Commitment to the Mine Ban Treaty
Mine Ban Treaty status
National implementation measures
Law No. 28824 enacted on 22 July 2006
16 May 2011
The Republic of Peru signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 17 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. Peru enacted domestic legislation to penalize violations of the Mine Ban Treaty on 22 July 2006.
On 16 May 2011, Peru submitted its 12th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report, for the period from March 2010 to March 2011.
Peru attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011.
Peru served as co-chair of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration in 2010, and as co-rapporteur of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operations of the Convention in 2011.
Peru is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.
Production, transfer, stockpiling, and retention
Peru is a former producer of antipersonnel mines. The Ministry of Defense has stated that Peru has never exported antipersonnel mines. Peru used antipersonnel mines around its electricity towers and public infrastructure during and after the internal conflict of 1980–1992.
Peru destroyed its stockpile of 338,356 antipersonnel mines between 1999 and December 2001.
In May 2011, Peru reported that it retained 2,040 antipersonnel mines for training purposes, which is 2,050 fewer mines than previously reported. In April 2010, Peru reported a total of 4,090 mines: 2,060 antipersonnel mines for training purposes and 2,030 mines retained for training that had been transferred for use “in the education and training of military personnel in basic and new techniques for demining.” In 2009, Peru reported a total of 4,047 mines retained for training purposes. Peru did not report in any detail on the intended purpose and actual use of its retained mines.
Since early 2007, remnants of the non-state armed group Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) have reportedly used victim-activated explosive devices, referred to as “explosive traps.” Victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.
In November 2010, local media reported that police had found 25 mines or explosive booby traps that it attributed to the Shining Path. In June 2010, media reported that a Peruvian soldier lost his leg after stepping on a mine while on patrol near the perimeter of the Cerro San Judas army base.
In October 2009, El Comercio reported that Staff Sergeant Sanchez EP Ipushima Euler was killed by a mine laid by the Shining Path. Minister of Defense Rafael Rey reportedly stated that the mine was laid by the Peruvian Army. Rey later clarified that an investigation into the incident had found the soldier was killed by an IED planted by the “narcoterrorists” (Shining Path). In December 2009, Peru’s Vice Minister of Foreign Relations Néstor Popolizio confirmed that there had been no mine use by Peru.
 Law No. 28824 imposes penal sanctions of five to eight years imprisonment. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, April 2007; and statement of Peru, Seventh Meeting of States Parties, Mine Ban Treaty, Geneva, 21 September 2006. The text can be found in the Boletín oficial de normas legales (Official Bulletin of Legal Norms) of the legal newspaper El Peruano, www.gacetajuridica.com.pe.
 The police produced the DEXA mine until production facilities were closed in 1994, while the navy produced the CICITEC MG-MAP-304 and the CICITEC MGP-30 mines until production facilities were closed in 1997. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form H, 2 May 2005; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Forms E and H, April 2003.
 Telephone interview with Gen. Raúl O’Connor, Director, Information Office, Ministry of Defense, 19 April 2000.
 Peru has denied mine-laying during the 1995 border conflict with Ecuador. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 6 May 2004.
 Two destructions of a total of 11,784 antipersonnel mines between March 2000 and March 2001 are sometimes not included in Peru’s destruction totals. Peru destroyed the bulk of its stockpile, 321,730 mines, between 30 May and 13 September 2001. Peru declared stockpile destruction complete in September 2001, but then destroyed a further 926 mines in December 2001 that it had intended to retain for training. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 658.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 16 May 2011. The mines held by the army are: 676 CICITEC (MGP), 600 M18-A1 Claymore, 500 PMA-3, 209 PMB-6N, and 30 POMZ-2M, while the Security Division (División de Seguridad, DIVSECOM) has 25 MAP-87.
 The mines transferred for training purposes are: 500 PMD6, 99 CICITEC (MGP), 100 M35C/ESC M5, 525 M-409, 291 PMA-6N, 470 PMNZ-2M (probably POMZ-2M), and 45 MAP-87. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2010.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 29 April 2009. Peru reported a total of 4,047 mines retained for training purposes: 775 CICITEC (MGP), 600 M18-A1 Claymore, 525 M409, 500 PMA-3, 500 PMB-6N (possibly PMD-6M), 500 PMD-6, 500 POMZ-2M, 100 M35 C/ESP M5, and 47 CICITEC mines. All are held by the army, except the 47 CICITEC mines, which are held by INPE.
 One article cited use of “explosive traps” in 24 attacks. “Las minas artesanales y trampas explosivas. Asesinos silenciosos en el Alto Huallaga” (“Artisanal mines and explosive traps. Silence murders in the Alto Huallaga”), InfoRegion (Lima), 28 October 2008, www.inforegion.pe. In the past decade, the only other reports of use of antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like devices by Shining Path came in June and July 2003. See Landmine Monitor Report 2004, p. 657. There were isolated reports of incidents involving explosive devices in subsequent years. See Landmine Monitor Report 2005, p. 476; and Landmine Monitor Report 2006, p. 588.
 “Ataque senderista contra campamento del Corah al norte de Tocache mata a un policía y hiere a otro” (“Shining Path attack against Corah camp north of Tocache kills a policeman and wounds another”), IDL-Reporteros, 6 November 2010, idl-reporteros.pe.
 Miguel Gutiérrez R., “Mina que mató a sargento fue colocada por las FFAA” (“Mine that killed sergeant was placed by the armed forces”), La República (Lima), 15 October 2009, larepublica.pe.
 “Muere sargento EP en Vizcatán al pisar mina senderista” (“EP sergeant dies after stepping on Shining Path mine”), El Comercio (Lima), 13 October 2009, elcomercio.pe.
 Original text: “Desgraciadamente fue una mina nuestra. Toda esa zona está minada para evitar ataques externos, y (Euler Sánchez ) no tuvo la precaución de ir por los lugares que estaban indicados. Pisó una mina nuestra; eso le ocasionó la muerte.” Miguel Gutiérrez R., “Mina que mató a sargento fue colocada por las FFAA” (“Mine that killed sergeant was placed by the armed forces”), La República (Lima), 15 October 2009, larepublica.pe.
 Letter from Rafael Rey, Minister of Defense, to the ICBL, 27 November 2009.
 He also said the Ministry of Defense had sent instructions to ensure the armed forces have the right information on legal obligations and international commitments, and that the Ministry of Defense had checked the stockpile of retained mines and none were missing. Notes from ICBL meeting with Néstor Popolizio Bardales, Vice Minister of Foreign Relations, and Wilyam Lúcar Aliaga, Contraminas, in Cartagena, 3 December 2009.