Zimbabwe

Mine Action

Last updated: 11 November 2018

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party
Article 5 deadline: 31 December 2025
On track to meet deadline

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

Mine action strategic plan

National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025

Mine action standards

National mine action standards

Operators in 2017

Armed Force’s National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS)
HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

61.79km2 CHA
Extent of contamination: heavy

Cluster munition remnants

None

Land release in 2017

Landmines

1.66km2 cleared, 2.79km2 reduced and 1.77km2 cancelled
1.8km2 confirmed as mined

Progress

Landmines

Zimbabwe’s national mine action strategy complements its revised Article 5 extension request that was approved at the Meeting of States Parties in December 2017

Note: CHA = confirmed hazardous area.

Contamination

At the end of 2017, the Republic of Zimbabwe had a total of less than 62km2 of confirmed mined area remaining (see table below).[1] This is a decrease from the 66km2 remaining at the end of 2016.[2] In June 2018, the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) informed Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that with continued progress in the first half of 2018, a total of just over 60.3km2 remained to be addressed.[3]

Mined areas (at end 2017)[4]

Location

Confirmed mined area (m2)

Musengezi to Mazowe
(formerly one area, Musengezi to Rwenya)

11,784,543

Mazowe to Rwenya
(formerly one area, Musengezi to Rwenya)

11,802,059

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3
(formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner)

16,508,588

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4
(formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner)

7,196,038

Rusitu to Muzite Mission

8,550,808

Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest

5,895,954

Lusulu

56,000

Total

61,793,990

 

Zimbabwe’s contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of antipersonnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonization. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian army.[5] Initially, antipersonnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometer of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire.” Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional fragmentation mines protected by antipersonnel mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire.[6] Antivehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.[7]

At the end of 2017, remaining contamination comprised five primary minefields, of which two were further divided into four areas for the purpose of tasking, identification, and reporting, making a total of seven minefields referred to by ZIMAC, as set out in table above above. All areas are confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and no suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remain to be addressed in Zimbabwe following the completion of significant re-survey in 2016.[8]

ZIMAC reports that antipersonnel mines continue to have a humanitarian as well as a socio-economic impact in 2017, most severely affecting poor, rural populations living along heavily mined border areas.[9] Mines continued to separate relatives living on both sides of minefields, deny use of agricultural land, kill and injure livestock and impede access for grazing, halt the productivity of areas of commercial farming, and impel some poor communities to take unacceptable risks to use contaminated land.[10] Accordingly, clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for local farmers, commercial agriculture, business, and tourism, allow for the construction of schools and clinics, and enable the safe return of those displaced as a result of the mine threat.[11]

Program Management

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ), under the Ministry of Defence, is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC reports to NAMAAZ.[12]

Since 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has provided assistance under a joint cooperation agreement with the government to the national program, training ZIMAC personnel, and supplying metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits.[13] This concluded in 2016, but the ICRC reported that in 2017 it provided support for the mine action authorities to enhance national ownership, delivered training on clearance, quality assurance and control, and information management, and made a financial contribution towards the launch of Zimbabwe’s new National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025. It stated that, as planned, the ICRC ended its support for support for mine action in the country at the end of 2017.[14]

In its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2017, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.[15] As of April 2018, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints.[16]

Strategic planning

The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, Zimbabwe’s first ever national mine action strategy and developed with the support of GICHD, was formally approved by the government in October 2017, presented at the Mine Ban Treaty 16th Meeting of States Parties in December 2017, and officially launched on 9 March 2018 by the vice president and minister of defence and war veterans affairs in a public event.[17] The strategy’s timeline corresponds to Zimbabwe’s revised fifth Article 5 deadline extension request with the overall goal of completing clearance in 2025.[18] In June 2018, ZIMAC reported that, together with NAMAAZ, efforts were ongoing to ensure that the plan was widely disseminated.[19] Gender and diversity considerations are also addressed in the strategy.[20]

Legislation and standards

There is no national legislation specific to mine action in Zimbabwe. In June 2018, ZIMAC reported that it had identified areas of Zimbabwe’s national mine action standards that required revision, including, but not limited to, standards for mine detection dogs (MDDs), mechanical assets, clearance depth, technical survey, and the cancellation of land already in use. It stated that standards for these areas would be considered during 2018, having previously reported that revisions would be made at the end of 2017.[21]

Information management

A Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) information management advisor held a workshop at the start of 2018 to ensure that the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was accurate and that ZIMAC personnel were able to retrieve all the information from it, with positive results.[22]

NPA additionally provided technical support to ZIMAC on information management during the year and assistance in data reconciliation.[23]

Operators

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS), HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA conduct land release in Zimbabwe. MAG became operational in December 2017, and APOPO, while accredited, was yet to commence operations as of September 2018.[24]

In 2017–2018, HALO Trust was assigned operations on the Musengezi to Mazowe minefield in Mashonaland Central, while MAG was assigned to the Mazowe to Rwenya minefield in Mashonaland East province (formerly one area, the Musengezi to Rwenya minebelt). Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3 was assigned to the NMCS and Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4 was assigned to APOPO (both in Masvingo province and formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner). Rusitu to Muzite Mission and Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest in Manicaland province remained assigned to NPA, and Lusulu, in Matabeleland North province to the NMCS.[25]

In 2017, HALO Trust deployed a total of 291 operations staff for clearance, with a further 83 support staff. Its capacity increased slightly in 2017 with the introduction of the program’s first mechanical demining team, while the number of its manual demining teams remained consistent at 28 as of the end of 2016.[26]

NPA reported that as a result of increased funding, at the start of 2017 its capacity increased from five manual clearance teams to seven, as well as one MDD team. This increased national demining personnel from a total of 56 in 2016 to 98.[27] It lost capacity, however, due to subsequent funding cuts during the year, and was down to three manual demining teams and one MDD team by January 2018.[28]

ZIMAC reported that the capacity of the NMCS increased from 120 deminers to 150, across 15 teams, thanks to equipment supplied by the ICRC in 2016. The NMCS also recruited two additional teams of 10 deminers each in March 2018 to deploy to the Lusulu minefield.[29]

In 2016, ZIMAC began accrediting MAG and APOPO, both of which were scheduled to begin operations in 2017.[30] In September 2017, MAG had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with ZIMAC and established an office in Harare ready to support the start of clearance operations later in the year.[31] MAG became operational in December 2017 and deployed one manual clearance team with 12 staff and one non-technical survey team with two staff.[32]

APOPO signed a MoU with ZIMAC, and the Ministry of Defence granted permission for it to begin operations in 2017. It was tasked, in cooperation with the NMCS, to survey and clear a 37km-long stretch of minefield along the border with Mozambique, running southwest from the Sango Border Post to the Mwenezi river. It stated that, as of May 2017, a task assessment had been carried out and that it expected to recruit and train approximately 25 national operations and support staff in the second half of 2018 to deploy in two manual demining sections.[33] However, despite its accreditation in 2017, APOPO failed to import its equipment from Mozambique in time to become operational. As of September 2018, APOPO was still waiting for both the equipment and sufficient funding to begin operations.[34]

While the majority of clearance in Zimbabwe continued to be manual in 2017, mechanical assets and the use of MDDs were in the process of being integrated into the national mine action program. As of mid-2018, however, the use of MDDs was limited to technical survey and clearance of soil with a high metallic content and the use of mechanical assets limited to clearance of areas with deeply buried mines and also areas with a high metallic content.[35]

Land Release

A total of just over 6.2km2 of land was reportedly released in 2017, with close to 4.5km2 of mined area released by clearance and technical survey and just under 1.8km2 cancelled by non-technical survey.[36] A further 1.8km2 was confirmed as mined. Results in 2017 compare to total release in 2016 of nearly 9.5km2.[37]

While clearance of antipersonnel mines remained steady in 2017, with just under 1.7km2 released through clearance, there was a major drop in cancellation output in 2017 of nearly 1.8km2 compared to close to 7.8km2 in 2016, due to the fact that comprehensive survey was finalized at the end of 2016. By 2017, Zimbabwe had a significantly more robust and realistic picture of verified contaminated area remaining, and therefore little survey or cancellation was carried out that year.[38]

Survey in 2017

Just over 4.5km2 of land was released by survey in 2017: 1,768,118m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey while 2,794,713m2 was reduced through technical survey. A further 1,782,579m2 was confirmed as mined.[39] In 2016, close to 7.8km2 of land was released (just under 6.3km2 cancelled, 1.5km2 reduced) with a further 9.8km2 confirmed as mined.[40]

As noted above, no major survey was conducted in 2017; instead only low-scale, pre-clearance re-surveys were carried out to confirm previous data of surveyed areas. In 2014–2016, a large amount of survey was undertaken, resulting in huge cancellation of land, and no new significant survey has been undertaken or required since and there ceased to be any cancellation of that magnitude. According to ZIMAC, the few areas of cancellation recorded in 2017 were a limited number of areas along the Mozambique border, which had been previously erroneously identified as cleared by the Mozambican mine action program or had since been put to use by locals.[41]

The additional areas reported as confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines in 2017, particularly in the NMCS’s areas of operations (see Table 2 below), were the result of the confirmation of a number of polygons that had been overlooked during previous survey and the subsequent enlargement of the recording of the size of these areas. These had not been accounted for in the results of the primary survey ending in 2016.[42]

HALO reported that its survey cancellation in 2018 was the result of non-technical re-survey of several tasks. It stated that the tasks themselves were not cancelled, but re-survey was done to be better able to identify the contaminated area, generally through reducing the estimates of the depth of lower-density ploughshare minefields by engaging with more members of the community and by tracking the location of mine rows on adjacent tasks.[43]

Mined area survey in 2017[44]

Operator

Area

Area cancelled (m²)

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

HALO

Musengezi to Mazowe

568,118

0

219,233

839,330

NPA

Muzite to Rusitu

0

0

0

83,190

NPA

Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest

0

0

0

802,308

NMCS

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3

1,200,000

0

1,548,946

1,069,885

APOPO*

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4

0

0

14,400

0

Total

 

1,768,118

0

1,782,579

2,794,713

Note: TS = Technical survey.
* While APOPO was not operational in 2017, the areas reported as confirmed in its assigned areas of operations occurred as a result of remapping and correction of grid points by ZIMAC.

Clearance in 2017

Clearance of antipersonnel mined area in 2017 was almost the same as in 2016. A total of 30,533 antipersonnel mines and one item of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were destroyed.[45] This represented an increase of 7,340 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2017 over the year before, potentially the result of improvements in the targeting of clearance.

Mine clearance in 2017[46]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

HALO (all areas of operations)

21

941,576

16,652

1

NPA (Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest)

5

583,650

13,446

0

NPA (Rusitu)

1

68,025

0

0

NMCS (Sango)

1

62,571

435

0

APOPO

0

0

0

0

MAG

0

39

0

0

Total

28

1,655,861

30,533

1

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

NPA reported that its increase in clearance output of more than 140,000m2 in 2017 compared with 2016 was due to funding that enabled an increase in the number of its manual demining teams from five to seven, and the introduction of an MDD team during the year. Productivity also improved from the agreement with ZIMAC to reduce clearance fade-out distances by five meters along the minebelts; to deploy MDDs as the main technical survey assets in the field; and an enhanced technical survey approach, under which the size of a standard technical survey search box doubled from 32 meters to 64, while processing requirements were reduced from 10% to 5%, enabling an increase in survey output.[47]

HALO reported a slight decrease in the total area cleared by its operations in 2016, though the number of mines destroyed was largely the same. More areas were processed in 2017 where, due to heavy soil disposition, many antipersonnel mines had sunk deep into the ground and were below metal-detector detection depth, necessitating a large increase in the number of slow “missing mine drills” that had to be conducted during clearance. These involved gaps in the minefield pattern being reinvestigated by excavating a top layer of soil and re-sweeping with a metal detector. The HALO Trust reported that the introduction of a mechanical demining team in 2017 was highly effective and that in areas of deeply buried mines, it was working six-times as quickly as a manual demining section.[48]

Deminer safety

ZIMAC reported that one member of the NMCS was injured by a R2M2 antipersonnel mine in the Limpopo to Sango Border minefield in 2017.[49]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is currently on track to meet this deadline.

Zimbabwe’s fifth extension request initially submitted in April 2017 and then revised in August, sought a final period of eight years through to 31 December 2025, setting a deadline for the completion of all clearance for the first time. The request was approved by at the 16th Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in December 2017.

Operators commended the cooperative and inclusive process behind the preparation of the extension request and the national mine action strategic plan, as well as efforts to accurately define the amount of contamination remaining, enabled by the application of solid survey methodology in earlier years.[50]

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted a fourth Article 5 clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Prior to that, since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it had submitted three previous extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The extension until 1 January 2018 was to enable further survey and clearance, but did not commit Zimbabwe to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period.[51]

In its latest extension request, Zimbabwe lists three primary factors that have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations thus far: the extent of the contamination, inadequate national funding for demining, and a lack of demining equipment. Positively, however, Zimbabwe reported that the impact of these factors was ameliorated by the completion of re-survey, allowing efforts to focus on clearance; by increasing partnerships between international operators and the government to build capacity; and by assistance from the ICRC for better demining equipment.[52] In the request, Zimbabwe also enumerated risks and assumptions that could impede it from completing clearance in due time, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, significant metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, and lack of funding.[53]

In June 2018, Zimbabwe informed States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that it had reassessed and revised its annual land release output figures in its extension request and National Mine Action Strategy on the basis of 2017 results and progress to date, versus expected future results. It stated that the adjustment was also in part the result of changes to surveyed polygons, particularly in the area of Rushinga, and the unexpected discovery of an extension of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield which occupied much of the NMCS’s capacity in 2017.[54] The revised figures were also reported in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in April 2018, and were not expected to affect its overall completion deadline projection of 2025.[55] The revised annual milestones to be achieved project that a total of 7.16kmwill be addressed in 2018; 8kmin 2019; 8.3km2 in 2020; 8.99km2 in 2021; 8.87km2i n 2022; 7.97km2 in 2023; 6.73km2 in 2024; and finally, 5.83km2 in 2025.[56]

ZIMAC reported that a total of 7,160,645m2 was set to be released across the country during 2018 and that remaining contamination was expected to drop to a total of 54.6km2. It expected positive developments during the year with an increase in national capacity, as it expected MAG to double its capacity by mid-2018, along with the two additional NMCS teams deployed to carry out demining on the Lusulu minefield, and with APOPO operational by the end of the year.[57]

In mid-2018, ZIMAC confirmed that Zimbabwe was on track to meet its targets under its Article 5 extension and affirmed that the revised workplan is highly achievable, provided that funding is secured from both the government and international donors.[58] ZIMAC reported that key priorities were securing funding for independent offices to house ZIMAC outside of its current location in a military cantonment, in order to enable freer interaction with all mine action stakeholders; purchase of additional demining equipment to better equip the NMCS, which it reported had significant human resources available but lacked equipment that could enable it to double its capacity; funding to conduct a comprehensive national victim survey; and information management and communication equipment, such as laptops, shared drives, and for the construction of a website.[59]

According to ZIMAC’s projections, a total of US$130.34 million is required to meet its Article 5 extension request clearance deadline by 2025, with on average close to US$16.3 million per year.[60]

HALO Trust reported it was expanding its mechanical demining operations in 2018, even if additional funding is not secured.[61] As of September 2018, MAG was deploying two additional teams and an expanded existing team, for a total of three teams in the field.[62]

NPA planned to deploy three manual demining teams in 2018, with two teams working in the Muzite to Rusitu minefield and one team in the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest minefield, each supported by the MDD team for technical survey. This is a decrease however from seven manual demining teams deployed in 2017, due to a significant cut in funding from the United States, which forced it to stop the work of four demining teams.[63]

In December 2017, during the 16th Meeting of States Parties, Zimbabwe and the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance convened an “Individualised Approach Platform” meeting, which ZIMAC reported enabled Zimbabwe to present its needs and challenges to international mine action stakeholders and donors. It hoped that on the basis of this meeting, additional assistance could be secured to fund its eight-year workplan.[64]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[2] Ibid., 4 July 2017.

[3] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[4] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.

[5] Mine Ban TreatyFourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 31 December 2013, p. 1; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.

[6] HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated; Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 31 December 2013; and Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.

[7] HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.

[9] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4. 


[12] Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7. 


[13] ICRC, “Zimbabwe: Living with the dread of an invisible enemy,” 29 November 2013.


[14] ICRC, “ICRC Annual Report 2017,” p. 229.

[15] Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 Extension Request (revised), 9 August 2017, p. 39.

[16] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form I.

[17] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[18] Ibid., 10 October 2017; and from Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 27 September 2017.

[19] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[20] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[21] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018, and 4 July 2017.

[22] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[23] Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.

[24] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018.

[25] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.

[26] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[27] Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[28] Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.

[29] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.

[30] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), p. 7; and interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, in Harare, 30 June 2016; and with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[31] Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[32] Ibid., 13 April 2018.

[33] Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Grant and Regional Manager, APOPO, 29 May 2017.

[34] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018; and emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018; and from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Director of Grants and Contracts, APOPO, 12 September 2018.

[35] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[36] Ibid.; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[37] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[38] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[39] Ibid.; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[40] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[41] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[42] Ibid., and 4 September 2018.

[43] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[44] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June and 4 September 2018; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[45] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018, and 4 July 2017; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[46] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018. HALO reported a total of 16,673 antipersonnel mines destroyed and stated that the item of UXO was not destroyed during mine clearance but as a spot task. According to Zimbabwe’s Article 7 report, four antivehicle mines were destroyed in Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest and two items of UXO in Musengezi to Mazowe minefield in 2017.

[47] Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 30 August 2018.

[48] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[49] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[50] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[51] Under its three-year extension until January 2018, Zimbabweundertook “to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit
a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.” Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6.

[52] Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 Extension Request (revised), 9 August 2017, pp. 8–9.

[53] Ibid., p. 41.

[54] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[55] Ibid.; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Annex A, “Revised Workplan for 2018–2025.”

[56] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Annex A, “Revised Workplan for 2018–2025.”

[57] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[61] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[62] Emails from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018; and from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018.

[63] Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.

[64] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form I.