Summary: Non-signatory Syria has shown minimal interest in the convention. It has ignored calls to accede to the convention that multiplied after Syrian government forces used cluster munitions in mid-2012. Syria abstained from voting on a key United Nations (UN) resolution on the convention in December 2017.

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions and it has denied possessing or using cluster munitions. At least 13 types of air-dropped and ground-launched cluster munitions have been used in Syria as well as an unknown type of rocket-delivered submunition. The vast majority of attacks have been attributed to Syrian government forces. The use of cluster munitions in Syria has caused widespread harm that has been met with strong condemnation.

Policy

The Syrian Arab Republic has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Syria has shown minimal interest in the convention and has not taken any steps towards accession. The Syrian government has commented publicly once, in 2011, on the question of whether it will accede to the convention. Its representative told States Parties that the government views cluster munitions as “criminalized by humanity” and said, “We appreciate the international effort to ban these weapons, but cannot sign due to Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights.”[1]

Syria abstained from the vote on a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution in December 2017 that calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “join as soon as possible.”[2] It has not explained the reasons for its abstention on this resolution and on previous UNGA resolutions promoting the convention in 2015 and 2016.

Syria did not engage in the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Syria participated as an observer in the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut, Lebanon in September 2011. This marks its first and to date only attendance at a meeting of the convention.

Syria is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Production and transfer

Syria is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions, but it has received and stockpiles them.

Stockpiling

Based on evidence of cluster munition use since 2012, Syria has imported or otherwise received at least 13 types of cluster munitions, as listed in the following table. When and how the Syrian government obtained these cluster munitions, and in what quantities, remains unknown.[3]

Types of cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012[4]

Use

Research continues to show that Syrian government forces are primarily responsible for using cluster munitions in the country. There were at least 36 separate cluster munition attacks between July 2017 and June 2018, while the Monitor reviewed, but could not confirm additional evidence of more than two-dozen possible cluster munition attacks. Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2017 reported at least 600 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2012 and July 2017, including 238 attacks between August 2016 and July 2017.

This indicates a significant drop in new use in the reporting period, but the number of cluster munition attacks was certainly higher as many attacks likely went unrecorded. Local residents, journalists, activists, and first responders continue to record and share evidence of cluster munition use in Syria, but such first-hand information has become increasingly scarce. Additionally, videos and photographs of cluster munition remnants often do not provide information on the date or circumstances of use.

During the reporting period, most cluster munition attacks were recorded in the governorates or provinces of Damascus and Idlib, while there was also new use of cluster munitions in Aleppo, As-Suwayda, Deir ez-Zor, and Rif Dimashq governorates.[5] All of the country’s 14 governorates except Tartus have experienced the use of cluster munitions since 2012 and As-Suwayda governorate was added to this list after a 22 May 2018 attack using OTR-21 Tochkaballistic missile and 9N24submunitions.

Various groups have reported new use of cluster munitions in Syria over the past year:

• Siege Watch issued a report on Eastern Ghouta that lists eight cluster munition attacks by Syrian government forces supported by Russia between 2 February and 11 March 2018.[6]
• Human Rights Watch investigated a 21 September 2017 cluster munition attack using ShOAB-0.5 submunitions on Qalaat Al-Madiq in Idlib that killed at least two civilians and injured at least one.[7] It identified at least 12 cluster bomb attacks inJisr Al-Shughur, Al-Tamaneh, and other parts ofIdlib governorate between 19 September and 30 September.

There is strong evidence that Russia stockpiles cluster munitions in Syria at its airbase at Hmeymim, southeast of Latakia city, and that it is using cluster munitionsin Syria or, at a minimum, directly participating together with Syrian government forces in attacks using cluster munitions on opposition-held areas.[8] There was a significant increase in the use of cluster munitions in Syria after Russia initiated a joint operation with Syrian government forces on 30 September 2015, but the overall number of reported attacks has decreased in the year to July 2018.[9] Russia has not explicitly denied its involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.

There has been no evidence to indicate that the United States (US) or its partners have used cluster munitions in the Operation Inherent Resolve coalition operation against the non-state armed group Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq that began in August 2014.[10] In July 2016, a spokesperson for the US Air Force’s Central Command told the Washington Post, “We have not employed cluster munitions in Operation Inherent Resolve. This includes both U.S. and coalition aircraft.”[11]

IS used cluster munition rockets in Syria in 2014 and may have continued to use them since then.[12] As the Syrian conflict continues, it is not possible to determine with confidence if other armed groups have used cluster munitions. There is evidence that opposition forces have repurposed unexploded submunitions for use in air-delivered and ground-emplaced improvised explosive devices (IEDs). When activated by their victim, such devices are considered antipersonnel landmines prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty.[13]

Previous use

Previously, Cluster Munition Monitor 2017 reported at least 600 cluster munition attacks in Syria between July 2012 and July 2017, including 238 attacks between August 2016 and July 2017.[14]

All except two types of the cluster munitions used in Syria since 2012 were manufactured by the Soviet Union/Russia.[15] When the Syrian government began its air campaign on rebel-held areas it used RBK-series air-dropped cluster bombs containing AO-1SCh and PTAB-2.5M bomblets emerged in mid-2012.[16] It has used air-dropped cluster bombs since then, including RBK-500 cluster bombs containing ShOAB-0.5 submunitions and AO-2.5RT and PTAB-2.5KO submunitions.[17]

More advanced RBK-500 SPBE bombs containing SPBE sensor fuzed submunitions and a ground-fired 240mm 3-O-8 rocket-assisted mortar projectile have only been used in Syria since Russia entered into its joint operation with Syrian government forces at the end of September 2015.[18]

Government forces first started to use ground-launched cluster munitions at the end of 2012, deploying multi-barrel rocket launchers to fire 122mm SAKR cluster munition rockets containing DPICM submunitions.[19] In early 2014, Syrian government forces began to use Smerch9M55K and Uragan9M27K-series surface-to-surface rockets containing 9N235 submunitions fitted with self-destruct mechanisms.[20] Syrian government forces have also used Tochka9M79-series ballistic missiles.

Responses to the use of cluster munitions

The Syrian military has denied possessing or using cluster munitions, but rarely responds to or comments on new use of cluster munitions.[21] IS has not responded to its reported use of cluster munitions.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has not explicitly denied Russia’s involvement in using cluster munitions in Syria, but rather claims that cluster munitions have been used in accordance with international humanitarian law and not indiscriminately.[22] In December 2016, Russia issued a three-page position paper on the use of cluster munitions in Syria that claimed “no cases of indiscriminate use of air weapons have been registered so far in the course of the counter-terrorist operation in Syria,” and concluded that “the question of the involvement of the Russian military personnel in the cases of indiscriminate CMs [cluster munition] use in Syria [is] totally inappropriate.”[23] In December 2015, the Russian Defense Ministry stated that “Russian aviation does not use [cluster munitions]” and that “there are no such munitions at the Russian air base in Syria.”[24]

The civilian harm caused by the use of cluster munitions in Syria has attracted widespread media coverage, public outcry, and condemnations from more than 145 states.[25] In September 2017, States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions adopted a report that “expressed their strong concern regarding recent incidents and evidence of use of cluster munitions in different parts of the world and condemned any use by any actor, in conformity with article 21.”[26] During the course of the meeting, approximately 20 countries and the European Union (EU) publicly condemned or expressed grave concern over new use of cluster munitions, with most citing Syria as the key country of concern.[27]

All of the convention’s presidents have issued statements since 2013 condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently Germany’s Ambassador Michael Biontino, president of the convention’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties.

At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2017, the EU strongly condemned the Syrian government for what “may amount to war crimes,” including the use of cluster munitions.[28] The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) has condemned the continued use of cluster munitions in Syria, for example, in its statement to the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2017.[29]

The previous UN Secretary-General Ban-Ki-moon has described “the carnage caused by cluster munitions in Syria” as “a direct violation” of international humanitarian law.[30]

States have adopted six UNGA resolutions since May 2013 condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 72/191 adopted on 19 December 2017 by a vote of 109 states in favor with 17 against and 58 abstentions, which expresses outrage at the continued use of cluster munitions.[31]

Since 2014, states have adopted 14 Human Rights Council (HRC) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including four since June 2017:

• Resolution 38/L.20adopted on 7 July 2018 by a vote of 26 in favor, five against and 15 abstentions, which “strongly condemnsthe continued use by the Syrian authorities of banned…cluster bombs.”[32]
• Resolution 37/29 adopted on 23 March 2018 by a vote of 27 states in favor and four opposed, with 16 abstentions, which “condemns the Syrian authorities’ use of…cluster munitions.”[33]
• Resolution 36/20 adopted on 29 September 2017 by a vote of 27 states in favor and seven states opposed, with 13 abstentions, which “condemns the Syrian authorities’ indiscriminate use of heavy weapons and aerial bombardments, including cluster munitions.”[34]
• Resolution 35/26 adopted on 23 July 2017 by a vote of 27 states in favor and eight states opposed, with 12 abstentions, which “condemns the Syrian authorities’ use of…cluster munitions.”[35]

The UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria, which reports to the HRC, has reported frequently on cluster munition use, most recently in June 2018.[36]

Note: ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Mine Contamination

The Syrian Arab Republic is contaminated by landmines left by successive Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 but particularly by the conflict in Syria since 2011. Ongoing hostilities and reports of continuing use of landmines by pro- and anti-government forces have prevented systematic large-scale survey to determine the extent and types of contamination.[1] 

Landmines, whether commercial or of an improvised nature, affect all regions and vary according to the armed groups active there. In 2017, Islamic State and other non-state armed groups reportedly used landmines in Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, Idlib, and Raqqa governorates.[2] Contamination is likely to be particularly dense in areas that were occupied by Islamic State.

The Syrian government reportedly laid mines along borders with Turkey and Lebanon in 2012 and Turkish authorities reportedly claimed five years ago that between 613,000 and 715,000 mines had been planted along the Turkish-Syrian border, making clear they were not emplaced by Turkish forces.[3] Heavy casualties that occurred in Manbij, close to the Turkish border, after Kurdish forces pushed out Islamic State in mid-August 2016 attest to massive contamination by mines and other improvised devices that were still inflicting casualties in 2017.[4]

Islamic State heavily mined the approaches to Minbij and around the Tishreen dam to the east of it, using young boys disguised as shepherds to lay the mines, the UN Commission of Inquiry monitoring the conflict in Syria reported in March 2017.[5] From Raqqa, former capital of the self-proclaimed Islamic State caliphate, to Hassakeh governorate in the northeast, and south to Deir ez-Zor, retreating Islamic State forces left massive contamination by improvised mines and other improvised devices that have taken a heavy toll on civilians returning in their wake.

Medical NGO Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) reported that the number of victims of landmines and other explosive devices it treated in north east Syria doubled between November 2017 and March 2018. (For further information about mine/ERW casualties, see Syria’s casualty profile.) MSF’s patients reported discovering mines and booby-traps on roads, alongside fields, on rooftops, and under staircases, as well as rigged in common household items from refrigerators and air conditioners to televisions and cooking pots.[6]

In northwestern Idlib and neighboring Aleppo governorates, mine/ERW clearance volunteers similarly report mines and other explosive devices planted in agricultural fields, next to roads, inside villages, and around schools and hospitals.[7] Rebel forces that subjected the towns of Foua and Kfraya to years of siege are said to have left hundreds of mines in surrounding fields as well as individual explosive devices in many homes.[8] Further south in Hama and Homs governorates, open-source reports of mine casualties, although unconfirmed, are suggestive of significant contamination left by all sides during years of conflict.[9]

In parts of southern governorates bordering Israel and Jordan accessible to volunteers, they have reported fewer mines than other types of explosive hazard,[10] but Syrian reports point to the presence of Russian PMN-2 and PMN-4 antipersonnel mines.[11] Remotely delivered T-84 antivehicle mines were reportedly used in the Golan Heights in the southwest of Syria (already heavily contaminated with antipersonnel mines).[12] There have also been reports that T-84 mines have been remotely deployed in Daraa governorate in the southwest of the country.[13]

Cluster Munition Contamination

Syria has widespread cluster munition contamination resulting from the armed conflicts continuing since 2011. Syrian government and Russian forces have used cluster munitions extensively and Islamic State has reportedly used them in a number of instances, but the extent of contamination is not known.[14]

In February 2017, the UN Commission of Inquiry on Syria reported “an alarming number of incidents involving cluster munitions,” affirming that their use in densely populated areas such as eastern Aleppo “constitutes the war crime of indiscriminate attacks in a civilian populated area.”[15]

Cluster munition use, casualties, and contamination have been reported in Aleppo, Dara’a, Deir az Zour, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Quneitra governorates, as well as the Damascus suburb of Eastern Ghouta. (See the Ban Cluster Munition profile for details of use in 2017.)

Other explosive remnants of war

Syria’s seven-year conflict has left heavy contamination by a wide range of explosive ordnance, including landmines, IEDs, and air-dropped and artillery ordnance. HALO Trust said it considered contamination to be so large that “the work required will be measured in decades, not years.”[16]

According to the UN 2018 Humanitarian Needs Overview, 8.2 million people are living in communities that report explosive hazards. Of communities in sub-districts affected by conflict, 43% reported the presence of explosive hazards. UNMAS reports that the destruction or contamination of key infrastructure, such as hospitals, has deprived civilians of basic services, and the presence of explosive hazards is a lethal barrier to movement, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to those seeking refuge from violence.[17]

Program Management

Syria does not have a national mine action authority or a national program for survey and clearance. Mine action has been conducted by a wide range of organizations, including military engineers of parties to the conflict, civil defense organizations, humanitarian demining organizations, and commercial companies.

Following UN Security Council Resolution 2165 (2014), which authorized cross-border humanitarian assistance into Syria, the UN Regional Humanitarian Coordinator requested UNMAS to provide assistance for mine action in Syria. In 2015, UNMAS opened an office in Gaziantep and established a mine action sub-cluster to integrate mine action into the broader Syria humanitarian response. In September 2017, UNMAS opened an office in Beirut to coordinate support provided through offices in Gaziantep and Amman for 27 mine action organizations, undertaking activities that included community-level contamination impact surveys, marking of some hazardous areas, risk education, and clearance.[18] UNMAS also maintained an incident database in Amman, making data on contamination available to humanitarian agencies. By June 2018, UNMAS said it had received almost half of its $14.8 million appeal for 2018.[19]

After months of discussions, UNMAS signed a memorandum of understanding with the Syrian government in July 2018, Syria’s state news agency quoted UNMAS director Agnès Macaillou as saying the agreement provided an encouraging start for UNMAS to undertake the necessary role in mine risk education.[20]

Russia deployed several hundred military deminers from the Armed Forces Demining Center supported by mine detection dog (MDD) teams and Uran-6 mine detection robots. Deployments included 200 deminers sent to Aleppo governorate, 150 to Palmyra, and 175 who were due to be sent to Deir ez-Zor governorate.[21] Some deminers were reportedly among troops due to return to Russia under the withdrawal announced in December 2017.[22] Russian deminers also provided training for Syrian army engineers at Hmeimim air base and at training centers established in 2017 in Aleppo and Homs. By the start of January 2018, Russian armed forces reported they had trained 900 Syrian engineers.[23]

International humanitarian and commercial operators were active mainly in northeastern Syria in areas recaptured from Islamic State by Kurdish and US-led coalition forces, but their identities remain anonymous on the basis of security concerns.

Syrian Civil Defence (SCD), supported with training and funding through Mayday Rescue, had clearance teams working in five governorates (Daraa, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Quneitra) and conducted a range of other activities (community liaison; risk education) in several other governorates.[24]

HALO Trust partnered with a Syrian NGO, SHAFAK, which conducted community impact survey, risk education, and victim data collection in Aleppo, Idlib, and Rural Damascus provinces in 2017. The partnership agreement with SHAFAK, based in Gaziantep, Turkey, started in mid-2016. Deteriorating security forced it to stop operating in Rural Damascus in March 2018. In mid-2017, HALO Trust started partnering with another Syrian NGO to recruit, train, and deploy teams for non-technical survey and disposal of ERW. In mid-December 2017, these three teams deployed in Daraa and some districts of Quneitra provinces, and were reconfigured into five teams in March 2018. The teams worked under supervision of five HALO Trust international staff working from a remotely located operations room. The teams photograph all items for identification and receive instruction on disposal and render-safe.[25]

Information management

UNMAS maintains an incident database in Amman making data on contamination available to humanitarian agencies.[26] Since September 2017, iMMAP has provided information management services for northeastern Syria coordinating data received from operators on hazard locations and results of non-technical survey, clearance, and risk education.[27]

Land Release

Continuing conflict prevented a coordinated national program of mine action in 2017 though mine action interventions gathered significant momentum, albeit at levels that varied in different regions according to the level of security. 

UNMAS reported that contamination impact surveys and non-technical surveys were conducted mostly in northwest and southern Syria, within Aleppo, Daraa, Idlib, and Rural Damascus governorates, and in Quneitra governorate, particularly in the sub-districts of Atareb, Busra Ash-Sham, Hrak, Izra’, Maaret Tamsrin, and Suran.[28] International operators also conducted community impact assessments and non-technical and technical survey in the north and northeast of the country.

Russia said its armed forces mine clearance personnel conducted four operations in 2016–2017, including two at historic Palmyra, one in Aleppo, and one in Deir ez-Zor, clearing a total area of 66km², 1,500 kilometers of roads, and more than 17,000 various buildings and structures. It said the Russian military deactivated 105,000 explosive items, including over 30,000 IEDs.[29] 

Russian media reported that military deminers had cleared more than 30km² in Syria between December 2016 and the end of February 2017.[30] Army engineers reported clearing some 20km² in Palmyra in 2016 and 2017, removing more than 24,000 ERW, but did not break down the items.[31] A Russian Defense Ministry spokesman was reported to have claimed that Russian deminers had cleared an area of 3.6km² around Aleppo, along with 75 kilometers of road, destroying 1,000 ERW, all in the space of a week.[32] Russian and Syrian army engineers were also active around Damascus and its suburbs, where opposition-held areas became the target of a major Syria-Russian offensive in early 2018.

In the areas of north and northeast Syria recaptured by Syrian Democratic Forces and the United States-led coalition, humanitarian and commercial operators sharply scaled up operations, employing several hundred staff to conduct community needs assessment and ERW clearance in al-Hassakeh, Deir ez-Zor, and Raqqa governorates. Improvised mines made up more than three-quarters of items destroyed by one international operator round Raqqa and more than 60% of items it destroyed in Hassakeh governorate. Submunitions represented a small proportion of items cleared.[33]

SCD conducted community impact surveys that provided a basis for clearance teams to plan and prioritize tasks. At the start of 2018, capacity included one clearance team in each of Hama, Idlib, and Quneitra governorates and two teams in Daraa.[34] SCD/Mayday Rescue said submunitions constituted the “vast majority” of items cleared in the course of conducting roving tasks in response to community requests. Teams conducted roving spot tasks responding to the impact of conflict. Between November 2015 and March 2018, SCD teams cleared nearly 16,000 submunitions, 11,759 of them in Idlib governorate, as well as 521 other items of UXO. In 2017 alone, SCD cleared 6,633 submunitions and marked 903 others found in circumstances that obstructed clearance.[35]

HALO Trust and SHAFAK started operations in early December 2017, with community liaison teams surveying and compiling maps of contaminated areas in Daraa as a basis for planning and clearance. By the end of March 2018, they had conducted 234 spot tasks in Dar’a (217) and Quneitra (17), destroying a total of 317 items (124 submunitions and 193 other UXO items).[36]

After Syrian government forces took control of southern governorates in July 2018 mine action in Quneitra and Daraa ceased.[37]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2017, 14 donors reported contributing US$89.4 million to mine action activities in the Syrian Arab Republic, $70 million more than in 2016 when international funding totaled $18.6 million.[1]

The United States (US) provided the largest contribution with $63 million, to support clearance operations in areas liberated from Islamic State in northeast Syria, as well as risk education and capacity-building activities. This represented 70% of the total international mine action assistance in Syria for 2017. In addition, Germany also provided substantial funds to mine action activities in Syria and contributed nearly $14 million.

International contributions: 2017[2]

Note: N/A = not applicable.

Since 2013, international contributions to mine action in Syria jumped from just $3.6 million in 2013 to more than $89 million in 2017, and totaled nearly $124.4 million (more than half of which was provided in 2017).

Summary of international contributions: 2013–2017[3]

The Monitor identified 1,906 mine/ERW casualties in the Syrian Arab Republic (not including the occupied Golan Heights) from multiple sources for 2017. However, since the conflict began in 2011, annual recorded totals of mine/ERW casualties are thought to be an undercount. It is certain that the actual number of casualties occurring in Syria in 2017, as in past years, was significantly higher than the annual total recorded.[2]

Casualties recorded in the Monitor date for 2017 occurred in 12 provinces of Syria: the largest portion (46%, or 880) were in Raqqa where extensive mine use in civilian areas was widely reported, followed by 29% (or 550) in Aleppo, and the remaining casualties were reported in Dar’a, Damascus, Damascus Suburbs, Deir Ezzor, Hama, Hasakeh, Homs, Idlib, Quneitra, and Sweida.

There is no comprehensive, or country-wide mine/ERW casualty data collection mechanism in place and the ongoing conflict hampers the recording of casualties by the various actors that capture such information. Nevertheless, several organizations have maintained efforts to record casualties of conflict, including those resulting from mines/ERW. The Monitor has extracted, analyzed, and compiled relevant mine/ERW casualty information for 2017 in a unified dataset. Notably, most data reported by these diverse actors for 2017 was unique, as Monitor analysis showed little duplication of mine/ERW casualties reported.

Cluster munition casualties

The Monitor identified 187 cluster munition casualties in 2017. As in previous years, the overwhelming majority of recorded casualties (170) were caused by cluster munition attacks, while 17 casualties caused by unexploded submunitions were recorded.

As with mines and other ERW, due to the challenges of collecting data, including the security situation and ongoing conflict, the number of cluster munition casualties caused by both attacks and unexploded submunitions is likely to be underreported. It is possible that some persons recorded as injured by other mine and remnants types were actually unexploded submunition casualties.

The 187 cluster munition casualties in 2017 were recorded in five governorates: Aleppo, Hama, Idlib, Raqqa, and Rural Damascus.

The 187 cluster munition casualties recorded in 2017 is a significant decrease from the 860 cluster munition casualties recorded in 2016. In 2015, 248 cluster munition casualties were recorded (231 from strikes).[3] In 2014, 383 casualties were recorded (329 from strikes); in 2013, 1,001; and in 2012, 583 (see previous Monitor casualty reports for further details).

Prior to new use of cluster munitions in 2012, at least five casualties from unexploded cluster submunitions had been recorded in Syria, including four child casualties in 2007.[4]

Casualties Overview

In 2015, the Monitor recorded 864 casualties (290 killed, 574 injured) attributed to mines, unexploded submunitions, and other ERW (mines/ERW) in Syria from multiple data sources. Of the total casualties, where reported, 100 were children, 133 were women and the majority, 569, were men.[1] However, since the conflict began in 2011, annual totals of mine/ERW casualties are thought to be an undercount. It is expected that the actual number of casualties in Syria in 2015, as in past years, was significantly higher than that recorded. Media reports indicated that there were over 300 casualties from landmines (100 killed; 200 injured) in the city of Kobane alone between January 2015 and April 2016.[2]

Overall, the intensity of the ongoing conflict and widespread persecution of human rights activists severely hampered civil society efforts to track casualties.[3] For example, in October 2015, the Violation Documentation Center in Syria (VDC) reported the death of one media activist who was contributing to the report and the destruction of another field researcher’s family home during airstrikes.[4]

Detailed data on fatalities was collected and disaggregated according to the weapons involved by the VDC and the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). The SNHR also documented a number of people injured by cluster munitions, when that information was available.[5] The majority of mine/ERW casualties for 2015 (551) were persons injured, compiled and recorded as casualties of unspecified mines by Handicap International (HI) in data on the needs of conflict survivors.[6] This marked the first time since the beginning of the conflict that a substantial dataset on persons injured by mines/ERW in Syria was available.[7] HI reported that of some 25,000 people from Syria with injuries it assessed, 53% were of injured by explosive weapons, of which 14% were mine survivors.[8]

The 864 mine/ERW casualties recorded in 2015 represent a significant increase from the 174 casualties (123 killed; 51 injured) by mines/ERW reported for 2014.[9] However, this is not representative of a trend. The data available for 2014 was mostly for fatalities, making it certain that persons injured were massively unreported. Persons injured were also severely underreported in 2013 and 2012. Since conflict began in 2011, the numbers of casualties identified annually in Syria increased significantly from previous years. In 2010, no casualties were identified in Syria, and in 2009, a single antivehicle mine casualty was reported.[10]

The year 2015 saw an intense escalation in casualties from mines/ERW, including victim-activated IEDs, especially in areas liberated from Islamic State (IS, also called Daesh). In May 2015, HI estimated that there had been five to seven mine/ERW incidents weekly resulting in casualties.[11] Particularly high casualty rates among returnees and especially among the locally formed explosive ordinance disposal (EOD) teams were reported.

In the Monitor casualty data for Syria for 2015, the deaths of at least 16 people due to mines were recorded as specifically related to entering or leaving besieged areas.[12] It was reportedly that there was an increase in the use of “landmines” to surround besieged areas of the Damascus suburbs in 2015, preventing civilians from leaving those areas and from bringing food and supplies into the besieged towns. This resulted in a number of casualties and exacerbated the suffering and starvation of the civilian population.[13] According to a media report from 1 January 2016, 15 men and six children had lost limbs due to the landmines surrounding the besieged town of Madaya alone.[14] Civilians continued to become casualties of the siege minefields into 2016. In April, three boys died of landmine-inflicted injures. The siege minefields also prevented access to emergency medical assistance for those people injured.[15]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded in Syria between 1967 and the end of 2015 was at least 1,955 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties (846 killed; 1,097 injured; 12 unknown).[16] Due to the absence of a national casualty data collection mechanism, it is probable that there were also unrecorded casualties before the beginning of internal armed conflict in 2011.

Cluster munition casualties

In 2015, the Monitor compiled data on least 248 cluster munition casualties, both from attacks (the direct use of cluster munitions in air strikes and shelling) and unexploded submunitions, including 92 people killed. Of this total, 231 casualties occurred during cluster munition attacks: 75 people—all civilians—were killed and another 156 people injured. In addition, 17 people were recorded as killed by unexploded submunitions. Due to key disaggregated data sources specifically recording fatalities but not injuries, no casualties injured by unexploded submunitions were identified for 2015, although it is likely that some persons recorded as injured by explosive remnants of war (ERW) and undefined mines types were actually unexploded submunition casualties.[17]

An additional 54 fatalities reported by the Violation Documentation Center (VDC) were attributed to the use of cluster munitions alongside other weapons, including thermobaric weapons. These casualties were not counted in the Monitor total of cluster munition casualties for 2015 because they did not exclusively identify the cause of fatality as cluster munitions.

The actual number of casualties due to cluster munition attacks and unexploded submunitions is likely much higher than those recorded. In 2015, the Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR) confirmed that it believed the number of cluster munition casualties, including persons injured, was far greater than what they had been able to report, noting that “the Syrian regime relies greatly on using cluster munitions during shelling.”[18] A representative of the VDC stated that the figures on their website are far less than those caused by the actual use of cluster munitions and that this is “due to the hardship of collecting data inside of the different geographic [areas] in Syria and the pursuit of human rights activists by all military parties.”[19]

Collection of data was ongoing and efforts to gather details on casualties were hampered by the intensity of the continuing conflict.[20] Both the SNHR and the VDC confirmed that difficulties persisted throughout 2015.[21] The SNHR reporting includes several detailed accounts of cluster munition use.[22]

For 2014, the Monitor reported 383 cluster munition casualties in Syria; at least 135 people were recorded as killed and some 248 people injured. Of these casualties, 329 (94 killed, 235 injured) were caused by cluster munition attacks; 51 casualties (38 killed; 13 injured) were recorded from incidents involving unexploded submunitions (including six people attempting to clear unexploded submunitions); and three fatalities were recorded as cluster munition casualties, without further details on use.[23] The Monitor received reports of at least 1,001 cluster munition casualties in 2013, including 151 killed.[24] In 2012, according to data from VDC and SNHR there were at least 583 cluster munitions casualties,[25] 113 people were reported as killed (including four due to unexploded submunitions) and some 470 people injured by cluster munitions.[26]

Cluster munition casualties continued to be reported into 2016. Preliminary Monitor analysis of reporting sources for the period from 1 January 2016 until the end of May 2016 indicated that there were at least some 270 cluster munition casualties during that period. Proportionally, a significant increase from the number and rate of cluster munition casualties recorded during 2015.[27]

Prior to new use of cluster munitions in 2012, at least five casualties from unexploded submunitions had been recorded in Syria, including four child casualties in 2007.[28]

Victim Assistance

There is no current estimate of the total number of survivors of mines, cluster munitions, and other ERW (mines/ERW) living in Syria. In March 2015, Handicap International (HI) estimated that at least one million people have been injured during the conflict, with tens of thousands needing prosthetics and rehabilitation services.[29]

Insecurity and conflict in Syria affected access to essential medical interventions and medical equipment. Emergency response and first aid was limited by the ongoing conflict. The Syrian Civil Defense organization, known as the White Helmets, provided search and rescue, first aid, and ambulance services in many areas affected by cluster munition strikes. This emergency assistance was often hindered by so-called double-tap strikes, whereby rescuers are targeted by a second airstrike.[30]

Throughout 2015 and into 2016, it became increasingly difficult for Syrians to cross the border to Turkey, including war-injured persons hoping receive medical care there.[31]

There were severe shortages of medicine and medical supplies, as well as the inability of many health workers to access their workplaces. These difficulties were exacerbated by overall disruptions to the health system. A lack of fuel, cuts in electricity, and water shortages forced many hospitals to operate at reduced capacity or cease operations altogether.[32] A continuously growing number of patients also strained the limited health resources available.[33]

Mine/ERW survivors in besieged areas were unable to access medical care due to a lack of medical supplies, personnel, and facilities. The UN reported that on the rare occasions that humanitarian aid reached besieged areas in 2015 and into 2016, surgical and trauma care equipment and other medical supplies needed for treatment of mine/ERW injuries had been removed from the aid convoys.[34] Medical evacuation from besieged areas was extremely limited. It was reported that civilians, including children injured by mines/ERW, were prevented from being evacuated out of besieged areas.[35]

Medical personnel and hospitals were deliberately targeted and access to medical services was denied. Increasing bombing and shelling of hospitals and clinics further reduced the provision of basic assistance to injured persons.[36] Physicians for Human Rights reports that 2015 was the worst year for bombing and shelling of medical facilities with 122 strikes documented. The organization documented 346 strikes on 246 different medical facilities from March 2011 until December 2015. In addition, at least 700 medical personnel have been killed and many more have fled since the conflict began.[37] In 2015, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) recorded 94 instances of bombing or shelling of MSF-supported health facilities, including 12 instances that completely destroyed the medical facility and another 16 attacks on MSF-supported ambulances.[38] At the end of 2014, only two hospitals and one referral center that provide specialized mental health services remained operational.[39]

The ICRC reported that health ministry hospitals and other health facilities, particularly the National Red Crescent Society’s mobile health units, provided emergency medical care, inpatient treatment, and primary healthcare to injured people using ICRC-donated medical supplies. The ICRC provided 12 prostheses to mine/ERW survivors in Syria in 2015 and the National Society helped distribute over one thousand wheelchairs and two thousand pairs of crutches. To support persons with disabilities, an ICRC-managed rehabilitation center opened in Aleppo; it provided services to almost one thousand people from June to December 2015.[40] However, supplies and support for casualty care reached areas under the control of armed groups only on a small number of occasions because of Syrian government restrictions as well the constant insecurity due to the conflict. The ICRC, the Syrian Red Crescent, and the UN evacuated hundreds of wounded people from besieged areas in December 2015, including some injured by mines/ERW. Four besieged areas received medical supplies in October 2015.[41]

Humanitarian organizations continued to support medical care and rehabilitation services throughout Syria. HI carried out some activities in Syria, in addition to supporting at least a dozen Syrian organizations and partners, to provide services directly to persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, or to make referrals to other services.[42] HI’s Emergency Division has been implementing an emergency intervention in northern Syria, which addresses the needs of persons with injuries and/or disabilities from December 2012 through into 2016. By early 2016, HI was reported to be the only organization to address those needs through community outreach. HI’s physical rehabilitation activities in northern Syria started in January 2013 and continued in 2016.[43] Continuing into 2016, HI’s Syria program addressed the situation of the most vulnerable persons (including people with injuries) with interventions including: identification of persons with injuries and/or disabilities at hospitals, in care houses, camps, and communities; provision of rehabilitation for persons with injuries and/or disabilities and their caregiver (including training and counselling), distribution of assistive and mobility devices, and the provision of prostheses; and the direct provision of psychosocial support sessions at HI Rehabilitation centers and camps as well as at the community level.[44] HI noted “a patent lack of immediate rehabilitation and psychosocial relief,” despite the rising number of conflict-injured people within Syria and those fleeing to neighboring countries.[45] A HI assessment of 361 people injured due to explosive weapons between April 2015 and March 2016 found that 80% had indications of psychological distress. HI offered psychosocial support to Syrians affected by the conflict, including individual counselling and support groups.[46] Vulnerable families were also provided in-kind or financial assistance.[47]

MSF supported some 40 health facilities in the Damascus region and supported around 45 facilities in northern and western Syria during 2015. These services are often the primary emergency care available for mine/ERW or cluster munition casualties. Due to attacks on these health facilities, the number of supported facilities varied month-by-month as they were forced to close or stop services for a period to relocate.[48] 

Assistance to Syrian refugees

Several international organizations provided assistance to Syrian refugees, including mine survivors and other weapon-wounded people, in multiple host countries.

In Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and Syria, HI teams supplied aid to injured refugees, persons with disabilities, and vulnerable persons, including by providing orthopedic devices and psychosocial support, supporting medical and rehabilitation facilities and helping them access services.[49]

The influx of refugees from Syria into Lebanon put an increasing strain on scarce local resources. International assistance was “relatively insignificant compared to the size of the crisis.”[50] In 2015, the ICRC continued to provide emergency medical care to weapon-wounded people from Syria, including post-operative care and physical rehabilitation. A few were fitted with assistive devices.[51] Socio-economic integration programs are limited, with many displaced survivors and other persons with disabilities relying on the support of family members, friends, and acquaintances.[52]

In Jordan, the wounded from Syria were taken to nearby hospitals immediately upon arrival. The costs of medical care are sometimes covered by UN and humanitarian organizations.[53] In 2015, MSF opened its upgraded reconstructive surgery hospital in Amman, Jordan. The hospital provides comprehensive medical care to war-injured persons including Syrians. In addition to specialized surgical services, the hospital offers physiotherapy and psychosocial support.[54]

Turkey provided emergency medical care for Syrians but costs involving physical rehabilitation, mobility aids, and plastic surgery are not covered so refugees have to rely on donors and humanitarian organizations. Turkey reported 70,000 surgical operations for Syrian refugees in the public health system during the first six months of 2015.[55] In the refugee camps near Suruç, mine survivors could receive medical assistance from volunteer healthcare workers, but there were only two ambulances and both were also used for transporting goods.[56] Turkey received around 2,500 injured Syrians (including landmine, cluster munition, and ERW survivors) a month in 2014.[57] The World Health Organization, Gaziantep University, and the Turkish Ministry of Health started the Refugee Doctor Adaptation Training for 25 Syrian refugee doctors in 2014 to help integrate Syrian medical professionals into the Turkish health system and provide services to Syrians. The curriculum expanded to train more than 200 doctors and nurses.[58]

Media reports indicated that there are many persons with disabilities, including war-injured persons such as landmine and cluster munition survivors, among refugees that travelled through Europe in 2015. There is no information on how many persons with disabilities or landmine survivors were among the refugees. There appeared to be a lack of even basic services to refugees with disabilities seeking safety.[59] For example, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressed concern that in Greece “refugees have to find themselves a place to sleep in the few shelters available creating conditions for the ‘strongest’ to find a shelter to the detriment of persons with specific needs.”[60] Difficulties in accessing basic necessities including sanitation services for refugees with disabilities continued into 2016.[61]

Syria ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 10 July 2009. In September 2013, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities made a statement with regard to Syria’s need to fulfill its obligations under the CRPD while calling for humanitarian agencies to be “allowed to operate without restrictions throughout Syria” to assist persons with disabilities, including “persons with disabilities among refugees and the internally displaced.”[62] From 2013 and continuing into 2016, HI was implementing a project to train Syrian refugees with disabilities to advocate for their rights in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.[63]