Summary: Non-signatory the United States (US) rarely commented publicly on the convention or its position on joining it until November 2015, when it abstained from the vote on the first UN resolution on the convention. Unlike other non-signatories, the US has never participated as an observer in a meeting of the convention. However, US officials continued to express concern about and/or condemn new use of cluster munitions, particularly in Syria, in 2016 and the first half of 2017.

The US maintains that cluster munitions have military utility, but, with the exception of a single 2009 strike in Yemen, has not used them since 2003 in Iraq. There has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in the coalition operation it leads against Islamic State (IS) forces in Syria and Iraq. A 2008 Department of Defense policy requires that the US not use cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance (UXO) after 2018. By then, all except a tiny fraction of its cluster munitions must be removed from active stockpile for demilitarization and destruction.

The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007. Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales. The CBU-105 is the only cluster munition that the US claims to meet the 1% UXO standard, transferred on the condition that recipients agree not to use them in civilian areas. The US suspended cluster munition deliveries to Saudi Arabia in May 2016 after evidence of civilian harm from the coalition operation in Yemen. Textron Systems, the manufacturer of the CBU-105, announced in August 2016 that it is ending its production of the CBU-105.

Policy 

The United States of America has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

The US never commented publicly on the convention or its position on joining it until November 2015, when it made a statement at UN General Assembly (UNGA) upon abstaining from the vote on the first UNGA resolution on the convention.[1] It repeated its remarks again, in October 2016, stating that it:

does not accept that the Convention on Cluster Munitions represents an emerging norm on prohibition and customary international law on the issue of cluster munitions in armed conflict. It strongly remains the US view that when used in accordance with international humanitarian law, cluster munitions with a low unexploded ordnance rate provide key advantages against certain types of legitimate military targets and can produce less collateral damage than high-explosive, unitary weapons.[2]

The statement asserts that cluster munitions remain “an integral part of U.S. force capabilities” and highlights the July 2008 Department of Defense policy directive on cluster munitions issued under President George W. Bush. According to this policy, which the Obama administration implemented without review or amendment, by the end of 2018 the US will no longer use cluster munitions that result in more than a 1% UXO rate.[3]

Under the 2008 policy, all cluster munition stocks “that exceed operational planning requirements or for which there are no operational planning requirements” be removed from active inventories and placed in the demilitarization account by 2018 for destruction.[4] In October 2016, the US told the UN that it “does not transfer cluster munitions to other countries except those that meet the 1% UXO rate” in accordance with US law.[5] In May 2016, the Obama administration placed a hold on cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia following evidence of harm from their use in Yemen.[6] 

Since taking office in January 2017, the administration of President Donald Trump has not announced a review of the Pentagon’s 2008 directive or otherwise commented on US measures to restrict or prohibit cluster munitions. The 2008 policy continues to be implemented, despite some questionable actions and remarks on cluster munitions such as the following:

• At his 11 January Senate hearing for confirmation as Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson declined to respond to a question by Democrat Senator Jeff Merkley for his views on civilian harm from US cluster munitions used by Saudi Arabia in Yemen.[7]
• At his 12 January Senate hearing for confirmation as Secretary of Defense, James Mattis described cluster munitions as “an integral part of U.S. force capabilities,” asserting that they “generate less collateral damage than high explosive unitary weapons” when used properly. When asked about US policy, Secretary Mattis stated that “identifying and mitigating any vulnerabilities to our defense posture caused by the current cluster munitions policy will be a priority.”[8]
• A handful of commentaries published by media outlets have questioned the need to complete the 2018 goal of demilitarizing almost all US cluster munition stocks by the end of 2018.[9]
• At the beginning of 2017, the US Department of State removed its webpage on cluster munitions, which stated that the US sees “demonstrated military utility” in cluster munitions, asserted their “elimination from U.S. stockpiles would put lives of its soldiers and those of its coalition partners at risk,” and claimed “cluster munitions can often result in much less collateral damage than unitary weapons.”[10] In April 2017, the Department of State reposted the page after stating that it was “archived” as part of standard procedures for old materials.[11]
• A 2 May article on the National Defense Industrial Association’s 2017 Armaments Systems Forum quoted the head of ammunition at Picatinny Arsenal as stating, “We have initiated de-milling all of our cluster munitions, but we have put a hold on that because we don't know what the current administration's position is with regard to the use of cluster munitions.”[12] On 18 May, Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Patrick D. Leahy (D-VT) wrote to Secretary of Defense Mattis requesting confirmation that the US continues to implement the 2008 policy and an update on the status of US stockpile destruction efforts.

The US did not participate, not even as an observer, in the 2007–2008 diplomatic Oslo Process that resulted in the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[13] However, US Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks show how the US attempted to influence its allies, partners, and other states during the process in order to affect the outcome of the negotiations, especially with respect to the issue of “interoperability” (joint military operations between the US and States Parties to the convention).[14] According to a Congressional Research Service report, “U.S. officials were concerned that early versions of the [draft treaty text] would prevent military forces from non-states parties from providing humanitarian and peacekeeping support and significantly affect NATO military operations.”[15] 

The US has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Sixth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2016.

The US abstained from a follow-up UNGA resolution promoting implementation on the convention in December 2016.[16] Both resolutions call on states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.” The US said it abstained because it considered the resolutions to be “applicable only to those states party to the convention.”[17]

Congressional initiatives concerning US policy and practice on cluster munitions in 2016 and first half of 2017 include:

• In July 2017, Representatives John Conyers (D-Mich.), Justin Amash (R-Mich.), Mark Pocan (D-Wisc.), and Barbara Lee (D-Calif.) introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that seeks to block funds from being used “to transfer or authorize the transfer of cluster munitions to the Government of Saudi Arabia.” A previous amendment in June 2016 was narrowly defeated in the US House of Representatives by a vote of 204 to 216.[18]
• Section 113 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 passed by the House of Representatives on 18 May 2017 requests the Department of Defense, in consultation with the Army, “to assess and report to Congress on the capabilities of the Army with respect to…changes in doctrine and war plans consistent with DOD policy on cluster munitions and unintended harm to civilians.”[19]
• On 7 April 2017, a dozen Democrat Senators co-sponsored legislation—S.897—introduced by Senators Feinstein and Leahy to prohibit US use of cluster munitions that result in more than 1% unexploded ordnance and encourage the US to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as soon as possible.[20] Representatives Jim McGovern (D-Mass.) and Darrell Issa (R-Vista) introduced companion legislation—H.R. 175—to the Cluster Munitions Civilian Protection Act in the House of Representatives. The legislation reflects the US policy that comes into effect at the end of 2018, but goes further by prohibiting their use in areas where civilians are known to be present and calling on the US to “take all steps necessary to enable it to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions as soon as possible.” The legislation has been referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Armed Services Committee respectively.

Section 143 of theNational Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, passed by the Senate on 12 August 2016, makes funding for the destruction of US cluster munition stocks dependent on the delivery of a report from the Secretary of Defense by 1 March 2017. Similar to the House version in 2017, it stipulates that the report should “assess and report to Congress on the capabilities of the Army with respect to…changes in doctrine and war plans consistent with DOD policy on cluster munitions and unintended harm to civilians,” and be prepared by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Army.[21]

US NGOs continue to campaign for the US to ban cluster munitions and accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[22] Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) representatives met with US State Department officials in 2016 and the first half of 2017.[23]

Responses to new use of cluster munitions 

In the second half of 2016 and first half of 2017, the US continued to make statements and support resolutions expressing concern at or condemning new use of cluster munitions:

• In remarks at a 12 April 2017 press briefing in Moscow with the Russian foreign minister, US Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson condemned the Syrian government’s use of “cluster bombs and other types of weapons that are intended to maim and kill in the most horrific ways.”[24]
• On 7 April 2017, Senator Benjamin Cardin (D-Maryland) reintroduced the Syrian War Crimes Accountability Act, which “strongly condemns the…targeting of civilian populations…with cluster bombs.”[25]
• On 24 March 2017, the US voted in favor of a Human Rights Council resolution that “condemns the Syrian authorities’ use of…cluster munitions.”[26]
• On 19 December 2016, the US voted in favor of a UNGA resolution expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[27]
• In September 2016, then-President Obama visited Lao PDR, where he met with victims of US cluster bombs and announced more funding to clear explosive remnants of war and landmines.
• On 16 March 2016, the House of Representatives passed a concurrent resolution condemning the “unlawful and indiscriminate violence against civilian populations” perpetrated by the Syrian government including its use of cluster munitions.[28] 

The US is not a party to the Mine Ban Treaty, but in June 2014 banned all US production and acquisition of antipersonnel landmines as well as US use of antipersonnel mines, except in Korea.[29] The White House described the new policy package as measures that will enable future US accession to the Mine Ban Treaty. Since 2009, the US has become a regular observer at Mine Ban Treaty meetings. 

The US is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and opposed the negotiation of a legally binding CCW protocol on cluster munitions until June 2007, after the Oslo Process to create the Convention on Cluster Munitions got underway.[30] The US then became one of the most ardent proponents of a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions, working intensively to forge agreement on a draft text. That initiative ended in November 2011, when states at the CCW’s Fourth Review Conference failed to reach consensus on adopting a draft cluster munitions protocol.[31] Since 2011, the US has not proposed any further CCW work on cluster munitions and the Convention on Cluster Munitions remains the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.[32]

Use

In a May 2016 letter, a senior US official said the Department of Defense views cluster munitions as “legitimate weapons with clear military utility. They are effective weapons, providing distinct advantages against a range of targets. When they are used correctly in the appropriate circumstances, they can result in less collateral damage than most unitary weapons.”[33]

Until the policy requiring the use of cluster munitions that result in 1% or less UXO comes into effect at the end of 2018, any cluster munition use that exceeds the 1% UXO rate must be approved by the Combatant Commander.[34] There does not appear to have been any US use of cluster munitions since an attack in Yemen in December 2009, while the last large-scale US use of cluster munitions was at the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.

The last time the US used cluster munitions was on 17 December 2009, when at least five TLAM-D cruise missiles, each containing 166 BLU-97 submunitions, were used in attack on an “alleged al-Qa’ida training camp” at al-Ma‘jalah in Abyan governorate in southern Yemen that killed 55 people, including 14 women and 21 children.[35] Cluster munition remnants were never cleared and have killed four more civilians and wounded 13 others since the attack, most recently in January 2012.[36] Neither the US nor the Yemeni government has publicly responded to the reported use and neither has denied US responsibility for the attack.[37]

According to a US Air Force spokesperson, neither the US nor other members of the international coalition has used cluster munitions in the air war against the non-state armed group of Islamic State in Iraq, Syria, and now Libya, that was continuing as of 30 June 2017.[38] A US Air Forces Central Command spokesperson said in July 2016, “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[39]

The US has provided logistical and other support to a Saudi Arabia-led coalition of states that has used US cluster munitions in Yemen since April 2015. 

The US used cluster munitions in several conflicts in the past: Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam (1960s and 1970s); Grenada and Lebanon (1983); Libya (1986); Iran (1988); Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (1991); Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995); Serbia, Montenegro, and Kosovo (1999); Afghanistan (2001 and 2002); Iraq (2003); and Yemen (2009).[40]

Alternatives to cluster munitions 

The Air Force, Army, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense continue research and development activities at the applied research level to develop alternatives to cluster munitions as well as improve the reliability of existing submunitions and develop new types of submunitions.[41]

One such weapon being developed to replace cluster munitions is the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System-Alternate Warhead (GMLRS-AW), developed by Lockheed Martin for the US Army.[42] Another 740 GMLRS-AW are being manufactured for foreign military sales.[43]

Production 

Since 2005, all submunitions produced by the US must have a failure rate of less than 1%, according to policy issued in 2001 by Secretary of Defense William Cohen.[44] The US last budgeted funds to produce new cluster munitions in 2007.[45] Since then, it has only manufactured cluster munitions for foreign sales (see Transfer section below).

In August 2016, CBU-105 manufacturer Textron Systems Corporation announced that it is stopping its production of the weapons, which are manufactured for each sales order in accordance with the delivery schedule.[46]

While the US government has yet to take any steps to prohibit US production of cluster munitions, Textron’s announcement marks the effective end of US cluster munition production as the company was the last manufacturer of these weapons.[47] The CBU-105 was assembled at McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma.[48] 

Following reports of civilian casualties from the Saudi-led coalition’s use of US cluster munitions in Yemen, public pressure mounted against Textron in the first half of 2016 with demonstrations by local activists, including arrests, outside the company’s headquarters in Providence, Rhode Island.[49]

In a 30 August 2016 filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, Textron announced it has discontinued production of the CBU-105 because of reduced orders, stating that “the current political environment has made it difficult” to obtain sales approvals from the executive branch and Congress.[50]

In the past, before the adoption of the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions, the US licensed the production of cluster munitions with Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and Turkey.

A 2017 report by PAX identifies 85 US financial institutions that hold investments in companies known to produce cluster munitions.[51]

Transfer 

Export moratorium language has been included in the annual budget each year.[52] The provision of military assistance for cluster munitions, the issuing of defense export licenses for cluster munitions, or the sale or transfer of cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology is prohibited unless “the submunitions of the cluster munitions, after arming, do not result in more than 1 percent unexploded ordnance across the range of intended operational environments.” In addition, any agreement “applicable to the assistance, transfer, or sale of such cluster munitions or cluster munitions technology” must specify that the munitions “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.”

On 19 May 2011, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—the US government agency that administers weapons transfers—issued a memorandum on the sale of cluster munitions that incorporates these legal requirements into DSCA policy by adding them to the Security Assistance Management Manual. According to the memorandum, “the only cluster munition with a compliant submunition (one that does not result in more than 1% UXO across the range of intended operational environments) is the CBU-97B/CBU-105, Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW).”[53]

Congressional notifications show that since 2008 the US has concluded agreements to sell CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons to seven countries:

• India—510 CBU-105 announced in 2008 for estimated $375 million;[54]
• Oman—32 CBU-105 announced in 2012;[55]
• Saudi Arabia—1,300 CBU-105 announced in 2010 and 404 CBU-105 in 2011[56]
• Singapore—three CBU-105 announced in 2014;[57]
• South Korea—367 CBU-105 announced 2012 and 2 CBU-105 in 2015;[58]
• Taiwan—64 CBU-105 announced in 2011;[59] and
• United Arab Emirates (UAE)—an unknown number of CBU-105 announced in 2007.[60]

In May 2016, a senior Department of Defense official acknowledged that the end-use provision of its 2012 agreement with Saudi Arabia and “in a handful of other cases…is incomplete.” The provision states that the purchaser agree the CBU-105 “will only be used against clearly defined military targets and will not be used where civilians are known to be present” but failed to include the rest of the legislatively-mandated phrase “or in areas normally inhabited by civilians.” According to the official, the Department of Defense is currently pursuing an amendment to the agreement to “remedy this specific error.”[61] 

The use of US-manufactured and -supplied CBU-105s by a recipient in 2015 and 2016 has raised serious questions about whether the transfer requirements were being met. Human Rights Watch (HRW) documented six instances of CBU-105 use in Yemen by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in 2015 and 2016.[62] Amnesty International and HRW documented cluster munition use by the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in civilian areas and none of these documented CBU-105 attacks in Yemen have involved armored vehicles, nor have damaged or destroyed armored vehicles been documented at the strike locations.[63] 

In May 2016, the Obama administration suspended transfers of cluster munitions to Saudi Arabia after reports of their use in civilian areas in Yemen.[64] A Department of Defense official said Saudi Arabia request for the delivery of 404 CBU-105s notified to Congress in June 2011 was “under review.”[65] The US CMC welcomed the decision to suspend US cluster munition transfers to Saudi Arabia and called for it to be made permanent and extended to cover all cluster munition transfers to any country.[66]

A massive arms deal announced in 2017 between the US and Saudi Arabia does not include the sale of cluster munitions.[67]

Until 2018, the Department of Defense “may, consistent with U.S. law and policy, seek to transfer cluster munitions that do not meet the 1% UXO rate provided that the receiving foreign government agrees not to use these cluster munitions after 2018.” However, no transfers are known to have been made under this provision since 2008.

While the historical record is incomplete, in the past the US transferred hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions containing tens of millions of submunitions to at least 30 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, the UAE, and the United Kingdom (UK).[68]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided information show that Chile transferred one 250kg cluster bomb and one 500kg cluster bomb to the US in 1991.[69]

Stockpiling 

An October 2004 Department of Defense report to the US Congress detailed a stockpile of 5.5 million cluster munitions of 17 different types containing about 728.5 million submunitions, as listed in the following table. However, that number does not appear to be a full account of cluster munitions available to US forces, as it apparently does not include US cluster munitions stocks located in foreign countries or stockpiled as part of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA).[70]

US stockpile of cluster munitions (as of 2004)[71]

According to one report, “the Pentagon estimates that ‘upward of 80 percent’ of U.S. cluster munitions reside in the Army artillery stockpile.”[72]

The 2004 list remains the most detailed public account of US cluster munition stocks. In the period since, the US provided slightly amended totals, but no detailed breakdown. In 2011, it stated the stockpile was comprised of “more than 6 million cluster munitions.”[73] In 2009, a US official said the stockpile was comprised of “more than 5 million cluster munitions with 700 million submunitions.”[74]

Stockpile destruction

The 2008 policy requires that the Department of Defense destroy more than 99.9% of its cluster munition stocks by the end of 2018, as it views only CBU-105 Sensor Fuzed Weapons as meeting the less than 1% percent UXO requirement.

All cluster munition stocks that exceed or do not satisfy operational planning requirements had to be removed by the service and combatant commands from the active inventory by June 2009.

It is unclear if the US completed the process of removing cluster munitions from the active stockpile by this date, as the Department of Defense has provided limited information on the process or the cluster munitions being demilitarized for eventual destruction. In a December 2015 presentation, the US Army stated that that there are currently 136,000 tons of cluster munitions in the demilitarization account known as “B5A,” which it said represents 28% of the total demilitarization stockpile.[75] It did not indicate the type, but described the munitions as “rounds,” which indicates artillery-delivered DPICM. According to the presentation, an additional 272,000 tons “remain in service accounts which would require disposal.” 

These numbers indicate a total of 408,000 tons of US cluster munitions are being demilitarized for destruction under the 2008 policy directive. By comparison, Germany in November 2015 completed the destruction of its stockpile of 573,000 cluster munitions and 62 million submunitions, which equated to approximately 50,000 tons. This was the highest number of cluster munition stocks held by any State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but equates to just 12% of total amount stockpiled by the US.

Previously, in February 2015, the army disclosed that 474,726 tons of cluster munitions were being destroyed: “approximately 221,502 tons of cluster munitions in the demil [demilitarization account] stockpile” and “an additional 250,224 tons are expected to be added into the [demilitarization account] no later than FY 2018 to ensure compliance with the Cluster Munitions Policy.”[76]

Between 2000 and 2012, the US destroyed 9,400 tons of outdated cluster munitions (not including missiles and rockets) on average per year, at an annual cost of $7.2 million.[77]

US company General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems describes its US-based demilitarization facility as “the largest cluster munitions disposal facility in the world.”[78] In 2013 and 2015, the company was awarded contracts to demilitarize US cluster munitions and other weapons.[79] In June 2014, General Dynamics completed the destruction of Canada’s stockpile of 12,597 M483A1 projectiles and 1,108,536 DPICM submunitions at its facility outside Joplin, Missouri.[80]

Since fiscal year 2007, there has been a separate funding source for the destruction of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rockets and ATACM missiles, with special destruction facilities for MLRS rockets at the Anniston Defense Munitions Center in Alabama and the Letterkenny Munitions Center in Pennsylvania. The Army requested $109 million for the destruction of 98,904 M26 MLRS rockets from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2012.[81]

In February 2016, the army announced its plan to modify 183 expired ATACM missiles, replacing the warheads with unitary weapons compliant with the 2008 policy.[82]

Foreign stockpiling and transit

The US appears to have removed its cluster munition stocks from the territories of at least two States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. According to a Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs official, the US removed its stockpiled cluster munitions from Norway in 2010.[83] The UK announced in 2010 that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[84]

The US has stockpiled and may continue to be storing cluster munitions in several countries, including Convention on Cluster Munitions States Parties Afghanistan, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as well as in non-signatories Israel, Qatar, and perhaps Kuwait. This information is contained in the following US Department of State cables released by Wikileaks in 2010–2011:

• In Afghanistan, the “United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions,” according to a December 2008 cable.[85]
• Germany has engaged with the US on the matter of cluster munitions that may be stockpiled by the US in Germany, according to a December 2008 cable.[86]
• In Israel, US cluster munitions are “considered to be under U.S. title” until they are transferred from the War Reserve Stockpiles for use by Israel in wartime. A cable on the inaugural meeting on 1 May 2008 of the U.S.-Israeli Cluster Munitions Working Group (CMWG) states that “U.S. legislation now prevents such a transfer of any cluster munitions with less than a one percent failure rate.”[87]
• Italy, Spain, and Qatar are identified in a November 2008 cable as “states in which the US stores cluster munitions,” even though apparently, Qatar “may be unaware of US cluster munitions stockpiles in the country.”[88]
• Japan “recognizes U.S. forces in Japan are not under Japan’s control and hence the GOJ [Government of Japan] cannot compel them to take action or to penalize them,” according to a December 2008 cable.[89]
• The US might be storing clusters munitions in Kuwait, according to a May 2007 cable.[90]

Policy

The United States of America (US) has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

The administration of Donald Trump has not indicated if US landmine policy will be revisited.

Under President Barack Obama, the US announced new landmine policy measures banning production and acquisition of antipersonnel mines as well as halting US use of the weapons outside of the Korean Peninsula. Officials articulated a new aspiration for the US to accede to the treaty, but Obama did not take any further measures before he left office in January 2017.[1]

The Clinton administration set the goal of joining the Mine Ban Treaty in 2006, but the Bush administration in 2004 rejected both the treaty and the goal of the US ever joining.[2]

In September 2014, the US committed to not use antipersonnel landmines outside of the Korean Peninsula and not to assist, encourage, or induce other nations to use, stockpile, produce, or transfer antipersonnel mines outside of Korea.[3] In June 2014 policy, the US foreswore future production or acquisition of antipersonnel mines and announced a Defense Department study or “high fidelity modeling and simulation effort” of alternatives to antipersonnel mines to “ascertain how to mitigate the risks associated with the loss” of antipersonnel mines.[4]

It is not clear if the 2014 landmine policy was codified, but previous landmine policies announced in 1996, 1998, and 2004 were all issued as presidential directives. The 2014 policy announcement followed more than two decades of efforts by Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont and NGOs organized under the US Campaign to Ban Landmines (USCBL).

The US was the first country to call for the “eventual elimination” of antipersonnel mines in September 1994 and it participated in the Ottawa Process that led to the creation of the treaty, but did not sign it in 1997.

Since the Mine Ban Treaty’s Second Review Conference in Cartagena in 2009, the US has attended every Meeting of States Parties as an observer, as well as the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and intersessional meetings in June 2016. The US participated in the Mine Ban Treaty’s Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago, Chile, in November 2016.

On 5 December 2016, the US abstained from voting on UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 71/34 calling for universalization and full implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, as it has done in previous years.

The US is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines and Protocol V on explosive remnants of war. It submitted its annual national report for Amended Protocol II on 26 March 2015, as required under Article 13. The report states that the 2014 policy steps taken by the US “are not required under Amended Protocol II” and confirms that antipersonnel mines stockpiled for use in Korea “remain compliant with the technical specifications required” of the protocol.[5]

Use

The Monitor has long reported that the last confirmed US use of antipersonnel mines was in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991.[6] However, as part of the June 27 policy announcement, the US acknowledged using one antipersonnel mine in Afghanistan in 2002.[7] There were reports in 2009 and 2010 of US forces in Afghanistan using Claymore directional fragmentation mines.[8] However, these munitions are not prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty if used in command-detonated mode.[9]

The US continues to stockpile antipersonnel landmines for use in Korea. According to the 2014 policy, “the unique circumstances on the Korean Peninsula and our commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea preclude us from changing our anti-personnel landmine policy there at this time.”

Two concerns regarding Korea emerged as sticking points during the US policy review. One relates to the arrangement for a joint combined command structure that would put a US general in charge of South Korean military forces in the event of active hostilities, and the potential problems that might cause if the US were party to the Mine Ban Treaty but South Korea were not. In October 2014, US and South Korean officials agreed to delay return of wartime control of South Korean forces to its government until those forces are better prepared to deter North Korea.[10] A second concern is the possible need for the US to use antipersonnel mines in the event of an invasion by North Korea.

The landmines already emplaced in and near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea are the responsibility of South Korean forces and not the US. In August 2015, South Korea and the UN Command in South Korea alleged that North Korea laid antipersonnel landmines in the southern section of the DMZ that maimed two South Korean soldiers on patrol.[11] Major General Koo Hong-mo of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff described the mine-laying incident as “unthinkable for a normal military.”[12]

Numerous retired military officers have questioned the utility of antipersonnel landmines in South Korea and elsewhere, citing the overwhelming technological superiority of other weapons in the US-South Korean arsenal in comparison with North Korea’s as sufficient to compensate for not using mines. In addition, a former commander of US forces in South Korea, the late Lt. Gen. James Hollingsworth, said in 1997 that antipersonnel landmines’ “minimal” utility to US forces is “offset by the difficulty…[they] pose to our brand of mobile warfare…Not only civilians, but US armed forces, will benefit from a ban on landmines. US forces in Korea are no exception.”[13]

The need for the Department of Defense study has been questioned by the USCBL, which stated that for more than a decade “the US has spent more than one billion dollars on the development and production of systems that could be considered alternatives to antipersonnel mines.”[14] A New York Times editorial on the 2014 policy observed, “the Pentagon could easily draw up plans for South Korea that exclude American landmines.”[15]

Transfer

US law has prohibited all antipersonnel mine exports since 23 October 1992, through a series of multi-year extensions of the moratorium.[16]

The US exported antipersonnel landmines including more than 5.6 million antipersonnel mines to 38 countries between 1969 and 1992. Deminers in at least 28 mine-affected countries have reported the presence of US-manufactured antipersonnel mines, including non-self-destructing and self-destructing/self-deactivating types.

Production

The last US antipersonnel mines were produced in 1997.[17] The US prohibited production of antipersonnel mines in 2014. Under the policy, the US has foresworn future production or acquisition of antipersonnel landmines.[18] Officials also said the Defense Department would conduct a detailed study of alternatives to antipersonnel mines and the impact of making no further use of the weapon. No more information has been released on the study or its status, as of October 2015.

No victim-activated munitions have been funded in the procurement or the research and development budgets of the US Armed Services or Defense Department in years. Related programs on the XM-7 Spider Networked Munition and the IMS Scorpion once had the potential for victim-activated features (thereby making them antipersonnel mines as defined by the Mine Ban Treaty), but were made to be strictly “man-in-the-loop” or command-detonated and therefore permissible under the treaty.[19]

Starting in 2018, the Army will reportedly field the Spider 1A man-in-the-loop setup system. From 2023 through 2027, it will field the “Gator Landmine Replacement” described as a networked munition system to “deny enemy access and use non-lethal means to keep civilians away from dangerous areas.”[20] It is also revamping the Volcano vehicle and helicopter landmine dispenser systems it originally used in the 1990s. All these are reported to be compliant with the Mine Ban Treaty.

Stockpiling

As part of the 2014 policy announcements, the Department of Defense disclosed that the US has an “active stockpile of just more than 3 million anti-personnel mines in the inventory.”[21] This represents a significant reduction from the previous total reported in 2002 of approximately 10.4 million antipersonnel mines.[22]

The US stockpile consists mostly of remotely-delivered mines that are scattered over wide areas by aircraft or tube artillery and equipped with self-destruct features designed to blow the mine up after a pre-set period of time, as well as self-deactivating features. The stockpile consists of the following types.

US stockpiles of antipersonnel mines in 2010[23]

Note: * The accounting for GATOR includes CBU-89 [22], CBU-104 [22], and CBU-78 [15] air-dropped bombs.

The shelf-life of existing antipersonnel mines stockpiled by the US decreases over time in part because batteries embedded inside the mines deteriorate as they age. The new policy precludes the US from extending or modifying the life of the batteries inside the existing stockpile.[24]

A Defense Department spokesperson stated in 2014 that the existing antipersonnel mine stocks “will start to decline in their ability to be used about [sic]—starting in about 10 years. And in 10 years after that, they’ll be completely unusable.”[25]

Stockpile destruction

The 2014 policy commits the US to destroy its antipersonnel mine stockpiles “not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea.” In April 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry said the US “will begin destroying its anti-personnel landmine stockpiles not required for the defense of the Republic of Korea.”[26]

All US stocks of weapons containing antipersonnel mines as well as munitions containing a mix of both antipersonnel and antivehicle mines that are not required for Korea must be removed from stocks located in the US, on supply ships, and in storage facilities overseas, then transported to a destruction facility.

Greater transparency is needed on the types and quantities of antipersonnel landmines to be destroyed and their inventory status as well as on implementation of the 2014 policy’s stockpile destruction requirement, including timeline and cost.[27] While no overview is publicly available, it appears that US antipersonnel mines stocks not required for Korea are being destroyed.

In December 2014, the US Army announced that Expal USA—the US subsidiary of Spanish defense company Expal—had won a contract to destroy Gator and Volcano mines at its facility in Marshall, Texas.[28] The contract’s estimated completion date is June 2020 according to Maxam, the multinational company that owns Expal.[29]

To destroy the ADAM mines, the US Army contracted General Atomics to build a special “munitions cryofracture demilitarization facility” at the McAlester Army Ammunition Plant in Oklahoma.[30] According to a Pentagon presentation, the ADAM mines are being destroyed through disassembly and cryofracture in a process of demilitarized that began in December 2004 and is set for completion by June 2018.[31] The plant is expected to process 50 projectiles per day to destroy the 10,041 tons of munitions in the demilitarization account.

Since 2011, at least 96 M86 Pursuit Deterrent Munitions and 40 M74 antipersonnel mines as well as other “problematic munitions” have been destroyed in a static detonation chamber built to destroy US stocks of chemical weapons.[32]

Retention

In 2011, the US said a small quantity of “persistent mines” (non-self-destructing) had been retained for demining and counter-mine testing and training.[33]

In 2016, the United States (US) contributed more than $152 million to 27 countries (19 States Parties, seven states not party, and one signatory).[1]

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lao PDR received the largest contributions, with a combined total of $81 million, representing more than half of total US funding in 2016.

US support to mine action was distributed among the following regions: East and South Asia and the Pacific ($72.3 million, 48%), the Middle East and North Africa ($50.9 million, 33%), Sub-Saharan Africa ($8.7 million, 6%), the Americas ($8.5 million, 5%), and Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia ($7.1 million, 5%). A further $4.6 million (3%) designated as global was not earmarked for any state or area or region.

The US allocates the majority of its mine action funding through the State Department’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). Additional funding is allocated through the Patrick Leahy War Victims Fund within the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID.

Contributions by recipient: 2016

From 2012–2016, the US contribution for mine action totaled approximately $672 million, with an annual contribution averaging $134 million; this represents one-quarter more than the $534.5 million provided in the previous five-year period from 2007–2011.[2]

It is the eighth-consecutive year that the US support has totaled more than $100 million.

Summary of contributions: 2012–2016[3]