United Kingdom
Cluster Munition Ban Policy
Five-Year Review: State Party the United Kingdom (UK) enacted implementation legislation for the convention before it ratified on 4 May 2010. It has participated in all of the convention’s Meetings of States Parties and intersessional meetings. The UK promotes universalization of the convention and hosted an event toward this objective in London in March 2015. The UK has condemned the use of cluster munitions, including in Syria. It has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation.
The UK produced, exported, imported, and used cluster munitions prior to joining the convention. In December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of a stockpile of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38.7 million submunitions. The UK initially retained cluster munitions for research and training purposes, but has not done so since 2013.
Policy
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 4 May 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 November 2010.
The Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010 serves as the UK’s implementing legislation for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, providing penal and financial sanctions for violations of its provisions.[1] The UK has classified cluster munitions in the highest category of prohibited exports under its Export Control Order of 2008.[2]
In March 2015, the UK government published a “Command Paper” prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that provides “post-legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010” to assess how the legislation has worked in practice. The Command Paper was presented to parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee as well as the Committees on Arms Export Controls.[3] It concluded that there are “no outstanding legal issues” regarding the UK’s implementation of the Act.[4]
The UK submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 28 April 2011 and has provided annual updated reports ever since, most recently on 29 April 2015.[5]
The UK participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Just before the conclusion of the negotiations in Dublin in May 2008, the UK changed its position to support a ban on all cluster munitions, a decision that had significant impact in influencing support in other countries for the convention text.[6]
The UK engages in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, including the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in San José, Costa Rica in September 2014, where it confirmed the completion of the destruction of its stockpiled cluster munitions in December 2013. The UK has also attended all of the convention’s intersessional meetings in Geneva, most recently in June 2015.
Promotion of the convention
The UK promotes universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s 2014 report on human rights and democracy states that in 2015, the UK “will continue to work diplomatically to pursue the goal of a world free of the suffering and casualties caused by anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions, by encouraging all states to refrain from the use of such weapons.”[7]
In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office informed the Monitor that “the UK has raised the issue of accession to the Convention with a number of States not Party at various points throughout [2014].” It reported that the Foreign & Commonwealth Office Minister for Defence and International Security, Tobias Ellwood MP, hosted a reception in London on 25 March 2015 to encourage states to join the convention. According to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, a number of non-signatory states attended the reception, during which Ellwood encouraged their accession and “spoke about the UK’s decision to come down on the side of a prohibition, having weighed up the humanitarian and security factors.”[8] The UK has responded to the new use of cluster munitions in 2014 and the first half of 2015.
On 10 February 2015, government spokesperson, Baroness Anelay of St Johns, expressed the UK’s concern at “recent reports of the use of cluster munitions in eastern Ukraine” and affirmed the need to “bring to book those responsible for human rights abuses.”[9] In response to a parliamentary question later that month on the cluster munition rocket attacks in eastern Ukraine, Anelay noted the government of Ukraine’s denial that its armed forces used cluster munitions and affirmed that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used intentionally to target civilians.” Anelay called on the parties to the conflict in Ukraine to abide by international humanitarian law and called on Ukraine and Russia to accede to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[10] In April 2015, a Foreign and Commonwealth Office official also cited the Ukraine government’s denial of cluster munition use and repeated in a letter to CMC UK member Article 36 that “cluster munitions should in no circumstances be used to target civilians.”[11]
The UK has vigorously and repeatedly condemned cluster munition use by the Syrian government since 2012.[12] It has voted in favor of UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, including Resolution 69/189 on 18 December 2014, which expressed “outrage” at the continued use.[13] The UK has voted in favor of four Human Rights Council resolutions condemning the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently a UK-led resolution on 2 July 2015.[14]
The UK also led a resolution adopted unanimously by the that UN Security Council on 29 June 2015, which expresses concern at evidence of cluster munition use in Darfur and calls on the government of Sudan to “immediately investigate the use of cluster munitions.”[15] On 27 May 2014, the UK voted in favor of a UN Security Council resolution that noted “with serious concern reports of the indiscriminate use of cluster munitions” in Jonglei, South Sudan in February 2014 and urged “all parties to refrain from similar such use in the future.”[16]
On 15 March 2015, the UK’s representative to Libya, Ambassador Michael Aron, described evidence of new use of cluster bombs in Libya as “deeply disturbing.”[17]
The UK has not commented on the use of cluster munitions in Yemen in April and May 2015 by the Saudi-led coalition.
At the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014, the UK expressed “concern” at “several reports” of the use of cluster munitions and urged “those states involved to cease the use of the weapons.”[18] Unlike the majority of states that made statements, the UK did not express concern at new use of cluster munitions in any specific country.
Despite these statements and actions, the CMC is concerned at a lack of consistency in the UK’s approach to how states that are part of the Convention on Cluster Munitions collectively respond to new use of cluster munitions. At a preparatory meeting for the convention’s First Review Conference in Geneva on 24 June 2015, the UK proposed watering down language condemning the use of cluster munitions in draft documents prepared for the First Review Conference.[19]
The UK is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.
Interpretive issues
The UK elaborated its views on the interpretation and implementation of a number of key provisions in the convention during the process of preparing its national legislation and in the period since with respect to the prohibitions on foreign stockpiling, transit, investment in cluster munition producers, and assistance with prohibited acts in joint military operations. A number of ministerial statements are on record clarifying the meaning of the UK’s national legislation on these issues and recognizing the positive obligations under the convention.[20] Additionally,in late 2010, several parliamentary questions were raised in response to reports in the British media based on United States (US) Department of State cables made public by Wikileaks.
Foreign stockpiling
In June 2008, immediately after the adoption of the convention, the UK stated it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention.[21] In December 2009, the government stated that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.”[22] In 2010, the UK announced that there were now “no foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions in the UK or on any UK territory.”[23]
The March 2015 Command Paper finds that the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act “allows for the extension of its provisions to any of the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, and any British overseas territory” but states that its application has only been extended to include the Isle of Man to date.[24] Therefore the UK has not applied its national legislation to the full extent possible, maintaining the possibility of acts being permitted in certain British overseas territories that would be prohibited on the mainland UK. This could represent a loophole by which foreign stocks of cluster munitions could return to the UK’s overseas territories in the future.
Transit
In March 2010, UK parliamentarians asked if “transit” of cluster munitions through UK territory is prohibited under the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010. The government stated that transit “would not in itself be prohibited, but a direct application would have to be made to the Secretary of State who would have to grant permission before it could happen. We would be reluctant to grant such permission.”[25]
In December 2010, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Defence said that under Section 8 of the UK’s legislation, the Foreign Secretary may grant authorization for visiting forces of states not party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions to “possess cluster munitions on, or transfer them through, UK territory.”[26] In 2011, a Minister of State clarified that this provision had been used only once, and that was to grant the US a temporary extension to keep cluster munitions on UK territory as it underwent the process of removing all remaining stockpiles.[27]
A US Department of State cable dated 21 May 2009 and made public by Wikileaks in 2010 stated that the head of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Security Policy Group had “reconfirmed” to US officials that “off-shore storage” of cluster munitions “on US ships would still be permitted” until 2013, and by temporary exception.[28] In response to a parliamentary question on the cable, the previous Labour government minister responsible for the legislation said that “it was our complete intention that there would be no American cluster munitions on British territories anywhere in the world.”[29]
According to the Command Paper, the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act has been extended to the overseas territory of the Isle of Man but not other overseas territories. Therefore it is technically possible that authorization by the Foreign Secretary would not be necessary for the transit or transfer of cluster munitions by visiting forces through other UK overseas territories, such as Diego Garcia.[30]
Interoperability
The convention’s Article 21 provisions on interoperability, the issue of joint military operations with states not party that use cluster munitions, are addressed in Clause 9 of the UK’s national legislation.[31] In 2011, the UK stated that its interpretation of Article 21 is that “notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 [prohibition on assistance], Article 21(3) allows States Parties to participate in military operations and cooperation with non-States Parties who may use cluster munitions. UK law and operational practice reflect this.”[32]
During the development of the UK’s implementation legislation, parliamentarians expressed concern that this clause would provide a loophole that would undermine the purpose of the convention and of the UK’s legislation, which is the elimination of cluster munitions.[33] When pushed by members of parliament to clarify just exactly what activities this clause would permit UK troops engaged in joint military operations to do, the government responded that UK troops “would not be allowed to request use of [cluster] munitions where the choice of munitions was within their exclusive control” but that “they could facilitate operations where [cluster munitions] might be used by a partner.”[34]
Parliamentarians argued that there would likely be situations that, while not illegal under the bill, would clearly be against the spirit and intention of the legislation and pressed the government on the need to develop proper guidelines and briefings for the UK military.[35] The government responded that “States Parties have to make sure that any other state with which they are working understands the basis on which their personnel will be engaged,” and added, “We have to make sure there is clear guidance for personnel, so they know exactly what they can and cannot do. That is already in hand.”[36] A significant result of the parliamentary debates on interoperability and Clause 9 was the recognition by the government of the need to promote universal adherence to the convention.
While there has been no evidence to indicate that the US is using cluster munitions in the “Operation Inherent Resolve” military action against forces of Islamic State (IS) (or Islamic State of Iraq the Levant, ISIL) that began last year in Syria and Iraq, the CMC has warned the US against using cluster munitions. The Monitor requested information from the UK on how it is engaging in the Iraq portion of the joint operation with the US and other states that have not banned cluster munitions. In May 2015, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office responded:
The prohibition on the UK’s use of cluster munitions is reflected in our operational targeting policy documents which outline how UK armed forces will operate, including with coalition partners. Restrictions on the use of weapons and national caveats imposed during coalition operations are a normal part of coalition operations. These directives include the national, operationally-specific, rules of engagement profiles and national caveats which will ensure that any action is within the parameters of UK law. Furthermore, a Chief of the Defence Staff’s Directive is issued to all UK personnel embedded with coalition forces explaining the UK legal position and how this affects their individual responsibilities in all matters including targeting.[37]
During the 2011 NATO military operation in Libya, Foreign Secretary William Hague informed the UK parliament that “we and our North Atlantic Treaty Organisation allies do not use cluster munitions.”[38] NATO confirmed that its forces did not use cluster munitions during the Libya operation in its formal response to a UN Commission of Inquiry.[39]
Advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs
The 2010 Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act makes it an offense for a person to “make arrangements under which another person acquires a prohibited munition,” “to make arrangements under which another person transfers a prohibited munition,” or to “assist, encourage or induce” any other person to engage in prohibited acts.
Concerns have been raised in the past about the promotion of cluster munitions by exhibitors at the annual Defence Systems and Equipment International Exhibitions (DSEi) in London. In 2009 and 2011, the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the DSEi in London displayed promotional materials advertising their cluster munitions.[40] Exhibitor information regarding “compliance” for the exhibition in September 2013 emphasized that it is prohibited to exhibit “non-unitary munitions” except those excluded from prohibition under the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[41] No advertisement of cluster munitions was reported at the 2013 exhibition.
The 2015 Command Paper does not include any reference to the advertising of cluster munitions at UK arms fairs in 2009 and 2011.[42]
Investment
While direct investment in cluster munitions is considered prohibited by Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act under the prohibition on assistance, the issue of indirect investments is not addressed. In 2011, the UK government recognized the need for further work to address “the problem of remote financing” and said that it had set up a working group to look into the matter.[43] The working group is not believed to have met as of July 2015.
In 2011, Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Alistair Burt stated that “indirect financing, including investments in companies that may produce cluster munitions alongside a range of other items and services, is an issue for individual institutions to consider under their own investment charters and social corporate responsibility agendas.”[44] There have been no parliamentary statements since that would suggest further action by the government to address investment in cluster munition manufacturers.
The 2015 Command Paper specifically highlights that the 2010 implementing legislation “did not prohibit indirect financing of cluster munitions production.”[45]
In March 2015, an opposition member asked the government a series of parliamentary questions about investment in cluster munition producers, including the adequacy of existing legislation, the possibility of enacting specific legislation to ban such investment, the ability of pension schemes to invest indirectly in cluster munition manufacture, and whether guidance could be issued to help pension schemes avoid such investment.[46] The government responded that there were no plans to review this specific area of pensions investments.[47]
Financial institutions have responded to public pressure and campaigning actions by NGOs calling for disinvestment from cluster munition manufacturers. A 2014 report on worldwide investment in cluster munitions published by CMC member PAX, identified US$1.4 billion invested by UK financial institutions in companies that manufacture cluster munitions between June 2011 and September 2014.[48] It listed seven UK financial institutions as implicated in investing in companies that produce cluster munitions.[49]
Use
As a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK has foresworn any use of cluster munitions, but in the past the UK used cluster munitions extensively, including in the Falkland Islands/Malvinas in 1982, in Iraq and Kuwait in 1991, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (including Kosovo) in 1999, and in Iraq in 2003.[50]
Production and transfer
The UK produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions in the past and has declared that it now has no facilities to produce cluster munitions.[51]
The UK produced several variants of the BL-755 bomb with 147 submunitions and also produced the L20A1 artillery projectile with 49 M85 dual-purpose improved conventional munition (DPICM) submunitions under license from Israel Military Industries.[52]
BL-755 cluster bombs were exported to, or were otherwise finally possessed by, the following countries: Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Iran, Italy, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, and the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.[53]
The UK also imported cluster munitions from the US: M483 155mm artillery projectiles, M26 rockets for the M270 Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), M261 Multi-Purpose Submunition (MPSM) rocket warheads used with CRV-7 air-to-surface launchers, and CBU-87 cluster bombs.[54]
Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 reported in detail on the ambiguous status of the “Starstreak” high-velocity missile, produced by Thales Air Defence Limited, with respect to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act.[55]
Stockpile destruction
The UK once stockpiled a total of 190,828 cluster munitions and 38,758,898 submunitions, as listed in the following table.[56]
Cluster munitions formerly stockpiled by the UK[57]
Type |
Quantity of cluster munitions |
Quantity of submunitions |
BL755 bomb, each containing 147 No2 Mk1 submunitions |
2,393 |
351,771 |
IBL755 bomb, each containing 147 No2 Mk1 submunitions |
4 |
588 |
RBL755 bomb, each containing 147 No2 Mk1 submunitions |
1,290 |
189,630 |
M261 rocket, each containing 9 M73 submunitions |
4,571 |
41,139 |
M483 projectile, each containing 88 M42/M46 submunitions |
82,900 |
7,295,200 |
M26 rocket, each containing 644 M77 submunitions |
43,692 |
28,137,648 |
L20A1 projectile, each containing 49 M85 submunitions |
55,978 |
2,742,922 |
Total |
190,828 |
38,758,898 |
Under Article 3 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK was required to declare and destroy or ensure the destruction of all stockpiled cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control as soon as possible, but no later than 1 November 2018.
On 17 December 2013, the UK completed the destruction of the stockpile, five years in advance of the treaty-mandated deadline.[58] The UK announced the completion at the convention’s intersessional meetings in April 2014 and the Fifth Meeting of States Parties in September 2014. It also declared the completion of the stockpile destruction in its April 2014 Article 7 report.
The stockpile was transferred and then destroyed at facilities in Germany, Italy, and Norway.[59] In April 2014, the UK reported that the total cost of the stockpile destruction was “around £40 million,” or US$66 million.[60]
Retention
Since 2013, the UK has reported that it does not have any cluster munitions or submunitions for training or research purposes and “has no immediate plans to acquire and retain sub-munitions for permitted purposes, but reserves the right to do so.”[61]
Previously, in 2011 and 2012, the UK reported that it was retaining 956 explosive submunitions of four types.[62] In 2013, it reported that the retained submunitions had been destroyed by demolition “because of concerns over condition, packaging and storage.”[63]
[1] House of Lords, Hansard, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (HMSO), 25 March 2010), Column 1057; and “Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010, Chapter 11.” A person guilty of an offense under this section is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years, or a fine, or both. For analysis of the legislation, see ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 109–111. See also Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form A, 28 April 2011.
[2] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 12 November 2010. Notes by the CMC; and statement by Viscount Younger of Leckie (Conservative),House of Lords Debate (London: HMSO, 25 March 2014), Column 27WS.
[3] Statement by Philip Hammond, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, House of Lords Debate (London: HMSO, 3 March 2015), Column WS.
[4] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Command Paper Cm9021: Post–legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
[5] Various time periods are covered by the Article 7 report submitted on 28 April 2011 (for the period ending 31 March 2011), 30 April 2012 (1 April 2011–31 March 2012), 2013 (1 April 2012–31 March 2013), 30 April 2014 (1 April 2013–31 March 2014), and 29 April 2015 (calendar year 2014).
[6] Statement by Gordon Brown, Prime Minister, “Breakthrough on cluster bombs draws closer,” 28 May 2008. For more details on the UK’s cluster munition policy and practice through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 173–180.
[7] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “Human Rights and Democracy Report 2014,” 12 March 2015.
[8] “Response to Cluster Munition Monitor” document attached to email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 May 2015.
[9] Statement by Baroness Anelay of St Johns, House of Lords Debate (London: HMSO, 10 February 2015), Column 1117.
[10] Statement by Baroness Anelay of St Johns, House of Lords Debate, (London: HMSO, 24 February 2015), Column W.
[11] Letter from the Private Secretary to the Rt Hon David Lidington, to Thomas Nash, Director, Article 36, 10 April 2015.
[12] Statement of the UK, UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, New York, 23 October 2012; statement by Baroness Warsi, Senior Minister of State, Department for Communities and Local Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 19 December 2012), Column WA325; House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 20 May 2013), Column 903; and House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO 10 January 2013), Column 483. On 22 October 2013, the UK hosted a meeting of the “London 11” group of Friends on Syria that issued a communiqué calling on the Syrian regime to “end the siege of urban areas and the indiscriminate attacks against civilians, in particular through air bombardment and the use of ballistic missiles, cluster bombs and explosive barrels.” The London 11 Core Group of the Friends of Syria that met in London on 22 October 2013 to discuss Syria was comprised of 11 states: four States Parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (France, Germany, Italy, UK), and seven states not party (Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States). London 11 Final Communiqué. In a February 2014 statement on Syria, the UK Foreign Secretary commented that “bombardment of civilian areas with barrel bombs continues unabated, and there are reports of attacks with cluster munitions as well.” See statement by William Hague, Foreign Secretary, “Foreign Secretary Statement to Parliament on Ukraine, Syria, and Iran,” Oral Statement to Parliament, 24 February 2014.
[13] “Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UNGA Resolution A/RES/69/189, 18 December 2014. The UK voted in favor of similar resolutions on 15 May and 18 December 2013.
[14] See, “The grave and deteriorating human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/29/L.4, 2 July 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/28/20, 27 March 2015; “The continuing grave deterioration in the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/26/23, 27 June 2014; and “The continuing grave deterioration of the human rights and humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic,” UN Human Rights Council Resolution A/HRC/RES/25/23, 28 March 2014.
[15] The five permanent members of the UN Security Council voted for the resolution in addition to non-permanent members Angola, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Spain, and Venezuela.
[16] Argentina, Australia, Chad, Chile, Jordan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nigeria, Rwanda, and South Korea. See UN Security Council Press Statement, “Security Council, Adopting Resolution 2155 (2014), extends mandate of mission in South Sudan,” 27 May 2014.
[17] Michael Aron (@HMAMichaelAron), “Deeply disturbing report by @HRW with evidence of recent use of cluster bombs in #Libya: http://linkis.com/www.hrw.org/news/201/qrldg,” 05:02am, 15 March 2015, Tweet.
[18] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Fifth Meeting of States Parties, San José, 2 September 2014.
[19] The UK requested that the drafts express “concern” rather than “deplore” or express “great distress” at new use of cluster munitions. It also stated that not all instances of cluster munition use have been “confirmed” and that the countries where cluster munitions have been used do not need to be named in the draft documents as it could deter states from joining the convention. Statement of the UK, Second Preparatory Meetings for the First Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Geneva, 24 June 2015. Notes by Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) and HRW. At a 9 July 2015 meeting to receive input on the revised draft documents, the UK continued to request that references to cluster munition use be qualified with the addition of “alleged” and “allegations” and also requested that countries where cluster munitions have been used not be named in the documents.
[20] See ICBL, Cluster Munition Monitor 2010 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2010), pp. 109–111.
[21] Statement by Lord George Mark Malloch-Brown, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard,(London: HMSO, 3 June 2008), Column 79.
[22] Statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.
[23] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions First Meeting of States Parties, Vientiane, 10 November 2010.
[24] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post–legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
[25] Statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.
[26] Statement by Lord Astor of Hever, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Defence, Conservative, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 21 December 2010), Column WA278.
[27] Statement by Lord John Howell of Guildford, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Conservative, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 31 January 2011), Column 1186. Lord Howell stated that “the one exception was made very properly by the previous Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr. Miliband, allowing the US a temporary extension of its right to keep cluster munitions while it went through the process of getting rid of them as part of the running down of cluster munitions stores in UK territory and in the United Kingdom. That is the only exception that has ever been made. For the future, we will consider bringing to Parliament and recording any decisions that may be proposed for temporary extension, and we will do that on a case-by-case basis. I have to say that in a number of instances it could be governed and limited by security considerations.” Secretary of State for Defence Liam Fox stated in 2010: “Neither I nor any other Secretary of State in this Government has issued any authorisation under Article 8 of the Act. Article 8 does not require such requests to be scrutinised by Parliament. However, in the event of a future request, we would consider on a case-by-case basis how best we can keep Parliament informed within the constraints of classification and operational planning.” Statement by Liam Fox, Secretary of State, Defence, House of Commons Debate, Hansard (London: HMSO, 9 December 2010), c427W. See also, statement by Jeremy Browne, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 1 November 2011), Column 589W.
[28] The cable quoted a UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office official as telling US officials: “It would be better for the USG [US government] and HMG [Her Majesty’s Government—UK] not to reach final agreement on this temporary agreement understanding until after the CCM ratification process is completed in Parliament, so that they can tell parliamentarians that they have requested the USG to remove its cluster munitions by 2013, without complicating/muddying the debate by having to indicate that this request is open to exceptions.” According to the cable, the UK’s position was that “any U.S. cluster munitions currently stored on British territory (either UK territory proper, Diego Garcia, or elsewhere) would be permitted to stay until 2013, while any new cluster munitions the USG wanted to bring to those sites after the treaty’s entry into force for the UK - either before or after 2013 - would require the temporary exception. Any movement of cluster munitions from ships at Diego Garcia to planes there, temporary transit, or use from British territory also would require the temporary exception after entry into force.” “U.S.-UK Cluster Munitions Dialogue,” US Department of State cable 09STATE52368 dated 21 May 2009, released by Wikileaks on 1 December 2010.
[29] House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 15 December 2010), Column 913. In June 2008, Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Lord Malloch-Brown, stated that although the UK did not read the prohibition on foreign stockpiling as a legal requirement under the treaty, it would seek the removal of foreign stockpiles of cluster munitions from UK territories within the eight-year period allowed for stockpile destruction in the convention. The government later told parliamentarians that the US had identified the cluster munitions on UK territory as “exceeding operational planning requirements” and that they would be “gone from the UK itself by the end of [2010]” and “gone from other UK territories, including Diego Garcia, by the end of 2013.” Statement by Lord George Mark Malloch-Brown, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 3 June 2008), Column 79; statement by Baroness Glenys Kinnock, House of Lords Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 8 December 2009), Column 1020; and statement by Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 925.
[30] See Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post –legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
[31] The clause states: “It is a defence for a person charged with an offence specified in any of paragraphs 1 to 6 of Schedule 2 [the prohibitions of the convention] to show that the person’s conduct took place in the course of, or for the purposes of, an international military operation or an international military co-operation activity.” Members in the House of Commons went to great lengths to seek clarification on the scope of this clause.
[32] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 30 June 2011.
[33] For example, see statement by William Cash, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 160; statement by Jo Swinson, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Column 906; and statement by Martin Caton, House of Commons Debate, Hansard,(London: HMSO, 17 March 2010), Columns 902–903.
[34] Statements by John Redwood and Chris Bryant, House of Commons Debate, Hansard,(London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 162.
[35] Statement by John Redwood, House of Commons Debate, Hansard,(London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Column 163.
[36] House of Commons Debate, Hansard,(London: HMSO, 23 March 2010), Columns 161–164.
[37] “Response to Cluster Munition Monitor,” document attached to email from Jeremy Wilmshurst, Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 15 May 2015.
[38] Statement by William Hague, Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 23 May 2011), Column 446W.
[39] NATO letter to the UN Commission of Inquiry on Libya, 15 February 2011. Cited in UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, “Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Libya,” A /HRC/19/68, 2 March 2012, p. 168, para. 638.
[40] In September 2011, Green Party leader and Member of Parliament Caroline Lucas raised concern that the Pakistan Ordnance Factory stand and Pakistan’s Defence Export Promotion Organization pavilion at the DSEi in London were displaying promotional materials advertising their cluster munitions. DSEi shut down both exhibits after the materials were found to “breach UK government export controls and our own contractual requirements.” In response, in 2011 the government said, “provided companies which produce cluster munitions do not engage in such promotional activities in the UK the Government have no plans to prohibit such companies from attending UK trade events.” The government placed responsibility with the event organizers, noting that “major UK defence exhibitions are commercial events and the admission of companies is a matter for the commercial organisers.” For details see ICBL-CMC, “Country Profile: United Kingdom: Cluster Munition Ban Policy,” 31 August 2012.
[41] DSEI website, “Compliance and Eligibility to Exhibit,” undated.
[42] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post –legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
[43] Statement by Lord Howell of Guildford, (London: HMSO, 31 January 2011), Column 1185.
[44] Statement by Alistair Burt, Under Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, House of Commons Debate, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 11 October 2011), Column 322W.
[45] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Command Paper Cm9021, “Post –legislative scrutiny of the Cluster Munitions (Prohibitions) Act 2010,” presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, 5 March 2015.
[46] Questions by Jim Cunningham, House of Commons Debate, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2015), Column W.
[47] Response by Rt Hon Steve Webb, House of Commons Debate, (London: HMSO, 23 March 2015), Column W.
[48] PAX, “Worldwide investment in Cluster Munitions: a shared responsibility, November 2014 update,” Utrecht, November 2014.
[49] Aberdeen Asset Management, Fidelity Worldwide Investment, Invesco, Old Mutual, Prudential, Schroders, and Standard Life were listed in the report’s “Hall of Shame.”
[50] HRW, “Ticking Time Bombs: NATO’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia,” Vol. 11, No. 6(D), June 1999; HRW, “Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Campaign,” Vol. 12, No. 1(D), February 2000; and HRW, Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq (New York: HRW, 2003).
[51] The initial Article 7 report declared “Nil” under the section on the status and progress of programs for conversion or de-commissioning of production facilities. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form E, 28 April 2011.
[52] Adam Ingram, Written Answers, House of Commons, Hansard, (London: HMSO, 17 November 2003), Columns 497W and 498W.
[53] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), pp. 468–470; Colin King, ed., Jane’s Explosive Ordnance Disposal 2007–2008, CD-edition (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2008), entries for: Iran, 10 January 2008; Italy, 10 January 2008; Netherlands, 10 January 2008; Oman, 10 January 2008; Pakistan, 10 January 2008; Saudi Arabia, 3 December 2007; Thailand, 10 January 2008; and United Arab Emirates, 10 January 2008; and Landmine Action, Explosive remnants of war: unexploded ordnance and post-conflict communities (London: Landmine Action, 2002). Croatia, Ecuador, Germany, Montenegro, Portugal, and Switzerland declared stockpiles of BL755 bombs, or the destruction thereof, in their Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 reports submitted in 2011. BiH disclosed stockpiling BL755 in a statement to the intersessional meeting on stockpile destruction held in Geneva in June 2011.
[54] The US supplied the UK with 1,008 CBU-87 cluster bombs at some point between 1970 and 1995. US Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, “Cluster Bomb Exports under FMS, FY1970–FY1995,” obtained by HRW in a Freedom of Information Act request, 28 November 1995. In June 2009, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA) reported that it had contracted the destruction of 600 CBU-87 bombs for the UK. See presentation by Peter Courtney-Green, Chief of the Ammunition Support Branch, NAMSA, “Technical Aspects of Cluster Munitions Stockpile Destruction,” Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions, 25 June 2009, slide 15.
[55] Questions have been raised about the status of the “Starstreak” missile, manufactured by Thales Air Defence Limited in the UK, in relation to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the UK’s Cluster Munition (Prohibitions) Act. Some literature produced by the manufacturer has asserted a utility for the weapon against ground-based targets, which would seem to contradict its exclusion from the Convention on Cluster Munitions on the basis that it has been “designed exclusively for an air defence role.” For a detailed discussion of the “Starstreak” missile, see Cluster Munition Monitor 2011 (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, October 2011), p. 177.
[56] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 29 April 2015; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 30 April 2014; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 30 April 2012; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form B, 28 April 2011.
[57] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Reports, Form B, 30 April 2013, 30 April 2012, and 28 April 2011. The April 2013 report listed 191,128 total munitions in overview text, 300 more than the Monitor’s calculations based on the more-detailed tables in the report.
[58] This task was completed on 17 December 2013 when the last Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) M26 bomblet was destroyed at Esplodenti Sabino’s facility, Casalbordino, Italy. See CMC Press Release, “UK Destroys Last Stockpiled Cluster Munition,” 19 December 2013.
[59] The BL-755 bombs, IBL755 bombs, and RBL755 bombs with their No2 Mk1 submunitions were destroyed by Spreewerk in Lubben, Germany. The M483 projectiles and M42/M46 submunitions were destroyed by July 2008 by Esplodenti Sabino in Casalbordino, Italy. The L20A1 were destroyed by NAMMO Buck in Pinnow, Germany. The stockpile of CRV-7 M261 rockets and M73 submunitions were destroyed by July 2009 by NAMMO Group Demil Division in Norway.
[60] Statement of the UK, Convention on Cluster Munitions Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 April 2014. Average exchange rate for 2014: £1=US$1.6484. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 2 January 2015.
[61] Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, 29 April 2015; Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2014; and Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.
[62] 576 KB-1 (from the M87 Orkan), 244 M42 (from the M483), 96 M46 (from the M483), and 40 Alpha submunitions (from the CB470). Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 28 April 2011. The UK’s second Article 7 report (April 2012) lists the same 956 explosive submunitions of four different types retained for training. The report also notes that 12 M42 submunitions consumed in the reporting period, but the total retained was not adjusted as a result of the consumption. In July 2012, a UK official clarified to the Monitor that no submunitions were consumed by the UK in the second Article 7 report’s period and the report’s inclusion of 12 consumed submunitions was an error. Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2012; and email from Graham Jessup, Conventional Disarmament Officer, Arms Trade Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 10 July 2012.
[63] According to the report, the UK destroyed 244 M42 submunitions and 96 M46 submunitions that had previously been held unfuzed after being removed from its M483 projectiles, 40 Alpha Bomblet submunitions (from a former South African CB470 cluster munition), and 576 KB-1 submunitions (from two former Yugoslav M87 Orkan cluster munitions). Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form C, 30 April 2013.
Mine Action
Treaty status |
|
Mine Ban Treaty |
State Party |
Convention on Cluster Munitions |
State Party |
Extent of contamination as of 31 March 2018 |
|
Landmines |
6.44km2 all on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas |
Cluster munition remnants |
Unknown, light contamination all contained in known mined areas on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas |
Other ERW contamination |
Contained within known hazardous areas |
Mine action management |
|
National mine action management actors |
National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) chaired by Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and comprising representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the islands’ government, and a strategic advisor |
Mine action strategic plan |
Demining is conducted in phases. Phase 5(a) and (b) (2016–2020) covers the clearance of 79 mined areas measuring an estimated total of 5.8km2 |
Operators in 2017 |
Battle Area Clearance, Training, Equipment, and Consultancy International (BACTEC) |
Land release November 2016–5 March 2018 (Phase 5 (a)) |
|
Landmines |
4,816,051m2 released with 4,173 antipersonnel mines and 242 antivehicle mines destroyed |
Cluster munition remnants |
No submunitions found. An empty BL755 cluster munition container was discovered in June 2017 |
Other ERW |
26 ERW destroyed |
Progress |
|
Landmines |
Only eight mined areas, covered 0.16km2 expected to remain at the end of March 2020, all located in the York Bay area of the islands. A technical survey is required to determine a plan and timeframe for the clearance of that area |
Cluster munition remnants |
It is not clear whether any of the 0.16km2 remaining to be cleared after March 2020 may contain cluster munition remnants |
Notes: ERW = explosive remnants of war.
Contamination
The only mined areas under the jurisdiction or control of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) are on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas in the South Atlantic, the result of armed conflict with Argentina in 1982.[1] As of March 2018, only 35 mined areas remained to be cleared, totaling 6.4km2 (see table below).[2]
Contamination by province (as at end of Phase 5(a), end March 2018)[3]
Area |
Mined areas |
Area (m2) |
Fox Bay |
12 |
236,950 |
Port Howard |
5 |
128,280 |
Darwin and Goose Green |
0 |
0 |
Murrell Peninsula |
6 |
6,046,800 |
Stanley Area 1 |
8 |
0 |
Stanley Area 2 |
2 |
2,570 |
Stanley Area 3 |
2 |
25,450 |
Stanley Area 4 |
0 |
0 |
Total |
35 |
6,440,050 |
Some clearance was undertaken in the early 1980s immediately following the conflict, during which 1,855 mines were removed and destroyed from mined area.[4] However, between the date the UK became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty (1 March 1999) and the submission of its first Article 5 deadline extension request in 2008, no clearance took place.[5]
The UK has reported that no civilian has ever been killed or injured by mines on the islands.[6] Over the years, however, civilians have deliberately or inadvertently entered a minefield in a number of cases. For example, the Ministry of Defence reported “infringement” of minefields by a total of six locals and 15 foreign fishermen or tourists between March 2000 and December 2008.[7] It is a criminal offence on the Falklands/Malvinas to enter a minefield.[8]
The socio-economic impact of contamination on the islands is said to be minimal. All mined areas and suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) have been “perimeter-marked and are regularly monitored and protected by quality stock proof fencing, to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians.”[9] According to the UK, mined areas represent “only 0.1% of land used for farming. The mined areas cover a wide range of terrain including sandy beaches and dunes, mountains, rock screes, dry peat, wet swampy peat, and pasture land.”[10] A number of instances of cattle, sheep, or horses entering the minefields have been recorded since 2000, some of which resulted in the animals’ deaths.[11]
Cluster Munition Contamination
In 2015, the UK affirmed that no known areas of cluster munition contamination exist outside SHAs on the islands, in particular, mined areas, all of which are fenced and marked.[12]
Cluster munition remnants may remain on the islands[13] as a result of use of BL755 cluster bombs by British forces against Argentine positions during the 1982 armed conflict. In February 2009, the Ministry of Defence stated that: “According to historical records either 106 or 107 Cluster Bomb Units (CBU) were dropped by British Harriers and Sea Harriers during the conflict. Each CBU contains 147 BL755 submunitions and using the higher CBU figure (107), a total of 15,729 submunitions were dropped. Using a 6.4% failure rate assessed during in-service surveillance over 15 years, we would estimate that 1,006 would not explode. Given that 1,378 BL755s were cleared in the first year after the conflict and that a further 120 have been found and disposed of since (totaling 1,498), clearly, there was a slightly higher failure rate. Even if the rate had been closer to 10% and 1,573 had failed, we can only estimate that some 70 remain but that due to the very soft nature of the peat found on the islands, many of these will have been buried well below the surface. We believe that the majority of those remaining are now contained within existing minefields and these will be cleared in due course.”[14]
In 1982–1984, battle area clearance (BAC) was undertaken over large areas looking for cluster munition remnants and other unexploded ordnance (UXO). Based on bombing data, areas where unexploded submunitions were expected to be found were targeted “very quickly,” and a large number were located and destroyed. Demining operations involved both surface and subsurface clearance.[15]
The UK has stated that potential cluster munition contamination has, in part, been taken into account during mine clearance operations on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas, with two areas, Fox Bay 8W and Goose Green 11, selected for clearance partly based on records indicating that cluster munitions had been dropped there. No cluster munition remnants were found in these two areas.[16]
In 2010, the UK reported destruction of two submunitions in Stanley Area 3, during clearance operations across four mined areas in 2009–2010.[17] In June 2015, the UK reported destruction of 19 submunitions during clearance operations in January to April 2015, also in Stanley Area 3.[18] UK records suggest that four cluster bombs were dropped in this area.[19] No further cluster munition remnants were encountered either during clearance operations in September 2015 to March 2016 in Stanley Area 2 and Stanley Area 3,[20] or during survey and clearance operations in November 2016 to March 2018.[21] In June 2017, however, the main body of a BL755 cluster munition container was found in “minefield GG08,” during BAC in the Goose Green region. No submunitions were found though and GG08 has now been declared cleared of all explosive ordnance.[22]
Program Management
A National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) was established in 2009 to regulate, manage and coordinate mine action on the islands.The NMAA is chaired by the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and comprises representatives from the Ministry of Defence, the islands’ government, and a strategic advisor. It meets “as required” (at least once every six months), with the land release contractor (currently Dynasafe BACTEC Ltd, formerly BACTEC) and the Demining Project Office (currently Fenix Insight), invited to attend “where appropriate.”[23]
In addition, there is a Suspect Hazardous Area Land Release Committee (SHALARC), which is a body based on the islands, composed of a wide range of local officials and a representative of the UK military. The SHALARC provides a forum for the contractors to discuss or provide detail on issues of concern or interest to the committee, such as the land release process, including when land has been released for public use.[24]
Strategic planning
The UK is currently undertaking the fifth phase of its demining operations on the Falklands/Malvinas. The government has committed to spend more than £27 million on Phase 5(a) and (b) (covering 2016–2020), which covers the clearance of 79 mined areas totaling some 10.86km2. This total includes 2.86km2 of BAC.[25]
Phase 5(a) commenced in November 2016 and concluded in March 2018.[26] During this phase operators cleared more mined areas for which there were no minefield records than previously. The prior technical survey included cutting lanes into suspected minefields in order to establish the position of any remaining mines.[27] Following the conclusion of Phase 5(a), the UK believes it has a more accurate picture of the remaining mine clearance challenge, which has helped inform its strategic planning and the drafting of its second Article 5 deadline extension request, which was submitted on 29 March 2018 for consideration by States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty.[28]
The current stage of demining, Phase 5(b), which began in April 2018, is due to conclude by the end of March 2020.[29] At the end of this Phase, it is expected that only eight mined areas will remain, covering an estimated 163,460m2, and located in the environmentally sensitive beach and sand dune area known as Yorke Bay.[30] Technical survey of Yorke Bay, which will be carried out during Phase 5(b), will inform the planning and costing for the release of the remaining eight mined areas.[31]
There is no reference to suspected cluster munition-contaminated areas in either the UK’s Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 transparency report for 2017, or in its draft 2018 Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request. It is unclear whether analysis of UK bombing data could provide evidence as to whether or not the eight mined areas in Yorke Bay forecast to still remain as at March 2020 could also contain cluster munition remnants.
To date, the UK has prioritized clearance of areasclosest to settlements and civilian infrastructure, resulting in release of areas closest to Port Stanley and the roads leading in and out of the islands’ capital. In early 2016, the Ministry of Defence and the FCO commissioned the UK’s Defence, Science and Technology Laboratory to carry out a study to help prioritize clearance of the remaining minefields in a Phase 5 of demining. The 2016 study applied Multi Criteria Decision Analysis to rank all remaining minefields according to a range of factors including size/density of minefield; terrestrial factors (remoteness of location, topography, and difficulty of mine removal); human factors (proximity to life, benefits to local population of clearance, and political prioritiesof the UK/islands governments); and environmental factors (conservation of wildlife and adherence to local legislation). The resultant priority list formed the basis of the UK government’s invitation to tender for the contract for Phase 5 demining.[32] The UK has noted that the “small” humanitarian and socio-economic impact of the remaining mined areas on the islands decreases as the mined areas closest to population centers are cleared.[33]
Legislation and standards
Survey and clearance operations on the islands are reported to meet or exceed the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), by adapting IMAS to meet the specifics of the situation on the islands.[34] Each project’s Statement of Requirement contains the standards specific to the tasks being addressed.[35] Applicable environmental standards are agreed on in coordination with the islands’ government Environmental Planning Department to minimize damage to the fragile environment and to aid remediation.[36]
Quality management
The Land Release Contractor on the islands(Dynasafe BACTEC Ltd, at present)undertakes its own internal quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC). The Demining Project Office (Fenix Insight, at present)monitors this quality management and can also conduct its external QA and QC.[37] The size of the sampled areas at each task is decided by the quality contractor based on the guidance set out in IMAS 09.20.[38]
Operators
The Land Release Contractor on the islands is selected by international competitive tender prior to each phase, as required by the European Union. Based on a balance of merit and value for money, the same organization, BACTEC, was awarded the land release contract for the current fifth phase of demining operations on the islands, as for the previous four phases.[39] Capacity for Phase 5 operations was increased from previous phases, with a total of 108 personnel: 84 demining staff (seven teams of 12—eight deminers, one supervisor, one team leader, a medic, and a driver per team); seven technical staff (surveyors, mechanics, and excavator operators); 13 support staff; and four management staff. Mechanical equipment includes one antivehicle mine machine, three antipersonnel mine machines, and two armored excavators, in addition to the required transportation equipment.[40]
The position of Demining Project Office, which implements the policies of the NMAA and monitors the land release operations on the islands, is also awarded through competitive tender. Based on merit, Fenix Insight has been awarded responsibility for the Demining Project Office for all five stages of demining so far.[41]
The UK has noted that the islands have limited capacity in terms of accommodation and medical/casevac (evacuation of casualties by air) facilities. Current staffing levels have reached the maximum that can be safely deployed on the islands, but work was claimed to be progressing “very well” with the current capacity.[42]
Land Release
During 2017, antipersonnel mine survey and clearance operations took place on the islands as part of Phase 5(a) of demining (November 2016 to March 2018, with operations stood down for the Austral winter).
Between January and December 2017, just over 1km2 was released by clearance, as part of Phase 5(a) clearance operations.[43]
While non-technical and technical survey have formed a key part of the UK’s operations on the islands for many years, the UK has not historically collated data on area cancelled and on area reduced.[44]
Survey in 2017
During Phase 5a (November 2016 to March 2018), technical survey was reported to have been completed in minefields in Port Howard, Fox Bay, and Stanley Area 3, but no data was reported on the amount of mined area reduced through survey.[45]
Clearance in Phase 5(a) (November 2016 to March 2018)
Phase 5(a) survey and clearance operations are tackling some of the most complex, remote, and environmentally sensitive minefields. Phase 5(a) commenced in November 2016 and ran until March 2018, with a three-month stand down over the Austral winter beginning in June 2017.[46] In total, during Phase 5(a) of clearance, 52 mined areas were released, totaling just over 2km2, with the destruction of 4,223 antipersonnel mines, 245 antivehicle mines, and 44 items of UXO (see table below).[47] A further 2.86km2 of BAC was conducted during this Phase.[48]
Of this, just over 1km2 of mined area was reported as cleared in 2017, with the destruction of 2,557 antipersonnel mines, 207 antivehicle mines, and 17 items of UXO during the course of the year.
Mine clearance Phase 5(a) (November 2016 to March 2018)[49]
Time period |
Geographic area |
Areas released |
Area cleared (m²) |
AP mines destroyed |
AV mines destroyed |
UXO destroyed |
November to December 2016 |
Stanley Area 2 and 3 |
7 |
426,346 |
1,314 |
19 |
1 |
January to December 2017(including three month stand down during Austral winter) |
Darwin and Goose Green, Stanley Area 2, 3, and 4 |
34 |
1,050,080 |
2,557 |
207 |
17 |
January to March 2018 |
11 |
577,474 |
352 |
19 |
26 |
|
Total |
52 |
2,053,900 |
4,223 |
245 |
44 |
Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.
Phase 5(b) of clearance operations, for the period April 2018 to March 2020, commenced on schedule in April, and is covering more than 5.95km2 of confirmed or suspected mined area.[50]
In some SHAs, machines (with a flail or tiller) are used to prepare the land for clearance, which improves productivity. All mechanically prepared ground is subsequently processed by deminers using visual search, detector search, raking, or full manual excavation drills. Furthermore, aerial drones, which were first introduced during Phase 4 clearance operations, are again being deployed during Phase 5. Use of drones to overfly SHAs helps to identify mine “dump” locations, row markers, and other evidence that might have otherwise taken a manual team several days to locate. The UK deems the use of drones to be an excellent addition to the demining toolbox. As it progresses towards clearing sand-duned areas, heavy sand-sifting machinery will be introduced.[51]
No cluster munition remnants were encountered during Phase 5(a), but theUK did report that the main body of a BL755 container was found in June 2017 in “minefield GG08,” during BAC in the Goose Green region of the islands.
GG08 has now been declared clear.[52]
Previous clearance Phases 1–4 (October 2009 to March 2016)
The first formal clearance operations since the UK became a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty in 1999 took place at the end of 2009. In total, during the first four phases of clearance from October 2009 to March 2016, 35 mined areas were released, totaling just over 2km2, with the destruction of 4,083 antipersonnel mines, 927 antivehicle mines, and 74 items of UXO, including 21 submunitions (see table below).
Mine clearance by project phase and area in October 2009 to 30 March 2016[53]
Project Phase |
Geographic area |
Areas released |
Area cleared (m²) |
AP mines destroyed |
AV mines destroyed |
UXO destroyed |
1 |
Fox Bay, Darwin and Goose Green, Stanley Area 1 and 3 |
4 |
89,540 |
678 |
568 |
12 |
2 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
|
3 |
Stanley Area 1, 2 and 3 |
6 |
841,241 |
233 |
32 |
6 |
4(a) |
Stanley Area 3 |
10 |
264,921 |
723 |
24 |
37 |
4(b) |
Stanley Area 2 and 3 |
15 |
832,594 |
2,449 |
303 |
19 |
Total |
35 |
2,028,296 |
4,083 |
927 |
74 |
Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.
Battle area clearance
Battle area clearance (BAC) operations conducted during Phases 2, 3, 4(b), and 5(a), resulted in nearly 7.86km2 of SHA being cleared, with the destruction of 87 items of UXO.[54]
Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance
Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2008), the UK is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2019. In July 2017, the UK reported that meeting the 2019 deadline would be “challenging,” and that its current priority was successful implementation of the first stages of the Phase 5, and agreeing on plans for demining beyond 2018.[55] In March 2018, the UK submitted a second extension request, seeking a further five-year extension to its Article 5 deadline, through to 1 March 2024. This will be the final deadline extension the UK expects to seek.
Phase 5(a) of survey and clearance operations finished as scheduled at the end of March 2018. Upon conclusion of Phase 5(a), just over 4.08km2 of minedland had been cleared since the UKjoined the Mine Ban Treaty, releasing a total of 87 mined areas. In addition, almost 7.86km2 of BAC has been released during this same period.[56] Phase 5(b) commenced immediately in succession in April 2018 and was expected to conclude by 31 March 2020.
As outlined by the UK in its Article 5 extension request, submitted for consideration by States Parties in March 2018, the UKexpects that eight remaining mined areas, covering an estimated 163,460m2, will remain upon completion of Phase 5(b) in March 2020. The mined areas in question are all located in Yorke Bay, an environmentally sensitive beach and sand dune area, which is also the most challenging of mined areas.[57] Technical survey will inform the planning and costing for the release of these remaining mined areas in Yorke Bay.[58] According to the UK, “It is possible that the work can be completed in a single further year, but that cannot be certain at this stage…Rather than request a three year extension which may prove insufficient, thus necessitating a further extension request, the UK requests a five year extension until 1 March 2024.”[59]
There are two further areas, Don Carlos Bay and Beatrice Cove, which have never been considered as mined, and which were not involved in the 122 mined areas established in the feasibility study in 2007, but which are located behind the long Murrell Peninsula fence. This area has been out of bounds to all persons on the islands since 1982, so it has not been possible to check whether these two areas were mined. If these two areas are found to require clearance, they will be added to the list of mined areas, and the UK expects they could be cleared within the five-year extension period.[60]
The UK “retains the strong intention that the clearance of Yorke Bay will be possible within the 5-year extension request.”[61] It does, however, cite two risk factors to the realization of the plan. The first is a risk that at Yorke Bay, some mines may have been moved by sand movement and that technical survey cannot identify the bounds of that movement, which may lead to lengthier and more expensive clearance. Second, there could be a delay in securing further funding, which “will be weighed against competing priorities and subject to approval at senior levels. ”This in turn could lead to a situation requiring demobilization, and remobilization of demining capacity, or retendering, after Phase 5, which would be timely and costly: hence the request to an extended deadline to 2024.[62]
The UK conducted an environmental impact assessment (EIA) in 2017, which was discussed with the islands’ government. The EIA identified two particular issues: a) the penguins on the islands; and b) the area at Yorke Bay, which will be addressed in such a way as to ensure impact to the existing environment is limited to the minimum practically possible.[63]
Most of the remaining mined areas are said to be in extremely remote locations, exposed to adverse weather conditions that enforce an annual three-month stand in the winter months.[64] The UK has also reported the following additional challenges to clearance in the islands: incomplete Argentine minefield records; concerns about the environmental impact of demining; and limits on the capacity of the islands to provide certain facilities for demining, such as accommodation for deminers and medical facilities, including for the evacuation of any casualties.[65] The UK reports that these factors are becoming increasingly significant as it tackles the more technically challenging and environmentally sensitive minefields in Phase 5 of demining. To address these considerations the UKhas increased its funding commitment for Phase 5.[66]
The UK government funds all mine-clearance operations in the islands.[67] The first four stages of demining (2009 to March 2016) cost £11 million (approximately US$14.5 million).[68] The UK government has committed to spend more than £27 million (approximately US$35.5 million at current exchange rates) on Phase 5 through to March 2020. This will leave eight mined areas as of end of March 2020. According to the UK, “further funding will be sought once the cost of covering Yorke Bay is known based upon the results of technical survey conducted during the extension request period in Phase 5.”[69]
Demining on the islands is conducted in phases, which cut across calendar years, though, based on the year in which demining tasks were completed, a total of 3.42km2 of mined area has been cleared in the last five years.
Five-year summary of mine clearance[70]
Year |
Area cleared (km2)* |
2017 |
1.05 |
2016 |
0.94 |
2015 |
0.59 |
2014 |
0 |
2013 |
0.84 |
Total |
3.42 |
*Based on the year in which clearance was completed.
The UK has committed to providing updated information on progress and next steps at subsequent future Meetings of States Parties.[71]
Article 4 Compliance
Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, the UK is required to destroy all cluster munitions in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 November 2020. It is unclear whether it is on track to meet this deadline.
Any cluster munition-contaminated area that might exist is within existing mined areas or SHAs on the isalnds, which the UK is addressing under its Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 obligations. If the UK proceeds according to the workplan laid out in its 2018 draft Article 5 deadline extension request, only eight mined areas in Yorke Bay, totaling an estimated 163,460m2, will remain at the end of March 2020. March 2020 falls ahead of the UK’s Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 deadline of November 2020. However, it has not specified which, if any, of the remaining mined areas may contain cluster munition remnants based on bombing data. As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether or not the UK is on track to meet its November 2020 Article 4 deadline.
The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.
[1] Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2008.
[2] Email from an official in the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre, FCO, 21 August 2018.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 6.
[5] Analysis of Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 November 2008.
[6] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty First Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2008, p. 4.
[7] Letter from Permanent Joint Headquarters of the UK Ministry of Defence to Landmine Action, 16 February 2009.
[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 10.
[9] Ibid., p. 2.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Letter from Permanent Joint Headquarters of the UK Ministry of Defence to Landmine Action, 16 February 2009.
[12] Email from a Conventional Arms Policy Officer, Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 1 July 2015.
[13] There is a sovereignty dispute with Argentina, which also claims jurisdiction over the islands, which it refers to as the Malvinas.
[14] Letter to Landmine Action from Lt.-Col. Scott Malina-Derben, Ministry of Defence, 6 February 2009; and email correspondence from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, 11 June 2015.
[15] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, 1 July 2015.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Statement of the UK, Mine Ban Treaty Tenth Meeting of States Parties, Geneva, 1 December 2010.
[18] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, 11 June 2015.
[19] Ibid., 1 July 2015.
[20] Ibid., 4 May 2016.
[21] Interview with an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, London, 19 April 2018.
[22] Emails from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, 22 and 23 June 2017.
[23] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 8.
[24] Ibid., p. 9.
[25] Ibid., pp. 7 and 14; and email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 26 June 2018.
[26] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 3.
[27] Emails from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 28 July and 11 October 2017; statement of the UK, Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and “Falklands: 46 minefields to be cleared in two years pledges Foreign Office,” MercoPress, 13 January 2017.
[28] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 11 October 2017.
[29] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 7.
[30] Ibid., pp. 7 and 14.
[31] Ibid., p. 14.
[32] Emails from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 21 September 2016, and 28 July 2017.
[33] Statement of the UK, Standing Committee Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017.
[34] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 26 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 3 and 7.
[35] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 15 July 2016.
[36] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form F.
[37] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 26 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 9.
[38] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 1 July 2016.
[39] Ibid., p. 9.
[40] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 28 July 2017.
[41] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 9.
[42] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 28 July 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 3.
[43] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 20182018, Annex A.
[44] Ibid.
[45] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 26 June 2018.
[46] Statement of the UK, Mine Ban Treaty 15th Meeting of States Parties, Santiago, 29 November 2017; and emails from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 2 June, 28 July, 11 October 2017, and 26 June 2018.
[47] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 26 June 2018.
[48] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, Annex A.
[49] Ibid. There is a small discrepancy between the mined area cleared and the number of mines destroyed, as reported previously for 2016 (six areas released, 423,210m2 cleared and 1,807 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines and one other UXO destroyed) and the data reported most recently for 2016 (seven areas released, 426,346m2 cleared and 1,314 antipersonnel mines, 19 antivehicle mines, and one UXO destroyed), as contained in the table on Phase 5 of this report. The FCO has confirmed that the data in the table is correct.
[50] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 26 June 2018.
[51] Ibid., 15 July 2016, and 28 July 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 8.
[52] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department of the FCO, 22 and 23 June 2017; and interview, London, 19 April 2018.
[53] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 24 August 2016. There is a small discrepancy between the mined area cleared and the number of mines destroyed, as reported previously for Phase 3 (826,000m2 cleared and 296 antipersonnel mines destroyed) and Phase 4(b) (2,674 antipersonnel mines and 360 antivehicle mines destroyed) and the data reported most recently in the UK’s 2018 Article 5 Extension Request (Phase 3: 841,241m2 cleared and 233 antipersonnel mines destroyed and Phase 4(b) 2,499 antipersonnel mines and 303 antivehicle mines destroyed), as contained in the table on mine clearance by phase in this report. The FCO has confirmed that the data in its 2018 Article 5 Extension Request and this table is now correct.
[54] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 26 June 2018.
[55] Ibid., 28 July 2017.
[56] Ibid., 26 June 2018.
[57] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 7 and 14.
[58] Ibid., p. 14.
[59] Ibid., p. 15.
[60] Ibid., p. 13.
[61] Ibid., p. 14.
[62] Ibid., p. 15.
[63] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 28 July 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 3 and 11.
[64] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 4.
[65] Statement of the UK, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2017; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 3.
[66] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, p. 3.
[67] Email from an official in the Arms Export Policy Department, FCO, 3 June 2015.
[68] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 3 and 10.
[69] Ibid., p. 10.
[70] See Cluster Munition Monitor reports on clearance for the UK covering 2013–2017.
[71] Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 2018, pp. 12 and 14.
Support for Mine Action
In 2017, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK) contributed £20.8million (US$26.8 million)[1] in mine action funding to 15 countries. Compared to 2016, the UK’s funding increased by 7% ($1.8 million more) in US dollar terms, and rose by 13% (£2.4 million more) in national currency terms.
The largest contribution went to Iraq, receiving the equivalent of more than $6.4 million, and representing one-quarter of UK’s total funding.
As in 2016, the UK allocated most of its mine action support in 2017 for clearance and risk education activities.
In addition to financial support, the UK provided in-kind assistance valued at £3million ($3.9 million) to support clearance operations in Libya.[2]
Contributions by recipient: 2017[3]
Recipient |
Sector |
Amount (£) |
Amount (US$) |
Iraq |
Clearance and risk education |
5,000,000 |
6,445,000 |
Afghanistan |
Clearance and risk education |
3,444,946 |
4,440,535 |
Somalia |
Clearance |
2,709,059 |
3,491,977 |
Cambodia |
Clearance and risk education |
1,758,984 |
2,267,330 |
South Sudan |
Clearance and risk education |
1,614,908 |
2,081,616 |
Zimbabwe |
Clearance and risk education |
1,574,501 |
2,029,532 |
Yemen |
Clearance and risk education |
1,150,000 |
1,482,350 |
Ukraine |
Capacity-building |
1,000,000 |
1,289,000 |
Myanmar |
Clearance and risk education |
661,651 |
852,868 |
Sri Lanka |
Clearance and risk education |
602,843 |
777,065 |
Georgia |
Risk education |
490,000 |
631,610 |
Lao PDR |
Various |
476,277 |
613,921 |
Vietnam |
Clearance |
135,087 |
174,127 |
Azerbaijan |
Clearance and risk education |
105,000 |
135,345 |
Angola |
Clearance and risk education |
44,625 |
57,522 |
Total |
20,767,881 |
26,769,798 |
In 2013–2017, the UK’s contribution to mine action totaled more than £71 million ($103 million). In comparison, in the previous five-year period from 2008–2012, the UK support to mine action amounted to £60.5 million ($99.2 million).[4]
Summary of contributions: 2013–2017[5]
Year |
Amount (£) |
Amount ($) |
% change from previous year ($) |
2017 |
20,767,881 |
26,769,798 |
+7 |
2016 |
18,395,476 |
24,935,067 |
+62 |
2015 |
10,047,885 |
15,357,188 |
+17 |
2014 |
7,968,591 |
13,135,425 |
-42 |
2013 |
14,574,446 |
22,797,349 |
+4 |
Total |
71,754,279 |
102,994,827 |
In September 2018, the UK announced the provision of an additional £46 million (some $58 million) towards projects for demining, risk education, and capacity development in Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Vietnam.[6]
In April 2017, the UK announced a £100 million aid package (some US$126 million) to support landmine clearance and risk education projects over the next three years, which represents a tripling in its contribution to mine action.[7] In comparison from 2014–2016, the UK contributed a total of £36.4 million (US$53.4 million). This new funding will focus on countries “where the greatest numbers of people continue to suffer from landmine contamination…and where continued insecurity and instability pose an ongoing threat to UK interests.” The countries that will benefit from this support are: Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe.[8]
[1] Average exchange rate for 2017: £1=US$1.289. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 11 January 2018.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Convention on Cluster Munitions 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2018.
[4] See, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, “Country Profile: United Kingdom: Support for Mine Action,” 30 October 2013.
[5] See previous Monitor reports.
[6] Department for International Development, “UK aid will protect more than 820,000 people from threat of lethal landmines,” Press release, 6 September 2018. Exchange rate for 6 September 2018: £1=US$1.2933. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Weekly),” 10 September 2018.
[7] Department for International Development, “UK triples support for action against landmines on 20th anniversary of Princess Diana’s iconic Angola visit,” Press release, 4 April 2017. Average exchange rate for April 2017: £1=US$1.2639. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Monthly),” 3 July 2017.
[8] Statement of the UK, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Session on International Cooperation and Assistance, 9 June 2017.
Casualties and Victim Assistance
Casualties
In 2009, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor identified 76 British military casualties (all killed) in Afghanistan from improvised explosive devices (IEDs); based on information available it was not possible to determine how many of the casualties were caused by victim-activated devices.[1] No casualties from landmines or explosive remnants of war (ERW) were identified.[2] This compares to 33 British military casualties (all killed) in Afghanistan from IEDs and landmines in 2008.[3] With the limited data available, it is not possible to determine incidents specifically caused by victim-activated landmines, ERW, or IEDs. Total figures on British mine, ERW, and victim-activated IED casualties abroad were not available, though given military casualty statistics, it is likely that they number in the hundreds.[4] In 2009, non-governmental sources tracking casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq criticized the Ministry of Defence for the lack of transparency and accuracy in reporting British casualties.[5]
Victim Assistance
The total number of mine/ERW survivors in the United Kingdom is unknown, but the vast majority are thought to be disabled veterans who were injured on foreign soil and who receive compensation through the Armed Forces Compensation Scheme (AFCS). Other benefits to which military survivors claiming AFCS compensation may have been eligible (depending on the severity of their injuries) included income support, housing benefit, and free medical prescriptions, among others.[6]
[1] Icasualty.org, “Coalition deaths by Nationality,” updated 8 August 2010, icasualties.org. Most media reports seemed to refer to casualties from incidents involving command-detonated devices, such as roadside bombs, which are not included in Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor casualty totals.
[2] Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor media for calendar year 2009; and Icasualty.org, “Coalition deaths by Nationality,” updated 8 August 2010, icasualties.org. In addition, 157 British soldiers were seriously or very seriously injured in Afghanistan during this period, but no information was available as to the cause of these injuries. Ministry of Defence, “Afghanistan Casualty and Fatality Tables: 7 October 2001 to 31 July 2010,” updated 31 July 2010. In Iraq, one British soldier was killed and one was seriously injured; the causes of these casualties were unknown. Ministry of Defence, “Operation Telic Casualty and Fatality Tables: 1 January 2003 to 31 July 2009,” undated, www.mod.uk.
[3] There was insufficient information in the data available to determine how many, if any, of these casualties were caused by victim-activated versus command-detonated explosive devices. Another 65 British soldiers were seriously or very seriously injured in Afghanistan in 2008 though no details were available as to the cause of the injuries. Icasualty.org, “Coalition deaths by Nationality,” updated 8 August 2010, icasualties.org; and Ministry of Defence, “Afghanistan Casualty and Fatality Tables: 7 October 2001 to 31 July 2010,” updated to 31 July 2010, www.mod.uk.
[4] See previous editions of Landmine Monitor.
[5] Casualty Monitor, “Monitoring and analysis of data on civilian and military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan,” 10 February 2009, www.casualty-monitor.org.
[6] Ministry of Defence, “Table Of Wider Benefits Potentially Available To AFCS Claimants,” undated, www.mod.uk.