Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Summary: Non-signatory Poland recognizes the humanitarian concerns raised by cluster munitions, but has not taken any steps to accede to the convention. Poland has participated in the convention’s meetings, but not since 2014. It abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2017.
Poland sees military utility in cluster munitions, but it has never used them outside of training. Poland has produced, but never exported cluster munitions. Poland has disclosed information on the types of its stockpiled cluster munitions, but not on the quantities.
The Republic of Poland has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.
In October 2017, Poland delivered a joint statement on behalf of itself and four other European Union (EU) member states that are not party to the convention—Estonia, Finland, Greece, and Romania—that expresses support for the convention’s “humanitarian goal” but also the importance of meeting the “legitimate security concerns and military and defence needs” of states.
Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has regularly responded to Cluster Munition Monitor’s request for updated information since 2009. In April 2017, it stated that it is “currently not in a position to join the convention,” but “recognizes the humanitarian problems caused by [cluster munitions]” and expresses its “support for the humanitarian cause.” Poland repeats its position that the “adoption of the CCM’s [Convention on Cluster Munition’s] obligations would mean a serious weakening of [the country’s] defence capabilities, which is not acceptable in the light of the deteriorated security environment.”
Poland has given several reasons for its lack of accession. In October 2016, Polish officials stated that Poland sees a distinct military purpose for cluster munitions and faces national security concerns. In 2013, a Polish official said the Ministry of Defense is concerned at the cost of replacing the cluster munitions stocks with another weapon. A Ministry of Foreign Affairs webpage states that “we recognize the right of states to use modern, highly reliable cluster munitions for defense purposes.”
Poland participated in the Oslo Process that led to the creation of the ban convention, but from the outset made it clear that it did not support a comprehensive prohibition on cluster munitions and preferred they be regulated through the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to which it is a party. Poland participated as an observer in both the negotiations of the convention in Dublin in May 2008 and the Convention on Cluster Munitions Signing Conference in Oslo in December 2008.
Poland participated as an observer in the first three Meetings of States Parties of the convention and in intersessional meetings in 2013 and 2014, but it has not attended any meetings since then.
Poland abstained from voting on a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2017, which urges states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.” In 2015 and 2016, Poland also abstained from the vote on previous UNGA resolutions promoting the convention and also delivered joint statements with other EU member states that have not joined the convention.
Poland has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2017.
Poland is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty.
Poland has consistently stated that the Polish Armed Forces have never used cluster munitions in combat situations. In April 2017, Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs again confirmed that “as in previous years, Polish Armed Forces did not use cluster munitions in combat situations.”
The website of Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that “Poland does not use cluster munitions in either combat situations or training,” but also that “cluster munitions constitute an efficient defense weapon” and “in our opinion there are currently no viable alternatives to replace cluster munitions.”
Poland acknowledged that its army and air force used cluster munitions for training purposes in 2009–2011 at training grounds, but it has said nothing about the use of cluster munitions in training since 2012.
Poland has described its air-delivered cluster munitions, which entered into service in the 1980s during the Warsaw Pact-era, as “obsolete” and stressed that “current military Air Force doctrine does not anticipate any use of air-delivered cluster munitions in military operations.” While Poland is adhering to most of the convention’s provisions, it has not been willing to introduce a national moratorium on cluster munition use or production or transfer.
Poland is a producer of cluster munitions, but the last time the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed to the Monitor that the weapons are “still produced” was in 2010. It stated in 2009 that cluster munitions manufactured by Poland are “exclusively for the needs of the Polish Armed Forces.”
At least four Polish companies have produced cluster munitions for the armed forces:
- Zakłady Metalowe “DEZAMET” S.A. has produced the ZK-300 Kisajno cluster bomb and another type of cluster bomb called the LBKas-250, which contains 120 LBok-1 bomblets. This company also produced a 98mm mortar projectile, as well as a 122mm projectile designed for the 2S1 “GOŹDZIK” howitzer.
- The Kraśnik defense plant produced cluster munitions for 98mm mortars, 122mm artillery, and 152mm artillery.
- Tłocznia Metali Pressta Spółka Akcynjna manufactured 122mm rockets.
- Fabryka Produkcji Specjalnej Spółka z o.o. produces the 122mm M-21FK “FENIKS-Z” and the 122mm “HESYT” rockets as well as GKO submunitions, a type of dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM).
Many of these companies are subsidiaries of the Polish Defence Holding company, formerly known as the Bumar Group, a majority government-owned industry consortium of defense sector companies.
In 2015, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again informed the Monitor that Poland’s stockpiles are “kept under strict control and are not subject to any international transfers.” Previously, in 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told the Monitor that Poland and/or Polish companies have not exported any cluster munitions in previous years. In 2010, however, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that Polish companies could, theoretically, be legally granted permission to export cluster munitions, if an application was requested.
Poland possesses a stockpile of ground-launched and air-dropped cluster munitions, mostly of Polish origin and some from the former Soviet Union.
The Polish land forces are equipped with the following types of cluster munitions:
- 122mm M-21FK “FENIKS-Z” rockets, containing 42 GKO submunitions, used by BM-21/21M or RM-70/85 multi-barrel rocket launchers;
- 122mm “HESYT-1” artillery projectiles, containing 20 GKO submunitions, used by 2S1 “GOŹDZIK” self-propelled howitzers; and
- 98mm “RAD-2” mortar projectiles, containing 12 GKO submunitions, used by M-98 mortars.
The Polish Air Force possesses the following types of cluster munitions:
- ZK-300 cluster bombs containing 315 LBOk fragmentation bomblets—both the carrier and bomblets were designed and produced in Poland; and
- BKF cartridges with antivehicle, incendiary, and fragmentation bomblets, imported from the former Soviet Union, for use in KMG-U dispensers on Su-22 aircraft.
In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the armed forces no longer possessed RBK-250, RBK-250-275, and RBK-500 type cluster bombs, which it said were withdrawn from service during the 1990s and destroyed.
In its April 2017 letter, Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that in the reporting period, “cluster munition stockpiles were kept under strict control and regular reviews.” In April 2015, it made a similar statement that its cluster munitions are subject to “regular stockpile reviews which lead to a reduction in…stockpiles since munitions that are not eligible for further use are destroyed.”
The cluster munitions section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website states that “the Polish Armed Forces are equipped with modern type of cluster munitions, which contain self-deactivation mechanisms which guarantee a very high level of reliability.” It further states that “cluster munitions are subject to regular reviews which lead to a reduction in their stockpiles since munitions that are not eligible for further use are destroyed.”
 from Marcin Wroblewski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, Human Rights Watch (HRW), 28 April 2017.
 In 2009, Poland stated that it considered cluster munitions equipped with self-destruct mechanisms and with a failure rate no higher than 3% to be “legitimate weapons of significant military value.” Letter from Adam Kobieracki, then-Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2009. See also, letter from Tomasz Łękarski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 June 2011.
 ICBL-CMC meeting with Miroslaw Broillo, Deputy Permanent Representative for Disarmament, and Col. Zbigniew Ciolek, Adviser, Permanent Mission of Poland to the UN, New York, October 2016.
 Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) meeting with Witold Majewski, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Republic of Poland to the Republic of South Africa, September 2013.
 Poland was one of three states attending the February 2007 conference launching the process to not endorse the Oslo Declaration, in which states pledged to negotiate a legally binding instrument by the end of 2008 prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable humanitarian harm.
 For details on Poland’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see HRW and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 226–227.
 “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016.
 Statement of Poland (on behalf of Greece, Estonia, and Finland, and Romania), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 31 October 2016; and statement of Poland (on behalf of Greece, Estonia, and Finland), UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 4 November 2015.
 “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution 72/191, 19 December 2017. Poland voted in favor of similar resolutions in 2013–2016.
 In 2010, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed that the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan had been equipped with cluster munitions for 98mm mortars, but also said that NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) policy to not use cluster munitions in Afghanistan “has been put into effect through the order of the Chief of General Staff” of the Polish Armed Forces. Letter from Marek Sczygieł, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2010; and ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 235–236.
 Letter from Marcin Wroblewski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, HRW, 28 April 2017.
 Letters from Tomasz Łękarski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 June 2011; and from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2010.
 Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2009.
 Letter from Marek Sczygieł, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2010; and CMC meeting with Witold Majewski, Embassy of the Republic of Poland to the Republic of South Africa, September 2013.
 Letter from Marek Sczygieł, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2010.
 Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2009.
 Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 391; and Zakłady Metalowe, DEZAMET S.A. website, “Air Armament,” undated. As of June 2017, the submunition variant is no longer listed as available for sale.
 Terry J. Gander and Charles Q. Cutshaw, eds., Jane’s Ammunition Handbook 2001–2002 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2001), p.626.
 In 2009, Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said GKO submunitions had been produced since 2001 and feature a self-destruction mechanism that ensures “negligible failure rates of the submunitions in all environmental conditions.” Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2009.
 Letter from Tomasz Łękarski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2015. This was also communicated to the Monitor in 2014. Letter from Michael Polakow, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, 23 May 2014.
 Letters from Tomasz Łękarski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 June 2011; from Marek Sczygieł, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2010; and from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2009.
 Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2010. The response stated: “Currently regulations on control of trade in goods of strategic importance do not provide for a total ban on exports of cluster munitions, as opposed to anti-personnel mines. Administrative decisions on the granting of permits to export weapons are considered on an individual basis with the involvement of consulting authorities, in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 29 November 2000 on foreign trade in goods, technologies and services of strategic importance for national security and for the maintenance of international peace and security (Journal of Laws of 2004 No. 229, item. 2315, as amended later). Obtaining permission for export of cluster munitions is theoretically possible, in the case of approval of the transaction by the trade control authority, after having received a positive opinion of consulting bodies, including the Foreign Ministry.” Translation by Marta Kulikowska, Polish Red Cross, 30 May 2010.
 Unless otherwise noted, all information on stockpiles was provided by letter from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 March 2009.
 Letter from Marek Sczygieł, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 July 2010.
 Letter from Marcin Wroblewski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Mary Wareham, HRW, 28 April 2017.
 Letter from Tomasz Łękarski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 29 April 2015. A similar statement in 2014, emphasized that regular reviews result “in a gradual decrease in the number of stockpiled units” of cluster munitions. Letter from Michael Polakow, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 May 2014.
Mine Ban Policy
The Republic of Poland signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 4 December 1997 and ratified on 27 December 2012, becoming a State Party on 1 June 2013.
Poland has reported that the Mine Ban Treaty, as an international agreement, is superior to domestic law once ratified and applies directly in Poland. It has indicated that national implementation measures may be addressed through an amendment to the Penal Code.
Poland submitted its latest Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency report in early 2017, covering calendar year 2016. Before ratifying the treaty, Poland submitted 11 voluntary Article 7 reports.
Poland attended the Mine Ban Treaty Fifteenth Meeting of States Parties in Santiago in November–December 2016, where it provided an update on its stockpile destruction. Poland also attended the intersessional meetings in Geneva in June 2017, and the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo, Mozambique, in June 2014.
Poland is not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Poland is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines. Poland submitted an annual report in accordance with the protocol’s Article 13 in March 2017.
Production, transfer, use, stockpiling, and destruction
Poland has regularly stated that it does not produce, export, or use antipersonnel mines.
In the past, Poland produced three types of antipersonnel mines and imported a fourth type. Poland exported antipersonnel mines until 1993. An export moratorium in 1995 was made permanent by cabinet decree on 7 April 1998, which was then superseded by a law adopted in September 2002.
In its initial Article 7 report provided in November 2013, Poland declared a stockpile of three types of antipersonnel mines: PSM-1, PMD-6, and MON-100.
Poland completed the destruction of its stockpile in April 2016, more than a year before its treaty-mandated deadline. Poland began destroying its stockpile of more than one million antipersonnel mines in 2003. At the Mine Ban Treaty’s Third Review Conference in June 2014, Poland reiterated a previous announcement first made in 2012 that it had already completed destroying more than one million antipersonnel mines or 97% of its stockpile. It stated that the stockpile destruction was ongoing and would be completed “well before the 2017 deadline.” It stated that the disposal of mines and their components was carried out in accordance with Polish labor and environmental protection standards.
Poland spent PLN450,000 (US$189,881) on the stockpile destruction project in 2008, an additional PLN655,000 ($212,214) in 2009, and another €286,000 ($379,265) in 2010.
In its initial Article 7 report as a State Party submitted in November 2013, Poland confirmed that it is not retaining any antipersonnel mines for training and research purposes, as permitted under Article 3 of the convention.
 Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 28 November 2013. The report also lists several domestic legal provisions on weapons controls and regulations of illegal materials as pertaining to the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty. Poland’s ratification legislation included a declaration with respect to interpretation of the ban on “assistance” contained in Article 1 of the Mine Ban Treaty. According to the declaration, “the mere participation in the planning or execution of operations, exercises or other military activity by the Polish Armed Forces, or individual Polish nationals, conducted in combination with the armed forces of states not party to the [Convention], which engage in activity prohibited under that Convention, is not, by itself, assistance, encouragement or inducement for the purposes of Article 1, paragraph (c) of the Convention.” Draft Ratification Bill, Parliament of the Republic of Poland, 21 June 2012.
 The rationale document also specifies that amendments to include antipersonnel mines will be made to Acts of the Council of Ministers of 3 December 2001 (Dz. U. Nr 145, poz. 1625, z późn. zm.) and 23 November 2004 (Dz. U. Nr 255, poz. 2557, zpóźn. zm.) on prohibitions and restrictions with regard to use, production, and trade of weapons, ammunition, and national security related goods. Draft Ratification Bill, Parliament of the Republic of Poland, 21 June 2012. Poland’s initial Article 7 report listed these and other domestic legal provisions as relevant to the implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty, but it is not clear that amendments have in fact been made to specifically include antipersonnel mines under their provisions.
 Poland submitted previous voluntary Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 reports in 2012 (for calendar year 2011), 2011 (for calendar year 2010), 2010 (for calendar year 2009), in 2009 (for calendar year 2008), and on 14 April 2008, 6 April 2007, 3 May 2006, 11 May 2005, 12 May 2004, and 5 March 2003.
 In 2006, Poland told the Monitor that current military doctrine does not foresee the use of antipersonnel mines, including in joint military operations or exercises with other states. Letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006. However, in January 2007 Poland said that it planned to install self-destruct or self-neutralization mechanisms on some antipersonnel mines. It has not referred to such plans since that time. In March 2008, officials stated that Poland does not rely on antipersonnel mines for the defense of its national territory or its bases abroad. See, Landmine Monitor Report 2009, p. 867.
 “Ordinance of the Council of Minister of August 20, 2002 concerning the imposition of prohibition and restriction on transfer of goods and strategic importance for the state security,” Journal of Laws, 6 September 2002.
 Poland has previously acknowledged possessing MON-100 Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines, and said that these are “meant exclusively for mine-controlled detonation…[which] excludes the possibility of accidental detonation.” The MON-100 is described in Poland’s first voluntary Article 7 report in 2003 as a “directional fragmentation mine, if equipped with a MUW fuse attached to a tripwire.”
 Poland initially reported 1,055,971 stockpiled antipersonnel mines at the end of 2002. During 2003, it destroyed 58,291 POMZ-2 (2M) mines due to expiration of shelf life. It destroyed another 12,990 stockpiled mines in 2005, again because their shelf life had expired.
 Statement of Poland, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014. In December 2013 and December 2012, Poland reiterated the announcement that it had already destroyed 97% of its stockpile of antipersonnel mines. In 2008, Poland announced destroying 651,117 mines, or two-thirds of its stockpile. This was a much more rapid destruction of stockpiles than previously planned. Poland further reduced its stockpile to 200,013 mines in 2009. No further reduction took place in 2010. In 2011, Poland reduced its stockpile to a total of 13,585 antipersonnel mines. As part of its search for alternatives to mines, in 2008 Poland started a research project “aimed at the development of a modern and comprehensive system of engineering obstacles (barriers),” which might include “explosive devices controlled by an operator.” As of June 2011, the project was reported to be 60% completed. See, statement of Wojciech Flera, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013; statement by Amb. Remigiusz A. Henczel, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2012; Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2008), Form B; Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2009); Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2010), Form B; Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2011), Form B; response to Monitor questionnaire by Adam Kobieracki, Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2010; and letter from Tomasz Łękarski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 June 2011.
 Statement of Poland, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 24 June 2014.
 Initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form F, 28 November 2013.
 Letter from Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2009; response to Monitor questionnaire by Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2010; and letter from Tomasz Łękarski, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 June 2011. Average exchange rate for 2008: US$1=PLN2.3699; and for 2009: US$1=PLN3.0865, Oanda.com. Average exchange rate for 2010: €1=US$1.3261. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 6 January 2011.
 Initial Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 28 November 2013. Poland reiterated its intention not to retain any antipersonnel mines at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013. Statement by Wojciech Flera, Minister Counsellor, Mine Ban Treaty Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 5 December 2013. This was confirmed previously in a statement by Amb. Henczel, Mine Ban Treaty Twelfth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 3 December 2012; and in a meeting with Col. Jaroslaw Rubaj, Counsellor-Military Adviser, Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, and Jaroslaw Ogrodzinski, Deputy Chief of Non-proliferation and Disarmament Division, Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Defence, 25 May 2012. In the past, Poland stated it planned to retain about 5,000 antipersonnel mines for training purposes. In 2009, Poland used 326 empty antipersonnel mine casings to train demining squads for peacekeeping and stabilization missions, up from 295 casings used in 2008, and 144 in 2007. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed the Monitor that imitation mine casings were used for training in 2010. This has been indicated also in Poland’s 2011 Article 7 report. See, Mine Ban Treaty Voluntary Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2010); and response to Monitor questionnaire by Adam Kobieracki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 8 April 2010. He stated that PSM-1, PMD-6, POMZ-2, POMZ-2M, and MON-100 casings were being used for this purpose.
Contamination and Impact
Poland remains contaminated by large quantities of explosive remnants of war (ERW) and, to a much lesser extent, mines from World War II. Poland has consistently stated there are no known or suspected mined areas in Poland.The Ministry of National Defense has reported that scattered “single” emplaced mines, mostly antivehicle mines, have been found during clearance operations but most of those that have been destroyed are remnants of World War II stockpiles.Poland is not believed to be affected by cluster munition remnants.
Mine Action Program
The army conducts clearance operations of former military facilities. It also conductsclearance operations in response to reports from the general public under a 2002 Ministry of National Defense order as well as according to other guidelines. Polish companies are involved in clearance operations within Poland. Polish deminers have also engaged in demining abroad as part of UN or other multinational operations.
Poland does not report formally on clearance of mines or ERW within Poland.Its CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 transparency report for 2011 gives details of clearance by Polish deminers only during peace operations in Afghanistan.
 See, for example, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports (for calendar years 2008, 2009, and 2010), Form C.
 See, for example, Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form C, 14 April 2008; letter from Grzegorz Poznanski, Deputy Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14 May 2008; letter from Tadeusz Chomicki, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 March 2006; and interview with Col. Marek Zadrozny, Ministry of National Defense, and Col. Slawomir Berdak, Polish Armed Forces, in Geneva, 8 May 2006.
 See, for example, CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 23 September 2009; and Statement of Poland, Second Review Conference, Cartagena, 4 December 2009.
 See, for example, CCW Amended Protocol II Article 13 Report, 23 September 2009.
Support for Mine Action
In 2017, the Republic of Poland provided nearly US$100,000—up from some $50,000 in 2016—to the United Nations Mine Action Survey (UNMAS) to mine action activities in Palestine and unearmarked funding.
Summary of contributions: 2015–2017
% change from previous year (US$)
Note: N/A = not applicable.
Casualties and Victim Assistance
In 2014, at least four explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (three killed and one injured) were reported in the media in the Republic of Poland. In January a 37-year-old collector of ordnance was killed while trying to disarm a missile from World War II found in the woods in the village of Czarnotrzew. In another incident in January a man was killed while working on explosive ordnance disposal for a private company. In March a man was seriously injured while trying to dismantle unexploded ordnance. A man diving to collect ordnance was killed in September.
Two ERW casualties were reported in the media in 2013. In Czestochowa, a father and his son were killed in December 2013 due to the explosion of a bomb in a location used for training fighter pilots during World War II.
In 2012, a man was killed by ERW, also likely dating from World War II. Incidents with ERW caused two child casualties in 2011. Prior to the 2011 incident, the last time casualties were identified was in 2008, when 10 ERW casualties were reported.
The Monitor identified a total of 212 mine/ERW casualties in Poland from 1999 to the end of 2014 (45 people were killed and 167 injured). The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Poland is not known. Due to incomplete data collection, casualties may have been under-reported. Between 1945 and 1973, 3,833 civilians (including 3,189 children) were killed and 8,221 (including 6,656 children) were injured in mine/ERW incidents. Between 1944 and 1994, 658 soldiers were killed and several thousand injured in clearance operations.
There is no specific victim assistance coordination mechanism in Poland. The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy is responsible for all disability-related matters. There is also a Government Plenipotentiary for Persons with Disabilities as well as a National Consultation Council for Persons with Disabilities, which organized training sessions for government officials to promote the inclusion of persons with disabilities into society and to fight discrimination. The State Fund for Rehabilitation of Disabled Persons (PFRON) was established in 1991 in order to create new jobs and/or retain jobs for persons with disabilities, fund social rehabilitation, and to finance NGOs projects (mainly on advocacy and public awareness).
Poland ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 27 September 2012.
 “Kolekcjoner niewybuchów zginął w eksplozji pod Ostrołęką” (“Collector of unexploded ordnance killed in an explosion at Ostroleka”), Wirtualna Polska, 14 January 2014.
 “Śmierć nurka w podwodnej eksplozji. Chciał wydobyć niewybuch?” (“Death of diver in underwater explosion. Did he want to take out the unexploded bomb?”), TVP Info, 7 September 2014.
 “Częstochowa: eksplozja niewybuchów zabiła dwie osoby” (“Czestochowa: the explosion of unexploded ordnance killed two people”), TVP, 21 December 2013.
 Tomasz Dybalski, “Śmierć od niewypału. Dlaczego doszło do tragedii? (nowe fakty)” (“Death by misfire. Why was there a tragedy? (New facts)”), Echodnia (daily newspaper), 22 July 2012.
 “Likely WWII Bomb Kills 2 Polish Children,” Associated Press (Warsaw), 24 March 2011; and Monitor analysis of data provided by email from Adam Kobieracki, Director of Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 23 April 2009.
 Letter from Maruisz Handzlik, Director of the Export Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 February 2001.
 See Ministry of Labor and Social Policy website; and United States Department of State, “2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Poland,” Washington, DC, 27 February 2014.