Iraq

Mine Action

Last updated: 16 November 2018

 

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party
Article 5 deadline: 1 February 2028
Not on track to meet deadline

Convention on Cluster Munitions

State Party
Article 4 deadline: 1 November 2023
Not on track to meet deadline

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

National Higher Council for Mine Action (NHCMA)
Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) manages three Regional Mine Action Centers (RMACs) in the center and the south
Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) coordinates four directorates in the Kurdish Region of Iraq (KRI)

United Nations agencies

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

Strategic plans

The Article 5 deadline extension request is Iraq’s formal strategic plan, although it has been overtaken by the need to address the massive contamination resulting from the conflict with non-state armed group Islamic State

Mine action standards

National Mine Action Standards
A national standard on IEDs was introduced in 2016

Operators in 2017

National:
Ministry of Defense
Civil Defense
IKMAA
Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Company
al-Safsafah Mine Action Company
Akad International Company for Mine & UXO Clearance
Al-Fahad Co. for Demining
Al-Danube


International:
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
Danish Demining Group (DDG)
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International)
iMMAP (for information management)
Janus Global Operations (no accreditation, provided management for Al-Fahad)
Optima (no accreditation, provided management for Al-Fahad)

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

1,219km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination (not including improvised mine contamination. Identified IED contamination of 185km2, which may in fact amount to antipersonnel mines)[1]
Extent of contamination: massive

Cluster munition remnants

131.07km2 CHA and 33.47km2 SHA
Extent of contamination: heavy

Other ERW contamination

Heavy ERW contamination

Land release in 2017

Landmines

Land release results are not comprehensive, and it is not possible to reconcile the various data sources
At least 16.27km2 of antipersonnel and improvised mine contaminated areas cleared, with the destruction of at least 12,531 antipersonnel mines
At least 23.15km2 of antivehicle mine contaminated areas cleared. Number of antivehicle mines destroyed not reported
Additionally, 55km2 of IED clearance was reported with the destruction of 13,212 IEDs. However, as the device types are not specified, it is not possible to know how much of this was improvised mine clearance. Large areas of this land were reported as cleared with no devices destroyed

(See land release section for details of survey and clearance operations and results)

Cluster munition remnants

22.45km2 CHAs confirmed
4,7 km2 cleared and 1,188 submunitions cleared
These are official figures. However, there are major inconsistencies in reporting

(See Land Release section for details)

Other ERW

At least 45,124 explosive hazards (IEDs and ERW) but device type not disaggregated, and it is not possible to reconcile the various data sources

Progress

Landmines

Iraq’s priority is the clearance of massive contamination by IEDs, including improvised mines, from areas liberated from Islamic State, in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict, the restoration of public services, and economic recovery

Cluster munition remnants

Iraq’s extensive cluster munition contamination, competing mine action priorities, and funding constraints make it improbable it will achieve its cluster munition clearance deadline in five years

Notes: IEDs= improvised explosive devices; CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardousarea;ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Mine Contamination

The Republic of Iraq is the world’s most contaminated country by extent of mined area. Legacy mined areas account for most known contamination, and result from the 1980–1988 war with Iran, the 1991 Gulf War, and the 2003 invasion by the United States (US)-led coalition. They include barrier minefields along Iraq’s borders with Iran and Saudi Arabia. In addition, occupation of large areas by Islamic State after 2014 added extensive contamination with improvised mines and other explosive devices. A high proportion of these explosive devices emplaced are antipersonnel mines prohibited under the Mine Ban Treaty.

Federal Iraq

Data provided by the DMA and its information management service provider iMMAP shows Federal Iraq’s extraordinary level of mine contamination, but suffer from inconsistencies. Iraq’s latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report identifies 1,072km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination as of the end of 2017.[2] However, the DMA reported, as of the end of 2017, total mine and IED contamination of 1,193km2, of which 1,008km2 contained antipersonnel mines, and 184.54km2 contained IEDs.[3] Much of this “IED” contamination may in fact amount to antipersonnel mines. The areas contaminated by IEDs, including improvised mines, in areas recaptured from Islamic State have not been subjected to large-scale systematic survey, but are claimed by national authorities to cover hundreds of square kilometers.[4]

Mine and “IED” contamination in Federal Iraq (at end 2017)[5]

Device

CHAs

Area (m2)

SHAs

Area (m2)

Total area (m2)

AP mines

163

339,769,206

28

19,337,541

359,106,747

AV mines

5

87,593

1

13,319

100,912

Mixed AP/AV

1

647,194,904

160

1,979,762

649,174,666

IEDs

106

0

1

184,646,643

184,646,643

Total

275

987,051,703

190

205,977,265

1,193,028,968

 

Earlier, in April 2018, the DMA had reported 1,133km2 of antipersonnel mine contamination in Federal Iraq as of the end of 2017, of which 1,117km2 were CHAs. Based on that estimate (which was revised in September 2018, as per the tables above), the following table shows the breakdown of mine contamination by governorate.

Confirmed antipersonnel mine contamination in Federal Iraq by governorate end 2017[6]

Province

CHAs

Total area (m2)

Babylon

4

192,292,943

Basrah

56

811,120,174

Diyala

4

1,991,255

Missan

208

48,537,781

Muthanna

1

10,479,896

Qadissiya

1

1,000,000

Salah al-Din

13

3,583,399

Thi-Qar

3

3,720,987

Wassit

33

44,782,202

Total

323

1,117,508,637

 

Federal Iraq “IED” contamination by governorate (at end 2017)

Governorate

SHAs

Area (km2)

Anbar

33

112.39

Babylon

1

2.24

Baghdad

4

63.35

Diyala

6

0.001

Kirkuk

5

0.75

Ninewa

111

5.91

Total

160

184.64

 

Iraqi authorities face an additional challenge managing huge quantities of explosives recovered from mined areas and collected in storage areas. Open source reports have identified 23 explosions at ammunition and explosive storage areas since 2016 resulting in 58 reported deaths and 162 injuries, including 13 explosions in the first eight months of 2018. Twenty people were reportedly killed and 120 injured in June 2018 by detonation of explosives stored by a militia under a mosque in Baghdad’s Sadr City.[7]

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

Antipersonnel mines in the KRI are a fraction of the contamination in central and southern Iraq but the mines left from previous decades would still rank the KRI on its own among the world’s top five most contaminated regions.

IKMAA estimated that legacy mined areas at the end of 2017 covered nearly 226km2, more than half of which is in Sulimaniya (Slemani) governorate, with antipersonnel mines covering almost 211km2. Both figures represented a slight drop from the previous year but did not include areas on the border with Turkey, which have never been surveyed because of insecurity.[8] Continuing fighting and airstrikes in the area reportedly continue to add mine and ERW contamination.

The estimate also did not include extensive areas contaminated by Islamic State-produced mines, which have not been subjected to comprehensive survey. However, most of the Grey Area previously shared between the KRI and Federal Iraq returned to the latter’s control after October 2017 and in the process the KRI was left with only a few small areas affected by such mines of an improvised nature.[9]

KRI mine contamination by device (at end 2017)[10]

Type of contamination

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

Total area (km2)

Antipersonnel mines

2,846

165.20

294

45.59

210.79

Antivehicle mines

10

0.25

2

0.003

0.25

Mixed

97

5.43

17

9.35

14.78

Other (not mines)

5

0.12

0

0

0.12

Total

2,958

171

313

54.94

225.94

 

Antipersonnel mine contamination in the KRI by province (at end 2017)

Governorate

CHAs

Area (km2)

SHAs

Area (km2)

Total area (km2)

Duhok

405

20.21

0

0

20.21

Erbil

335

48.58

0

0

48.58

Garmyan

156

7.73

113

11.75

19.48

Slemani

1,950

88.68

181

33.84

122.52

Total

2,846

165.20

294

45.59

210.79

 

Improvised mines

International operators have encountered a wide variety of improvised devices left by Islamic State but report that the vast majority are victim-activated and meet the Mine Ban Treaty’s definition of an antipersonnel mine. These mines are mostly activated by a pressure plate or “crush necklace” wires sufficiently sensitive to be detonated by the weight of a child and connected to ammonium nitrate-based explosives and fuel. The size of the charge ranges from 3kg to 100kg, which is capable of destroying a vehicle.[11] Mines Advisory Group (MAG) and Janus Global Operations working in northern and central Iraq, respectively, in 2017, both reported such devices made up well over 90% of the items they cleared.[12]

Islamic State used improvised mines in conventional lanes in open country and around the perimeter of villages and access to key buildings. As an example of the scale of the contamination, MAG identified three mine “panels” in the vicinity of Bashiqar (Ninewa governorate) in 2017 stretching over distances of 12km, 18km, and 24km, respectively, with multiple rows of devices spaced at intervals of between one and several meters in straight lines or zigzag patterns. It has also encountered devices loaded with chemical agents.[13]

Islamic State also mined the approaches to buildings and public infrastructure, and extensively booby-trapped private houses and property, posing a lethal threat to civilians returning to their homes. Operators have encountered devices activated remotely, by command wire, or victim initiated by the breaking of an infrared beam. Devices had been concealed in household appliances, furniture, and even syringes. Devices that are not victim activated do not meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine. Where sensitive antihandling devices are fitted, however, this would typically be considered an antipersonnel mine.[14] In Mosul in 2018, operators have continued to find dead bodies wearing suicide vests.[15]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Cluster munition remnants contaminate significant areas in the center and south of Iraq, a legacy of the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion. It reports CHAs containing cluster munition remnants at the end of 2017 as covering a total of 131km2 in eight governorates, an area that was one-third less than at the end of the previous year. However, the reduction in contamination is not explained by the land release results provided for 2017. Three governorates, Basra, Muthanna, and Najaf accounted for 98% of the total.[16]

Iraq’s Kurdish region authorities do not report the presence of any CHAs containing cluster munition remnants but say some contamination remains in Kirkuk and Ninava governorates, believed to be a legacy of US-led coalition air strikes, and operators continue to report clearance of some cluster munition tasks. Operators have reported that these still need to be surveyed to determine the extent of contamination.[17]

Cluster munition contamination (at the end of 2017)[18]

Province

CHAs

CHA area (m2)

SHAs

SHA area (m2)

Anbar

1

15,726

0

0

Basrah

50

7,695,422

0

0

Kerbala

5

1,855,267

3

33,470

Missan

15

481,048

0

0

Muthanna

29

116,779,320

0

0

Najaf

2

3,829,017

0

0

Thi Qar

4

121,394

0

0

Wassit

2

299,143

0

0

Total

108

131,076,337

3

33,470

 

Program Management

Mine action in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA coordinates and manages the sector in Federal Iraq in central and southern Iraq. IKMAA, created in 2004, manages mine action in the four northern governorates that fall within the KRI.

The operating areas of the two authorities changed in 2017. From September 2015, DMA and IKMAA shared operations in a so-called Grey Area, an area of about 69,000km2 that was controlled or contested by Islamic State forces after 2014. The line separating DMA and IKMAA areas of responsibility in the Grey Area was determined by which forces had liberated areas from Islamic State and taken control of the territory. Much of Kirkuk governorate was occupied by the Kurdish peshmerga.[19] After a vote for independence in a referendum in the KRI in September 2017, Iraqi forces took over control of historically contested areas, including Kirkuk governorate, ending the Grey Area.

UNMAS established a presence in Iraq in mid-2015 to assess the extent of the threat of explosive weapons in areas retaken from Islamic State and to help the DMA develop an emergency response. UNMAS has provided “explosive hazard management” to support stabilization and recovery, including the return of people displaced by conflict. Under that mandate, UNMAS contracted implementing partners to undertake assessment, survey, “high-risk” search, and battle area clearance in liberated areas on tasks supporting UN Development Programme (UNDP) stabilization initiatives and in support of the government of Iraq. It also provided training for selected security service and mine action personnel.

By late July 2018, UNMAS had a total of 70 staff, of whom 46 were internationals, working from offices in Baghdad and Erbil. Implementing partners in 2017 included Optima Group and Danish Demining Group (DDG), who operated in Anbar, Kirkuk, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din, governorates.[20]

Federal Iraq

The DMA implements policy set by a National Higher Council for Mine Action (NHCMA) created by, and reporting to, the prime minister, in which the ministries of defense, interior, and oil are major actors. The NHCMA is supported by a Technical Committee, functioning as its secretariat.[21] The Ministry of Oil contracts and manages commercial operators conducting clearance supporting the oil sector.

The DMA has three regional mine action centers (RMACs):[22]

  1. North: covering the governorates of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din;
  2. Middle Euphrates (MEU): Babylon, Baghdad, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiyah, and Wassit;
  3. South: Basrah, Missan, Muthanna, and Thi-Qar.

RMAC-North, based in DMA headquarters in Baghdad covers areas liberated from Islamic State, accounting for Iraq’s contamination by landmines of an improvised nature. In 2018, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) seconded a technical adviser to support RMAC-North.

RMAC-South, based in Basra, which accounts for 71% of confirmed antipersonnel mine contamination (see table below) as well as 95% of Iraq’s cluster munition remnants contamination, was active tasking and coordinating operations by humanitarian clearance agencies but since 2016 has focused on cluster munition remnants not mines.[23]

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

IKMAA functions as a regulator and operator. It reports directly to the office of the prime minister in the Kurdish Regional Government and coordinates four directorates in Dohuk, Erbil, Garmian, and Sulimaniya (Slemani). Despite financial constraints that have halved salaries for all staff, it also operates 27 12-strong manual demining teams, seven mechanical teams, five survey teams, three explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, and 35 quality assurance (QA) teams responsible for accreditation and monitoring the work of all operators.[24]

Operators identified areas affected by mines of an improvised nature for clearance in consultation with district-level authorities and submitted requests for task orders to IKMAA. Areas to which communities were returning were the main priority. IKMAA teams conducted QA.

Strategic planning

Iraq’s Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in April 2017, is Iraq’s formal strategic plan, though it has been overtaken and rendered largely obsolete by the conflict with Islamic State. Federal Iraq’s mine action priority is tackling the massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature as well as ERW in liberated areas to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons, rehabilitation of public services, and restoration of the economy. The scale of the challenge has largely marginalized efforts to address legacy minefields in Federal Iraq.[25]

IKMAA continued to identify extension request targets and clearance of legacy minefields as a priority. IKMAA’s priorities for areas affected by legacy minefields include clearing agricultural land, infrastructure, tackling CHAs close to populated areas, as well as areas reporting most mine incidents and casualties. Operators have already completed clearance of high-risk areas and are now focused on medium-risk tasks, including mined areas close to villages and impacting key infrastructure. IKMAA started work on a five-year strategy in the last quarter of 2017 after the referendum and the loss of control over much of the Grey Area.[26]

The extension request prepared with the support of UNMAS set out separate two-year and 10-year workplans for the DMA and for IKMAA, which detail projected expenditure but provide no information on operations or priorities. It said the two-year work plans were based on existing capacity and described the 10-year plans as “aspirational” and dependent on attracting international donor funding.[27]

The DMA envisaged expenditure of $30 million in 2018–2019 and $238 million over the 10-year period to the end of 2027. IKMAA proposed expenditure of almost $25 million in 2018–2019 and $247 million over the same 10-year period. The projected expenditure targeted clearance of legacy minefields only and not the cost of operations tackling mines of an improvised nature, cluster munition remnants, or other ERW.[28]

The request identifies a range of factors that have slowed the progress of mine action:[29]

  • Insecurity due to the conflict with Islamic State;
  • Extensive additional contamination as a result of conflict;
  • Lack of funding;
  • Lack of information because the Ministry of Defense lost all minefield maps after the change of regime in 2003;
  • Lack of technical expertise and capacity.

Iraq does not have a strategic plan for the clearance of cluster munition remnants. Its vision for mine action is “Iraq free from the impact of mines and explosive remnants of war, including cluster munitions.”[30] In the south, RMAC-S and NPA have developed a long-term operating plan and system of prioritizing tasks taking account of accidents, land use, and beneficiaries.[31]

Legislation and standards

It is planned to revise Iraq’s national mine action legislation. Its national mine action standards are largely consistent with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and include small adjustments to reflect national conditions. The DMA introduced a national standard on IEDs in 2016 and is working with UNMAS to update the standard on IEDS based on the experience gained in tackling dense contamination in areas liberated from Islamic State since 2016.[32]

In the meantime, accreditation for IED disposal has been based on military standards with operators adapting mine clearance and battle area clearance (BAC) operating procedures to suit security conditions and the local environment in their areas of activity. Operators employed national staff to conduct technical survey and mark items for clearance and restricted minesof an improvised natureand IED disposal to team leaders, supervisors, and international staff. In areas close to active hostilities, operators applied their own minimum security criteria. These included an absence of Islamic State activity for a specified period of time, minimum distances from, and no line of sight to, an Islamic State frontline position.[33]

Quality management

The DMA and IKMAA both undertake QA/quality control (QC). The DMA has five teams based in Baghdad undertaking QA or QC as required in different locations and further QA/QC capacity in RMAC-N and RMAC-S. The extent of their operations is unclear. The DMA also contracts other organizations to conduct QC. Danish Deming Group (DDG) undertakes QC on clearance operations by commercial companies under contract to the Ministry of Oil.[34]

UNMAS Iraq requires implementing partners to have internal quality management systems providing for QA/QC. It says that it conducts joint QA with the DMA, and that staff from itsExplosive Hazard Management project conduct in-progress and post-clearance inspection of each individual task as required.[35]

IKMAA reported it had 37 active teams conducting QC in the KRI and Kurdish-controlled areas of the Grey Area in 2017.[36]

Information management

The DMA and IKMAA operate Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) NG databases that are operated by iMMAP, a service provider working under contract to the US Department of State’s Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA). The DMA central database is located at its Baghdad headquarters. RMAC South maintains a database in Basra, receiving reports from demining organizations in its area of operations, and which is synchronized with Baghdad at irregular intervals that are determined by the volume of data to be uploaded. UNMAS implementing partners report directly to UNMAS, which in turn forwards the data to the DMA.

Operators are required to submit results in hard copy delivered by hand to the DMA every month, which then enters results into the database. The procedure meets Iraqi legal requirements, which do not recognize electronic copies, but causes delays of several months in entering survey and clearance data. This has caused problems with task orders.[37] The DMA is trialing electronic data entry for risk education results and plans to expand it to other mine action activities.[38]

Operators

International operators

From 2016, the capacity of operators has sharply expanded in Iraq and from the last quarter of 2017 the distribution of that capacity started to shift from the KRI to Federal Iraq. At the end of 2016, five international demining organizations deployed a total of 133 staff in Federal Iraq and more than 630 in the KRI. Only two international demining NGOs operated in Federal Iraq with total of 132 staff. By the end of 2017, those five organizations employed close to 800 staff in Federal Iraq and around 400 in the KRI.[39]

Operators are required to be accredited with the DMA in Federal Iraq and with IKMAA in the KRI. Visa-free entry and a more stable regulatory environment in the KRI made it easier for operators to establish a presence. After the Kurdish referendum on independence in September 2017, Iraqi forces took back control of much of the Grey Area. This moved much of the area liberated from Islamic State and which was heavily contaminated with mines of an improvised nature under the authority of the DMA, increasing pressure on operators to seek DMA accreditation.

In Federal Iraq, operators need to register with the NGO Directorate before seeking DMA accreditation, an opaque process that has sometimes taken years and posed a major obstacle to scaling up capacity for an emergency response to tackling post-Islamic State contamination. Revision of these procedures in 2017 allowed provisional accreditation of five organizations resulting in 2018 opening the way for a rapid expansion of capacity as increased donor funding became available for Iraqi mine action.

International mine action NGOs active at end 2017[40]

Operator

Personnel in Federal Iraq (DMA)

Personnel in KRI
(IKMAA)

Teams

Personnel

Teams

Personnel

DDG

20

101

6

50

FSD

0

0

4

35

HI

0

0

1

7

MAG

60

600

42

280

NPA

10

68

6

32

Total

90

769

59

404

 

Federal Iraq

National organizations undertaking mine clearance include army engineers tasked by the Ministry of Defense. Civil Defense, under the Ministry of Interior, operates around 600 EOD technicians and has a presence in every governorate. It clears ERW, including conventional mines and cluster munitions, but does not tackle mines of an improvised nature or IEDs, which are dealt with by another unit of the Ministry of Interior.[41]

National commercial companies accredited in 2017 included Al-Fahad Co. for Demining, Al-Safsafa, Akad International Co. for Mines, and Al-Danube. Two international commercial companies, Janus Global Operations and Optima, lacked accreditation and provided management for mine action teams provided by Al-Fahad.

Until late 2017, only two international NGOs—DDG and NPA—were active in Federal Iraq but neither conducted clearance of mines, whether commercially produced or of an improvised nature. DDG more than doubled its capacity in Federal Iraq in 2017 to around 100 staff. It started with an office in Basra where it had two BAC teams conducting cluster munition clearance and QC on behalf of the RMAC-S. In the course of the year, it added offices in Mosul and Kirkuk as well as a shared office in Anbar and was contracted by UNMAS to carry out assessments/survey in Mosul governorate.[42] In 2017, DDG declined to undertake clearance of mines of an improvised nature or IEDs, though it received IED accreditation from the DMA in May 2018.[43]

MAG, the longest established international operator after more than 25 years in Iraq, was already much the biggest at the start of 2017. It expanded rapidly during the year, adding 27 teams. Until 2018, MAG operated exclusively in the KRI but after more than three years of trying, it received registration in Federal Iraq in January 2018 and accreditation from the DMA in March. By September 2018, MAG had a total of 65 teams and around 650 personnel working in districts that, until September 2017, had come under IKMAA jurisdiction.[44]

At the start of 2017, NPA had two teams with 49 staff based in Erbil in the KRI and 92 staff in Basra. At the end of the year it restructured its presence in Iraq, moving its country management team to Baghdad in December and was preparing to expand operations into new areas. NPA Basra started 2017 with three survey and five EOD/BAC teams focused on survey and clearance of cluster munition remnants, but added three teams more in the course of 2017. NPA opened offices in Mosul in April 2018 and in Anbar governorate in July 2018.[45]

HALO Trust received provisional accreditation in May 2018 and started operating in Anbar province in July 2018 with a survey team and a mechanical clearance team in Fallujah clearing large defensive mine belts and smaller clusters around houses.[46]

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

IKMAA’s operating capacity remained unchanged from the previous year: 37 demining teams (444 personnel), seven mechanical teams, three EOD teams, five survey teams, 37 QA teams, and 10 risk education teams. IKMAA teams are focused on clearing legacy minefields, prioritizing agricultural land, but it operated under severe financial constraints that led it in 2016 to cut salaries in half.[47]

MAG remained much the biggest international operator with 24 teams operational in the KRI at the end of 2017, including 10 survey and clearance teams, two multi-task teams, a mechanical and mechanical support team, and 10 community liaison teams. MAG continued to clear legacy mined areas and cluster munition contamination but the main focus was on removing belts of mines of an improvised nature in areas liberated from Islamic State in Ninewa governorate.[48]

Three other international NGOs also concentrated on Islamic State’s legacy in liberated areas. NPA had two survey teams and four search teams working in Hamdaniya district of Ninewa governorate.[49] The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), which started operations in Iraq in 2016, had four teams and a total of 35 staff who conducted clearance in Erbil, Kirkuk, and Mosul governorates.[50] Humanity and Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) had three teams, also focused mainly on clearing mines of an improvised nature in Kirkuk province.[51]

Land Release (mines)

Iraq’s top priority in 2017 was clearance of massive contamination by mines of an improvised nature as well as IEDs from areas liberated from Islamic State in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict, the restoration of public services, and economic recovery. In Federal Iraq, operators focused on tackling dense and complex contamination in key population centers such as Fallujah, Mosul, and Ramadi, facing multiple varieties of mines and IEDs and a wide array of unexploded ordnance (UXO). UNMAS reported in 2018 that, in Mosul alone, 24km2 had been searched and cleared of devices ranging from suicide vests, to mortars, grenades, rockets, and air-dropped ordnance.[52]

The extent of land released in Iraq in 2017 could not be determined with any degree of accuracy from the data for Federal Iraq provided by the DMA and iMMAP.

Survey in 2017 (mines)

Federal Iraq

The DMA reported that survey in 2017 identified a total of 26.7km2 of CHA, of which 24.6km2 was confirmed by the commercial company, Arabian Gulf.[53]

The DMA also reported that non-technical survey was conducted over an area of 1,102km2 in 2017, of which 95% was attributed to two Ministry of Interior agencies, Civil Defense and the EOD Directorate, but it did not report any area cancellation or confirmation as a result. No explanation was provided for this.[54]

As Iraqi security forces established control of areas occupied by Islamic State forces, commercial operators tasked by UNMAS deployed assessment teams followed up by high-risk search and survey teams, focusing on key population centers.

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

IKMAA was unable to fulfil plans to complete “preliminary technical survey” of mined areas in 2017 due to lack of funds and unspecified logistical problems. Survey teams continued working in Sulimaniya and Garmyan governorates and reported some new finds of mined area, but also released 18.4km2 through cancellation and area reduction.[55]

International operators conducted “high-risk” survey of contamination from mines of an improvised nature in liberated areas combining non-technical survey, hazardous area reports from Kurdish peshmergasecurity forces, local authorities, and community liaison teams, and limited technical survey to define mine lines and polygons or hazard perimeters.[56]

Clearance in 2017 (mines)

Clearance of legacy mined areas left from earlier conflicts continued in the KRI at about the same level as in 2016, but the limited clearance capacity and resources available in Federal Iraq in 2017 was focused on liberated areas. Some clearance of conventional mines may have been conducted by commercial companies operating under contract to the Ministry of Oil but no capacity was otherwise available for clearance of Iraq’s massive barrier minefields bordering Iran and Saudi Arabia.[57]

Clearance results are not comprehensive and it is not possible to reconcile the various data sources.

Federal Iraq

National clearance efforts were led by the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior’s EOD Directorate but results of their operations were not clear. The DMA records improvised mines as IEDs and reported clearance of 55.3km2 of area affected by IEDs (see table below) but did not identify the organizations responsible or specify device types. It also reported large areas cleared without the destruction of any items.[58] The DMA later reported clearance of 93.4km2 of IED contamination and 32,227 devices in 2017.[59]

“IED” clearance in Federal Iraq in 2017[60]

Province

Area cleared (m2)

“IEDs” destroyed

Anbar

1,476,321

2,212

Diyala

0

166

Kirkuk

13,572,350

2,258

Ninewa

27,555,612

8,341

Salah al-Din

12,656,910

235

Total

55,261,193

13,212

 

In 2017, international organizations conducting clearance in liberated areas were limited to two commercial companies and their national partners. Optima, working in partnership with local operator al-Danube and under contract to UNMAS, conducted clearance in the city of Falluja where it has operated since 2016, and in 2017 it started working in Mosul. Janus Global Operations, funded by the WRA and working in partnership with al-Fahad Co. for Demining, focused clearance on the city of Ramadi.

Operating initially in insecure areas close to military front lines, operators focused on emergency assessments and spot tasks to enable humanitarian access before undertaking clearance tasks supporting UNDP stabilization initiatives. UNMAS reported that implementing partners cleared an area of 2,976,413m2 and assessed or cleared 622 priority critical infrastructure sites. In the process, it said they cleared 45,124 explosive hazards (IEDs and ERW) but did not disaggregate the device types.[61]

Iraq reported clearance of almost 30km2 of legacy mined area in 2017 in its Article 7 report for 2017, of which more than three-quarters was land contaminated by antivehicle mines but the location and organizations conducting the clearance were not reported.[62]

Reported mine clearance in 2017[63]

AP mined area (m2)

AV mined area
(m2)

Mixed AP/AV mined area
(m2)

Total
(m2)

15,097

23,147,092

6,783,610

29,945,799

 

Kurdistan Region of Iraq

IKMAA reported mine clearance of 2.6km2, down slightly from the previous year, but international operators reported less clearance than IKMAA attributed to them, suggesting a lower total.[64]

According to Iraq’s Article 7 report for 2017, of the 2,597,680m2 addressed, 2,051,667m2 was cleared (226,167m2 cleared with MDD; 113,425m2 cleared by full excavation; 1,606,205m2 cleared “electronically”; and 105,870m2 cleared mechanically), and the 546,013m2 was reduced.[65]

Geographically, of the 2.6km2 total, 516,378m2 was reported to have been cleared in the governorate of Erbil; 1,468,550m2 in the governorate of Sulaymaniyah, and 612,752m2 in the governorate of Dohuk.[66]

IKMAA teams cleared almost exactly the same amount of land as in 2016, again concentrating on legacy mined areas rather than liberated areas affected by mines of an improvised nature.

Clearance of legacy mined areas in the KRI in 2017[67]

Operator

Mined areasreleased

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

AV mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

IKMAA

19

1,328,138

2,658

12

730

MAG

19

1,215,885

389

3

689

FSD

0

4,409

1

0

0

DDG

1

49,248

148

0

15

Total

39

2,597,680

3,196

15

1,434

 

MAG continued to work on legacy mines, reporting that it cleared 844,394m2 and 390 antipersonnel mines working on legacy tasks. MAG deployed 10 mine action teams, two multi-task teams, and seven community liaison teams as well as mechanical assets and mine detection dogs. MAGalso deployed multi-task teams and mechanical assets toaddress long belts of mines of an improvised nature in liberated areas but after Federal Iraqi troops took back control of most of the Grey Area in September 2017, most of these areas came under the authority of the DMA. MAG had to suspend operations there until it received DMA accreditation in April 2018 but in the meantime, was able to reassign some multi-task teamsto tackle legacy mine clearance.[68]

Despite the loss of operations in liberated areas in the last quarter of the year, MAG cleared nearly 6km2 of land affected by mines of an improvised nature (see table below), a little more than in 2016, and also cleared 5,649 devices, the vast majority of them pressure-plate antipersonnel mines.[69] FSD, the other humanitarian organization engaged in clearing mines of an improvised nature in the KRI in 2017, increased the area it cleared by two-thirds and doubled the number of devices it tackled.[70]

Clearance of mines of an improvised nature in the KRI in 2017[71]

Operator

Governorates

Area cleared (m2)

Mines destroyed

FSD

Erbil, Kirkuk, Mosul

904,906

3,686

MAG

Ninewa

5,960,804

5,649

Total

 

6,865,710

9,335

 

Deminer safety

A MAG deminer died after detonating a mine of an improvised nature in Hamdaniya district in April 2017. An internal investigation determined that the deminer’s detector search head had accidentally initiated the device’s pressure plate. IKMAA also convened an inquiry into the incident and took disciplinary action against the supervisor for the area and the team leader.[72] A Civil Defense EOD technician was killed in Ramadi by an anti-handling device that detonated as he attempted to clear an item of UXO.[73]

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

Iraq’s response to cluster munition contamination has been eclipsed at a national level by the priority given to tackling densely mine-contaminated areas liberated from Islamic State to permit the return of displaced populations.[74] However, RMAC-S, covering the area most affected by cluster munition remnants, has continued to develop plans for cluster munition survey and clearance.[75] Assessing the extent of progress is hampered by major inconsistencies between results reported by the DMA and operators.

Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

The DMA did not report any SHAs cancelled by non-technical survey in 2017 but said operators confirmed 86 CHAs with cluster munition remnants affecting 22.45km2 (see table below), more than double the areas confirmed in 2016.[76] However, there were major discrepancies between the data provided by DMA and that provided by the operators.

Survey of cluster munition-contaminated areas in 2017[77]

Operator

CHAs confirmed

Area confirmed (m2)

Al-Safsafah

1

44,061

Civil Defense

15

8,038,369

DDG

3

68,184

IMCO

4

3,495,999

Army

3

119,264

NPA[78]

58

10,575,377

RMAC South

2

110,406

Total

86

22,451,660

 

Survey progress in 2018 (cluster munition remnants)

In January 2018, NPA convened a workshop with RMAC-S, iMMAP, and DDG on the Cluster Munition Remnant Survey (CMRS) methodology that it applies in Lebanon and Southeast Asia and the same month it started a CMRS survey in Muthanna governorate.[79] By May 2018, teams had identified more than 2,500 items, mainly BLU 63 and M77 devices.[80]

Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

Iraq reported clearing at least 4.73km2 of cluster munition-contaminated land in 2017, 50% more than the previous year, and this may have understated the result (see table below). There are discrepancies between the data provided by DMA and the operators. Clearance of oilfields conducted by commercial operators under contract to the Ministry of Oil is not reported to the DMA.

Clearance of Cluster Munition Contamination in 2017[81]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

Submunitions destroyed

UXO destroyed

Center & South

Akad

1

52,744

0

0

Civil Defense

8

1,063,824

172

177

DDG[82]

1

117,804

0

0

NPA[83]

23

3,147,345

553

224

Subtotal

33

4,381,717

725

401

KRI

HI[84]

2

149,511

82

0

MAG[85]

2

198,763

381

0

Subtotal

4

348,274

463

0

Total

37

4,729,991

1,188

401

 

This is 50% more than the previous year. The increase in area clearance occurred in central and southern Iraq where the DMA recorded clearance of 4.38km2, compared with 2.89km2 in 2016, although the number of items destroyed was less than half the number in 2016. NPA, operating with five survey and six clearance teams accounted for most of the cluster munition clearance in Iraq. In 2017, it cleared a smaller area than in 2016 but more than double the number of submunitions.[86] DDG, which was not active in southern Iraq in 2016, operated with six survey and two explosive ordinance disposal/battle area clearance (EOD/BAC) teams in Basra governorate in 2017.[87] Clearance by MAG was fractionally less than the previous year, although it destroyed more than three times the number of submunitions.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2017), Iraq is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 February 2028.

The scale of Iraq’s landmine contamination presents a challenge that will not be met within the 10-year extension to its Article 5 deadline. Iraq’s extension request provides little guidance as to how the deadline could be met, underscoring obstacles posed by insecurity, new contamination added by continuing conflict, lack of capacity and expertise and, critically, lack of funding. Iraq will submit an update to its extension request two years into its extension period, but key issues are shrouded in uncertainty.

Iraq needs, as a priority, to clarify the scope of its Article 5 obligations. Areas liberated from Islamic State forces since 2016 include potentially hundreds of square kilometers contaminated by improvised mines laid by Islamic State. Iraq does not categorize or report any of these devices as mines, but as IEDs. However IEDs that are designed to be activated by a person and placed under, on or near the ground are antipersonnel mines and are covered by the scope of Article 5.

The Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties invited Iraq to report annually on funding available from external sources and the government for its treaty implementation efforts but there is little clarity on funding for the sector. The extension request envisaged expenditure from government sources of $30 million in 2018–2019 and $238 million over the 10-year period to the end of 2027 but the DMA was unable to give details of government funding available to mine action in 2017 or 2018. Most funding is provided by international donors through UNMAS.

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Iraq is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2023.

Iraq’s extensive cluster munition contamination, competing mine action priorities, and funding constraints make it improbable it will achieve its cluster munition clearance deadline in five years.

Cluster munition clearance in 2015–2017

Year

Central and Southern Iraq

KRI

Total

2017

4,381,717

348,274

4,729,991

2016

2,889,585

209,920

3,099,505

2015

8,235,094

546,371

8,781,465

Total

15,506,396

1,104,565

16,610,961

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Most recent estimate of contamination as of the end of 2017, provided by email from Ahmad Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 13 September 2018; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, IKMAA, 8 May 2018. The Article 7 report for 2017 reported 1,072kmat the end of 2017.

[3] Email from Ahmad Al Jasim, DMA, 13 September 2018.

[4] Emails from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017; and from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 April 2017.

[5] Email from Ahmad Al Jasim, DMA, 13 September 2018.

[6] Ibid., 10 April 2018. The table as presented has been amended to remove contamination in Kirkuk governorate, which was reported as consisting of two CHAs totaling 1m2.

[7] Media reports monitored by the International NGO Safety Organization.

[8] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[9] Email from Portia Stratton, Country Director, MAG, 9 September 2018.

[10] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[11] Interviews with Mick Beeby, Technical Operations Manager, MAG, 24 July 2017; and with Craig McInally, Northern Iraq Operations Manager, NPA, 22 July 2017 .

[12] Interview with Nina Seecharan, Country Director, Mick Beeby, and Kathy Keary, Grants and Liaison Officer, MAG, in Erbil, 23 July 2017; “An Initial Study into Mine Action and Improvised Explosive Devices,” GICHD, February 2017, p. 21. Janus and the GICHD study refers to the munitions as IEDs.

[13] Interview with Nina Seecharan, Mick Beeby, and Kathy Keary, MAG, in Erbil, 23 July 2017.

[14] See Mine Ban Treaty Article 2 (3).

[15] Interview with Kelvin Windsor, Country Manager–Iraq, Optima, Baghdad, 6 September 2018.

[16] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018.

[17] Emails from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018; and from Steven Warner, Desk Officer, MAG, 10 April 2018.

[18] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018.

[19] Email from Isam Ghareeb, iMMAP, 1 August 2016; and interview with Obaid Ahmad, General Director of Technical Affairs, IKMAA, Erbil, 22 July 2017.

[20] Email from Pehr Lodhammer, Senior Programme Adviser, UNMAS, 15 August 2018.

[21] Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, Assistant Director General, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018; and DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015.

[22] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, March 2017, p. 24.

[23] Interview with Mats Hektor, Project Manager South Iraq, NPA, Erbil, 22 July 2017.

[24] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 April 2017; and interview, Erbil, 27 July 2017.

[25] Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018.

[26] Emails from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 May 2018; and from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018.

[27] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (revised), August 2017, p. 13.

[28] Ibid., pp. 96–98.

[29] Ibid., pp. 10–12 and 88.

[30] DMA presentation to 2015 Mine Action Country Planning Workshop for Iraq, Istanbul, 13 May 2015.

[31] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Country Director Iraq, NPA, Craig McInally, Northern Iraq Operations Manager, NPA, and Mats Hektor, NPA, 2 April 2018.

[32] Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018; and information in email from Abigail Hartley, Chief of Policy, Advocacy and Public Information, UNMAS, 5 October 2018.

[33] Interviews with international operators, Erbil, 22–27 July 2017.

[34] Interview with DMA, Baghdad, 6 September 2018.

[35] Email from Per Lodhammer, UNMAS, 15 August 2018.

[36] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmad, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[37] Interviews with operators, Baghdad, 4–12 September 2018.

[38] Interview with Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, Baghdad, 9 September 2018.

[40] Emails from Lene Rasmussen, Regional Manager MENA, DDG, 3 June 2018; from Peter Smethers, Programme Manager/Country Director, FSD, 3 May 2018; from Fanny Del, Operations Coordinator, HI, 18 May 2018; from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018; and from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 2 April 2018.

[41] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 6 April 2017.

[42] Email from Lene Rasmussen, DDG, 3 June 2018.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Telephone interview with Portia Stratton, MAG, 7 September 2018; and email, 26 September 2018; and email from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018.

[45] Interview with Gus Guthrie, NPA, Baghdad, 7 September 2018.

[46] Interviews with Dorinda Brinke, Deputy Programme Manager, HALO Trust, Baghdad, 5 September and 2 October 2018.

[47] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[48] Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018.

[49] Email from Gus Guthrie, NPA, 2 April 2018.

[50] Email from Peter Smethers, FSD, 3 May 2018.

[51] Email from Fanny Del, HI, 18 May 2018.

[53] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018. Iraq’s Article 7 report for 2017 reported confirmation of 26.9km(p. 18).

[54] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018.

[55] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[56] Interviews with international operators, Erbil, 22–27 July 2017.

[57] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018; and interview, Baghdad, 10 September 2018; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[58] Data received from DMA showed that the Ministry of Defense cleared 28.7km2and the Ministry of Interior’s EOD Directorate cleared 26km2but did not destroy any items in doing so. Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018.

[59] Email from Ahmed Al Jasim, DMA, 13 September 2018.

[60] Ibid., 10 April 2018.

[61] Email from Pehr Lodhammer, UNMAS, 15 August 2018.

[62] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 68.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[65] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 69.

[66] Ibid.

[67] Email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018.

[68] Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Email from Peter Smethers, FSD, 3 May 2018.

[71] Emails from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018; and from Peter Smethers, FSD, 3 May 2018.

[72] Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018.

[73] Interview with Police Col. Sihad Ahmed Abd, Head of EOD, Civil Defense, Baghdad, 6 September 2018.

[74] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018.

[75] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Craig McInally, and Mats Hektor, NPA, 2 April 2018.

[76] Email from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018.

[77] Ibid. HI also reported confirming three cluster munition-affected areas totaling 149,511min and around Kirkuk, which was not reflected in official data. Email from Fanny Del, HI, 18 May 2018.

[78] NPA, however, reported that in three southern governorates it cancelled 35 SHAs totaling 73kmwhile confirming 79 other areas totaling 36km2. In the process of non-technical survey, it also cleared 2,344 submunitions and 1,496 other UXO items. Only Iraq’s military is authorized to conduct demolitions.

[79] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Craig McInally, and Mats Hektor, NPA, 2 April 2018.

[80] Skype interview with Mats Hektor, NPA, 14 May 2018.

[81] Except as specified, data provided by emails from Ahmed Al-Jasim, DMA, 10 April 2018.

[82] DDG reported clearing 0.67kmand 183 submunitions. Email from Lene Rasmussen, DDG, 3 June 2018.

[83] NPA reported clearing 3.91kmalong with 1,087 submunitions and 1,002 other UXO items. Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Craig McInally, and Mats Hektor, NPA, 2 April 2018.

[84] Email from Fanny Del, HI, 18 May 2018.

[85] Email from Steven Warner, MAG, 10 April 2018.

[86] Email from Jonathon Guthrie, Craig McInally, and Mats Hektor, NPA, 2 April 2018.

[87] Email from Lene Rasmussen, DDG, 3 June 2018.