Latvia
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Summary: Non-signatory Latvia says it is in de facto compliance with the convention’s provisions, but it has not taken any steps to accede. Latvia has never participated in a meeting of the convention, even as an observer, and abstained from voting on a key UN General Assembly resolution promoting the convention in December 2017. Latvia states that it has never used, produced, stockpiled, or transferred cluster munitions.
Policy
The Republic of Latvia has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
Latvia says it is in de facto compliance with the convention’s provisions, but it has not taken any steps to accede. In a 20 July 2018 letter, Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgars Rinkēvičs told the Cluster Munition Coalition that his country “fully shares the concerns” over the “indiscriminate use of certain cluster munitions” and “supports the objectives” of the ban convention.[1] He went on to state that “the position of the government of Latvia regarding accession to the Convention has not changed.”
Previously, in December 2016, Latvia said it was committed “to act in line” with the provisions of the convention and “fully shares the concerns relating to the disastrous consequences caused by the indiscriminate use of certain cluster munitions.” Latvia drew attention to the need to balance humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions with “security concerns and strategic defense considerations.”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials have regularly communicated with Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor since 2010.[2] In May 2017, Latvia told the Monitor that its position on accession “has not changed” and committed to “act in line” with the convention’s provisions.[3]
Latvia participated as an observer in a couple of meetings of the Oslo Process that created the convention, including the Dublin negotiations in May 2008 and the Oslo Signing Conference in December 2008.[4]
Latvia has never participated in a meeting of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, even as an observer. It was invited to, but did not attend, the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2017.
In December 2017, Latvia abstaining from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that urgesstates outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[5] In 2015 and 2016, Latvia abstained from previous UNGA resolutions promoting implementation and universalization of the convention.
Latvia has voted in favor of Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in March 2018.[6] It has also voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2017.[7]
Latvia is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is a party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW).
Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling
In July 2018, Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgars Rinkēvičs told the Cluster Munition Coalition that “Latvia neither produces nor posesses cluster munitions, nor does it store or use them. Furthermore, Latvia currently has no plans to acquire or use this type of munitions in future.”[8]
Latvia has stated several times that it has never used, produced, stockpiled, or transferred cluster munitions.[9]
[1] Letter to the Cluster Munition Coalition from Edgars Rinkēvičs, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, Ref: 32-1892, 20 July 2018.
[2] In a May 2015 letter, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official reiterated Latvia’s “firm support” for the convention and said the country “de-facto complies” with the convention’s provisions. The official said Latvia is not considering submitting a voluntary Article 7 transparency report for the convention, as suggested by States Parties. Letter No. 32/202-2010 to Mary Wareham, HRW, from Amb. Baiba Braže, Director-General of Security Policy and International Organisations Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 May 2015. See also, emails from Martins Pundors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 19 May 2014, and 30 July 2013; Letter No. 32/63-1434 from Amb. Baiba Braže, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 April 2012; email from Ieva Jirgensone, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 April 2011; and Letter No. 32/112-1697 from Kaspars Ozolins, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2010.
[3] Letter No. 32-11923 to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch (HRW), from Amb. Ingrida Levernce, Director-General of Security Policy and International Organisations Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 May 2017.
[4] For details on Latvia’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2010, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 225–226.
[5] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017.
[6] See, “The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 37/29, 23 March 2018; The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 36/20, 29 September 2017; “The human rights situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution 35/26, 23 July 2017. It voted in favor of similar HRC resolutions in 2014–2016.
[7] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 72/191, 19 December 2017. Latvia voted in favor of similar resolutions in 2013–2016.
[8] Letter to the Cluster Munition Coalition from Edgars Rinkēvičs, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, Ref: 32-1892, 20 July 2018.
[9] It stated that, “Latvia neither produces nor possesses cluster munitions nor do we store or use them.” Explanation of Vote by Latvia, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015. See also, Letter No. 32/202-2010 from Amb. Baiba Braže, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, HRW, 11 May 2015; email from Martins Pundors, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 30 July 2013; Letter No. 32/112-1697 from Kaspars Ozolins, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2010; and email from Ieva Jirgensone, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 April 2011.
Mine Ban Policy
Policy
The Republic of Latvia acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty on 1 July 2005, becoming a State Party on 1 January 2006. Latvia has not enacted new legislation specifically to implement the Mine Ban Treaty, but has detailed a number of national implementation measures.[1]
Latvia submitted its sixth Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in 2011, covering calendar year 2010.[2] Before adhering to the treaty, Latvia submitted three voluntary reports.[3]
Latvia attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, but did not attend the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in Geneva in June 2011.
Production, transfer, stockpiling, and retention
Latvia did not produce or export antipersonnel mines in the past, but inherited a small stockpile of Soviet antipersonnel mines. Latvia completed destruction of its stockpile of 2,490 PMN-2 mines on 2 August 2006.[4]
In its latest Article 7 report, Latvia reported that it does not retain any mines for training, and that “APMs retained for training were destroyed in 2010.”[5] It indicated that the PMN-2 and OZM-4 mines were disposed of by detonation.[6] However, it did not explain the decrease in the number of mines retained from 2009 to 2010. Previously, in its Article 7 report submitted in 2010 (for calendar year 2009), Latvia recorded 118 mines retained for training, and it noted “781 paces [sic] of bounding mines OZM-4 were destroyed as part of training and demilitarization.”[7]
Latvia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. It submitted its annual report required by Article 13 of the protocol on 29 March 2011. Latvia is party to Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.
[1] In its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for 2007, Latvia for the first time included details about national implementation measures in accordance with Article 9 of the treaty. The report lists four measures. The four measures are: (1) Law on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, which is the law authorizing accession to the treaty; (2) Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 645 of 25 September 2007 on the List of National Strategic Goods and Services, which prohibits export and transit of antipersonnel mines; (3) The Code for Administrative Violations, which lays down liability for violations of circulation, manufacturing, storage and use of strategic goods and arms and explosive devices as well as their export, import and transfer; and (4) The Criminal Law, which provides for liability in case of smuggling explosive devices. Section XX of the Criminal Law stipulates punishment for unauthorized manufacture, acquisition, storage and sale as well as transportation and conveyance of weapons and explosives. Latvia had in the past only reported its Law on the Circulation of Arms prohibiting the export and transit of antipersonnel mines. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2007), Form A.
[2] It submitted Article 7 reports in 2010, 29 April 2009, 2008, May 2007, and on 28 April 2006.
[3] It submitted voluntary reports on 16 June 2005, 14 May 2004 and 1 May 2003.
[4] Statement of Latvia, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 20 September 2006. Latvia’s reporting on its stockpile had been inconsistent. Over the years, it had declared its stockpile to consist of between 0 and 4,666 antipersonnel mines. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 403. Also, in its four formal Article 7 reports, Latvia did not include in its stockpile the MON-50, MON-100, MON-200, and “Defense Charge-21” Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines listed in its previous voluntary reports. It has stated “they are defence charge and not observed by the Ottawa Convention. Latvia is committed not to use them as APM.” Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2006. Use of Claymore-type mines in command-detonated mode is permissible under the Mine Ban Treaty, but use in victim-activated mode (with tripwires) is prohibited. The ICBL has urged States Parties to report on steps taken to ensure that these types of mines can only be used in command-detonated mode.
[5] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for period 01 January 2010 to 31 December 2010), Form D, Form G.
[6] Ibid, Form F.
[7] Ibid, Form D.