Afghanistan

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 21 July 2016

Summary: State Party Afghanistan ratified the convention on 8 September 2011. Draft legislation is being prepared to enforce its implementation of the convention. Afghanistan has participated in all of the convention’s meetings and voted in favor of a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. It has promoted universalization of the convention and condemned new use of cluster munitions.

In its initial transparency report for the convention provided in 2012, Afghanistan confirmed it has not used, produced, or transferred cluster munitions. The national armed forces do not stockpile cluster munitions, but Afghanistan regularly reports the discovery and destruction of abandoned weapons including cluster munitions.

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 8 September 2011, and became a State Party on 1 March 2012.

Afghanistan reported in April 2016 that the Ministry of Justice is preparing draft implementation legislation for the convention.[1] Previously, in April 2015, it reported that the Ministry of Justice was considering how to amend existing legislation to enforce the provisions of the convention.[2] A 2012 legislative review advised that existing law should be amended, while a technical committee has provided support to the process of preparing the draft.[3]

Afghanistan submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 30 August 2012 and has provided updated annual reports since, most recently on 25 April 2016.[4]

Afghanistan participated in most meetings of the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but despite actively supporting the ban objective it did not endorse the Wellington Declaration that would have committed it to participating fully in the formal negotiations of the convention. It also did not attend the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, not even as an observer.[5] Afghanistan attended the convention’s Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008 as an observer, but unexpectedly signed the convention near the end of the conference after the representative announced that he had received instructions and authorization to do so.[6]

Afghanistan plays a positive and active role in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It participated in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015. In an address to the high-level segment of the meeting, Afghanistan described the convention as “one of the success stories in disarmament” and affirmed the need to “send out a strong message through this conference against cluster munitions and reaffirm our collective commitments for a world free of cluster munitions in the near future.”[7]

Afghanistan has attended all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties as well as intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011–2015.

On 7 December 2015, Afghanistan voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the Convention on Cluster Munitions, which urges states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[8] Afghanistan has proposed that South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) member states discuss cluster munitions.[9]

Afghanistan has condemned the use of cluster munitions and voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[10] At the First Review Conference, Afghanistan expressed strong support for draft outcome documents that condemned any cluster munition use by any actor and commented that “States Parties should join hands to end all suffering caused by these indiscriminate and inhumane weapons.”[11]

Afghanistan is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It signed the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in April 1981, but has not ratified.

Interpretive issues

Afghanistan has not elaborated its views on several important issues relating to interpretation and implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks in 2011 have outlined US interpretation of the convention as it relates to Afghanistan (see section on Foreign stockpiling). In a December 2008 State Department cable, the US outlined its concern over how Afghanistan would interpret the convention’s prohibition on transit and foreign stockpiling, as well as Article 21 on “interoperability” or joint military operations with states not party to the convention.[12]

Use, production, and transfer

In its initial Article 7 report, Afghanistan declared that it has no “production industry” for manufacturing cluster munitions.[13] In September 2011, Afghanistan stated that it “does not use, produce, or transfer Cluster Munitions in the country.”[14]

The Monitor is not aware of any use of cluster munitions in Afghanistan since 2002. US aircraft dropped 1,228 cluster bombs containing 248,056 submunitions in 232 strikes on locations throughout the country between October 2001 and early 2002.[15] Soviet forces also used air-dropped and rocket-delivered cluster munitions during their invasion and occupation of Afghanistan from 1979–1989, while a non-state armed group used rocket-delivered cluster munitions during the civil war in the 1990s.[16]

Stockpiling and destruction

In September 2013, Afghanistan informed States Parties that it “destroyed all its cluster munitions stocks before” the convention entered into force and therefore complies with its obligations under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[17] In October 2013, it stated that concerning cluster munitions, “Afghanistan is pleased to have destroyed all weaponry of this kind within its military stockpile.”[18]

Afghanistan “has not officially announced” the completion of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but reports that “the Ministry of Defence verbally confirms that there is not any stockpile of cluster munitions left with Afghan National Forces.”[19] This would appear to indicate that there are not any stocks under the jurisdiction and control of national forces, but additional stocks abandoned in the past by the government may continue to be discovered.

Afghanistan’s Article 7 reports have contained information under stockpile destruction indicating significant destruction during 2005–2011 and further destruction in 2012–2015.[20] In April 2016, Afghanistan reported that HALO Trust weapons and ammunition destruction teams destroyed 165 “cluster munitions” during 2015 under the supervision of the Ministry of Defence.[21] Given the government’s statements that there are no longer any stocks, these destroyed items were likely cluster munitions abandoned by other combatants in the past (and recently discovered) and/or cluster munition remnants destroyed in mine action and clearance operations. These are all considered cluster munition remnants under the Convention on Cluster Munitions and not stockpiled cluster munitions.

In 2008, Jane’s Information Group listed Afghanistan as possessing KMG-U dispensers and RBK-250-275 cluster bombs.[22] Standard international reference sources have listed Afghanistan as possessing Grad 122mm and Uragan 220mm surface-to-surface rockets, but it is not known if these included versions with submunition payloads.[23]

Foreign stockpiling

According to a December 2008 State Department cable released by Wikileaks, “The United States currently has a very small stockpile of cluster munitions in Afghanistan.”[24] In February 2011, an Afghan human rights group called on the US government and NATO to reveal if it they had stockpiled or used cluster munitions in Afghanistan since the 2002 conflict.[25]



[3] A joint technical committee is working to prepare draft implementing legislation for both the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions and includes the government’s Department of Mine Clearance, Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA), the Mine Dog Center, Afghan Landmine Survivors’ Organization (ALSO), and the ICRC. Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Third Meeting of States Parties, 13 September 2012. See also Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 30 August 2012.

[4] Afghanistan’s initial Article 7 report covered calendar year 2011, while the 19 May 2013 covered calendar year 2012, the 27 April 2014 update was for calendar year 2013, the 28 April 2015 update covered calendar year 2014, and the 25 April 2016 update covered calendar year 2015.

[5] For details on Afghanistan’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 27–28.

[6] Two United States (US) Department of State cables subsequently made public by Wikileaks have shown how US officials had sought assurances from the highest levels of the Afghan government that Afghanistan would not join the convention; however, during the Oslo Signing Conference President Karzai decided that Afghanistan should sign the convention. “Afghan views on cluster munitions and Oslo process,” US Department of State cable 08KABUL346 dated 12 February 2008, released by Wikileaks on 20 May 2011.

[7] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015.

[8]Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[9] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 3 September 2014.

[10]Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 69/189, 18 December 2014.

[11] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Review Conference, Dubrovnik, 9 September 2015.

[12] According to the cable, the US has interpreted the convention as allowing “U.S. forces to store, transfer, and use U.S. cluster munitions in the territory of a State Party.” The cable states that “the United States reads the phrase ‘military cooperation and operations’ in Article 21 to include all preparations for future military operations, transit of cluster munitions through the territory of a State Party, and storage and use of cluster munitions on the territory of a State Party.” “Demarche to Afghanistan on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010.

[14] Statement by Dr. Zia Nezam, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Convention on Cluster Munitions Second Meeting of States Parties, Beirut, 14 September 2011.

[15] Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and their Use by the United States in Afghanistan,” Vol. 14, No. 7 (G), December 2002.

[16] CMC Fact Sheet prepared by (HRW), “Cluster Munitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,” October 2008.

[17] Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fourth Meeting of States Parties, Lusaka, 10 September 2013. In April 2014, Afghanistan again stated that it destroyed all stockpiles of cluster munitions before the convention entered into force and no longer has a stockpile. Statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 April 2014. Notes by the CMC.

[18] Statement of Afghanistan, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 14 October 2013.

[20] Afghanistan’s initial Article 7 report detailed the destruction between 2005 and 2011 of over 402,000 submunitions of various types. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 August 2012. The subsequent Article 7 reports detail the destruction of 761 additional munitions and submunitions discovered in 2012 and 2013 and also provide an updated accounting of the various submunitions destroyed between 2005 and 2011, listing five types of munitions not included in the initial report. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, Part II, 27 April 2014; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 19 May 2013.

[21] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, Part II, para. 3 (a), 25 April 2016. Note that Afghanistan stated in its 2015 Article 7 Report that 187 “cluster munitions” were destroyed in 2014. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, Part II, para. 3 (c), 28 April 2015.

[22] Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2008, CD-edition, 15 January 2008 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008).

[23] Ibid.; and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2005–2006 (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 233.

[24]Demarche to Afghanistan on cluster munitions,” US Department of State cable 08STATE134777 dated 29 December 2008, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010.

[25] Afghanistan Rights Monitor, “Annual Report: Civilian Casualties of War, January–December 2010,” p. 15.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 09 October 2018

Policy

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 11 September 2002, becoming a State Party on 1 March 2003.

Afghanistan has not adopted national implementation legislation.[1] A draft regulation prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of mines and cluster munitions was prepared in 2013. In its Article 7 report submitted in 2018, Afghanistan reported the regulation “recently has been processed by the Ministry of Justice and has been sent to the Legislation Committee of the Cabinet of Ministers for their review and approval. DMAC [the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination] will follow it up with the Legislation Committee of the Cabinet to ensure it can be endorsed by them as soon as possible.”[2]

Afghanistan has submitted its annual Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report covering calendar year 2017.[3]

Over the past decade, Afghanistan has participated in every Meeting of States Parties, including the convention’s Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in December 2017. Afghanistan has participated in all intersessional meetings of the Mine Ban Treaty, except in May 2016. It also attended the Mine Ban Treaty’s First Review Conference in Nairobi in 2004 and its Second Review Conference in Cartagena in 2009, however its delegation to the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 was denied a transit visa en-route.

Use

Use of victim-activated improvised mines and other improvised explosive devices (IEDs)by armed groups continued in 2017 and 2018, resulting in further casualties.

Non-state armed groups

The use of victim-activated improvised mines by armed groups, mainly the Taliban, and Daesh/Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), continued in 2018. In June 2018, Afghanistan informed States Parties that new use of pressure plate improvised mines, which are causing approximately 170 deaths a month, was adding to their clearance burden and making it difficult to meet their Article 5 obligations.[4]

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported that anti-government forces used victim-activated improvised mines throughout 2017 and the first half of 2018. Victim-activated (pressure plate) improvised mines were responsible for more than half of all casualties attributed to indiscriminate explosive weapons during 2017, but overall casualties reportedly dropped by 8% from 2016.[5] However, not all pressure plate improvised mines can be detonated by a human being. An investigation into pressure plate mine incidents in 2017 by the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS) determined that roughly three-quarters of pressure plate improvised mines were antipersonnel, and that a quarter were antivehicle.[6] In 2018, UNAMA reported that use of pressure-plate IEDs, while continuing, decreased dramatically. UNAMA documented a 43% reduction in civilian casualties attributed to pressure plate improvised mines when compared to the same period in 2017.[7] UNAMA shares the view of Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that victim-activated IEDs function as antipersonnel mines and are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, while command-detonated IEDs are not banned.[8] In July 2018, UNAMA reported that it had engaged in extensive advocacy efforts with anti-government elements on civilian casualties caused by pressure plate improvised mines for some years.[9]

The Taliban have not made any statement regarding use of victim-activated IEDs since October 2012, when, on the Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan website, it denied the use of victim-activated explosive devices and said it uses only command-detonated explosive devices.[10] As in previous years, the Taliban have claimed responsibility for an extensive number of attacks against military personnel and vehicles using landmines.[11]

At least 3 deminers were killed by Daesh/ISKP in 2017 and at least 95 mine clearance staff were abducted during the year.[12]

Production, transfer, stockpile destruction, and discoveries

Afghanistan is not known to have ever produced or exported antipersonnel mines. Throughout many years of armed conflict, large numbers of landmines from numerous sources were sent to various fighting forces in Afghanistan. In recent years, there were no confirmed reports of outside supply of antipersonnel mines to non-state armed groups.

Afghanistan reported that it completed its stockpile destruction obligation in October 2007, eight months after its treaty-mandated deadline of 1 March 2007.[13] It reported the destruction of 525,504 stockpiled antipersonnel mines between 2003 and 2007.[14] It is unclear how many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program. It reported that it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines as of April 2007, and later reported that it destroyed 81,595 antipersonnel mines in calendar year 2007.[15]

Previously, there were regular reports of Afghan security forces seizing caches of landmines during military operations or surrendered to the authorities. Afghanistan reported that a total of 886 antipersonnel mines were discovered and destroyed during calendar year 2017 from stocks recovered during military operations, surrendered during disarmament programs, and discovered by civilians.[16] Since Afghanistan’s stockpile destruction deadline, it has reported discovery and destruction of 84,518 antipersonnel mines in previously unknown stockpiles.[17]

Mines retained for training and development

Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training in mine detection, mine clearance, or mine destruction techniques. It has reported that “mine bodies used in these programmes have had their fuzes removed and destroyed and are no longer capable of being used.”[18] In June 2011, the chief of operations of the Mine Action Coordination Center of Afghanistan (MACCA) confirmed to the Monitor that Afghanistan does not retain any live mines for training or other purposes.[19] All mines retained are fuzeless and are used to train mine detection dogs.[20]



[1] Previously, Afghanistan reported that the Ministry of Defense instructed all military forces “to respect the comprehensive ban on antipersonnel mines and the prohibition on use in any situation by militaries or individuals.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form A. In April 2016, Afghanistan wrote that, “Afghanistan has long time back drafted a law as an instrument for the implementation of Article 9 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention and Convention on Cluster Munitions. This will supplement an existing law banning the use, acquisition, trading and stockpiling of weapons, ammunition and explosive items without the required legal license. This new law relates specifically to the provisions of the Convention on Cluster Munitions and Ottawa Treaty. The Ministry of Justice has already reviewed this draft and advised that it should be made available as an annex to the existing law than processing it as a new law. This is still in the ministry of justice. H.E. The President is aware of it through DMAC and has promised to put pressure on the Ministry of Justice to take it in the review plan of 1395 (April 2016–March 2017).” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2016.

[3] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017). Previous Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports were submitted annually, except in 2011.

[4] Statement of Afghanistan, Session on Clearance, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[6] Email to the Monitor from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, UNOPS, Kabul, 13 June 2018. The analysis assumed that for incidents involving improvised mines with a pressure plate that produced more than two casualties as likely antivehicle improvised mines, and incidents with one to two casualties as likely antipersonnel improvised mines.

[10] “We clearly want to state that our Mujahideen never place live landmines in any part of the country but each mine is controlled by a remote and detonated on military targets only.” “Reaction of Islamic Emirate regarding accusations of UNAMA about explosive devices,” 22 October 2012.

[13] In April 2007, Afghanistan informed States Parties that while it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, two depots of antipersonnel mines still remained in Panjsheer province, about 150 kilometers north of Kabul. Provincial authorities did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion. For details on the destruction program and reasons for not meeting the deadline, see, Landmine Monitor Report 2007, pp. 89–90; and Landmine Monitor Report 2008, pp. 79–80.

[14] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report(for calendar year 2013), Form G. How many stockpiled mines Afghanistan had destroyed at the time it declared completion of the program lacked clarity. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, pp. 99–100.

[15] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form G, 13 May 2008.

[16] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form Bstates that 886 antipersonnel mines manufactured in China, Czechoslovakia, Iran, Italy, Pakistan, and Russia were seized or recovered during 2017.

[17] The type and number of mines destroyed in each location as well as the dates of destruction have been recorded in detail. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form G.

[18] Reported in Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, each year since 2012.

[19] Email from MACCA, 4 June 2011.

[20] Interview with MACCA, in Geneva, 24 June 2010. The former UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan program director also told the Monitor in June 2008 that all retained mines are fuzeless and that the fuzes were destroyed prior to use in training activities.


Mine Action

Last updated: 07 November 2018

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party
Article 5 deadline: 1 March 2023
Not on track to meet deadline

Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party
Article 4 deadline: 1 March 2022
Unclear whether on track to meet deadline

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

The Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) is led by Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC), which comes under the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority. Transition to national ownership was completed in 2017

UN agencies

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in support of DMAC

Mine action strategic plan

Mine action plan 2016–2020

Mine action legislation

Draft mine action law has been submitted to the cabinet’s legislative committee for approval, as of April 2018

Mine action standards

National Mine Action Standards (NMAS)
A policy paper on Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM) was issued in May 2018

Operators in 2017

National:
Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC)
Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA)
Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC)
The Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR)
AREA

 

International:
Danish Demining Group (DDG)
The HALO Trust
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
Janus Demining Afghanistan (previously Sterling International)

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

205km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination; 297km2 of antivehicle mine contamination: and 20km2 of improvised mine contamination.[1]However, there is no reliable estimate of the much larger areas assessed as contaminated by locally-produced mines

New landmine contamination in 2017

New victim-activated improvised mine contamination, extent unknown

Cluster munition remnants

6.51km2
Extent of contamination: medium
(Discrepancies between data sources exist, see below)

ERW contamination

119km2 in 2017.[2] Additionally, 42 firing ranges covering 605km2 remain to be cleared[3]

Land release in 2017

Landmines

40.04km2 mined area cleared, of which 28.2km2 was affected by antipersonnel mines or a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines. 0.96km2 mined area reduced, of which 0.94km2 was antipersonnel mine or a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mined area. 2.4km2 of suspected mined area was cancelled. 14,629 antipersonnel mines were destroyed[4]

Cluster munition remnants

2.82km2 cleared
368 submunitions destroyed (including 356 during Weapon Ammunition Disposal and Conventional Ammunition Disposal)
(Discrepancies between data sources exist, see below)

Other ERW

42,820 other ERW destroyed[5]

Progress

Antipersonnel mines

Mine clearance has been severely hampered by a lack of funding since 2012 and insecurity. Moreover, Afghanistan also has to reassess its Article 5 obligations to take account of extensive contamination by improvised mines

Cluster munition remnants

Clearance of the areas reported in the Article 7 report is funded and expected to be completed by September 2019. However, any additional contamination identified is outside the scope of this project. Moreover, insecurity has prevented access to some of the contaminated areas in 2018

Note: ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Contamination

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is one of the countries most affected by mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) resulting from the decade-long war of resistance that followed the Soviet invasion of 1979, the 1992–1996 internal armed conflict, 1996–2001 internal armed conflict, and the United States (US)-led coalition intervention in late 2001, which added considerable quantities of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Continuing conflict between the government, the Taliban and other armed groups is still adding contamination, particularly by improvised mines, which have overtaken legacy mined areas as the biggest humanitarian threat.[6]

Two different sets of figures were provided for the extent of antipersonnel mine contamination as of the end of 2017. According to data provided by the Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), at the end of 2017, Afghanistan had 2,073 mined areas containing antipersonnel mines affecting 205km2. This represented a second successive year of net decline in the extent of antipersonnel contamination. But surveys continue to find new areas of legacy mine contamination. DMAC added 92km2 of mine and ERW contamination to the database in 2017 and reported 20km2 affected by abandoned improvised mines, though it has yet to reach a reliable estimate of much larger areas assessed as contaminated by such mines (see section on improvised mines below).[7]

Remaining contamination at the end of 2013, 2015, and 2017 according to DMAC[8]

Type of contamination

Hazardous areas

Area (km2)

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

Antipersonnel mines

2,981

2,825

2,765

2,387

2,073

240

230

251

225

205

Antivehicle mines

1,140

1,156

1,243

1,145

1,122

236

256

275

277

297

Improvised mines*

28

19

23

N/R

57

5

4

5

N/R

20

ERW**

179

254

279

310

310

35

38

63

89

119

Total

4,328

4,254

4,310

3,842

3,562

516

528

594

592

641

Note: N/R = not reported.
* Abandoned devices only.
** 2017 data includes 18 areas with cluster munition remnants over 6.86km2.

In contrast, Afghanistan’s latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report said its Article 5 obligations at the end of 2017 comprised 2,130 hazardous areas covering almost 225km2 (see table below), 7.45km2 less than at the start of the year.[9]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by region (end-2017) according to the 2017 Article 7 report[10]

Region

Mined areas

Area (km2)

Northeast

703

62.94

Central

595

39.82

South

176

44.70

West

67

34.00

Southeast

199

18.77

North

286

15.93

East

104

8.50

Total

2,130

224.66

 

DMAC reported that 143 of Afghanistan’s 400 districts had been cleared of mines by the end of 2017. The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) had declared six districts of Badakhshan to be mine free in April 2017. HALO Trust reported in February 2018 that the western province of Herat was free of mines after years of operations involving clearance of more than 600 mined areas. Land release had opened up 40km2 of farmland.[11]

DMAC estimates of antivehicle mine contamination have risen steadily as a result of survey in the last five years, reaching nearly 300km2 by the end of 2017 (see table above).

Improvised mines

Afghanistan’s Article 5 clearance obligations have been significantly increased by improvised mines, which have also contributed to a sharp upturn in casualties in recent years. Afghanistan now identifies them as the greatest challenge for the mine action sector.[12] (See Afghanistan’s casualty profile for details.)

At the request of the National Security Council, DMAC’s implementing partners conducted a rapid assessment of 22 provinces at the end of 2016. Implementing partners reported five provinces as inaccessible.[13] In the remaining 17, they identified 270 areas affected by post-2001 ERW, covering an estimated 421km2, in which antipersonnel mines accounted for 5.3km2 and improvised devices, including improvised pressure-plate mines, affected 228km2. This included almost 55km2 classified as high risk, mostly in Kandahar, Helmand, and Urozgan provinces, as well as 3.5km2 of medium risk and 170km2 as low risk. Antivehicle mines affected 90,000m2 and ERW were nearly 188km2.[14]

The MAPA entered the assessment results into the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database in late 2017.[15] At the end of March 2018, DMAC estimated that improvised pressure-plate mines affected an area of 248km2.[16]

In 2018, DMAC replaced the term pressure-plate IED (PP-IED) with Abandoned Improvised Mine (AIM) in its data.[17] The term PP-IED continued to be used by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA).[18]

Cluster Munition Contamination

The Directorate of Mine Action Contamination (DMAC) reported that the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan had 6.51km2 of cluster munition contamination at the end of 2017.[19]

DMAC said one cluster munition hazardous area affecting 1.86km2 was added to the database during the year.[20]

All the identified sites are affected by remnants of the 1,228 cluster munitions containing some 248,056 BLU-97B submunitions dropped by the US between October 2001 and early 2002.[21] Cluster munition remnants are said to affect less than 7,000 people, but block access to grazing and agricultural land.[22]

Cluster munition contamination, however, is more widespread than the clearly defined US cluster strike sites. Soviet forces used cluster munitions during the decade-long war of resistance to the Soviet-backed government and demining operators continue to find unexploded submunitions on demining and battle area clearance tasks.[23]

Other explosive contamination

The estimate of ERW contamination reported by the DMAC has more than tripled since 2013 to 119km2 in 2017, not including NATO firing ranges, but including cluster munition remnants. (See table in the mine contamination section.) DMAC reported 42 ranges covering 605km2 remained to be cleared.[24]

Afghanistan reported massive ERW contamination in its Article 7 report for 2017, which has continued to rise as a result of continuing conflict. It reported total ERW contamination at around 1,674km2 as of the end of 2017, reporting “legacy contamination” of 588km2 dating back to before 2001 and 1,086km2 that occurred after 2001.[25]

Program Management

The Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) is led by DMAC, which comes under the Afghan National Disaster Management Authority. It receives operational support in planning, prioritizing, and information management from “UNMAS in support of DMAC” (UNMAS/DMAC).[26]

DMAC staff increased to 159 working in 15 departments by the end of 2017 after personnel transitioned from UN to DMAC contracts.[27] Department heads were due to continue as UNMAS advisers to DMAC until also coming under DMAC management by the end of June 2018, though the transition process was completed a month early.[28] A total of 240 personnel were still employed in UNMAS/DMAC in 2017, but the number was due to fall to 209 in 2018.[29]

Strategic planning

Afghanistan‘s Article 5 deadline extension request submitted in 2012 and revised in August of that year, set out a plan to clear all known areas contaminated by mines and ERW by March 2023. It consolidated the 4,442 mine and ERW hazards then remaining into 308 projects to facilitate monitoring of progress and resource mobilization, an approach that continues to shape mine action planning.[30] However, the extension request targets were soon overtaken by a sharp drop in donor funding, which fell by more than half between 2011 and 2014, and by the addition of extensive contamination by improvised mines, expanding the extent of Afghanistan’s Article 5 obligations.

A five-year plan for 2016–2020, adopted in January 2016, did not amend extension request clearance targets but set four strategic goals:[31]

  • Facilitate development;
  • Engage with other sectors;
  • Reduce the impact of mines and ERW, and mitigate the impact of mine incidents; and
  • Mainstream gender and diversity to ensure participation in, and shared benefits of, mine action.

The plan set out 33 objectives and 111 associated actions. These included incorporating mine action into Afghanistan’s National Priority Programs and Sustainable Development Goals; integrating mine action into the activities of line ministries, improving fundraising; completing survey; and keeping implementation of Afghanistan’s Article 5 extension on track. The plan acknowledged that continued use of improvised mines on the present scale could prevent Afghanistan from meeting its Article 5 clearance deadline.[32]

DMAC’s concept paper on improvised mines reported that none was cleared in 2017 but proposed clearance of the entire ERW-affected area of 421km2 identified in 17 provinces at a projected cost of US$146 million. DMAC continued to discuss approaches to tackling improvised mines with operators and was due to roll out a strategy for clearance in 2018.[33]

DMAC also produced a concept paper in 2017 proposing clearance of all remaining antivehicle mine contamination, consisting at the time of the report (mid-2017) of 1,096 hazardous areas covering 292km2 across 26 provinces. Contamination consists mainly of minimum-metal mines laid randomly over large areas and sometimes at a depth that can be difficult for conventional detectors to locate. The paper recommended clearance by front-end loaders with mechanical follow-up at an estimated cost of almost $128 million.[34]

In 2018, Afghanistan expected to release almost 64km2 of contamination from antipersonnel mines, antivehicle mines, and ERW (57.5km2 through clearance and 6.4km2 through area reduction). Two-thirds of the area to be cleared was in central areas and the northeast of the country.[35]

A plan to clear the cluster munition-contaminated areas that are reported in Afghanistan’s Article 7 report for 2017 is included in its Mine Ban Treaty workplan, and is funded.[36] However, the funded plan does not cover any additional cluster munition-contaminated areas that have been or would be subsequently identified.[37]

Legislation and standards

DMAC has prepared draft mine action legislation to be included as an annex to a 2005 law banning the use, acquisition, and stockpiling of weapons, ammunition, and explosive items. After years of review by the Ministry of Justice, the draft has reportedly been referred to the cabinet’s legislative committee for approval.[38]

An “Abandoned Improvised Mine (AIM) technical working group,” set up in November 2017, has been assigned the task of drafting standard terminology and policy for tackling improvised mines. A policy paper on AIMs issued by DMAC in May 2018 after consultations with implementing partners set out 11 principles to be followed by implementing partners.[39] These included the following:

  • All survey and clearance should be conducted in accordance with MAPA principles of neutrality and MAPA members shall not participate in or facilitate counter-IED activities, including providing information on AIMs to security forces.
  • Afghan national mine action standards are the default standards for AIM activities but operators should also draft specific standard operating procedures for AIM-related operations.
  • Each organization and team needs DMAC accreditation for each type of activity.
  • AIM activities should receive a high level of internal and external quality assurance (QA).
  • AIM clearance should only be conducted with the full consent of the community and all relevant actors, and should not be conducted in areas of ongoing conflict.
  • AIM activities should be recorded on IMSMA, including information on access, level of conflict, and details of each device or suspect device.
  • All survey should be conducted by teams trained and accredited for AIM non-technical survey.
  • If new AIM contamination is suspected in areas that were previously cleared or identified as clear, resurvey should be coordinated by DMAC with full consent of all relevant actors and include an assessment of the level of conflict.

Quality management

DMAC had 26 QA/quality control (QC) staff working in seven regions, which conducted 2,399 monitoring visits in 2017. The staff reported 57 major and 59 minor non-conformities.[40] Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) operations in Afghanistan’s remote northern province of Badakhshan are accessed mainly through Tajikistan, and QA is conducted by the Tajikistan National Mine Action Center (TNMAC) on behalf of DMAC to avoid travel and visa delays.[41]

DMAC also conducted external QA/QC of firing range clearance with 21 quality management (QM) inspectors who carried out 2,708 visits in 2017 during which they reported three major non-conformities.[42]

Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) was accredited by DMAC in November 2017 to conduct a Third Party Monitoring project funded by the US Department of State to monitor performance of all implementing partners receiving US funding.[43]

Operators

The MAPA employed a total of 7,156 people at the end of 2017 but the sector has been facing severe financial constraints, and in 2018, DMAC expected the number would fall to 5,376.[44]

Mine clearance is conducted by six national and three international NGOs.[45] Long-established national NGOs are: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), the Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), the Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), and the Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR). AREA, a national NGO accredited in 2014, became operational at the end of 2016. International NGOs active in survey and clearance in 2017 were Danish Demining Group (DDG), The HALO Trust, and FSD. As noted above, NPA started work in 2017 providing QA/QC of projects funded by the US Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA).

Land Release (mines and ERW)

The MAPA cleared a total of 40km2 of overall mined area in 2017, less than the 49.2km2 cleared in 2016. A significant proportion of 2017 clearance concerned land contaminated only by antivehicle mines. The amount of cleared land affected only by antipersonnel mines or mixed antipersonnel/antivehicle mines amounted to 28.2km2.[46] This represents a slight increase in antipersonnel mine or mixed mine clearance, compared to the equivalent 27.1km2 in 2016.[47]

Mine and ERW survey to identify and cancel hazardous areas in 2017

DMAC reported adding mine and ERW contamination totaling almost 93km2to the database in 2017. Of this, 62km2 was mined area, 46 suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) affecting 47km2 and 97 confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) covering almost 15km2 (see table below). It also reported that operators cancelled 39 suspected mined areas covering 2.4km2 in 2017.

New suspected or confirmed mined areas and battle areas identified in 2017[48]

Type

SHAs identified

Estimated area (m2)

CHAs identified

Estimated area (m2)

Total area (m2)

Mined area

46

47,049,041

97

14,746,667

61,795,708

Battle area

14

20,923,157

9

10,009,617

30,932,774

 

DMAC had planned survey of 24 districts in Year 1396 (2017–2018) under the “Mine and ERW Impact Free Community Survey” (MEIFCS) started in 2012, but it was held back by a lack of funding. The only recorded MEIFICS activity was undertaken by FSD, which surveyed 13 communities in Badakhshan.[49] MCPA deployed nine teams to conduct non-technical survey on ERW contamination resulting from fighting in 24 districts across 12 provinces.[50]

Mine and ERW clearance and reduction through technical survey in 2017

MAPA reported release of 41km2 of overall mined area through clearance and area reduction in 2017 (see table below). It included a total of 29.1km2 affected by antipersonnel mines or a mixture of antipersonnel and antivehicle mines, of which 28.2km2 was released through clearance and 0.94km2 through area reduction.[51] No clearance of improvised mines was reported in 2017 despite growing attention to the issue.[52]

Afghan implementing partners were mainly responsible for an upturn in clearance in 2016 and accounted for most of the downturn in 2017, mainly as a result of financial constraints. In 2017, six national implementing partners collectively cleared 17.4km2, little more than half the area they cleared in 2016, with DAFA and MDC in particular experiencing loss of contracts. Only AREA, which started demining in 2016, significantly expanded operations in 2017 (clearing 1.3km2).[53]

HALO Trust increased its area clearance by more than a quarter in 2017 and accounted for more than half the total mined area cleared by the MAPA. The increase was made possible by increased funding, which saw HALO add around 870 staff over the year, bringing the total to 3,420 (of whom 2,975 were engaged in operations). HALO expanded its area of operations to include the southern province of Kandahar in addition to its work in the center, north, northeast, southeast, and the west. In 2018, HALO completed training of its first team in survey, clearance, and disposal of improvised mines.[54]

DDG, with three clearance teams and one survey team and 35 field staff, implemented one DANIDA contract in 2017, clearing almost one-third less land than in 2016 but destroying more mines. It won an additional contract in 2017 from WRA but started work in 2018.[55]

FSD increased capacity from three demining teams to four in 2017 and increased the amount of land released through clearance by more than 60% to 0.5km2, as well as destroying more than 6,500 antipersonnel mines.[56]

Mine clearance and reduction in 2017[57]

Operator

Areas

Area cleared (m2)

Area reduced (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

AREA

21

1,295,095

0

195

5

80

ATC

82

4,050,832

252,471

924

18

4,197

DAFA

10

3,330,914

0

0

49

523

DDG

7

227,636

70,581

81

3

139

FSD

6

533,688

0

6,526

0

114

HALO

336

21,919,980

0

6,052

139

1,007

MCPA

41

2,836,400

114,895

180

17

51

MDC

16

2,207,307

0

2

21

44

OMAR

58

3,643,027

523,784

643

10

1,069

Total

577

40,044,879

961,731

14,603

262

7,224

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

 

Clearance and reduction of mined area containing antipersonnel mines in 2017[58]

Operator

Area cleared (m2)

Area reduced (m2)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

AREA

1,295,095

0

195

5

80

ATC

3,302,107

240,108

924

0

4,114

DAFA

11,320

0

0

0

0

DDG

227,588

70,581

81

0

139

FSD

533,688

0

6,524

0

114

HALO

17,674,607

0

5,975

11

964

MCPA

1,765,792

101,508

148

1

47

MDC

4,817

0

2

0

0

OMAR

3,362,203

523,653

643

0

1,064

Total

28,177,217

935,850

14,492

17

6,522

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

 

By the end of 2017, Afghanistan said it had closed 64 firing ranges and released 555km2 of firing range land, destroying in the process 26 antipersonnel mines, 50 antivehicle mines, and 93,228 items of UXO.[59]

Land Release (cluster munitions)

Cluster munition survey in 2017

No area of cluster munition remnants was reported to have been released by survey in 2017. However, DMAC said one cluster munition hazardous area affecting 1.86km2 was added to the database during the year.[60]

Cluster munition clearance in 2017

DMAC reported that a total of 2,822,647m2 of cluster munition-contaminated land was cleared, resulting in the destruction of 12 cluster munition remnants. DAFA cleared 1,208,447m2 with the destruction of 12 cluster munition remnants, and AREA cleared 1,625,200m2, but no cluster munition remnants were destroyed. HALO destroyed five cluster munition remnants during explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) tasks, and 356 during weapon ammunition disposal (WAD) and conventional ammunition disposal (CAD).[61]

Deminer safety

DMAC reported two deminers were killed and one injured in the course of demining in 2017 but 14 security incidents reported in 2017 inflicted greater losses. This included one AREA deminer who was murdered by anti-government elements in Nangahar province in September. A total of 97 staff were abducted but later returned. Operators also reported equipment losses, including detectors, VHF radios, and mobile phones.[62]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2013), Afghanistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2023. Afghanistan will not meet this deadline.

The extension request Afghanistan submitted in 2012 is not on track to fulfil its targets. A sharp downturn in donor funding since 2012 resulted in loss of MAPA capacity and a drop in combined antivehicle and antipersonnel mine clearance rates (see table above), although annual antipersonnel mine clearance rates have increased over the last three successive years. To catch up, DMAC called for funding of US$110 million in 1396 (2017–2018) but received just short of $40 million. The MAPA required $76 million in 1397 (2018–2019) to support release of 144km2 of mine and ERW contamination but expected to receive funding at the same level as the previous year or slightly more.[63]

Afghanistan also has to reassess its Article 5 obligations to take account of extensive contamination by improvised mines. The extent of this new contamination has yet to be determined by survey but preliminary estimates in 17 of 22 affected provinces identified 152 hazards covering approximately 228km2. Moreover, mitigating the threat is obstructed by insecurity which renders some areas inaccessible to deminers, and even where there is access, clearance teams will be limited to tackling only the hazardous areas where they have the consent of all relevant parties.

Combined antipersonnel and antivehicle mine clearance in 2013–2017

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2017

40.04

2016

49.25

2015

35.38

2014

62.87

2013

60.11

Total

247.65

 

Antipersonnel mine clearance in 2013–2017[64]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2017

28.12

2016

27.12

2015

13.44

2014

22.28

2013

N/R

Total

90.96

 

Cluster Munition Convention Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Afghanistan is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2022.

Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request in 2012 provided for clearance of all ERW, including unexploded submunitions, by 2020.[65] Cluster munition clearance has been overshadowed by funding constraints, competing priorities, and insecurity, which has hindered access to some cluster munition-affected areas, but DMAC continues to assert that with financial support Afghanistan can complete clearance in 2019, two and a half years ahead of its Article 4 deadline.[66]

The 16 cluster munition-contaminated areas reported in Afghanistan’s Article 7 report for 2017 are being addressed through a project implemented by DAFA and funded by the US Department of State. The project started on 1 September 2017 and it expected to be completed on 31 September 2019.[67] In 2017 and 2018, additional cluster munition contamination was identified, which is outside the scope of this project. Moreover, DMAC expects that other areas may be identified in the future. In July 2018, DMAC reported that DAFA was unable to access two sites in Nagarhar and Paktya provinces due to security constraints.[68]

Five-year summary of clearance[69]

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2017

1.2

2016

0

2015

0

2014

0

2013

0

Total

1.2

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018. However, Afghanistan reports 224km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination (127.06km2CHA and 97.6km2SHA) in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2017) Form C.

[2] Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018. However, the Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Background, reports total ERW contamination as 1,674km2 as of the end of 2017.

[3] Data provided by DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[4] Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 16 July 2018. Afghanistan’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2017 recorded clearance of 27,848,953m2 in 2017, reduction of 948,213m2, and cancellation of 1,729,047m2.

[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Transparency Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

[6] See, for example, reports that armed opposition groups mined the highway linking Kabul and Ghazni during fighting in August 2018. “Intense fighting as Taliban presses to take Afghan city,” Reuters, 12 August 2018.

[7] Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F. The form also states that 2,088 antipersonnel mine hazards covering 223km2 remained at the end of 2017.

[10] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

[11] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018; UNMAS/DMAC, “Six districts of Badakhshan Province declared free of known mines and explosive remnants of war,” Press release, 4 April 2017; andJared Ferrie, “Herat declared mine free after 10-year clearance drive,” Reuters, 15 February 2018.

[12] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Background, p. 5.

[13] The five inaccessible provinces were Baghdis, Ghor, Laghman, Sar e Pul, and Zabul.

[14] DMAC, “Concept Note: Demining Operations in Mines/ERWs/Pressure Plate IEDs Contaminated Areas,” undated but 2017, p. 2 and Annex A.

[15] Email from DMAC, 12 September 2018.

[16] DMAC, “MAPA Fast Facts, Quarterly Update, 4thQuarter 1396 (January–March 2018).”

[17] Email from Habib Khan Zazai, Head of Victim Assistance Department, UNMAS, in support of DMAC, 21 June 2018.

[18] UNAMA reported different figures for mine/ERW casualties and PP-IED (improvised mines) casualties, in its annual Protection of Civilians report. UNAMA “Protection of Civilians Annual Report 2017,” February 20017, pp. 16–17, 31–32.

[19] Email from Alauddin Mateen, Plans Officer, DMAC, 15 July 2018. However, there were inconsistencies with other reports of the extent of contamination at the end of 2017. DMAC also reported by email on 11 April 2018 that total contamination at the end of 2017 was 6.86km2. Nearly half of the contamination was in a single district of northeastern Takhar province. The other affected provinces were Nangarhar, Paktya, and Wardak. The Article 7 Report for 2017 reported 6.52km2 at the end of 2017, in Nangarhar, Takhar, and Paktya.

[20] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[21] Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Mines Action Canada, Ottawa, May 2009), p. 27.

[22] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018; and statement of Afghanistan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Session on Clearance and Risk Education, Geneva, 15 April 2013.

[23] Interviews with MACCA implementing partners, Kabul, May 2013.

[24] Data provided by DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[25] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Background. The report identifies a total of 1,764km2 of ERW contamination but provides estimates of pre-2001 and post-2001 contamination, which amount to 1,674km2. DMAC’s “Fast Facts” reported ERW contamination of 1,800km2 of the end of March 2018, recording the area affected by antipersonnel mines as 208km2 and by antivehicle mines as nearly 504km2.

[26] Email from Mohammad Wakil Jamshidi, Chief of Staff, UNMAS/DMAC, 16 May 2017.

[27] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[28] Ibid., 18 August 2018.

[29] Ibid., 11 April 2018.

[30] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2012, pp. 167–175.

[31] National Mine Action Strategic Plan, 1395–1399 (2016–2020), State Ministry for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Affairs, undated but 2016, pp. 2–7.

[32] Ibid., p. 22.

[33] UNMAS/DMAC, “Concept Paper: Demining Operations in Mines/ERWs/Pressure Plate IEDs Contaminated Areas,” undated but 2017, p. III.

[34] DMAC, “Concept Note for Clearance of Anti-Vehicle Remaining Mined Areas in Afghanistan,” undated but 2017, pp. 3–8.

[35] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

[36] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

[37] Email from Alauddin Mateen, Plans Officer, DMAC, 15 July 2018.

[38] Email from DMAC, 18 April 2018; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form A.

[39] Email from DMAC, 18 April 2018; DMAC, “Policy on Abandoned Improvised Mines Demining in Afghanistan,” May 2018, pp. 2–4; and interview with Patrick Fruchet, Head of Office, UNMAS Kabul, in Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[40] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[41] Email from Mathew Wilson, Head of Operations, FSD, 23 July 2018.

[42] Email from DMAC, 12 September 2018.

[43] Email from Vanja Sirica, Country Director, NPA, 25 April 2018.

[44] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[45] Ibid.

[46] Ibid., and 16 July 2018. Afghanistan’s Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F recorded clearance of 27,848,953m2 in 2017, reduction of 948,213m2, and cancellation of 1,729,047m2.

[47] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F.

[48] Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 16 July 2018.

[49] Ibid., 11 April 2018.

[50] The 12 provinces were Baghlan, Faryab, Ghazni, Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Logar, Maidan Wardak, Nangarhar, Paktika, and Paktya,

[51] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[52] Ibid.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Email from Calvin Ruysen, Regional Director for Central Asia, HALO Trust, 16 May 2018.

[55] Email from Maria Berwald, Programme and Operations Coordinator Afghanistan and Colombia, DDG, 25 April 2018.

[56] Email from Mathew Wilson, FSD, 23 July 2018.

[57] Email from Abdul Qudos Ziaee, UNMAS/DMAC, 18 July 2018. Data records clearance of antipersonnel and mixed mined areas.

[58] Email from DMAC, 18 July 2018. Afghanistan’s Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F recorded clearance of 27,848,953m2 in 2017, reduction of 948,213m2, and cancellation of 1,729,047m2, with the destruction of 14,624 antipersonnel mines and 286 antivehicle mines.

[59] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C.

[60] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018.

[61] Email from Alauddin Mateen, Plans Officer, DMAC, 15 July 2018. These figures differ from other information provided by DMAC by email on 11 April 2018. This stated that a total area of 2,497,625m2 was cleared, which consisted of 1,625,000m2 cleared by AREA during which 77 UXO but no submunitions were destroyed, and 872,625m2 by DAFA, which resulted in the destruction of 108 submunitions and 295 other UXO items. In addition, HALO Trust said it cleared one area of 328,650m2, destroying three submunitions and 12 items of UXO. Email from Calvin Ruysen, Desk Officer, Central Asia Desk, HALO Trust, 16 May 2018. These figures are also different to those provided in the Article 7 report (for calendar year 2017), which states that 2,887,952m2 of cluster munition hazards were completed in 2017, with the destruction of 418 devices. See, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

[62] Email from DMAC, 11 April 2018; statement of UNMAS/DMAC, “UNMAS Afghanistan and DMAC strongly condemn brutal murder of an Afghan deminer in Nangahar,” 12 September 2017. UNAMA reported three humanitarian deminers killed and one injured in conflict-related attacks. See, UNAMA “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2017,” February 2018

[63] Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMAC, in Geneva, 8 June 2018; email from DMAC, 1 April 2018; UN Mine Action Gateway, “Survey and Clearance of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) in 1397 (April 2018–March 2019).”

[64] Email from DMAC, 18 July 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports for 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016 (Form F).

[65] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2012, p. 194.

[66] Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, Director, DMAC, in Geneva, 16 February 2018.

[67] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F.

[68] Email from Alauddin Mateen, DMAC, 15 July 2018.

[69] See Cluster Munition Monitor and Mine Action Review reports on clearance in Afghanistan covering 2013–2017.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 08 November 2018

In 2017, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan received nearly US$42 million from 17 donors, a decrease of 27% compared to 2016 ($15 million less).[1]

The United States (US) provided the largest contribution with $18 million, which represents 43% of the total international mine action assistance in Afghanistan for 2017.

Of the total contribution, more than four-fifths ($33.4 million) went toward clearance and risk education activities, 6% ($2.4 million) was for victim assistance, 3% was for capacity-building ($1.3 million), and the remainder ($4.8 million) went to other mine action activities that were not disaggregated by sector.

Victim assistance is integrated within the broader coordination mechanisms of the disability sector.[2] Consequently, overall funding to victim assistance is under-reported. As in 2016, victim assistance came from three donors in 2017: Germany ($1.8 million), Italy ($565,0500), and Norway ($133,045).

The Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) is largely funded through international assistance, although in the past the government of Afghanistan has reported contributing to some specific projects. For instance, in 2015 the government of Afghanistan contributed $1.5 million for clearance operations in Logar province, while in 2013, Afghanistan contributed $2.6 million for clearance of the Aynak copper mine.[3] No information on any national contribution was available for 2017, 2016, and 2014.

International contributions: 2017[4]

Donor

Sector

Amount
(national currency)

Amount
(US$)

US

Clearance and risk education

$18,000,000

18,000,000

Germany

Clearance and victim assistance

€5,247,598

5,930,310

United Kingdom

Clearance and risk education

£3,444,946

4,440,535

Canada

Various

C$4,000,000

3,080,715

Japan

Various

¥318,588,088

2,841,999

Netherlands

Clearance

€1,378,849

1,558,237

Denmark

Clearance and risk education

DKK9,000,000

1,364,525

Norway

Clearance and victim assistance

NOK11,100,000

1,342,542

Finland

Capacity-building and clearance

€900,000

1,017,090

Italy

Victim assistance

€500,000

565,050

United Nations

Capacity-building

N/A

559,845

New Zealand

Clearance

NZ$700,000

497,770

Australia

Clearance

AU$410,000

314,511

Belgium

Capacity-building

€150,000

169,515

Ireland

Clearance and risk education

€150,000

169,515

Sweden

Various

SEK338,000

39,565

Slovenia

Capacity-building

€30,218

34,149

Total

   

41,925,873

 

Since 2013, Afghanistan has received more than $260 million in international assistance for mine action. Between 2010–2014, a downward trend had been apparent with a continuous decline in international assistance that dropped from $102 million in 2010 to less than $50 million in 2014.

In 2017, Afghanistan Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC) noted that “If the funding trend continues to be the same, it is unlikely that Afghanistan will fulfill its obligation toward Ottawa extension plan and achieve its goal of making the country free from mine/ERW by 2023.”[5]

Summary of contributions: 2013–2017[6]

Year

Amount
(US$)

% change from previous year ($)

2017

41,925,873

-27

2016

57,257,467

+11

2015

51,689,045

+18

2014

43,973,822

-34

2013

66,733,076

-26

Total

261,579,283

 

 



[1] Australia, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2018; Belgium, Convention on Cluster Munitions, Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2018; Canada, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 1 May 2018; Germany, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, 2 March 2018; Italy, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, April 2018; Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2018; New Zealand, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2018; Sweden, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 23 April 2018; United Kingdom, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2018; Netherlands, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form J, April 2018; ITF Enhancing Human Security, “Annual Report 2017,” March 2018, pp. 24–25; responses to Monitor questionnaire by by Mikko Autti, Desk Officer, Finland Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 October 2018; and by Trine Louise Magard Hansen, Head of Section, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 October 2018; emails from Leah Murphy, Desk Officer, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 25 September 2018; from Ingrid Schoyen, Senior Adviser, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 25 September 2018; from Olivia Douwes, Policy Officer, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12 September 2018; and from Katherine Baker, Foreign Affairs Officer, Weapons Removal and Abatement, US Department of State, 9 and 24 October 2018.

[3] MACCA, “MAPA Annual Report 1394,” September 2016, pp. 40–41; and MACCA, “Fast Facts: Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan,” December 2013.

[4] Average exchange rate for 2017: A$1=US$0.7671; C$1.2984=US$1; DKK6.5957=US$1; €1=US$1.1301; ¥112.1=US$1; NZ$0.7111=US$1; NOK8.2679=US$1; £1=US$1.2890; SEK8.5430=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 11 January 2018.

[6] See previous Monitor reports. The total for international support in 2015 has been rectified as a result of revised US funding totals.


Casulaties

Last updated: 11 October 2018

 

Casualties[1]

All known casualties (between 1978 and 2017)

30,980 mine/unexploded remnants of war (ERW) casualties: 7,456 killed and 23,524 injured

Casualties in 2017

Annual total

2,300

Increase from
1,985 in 2016[2]

Survival outcome

797 killed; 1,503 injured

Device type causing casualties

62 antipersonnel mine; 21 antivehicle mine; 1,093 improvised mine; 1,124 ERW

Civilian status

2,297 civilians; 3 deminers

Age and gender

1,030 adults:
160 women; 870 men

1,270 children:
1,082 boys; 188 girls

 

The mine ERW casualty total for 2017 for the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is based on Monitor analysis of data provided by the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC). There has been a trend of increasing mine/ERW casualties in Afghanistan since 2013. In 2017, the increase was attributable to an increase in ERW casualties. Casualties caused by antipersonnel mines,antivehicle mines, and improvised mines decreased in 2017. Mine/ERW and improvised explosive device (IED) casualty data in Afghanistan is updated regularly and therefore discrepancies often occur in the total numbers of recorded casualties between update periods.

In 2017, the majority of mine/ERW casualties, 55%, were children (1,124 of 2,039 were the age was known). This represents a continuing increase in annual child casualties both in total numbers and as a proportion of the total compared to 2016 (42%, or 841 casualties) and 2015 (36%, or 577 casualties).

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) has reported that improvised mines constructed aspressure-plate IEDs (PP-IEDs),“function as victim-activated devices, triggered by any person stepping on them—including children—or any vehicle driving over them.” These improvised mines, therefore, likely fit the Mine Ban Treaty definition of antipersonnel mines.[3] In 2018, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) replaced the term PP-IED with Abandoned Improvised Mine (AIM) in its data.[4] The term PP-IED continued to be used by UNAMA.[5] The number of PP-IED casualties recorded by DMAC decreased slightly to 1,093 in 2017 from the 1,185 recorded for 2016.[6] The annual number of improvised landmine casualties reported with disaggregated data by UNMAS and/or UNAMA for the years 2012–2017was far higher than those identified in the years prior to 2011: 2017 (1,041), 2016 (1,195), 2015 (1,101), 2014 (809),[7] 2013 (567), and 2012 (987).[8]

For 2017, UNAMA reported 1,019 PP-IED casualties.[9] Civilian casualties from improvised mines accounted for more than half of the 1,856 (624 killed; 1,232 injured) civilian casualties from IEDs reported by UNAMA for 2017 in its annual report. UNAMA uses a strict and exacting methodology for verification of civilian casualties, and acknowledges that this, together with limitations in the operating environment, creates the possibility of under-reporting. UNAMA describes its methodology and limitations on its data as follows: “For verification of each incident involving a civilian casualty, UNAMA requires at least three different and independent types of sources, i.e. victim, witness, medical practitioner, local authorities, confirmation by party to the conflict, community leader or other sources…Where UNAMA is not satisfied with information concerning an incident, it will not consider it as verified. Unverified incidents are not included in this report…UNAMA does not claim that the statistics presented in this report are complete and acknowledges possible under-reporting of civilian casualties given limitations inherent in the operating environment.”[10] Since 2015, UNAMA has reported a continued decrease in civilian deaths and injuries from command-detonated IEDs,[11] which are not prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.

Both DMAC of the government of Afghanistan (previously, MACCA) and UNAMA have expressed concerns about civilian casualties from ERW associated with the closure of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) bases and high-explosive firing ranges. Many of the ranges were not sufficiently cleared of ERW prior to closure.[12] Casualties from bases and ranges were recorded as follows: two in 2009, nine in 2010, 15 in 2011, 49 in 2012, 53 in 2013, 34 in 2014, eight in 2015, 22 in 2016, and 10 in 2017.[13]

Cluster munition casualties

Since 1980, 756 casualties of cluster munition remnants have been recorded. In addition, at least 26 casualties during cluster munition strikes have been recorded.[14] DMAC/MACCA data included 249 unexploded submunition casualties since 1981.[15] No unexploded submunition casualties were reported in 2016 and 2017; four were reported in 2015.



[1] Casualty data for 2017 is based on emails from Habib Khan Zazai, Head, Victim Assistance Department, United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), in support of Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), 4 April and 21 June 2018.

[2] In 2018, DMAC revised the total of mine/ERW casualties for 2016 to 1,985 from the 1,943 reported in the Monitor in 2017. Email from Habib Khan Zazai, UNMAS, 4 April 2018.

[3] UNAMA “Protection of Civilians Annual Report 2016,” February 2017, pp. 7, 52, 56.

[4] Email from Habib Khan Zazai, UNMAS, 21 June 2018.

[5] UNAMA reported different figures for mine/ERW casualties and PP-IED (improvised mines) casualties in its annual Protection of Civilians report. UNAMA “Protection of Civilians Annual Report 2017,” February 20017, pp. 16–17, 31–32.

[6] In 2018, revised DMAC data put the number of improvised mine casualties for 2016 as 1,195 from the 1,180 previously reported in 2017.

[7] UNMAS reports 654 improvised mine casualties for 2014. Email from Habib Khan Zazai, UNMAS, 17 June 2017.

[8] Data analysis conducted by the Monitor.

[9] UNAMA uses a strict and exacting methodology for verification of civilian casualties and acknowledges that this, together with limitations in the operating environment, creates the possibility of under-reporting. UNAMA describes its methodology and limitations on its data as follows: “For verification of each incident involving a civilian casualty, UNAMA requires at least three different and independent types of sources, i.e. victim, witness, medical practitioner, local authorities, confirmation by party to the conflict, community leader or other sources…Where UNAMA is not satisfied with information concerning an incident, it will not consider it as verified. Unverified incidents are not included in this report…UNAMA does not claim that the statistics presented in this report are complete and acknowledges possible under-reporting of civilian casualties given limitations inherent in the operating environment.” See, UNAMA “Protection of Civilians Annual Report 2016,” February 2017, pp. 1–2.

[10] See, UNAMA “Protection of Civilians Annual Report 2016,” February 2017, pp. 1–2.

[11] Including remote-controlled, non-suicide vehicle-borne, and magnetic IEDs.

[12] UNAMA, “Protection of Civilians 2014 Mid-Year Report,” July 2014.

[13] Email from Habib Khan Zazai, UNMAS, 7 May 2017, and 4 April 2018.

[14] HI, Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities (Brussels: HI, May 2007), p. 95. The ICRC recorded 707 casualties occurring during cluster munition use between 1980 and 31 December 2006, to which 47 casualties from 2007 to the end of 2015 recorded by MACCA were added. Due to under-reporting, it is likely that the numbers of casualties during use, as well as those caused by unexploded submunitions, were significantly higher.

[15] Casualty data provided by MACCA, 2 May 2016; and by UNMAS, 5 April 2017.


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 30 October 2017

Summary action points based on findings

  • Expand access to physical rehabilitation needs, particularly in provinces lacking services or where traveling to receive rehabilitation is difficult for survivors.
  • Develop, adopt, and implement a national disability plan that includes objectives that respond to the needs of survivors and recognizes its victim assistance obligations and commitments, together with a monitoring structure.
  • Ensure that meaningful participation of survivors is increased at all levels.
  • Prioritize physical accessibility, particularly for services and for government buildings.
  • Provide psychosocial and psychological support, including peer support in particular to new survivors as well as those who have been traumatized and live in isolation.

Victim assistance commitments

The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is responsible for significant numbers of survivors and victims of landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). Afghanistan has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and has victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 18 September 2012.

Victim Assistance

The total number of survivors in Afghanistan is unknown, but in 2006 the number was estimated to be 52,000–60,000.[1]

Victim assistance since 2015

Despite improvements, geographic coverage of healthcare remained insufficient, particularly in terms of physical rehabilitation. Physical rehabilitation services were almost entirely operated by international NGOs and the ICRC under the coordination of the government. The government of Afghanistan was preparing for taking on the responsibility of managing physical rehabilitation services, starting within the local healthcare services level and providing for rehabilitation from the development budget.[2] The ICRC increased its support to medical care, physical rehabilitation, and social reintegration consistently throughout the period, while international NGOs continued to provide the remainder of physical rehabilitation services.[3]

Movement restrictions (due to conflict, lack of accessible roads, and the cost of transport) were persistent obstacles to victim assistance in some parts of the country, which continued through the reporting period.

Handicap International (HI) and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) had to hand over physiotherapy services in health facilities according to a Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) policy requirement that physiotherapy services should be provided only as part of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) through district hospitals and health clinics by end of 2015.[4]

Funding challenges continued to impede progress. In 2013, there was an overall decline in the number of projects being implemented and some organizations were unable to fulfill their planned projects and overall mandates due to a decrease in international financial support. Although resources were greatly reduced, there were still some donors who sustained their support for persons with disabilities in ways that included survivors. The Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) and the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) increased financial support to victim assistance and disability-related projects by registering national and international NGOs, which could then receive specific project funding. By 2017, the MACCA was renamed the Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC).

Afghanistan reported that, while there was tangible progress on the ground, the scale of victim assistance services was inadequate compared to the need.[5] Funding decreased and many NGOs providing victim assistance and other services for persons with disabilities faced critical financial shortages. Due to the shortage of financial resources some provincial branches of NGOs ceased their victim assistance activities.[6]

Victim assistance in 2016 (or Afghan year 1395)

Since 2014, funding had decreased significantly. As a result, many organizations that provide disability assistance were nearing the point of facing closure, such as the Afghan Landmine Survivors Organization (ALSO), Community Center for Disabled People (CCD), Development and Ability Organization (DAO), and others. Yet the government did not have any plan to provide direct victim assistance, even as the number of survivors was increasing. The lack of funding had a significant negative impact on the probable survival of local NGOs and consequently, on the lives of survivors. The local organizations that had predominately provided service for survivors or persons with disabilities declined although there was not yet a state-led program to serve persons with disabilities that would replace that assistance. Local NGOs reported occasionally being granted small projects, but were unable to compete with the large international NGOs for more sustainable funding. Although the number of survivors continued to increase, disability was not among the priorities of most of donors.[7]

Afghanistan reported that victim assistance, as one of the main pillars of mine action, focused on advocacy, awareness, and prevention activities within the broader context of the disability sector as required by the Mine Ban Treaty.[8] It also stated that the victim assistance sector faced a “critical funding shortfall.” In this context, Afghanistan explained that disability rights and victim assistance agencies “received the least amount of financial support from the international community” and that the limited financial support “endangers” existing capacities and the potential for implementation.[9] Due to the decline in funding, only one prioritized victim assistance project received funding through the mine action center in 2016. The UNMAS/DMAC Victim Assistance Department did not have adequate funding to directly implement projects, but rather maintained a list of prioritized projects to which funds could be allocated.[10] Of the seven projects identified for implementation by UNMAS/DMAC in 2017, only the project for establishing physical rehabilitation centers in Khost and Farah provinces was funded. Six out of nine physical rehabilitation centres supported through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund—including four mobile orthopaedic workshops—faced insecure funding situations.[11]

In 2016, 90% of the population lived more than 100 kilometers from a rehabilitation center and some 20 provinces out of 34 do not have prostheses and orthoses facilities.[12] A lack of female health service providers remained a challenge in rural areas.[13]

Assessing the needs

No specific needs assessment surveys of survivors’ needs were reported in 2016, though many organizations kept their own records on beneficiaries’ needs.

In 2016, a disability survey consultant conducted an in-country assessment, stakeholder meetings, and completed the preliminary work to develop the implementation plan for the nationwide disability survey.[14] However, in accordance with instructions from the US Agency for International Development (USAID), in March 2017 the National Disability Survey of Afghanistan (NDSA) was put on hold. The survey was subsequently removed from the scope of the US-funded Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III).[15] The last national disability survey was carried out in 2005.[16]

A program evaluation by SCA among community-based rehabilitation (CBR) participants confirmed the high proportion of war and mine/ERW survivors among men with disabilities compared to other groups of persons with disabilities. Persons born with impairments had the same gender breakdown, while disease caused a higher proportion of disability among females.[17]

HI conducted small-scale surveys on needs, capacities, issues, and challenges in project sites (small areas) in order to understand the situations faced by mine/ERW survivors and persons with disabilities. A Knowledge, Attitude, and Practices (KAP) survey conducted by HI community mobilizers among 600 community members in Kandahar.[18]

The Afghans Landmine Survivors’ Organization (ALSO) conducted a study and assessment titled Access of Persons with Disabilities to Education in Afghanistan in 2017. Findings of the study were shared with victim assistance and disability organizations in a conference conducted in Kabul and findings were published for wider distribution.[19]

Victim assistance coordination[20]

Government coordinating body/focal point

The Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MoLSAMD), the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), and the Ministry of Education (MoE) with UNMAS/DMAC Victim Assistance Department technical support; as well as the Afghanistan National Disaster Management Authority (ANDMA)

Coordinating mechanisms

Victim Assistance Coordination Meetings, the Disability Stakeholder Coordination Group (DSCG); the Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Taskforce, and several other groups (see below)

Plan

None: The Afghanistan National Disability Action Plan (ANDAP) revision process was pending the adoption of a new disability policy

 

MoLSAMD is the government focal point for victim assistance and regulating the legislation of disability issues overall.[21] A new Deputy Minister for MoLSAMD was appointed, as the victim assistance focal point in 2015.[22] In 2016, an institutional capacity assessment and action plan was developed for MoLSAMD, by an international consultant supported by UNMAS, and shared with the ministry for implementation purposes.[23] Other national and international stakeholders support the government in developing or amending legislation. The MoPH, the MoE, and MoLSAMD are involved in disability services and advocacy activities. The work of these three key ministries is supported by the Victim Assistance Department of UNMAS/DMAC, which works closely with three ministries and which provides technical support to each for annual planning, priority setting, contract development, and quality assurance for UNMAS-funded activities.[24]

The Victim Assistance Department of DMAC/UNMAS supported a capacity-building need assessment for MoLSAMD that began in the first quarter of 2017. A desk-based assessment with the three key ministries found that there was a lack of reliable data and data collection process in the ministries. Based on the assessment, work with Martyrs and Disability Deputy Ministry of MoLSAMD to develop a new database started in March 2017 and 15 ministry personnel were trained on the database, which was planned to be officially launched later in 2017. New beneficiary data collection forms were also designed.[25]

From the beginning of 2016 through the end of the second quarter of 2017, three additional victim assistance/disability organizations were accredited by DMAC/UNMAS and received certification to conduct activities.[26]

The MoPH plan of action consists of the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS); physiotherapy services are included in both, while prosthetic services were only included in the EPHS. The MoPH Strategic Framework 2011–2015 counted improving disability services among its priorities, and the ministry’s focal point for disability, the Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Department (DRD), had an implementation strategy for the framework. The MoPH included disability and physical rehabilitation in a new national health policy originally developed for 2015–2020. The national disability and physical rehabilitation strategic plan for the health sector 2016–2020 was drafted and in the approval stages.[27]

No progress was reported on the process of developing a national plan for persons with disabilities. The National Disability Action Plan remained unrevised since it expired in 2011. A new plan was not to be drafted until the finalization of a comprehensive national disability policy. The Afghanistan National Policy for Persons with Disabilities was in its third draft in 2016 and had been made available in local languages for wider consultation and feedback.[28]

The Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) adopted a five-year (2016–2021) strategic plan in 2015 addressing the so-called pillars of mine action. A sub-goal of the plan focuses on victim assistance, and related advocacy. Advocacy efforts are undertaken to ensure that disability and victim assistance are addressed in relevant government strategies, policies, and in departmental budgets.[29]

An action plan for implementation of the newly developed Inclusive and Child Friendly Education Policy, making the National Education Strategic Plan III (NESP III 2016–2020) was significantly more inclusive of victim assistance and disability rights than the previous two plans. With these changes, inclusive education was comprehensively addressed in the third strategic plan.[30] A number of policies in Afghanistan referred to services for persons with disabilities, and although relevant to mine/ERW survivors do not necessarily specifically mention victim assistance. Other than the former Inclusive Education Policy of the MoE, among these was the Health and Nutrition Strategy of the MoPH.[31]

In 2017, ACAP III (April 2015–February 2018), was being implemented by UNMAS to provide “immediate assistance packages including food and non-food items, psychosocial counseling, physical rehabilitation support and economic reintegration packages tailored to individual needs to restore lost livelihoods and assist with recovery.” Activities were anticipated to continue until 2018.[32]

ACAP III is a USAID-funded program through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action intended to provide targeted immediate assistance to victims of conflict, mines, and ERW; strengthen existing services; and contribute to the development of government authorities’ capabilities to provide assistance to civilian victims of conflict in Afghanistan. Long-term services are also provided in communities most affected by conflict. Other ACAP III objectives are to link beneficiaries with assistance programs and to improve knowledge of victim assistance services among communities, civil society, and government networks.[33] ACAP III marked a change from the first two ACAP programs, which provided humanitarian assistance only for assistance-eligible incidents to “innocent civilian casualties who have suffered losses resulting from operations between U.S. and coalition military forces and the Taliban or other insurgents.”[34]

Coordination and planning

The coordination group for victim assistance with the participation of key bi-monthly national and international victim assistance and disability organizations and representatives of the line ministries, including the MoPH, MoLSAMD, and the MoE (established by MACCA in 2013), held five meetings in 2016, as it had in 2015; discussion at these meetings focused on ACAP III, assistance to civilian victims of conflict, and mine/ERW and IED civilian victims specifically, as an added value of the victim assistance pillar of the mine action.[35] In 2017, through the end of July, three victim assistance coordination meetings were held to discuss issues of national ownership and the roles of ministries, coordination of activities, and funding raising.[36]

Several other coordination groups regularly held meetings relevant to victim assistance and disability rights, both nationally (from Kabul) and at the regional level. The various coordination group meetings included the following:

  • The Disability Stakeholders Coordination Group (DSCG) (Chaired by the deputy minter of MoLSAMD) conducted 10 meetings in 2016, compared to nine in 2015, with topics including the amending disability law, CRPD reporting, consideration of an independent directorate for disability issues, disability employment within government agencies, and annual events. Another three DSCG meetings through June 2017 focused on amendments to the national disability law.
  • The Disability and Physical Rehabilitation Taskforce (coordinated by the MoPH) held six working group meetings in 2016, compared to five in 2015, an accomplishment being the revision and continued updating of a new disability and physical rehabilitation strategy, disability certification guidelines, and training of physiotherapists and prosthetic technicians. In April 2017, the Physical Rehabilitation Taskforce meeting addressed the annual action plan for Afghan year 1396 (2017–2018).
  • The Advocacy Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ACPD) includes advocacy meetings and events on a wide range of issues held by diverse actors from the sector. In April 2017, ALSO hosted an ACPD meeting where committee members jointly finalized the committee’s three-year (2017–2020) strategic action and 2017 action plan. Three ACPD meetings were held in 2017 through June, with the focus on nationwide disability survey planning.
  • The Afghan CBR Network (coordinated by the MoPH-DRD) conducted three meetings in 2016, compared to two meetings in 2015, and discussed implementation of the CBR program carried out in 20 out of 34 provinces of Afghanistan.
  • The Inclusive Child Friendly Education-Coordination Working Group (ICFE-CWG); chaired by the MoE held 10 meetings in 2016, 11 meetings in 2015, and 10 in 2014, and discussed implementation of the Inclusive Education policy and other relevant issues.
  • The Inter-ministerial Committee on Disability; chaired by MoLSAMD also holds occasional meetings.[37] More generally national and regional meetings of the UNCHR-led Afghanistan Protection Cluster (APC) were conducted to avoid duplication and coordinate activities concerning protection of the civilians.

In October 2016, the MoLSAMD, with the support of Counterpart International and USAID, held a two-day national conference, the National Conference for Persons with Disabilities, in Kabul with 450 participants, including the representative of Executive of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the first lady, ministers and deputy ministers, representatives of the national and international institutions, and key stakeholders from provinces, including representation by persons with disabilities. The government affirmed its commitment to the rights of persons with disabilities, specifically capacity-building and vocational training. Problems and challenges, as well as probable future obstacles, were discussed.[38] In cooperation with MoLSAMD, the ACAP III technical advisor provided substantive support to MoLSAMD for the 2016 National Disability Conference.[39]

In follow-up to the National Conference for Persons with Disabilities in Afghanistan, in May 2017 a conference entitled the Afghan Disability Rights Conference: From Policy to Programming was held at the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, DC, with 150 participants joining panel discussions and sharing of ideas. Mine/ERW survivors were mentioned together with other persons with disabilities and a mine survivor and persons with disabilities participated on panels.[40]

Reporting

Afghanistan provided information on progress in and challenges to victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Chile and intersessional meetings in 2016. Afghanistan presented victim assistance developments at the Convention on Cluster Munitions Sixth Meeting of States Parties in September 2016.[41] Afghanistan continued to make extensive use of all sections of its Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report for 2016. Afghanistan also included detailed reporting on victim assistance activities in its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reporting for 2016.[42]

Survivor inclusion and participation

Persons with disabilities and their representative organizations were included in decision-making and participated in the various coordination bodies. However, it was reported that their views were not fully taken into account. Survivors and other victims were involved in short-term decisions only, being invited to meetings was seen as a means of pacification.[43] It was reported that survivors involved in planning and coordination presented ideas and had expectations that they would be considered, but the implementing organizations, government, and donors were not able to respond to all the needs survivors presented.[44] With only a few organizations involved in implementation of victim assistance projects, survivors were not adequately included in service provision.[45]

The inclusion of persons with disabilities, survivors—and their representative organizations, if and where they existed—remained totally insufficient. Participation was generally not effectively included as an essential component of activities.[46]

Some NGOs had a proportion of employees who were persons with disabilities. The ICRC Afghan Physical Rehabilitation Program was managed by persons with disabilities. The rehabilitation program maintained a policy of “positive discrimination,” employing and training only persons with disabilities. Service provision was entirely managed by survivors and persons with disabilities, including technical and administrative positions. The ICRC continuously consulted with and involved survivors in the decision-making process as survivors were fully integrated into its operations. The positive discrimination policy also aimed to demonstrate that persons with disabilities are an asset to society, not a burden.[47] HI staff in Afghanistan included 14% of persons with disabilities.[48] At HI rehabilitation centers 19% physical rehabilitation center staff are persons with disabilities, most of them being mine survivors.

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

MoLSAMD

Government

Technical support, training, and coordination; providing pensions and allowances, organizing of service for survivors with disabilities and families of persons killed

MoPH

Emergency and continuing medical care, medication, surgery, awareness-raising, counseling (supported by the World Bank, UN, and donors), physical rehabilitation and psychosocial support

MoE

Inclusive education and assistance through education

Afghan Amputee Bicyclists for Rehabilitation and Recreation (AABRAR)

National NGO

Physiotherapy, education, and vocational training; sport and recreation; capacity-building for local civil society organizations (CSOs) and disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs)

Afghan Landmine Survivors Organization (ALSO)

Advocacy workshops and implementing services through local partners; referral of students to education centers from basic to advanced level; research and promoting access to education

Community Center for Disabled People (CCD)

Social and economic inclusion and advocacy; art training for war survivors and job placement

Development and Ability Organization (DAO)

Social inclusion, advocacy, rehabilitation, and income-generating projects

Kabul Orthopedic Organization (KOO)

Physical rehabilitation and vocational training

Rehabilitee Organization for Afghan War Victims (ROAWV)

Economic inclusion training and awareness raising

Empor Organization (EO)

For profit organization

Physical rehabilitation and prosthetics; technical support for advanced technology limbs for ACAP III beneficiaries

Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC)

National organization

Awareness-raising and rights advocacy program for DPOs; monitoring

EMERGENCY

International NGO

Operating surgical centers in Kabul, the Panjshir Valley, and Lashkar-gah and a network of first aid posts and health centers

Handicap International (HI)

Victim assistance, disability advocacy and awareness, capacity-building of disabled persons’ and survivors’ organizations; physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics, rehabilitation training

Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA-RAD)

Health care, CBR, physical rehabilitation, psychosocial support, economic inclusion through revolving loans, inclusive education, advocacy, and capacity-building

ICRC

International organization

Emergency medical care; physical rehabilitation, including physiotherapy, prosthetics, and other mobility devices; economic inclusion and social reintegration, including education, vocational training, micro-finance, and employment for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors and Ministry of Defense/military casualties; schools for orthopedic technicians and physiotherapists; sport and support to the Paralympic Committee

 

Emergency and continuing medical care

The health sector in Afghanistan was not reaching as many people as needed services and a more inclusive policy and implementation was required. Difficulty with human resources as well as conflict within the national government made the delivery of inclusive public health and affected all Afghans difficult, especially persons with disabilities.[49]

Conflict in Afghanistan resulted in the need for an increase in medical care, while there were fewer resources available. As was the case in recent years, many of the weapon-wounded patients treated at ICRC-supported hospitals were injured by mines or ERW: 679 out of 1,850 (or 37%) in 2016, and 1,065 of the 2,202 (or 48%) reported for 2015.[50] In 2016, more than 1,500 weapon-wounded people reached the hospitals by means of an ICRC-funded transport system of taxis and ICRC vehicles.[51] In 2015, some 2,100 weapon-wounded people reached the hospitals through the system, 1,600 people in 2014, and 1,000 in 2013.[52]

The number of newly registered amputees recorded in the ICRC orthopedic center data demonstrated that the number of survivors and amputees remained constant since 2013:

  • 2014: 1,318 amputees registered, including 538 mine survivors, 51 other war incidents, and 729 persons amputated for other reasons;
  • 2015: 1,261 amputees registered, including 521 mine survivors, 47 other war incidents, and 693 persons amputated for other reasons;
  • 2016: 1,317 amputees registered, including 525 mine survivors, 44 other war incidents, and 748 persons amputated for other reasons; and
  • January–June 2017: 560 amputees registered, including 238 mine survivors, 26 other war incidents, and 296 persons amputated for other reasons.[53]

During 2016 and through July 2017, ACAP III provided some 11,400 war victims with immediate assistance packages of food and non-food items.[54]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

Physical rehabilitation was not available in all provinces of Afghanistan.Rehabilitation centers were concentrated in 16 of the 34 Afghan provinces and patients were often forced to travel long distances to access services. Six rehabilitation centers faced funding shortages in 2016–2017.[55] DAO reported that the provision of physical rehabilitation was “tremendously reduced” in both its physical rehabilitation centers in Kunar and Uruzgan province due to a severe funding problem. As a result, persons with disabilities in these provinces remained without prosthetic limbs in 2016–2017.[56] Previously, in 2015–2016, DAO had managed to increase coverage and the number of people served by establishing a new fixed and mobile physical rehabilitation center for persons with disabilities, covering all districts of Uruzgan, and nearby districts from Zabul and Daikondi provinces.[57]

A lack of female health service providers especially in the field of physical rehabilitation was a challenge in rural areas, which resulted in women and girls with disabilities having less access to services.[58]

Through ACAP III an additional seven rehabilitation facilities (three static centers and four mobile centers) were established in Khost, Uruzgan, Faryab, Kunduz, Kabul, and Farah provinces. In 2016, UNMAS/DMAC established physical rehabilitation centers in Khost and Farah provinces. The project, implemented by AABRAR, started in September 2016 and was completed by the end of April 2017. The Khost and Farah centers delivered 176 prostheses among the 2,416 direct beneficiaries receiving rehabilitation services. Additionally, disability awareness and advocacy training was provided to 2,917 people at the centers.

Physiotherapists in Afghanistan are mostly employed by NGOs and international organizations. The goal for long-term sustainability of rehabilitation is to gradually shift services into government institutions, as the medical sector is improved and is able to take over the provision of rehabilitation services.[59]

Delivery of prostheses in the seven ICRC centers in 2016 totaled 4,321, 59% (or 2,553) of which were for mine/ERW survivors;[60] in 2015, 4,120 (2,474 of which were for mine/ERW survivors).[61] In the first six months of 2017, 2,072 prostheses were manufactured, 1,227 of them for mine/ERW survivors. Over several years to 2017, the ICRC program has been facing a worrying increase in the number of children affected by cerebral palsy (CP) or who are spinal cord injured (paraplegics and tetraplegics) as these two categories of disability were totally neglected by the health system. New units had to be created, training organized, and qualified staff increased. ICRC requests for an intervention of the MoPH, through its DRD, were not responded to and governmental hospitals were not providing assistance.[62]

In support of the national and local authorities HI began a project to harmonize training curricula for local physiotherapist and orthopedic technicians, opened training centers in seven provinces (in Kandahar, Herat, Nangarhar, Balkh, Takhar, Kapisa, and Kabul), and increased the capacity of the existing rehabilitation facilities. The EU-funded project, Toward Improved Access to Quality Physical Rehabilitation in Afghanistan (TIQRA), launched in December 2015, supports the government of Afghanistan to improve the of delivery of public health services with a special focus on contributing to the expansion of and improved access to quality physical rehabilitation in underserved areas. A consortium of three partners: HI (as lead organization), Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC), and Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) were implementing the project.[63]

In Lashkar Gah, Helmand province, the planning for the construction of a new ICRC orthopedic center was in progress in 2017. The center was designed to provide Helmand with a permanent and well-equipped rehabilitation center to replace the existing functional but temporary facility.[64] State plans for 2017–2018 included establishing three physical rehabilitation centers in Khost, Farah, and Kunar provinces respectively, funded by Canada through the UN Voluntary Trust Fund.[65] The MoPH maintained a priority list of provinces for future expansion of rehabilitation and prosthetic services under the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS). It was planned to have nine physical rehabilitation centers placed under the supervision of the MoPH over a period of 10 years.[66]

The ICRC reported that, as acknowledged by the MoPH authorities, it would be unrealistic to consider the government capable of ensuring the required rehabilitation services itself. It is anticipated that it will take years before the national authorities have the capacity to fully manage the long-term functioning of services.[67]

ACAP III provided home-based physiotherapy to civilian victims of conflict in all 34 provinces of Afghanistan. Physiotherapists also provided referrals to local facilities and travel assistance. In 2017, ACAP III was providing a limited number of amputees with high-tech electric upper limbs for the first time in Afghanistan, with technical support for UNMAS from the EMPOR Organization.[68]

Social and economic inclusion and psychological support

A lack of dedicated resources severely inhibited capacities to provide employment for persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors.[69] The ICRC secured employment for persons with disabilities[70] and supported vocational training.[71] The ICRC also provided micro-credits for persons with disabilities and their families, distributed stationery kits to students, and supported home tuition for children.[72] From September 2015 through June 2016, the CCD implemented a project to support the war victims in Kunduz province.[73]

The ACAP III project supported 4,300 eligible war victims, including mine/ERW-affected victims, with tools based on their economic reintegration needs.[74]

A lack of psychosocial support, particularly peer support, has remained one of the largest gaps in the government-coordinated victim assistance and disability programs, although some national and international NGOs provided these services. Psychosocial counseling services were provided to civilian conflict victims nationwide through ACAP III.[75] During 2016 through July 2017, a total of 12,500 eligible war victims received psychological support and counseling through ACAP III.[76]

Overall there were very limited opportunities for sports for persons with disabilities throughout the country. The ICRC offered persons with disabilities social inclusion opportunities and also continued to promote a wide range of sporting activities.[77] The Afghanistan men’s and women’s wheelchair basketball national teams were sponsored to travel abroad to compete in international tournaments.[78]

In 2016, UNMAS could not financially support inclusive education training due to lack of funding. Other stakeholders, including SERVE, SCA, and AAR Japan, continued to provide financial and technical support for inclusive education training of MoE school teachers and enrolment of children with disabilities in general schools (at least 1,600 beneficiaries from 2016 through July 2017).[79] Through August 2017, UMMAS/DMAC only had enough resources available for its victim assistance department to provide technical support for inclusive education activities of the MoE. UNMAS/DMAC continued to seek funding to support inclusive education directly as had been the case until 2014.[80] ALSO held a conference on the results of its study on education needs in 2017. The main objective was to promote access of persons with disabilities to primary, secondary, and higher education.[81]

Gender

Many NGOs, both national and international, provided assistance to women with disabilities in major provinces. However, women with disabilities in remote provinces and districts required more support. The Mine Action Program of Afghanistan (MAPA) Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2014–2016, including victim assistance, was addressed through coordination and gender mainstreaming officers in NGOs.[82] The Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2014–2016 stated, “Existing discrimination and bias sometimes mean that women can be hard to reach when implementing surveys and as a result, this means that their priorities–frequently the priorities of their children and of basic community survival–can be excluded. In areas such as victim assistance…gender determines the access to and impact of activities and services, where females often face more restrictions compared to males.”[83] In mid-2016, a gender consultant completed in-country assessment of gender considerations in ACAP III and measures to improve gender awareness in MoLSAMD services.[84]

After it expired, the Gender Mainstreaming Strategy 2014–2016 was replaced with a UNMAS/DMAC gender and diversity policy; as well as being represented in the fourth goal (on gender) of the National Mine Action Strategic Plan. A new Gender Associate with UNMAS/DMAC was recruited in March 2017 to coordinate gender issues, including victim assistance and disability contexts.[85]

Services for women and also for children were not sufficient to reach those in need or to cover all disabled women or children in the country.[86]

Laws and policies

The Law on the Rights and Benefits of Person with Disabilities and the Law on the Rights and Benefits for Relatives of Martyrs and Disappeared Persons remained the key legislative provisions. The Law on the Rights and Benefits of Persons with Disabilities was amended[87] in March 2013. However, the law contained discriminatory provisions and was not in conformity with the principles of the CRPD. In 2015, a working committee for amending the disability law was established.[88] By the end of 2016, Afghanistan stated that “the complete amendment of the Law on the Rights and Benefits of Persons with Disabilities has been initiated to comply with the international human rights obligations, as well as to address problems on its practical implementation.”[89] The process of amending the legislation was completed by May 2017 and the draft submitted to Ministry of Justice. The revised law was subsequently returned to MoLSAMD to be sent to Ministry of Justice for approval and publication in official gazette as “The Law of Persons with Disabilities.” The law was pending approval by the national government in August 2017.[90]

According to legislation, persons with disabilities should comprise 3% of state employees. In 2015, the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee reported that many persons interviewed noted that numerous violations of the Law on the Rights and Privileges of Persons employment quota occurred due to bribery and nepotism that resulted in job opportunities being taken away from persons with disabilities.[91]

The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination and requires the provision of assistance to persons with disabilities, which include healthcare and financial protection.[92] In 2017, it was reported that “in practice, the situation is quite different and many persons with disabilities are deprived of basic rights.”[93]

Except the monthly pension, no other resources were allocated for victims or survivors directly.[94] Pensions are reported to be “totally insufficient” and not all persons with disabilities were eligible to receive them.[95] Discrimination in the allocation and payment of pensions by which only war victims were entitled to benefits persisted.[96]

Although Afghan disability legislation mandates that ministries, government offices, transportation facilities, and all new public construction should include facilities for the persons with disabilities in their design, it was reported that it rarely occurs.[97] In 2016, MoLSAMD, with support of the World Bank, started renovation of the ministries premises in order to improve accessibility for persons with disabilities in line with accessibility guidelines and standards. The renovation was completed in the first quarter of 2017.[98]

It was reported that although Afghanistan had joined the relevant treaties and conventions, the provisions were not implemented.[99]

In 2015–2016, DAO trained some 500 medical practitioners in the application of the CRPD and its obligations to provide adequate medical care to persons with disabilities.[100] One hundred NGO employees in five provinces[101] were also trained in CRPD and disability rights awareness.[102]

In 2016, Afghan DPOs submitted a detailed parallel (alterative, or “shadow”) CRPD report to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.[103]



[1] Handicap International (HI), “Understanding the challenge ahead: National disability survey in Afghanistan 2005,” Kabul, 2006.

[2] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[3] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[4] For example, HI reported that there are 15 district health clinics in Kandahar province, but none of them provide rehabilitation services. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Juliette Coatrieux, HI, 26 April 2015; and SCA, “SCA Initiates National Physical Rehabilitation Workshop,” 29 December 2014. See also SCA, “Commitment for Change: Strategic plan 2014–2017,” undated.

[5] Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.

[6] Response to Monitor questionnaire by MACCA (consolidated questionnaire including information from MoE, MoLSAMD, and MoPH), April 2015.

[7] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Islam Mohammadi, Executive Director, ALSO, 30 July 2017.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

[9] Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

[10] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[11] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[12] “Financial Access to Rehabilitation Services in Afghanistan in 2016,” cited in response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[13] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[14] UNMAS and USAID, “Monthly Status Update – July 2016 Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III),” August 2016.

[15] UNMAS and USAID, “Monthly Status Update – April 2017 Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III),” May 2017; and UNMAS and USAID, “Monthly Status Update – March 2017 Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III),” April 2017.

[18] In Daman, Dand, and Arghandab districts.

[19] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[20] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form J; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), Form H.

[21] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J; and response to Monitor questionnaire by MACCA (consolidated questionnaire, including information from MoE, MoLSAMD, and MoPH), April 2015.

[22] Email from MACCA (consolidated questionnaire, including information from MoE, MoLSAMD, and MoPH), 7 April 2016.

[23] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

[24] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[25] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Email from MACCA (consolidated questionnaire, including information from MoE, MoLSAMD, and MoPH), 7 April 2016; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

[28] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[29] Email from MACCA (consolidated questionnaire, including information from MoE, MoLSAMD, and MoPH), 7 April 2016.

[30] Ibid.; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[31] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Juliette Coatrieux, HI, 26 April 2015.

[32] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[34] USAID, “Afghan Civilian Assistance Program II (ACAP II),” Fact sheet, 11 August 2014.

[35] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J; and email from MACCA (consolidated questionnaire, including information from MoE, MoLSAMD, and MoPH), 7 April 2016.

[36] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[37] Ibid.

[39] UNMAS and USAID, “Monthly Status Update – October 2016 Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III),” November 2016.

[40] The conference was held in partnership with the US International Council on Disabilities, the US-Afghan Women’s Council, Georgetown University’s Center for Child and Human Development, Counterpart International, and Trivision. Embassy of Afghanistan, “Final Report Afghan Disability Rights Conference: From Policy to Programming May 23 and 24, 2017 Washington, DC,” undated, but 2017.

[41] Statements of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014; Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, 9 April 2014; Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San Jose, 4 September 2014; and Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 3 December 2013.

[42] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H.

[43] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[44] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Islam Mohammadi, ALSO, 30 July 2017.

[45] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Shafaq, CCD, 1 August 2017.

[46] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 14 April 2016, and 14 April 2015; and by Omara Khann Muneeb, Director, DAO, 5 April 2016.

[47] ICRC, “The ICRC's physical rehabilitation work in Afghanistan,” Fact sheet, June 2016.

[49] The conference was held in partnership with the US International Council on Disabilities, the US-Afghan Women’s Council, Georgetown University’s Center for Child and Human Development, Counterpart International, and Trivision. Embassy of Afghanistan, “Final Report Afghan Disability Rights Conference: From Policy to Programming May 23 and 24, 2017 Washington, DC,” undated, but 2017.

[50] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 336. The hospitals treated 1,827 weapon-wounded patients in 2014 (a similar number of beneficiaries compared to 2,023 in 2013); 42% (861) were injured by mines/ERW (compared to 47%, 950 in 2014). ICRC, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, p. 282; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014, p. 282.

[51] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, 2017, p. 317.

[52] ICRC, “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015, p. 279; and ICRC, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, 2014, p. 281.

[53] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[54] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bismillah Safi, Admin/Finance Manager, DAO, 30 July 2017.

[57] Daichopan, Zabul and Kijran, Daikondi are closer to Uruzgan. Response to Monitor questionnaire by Omara Khann Muneeb, DAO, 5 April 2016.

[58] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[59] AAPT, “PT Services in Afghanistan,” undated.

[60] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, 2017, p. 319.

[61] ICRC, “Annual Report 2015,” Geneva, 2016, p. 336.

[62] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[63] HI, “Federal Information – Country Card Afghanistan,” August 2016; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Taimur Ahmed, HI, 7 June 2016.

[64] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[65] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[66] These were Kunduz (regional center), Farah, Bamyan, Paktia, Badghis, Baghlan, and Zabul. Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[67] ICRC Physical Rehabilitation Programme (PRP), “Annual Report 2014,” Geneva, 2015; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[68] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[70] More than 40 people gained employment.

[71] Some 390 people attended vocational training.

[72] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, 2017, p. 316.

[73] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Mohammad Shafaq, CCD, 1 August 2017.

[74] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[75] UNMAS, “Portfolio of Mine Action Projects: ACAP III,” undated; and UNMAS and USAID, “ACAP III Monthly Status Updates,” for 2016 and 2017.

[76] Email from ACAP III Data Monitoring Associate, to DMAC, 7 August 2017, cited in response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[77] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, 2017, p. 319; and response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 14 April 2016.

[78] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[79] SCA provided training to 1,400 teachers, SERVE for 100 teachers, and AAR Japan trained 30 child protection officers in two school of Parwan province that resulted in the enrollment of 56 children with hearing, visual, and mental impairments. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form H; and response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[80] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[81] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Islam Mohammadi, ALSO, 30 July 2017.

[82] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Juliette Coatrieux, HI, 26 April 2015; and by Mohammad Naseem, ABRAAR, 22 April 2015.

[84] UNMAS and USAID, “Monthly Status Update – July 2016 Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP III),” August 2016.

[85] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[86] Responses to Monitor questionnaire by Ali Mohabati, Coordinator for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, AIHRC, 9 April 2016.

[87] Articles 4,8, 19, and 24 of the law were amended.

[88] Email from MACCA (consolidated questionnaire, including information from MoE, MoLSAMD, and MoPH), 7 April 2016.

[89] Statement of Afghanistan, Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016.

[90] Response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[91] Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee Vulnerability to Corruption, “Assessment of the Payment System for Martyrs and Persons Disabled by Conflict,” 3 June 2015, p. 5.

[92] US Department of State, “2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan,” Washington, DC, 13 April 2017.

[93] The conference was held in partnership with the US International Council on Disabilities, the US-Afghan Women’s Council, Georgetown University’s Center for Child and Human Development, Counterpart International, and Trivision. Embassy of Afghanistan, “Final Report Afghan Disability Rights Conference: From Policy to Programming May 23 and 24, 2017 Washington, DC,” undated, but 2017.

[94] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Islam Mohammadi, ALSO, 30 July 2017.

[95] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 29 July 2017.

[96] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Bismillah Safi, DAO, 30 July 2017.

[97] Farid Tanha, “Afghanistan: Fighting for Disability RightsDisabled people say they face social prejudice and government inaction,” The Institute for War & Peace Reporting, 6 April 2017.

[98] Statement of Afghanistan, Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2016; and response to Monitor questionnaire by UNMAS/DMAC, 8 August 2017.

[99] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Alberto Cairo, ICRC, 14 April 2016.

[100] The CRPD trainings were conducted in Laghman, Ghazni, Hirat, Kandahar, Takhar, Badakhsahn, Bamyan, Paktia, and Logar.

[101] The provinces were Ningarhar, Kabul, Hirat, Balkh, and Zabul.

[102] Response to Monitor questionnaire by Omara Khann Muneeb, DAO, 5 April 2016.