 715).
[72] Daniel Wasserbly, “Army Warhead Program to Reduce Dud Rate for Cluster Munitions,” InsideDefense.com, 21 July 2008, quoted in Andrew Feickert and Paul K. Kerr, “Cluster Munitions: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 29 April 2014, p. 5.
[73] Statement of the US, CCW Fourth Review Conference, Geneva, 14 November 2011. In a 2011 presentation to CCW delegates, the US claimed that “around two million” cluster munitions would be captured by a CCW proposal to ban the use of cluster munitions produced before 1980. The types of cluster munitions included in this figure were listed on a slide projected during an informal briefing to CCW delegates by a member of the US delegation. Several of the types (such as CBU-58, CBU-55B, and M509A1) were not listed in the “active” or “total” inventory by the Department of Defense in a report to Congress in late 2004.
[74] The statement said the US has estimated the cost of destroying the stockpile using current demilitarization capabilities at $2.2 billion. Statement of the US, Third Conference of the High Contracting Parties to CCW Protocol V, Geneva, 9 November 2009.
[75] Rickey Peer, US Army, “Joint Munitions Command (JMC) Overview, Conventional Ammunition Demil Program,” Global Demil Symposium, 8 December 2015, slide 5.
[76] Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 President's Budget Submission,” February 2015.
[77] Figures and averages are compiled from annual editions of Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” from fiscal year 2000 to fiscal year 2012.
[78] See, General Dynamics website, “About Munition Services,” undated.
[79] On 18 February 2015, General Dynamics was awarded a $9.3 million contract to demilitarize 3,248 cluster bomb units and other high explosive cartridges. See, Department of Defense, “Contracts,” Release No. CR-031-15, 18 February 2015. On 29 August 2013, General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems was awarded a $11.7 million contract for the destruction of 49,387 rounds of Improved Conventional Munitions and 5,192 Cluster Bomb Units. The contract was for $11,714,490. Department of Defense, “Contracts,” No. 625-13, 29 August 2013.
[80] Canada reported in 2015 that General Dynamics in Joplin was “one of two companies that were compliant from 6 bidders.” It stated Canada’s demilitarization strategy was to award a service contract through an open completion to a company that had demilitarized the same cluster munitions within the last five years, from US stockpiles. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2015.
[81] Department of the Army, “Procurement of Ammunition, Committee Staff Procurement Backup Book,” February 2011, pp. 729–730.
[82] Department of Defense, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2017 President's Budget Submission,” February 2016.
[83] The official stated: “After the adoption of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Norway discussed with the USA the issue of their stockpile of cluster munitions on Norwegian territory. Norway offered to destroy these cluster munitions together with our own stockpiles. However, the USA decided to remove their stocks, something which happened during the spring of 2010.” Email from Ingunn Vatne, Senior Advisor, Department for Human Rights, Democracy and Humanitarian Assistance, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1 August 2012. According to a US cable dated 17 December 2008, the US stockpile in Norway was thought to consist of “2,544 rounds” of “D563 Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM)” and “2,528 rounds” of “D864 Extended Range Dual Purpose ICM.” See, “Norway Raises Question Concerning US Cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08OSLO676 dated 17 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
[84] Section 8 of the UK’s legislation states that its foreign secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.” In November 2011, UK officials stated that the only such authorization given to date was provided by former Foreign Secretary David Miliband to the US Department of State to permit the US to transfer its cluster munitions out of UK territory. Statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, Written Answers (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1 November 2011), Column 589W.
[85] “Demarche to Afghanistan on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 2 December 2010.
[86] A US cable dated 2 December 2008 citing a discussion between US officials and Gregor Köbel, then-Director of the Conventional Arms Control Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, states “Koebel stressed that the US will continue to be able to store and transport CM [Cluster Munitions] in Germany, noting that this should be of ‘no concern whatsoever to our American colleagues.’” See, “MFA Gives Reassurances on Stockpiling of US Cluster Munitions in Germany,” US Department of State cable 08BERLIN1609 dated 2 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011. See also, “Demarche to Germany Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125631 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
[87] “Cluster Munitions: Israeli’s Operational Defensive Capabilities Crisis,” US Department of State cable 08TELAVIV1012 dated 7 May 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
[88] “Demarche to Italy, Spain and Qatar Regarding Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE125632 dated 26 November 2008, released by Wikileaks on 30 August 2011.
[89] “Consultations with Japan on Implementing the Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions,” US Department of State cable 08TOKYO3532 dated 30 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.
[90] The cable contains the text of a message sent from a US military advisor to UAE authorities concerning a transfer of “ammunition immediately via US Air Force aircraft from Kuwait stockpile to Lebanon.” About the items to be transferred, the cable states: “The United States will not approve any cluster munitions or white phosphorus.” See “Follow-up on UAE Response to Lebanese Request for Emergency Aid,” US Department of State cable 07ABUDHABI876 dated 24 May 2007, released by Wikileaks on 1 September 2011.