Angola

Mine Action

Last updated: 07 November 2018

 

Treaty status

State Party to Mine Ban Treaty

State Party
Article 5 deadline: 31 December 2025
Unclear whether on track to meet deadline

State Party to Convention on Cluster Munitions

Signatory

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

89.3km2 CHA and 58.3kmSHA
Massive contamination

Cluster munition remnants

Not known, but low contamination

Other ERW contamination

Heavy contamination

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

The National Intersectoral Commission for Demining and Humanitarian Assistance (Comissão Nacional Intersectorial de Desminagem e Assistência Humanitária, CNIDAH)

The Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED)

Mine action legislation

No national mine action legislation, based on available information

Mine action standards

National Mine Action Standards (NMAS)

Operators in 2017

National:
Four CED operators—the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, The National Institute for Demining (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD), and thePolice Border Guard National commercial companies

 

International:
The HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

Land release in 2017

Landmines

141.6km2 released: 138km2 cancelled, 2.4km2 reduced and 1.18km2 cleared. 3,546 antipersonnel mines and 124 antivehicle mines destroyed
15.15km2 confirmed through survey

Cluster munition remnants

None

Other ERW

3,009 UXO destroyed

Landmines

Three of the 18 provinces still require completion of re-survey in order to provide a comprehensive overview of the national extent of remaining contamination. Ongoing efforts are required to improve data management, in order to capture all land release efforts comprehensively and accurately. The new Article 5 deadline of 2025 is unlikely to be met if current funding levels are not significantly increased

Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordinance.

Mine Contamination

According to its latest Article 7 transparency report, as at April 2018, the Republic of Angola had a total of 1,220 mined areas remaining, covering 147.6km2: 999 CHAs over 89.3km2 and 221 SHAs over 58.3km2.[1] All 18 provinces still contain mined areas.

The report noted, however, that a process was ongoing of updating the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database with additional information from national demining entities, the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) and the National Demining Institute (Instituto Nacional de Desminagem, INAD).[2]

Re-survey of Moxico and Malanje provinces was completed in mid-2017, along with Bengo and Luanda provinces in August/September 2017. This leaves only three provinces where re-survey has yet to be completed: Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, where re-survey efforts were ongoing and due to be completed in 2018; and Cabinda, the only province where re-survey had yet to commence at September 2018.[3]

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province (as of April 2018)[4]

Province

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Bengo

55

4,278,431

0

0

Benguela

71

4,305,107

0

0

Bié

119

6,007,303

0

0

Cabinda

2

49,500

34

7,643,567

Huambo

5

517,497

0

0

Huila

17

3,219,680

0

0

Kuando Kubango

248

22,666,069

0

0

Kunene

33

2,575,367

0

0

Kwanza Norte

41

7,038,501

0

0

Kwanza Sul

127

8,585,995

1

35,000

Luanda

9

1,121,211

0

0

Lunda Norte

N/R

N/R

47

7,756,788

Lunda Sul

9

523,980

96

39,776,600

Malanje

10

1,569,312

0

0

Moxico

186

11,254,849

40

1,196,085

Namibe

3

253,750

0

0

Uige

47

6,513,964

3

1,860,000

Zaire

17

8,823,000

0

0

Total

999

89,303,516

221

58,268,040

Note: N/R = not reported.

One operator estimated, however, that as of April 2018, a total of 1,219 tasks remained to be addressed, with a total estimated size of 92km2. This calculation was made on the basis of the expected outcome of final re-survey efforts across the whole country.[5] If accurate, it would be a very considerable decrease from the national estimate from mid-2014 of almost 129km2 of CHA and 356km2 of SHA.[6]

Angola’s contamination is the result of more than 40 years of internal armed conflict that ended in 2002, during which a range of national and foreign armed movements and groups laid mines, often in a sporadic manner. Historically, the most affected provinces have been those with the fiercest and most prolonged fighting, such as Bié, Kuando Kubango, and Moxico. Landmines affect some of the poorest and most marginalized communities in the country, including those experiencing chronic food insecurity.[7] In 2017, remaining contamination was predominately located in rural, underdeveloped areas.[8] Mines continue to have a significant socio-economic impact for these communities and impede the return of the displaced and block access to land and water.[9]

Much of the land released by mine action is used for agriculture, which is of critical importance for acutely poor communities reliant on subsistence farming. But the lack of safe land also continues to have implications for larger-scale agricultural production as Angola seeks to diversify its sources of national income. CNIDAH confirmed in 2017 that the government was developing a new strategy of economic diversification, including expansion of agriculture, livestock, tourism, and mining, and the presence of mines was a serious impediment to many of these.[10]

Historically, humanitarian demining efforts in Angola have focused on urban and peri-urban areas due to security concerns in the countryside during the years of conflict, and in response to the needs of growing town-based populations afterwards. HALO Trust reported in 2018 that many of the cities and towns in Angola had witnessed significant urban expansion, following reconstruction enabled by mine clearance. At the same time, rural populations have been largely left without support to deal with mine contamination, which for hundreds of communities means living beside minefields, with the daily threat of mines, despite the end of the conflict over 15 years ago.[11]

In 2018, MAG continued to emphasize Angola’s critical need to diversify its economy following the crash in global oil prices in mid-2014. Contamination from mines continued to hamper social and economic development, and new victims continued to be reported, often children, it said. Food security and improved livelihoods remained dependent on access to cleared land for housing, farming, access to water sources, and small market production. As in 2017, a reverse migration continued in its areas of operations, with the return of populations from coastal urban areas to subsistence farming in the provinces, along with the spontaneous return of internally displaced persons and refugee populations.[12]

Cluster munition contamination

The extent to which Angola is affected by cluster munition remnants remains unclear. There is no confirmed contamination, but there may remain abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions. Cluster munition contamination was a result of decades of armed conflict that ended in 2002, although it is unclear when, or by whom, cluster munitions were used in Angola. In 2011, HALO and INAD affirmed that unexploded submunitions remained in Cuando Cubango province.[13]

None of the three international mine action operators working in Angola—HALO, MAG, and NPA—reported encountering any cluster munition remnants in operations in 2017 or the first half of 2018.[14]

The last recorded finding of cluster munition remnants was in August 2016, when HALO found two Alpha submunitions in Cunene province, which were reported by local residents to a HALO survey team during re-survey operations.[15] A number of damaged bomb casings were also found but, according to HALO, it was unclear if the bombs had been fired at a target in the area or if they were jettisoned after an unsuccessful mission and the bomblets scattered on the ground.[16]

HALO stated that this was an isolated case and noted that it had seen very little evidence of cluster munition strikes in Angola. In addition, the majority of bomblets the organization had destroyed were aging items from military stockpiles, which the military had identified and requested the organization to destroy.[17]

According to reports from NGO operators in the national mine action database, cluster munition remnants ceased to be found in significant numbers after 2008, with the exception of HALO reporting finding and destroying 12 submunitions in 2012 and encountering the two above-mentioned submunitions in 2016.As of May 2018, the other clearance operators had not found cluster munition remnants in more than 10 years.[18]

More typical of cluster munition destruction is the disposal of old or unserviceable cluster munitions identified by HALO’s Weapons and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) teams in military storage areas, some of which were earmarked for destruction by the Angolan Armed Forces. Between 2005 and 2012, HALO’s WAD teams reported destroying a total of 7,284 submunitions.[19] In May 2018, HALO confirmed it had not been asked by the military to do any further destruction of cluster munition stockpiles since 2012.[20]

Other explosive remnants of war and landmines

Angola also has a significant problem of ERW, especially unexploded ordnance (UXO).[21]

Program Management

Angola’s national mine action program is managed by two mine action structures. CNIDAH serves as the national mine action center. It reports to the Council of Ministers or, in effect, to the Presidency of the Republic. It also accredits NGOs and commercial demining companies. Under the vice-governor of each province, CNIDAH’s 18 provincial operations offices set annual objectives.

The other coordination body, the the Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED), reports to the newly created Ministry of Social Action, Family, and Women’s Promotion (Ministério da Acção Social, Família e Promoção da Mulher, MASFAMU, formerly the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration, or MINARS). It supports mine clearance in areas where development projects are a priority and is the coordination body for activities conducted by the national public operators (the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the
Police Border Guard).[22] INAD, which was established in 2002 in order to separate coordination and operational roles, is responsible, under the auspices of the MASFAMU, for demining operations and training.

Strategic planning

In 2017, Angola submitted a request to extend its Article 5 deadline for a further eight years, until the end of 2025. Operators commended CNIDAH’s inclusive and participatory approach to the elaboration of the request.[23] The initial version of the request did not contain a detailed workplan or annual clearance targets, but suggested that clearance could gradually phase out, with clearance of less-contaminated provinces completed first.[24]

Angola’s revised extension request, submitted in November 2017, set out annual targets for clearance on a province-by-province basis (see Article 5 section). As of June 2018, no new detailed strategic plan had been published since the expiration of Angola’s 2013–2017 Mine Action Strategic Plan, despite the significant effort made to accurately define all remaining mined areas for inclusion in the initial Article 5 extension request. According to HALO, a key challenge hindering the development of such a strategy or detailed workplan was the difficulty faced by CNIDAH and operators to project and actualize the completion of annual clearance targets on the basis of the severely limited funding available in 2017, along with a lack of engagement from donors on prioritization.[25]

In granting the Article 5 extension request in December 2017, States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty stipulated that Angola should submit an updated workplan to detail activities and land release output projections for the duration of the request period. At the 16th Meeting of States Parties in December 2017, Angola pledged to submit an updated workplan by the 17th Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.[26]

Legislation and standards

There is no national mine action legislation in Angola, based on available information.

According to Angola’s revised November 2017 extension request, a process has been initiated to update its national standards on management and quality control.[27]

Quality management

CNIDAH is responsible for undertaking external quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) of mine action activities, including QC of all completed tasks prior to handover of land to beneficiaries.[28]

In 2017, HALO indicated that QA at provincial level remained generally weak, due to lack of funding and support. The frequency of worksite visits varied between provinces and there was a significant backlog of tasks awaiting formal handover in HALO Trust’s areas of operations, it said. While these were being addressed by joint HALO/CNIDAH post-clearance visits on a province-by-province basis, as an interim measure, informal handovers took place between HALO and local beneficiaries in order to facilitate more timely use of returned land. HALO further reported that CNIDAH was openly requesting donor assistance for improvement of its quality management capacity.[29]

NPA reported that CNIDAH conducted QC on several of its tasks during the year, while MAG stated that the CNIDAH team visited its operations regularly.[30] NPA reported that while CNIDAH’s provincial offices were facing considerable restrictions due to lack of funding, in coordination and with support from NPA, including for transport, tasks carried out in 2017 were eventually quality assured by CNIDAH.[31]

CNIDAH reported in its revised Article 5 extension request that while improvements in its own and the CED’s QC teams had been made, more remained to be done requiring “special measures in relation to this challenge.”[32]

Information management

Angola’s mine action program has been plagued with difficulties in information management for more than a decade, impeding efforts to achieve a comprehensive, accurate understanding of contamination. As a consequence, Angola has made widely different and conflicting claims of the extent of its mine problem. Two issues are at the crux of Angola’s inability to construct a reliable mine action database: on the one hand, CNIDAH’s database does not match NGOs’ own records, while on the other, CED operators fail to report to CNIDAH in the IMSMA format.[33] Operators have persistently raised concerns about inaccurate data, inconsistency and unreliability of information, internal issues within CNIDAH, and lengthy delays in updating data.[34]

In early 2016, IMSMA New Generation (NG) was installed with the help of the GICHD. The cleaning up of discrepancies resulted in significant areas of SHA and CHA being cancelled from the database.[35]

Unfortunately, despite the significant efforts invested in improving the accuracy of the database and progress in reconciling data, these advances were not reflected in the Article 5 extension requests submitted by CNIDAH in 2017. The initial May request contains inconsistencies between key figures in the narrative text and in the supporting annexes, as well as calculation errors.[36] The revised November request is an improvement, though it still contains inconsistencies between figures reported in the request and in annexed tables.

CNIDAH reported in April 2018 that efforts continued in order to harmonize its database with CED data, but stated that further work on use and management of data was needed with respect to INAD, which is the guardian of the IMSMA database for the CED, the Demining Brigades of the Security Unit of the President of the Republic, the Angolan armed forces, and the Angola Border Guard Police.[37]

In 2018, MAG reported that the significant discrepancies in the extension request and between the NGO operators’ reporting and the CNIDAH database had been noted and were in process of being cleared from the IMSMA database.[38] MAG and HALO reported that new figures for the re-survey work they conducted in 2017 in Bengo, Luanda, and Moxico were not reflected in the request, despite the re-survey having been completed by May 2017.[39]

HALO reported that in recent years, due to Angola’s ongoing financial crisis, CNIDAH continued to have difficulties to pay for reliable internet connections that would facilitate basic data transfers. Instead, operators were having to visit CNIDAH in Luanda and transfer data directly via memory sticks.[40]

Operators

Three international NGOs conducted humanitarian demining in Angola in 2017: HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA. Operators included local NGOs, The Association of Mine Professionals (APACOMINAS), Demining and Humanitarian Assistance Organization (ODAH), Union for the Rights to Education, Health and Safety for the Unemployed (UDESSD), and Associação Terra Mãe (ATM).

From 2007 to 2017, collectively the resources of the three largest operators, HALO, MAG, and NPA declined by nearly 90%.[41]

In 2017, HALO employed, on average, 292 staff, a reduction of 23 on the previous year. On average in 2017, 16 manual demining teams were operational along with one mechanical demining team operating a DIGGER tiller, as well as two combined survey, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), risk education, and minefield marking teams.[42]

On 8 March 2017, HALO introduced a “100 Women in Demining in Angola” project, with the aim of empowering 100 women through recruitment, training, and employment across a range of mine action roles, including operations, administration, logistics, and fleet support. The focus of the project was Benguela province, where more than 75 minefields continued to impact local communities and demining operations had stopped in 2014 due to a lack of funding. As of June 2018, HALO reported that 36 women had been trained as deminers, 20 had been trained as paramedic-deminers, and three had been trained as drivers. Demining had included clearance of two minefields totaling 60,000m2, with more than 200 mines and items of UXO destroyed.[43]

HALO reported a significant reduction in demining capacity in Cuito Cuanavale in Kuando Kubango province in the first half of 2017 due to reduced funding, forcing it to suspend all demining operations and the deployment of six local demining teams. Some overall capacity was recovered later in the year as a result of its “100 Women in Demining” project in Benguela province. HALO noted that it considered Cuito Cuanavale to be the most heavily mined town in Africa, despite the removal of more than 35,000 mines in 2005–2017.[44]

At the start of 2017, MAG employed a total of 83 national staff and four international staff, which increased to 98 national staff and five international staff at the end of 2017, as a result of increased funding. It reported training its first female deminers in April 2018. In 2017, it began deploying a Mini-MineWolf 240 and a TEREX Ground Preparation machine.[45]

In 2017, NPA reported that its operational capacity faced two major staff reductions during the year: the number of deminers dropped from 74 in January–February to 44 in December. Mechanical assets could only be financially supported and deployed in the first half of 2017, and operations resumed to manual demining only in July–December 2017.[46] NPA also continued its partnership with international demining NGO APOPO during the year, which employed eight mine detection rat handlers and two mechanical operators, and four deminers from October 2016 to operate a brush-cutter machine.[47]

Collectively, the four CED operators—the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the
Police Border Guard—are working in all18 provinces. They are tasked by the government to clear or verify areas prioritized by national infrastructure development plans.[48] A number of commercial companies[49] operate in Angola and are accredited by and report to CNIDAH, but are mostly employed by state or private companies to verify areas to be used for investment, whether or not they are known to contain SHAs.[50]

Land Release (mines)

Prior to Angola’s submission of its Article 5 deadline extension request in 2017, the various problems with the national database, including the different reporting formats between CNIDAH and CED, made it difficult to describe in detail and with any degree of accuracy the extent of land released in Angola over the years. Additionally, data from the CED and commercial companies have not been made available. Angola did not provide land release results in its Article 7 report for June 2017 to December 2017.

Operators reported an increase in total land release from 138.4km2 released by survey and clearance in 2016 to close to 141.6km2 in 2017. This was due to accelerated efforts to complete re-survey in preparation for the submission of the extension request. The amount of land released through clearance remained steady, dropping only marginally from just under 1.2km2 in 2016 to just over 1.18km2 in 2017, despite funding and capacity for clearance continuing to decrease.[51]

Angola’s progress in land cancelled and reduced through survey has resulted in a hugely significant amount of land release, with close to 274km2 of land released in just two years.

Survey in 2017 (mines)

International operators completed re-survey of Moxico and Malanje provinces in mid-2017, along with Bengo and Luanda provinces in August/September 2017. This leaves only three provinces where re-survey has yet to be completed: Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, where re-survey efforts were ongoing and due to be completed in 2018; and Cabinda, the only province where re-survey had yet to commence at September 2018.[52]

International operators reported cancelling more than 138km2 of SHA through non-technical survey in 2017, and reducing a further 2.4km2 through technical survey, while confirming as contaminated 143 mined areas with a total size of over 15km2 (see table below).[53] This compares to 2016 when nearly 136km2 of SHA was cancelled through non-technical survey, 1.2km2 reduced through technical survey, and 155 areas with a total size of nearly 7.8km2 confirmed as mined.[54]

Mined area survey in 2017[55]

Operator

SHAs cancelled

Area cancelled (m²)

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

HALO (Bengo)

96

61,879,866

55

3,440,820

0

HALO (Benguela)

6

566,723

2

97,300

0

HALO (Bié)

2

20,000

0

0

0

HALO (Huambo)

1

20,600

1

1,971

489,652

HALO (Huila)

0

0

0

0

2,901

HALO (Kuando Kubango)

2

63,250

3

88,500

208,576

HALO (Luanda)

45

15,459,511

9

1,121,211

0

MAG (Moxico)

59

10,131,044

17

769,344

116,669

MAG (Lunda Sul)

99

39,318,011

42

7,260,216

0

MAG (Lunda Norte)

9

6,641,500

0

0

0

NPA (Malanje)

6

803,555

10

1,772,867

1,393,062

NPA (Uige)

6

3,457,953

4

599,046

215,646

Total

331

138,362,013

143

15,151,275

2,426,506

Note: TS = technical survey.

In March 2017, NPA completed re-survey of Malanje province.[56] Its survey output increased dramatically in 2017 to close to 5.9km2 released through non-technical and technical survey, and just under 2.4km2 confirmed, compared with just over 0.6km2 released through survey and 0.4km2 confirmed in 2016. It reported that this was due to refresher trainings for operational staff on land release methodologies and a task which consisted of an old electric power transport line of approximately 18km in length, allowed for a high portion of the land reduced through technical survey, in comparison with survey outputs in 2016.[57] NPA reported that a further 3.25km2 was cancelled as a result of database clean-up in Uige province in 2017.[58]

MAG reported that it completed non-technical re-survey of Moxico province in May 2017, although it noted that CNIDAH only completed updating the IMSMA database with the results in the first quarter of 2018. As of September 2018, non-technical survey in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, which began in June–July 2017, was ongoing, and was expected to be completed by the end of 2018.[59] Its re-survey of Moxico province identified a total of 244 tasks with a total size of more than 13.5km2 remaining. This marked the end of a three-year process to re-survey the province in which a total of 221 tasks were cancelled and 108km2 cancelled or reduced.[60]

HALO Trust completed re-survey of Bengo and Luanda provinces in August and September 2017, however, the results of the re-survey were not included in the figures presented in Angola’s extension request. It intended to start re-survey of the last remaining province, Cabinda, in April 2019 once the rainy season ended, and estimated that it could complete re-survey by September 2019.[61]

Clearance in 2017 (mines)

As set out in the table below, international NGO operators reported clearing a total of over 1.18km2 of mined area in 2017, destroying in the process 3,480 antipersonnel mines, 114 antivehicle mines, and 2,201 ERW.[62] The amount of area cleared is similar to 2016, when NGO operators reported clearing a total of just under 1.2km2 of mined area.[63] However, the amount of mines found and destroyed nearly trebled from 1,255 in 2016, suggesting an improvement in targeted and efficient clearance and land release operations.[64]

Mine clearance in 2017[65]

Operator

Province

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

HALO

Benguela

4

28,780

44

0

110

Huambo

18

364,237

27

9

441

Huila

1

10,828

20

0

1

Kuando Kubango

7

326,062

1,957

16

62

MAG

Moxico

2

291,477

188

88

1,524

NPA

Malanje

13

163,262

1,224

1

53

Uige

2

0

20

0

10

Total

 

47

1,184,646

3,480

114

2,201

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

Additionally, NPA reported destroying 12 antipersonnel mines, four antivehicle mines, and 67 items of UXO in spot tasks in 2017.[66] MAG deployed an EOD team to clear spot tasks, destroying 45 antipersonnel mines, one antivehicle mine, and 545 items of UXO.[67] HALO reported destroying nine antipersonnel mines, five antivehicle mines, and 196 items of UXO in EOD spot tasks.[68]

MAG reported that its significant increase in clearance output in 2017 of nearly 0.29km2 up from 0.16km2 in 2016 was due to the use of a MineWolf 240 as a ground preparation asset, followed by manual clearance.[69]

HALO Trust reported that its decrease in clearance output in 2017, from just over 0.8km2 in 2016 to just under 0.7km2 in 2017, was a direct result of experienced demining capacity having to be suspended due to lack of funding where operations were ongoing, while a new capacity had to be recruited and trained in new areas, where new funding was able to be secured.[70]

In 2016, HALO Trust launched a “Mine Impact Free Huambo” initiative, with the goal of completing clearance of Huambo province by end-2018. With support from a consortium of partners including the United States (US), Switzerland, and Japan, along with the Canton of Bern and DIGGER Foundation, HALO Trust aimed to deploy 10 demining teams and a DIGGER D-250 tiller to complete clearance of Huambo within three years.[71] As of July 2018, HALO reported that five minefields remained to be cleared, and if access to one minefield around an ammunition storage area at a military base was granted, it believed that clearance of Huambo province would be completed before the end of 2018.[72]

Following completion of re-survey in 2017, NPA reported completing clearance of all known and registered tasks in Malanje province as at end-May 2018, marking a highly significant milestone of the first province to be declared free of the threat of mines in Angola, following official declaration by CNIDAH.[73]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

No land containing cluster munition contamination was reported to have been released by clearance or survey in 2017.

Land release of other explosive remnants of war

HALO used funding from the US Department of State to respond to 131 EOD call-outs across six other provinces during the year.[74]

Deminer safety

HALO Trust reported that on 13 February 2018 one of its deminers was severely injured after he initiated a Soviet-made fragmentation mine that had fallen off its wooden stake and both tripwire and mine had become buried below the surface.[75]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with
the eight-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Angola is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is unclear whether it will meet this deadline.

According to its revised November 2017 extension request, Angola intends to meet the following annual milestones: 176 mined areas addressed in 2018; 189 mined areas addressed in 2019; 190 mined areas addressed in 2020; 188 mined areas addressed in 2021; and 688 mined areas addressed in 2022–2025.[76] At the same time, annexed tables accompanying the revised request contain a more detailed breakdown of annual targets for remaining contamination to be addressed. However these figures are inconsistent with the annual targets in the request itself, and with the conflicting total estimates of contamination reportedly remaining to be addressed.

At the 16th Meeting of States Parties, Angola was requested to provide an updated and detailed workplan providing greater clarity on the amount of remaining contaminated area and milestones for completion. The Article 5 Committee noted that this workplan should contain an updated list of all areas known or suspected to contain antipersonnel mines, annual projections of which areas would be dealt with by which organizations during the remaining period covered by the request and a detailed updated budget.[77] Angola pledged to submit this updated workplan by the 17th Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.[78]

In 2018, HALO, MAG, and NPA, reported that Angola’s new Article 5 deadline of 2025 would not be met if current funding levels are not significantly increased.[79] All three operators were badly affected by the US’s decision to pull its funding for mine action in Angola, which ended in April 2018.[80]

In 2017, annual funding was only 19% of the then projected amount needed ($275 million) to complete mine clearance by the end of 2025.[81] In 2016, the loss of funding from the European Union (EU) Development Fund for demining impacted all international operators with demining effectively coming to a halt in five provinces (Bié, Benguela, Cunene, Kwanza Sul, and Kwanza Norte).[82] A steady decline in funding continued in 2017, culminating in the critical loss of US funding for mine action operations in April 2018. Prior to that, US support had accounted for 80% of all funding for mine action in Angola following the withdrawal of the EU in 2016.[83]

According to HALO Trust, with the lack of a strategic plan in place for 2018 or going forward, only individual donor workplans as brokered by operators existed, which were endorsed by CNIDAH.[84]

The revised November 2017 extension request indicates that the total cost for activities planned during the period of the extension is US$348 million.[85] According to the revised 2017 extension request, two roundtables will be held in 2017–2018 with potential donors from the banking, industrial, steel and other sectors, with the aim of mobilizing public, private, national, and foreign resources.[86] A roundtable to this effect was held in June 2017, followed by a larger conference in November 2017.[87] According to the revised extension request, a strategy for a thematic approach to funding will also be developed. The request states that mobilization of national funding will require persuasion of “competent bodies of the Angolan State, through existing legal planning mechanisms for this purpose,” adding that CNIDAH is primarily responsible for the implementation of the strategy, which it said is already in progress.[88]

The government of Angola has provided significant funding for demining, but almost exclusively in support of major infrastructure projects, and it has faced severe budget cuts following the global crash in oil prices. Clearance of rural areas has typically not been funded by the government, and assistance from international demining organizations has been vital to clear poor and rural areas.[89] Despite not funding mine action by international operators directly in 2017, the government did continue to make available in-kind support, such as free use of land for office compounds, and institutional incentives such as tax exemptions on the import of goods.[90] However, according to MAG, a new tax code introduced in 2018 restricted tax-exempt items to uniforms, blankets, and tents only, while its primary import costs were from cars and spare parts and no longer tax-exempt.[91]

News that clearance of two provinces, Malanje and Huambo, are on-track to being reported completed by 2018 is highly encouraging. Completion of these provinces will be major steps forward for Angola’s mine action program and a demonstration that meaningful progress is achievable to reach Angola’s completion target of 2025.

Five-year summary of clearance

Year

Area cleared (km2)

2017

1.2

2016

1.2

2015

4.1

2014

2.2

2013

3.8

Total

12.5

 

Progress Towards Completion of Cluster Munition Clearance

HALO reported in May 2018 that it had not been able to deploy any capacity to address the area around the Alpha bomblets identified during the re-survey of Cunene province in August 2016 due to a lack of funding.[92]

No clearance of cluster munition remnants has been conducted in the past five years.

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8.

[2] Ibid., p. 7.

[3] Ibid., p. 8; and email from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8.

[5] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, Country Director, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[6] Figures as ofJune 2014. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 2013), Form C.

[7] Email from Vanja Sikirica, Country Director, NPA, 11 May 2016; and response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[8] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[9] Ibid.; and from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[10] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 19.

[11] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[12] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[13] Interviews with Jose Antonio, Site Manager, Cuando Cubango, HALO; and with Coxe Sucama, Director, INAD, in Menongue, 24 June 2011.

[14] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 17 May 2018; from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018; and from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.

[15] The Alpha bomblet was developed in Rhodesia in 1970 and later in South Africa in the 1980s. It was produced to be incorporated into the CB470 cluster bomb, which contained 40 Alpha submunitions each and were designed to be dropped from baskets or “hoppers” in the bomb bays of bomber aircraft. Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 2 May 2017; and Weapons Systems, “CB470,” undated.

[16] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 3 May 2017.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Prior to this, as of February 2008, NPA reported clearing 13 submunitions in Kwanza Sul province; MAG reported clearing 140 submunitions in Moxico province; and HALO reported clearing 230 submunitions in Bié province. NPA reported finding no cluster munition remnants during its operations in northern Angola, with the exception of a small number of submunitions found in 2008. Menschen gegen Minen (MgM) reported that no cluster munition remnants had been discovered in its areas of operations in southeast Angola from 1997 through to May 2016, including near Jamba, an area in the southeast of the province where contamination might have been expected. Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO, 19 March 2013; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; from Kenneth O’Connell, Technical Director, MgM, 5 May and 15 June 2016; from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 17 May 2016; from Bill Marsden, Regional Director, East and Southern Africa, MAG, 18 May 2016; and from Mohammad Qasim, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/CNIDAH, 22 February 2008.

[19] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO, 19 March 2013.

[20] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 17 May 2018.

[21] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email, 17 May 2016.

[22] Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.

[23] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[24] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 19.

[25] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[26] Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, Mine Ban Treaty 16thMeeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.

[27] Mine Ban Treaty Second revised Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 November 2017, p. 14.

[28] Ibid.; and emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[29] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[30] Emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[31] Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.

[32] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 14 November 2017, p. 14.

[33] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2016; and interview with Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, in Geneva, 10 April 2014.

[34] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017, and 11 May 2016; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017, and 17 October 2016;and from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 17 May 2016.

[35] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 12; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 7.

[38] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[39] Ibid; and, email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.

[40] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[41] Chris Loughran and Camille Wallen, “State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment,” MAG and HALO Trust, December 2017.

[42] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[46] Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018.

[47] Email from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017.

[48] CNIDAH, “Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period,” June 2014, p. 6.

[49] Including: Yola Comercial, Fragilpe, Kubuila, Prodminas, Mavaarum, OJK, VDS, PAFRA, Anglowest, Sedita, Teleservice, and Grupo Everest. CNIDAH, “Angola: workplan 2014–17 for the Ottawa Convention Article 5 extension period,” June 2014. According to CNIDAH, a total of 25 commercial companies conducted demining activities from 2012–2016. Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 11 May 2017, p. 17.

[50] Email from Joaquim Merca, CNIDAH, 12 May 2014.

[51] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018; and questionnaire response by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[52] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8; and email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.

[53] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[54] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[55] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018. NPA reported that five of the 10 areas it confirmed as CHAs in Malanje province in 2017 referred to new areas, which were not previously recorded as SHAs in the CNIDAH database.

[56] Emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 25 September 2017; and from Nicola Jay Naidu, NPA, 11 September 2018.

[57] Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018. According to NPA, the task consisted of an 18km-long electric power line with poles every 300 meters or so and up to 20 mines surrounding each pole. Full clearance around the poles, combined with exploratory technical survey lines between the poles, accounted for the large increase in reduction through technical survey in 2017.

[58] Emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May and 29 September 2017; and from Nicola Jay Naidu, NPA, 11 September 2018.

[59] Emails from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April and 7 September 2018.

[60] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[61] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.

[62] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

[63] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017; and from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 28 September 2017. Figures reported by NPA include outputs by APOPO’s mine detection rats.

[64] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018; and response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017; and emails from Vanja Sikirica, NPA, 11 May 2017; and from Bill Marsden, MAG, 2 May 2017.

[65] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[66] Email from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018. NPA reported additionally carrying out battle area clearance in 2017, making its total land release figure for the year 2,092,288m2.

[67] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[68] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[69] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[70] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[71] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[72] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 16 September 2018.

[73] Emails from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Nicola Jay Naidu, NPA, 11 September 2018.

[74] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO, 17 May 2018.

[75] Ibid., 15 June 2018.

[76] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request Analysis, 1 December 2017, p. 4.

[77] Ibid., p. 6.

[78] Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, Mine Ban Treaty 16thMeeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.

[79] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[80] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.

[81] Stratton and Loughran, “Issue Brief: Time to Change Course, Angola and The Ottawa Treaty,” MAG, April 2017.

[82] Ibid.; and emails from Gerhard Zank, 17 May and 17 October 2016. The EU has been a major donor in Angola. In 2013, its office in Angola announced it would provide another €20 million ($25 million) for mine action in 2013–2017. After delays that slowed demining operations, €18.9 million ($25 million) was finally provided through the 10th European Development Fund. However, support for demining from the Fund ended in 2016.

[83] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018; and Loughran and Wallen, “State of Play: The Landmine Free 2025 Commitment,” MAG and HALO Trust, December 2017.

[84] Email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018.

[85] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 14 November 2017, p. 25.

[86] Ibid., p. 21.

[87] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 10 September 2018.

[88] Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), 14 November 2017, p. 21.

[89] Response to questionnaire by Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 22 May 2017.

[90] Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.In 2017, MAG reported that in-kind support from the government of Angola continued in the form of rent-free operations base, field camp, and training area, and that deminers had received plots of land for farming or housing in the past. HALO reported that its compounds and camps/office facilities were operated on rent-free land provided by relevant provincial governments in Huambo, Kuito, Menongue, and Cuito Cuanavale.

[91] Email from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 10 September 2018.

[92] Ibid., and 3 May 2017. After finding the two Alpha bomblets in August 2016, HALO was planning to carry out limited battle area clearance around the reported area until fade-out. They were intending to perform this work, subject to funding, in July or August 2017, during Angola’s dry season when items can be more easily seen.