Landmine Monitor 2018
Contamination & Clearance
Ten States Parties have residual or suspected contamination (Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Palau, the Philippines, and Tunisia) and and state not party Saudi Arabia is also suspected to be contaminated.
The political declaration adopted at the Mine Ban Treaty’s Third Review Conference in 2014 includes a commitment to fulfill treaty obligations to the fullest extent possible by 2025. Although most countries are not ontrack with their respective Article 5 clearance deadlines, the majority should reach the 2025 clearance goal, with sufficient funds and commitment, and where security conditions permit.
Mine Contamination in 2017
Sixty states and areas have an identified threat of antipersonnel mine contamination (34 States Parties, 22 states not party, and four other areas). It is not possible to provide a global estimate of the total area contaminated by landmines, due to a lack of data. Nonetheless, some states continued to improve their understanding of the extent of contamination in 2017 using land release methodologies to cancel suspected areas by non-technical survey and to reduce confirmed hazardous area through technical survey. However, in a number of countries, extensive recent use of antipersonnel mines—particularly improvised mines—has not been fully quantified.
There was new contamination in 2017 and/or 2018 in States Parties: Afghanistan, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, and Yemen; and in states not party: India, Myanmar, Pakistan, Syria, and Thailand. There was unconfirmed use in States Parties Cameroon, Mali, Tunisia, Ukraine; and states not party Libya and Saudi Arabia. (See the Ban Policy chapter for details.)
This table is based on the information provided by official sources. The extent of contamination estimated in some countries may in the future be subject to significant revision—either increased or decreased—based on survey results.
States Parties Mauritania and Mozambique are no longer on the list of contaminated states, as they completed clearance in 2017.
Several of the states for which no estimate is provided are heavily or massively contaminated. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) separating North Korea and South Korea and the Civilian Control Zone (CCZ) immediately adjoining the southern boundary of the DMZ remain among the most heavily mined areas in the world, but no data is available on the extent of contamination. Morocco, Myanmar, Russia, and Syria also have widespread contamination, but the extent is not known.
Ten States Parties  have residual or suspected contamination: Algeria, Cameroon, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mali, Moldova, Namibia, Palau, the Philippines, and Tunisia. State not party Saudi Arabia  is also suspected to be contaminated.
Mine Clearance in 2017
Total global clearance of landmines in 2017 was at least 128km2, with at least 168,000 antipersonnel mines destroyed. However, this is an underestimation as some actors, such as armies, police, or commercial operators, may not systematically report clearance results. Moreover, in some states, informal clearance or community-based clearance has been conducted, which is not subject to quality management and entry into the national databases. In some cases, land was cleared that was found to contain no mines. For further details of land release results, both survey and clearance, see individual country profiles on the Monitor website.
In 2017, the reported global total area cleared declined for the third year in a row, while the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed was lower than the previous year. The decrease in reported area cleared between 2016 and 2017 can be mainly attributed to two countries: in Iraq improvised explosive device (IED) clearance was not included in the clearance figures as it is not known how much of this was contaminated by improvised mines; and in Croatia there was a 20% decrease in area cleared, although the amount of land released through survey was doubled. The number of antipersonnel mines destroyed fluctuated considerably across countries. The main explanation for the decrease in antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2017 compared to 2016 is the 62,589 antipersonnel mines destroyed by Algeria, which completed clearance that year.
Of the 11 states and one other area that are massively contaminated with more than 100km2 of mine contamination, three States Parties reported very low clearance results of less than 1km2 in 2017: Angola, BiH, and Chad.
No mine survey or clearance occurred in States Parties Chad and Niger, nor in states not party Armenia and Myanmar. Only survey was conducted in Serbia, during which three antipersonnel mines were destroyed. No systematic mine survey or clearance occurred in state not party Lao PDR, although 23 antipersonnel mines were destroyed during EOD operations.
No mine survey or clearance results were reported for States Parties Eritrea, Ethiopia, and for states not party, Cuba, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Korea, and Uzbekistan. It was announced that some limited demining in the DMZ between North and South Korea commenced on 1 October 2018, as part of joint efforts to exhume the remains of troops from the Korean War. Although only a small area of land was cleared, and to unknown standards, the ICBL has welcomed this confidence-building measure and expressed hope that it would help decrease tensions on the Korean peninsula.
China reported that the army had conducted mine clearance between November 2015 and February 2017. Its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V report submitted in March 2018 recorded no change on “landmine clearance,” although the media reported that mine clearance had resumed in November 2017. Russia reported in its CCW Protocol V transparency report that it had conducted antipersonnel mine clearance but did not provide details.
In several countries, mine clearance was known to have occurred in 2017, although it was not formally reported. In Syria, international and national operators, both civilian and military, have been active. There are media reports of clearance in State Party Nigeria, and in state not party India. In Iran, commercial clearance occurred in oil and gas producing areas.
In Algeria, which declared completion of clearance in 2016, no areas were reported as cleared but 137 isolated mines were destroyed.
An improvised explosive device (IED) is a device produced in an improvised manner incorporating explosives or noxious chemicals. IEDs that are designed to be exploded by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person meet the definition of an antipersonnel mine, and therefore fall under the Mine Ban Treaty. When victim activated, these devices are known as improvised mines.
Improvised mines are not new and have been found in many countries for decades. The countries here do not comprise an exhaustive list, so the true extent of global improvised mine contamination is probably more widespread. In 2017 and 2018, confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination and/or incidents and casualties were reported in the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Ukraine, and Yemen; and states not party India, Lebanon, Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria.
States Parties have a number of obligations with regards to improvised mines. Affected States Parties must report any confirmed or suspected improvised mine contamination in their Article 7 transparency reports. Resources must be made available to assess the extent of contamination and develop appropriate strategies to address it. States Parties should exchange expertise to ensure that standards are adequate for addressing improvised mines. Affected countries and donors must be prepared to cover the costs of equipment and resources needed to deal with improvised mines, which maybe higher than dealing with manufactured mines. Finally, States Parties should also monitor progress toward meeting Article 5 obligations related to improvised mines to ensure compliance with the Mine Ban Treaty.
The global understanding of the extent of contamination has slightly improved since 2016, but there has been no systematic survey of any improvised mine contamination. In 2017, Afghanistan reported 20km2 affected by abandoned improvised mines, and it has yet to reach a reliable estimate of the 248km2 identified through a rapid assessment. Colombia reports a national estimate of 46 km2 of mine contamination, which is largely improvised mines, although it has yet to establish a national baseline. In Iraq, improvised mine contamination has not been subject to large-scale systematic survey, although the national authorities report that they cover hundreds of square kilometers. In September 2018, Iraq reported 184km2 of IED contamination as of the end of 2017, which may in fact be improvised mines. In Syria, improvised mines made up more than three-quarters of items destroyed by one international clearance operator around Raqqa and more than 60% of items it destroyed in Hassakeh governorate.
Afghanistan issued apolicy paper on Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM) in May 2018 that set out a number of principles to be followed by implementing partners. In Iraq, the Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) introduced a national standard on IEDs in 2016 and is working with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining(GICHD) to update the standard to take into account the experience gained in tackling the dense contamination of improvised devices in areas liberated from the non-state armed group Islamic State since 2016.
Cameroon and Nigeria should inform States Parties of the discovery of any contamination including victim-activated improvised mines. Iraq must consider improvised mine contamination as part of its Mine Ban Treaty obligations. It was not included in Iraq’s 2018 Article 5 mine clearance deadline extension request, nor in its Article 7 report for 2017.
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Obligations
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, States Parties are required to clear all antipersonnel mines as soon as possible, but not later than 10 years after becoming party to the treaty. States Parties that consider themselves unable to complete their mine clearance obligations within the deadline may submit a request for a deadline extension of up to 10 years.
Completion of Article 5 implementation
Mauritania completed clearance in December 2017 and, as of July 2018, the mine action program had submitted a proposal to the government that a declaration of compliance with their Article 5 obligations be made.
In addition, state not party Nepal and other area Taiwan have completed clearance of known mined areas since 1999. El Salvador, a State Party, completed clearance in 1994 before the Mine Ban Treaty was created.
Jordan declared completion of clearance under the Mine Ban Treaty in 2012 but is still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and therefore does not appear in the table. Nigeria declared completion of clearance in 2011, however there have been reports of new contamination resulting from use of antipersonnel mines by a non-state armed group. It therefore does not appear in the table.
Progress on meeting deadlines
As of October 2018, only four States Parties appear to be on track to meet their clearance deadliness, while 13 appear not to be on track, and the status of seven is unclear. Seven are awaiting approval of their extension requests submitted in 2018. Two States Parties that have declared completion in the past are still finding antipersonnel mine contamination and should request new deadlines. One State Party is ready to declare completion.
In 2017, five States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete their Article 5 obligations that were granted at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2017.
- Angola requested until 1 January 2026 with the goal of eliminating 1,465 mined areas totaling 221.4km2. It is in the process of completing national non-technical survey across the country. In granting the extension, States Parties requested Angola provide an updated and detailed workplan providing greater clarity on the amount of remaining contaminated land and milestones for completion. Angola pledged to submit this updated workplan by the 17th Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.
- Ecuador was granted a five-year extension until 31 December 2022. It stated that it was requesting an additional five years to clear the remaining 0.1km2 of mined areas because mechanical assets cannot be used in these areas and operating conditions are challenging. In granting the extension, States Parties requested that Ecuador submit, by 30 April 2019, an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension request.
- Iraq was granted a 10-year extension until 1 February 2028. The extension request set out separate two-year and 10-year workplans. It said the two-year workplan was based on existing capacity and described the 10-year plan as “aspirational” and dependent on attracting donor funding. The plans did not address improvised mine contamination. In granting the request, States Parties requested that Iraq submit to the Fourth Review Conference in 2019 an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension request, and every two years following this. The meeting noted that success is contingent upon increased funding, the maintenance of security, and changes in the political climate to enable access to those hazardous areas near international borders.
- Thailand was granted a five-year extension to 31 October 2023. It had a total of 358.81km2 remaining to be released, of which it foresees 86.5% of suspected contamination being cancelled. States Parties, recalling that the implementation of Thailand’s national demining plan may be affected by pending survey and demarcation of land boundaries, requested that Thailand submit to the States Parties, by 30 April 2019, an updated workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension request.
- Zimbabwe was granted an extension request to 31 December 2025 to complete survey and clearance of all mined areas. The Committee on Article 5 Implementation noted that the plan presented by Zimbabwe is workable, lends itself well to be monitored, and states clearly which factors could affect the pace of implementation. States Parties requested that Zimbabwe submit, by 30 April 2019, an updated detailed workplan for the remaining period covered by the extension.
In 2018, seven States Parties submitted requests for extended deadlines to complete their Article 5 obligations, for approval at the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in November 2018.
- BiH submitted an interim two-year extension request to 1 March 2021 in order to carry out survey activities to more accurately define the perimeter of mined areas. BiH believes it will then be better able to calculate the time required to complete its Article 5 obligations. It has pledged to submit a final extension request by 31 March 2020. During 2019 and 2020, BiH also intends to continue land release operations in line with annual workplans, however it is not clear how this will be coordinated with the national survey. The extension request contained conflicting figures for the extent of suspected contamination.
- Croatia requested until 1 March 2026 to address its remaining 387.3km2 of mine contamination. Croatia intends to use state as well as European Union funds, which it is confident it will secure as planned.
- Cyprus submitted an extension request to 1 July 2022, referring back to its 2015 second request. The reason cited for the second request was the same as the first, namely that Cyprus does not have effective control over remaining contaminated areas.
- Serbia submitted an extension request to 1 March 2023. It includes a workplan for the completion of demining of 2.35km2 during the period 2018–2023. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) noted that the first extension request was found by States Parties to lack ambition, that the second extension request is for a similar amount of land to be released in a similar amount of time, and that it believes that Serbia’s targets could be more ambitious.
- Sudan submitted an extension request to April 2023. It includes an updated workplan, with annual targets for completion, with a total planned release of 53 confirmed hazardous areas with a size of 2.42km2 and 45 suspected hazardous areas with a size of 16.87km2, as of February 2018. Sudan committed to producing a detailed and updated workplan for clearance of South Kordofan and Blue Nile states for 2019–2023 when security conditions enable full access. It is expected that access will result in the cancellation of suspected areas as well as new hazardous areas being identified.
- Ukraine submitted an extension request to 1 December 2021. Ukraine’s preliminary estimation is that 7,000km2 of land is contaminated. This is not just antipersonnel mine contamination, but also includes ERW. Ukraine also reports the presence of improvised mines. The extension request states that the irregular and non-selective use of mines currently prevents an understanding of the extent of contamination. It also states that, “Currently Ukraine doesn’t have control over the temporary occupied parts on Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as over the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.” A State Program for Restoration and Development of Peace in Eastern Regions of Ukraine has been established, which aims to conduct demining activities in 2018-2020, funded by the state budget. The extension request outlines the roles and responsibilities of the different actors engaged in mine action, but does not provide a workplan. Until the extension request is approved by States Parties, Ukraine is in violation of Article 5 for missing its 1 June 2016 clearance deadline.
- The UK submitted a second extension request through to 1 March 2024. The UK expects that eight mined areas, covering an estimated 0.16km2 will remain by March 2020. These areas are all located in Yorke Bay, an environmentally sensitive beach and sand dune area. Technical survey at Yorke Bay will be conducted by 1 March 2019, which will enable the clearance work to be costed. The UK stated its “strong intention” to complete clearance within five years, but warned that there could be a delay in securing further funding.
Monitoring the Progress of States Parties Against their Article 5 Obligations and the Maputo Action Plan
In the Maputo Action Plan, adopted at the Third Review Conference in June 2014, States Parties agreed to “intensify their efforts to complete their respective time-bound obligations with the urgency that the completion work requires.” Actions #8, #9, and #11 relate to clearance.
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation presented its preliminary observations at the intersessional meetings in June 2018, reporting on 25 States Parties that had submitted information by that date.
The assessment of progress under the Maputo Action Plan is drawn from both the committee’s observations and Landmine Monitor’s review of the progress of States Parties.
Maputo Action Plan action #8: quantification and qualification of remaining contamination challenge
Almost all States Parties need to improve the quantification and qualification of the remaining contamination challenge. Only four States Parties have a clear understanding of the remaining contamination: Chile, Ecuador, Sri Lanka, and the UK. Thirteen States Parties have a good knowledge of the locations of confirmed and suspected contamination, but survey is needed to clarify the actual extent of contamination within those areas: Angola, BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, DRC, Jordan, Peru, Senegal, Serbia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. Thirteen States Parties have reported on known contaminated areas, but do not have a complete picture of the extent of contamination, as there are areas that have not been surveyed: Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mozambique, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen. Eritrea has not provided an update on the estimated extent of contamination since the end of 2013. Three States Parties have not formally reported the locations of any mined areas: Cameroon, Nigeria, and Oman.
There were inconsistencies between the figures provided by different sources (such as Article 7 reports, Article 5 extension requests, mine action centers, and operators) for the extent of remaining contamination at the end of 2017 in the following countries: Afghanistan, BiH, Iraq, Peru, and Senegal.
The Committee on Article 5 Implementation assessed the degree of clarity of the remaining challenge, finding that only seven of the 25 States Parties assessed had provided a high degree of clarity in their reporting: Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.
Maputo Action Plan Action #9: application of land release technologies
Almost all States Parties that implemented systematic mine clearance programs in 2017 used land release methodologies (survey and clearance).
In 2017, three States Parties used non-technical and technical survey to release significant amounts of land—more than 30km2—thus greatly decreasing their estimate of remaining contamination: Angola, Cambodia, and Thailand.
In Angola, re-survey has been completed in 15 of its 18 provinces. Jordan continued the process of verifying areas for missing mines. In Somalia in 2017, for the first time, survey and risk education teams were deployed in all five of southcentral Somalia’s federal states, despite security challenges. In Sri Lanka, a district-by-district re-survey that began in 2015 was completed in February 2017, providing far greater clarity on the extent of confirmed contamination remaining.
In some States Parties, plans are underway to increase the use of land release approaches. In BiH, a country-wide “assessment” is to be conducted in 2018–2019 to establish a more accurate baseline of mine contamination and help to improve the efficiency of follow-on survey and clearance operations. The new Cambodian national mine action strategy issued in 2017 emphasized that “it is essential clearance assets are only deployed in areas where there is clear evidence of mines,” reacting to a weakness in clearance operations in previous years. It said that, in the future, clearance tasks should be prioritized on the basis of “effective” non-technical survey. In Chad, at the end of 2017, funding was secured to conduct survey and clearance. Colombia’s strategic plan for 2016–2021 aims to establish a national baseline of contamination.
Continuous conflict in State Party Yemen since March 2015 has prevented systematic survey.
However, the committee observed that some States Parties have not adopted the most relevant land release standards, policies, and methodologies, in line with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and in a manner consistent with Action #9 of the Maputo Action Plan.
Maputo Action Plan Action #11: on-time submission of high-quality requests
In 2018, six states submitted Article 5 extension requests on time: BiH, Croatia, Cyprus, Serbia, Sudan, and the UK. Ukraine submitted a long overdue request in November 2018.
All seven requests included information on progress made so far, and some form of political commitment to complete the task of mine clearance. Most contained consistent data, detailed plans for land release activities during the extension period, and milestones to measure progress. However, there was scope for improvement in the quality of data and description of plans in some extension requests.
Maputo Action Plan Action #25: annual submission of high-quality and updated information
As of October 2018, Article 7 transparency reports for 2017 were still outstanding for Eritrea, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Yemen. Four were outstanding in the same month of 2017.
Cameroon has not submitted an Article 7 report since 2009, Eritrea and Nigeria since 2014.
Sri Lanka’s initial Article 7 report is due by 28 November 2018.
(See the table “Clearance of mined area in 2017” above for notes about the quality of information provided on clearance by individual states.)
Other issues affecting clearance obligations
Inadequate funding was cited as a challenge to achieving Article 5 implementation deadlines by the following States Parties: Afghanistan, Angola, BiH, Cambodia, Chad, Ethiopia, Iraq, Niger, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, Tajikistan, and Zimbabwe.
Although DRC has stated that it can achieve its Article 5 deadline, it reported funding difficulties.
Almost all States Parties with mine contamination have a national mine action program or institutions that are assigned to fulfill the state’s clearance obligations.
In Cyprus, the mine action program is managed by UNMAS.
In Somalia, there was no government funding for the Somalia Explosive Management Authority (SEMA), and UNMAS stopped funding SEMA at start of 2016, in expectation that its legislative framework was due to be approved by the Federal Parliament and that funding for SEMA would be allocated from the national budget.
In South Sudan, while it is planned that the National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) will ultimately assume full responsibility for all mine action activities, UNMAS has reported that the NMAA’s continued serious financial and technical limitations challenged the effective management of operations in 2017. In 2018, UNMAS stated that reversing a change in the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate that halted the capacity-building of government institutions would greatly enhance UNMAS’ ability to support the NMAA.
In Ukraine, a national mine action program overseen by a national mine action authority and center is being developed with support from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project-Coordinator and the GICHD. The donors have agreed to an extension of the project until the end of 2018 due to delays in the adoption of the mine action law.
In Yemen, the Yemeni Executive Mine Action Center (YEMAC) has become, de facto, two organizations, split between Sanaa, under the control of the Houthis, and the southern city of Aden controlled by the Saudi- and UAE-led coalition and Yemen’s internationally recognized but exiled government. The Sanaa office coordinates operations in the north and center of the country while the Aden office oversees operations in southern provinces.
In Eritrea, the mine action program was not functioning in 2017. States Parties, Nigeria, and Oman do not have national mine action programs.
In stark contrast, fewer than half of states not party have functioning mine action programs. There were no new mine action programs established among states not party in 2017. The following 12 states not party do not have national mine action programs: China, Cuba, Kyrgyzstan, India, Morocco, Myanmar, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, and Uzbekistan. Egypt’s mine action program continued to not function, while the status of Iran’s mine action center remained unclear.
Clearance in conflict
In 2017 and 2018, conflict affected land release operations in 11 States Parties (Afghanistan, Cameroon, Colombia, Iraq, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Yemen) and four states not party (Libya, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Syria). Insecurity also restricted access to some areas that are or may be antipersonnel mine-affected in States Parties Chad, Colombia, DRC, Ethiopia, Jordan, Senegal, Thailand, and Turkey.
In Afghanistan, some provinces are inaccessible to mine action operators. In 2017, three humanitarian deminers were killed and one injured in conflict-related attacks.
In Colombia, although the 2016 peace deal resulted in an agreement by the government and the FARC on demining, by August 2018, the election of a new president made the status of some of the pillars of the peace deal uncertain. In some locations, this has had an effect on the ability of operators to conduct land release. In 2017 and 2018, humanitarian demining operators had vehicles seized and damaged by FARC dissidents, in some cases resulting in the suspension of operations.
In South Sudan, the release of mined areas plummeted in 2017 largely due to security concerns from the ongoing conflict, which significantly impeded mine action operations during the year. The program shifted away from large area clearance to EOD spot tasks using smaller, more mobile teams. Four mine action personnel were seriously injured in an ambush, and there were several instances of criminality in which teams were robbed by armed groups.
In Iraq, Somalia, and Yemen, despite insecurity, some progress was reported. In Iraq, the main priority was tackling the massive contamination by improvised mines and other ERW found in areas recaptured from the non-state armed group Islamic State, to facilitate the return of internally displaced people, the rehabilitation of public services, and the restoration of the economy. In Somalia in 2017, survey and risk education teams were able to be deployed in all five of southcentral Somalia’s federal states for the first time. HALO Trust was able to deploy survey and clearance teams despite persistently high levels of insecurity. In August 2017, three HALO staff were abducted by the non-state armed group Al-Shabaab; one was shot but recovered. All were eventually released. In Yemen, despite continued armed conflict, the YEMAC expanded operations and improved productivity.
In states not party Libya and Syria, where there is limited clearance capacity, international mine clearance operators have continued to focus their efforts on capacity-building and training of national actors.
Occupation and other issues related to the jurisdiction and control of territory also impact mine clearance. Cyprus does not have effective control of antipersonnel mine-contaminated areas. In Palestine, Israel will not authorize clearance by Palestinians, and most mined areas are in zones controlled by Israel or under joint control. Ukraine has noted that it does not currently have access to some mined areas. In Azerbaijan, Armenian forces occupy a significant area of the country where considerable contamination exists. In Georgia, there may be mined areas in South Ossetia, however, South Ossetia is effectively subject to Russian control and is inaccessible to the Georgian authorities and international NGOs. In Thailand, a high proportion of remaining contamination is located in border areas that are the subject of demarcation disputes or security issues.
Below are brief summaries of contamination and clearance efforts in countries with massive contamination of more than 100km2, in addition to Syria where the scale of the extensive contamination is not known. (For complete information on all states, see the online mine action country profiles at www.the-monitor.org/cp.)
The Department of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) reported that State Party Afghanistan had 205km2 of areas containing antipersonnel mines at the end of 2017. Surveys continue to find new areas of legacy contamination, and mine/ERW contamination continues to increase. The DMAC reported an additional 20km2 of improvised mine contamination, and it has yet to reach a reliable estimate of the much larger areas also thought to be contaminated by such mines. Afghanistan now identifies improvised mines as the greatest challenge for the mine action sector. Mine clearance is conducted by six national and three international NGOs. Since 2012, land release has been affected by a sharp downturn in funding as well as security constraints.
As of April 2018, State Party Angola reported a total 147.6km2 of mined areas: 89.3km2 of confirmed hazardous areas and 58.3km2 of suspected hazardous areas. All 18 provinces still contain mined areas. As of September 2018, national re-survey had been completed in 15 provinces. Of the remaining provinces, Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul were due to be completed in 2018, while re-survey had yet to commence in Cabinda. Clearance is conducted by four Executive Commission for Demining (Comissão Executiva de Desminagem, CED) operators—the Armed Forces, the Military Office of the President, INAD, and the Police Border Guard, as well as commercial companies, and three international NGOs—the HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group (MAG), and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Angola faces severe funding constraints to achieving its new Article 5 deadline of 2025.
No estimate of the extent of contamination in state not party Azerbaijan was provided for the end of 2017, but at the end of 2015, 69.9km2 of area was suspected to contain antipersonnel mines. In addition, the extent of contamination in areas occupied by Armenia is unknown, although the Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) has suggested that contamination may cover between 350km2 and 830km2. The most heavily contaminated areas are along the borders and confrontation lines between Armenia and Azerbaijan, including the area in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2017, land release was conducted by ANAMA and two national NGOs, International Eurasia Press Fund (IEFP) and Daya. Land release increased in 2017 to facilitate the return by internally displaced people to a village that had been liberated from Armenian occupation in 2016. However, of the 7.69km2 cleared, 3.6km2 was found to contain no mines.
State Party BiH has provided conflicting estimates of the extent of contamination at the end of 2017, the lowest figure being 1,056km2. BiH expects that not all suspected hazardous areasare in fact contaminated by mines and that clearance will only need to be conducted in relatively small areas. An 18-month country-wide assessment is planned for 2018–2019. The results of this re-survey will enable BiH to plan for the realization of the new National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025 and preparation of its final Article 5 extension request through to completion. In 2017, land release of mined areas was conducted by the BiH Armed Forces, Federal Administration of Civil Protection, the Civil Protection of Republic of Srpska, 10 NGOs, and four commercial demining companies.
State Party Cambodia’s antipersonnel mine problem is concentrated in, but not limited to, 21 northwestern districts along the border with Thailand. As of the end of 2017, the total known or suspected contamination is 895km2. In 2018, Cambodia launched a new National Mine Action Strategy to complete clearance of mines by 2025, beyond Cambodia’s current Article 5 deadline of 2020. This is dependent on increased donor funding. The strategy emphasizes more efficient use of clearance assets. Land release is undertaken mainly by the Cambodian Mine Action Center (CMAC) and two NGOs, HALO Trust and MAG.
As of December 2017, State Party Chad reported a total of 122km2of confirmed and suspected hazardous area. However, Chad expects more contaminated areas to be identified in the Borkou, Ennedi, Moyen Chari, and Tibesti regions. Improvised mines have been reported in the Lake Chad region. No land release was conducted in 2017. European Union funding was received in late 2017 for a project called PRODECO, in which Humanity & Inclusion (HI, formerly Handicap International) focuses on survey and clearance in the Borkou and Ennedi regions while MAG works in the Tibesti and Lake Chad regions. The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action(FSD) provides technical support, training, and capacity-building to the National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND).
At the end of 2017, State Party Croatia reported a total of 411km2 of mined area, of which 270km2 was suspected hazardous area and 142km2 was confirmed hazardous area. A further 33km2 of confirmed hazardous areaswere under military control. Eight of Croatia’s 21 counties are mine affected. Almost all civil clearance is conducted by local companies competing for tenders. Twenty-one companies conducted demining in 2017. Croatia aims to complete clearance by March 2026, according to its second extension request submitted in 2018.
The full extent of contamination in State Party Iraq is unknown. The Directorate of Mine Action (DMA) and Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Authority (IKMAA) reported a total of 1,219km2. However, this is not consistent with the figures provided in the Article 7 report. In addition, the DMA reported 185km2 of IED contamination, much of which may in fact be antipersonnel mines. In 2017 and 2018, Iraq’s priority is the clearance of massive contamination by IEDs, including improvised mines from areas liberated from non-state armed group Islamic State, in order to facilitate the return of hundreds of thousands of people displaced by conflict, the restoration of public services, and economic recovery. Mine action in Iraq is managed along regional lines. The DMA coordinates and manages the sector in central and southern Iraq. IKMAA manages mine action in the four northern governorates that fall under the Kurdish Regional Government. Land release in 2017 was conducted by army engineers, the civil defense, IKMAA, national and international commercial companies, and five international NGOs (Danish Deming Group (DDG), FSD, HI, MAG, and NPA). Optima provided management for Al-Fahad.
State not party Syria is contaminated by landmines left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 but particularly by the conflict since 2011. All regions are affected. Ongoing hostilities and reports of continuing use of landmines have prevented systematic survey to determine the extent and types of contamination. Improvised mines have been used extensively. Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a national program for survey and clearance. UNMAS operates from Gaziantep, Amman, and Beirut to coordinate support to mine action. In July 2018, UNMAS signed a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian government, which was reported to enable UNMAS to conduct mine risk education. In 2017, mine action was conducted by a wide range of organizations, including military engineers of parties to the conflict, civil defense organizations, humanitarian demining organizations, and commercial companies. However, no land release results were available.
By the end of 2017, State Party Thailand reported 391km2 of suspected hazardous area. However, it expected that, based on previous survey results, almost 87% of this area would be cancelled. A potential obstacle to completion of its Article 5 clearance obligations is the high proportion—around 90%—of remaining contamination located in border areas that are subject to demarcation disputes or security issues. In 2017, clearance was conducted by the Thailand Mine Action Center’s (TMAC) four Humanitarian Mine Action Units and NPA. The Thai Civilian Deminers Association conducted non-technical and technical survey.
State Party Turkey reported 164km2 of contamination across 3,061 confirmed hazardous areas, with a further 701 suspected hazardous areas,for which no estimate of size is available. The majority of contamination is along the border with Syria and some sections of the borders with Armenia, Iran, Iraq, and Azerbaijan. Mines have also been laid inside the country around military installations, while improvised mines and other IEDs have been used by non-state armed groups. In 2017, Turkey completed Phase 1 of the European Union Eastern Border Mine Clearance Project on the eastern border with Iran, with clearance conducted by commercial company MECHEM. The Turkish armed forces also conducted land release along the borders with Iran and Syria, including to support the construction of the Border Security Surveillance System along the Syrian border.
The extent of contamination in State Party Yemen is unknown. Its latest Article 7 report, submitted in 2017, reported suspected and known contamination of 323km2 and noted that survey was expected to identify additional contamination. Yemen is contaminated with mines from conflicts in 1962–1969 and 1970–1983, mines that were laid in border areas between North and South Yemen before they unified in 1990, and mines from successive conflicts that erupted since 1994, including the ongoing conflict that began in March 2015. The latest conflict has involved extensive use of improvised mines. All land release is conducted by the Yemen Executive Mine Action Centre (YEMAC). Despite the ongoing conflict, the YEMAC expanded operations in 2017. However, the teams are constrained by a lack of training and equipment.
The exact extent of mine contamination across other area Western Sahara is not known, although the areas along the Berm are thought to contain some of the densest mine contamination in the world. To the east of the berm, mine action is managed by the Sahrawi Mine Action Coordination Center (SMACO) with the support of UNMAS. The primary mine threat east of the Berm, excluding both the Berm itself and the buffer strip, is from antivehicle rather than antipersonnel mines; cluster munitions are also a major hazard. During 2018, non-technical survey efforts east of the berm greatly reduced the extent of suspected contamination to an estimated 120km2 by September 2018. Areas located within the 5km-wide buffer strip are inaccessible for clearance. Land release east of the berm in 2017 was conducted by Dynasafe MineTech Limited (DML) and NPA. The area west of the berm is under Moroccan control, and land release is conducted by the Royal Moroccan Army. There the extent of contamination west of the berm is unknown.
 The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
 This year’s Ban Policy chapter reports findings from October 2017 to October 2018, listing a slightly different set of countries where landmine use was confirmed or suspected. New use resulting in new contamination is confirmed to have occurred earlier in 2017 in Iraq and Syria, and was suspected earlier in 2017 in Cameroon and Saudi Arabia, as reported in Landmine Monitor 2017. Those countries are also here because this chapter reports on the entirety of 2017.
 Four small suspected mined areas with a combined size of 1,881m2remain submerged under water. These areas are “suspended” and Mozambique plans to address them once the water level has receded and access can be gained. See, Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5, submitted by Mozambique, 16 December 2015, p. 5; and statements of Mozambique, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017, and 8 June 2018.
 Response by the Permanent Mission of South Korea to the UN in New York, 9 May 2006; and K. Chang-Hoon, “Find One Million: War With Landmines,” Korea Times, 3 June 2010.
 In some cases, the Monitor records casualties in countries not listed as having confirmed landmine contamination. This happens when the casualties are due to ERW rather than landmines (Indonesia, Kenya, Poland, Tanzania, and Uganda), or when it has not been possible for the precise nature of the contamination causing casualties to be conclusively verified with regard to Article 5 obligations (Algeria, Cameroon, Kuwait, Mozambique, Philippines, and Tunisia).
 From January to October 2017, 137 “isolated” antipersonnel mines were destroyed. See, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report 2018, Form C, p. 26.
 In Cameroon, allegations of use by Boko Haram of improvised antipersonnel mines have been reported.
 Djibouti completed its clearance of known mined areas in 2003 and France declared it had cleared a military ammunition storage area in Djibouti in November 2008, but there are concerns that there may be mine contamination along the Eritrean border following a border conflict in June 2008. Djibouti has not made a formal declaration of full compliance with its Article 5 obligations.
 Antipersonnel mine casualties were reported in Kuwait in 2017.
 In Mali, there are unconfirmed allegations of use of antipersonnel mines.
 Moldova, which had an Article 5 deadline of 1 March 2011, made a statement in June 2008 that suggested it had acknowledged its legal responsibility for clearance of any mined areas in the breakaway republic of Transnistria, where it continues to assert is jurisdiction. However, this statement was later disavowed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 2 June 2008, bit.ly/MoldovaNSA2008.
 Despite a statement made by Namibia at the Second Review Conference that it was in full compliance with Article 5, questions remain as to whether there are mined areas in the north of the country, for example, in the Caprivi region bordering Angola.
 Palau may have residual antipersonnel mine contamination.
 The Philippines, which has alleged use of antipersonnel mines by non-state armed groups over recent years, has not formally reported the presence of mined areas.
 There were casualties from victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Tunisia in 2015, 2016, 2017, and 2018. It is likely that these devices were recently laid when they exploded.
 Reports of mine use and seizures have occurred in southern Saudi Arabia on its borders with Yemen, in Aseer and Jazan provinces.
 See Mine Action country profiles available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
 In Libya, several operators were engaged in EOD operations.
 In Pakistan, the army destroyed 95 unserviceable antipersonnel mines. CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2017), Forms B and F.
 “North, South Korea begin removing landmines to ease tensions,” The Globe and Mail, 1 October 2018,bit.ly/KoreaMinesGlobeMailOct2018; “Joint mine removal operation begins in DMZ,” Hankoreh, 7 October 2018, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/864763.html; and “Landmines in DMZ to be cleared from Monday,” The Korea Times, 1 October 2018, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2018/09/356_256216.html.
 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2016), Form B. Unofficial translation.
 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2017), Form B; and “Land mine removal resumes on border,” China Daily, 29 November 2017, www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2017-11/29/content_35118834.htm.
 CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report (for 2016), Form B; and Protocol V Article 10 Report (for 2016), Form A.
 “Russian sappers demined some 890 acres in Aleppo in a single week,” Sputnik, 30 January 2017, https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201701301050140911-russian-sappers-demine-aleppo/; and email from international mine action operator on condition of anonymity, 3 May 2018.
 “How Bama IDPs will return home–Gov. Shettima,” Premium Times, 30 March 2018, www.premiumtimesng.com/regional/nnorth-east/263539-how-bama-idps-will-return-home-gov-shettima.html; and “Nigeria Needs Assistance of UN, Others to Demine Sambisa– Buratai,” AllAfrica, 2 April 2017, http://allafrica.com/stories/201704030012.html.
 “Advanced tech to help soldiers map minefields,” The Times of India, 10 July 2017, bit.ly/TimesofIndiaJuly2017; and “IEDs pose huge challenge in efforts to counter Naxals: Police,” The Indian Express, 24 July 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ieds-pose-huge-challenge-in-efforts-to-counter-naxals-police-4764492/.
 PEDEC website, www.pedec.ir/en; and email from Reza Amaninasab, Ambassadors for Development without Borders, Tehran, 9 July 2018.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, p. 26.
 For further details, see individual country profiles on Mine Action and Casualties on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org.
 Afghanistan uses the term Abandoned Improvised Mines (AIM), instead of the previously used term “Pressure Plate IED,” (PPIED). Email from Habib Khan, Head, Victim Assistance Department, DMAC, 21 June 2018. See, Directorate of Mine Action (DMAC), “Policy on Abandoned Improvised Mines Demining in Afghanistan,” May 2018.
 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018; DMAC, “MAPA Fast Facts, Quarterly Update, 4thQuarter 1396 (January−March 2018).”
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
 Emails from Ahmed Al Jasim, Manager, Information Department, DMA, 6 April 2017; and from Khatab Omer Ahmed, Planning Manager, Iraqi Kurdistan Mine Action Agency (IKMAA), 8 April 2017.
 Email from Ahmad Al Jasim, Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), 13 September 2018.
 Email from international mine action operator on condition of anonymity, 3 May 2018.
 DMAC, “Policy on Abandoned Improvised Mines Demining in Afghanistan,” May 2018.
 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018.
 Email from Alioune ould Menane, National Coordinator, National Humanitarian Demining Programme for Development (Programme National de Déminage Humanitaire pour le Développement, PNDHD), 23 July 2018.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), November 2017, pp. 6 and 11.
 “Decisions on the request submitted by Angola for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
 Statement by Amb. Maria de Jesus Dos Reis Ferreira, Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, Vienna, 21 December 2017.
 Additional information to Ecuador’s deadline Extension Request, 8 September 2017.
 “Decisions on the request submitted by Ecuador for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), August 2017, p. 13.
 “Decisions on the request submitted by Iraq for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of antipersonnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” 21 December 2017.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 5 and 6.
 “Decisions on the request submitted by Thailand for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
 “Decisions on the request submitted by Zimbabwe for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance with Article 5 of the Convention,” Mine Ban Treaty Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties, 21 December 2017.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 22 and 27; and “BIH Statement on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 22 and 27; and “BIH Statement on Interim Request for Extension to the Deadline for Fulfilling Obligations as per Article 5,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 7 June 2018.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, p. 44; and addition information submitted on 21 June 2019, p. 2.
 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 27 March 2015.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 14 March 2018, pp. 8, 9, 31, and 32.
 ICBL comments on Serbia’s extension request to the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 7–8 June 2018.
 Mine Ban Treaty Third Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 28 March 2018, pp. 8 and 11.
 Mine Ban Treaty deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, pp. 1-3.
 Mine Ban Treaty deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2018, pp. 7 and 14.
 Ibid., p. 4.
 Ibid., pp. 14 and 15.
 Maputo Action Plan, 27 June 2014, bit.ly/MaputoActionPlan.
 Preliminary Observations of the Committee on Article 5 Implementation, 7–8 June 2018,http://bit.ly/MBT2018ISM.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8; and email from Gerhard Zank, Programme Manager, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
 Emails from Claus Nielsen, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 22 March and 10 September 2018.
 Email from Alistair Moir, Country Director, MAG, 27 September 2017.
 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center (BHMAC), 17 May 2018; BHMAC, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 21; and revised Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request, September 2018, pp. 6 and 20–21.
 Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistance Authority (CMAA), “National Mine Action Strategy 2017–2025,” May 2018, pp. 8–9.
 Responses to questionnaire by Romain Coupez, MAG, 3 May 2017; and by Benjamin Westercamp and Seydou N’Gaye, Humanity & Inclusion (HI), 22 March 2017.
 “Preliminary Observations, Committee on Article 5 Implementation,” Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, 7–8 June 2018.
 See summaries above, and detailed country profiles for further information at www.the-monitor.org/cp.
 Email from Julie Myers, UNMAS (based on information provided by Joseph Huber, UNMAS, and Maj. Rich Pearce, UNFICYP), 11 September 2018.
 Emails from Terje Eldøen, NPA, 5 June and 14 June 2016. A seven-month grant from UNMAS expired in December 2015 under which SEMA was expected to have established itself as a sustainable government entity. Email from Mohammad Sediq Rashid, UNMAS, 8 June 2017.
 Emails from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
 “Mine Action Activities,” Side-event presentation by Amb. Vaidotas Verba, Head of Mission, OSCE Project Coordinator in Ukraine, 19th International Meeting, 17 February 2016.
 Email from Miljenko Vahtaric, OSCE PCU, 30 April 2018.
 Interviews with Ahmed Alawi, YEMAC, and Stephen Bryant, Chief Technical Adviser, UNDP, in Geneva, 17 February 2016; and UNDP, “Support to eliminate the impact from mines and ERW − Phase IV, Annual Progress Report 2014,” undated but 2015.
 See Mine Action country profiles available on the Monitor website, www.the-monitor.org/cp.
 UNAMA, “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Annual Report 2017,” February 2018.
 International Crisis Group, “Risky Business: The Duque Government Approach,” 21 June 2018; and interviews with Pauline Boyer and Aderito Ismael, HI, Vista Hermosa, 8 August 2018; with Esteban Rueda, and Sergio Machecha, NPA, Vista Hermosa, 9 August 2018; with Hein Bekker, and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and with John Jimenez, Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM), Vista Hermosa, 11 August 2018.
 Email from Vanessa Finson, NPA, 11 May 2018; interviews with Alejandro Perez, CCCM, Bogota, 14 August 2018; and with Hein Bekker and Emily Chrystie, HALO Trust, San Juan de Arama, 10 August 2018; and “Hombres armados detienen equipo de The HALO Trust en Uribe, Meta; amenazan al personal y queman una camioneta,” Descontamina Colombia, 19 July 2018.
 Emails from Tim Lardner, Chief, Mine Action, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
 Emails from Richard Boulter, UNMAS, 6 June 2018; and from Tim Lardner, UNMAS, 27 February and 1 March 2018.
 Interview with Baker Saheb Ahmed, DMA, Baghdad, 5 September 2018; and, UNMAS in Iraq website, unmas.shorthandstories.com/unmas-in-iraq/index.html.
 Email from Chris Pym, HALO Trust, 14 May 2018.
 UNDP, “YEMAC productivity, January to May 2018,” received by email from Stephen Bryant, UNDP, 15 July 2018; and Minutes of Yemen Mine Action Technical Working Group Meeting, Amman, 24 July 2018.
 Libya: UNMAS, “Programmes: Libya,” March 2018; emails from Lyuba Guerassimova, Programme Officer, UNMAS, 28 February 2017; and from Dandan Xu, Associate Programme Management Officer, UNMAS, 12 July 2017; and Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Support Mission in Libya, UN Doc. S/2018/140, 12 February 2018, p. 12; email from Jakob Donatz, UNMAS, 21 June 2018; DCA website, www.danchurchaid.org/where-we-work/libya; telephone interview with Darren Devlin, DDG, 20 June 2018; and email, 4 July 2018; Syria: Telephone interview with Luke Irving, Specialist Training and EOD Manager, Mayday Rescue, 28 March 2018; Mayday Rescue, “Syria Civil Defence, Explosive Hazard Mitigation Project Overview, Nov 2015–Mar 2018,” 1 March 2018; email from international mine action operator on the basis of anonymity, 3 May 2018; interview with Tim Porter, Regional Director for the Middle East, HALO Trust, in Geneva, 15 February 2018; emails from Adam Boyd, Programme Manager, HALO Trust Syria/Jordan, and Rob Syfret, Deputy Programme Manager and Operations Manager, HALO Trust, 18 May, 13 and 21 June 2018; and HALO Trust, “Survey and Explosive Hazard Removal in Dar’a and Quneitra Governorates, Southern Syria,” undated but 2018.
 Email from the Planning Department, PMAC, 26 June 2018.
 Letter to the UN Secretary General from Ukraine, 1 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 1 November 2018, p. 3.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 3 and 21.
 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018. However, the Article 7 Report (for 2017) states that 2,088 antipersonnel mine hazards covering 223km2 remained at the end of 2017.
 Emails from DMAC, 11 April and 18 August 2018.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Background, p. 5.
 National NGOs: Afghan Technical Consultants (ATC), Demining Agency for Afghanistan (DAFA), Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA), Mine Detection and Dog Centre (MDC), Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation (OMAR), AREA. International NGOs: Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust, Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), and Janus Demining Afghanistan (previously Sterling International).
 Interview with Mohammad Shafiq Yosufi, DMAC, in Geneva, 8 June 2018; email from DMAC, 1 April 2018; and UN Mine Action Gateway, “Survey and Clearance of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) in 1397 (April 2018–March 2019),” undated.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for June 2017–April 2018), p. 8.
 Ibid.; and email from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 11 September 2018.
 Emails from Gerhard Zank, HALO Trust, 15 June 2018; from Joaquim da Costa, NPA, 10 May 2018; and from Jeanette Dijkstra, MAG, 24 April 2018.
 Email from Tural Mammadov, Operations Officer, Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA), 19 October 2016.
 ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018,” undated, p. 5.
 See report on Nagorno-Karabakh on Monitor website.
 Email from Sabina Sarkarova, ANAMA, 2 May 2018.
 ANAMA, “Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action 2018,” undated, p. 14.
 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 7 September 2018, pp. 5, 17, and 18. It also reports 1,080km2. See p. 4. The Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, reports 1,061km2 of suspected hazardous area.
 Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), 7 September 2018, p. 19.
 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 17 May 2018; BHMAC, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 21; and Mine Ban Treaty Second Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), submitted September 2018, pp. 6 and 20–21.
 Email from Ljiljana Ilić, BHMAC, 17 May 2018; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form F; and BHMAC, “Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Annual Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 14. The national NGOs are: DEMIRA, Dok-ing Deminiranje N.H.O., EDD Training Centre, Eko Dem, Pro Vita, Stop Mines, Udruga “Pazi Mine Vitez,” and, Association UEM. The international NGOs are MAG and NPA. The commercial operators are: Detektor, N&N Ivsa, Point, and UEM.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), p. 9.
 CMAA, “National Mine Action Strategy 2017–2025,” May 2018, p. 9.
 Ibid., pp. 8–9.
 Email from Soultani Moussa, Manager/Administrator, National High Commission for Demining (Haut Commissariat National de Déminage, HCND), 19 June 2018.
 HCND, “Plan d’action prévisionnel 2014–2019 de mise en œuvre de la composante déminage et dépollution de la Stratégie de l’action contre les mines au Tchad” (“Mine Action Plan 2014–2019”), May 2014.
 M. P. Moore, “This Month in Mines, February 2017,” 7 March 2017, https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.com/2017/03/07/the-month-in-mines-february-2017/;“This Month in Mines: April, May and June,” https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.com/2017/07/25/the-months-in-mines-april-may-and-june/;“This Month in Mines, September and October 2017,” 30 November 2017, https://landminesinafrica.wordpress.com/2017/11/30/the-months-in-mines-september-and-october-2017/.
 HI, “Country Profile Chad,” September 2017, www.handicapinternational.be/sites/default/files/paginas/bijlagen/201710_fp_tchad_fr.pdf.
 Email from Soultani Moussa, HCND, 14 September 2018.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C; and email from Davor Laura, Head of Quality Control, Croatian Mine Action Center (CROMAC), 6 April 2018.
 In Croatia’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form C, this was reported to be 32.66km2; and in Croatia’s 2018 Article 5 deadline Extension Request, as 32km2.
 Email from Davor Laura, CROMAC, 6 April 2018. See the country profile for the full list of operators in 2017.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2019, p. 8.
 This is the recent estimate of contamination as of the end of 2017, provided by email from Ahmad Al Jasim, DMA, 13 September 2018; and email from Khatab Omer Ahmed, IKMAA, 8 May 2018. The Article 7 report for 2017 reported 1,072km2 at the end of 2017.
 Iraq Mine and UXO Clearance Company, al-Safsafah Mine Action Company, Akad International Company for Mine & UXO Clearance, Al-Fahad Co. for Demining, and Al-Danube.
 Email from Gilles Delecourt, Senior Programme Manager, UNMAS, 22 May 2018.
 Interview with Gilles Delecourt, UNMAS, Geneva, 16 February 2018; and email, 22 May 2018; and UNMAS, “Programmes in Syria,” updated March 2018.
 “Syria, UN Mine Action Service, Sign MoU,” Syrian Arab News Agency, 8 July 2018, www.syrianews.cc/syria-un-mine-action-service-sign-mou/.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form D.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request (Revised), September 2017, pp. 5 and 6.
 Ibid., pp. 3 and 21.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 29 March 2013, pp. A-1 and A-5.
 Email from Lt.-Col. Halil Şen, Turkish Mine Action Center (TURMAC), 21 June 2017; interview with Col. Zaki Eren, and Maj. Can Ceylan, TURMAC, in Vienna, 20 December 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form A.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form A; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Forms A and D.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2017), Forms D and L.
 Conflict Armament Research, “Mines and IEDs Employed by Houthis on Yemen’s West Coast,” September 2018, pp. 5−6, 11.
 UNDP, “Emergency Mine Action Project, Annual Progress Report 2017,” January 2018, p. 9.
 A 2,700km-long defensive wall, the Berm, was built during the conflict, dividing control of the territory between Morocco on the west, and the Polisario Front on the east. The Berm is 12-times the length of the former Berlin Wall and second in length only to the Great Wall of China.
 See UNMAS, “About UNMAS in Western Sahara,” updated May 2015; and Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), “Making life safer for the people of Western Sahara,” London, August 2011.
 Email from Graeme Abernethy, UNMAS, 1 March 2018.
 Ibid., 14 September 2018. The buffer strip is an area 5km wide east of the Berm. MINURSO, “Ceasefire Monitoring Overview,” undated, https://minurso.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=11421&language=en-US.
 Clearance of the buffer strip of mines ERW is not foreseen in MINURSO mission agreements. See, “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2017/307, 10 April 2017, p. 8.
 “Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara,” UN doc. S/2018/277, 29 March 2018, para. 43.