Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordnance.

Mine Contamination

At the end of 2017, the Republic of Tajikistan had just under 7.46km² of mine contamination across 153 CHAs, and almost 1.35km² of SHA across 59 unsurveyed minefields, as set out in the table below.[1] The 59 SHAs equate to 45 remaining tasks to be surveyed, as some tasks contain multiple minefields, potentially laid at different times during different conflicts and because minefields are counted separately if they are more than 500 meters apart.[2] The mined areas are located in 13 districts in three provinces of Tajikistan.

The overall baseline contamination at the end of 2017 is a small reduction compared to the end of the previous year (7.76km² of confirmed contamination and 1.97km² of suspected mined area).[3] The differences in the figures, though, cannot be satisfactorily explained or reconciled by area released by clearance and survey during 2017.

Antipersonnel mine contamination by province (at end 2017)[4]

Note: N/K = not known.
* The size of the mined areas is estimated from desk analysis but is pending survey.

While most minefield records are of good quality, some do not reflect the reality on the ground, and as such the records have to be verified and validated by non-technical survey and data analysis.[5]

Mine contamination in Tajikistan is the consequence of different conflicts. Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan was mined by Russian forces in 1992–1998; the border with Uzbekistan was mined by Uzbek forces in 2000–2001; and the Central Region of Tajikistan was contaminated as a result of the 1992–1997 civil war.[6]

Mine contamination remains in the provinces of Khatlon and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) along the Afghan border (reported to contain 60,357 antipersonnel mines), as well as in the Central Region.[7] Shamsiddin Shohin district (formerly known as Shuroobod district) in Khatlon province is the most heavily mined district. Mines were laid in and around military positions on hilltops overlooking the Panj river valley, mostly delivered remotely by helicopter or laid by troops who were moved in and out by helicopter as there are no established roads or tracks to access the minefields for survey or clearance.[8]

As of December 2017, there remain 45 unsurveyed minefields (from an original total of 107), all located in the provinces of Khatlon and the GBAO along the border with Afghanistan.[9] TNMAC plans to complete survey of the remaining unsurveyed minefields by the end of 2020.[10] While none of the unsurveyed areas are considered completely inaccessible for the survey (or for subsequent clearance),[11] serious challenges have been reported during non-technical survey in accessing the mined areas in mountainous terrain and with one mined area blocking access to a number of others.[12]

While Tajikistan and Uzbekistan settled most of their 1,283km-long border dispute following the collapse of the Soviet Union, there are still areas of the border that have not yet been delineated and where the exact location of the landmine contamination is not known. Most of the mined areas are thought to be in disputed sections of the Tajik-Uzbek border, which have not been accessible, and for which evaluation and analysis of information is not yet complete.[13] The mine contamination is believed to be on Uzbek territory,[14] but there is a possibility that some mines may have been displaced downhill into Tajikistan due to landslides or flooding.[15] The first ever state visit of the president of Uzbekistan to Tajikistan took place in March 2018, and several agreements were signed between the two countries, including one on demarcation of the separate regions of the Tajik-Uzbek border. Tajikistan expected decisions to be taken in 2018 regarding clarification and identification of SHAs on the Uzbek border, and any demining operations will require agreement and cooperation between both nations.[16]

Information about mined areas on the Tajik-Uzbek border is limited and based on non-technical survey conducted in 2011–2015 by the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and a needs assessment survey by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2013–2015. However, the FSD non-technical survey did not cover the whole of the Tajik-Uzbek border, only Sughd province. The FSD survey was not comprehensive and was mainly based on incident forms, as the boundary line was not accessible to survey teams. Records lack detail on the exact location where mine incidents occurred and civilians living in the area simply reported the location of mine contamination and landmine incidents as occurring in the border area.[17] According to Tajikistan, communities living in dangerous areas near the Tajik-Uzbek border are mainly engaged in livestock, agriculture, fodder, and collection of firewood, and despite the risk, the local population is forced to operate in these areas.[18]

Mountains cover more than 90% of Tajikistan’s territory, and so productive land that can be used is extremely important to local communities. Mine contamination in Tajikistan is said to constrain development, limit access to grazing and agricultural land, and affect farming, wood and herb gathering, and grazing activities related to rural life, especially in the Central Region.[19] Most of the contamination is, though, located along the borders, with a lesser direct impact on local communities and development, as these are restricted military security zones. However, District Authorities and local communities do still use these areas for development projects, including collecting firewood and stones, piping for irrigation and drinking water, and fishing and livestock. National authorities have used cleared land for agriculture, fisheries, road construction, disaster mitigation activities, water piping, electricity line posts, gold extraction and mining, and maintenance of dams.[20] Furthermore, contamination in these regions affects cross-border trade and security and has a negative political impact on peacebuilding initiatives with neighboring countries.[21]

Cluster Munition Contamination

A suspected area of cluster munition contamination was discovered in 2018 in Darvos district in the Central Region of Tajikistan. The area, of an estimated size of 138,500m², was confirmed as cluster munition-contaminated during subsequent non-technical survey in June, and has been scheduled for clearance in 2018 before the summer window for access to the Central Region closes.[22] TNMAChas also reported that, as of the end of 2017, seven of Tajikistan’s eight recorded battle areas may contain cluster munition remnants, totaling an area of 877,040m².[23] The battle areas in question are mainly recorded as hazardous areas due to past accidents involving unexploded ordnance (UXO) or reports from local communities, but for which the resulting survey did not specify the precise type of contamination. Re-survey of most of these areas is required to determine whether or not further evidence of explosive remnants of war (ERW) exists, including cluster munition remnants.[24]

Tajikistan had previously reported that while submunitions may still be encountered in the future during other survey and clearance operations, no known cluster munition contamination existed in Tajikistan other than the small area of contamination discovered during non-technical survey in August 2016.[25] This area was cleared in 2017, along with a separate area of cluster munition contamination discovered and cleared in 2017.[26]

Tajikistan also referenced cluster munition contamination in its clearance statement at the Sixteenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in 2017, stating, “The level of mine contamination in Tajikistan remains relatively high, mainly on Tajik-Afghan Border, where the landmines and explosive remnants of war including cluster munition remnants are still affecting the lives of the people of Tajikistan.”[27]

Cluster munitions were used during Tajikistan’s civil war in the 1990s, though it is not known who dropped them. In total, since the start of the mine action program in 2003 until the end of 2015, it is reported that approximately 750 submunitions were identified and destroyed in Tajikistan.[28]

Program Management

The Commission for the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law (CIIHL) acts as Tajikistan’s national mine action authority, responsible for mainstreaming mine action in the government’s socio-economic development policies.[29] The TNMAC has acted as the secretariat for the CIIHL, to which it reports.[30]

While transition to national ownership is considered to have been successful, the UNDP’s Support to Tajikistan Mine Action Programme (STMAP) project has continued to support the building of sustainable national structures and TNMAC’s technical capacity.[31] However, lack of funding might result in the project folding in 2018.[32]

The Ministry of Defense plays a significant role in Tajikistan’s mine action sector. With its adoption in July 2013 of the Strategic Plan on Humanitarian Demining (2013–2016), the Ministry has sought to focus on three main objectives: to further support demining; to enhance national capacities; and to create the conditions for an effective national mine action program.[33] The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Programme Office in Dushanbe (OCSE POiD) supported the Ministry of Defense to develop an updated plan, entitled “Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Tajikistan Co-operation Plan for Humanitarian Demining 2018–2023.” The draft plan was developed in August and September 2017 through a joint working group, and as of early October was with the Ministry of Defense for review.[34]

An agreement on cooperation between the governments of Tajikistan and Afghanistan was signed in 2014, and TNMAC has coordinated with the UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACCA) and Afghanistan’s Directorate of Mine Action Coordination (DMAC) on land release approaches, National Mine Action Standards (NMAS), exchange visits, cross-border projects, victim assistance, and risk education.[35] Since 2017, this also includes collaboration regarding quality management (QM).[36]

Strategic planning

A new National Strategy on Humanitarian Mine Action for 2017–2020 was approved by government decree No. 91 on 25 February 2017.[37] The previous national mine action strategic plan 2010–2015 expired at the end of 2015.[38]

According to GICHD, which has supported strategic planning, the national strategy is, however, very general, and while it includes a “plan,” which lists the various overarching activities to implement the strategy, it lacks detail on prioritization of clearance tasks, timelines, or capacities for survey and clearance operations.[39]

In addition, operators were not consulted on the final version of the national strategy, but only in the draft “Antipersonnel Mine Ban Convention Article 5 Completion Plan 2016–2020,” which focuses on mine contamination, and for which operators advised that the national strategy’s planning concept needed more work.[40] This recommendation, however, is not reflected in the planning details of the national strategy as approved by the government.

TNMAC is still in the process of finalizing the draft Article 5 completion plan for 2016–2020, which contains more detail on implementing the strategy, and which will be reviewed each year.[41] Based on the October 2016 draft, the completion plan focuses on the most heavily mined regions, which are along the Afghan border. From June to September, during favorable weather in the high-altitude areas, efforts will focus on the Central Region.[42] In conjunction with the government of Tajikistan and the Tajik Border Forces, TNMAC will prioritize land release activities using a district-by-district approach based on the following criteria:

• mined areas with economic and infrastructure impact;
• the number of unsurveyed minefield records in each district (those with a larger number of minefields records will be considered a priority for the deployment of non-technical survey teams); and
• the number of mined areas in each district (a smaller number of minefields will be considered a priority to deploy clearance teams to release the whole district).[43]

In conjunction with the government of Tajikistan and the Tajik Border Forces, TNMAC prioritizes land release activities using a district-by-district approach based on the following criteria: mined areas with economic and infrastructure impact; the number of unsurveyed minefield records in each district (those with a larger number of minefields records will be considered a priority for the deployment of non-technical survey teams); and the number of mined areas in each district (a smaller number of minefields will be considered a priority to deploy clearance teams to release the whole district).[44] Issues of accessibility due to mountainous terrain and adverse weather conditions during winter limit access to some designated priority tasks, as do security restrictions.[45]

The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) is working with TNMAC and UNDP to develop a prioritization system and tool for Tajikistan, which will identify distinct criteria and indicators for the separate regions.[46] A pilot of the Priority Setting Tool for Mine Action (PriSMA) was conducted from July to September 2017.[47] As of May 2018, a second version of PriSMA had been developed and piloted and was in the process of being integrated with TNMAC’s existing priority-setting workflow, including specific requests received from the government and field survey recommendations.[48]

Legislation and standards

Tajikistan’s Law on Humanitarian Demining (number 1338) was ratified by Tajikistan’s parliament on 23 July 2016.[49]

Tajikistan’s National Mine Action Standards (TNMAS) have been revised, and were approved by decree No. 162 on 1 April 2017. The new standards have been translated into Russian and English.[50]

In 2017, TNMAC further developed its new approach to survey, known as “non-technical survey with technical intervention.” In addition to standard non-technical survey, survey teams are also using technical assets to confirm and locate actual evidence of mines and UXO. This is intended to enhance the efficiency of operations by confirming areas as mined and by more accurately determining the location of minefields.[51]

Quality management

In 2017, TNMAC officers began conducting quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) on demining operations on the Afghan side of the border, having been accredited by DMAC Afghanistan and according to Afghanistan National Mine Action Standards. This is based on a memorandum of understanding between Tajikistan and Afghanistan, within the framework of a cross-border cooperation project, with financial support from the United States (US); this cooperation has continued into 2018.[52]

Operators

In 2017, operational capacity included two manual clearance FSD teams; five multi-purpose manual Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) teams; five military multi-purpose manual teams (four from the Ministry of Defense Humanitarian Demining Company (HDC) and one from the Committee of Emergency and Civil Defense); and two Union of Sappers of Tajikistan (UST) non-technical survey teams.[53]

Clearance capacity in 2018 was less than the previous year, due to funding constraints.[54]

Following the signature of a memorandum of understanding with the OSCE POiD in 2009, the Ministry of Defense established the HDC.[55] Since TNMAC’s nationalization, the HDC has acted as a contractor for TNMAC, and OSCE POiD funds the HDC through TNMAC.[56] In 2017, three of the five Ministry of Defense teams were supported by OSCE POiD unified budget (from participating states) and two by the US Department of State via the OSCE POiD.[57]

The Ministry of Defense provides five teams to the HDC as part of its commitment to assist TNMAC to meet Tajikistan’s Article 5 obligations. Military deminers are reportedly less expensive than deminers of international NGOs, and have the additional advantage of having security access to survey and clear mined areas in the vicinity of military bases and other areas that may be inaccessible to other implementing partners due to security restrictions. The Ministry of Defense also has one demining machine, which is a tiller. Implementing partners can request use of the demining machine from the Ministry of Defense, but the machine must be operated by Ministry of Defense personnel.[58]

The OSCE POiD’s strategy in Tajikistan is twofold: to support the development of national demining capacity; and to foster regional cooperation in border management and security.[59] The OSCE POiD supported the HDC via the UST, which it contracted to provide project management and administrative support to the Ministry of Defense’s HDC in 2010–2013.[60] In addition, the OSCE POiD provided explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) courses to clearance operators and implementing partners in Tajikistan and participants from elsewhere in the region in 2017, at a regional explosive hazard training center.[61]

Until 2015, limitations in Tajikistan’s legislation had prevented UST, a national not-for-profit organization, gaining accreditation for demining activities.[62] In 2015, UST obtained permission to conduct survey and received a grant from UNDP for technical and non-technical survey in the south of the country.[63] UST is accredited to conduct non-technical survey, risk education, and victim assistance. In 2017, UST received additional accreditation to conduct non-technical survey with technical survey intervention, but it is not accredited to conduct stand-alone technical survey or clearance.[64] In 2016, two UST teams (four surveyors per team) conducted non-technical survey in the Shamsiddin Shohin district of the Khatlon region, and as of May 2018 survey operations were ongoing.[65] While some staff positions at UST are permanent, such as the operations manager, deminers are recruited annually for the operations period from Spring until October, based on UST’s annual survey plan.[66]

Neither mine detection dogs (MDDs) nor machines were used operationally in 2017.[67] The MDD program ended in early 2015 due to the very limited number of tasks suitable for dogs. Consequently, 18 MDDs were handed over to the Ministry of Interior and to the Border Forces.[68] Similarly, economic use of mechanical assets reached its limit, and as of November 2016, all areas suitable for machine deployment had reportedly been completed,[69] and the remaining mined area is only suitable for manual demining operations.[70] However, this refers to accessible remaining mined area in districts in which security permission has been granted for clearance operations. Many of the western districts of the Tajik-Afghan border, which are currently not accessible because of security restrictions, contain mined areas on flat terrain, which is suitable for mechanical demining.[71] Furthermore, NPA believes there may be some potential for use of machinery in some of the current demining operations, which could potentially save significant time, especially in areas that are subject to full excavation because of high scrap metal contamination in the soil.[72]

Land Release (mines)

Total mined area released by clearance in 2017 was nearly 0.62km². In addition, nearly 0.16km² was released by technical survey and over 0.48km²was cancelled by non-technical survey.

This is an increase in clearance output on the 0.5km² of mined area cleared in 2016, with a five-fold increase in the number of antipersonnel mines destroyed, but a decrease on the 0.95km² reduced by technical survey the previous year.[73]

Depending on weather conditions, land release operations in the Khatlon region of the border usually start in February/March; the GBAO part of the border only becomes accessible from May until October; and the Central Region from June until September.[74]

Survey in 2017(mines)

In 2017, a total of 156,615m² was reduced through technical survey and a further 483,419m² was cancelled by non-technical survey in Lakhsh and Rasht districts in the Central Region, Darvoz, and Vanj districts in GBAO region, and Shamsiddin Shohin district in Khatlon province.[75]

As of early October 2017, UST was conducting non-technical survey with technical survey intervention, in line with the new land release methodology in Tajikistan.[76] This methodology helps improve the efficiency of survey operations, as minefield records are sometimes incomplete or inconsistent due to incorrect coordinates and grid numbering or lack of landmarks/reference points, and there is often a lack of local people to ask about evidence of mines, accidents etc., as people have moved away because of the contamination. This can result in inflated polygons. In addition, mines are sometimes displaced due to landslides, rock falls, and flooding.[77] Of the 19 minefields UST surveyed in 2017, four were with the use of technical interventions and the remainder were solely using non-technical survey as they were surveyed before the new methodology was approved. The use of technical interventions by UST is expected to improve operational efficiency, but it will also slow down the rate of survey by UST of the remaining unsurveyed minefields.[78]

While in many instances the contaminated area is cancelled or reduced through survey by UST, there are also instances when survey reveals the size of the mined area as being larger than indicated on the minefield records. This can be due to a number of factors, such as windy conditions at the time when helicopter-dropped mines were deployed which leads to greater dispersal of the mines; the height of the helicopter above the ground at the time of deployment (in time of hostilities, the distance of the helicopter from the ground is significantly increased, resulting in wider dispersal of the mines); and mountainous terrain.[79]

Clearance in 2017(mines)

In 2017, FSD, NPA, and the Ministry of Defense/HDC cleared nearly 0.62km² across 23 mined areas (some of which were suspended and not yet completed as at the end of 2017), destroying 6,647 antipersonnel mines and 22 items of UXO (see table below).[80] This is a slight increase on the 0.5km² cleared in 2016, but a substantial increase on the 1,248 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2016,[81] due to the density of mines along the Afghan border.

Mine clearance by operator in 2017*[82]

Note: AP = antipersonnel.
* Clearance includes suspended area not yet completed as of end 2017.
** Excludes 298 antipersonnel mines found in 2017, but not destroyed until 2018.

Antipersonnel mines were found in nearly all clearance tasks in 2017, with the exception of a minefield in Rasht district, DRD province, a minefield in Panj district, Khatlon province tasked to FSD for clearance, and a minefield tasked to NPA in Lyakhsh district in the Central Region. NPA, however, found strong evidence on its task of the past presence of mines, such as pieces of rubber plates, pieces of plastic fragments, and holes created as a result of the detonation of PMN mines.[83]

NPA also reported some challenges posed by the very high density of metal scrap in tasks in Sarichashma municipality, in Shamsiddin Shohin district, which on many occasions made work with the metal detectors impossible and full excavation had to be conducted.[84]

Due to a security incident on the Afghan border in the beginning of December 2017 (unrelated to mine action), NPA had to leave its area of operations in Shamsiddin Shohin district one week earlier than planned.[85] As a result, an additional 298 mines found in 2017 were not destroyed until 2018.[86]

In 2015 and 2016, due to increased security in northern parts of Afghanistan (along the Tajik border), the Border Forces denied permission for clearance operations in the Khatlon border region—an area that contains nearly three-quarters of all mine contamination in Tajikistan.[87] In 2016, the Border Forces only permitted non-technical survey operations in Shamsiddin Shohin district to survey some of the previously unrecorded minefields.[88] In January 2017, greater access for clearance and survey operations was granted along the Tajik-Afghan border, including Shamsiddin Shohin district.[89]

As of April 2018, clearance was being tasked to the eastern part of the Tajik-Afghan border and in Shamsiddin Shohin district, which is the most contaminated district along the border, containing 93 CHAs totaling an estimated 3.3km² (approximately 44% of all confirmed mine contamination).[90]

Furthermore, in November 2017, the Border Guards granted permission for demining operations in the Jaykhun, Panj, Farkhor, and Hamadoni districts of Khatlon. However, due to the unstable situation on the border and in the interest of the safety of humanitarian deminers, no land release was carried out in these areas.[91] TNMAC is negotiating with Border Forces to provide a security convoy for demining teams in these western districts of the Tajik-Afghan border in the plain areas, which comprise around one quarter of the total contamination.[92] TNMAC is also continuing negotiations with government authorities regarding access for survey and clearance to the remaining districts of the Tajik-Afghan border that are closed at present.[93]

Deminer safety

In 2017, there was one demining accident, during mine clearance operations in Shamsiddin Shohin district in September. A female NPA deminer accidentally penetrated a PFM-1 antipersonnel mine during excavation and came into contact with toxic liquid elements from inside the mine. The deminer received medical assistance and made a full recovery.[94]

Land Release (cluster munition remnants)

In 2017, 19,568m² of cluster munition-contaminated area was released through technical survey and a further 248,581m² through clearance, during which a total of 164 submunitions were destroyed. An additional 109,566m² was cancelled by non-technical survey.[95]

In 2017, NPA reduced 19,568m² through technical survey and cleared 208,147m² of cluster munition contamination in the Darvos district in the Central Region, during which 36 АО-2.5 submunitions and five other items of UXO were destroyed.[96] NPA’s clearance occurred between 3 June and 5 August 2017, undertaken by a multi-task team of eight deminers.[97] The task had previously been confirmed as cluster munition-contaminated in August 2016, during NPA non-technical survey, when an AO-2.5RT submunition was found, along with other evidence of contamination, including pieces of cluster bomb containers, pieces of further AO-2.5RT submunitions, and several recognizable blast locations.[98] The onset of winter, and adverse weather conditions at high altitude, had prevented NPA from conducting clearance of this area in 2016.[99]

The FSD confirmed 150,000m² as cluster munition-contaminated during survey in Rasht Valley, in the districts of Republican Subordination region of Tajikistan, of which 40,434m² was cleared with the destruction of 128 SHOAB-0.5 submunitions, while the remaining 109,566m² of the polygon was cancelled.[100]

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2009), Tajikistan is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 April 2020. It is not on track to meet its deadline.

A reduction in demining capacity; insecurity along its border with Afghanistan and lack of permission to conduct demining in some of the western districts; the inaccessibility and/or operational difficulty of some mined areas; and the very poor quality of some minefield records, mostly from the civil war in the Central Region, means that Tajikistan will not meet its 2020 Article 5 deadline and is not even likely to complete clearance by 2025.[101]

In total during the last five years, Tajikistan has cleared just over 4km² of mined area (see table below). Progress was hampered in 2015 and 2016 due to restricted access for clearance in the Afghanistan border region because of heightened insecurity. This resulted in delay of clearance operations and a focus on the mountainous Central Region, where adverse weather means the demining window is much shorter, and where additional challenges result from the need to access remote locations and to ensure medical evacuation.[102] In a positive development, clearance was permitted in parts of the Tajik-Afghan border in 2017 and continued in 2018, including Shamsiddin Shohin district, which is one of the most mined districts in Tajikistan.[103]

Mine clearance in 2013–2017[104]

In its Article 7 transparency report for 2016, Tajikistan estimated that it would clear 1.52km² across 22 mined areas in 2017.[105] Actual mine clearance output in 2017, of nearly 0.62km², fell well short of this target.

In its most recent Article 7 report (for 2017), Tajikistan estimated release of 30 minefields (26 in Khatlon district, three in GBAO, and one in the Central Region) in 2018, totaling over 1.9km². This would be followed by release of 30 minefields (20 in Khatlon district, nine in GBAO, and one in the Central Region) in 2019, totaling over 2km².[106] Taking into account the mountainous terrain, inaccessibility, and climatic conditions of the mined areas, along with the current demining capacity, Tajikistan reassessed that it would actually clear only 1.5km² across 20 minefields in 2018, in addition to conducting non-technical and technical survey on the unsurveyed minefield records.[107] However, based on recent annual clearance output, even this reduced estimate of 1.5km² of annual clearance is very high and well over double the 2017 clearance output.

TNMAC estimates that it will complete survey of the 45 unsurveyed minefield records by the end of 2020.[108] Many of these unsurveyed minefields are extremely hard to access, with UST’s survey teams sometimes having to walk for more than three hours each way in mountainous terrain, to access the survey area, leaving only a few hours each day for survey activities.[109] Once survey of the unsurveyed minefields has been completed, Tajikistan will, though, have a more accurate understanding of its baseline mine contamination, which will in turn help TNMAC to develop a more accurate Article 5 completion plan.

Tajikistan has been developing an Article 5 workplan for 2016–2020.[110] In June 2017, at the Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Tajikistan reported that it needs “advisory support and exchange experience on addressing inaccessible areas and non-executable tasks, as well as on all other challenges faced.”[111] However, with the introduction of an arrangement for medical evacuation by helicopter, in collaboration with the armed forces, there were no longer any mined areas deemed to be “inaccessible” as of May 2018. As part of the casevac arrangement, a military helicopter and pilot are on standby in Dushanbe, and are notified of the coordinates of helicopter landing pads in areas where survey and clearance operations are being undertaken in areas not accessible by road.[112] There are, however, mined areas on two islands in the Panj river on the Tajik-Afghan border, one of which is 538,500m² and the other is 30,000m², which at present are non-executable. The islands were created by a change in the flow of the river, and it is possible that the river may again change its path and re-connect the islands with the Tajik river bank in the future.[113]

Progress towards completion of cluster munition clearance

Tajikistan had reported previously that, while submunitions might still be encountered in the future during demining operations, once the small amount of previously undiscovered cluster munition contamination had been released in 2017, no known cluster munition contamination would exist in Tajikistan.[114] In April 2018, however, TNMAC reported that as of the end of 2017, seven of Tajikistan’s eight battle areas may contain cluster munition remnants, totaling almost 0.9km².[115] Survey is required to determine whether or not these areas do indeed contain cluster munition remnants and/or other ERW and TNMAC’s plans to release them.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.