Summary: Non-signatory Russia has acknowledged the humanitarian risks associated with cluster munitions, but sees military utility in the weapons and has not taken any steps to accede to the convention. It again voted against adopting a key annual United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention in December 2017. Russia has participated as an observer in two meetings of the convention, but not since 2012.

Russia—and the Soviet Union before it—is a major producer, stockpiler, and exporter of cluster munitions. Russia has participated in a joint military operation with the Syrian government since September 2015, which has seen the widespread use of cluster munitions. Russia has not explicitly denied its involvement in the use of cluster munitions in Syria, but claims that cluster munitions are used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Russia is one of the biggest critics of the convention and has not taken any steps to accede as it sees military utility in cluster munitions. In December 2016, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov responded to a letter from Human Rights Watch (HRW) on the use of cluster munitions in Syria.[1] He also provided a three-page paper entitled, “Russia’s Position on the Use of Cluster Munitions in Syria” that states:

As a responsible party to a number of multilateral arrangements on the control and prohibition of conventional arms, our country strictly complies with its commitments, including with regard to cluster munitions (CMs) that Russia views as a legal means of warfare”[2]

Russia has commented more often on the convention since November 2015, when it voted against a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[3] Upon voting against a subsequent UNGA resolution promoting the convention in October 2017, Russia’s representative Vladimir Yermakov told the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security that:

Our assessment of Cluster Munitions Convention (CMC) has not changed. The CMC is a politicized document that tailors the very definition of CMs [cluster munitions] to the interests of individual states which are trying to preserve their one-sided military and technical advantages. The CMC only proclaims the ‘ban’ on CMs but in fact does not prohibit it. Moreover, it artificially qualifies these munitions as ‘bad’ and ‘good’ on the basis of random and unsubstantiated criteria. Indeed, Article 21 de-facto makes null and void all CMC restrictions since it allows its State Parties to participate in joint combat operations together with States non-Parties using any CMs.[4]

Previously, in November 2015, Russia expressed “concern about the humanitarian impact of the arbitrary use of cluster munitions,” but called the convention “a very poor example of how to reach agreement on arms control” that “is a cynical attempt to repartition [sic] the market for cluster munitions.”[5]

Russia never participated in the Oslo Process that produced the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[6] When the convention opened for signature in December 2008, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed Russia’s opposition to “unjustified restrictions and bans on cluster munitions,” which it defended as “a legitimate type of weapon that is not banned by international humanitarian law and plays a significant role in the defense interests of Russia.”[7]

Russia participated as an observer in a few meetings of the convention, but not since 2012.[8] It did not make any statements at these meetings.

Russia has expressed selective concern at new use of cluster munitions. It made several statements criticizing and expressing “serious concern” at the use of cluster munitions “against civilian population” in eastern Ukraine in 2014.[9] Russia has also asked the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) to investigate cluster munition use in Ukraine.[10] However, Russia has not acknowledged or taken any measures to address the use of cluster munitions by Russian-backed armed opposition groups in eastern Ukraine (see Use section below).

Russia voted in favor of a 2015 UN Security Council resolution that expressed concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur, Sudan.[11] It also voted in favor of a 2014 Security Council resolution that expressed concern at the “indiscriminate” use of cluster munitions in South Sudan.[12]

Russia has not condemned the use of cluster munitions in Syria or Yemen.

Russia is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and, after opposing CCW discussions on cluster munitions for years, changed its position in 2011 to support an effort led by the United States (US) to conclude a new CCW protocol on cluster munitions.[13] That initiative failed in November 2011, effectively ending the CCW’s deliberations on cluster munitions and leaving the Convention on Cluster Munitions as the sole international instrument specifically dedicated to ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions. Russia has not proposed any CCW work on cluster munitions since then.

Production and transfer

Russia, and historically the Soviet Union, is a major producer and exporter of cluster munitions. Additionally, several states inherited stocks of cluster munitions when the Soviet Union dissolved. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Our records on the production, usage, and export of cluster munitions…are confidential and will not be publicized.”[14]

According to international technical reference materials, three state-owned Russian companies have produced cluster munitions:

• Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise (air-dropped bombs);
• Mechanical Engineering Research Institute (120mm, 152mm, and 203mm artillery projectiles); and
• Splav State Research and Production Enterprise Rocket (122mm, 220mm, and 300mm rockets).

During the reporting period, Russia began testing the “Drel” PBK-500U gliding cluster bomb, a new cluster munition developed by Bazalt State Research and Production Enterprise, according to the company.[15]

Cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have been reported in the stockpiles of at least 36 states, including 20 that are not yet States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions:[16] Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia,[17] India,[18] Iran, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Kuwait,[19] Libya,[20] Mongolia, Poland,[21] Romania, Sudan,[22] Syria, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,[23] Uzbekistan, and Yemen.[24] RBK series bombs containing various submunition types appear to account for the vast majority of cluster munitions used in Syria by the Syrian government and Russian forces.[25]

A total of 10 States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions have stockpiled cluster munitions of Russian/Soviet origin have formally declared the stocks, providing types and quantities, as listed in the following table.

Stockpiled Soviet/Russian cluster munitions declared by States Parties[26]

Stockpiling

Russia has acknowledged possessing a “large” stockpile of cluster munitions “stored throughout the state,” and has stated that disposing of a wide range of obsolete cluster munitions would be time-consuming and “a significant financial expenditure.”[27] At the CCW in November 2011, Russia stated that the size of its cluster munitions stockpile is similar to that of the US, which had reported 5.5 million cluster munitions.[28]

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The quantity and types of cluster munitions stockpiled in the Russian Ministry of Defence are confidential and will not be publicized.”[29] The following list of types stockpiled is based on a wide variety of publicly available sources.

Cluster munitions stockpiled by the Russian Federation[30]

Note: FAE = fuel air explosive; HE/AT = high explosive antitank; SFW = sensor-fuzed weapon.

Use

Use in Syria

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and that it is using cluster munitionsor, at a minimum, directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks that have used cluster munitionson opposition-held areas of governorates. There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia initiated a joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but the overall number of reported attacks decreased in Syria in the year to July 2018.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense appeared to acknowledge responsibility for a June 2016 attack on coalition-backed armed opposition forces near the Syrian al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq, which the United Kingdom (UK) and US said used RBK-500 AO-2.5RT/RTM cluster munitions.[32] 

Russian and Syrian government forces use many of the same aircraft and weapons and frequently carry out offensives together. However, Russia is the only force in Syria to operate Sukhoi SU-25 and SU-34 fighter-ground attack jets used to deliver RBK-series cluster bombs. HRW, Amnesty International, and others have compiled credible evidence, including videos and photographs, documenting SU-25 and SU-34 near or involved in attacks near sites when cluster munitions were used.[33]

All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union/Russia.[34] When the Syrian government began its air campaign on rebel-held areas it used RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets emerged in mid-2012.[35] It has used air-dropped cluster bombs since then, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions and AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions.[36] A t the beginning of 2014, Syrian government forces first started to use Smerch 9M55K and Uragan 9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms.[37] Syrian government forces have also used Tochka9M79-series ballistic missiles.

More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have only been used in Syria since Russia entered into its joint operation with Syrian government forces at the end of September 2015.[38]

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but rather claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[39] In December 2016, Russia issued a three-page position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria that claimed “no cases of indiscriminate use of air weapons have been registered so far in the course of the counter-terrorist operation in Syria,” and concluded that “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munition] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[40] In December 2015, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[41]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[42] In September 2017, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.”[43] During the course of the meeting, approximately 20 countries and the European Union publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[44]

Previous use

In eastern Ukraine, Russian-backed insurgents used cluster munition rockets in 2014 and 2015, impacting villages in government-controlled areas.[45] Ukrainian government forces were also responsible for cluster munition rocket attacks.[46] Russia expressed concern at Ukrainian government use of cluster munitions, but has not commented on cluster munition attacks by opposition forces.[47] There has been no evidence or allegations of new use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine by any party since a February 2015 ceasefire went into effect.[48]

During an August 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia used cluster munitions including RBK AO-2.5RTM cluster bombs and Uragan ground-fired rockets containing 9N210 submunitions. Russia used cluster munitions in or near nine towns and villages in the Gori-Tskhinvali corridor south of the South Ossetian administrative border.[49] Russia has denied using cluster munitions in Georgia.[50] The Netherlands has sought accountability and an investigation into the death of Dutch journalist Stan Storimans, who was killed by a Russian cluster munition strike in Georgia in August 2008.[51]

Russian forces also used cluster munitions in Chechnya from 1994–1996 and again in 1999.[52]

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, cluster munitions were also used by various forces in several conflicts in Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Tajikistan. The extent of involvement of Russian forces in this use of cluster munitions is not known, but cannot be discounted.

The Soviet Union used cluster munitions from 1979–1989 in Afghanistan and first used cluster munitions during World War II against German armed forces in 1943.[53]

Policy

The Russian Federation has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Perhaps signaling a shift in its attitude to joining the treaty, Russia stated in October 2017, “We do not exclude our possible accession to Ottawa Convention in the future. In the meantime, Russia continues work to address a number of technical, organizational and financial issues related to implementation of Ottawa Convention.”[1]

Previously, in December 2009, Russia reiterated that it has not been able to accede due to the military utility of antipersonnel mines, the lack of viable alternatives, and the financial difficulties in destroying its large stockpile within four years.[2]

Russia last attended as an observer the Tenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November–December 2010, where it made a statement for the first time at an annual meeting for the Mine Ban Treaty. Russia did not participate in the intersessional meetings of the treaty in Geneva in June 2017.

Russia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on mines.[3] It routinely submits national annual reports as required by Article 13, including in 2017. Russia is also a party to CCW Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.

Russia reports that in order to comply with Amended Protocol II, a “National System of Technical Requirements for Landmines including antipersonnel and other than antipersonnel ones was elaborated and adopted; planned disposal of obsolete landmines is underway; new, more effective types of detection and demining tools are developed and commissioned. Marking of mine fields at the national boarder of the Russian Federation is fulfilled in full compliance with Paragraph 1 of the RF Federal Law #158FZ of December 7, 2004, ‘On Ratification of Amended Protocol II…’”[4]

Use, production, transfer, stockpiling, and destruction

Since 1999, Russian forces have used antipersonnel mines in Chechnya, but also at times in Dagestan, Tajikistan, and on the border with Georgia.[5] Russia has argued that its mine use has been necessary to stop flows of weapons, drugs, and terrorists, and maintained that it has been in full compliance with CCW Amended Protocol II on landmines.[6]

Russia has produced at least 10 types of antipersonnel mines since 1992, including blast mines (PMN, PMN-2, PMN-4, and PFM-1S) and fragmentation mines (POMZ-2, OZM-72, MON-50, MON-90, MON-100, and MON-200). Russia has stated on several occasions that its production of blast mines stopped in 1997.[7] Russia has been conducting research on new mines, modifications to existing mines, and alternatives to mines since at least 1997.[8]

Russia has had a moratorium since 1 December 1994 on the export of antipersonnel mines that are not detectable or not equipped with self-destruct devices. The moratorium formally expired in 2002, however Russian officials stated in June 2009 that it is still being observed.[9]

Antipersonnel mines of Soviet/Russian origin have been found emplaced in at least 30 mine-affected countries.[10]

Since 2012, the Syrian army has used mines of Soviet/Russian origin, including PMN-2 and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines and TMN-46 and TM-62 antivehicle mines, along its borders with Lebanon and Turkey.[11]

Since 2014, antipersonnel mines produced in Russia but never stockpiled in Ukraine have been spotted in visual media products or reported seized by Ukrainian authorities. For example, in a video produced by a pro-rebel media source in July 2014, combatants associated with the Russian supported Zarya Battalion were shown emplacing a PMN-4 antipersonnel mine, in conjunction with emplacing TM-62M antivehicle mines at an unknown location in eastern Ukraine. This type of mine has never been declared to be stockpiled by Ukraine and was only first publicly displayed by Russia in 1993.[12]

In November 2004, Russia released official information for the first time on the number of antipersonnel mines in its stockpiles, when then-Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov cited a figure of 26.5 million. The minister forecast that approximately 23.5 million of these antipersonnel mines would be destroyed between 2005 and 2015.[13] At the Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Russia declared that it has destroyed 10 million mines, including antipersonnel mines.[14] In 2010 only, more than 464,000 antipersonnel mines that did not meet international requirements were also destroyed.[15]

Russian officials have acknowledged that Russian military units in other countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States maintain antipersonnel mine stockpiles, such as 18,200 in Tajikistan and an unknown number in Georgia (Abkhazia).[16]

Contamination

The Russian Federation is heavily contaminated with mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) as a result of World War II, the two Chechen wars (1994–1996 and 1999–2009), and armed conflicts in the Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, and Kabardino-Balkaria.

Antipersonnel and antivehicle mines were used extensively in the two major conflicts in Chechnya. Estimates of the extent of contamination vary greatly because no systematic effort has been undertaken to assess the scope or impact of the problem.[1] In 2010, Russia’s deputy prime minister and presidential special envoy to the Caucasus, Aleksandr Khloponin, claimed that mines affected 14km² of land and posed a major obstacle to development.[2] In contrast, Chechen officials and human rights organizations have previously estimated that 245km² of land was mined, including 165km² of farmland and 73km² of woodland.[3]

In January 2017, a commander in the Russian armed forces reportedly told press agency Interfax that more than 100km² of land remained to be cleared in Chechnya, and a further 20km² in neighboring Ingushetia.[4] According to the online media report, areas cleared to date had nearly all been in lowland Chechnya and remaining mined area is in more mountainous terrain, complicating demining efforts.[5]

Program Management

There is no formal civilian mine action program in Russia and no national mine action authority. Mine clearance is carried out by Federal Ministry of Defense engineers, demining brigades of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and by the MES, through its specialized demining units (EMERCOM Demining and the “Leader” Center for Special Tasks).[6]

Russia reported that its armed forces established an International Demining Action Center in 2014. The center serves as a base for specialist training in detection and clearance of explosive devices, demining, and operation of mobile robotic tools, and does not function as a mine action center as the term is generally understood in mine action.[7]

Clearance of explosive ordnance in 2017 was reportedly undertaken by 7,050 military personnel, including 846 officers, 97 demining teams, 978 vehicles, and 51 pieces of demining machinery.[8]

Land Release

In its Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) Protocol V transparency reports for 2017, Russia reported that its armed forces engineering units conducted demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) in the “territories of the Russian Federation,” including the western, southern, central, and eastern military districts, and the northern navy district.In total, more than 331,607 explosive devices were destroyed, including 30,292 IEDs.[9]

In 2016, the Deputy Chief Engineer of Russia’s armed forces, Colonel Ruslan Alahverdiev, had reportedly promised to complete clearance of Chechnya and Ingushetia by 2018.[10] However, in the online media report, it was unclear whether Colonel Alahverdiev was referring only to clearing all roads and forests, or if roads and forests are the only remaining mined areas in Chechnya and Ingushetia. In September 2017, online media reported that combat engineers had been working since April 2017 to clear forests in mountainous areas and foothills in Chechnya.[11]

Progress in 2018

For 2018, Russia planned to clear more than 53km² of ERW: 14.7km² in the western military district, 14.2km² in the southern military district, 13.9km² in the central military district, 6.2km² in the eastern military district, and 4.1km² in the northern navy district.[12]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

Casualties Overview

In 2016, four mine/ERW casualties were identified in the Russian Federation through Monitor media scanning. All recorded casualties in 2016 were adult male civilians. No child casualties were recorded among civilians.[1]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties throughout Russia remains unknown.

A total of 3,187 civilian mine/ERW casualties (746 killed; 2,440 injured; 1 unknown) have been recorded since 1994, including in UNICEF data for casualties in Chechnya.[2]

Cluster munitions were reported to have caused at least 638 casualties; 612 of the casualties occurred during strikes in Chechnya (294 killed; 318 injured) in the period from 1994 to the end of 1999. The other 26 casualties were caused by unexploded submunitions and were reported between 1994 and the end of 2007.[3]