Zimbabwe

Cluster Munition Ban Policy

Last updated: 02 August 2018

Summary: Non-signatory Zimbabwe has shown interest in the convention, but has not taken any steps towards accession. It is the only country to vote with Russia against an annual United Nations (UN) resolution promoting the convention, most recently in December 2017. Zimbabwe has participated as an observer in several meetings of the convention, but not since 2015.

Zimbabwe produced, exported, and imported cluster munitions in the past and is believed to stockpile them, but it is not clear if it ever used cluster munitions.

Policy

The Republic of Zimbabwe has not acceded to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Zimbabwe has shown interest in the convention, but has taken no steps to accede besides stakeholder consultations.[1]

Zimbabwe participated in two regional meetings held during the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitionsand expressed its support for a comprehensive ban without exceptions.[2] It was absent from the Dublin negotiations in May 2008 and the Oslo signing conference in December 2008.

Zimbabwe participated in the convention’s annual Meetings of States Parties in 2010–2013 and intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2012–2015. It was invited to, but did not attend, the convention’s Seventh Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2017. Zimbabwe has participated in regional workshops on the convention, most recently in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in August 2016.[3]

In December 2017, Zimbabwe and Russia were the only countries to vote against UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 72/54, which calls on states outside the Convention on Cluster Munitions to join “as soon as possible.”[4] Zimbabwe has not explained why it voted against this non-binding resolution or on previous UNGA resolutions promoting on the convention in 2016 and 2015.[5]

Zimbabwe is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

It is unclear if Zimbabwe has ever used cluster munitions.[6]

Jane’s Information Group has reported that the Alpha bomblet developed for the South African CB-470 cluster bomb was produced in Rhodesia and that “Zimbabwe may have quantities of the Alpha bomblet.”[7]

Zimbabwe is not known to have produced or exported cluster munitions since it gained independence in 1980, but it likely has a stockpile. In 2010, an official informed the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) that Zimbabwe still possessed cluster munitions that remained from the former Rhodesia’s arsenal.[8]

Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paolo reported in 2012 on declassified Ministry of Defense documents showing that Brazil transferred 104 BLG-250K and four BLG-60K cluster bombs and various components for BLG-500K, BLG-250K, and BLG-60K cluster bombs to Zimbabwe between January 2001 and May 2002.[9]

A copy of an official document obtained by Human Rights Watch in May 2018 indicates that Zimbabwe may have transferred Chilean-manufactured cluster munitions to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in or after July 2013.[10] The DRC signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 18 March 2009, but has not ratified. As a signatory, the DRC has committed not to take any action that runs contrary to the object and purpose of the convention such as importing or otherwise receiving cluster munitions.

Zimbabwe also possesses RM-70 and BM-21 122mm surface-to-surface rocket systems, but it is not known if these include versions with submunition payloads.[11]



[1] In May 2013, a government representative told a regional meeting that Zimbabwe is “seriously considering” accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions, but acknowledged the process toward joining the convention has been slow. Statement of Zimbabwe, LoméRegional Seminar on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lomé, Togo, 22 May 2013. The representative informed the CMC that consultations are continuing, but no decision has yet been made. CMC meeting with Mucheka Chameso, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Zimbabwe to the UN in Geneva, in Lomé, 22 May 2013. In May 2012, a government representative said Zimbabwe was conducting “consultations with relevant stakeholders on the country’s accession to the Convention on Cluster Munitions” that it hoped to soon conclude. Statement of Zimbabwe, Accra Regional Conference on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Accra, May 2012. In March 2010, Zimbabwe stated that “discussions are underway on the matter” of joining the convention. See, statement of Zimbabwe, Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Pretoria, 25 March 2010. Notes by Action on Armed Violence.

[2] For details on Zimbabwe’s policy and practice regarding cluster munitions through early 2009, see Human Rights Watch and Landmine Action, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice (Ottawa: Mines Action Canada, May 2009), pp. 262–263.

[3] “The Addis Ababa Commitment on Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” Africa Regional Workshop on the Universalization of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, 5 August 2016.

[4] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 72/54, 4 December 2017.

[5] “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 71/45, 5 December 2016; and “Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions,” UNGA Resolution 70/54, 7 December 2015.

[6] Zimbabwe has not made a statement regarding possible past use. One source has said Zimbabwean and/or Congolese aircraft dropped cluster bombs in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1998. Tom Cooper and Pit Weinert, “Zaire/DR Congo since 1980,” Air Combat Information Group, 2 September 2003.

[7] Robert Hewson, ed., Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, Issue 44 (Surrey, UK: Jane’s Information Group Limited, 2004), p. 440.

[8] CMC meeting with Mucheka Chameso, Permanent Mission of Zimbabwe to the UN in Geneva, Africa Regional Conference on the Universalization and Implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, in Pretoria, 25–26 March 2010. Notes by the CMC.

[9] Rubens Valente, “Brasil vendeu bombas condenadas a ditador do Zimbábue,” Folha de São Paolo, 22 July 2012.

[10] A “packing list” dated 3 July 2013 and issued on the letterhead of Zimbabwe Defence Industries Ltd is addressed to the National Army of the DRC. The list of various weapons includes three crates or pallets of cluster bombs, one weighing 350kg and two weighing 150kg each. According to the document, a manual for CB-250K cluster bombs was also provided. It is unclear if complete cluster bombs were provided or components. Chile produced and transferred CB-250K cluster bombs prior signing the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions.

[11] International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011 (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 449.


Mine Ban Policy

Last updated: 02 November 2011

Policy

The Republic of Zimbabwe signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997 and ratified on 18 June 1998, becoming a State Party on 1 March 1999. In January 2001, Zimbabwe enacted the Anti-Personnel Mines (Prohibition) Act 2000, which incorporates the treaty into Zimbabwe’s domestic law.[1]

Zimbabwe has provided its views on matters of interpretation and implementation related to Articles 1, 2, and 3. In May 2006, it stated that in joint military operations Zimbabwean forces will not assist or participate in planning and implementation of activities related to the use of antipersonnel mines. It said that the Mine Ban Treaty “clearly bans” foreign stockpiling and transit of antipersonnel mines, and also prohibits antivehicle mines with sensitive antihandling devices or sensitive fuzes that can function as antipersonnel mines. Finally, it said that the number of mines States Parties chose to retain should only be in the hundreds or thousands and not tens of thousands.[2]

Zimbabwe submitted its 10th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report in December 2010, covering calendar year 2010.[3]

Zimbabwe attended the Tenth Meeting of States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty in Geneva in November–December 2010, as well as the intersessional Standing Committee meetings in June 2011.

Zimbabwe is not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.  

Production, Transfer, Stockpile Destruction, and Retention

The government maintains that there has been no mine production since independence.[4] Previously, government and other sources indicated that Zimbabwe was a past producer and exporter of antipersonnel mines, but not on a significant scale.[5] On 15 November 2000, Zimbabwe destroyed its stockpile of 4,092 antipersonnel mines.[6]  At the time, it decided to retain 700 mines for training and development purposes (500 PMD-6 and 200 R2M2).[7]

In its Article 7 report for 2010, Zimbabwe reported 550 mines retained for training purposes (400 PMD-6 and 150 R2M2).[8] During calendar year 2010, Zimbabwe destroyed 20 R2M2 during “training of deminers.”[9] However, it appears that the number of mines retained for Zimbabwe should be 530 mines, since it reported 550 mines retained for training in its report covering calendar year 2008.[10]

Zimbabwe has acknowledged that it also stockpiles Claymore-type devices, but without tripwire fuzes because Zimbabwe considers these illegal under the Mine Ban Treaty.[11]

 



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form A, 1 December 2003. The ICBL expressed concern about a provision in the act relating to joint military operations with a country not party to the Mine Ban Treaty; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2001, p. 176.

[2] “Response to LM Draft Report for Zimbabwe,” from Col. J. Munongwa, former Director, ZIMAC, 30 May 2006; and see Landmine Monitor Report 2006, pp. 810–811, for more details.

[3] Zimbabwe previously submitted Article 7 reports in December 2008, December 2007, on 5 December 2006, 5 December 2005, 8 July 2005, 1 December 2003, 13 February 2003, 4 April 2001, and 11 January 2000.

[4] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form E, December 2006.

[5] Earlier statements by Zimbabwe government sources and others indicated that production of two types of Claymore mines, the Z1 and ZAPS, ended when Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, while production of PloughShare mines was stopped between 1990 and 1993. For more information on past production and export, see Landmine Monitor Report 1999, pp. 97–99.

[6] Zimbabwe destroyed 3,846 PMD-6 mines and 246 R2M2 mines. Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, 8 July 2005.

[7] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form D, 4 April 2001.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for period January 2010 to December 2010), Form D.

[9] Ibid, Form B.

[10] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report, Form B, December 2008.

[11] Interview with Col. J. Munongwa, ZIMAC, in Geneva, 4 February 2003.


Mine Action

Last updated: 11 November 2018

Treaty status

Mine Ban Treaty

State Party
Article 5 deadline: 31 December 2025
On track to meet deadline

Mine action management

National mine action management actors

National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ)
Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

Mine action strategic plan

National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025

Mine action standards

National mine action standards

Operators in 2017

Armed Force’s National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS)
HALO Trust
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)

Extent of contamination as of end 2017

Landmines

61.79km2 CHA
Extent of contamination: heavy

Cluster munition remnants

None

Land release in 2017

Landmines

1.66km2 cleared, 2.79km2 reduced and 1.77km2 cancelled
1.8km2 confirmed as mined

Progress

Landmines

Zimbabwe’s national mine action strategy complements its revised Article 5 extension request that was approved at the Meeting of States Parties in December 2017

Note: CHA = confirmed hazardous area.

Contamination

At the end of 2017, the Republic of Zimbabwe had a total of less than 62km2 of confirmed mined area remaining (see table below).[1] This is a decrease from the 66km2 remaining at the end of 2016.[2] In June 2018, the Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) informed Mine Ban Treaty States Parties that with continued progress in the first half of 2018, a total of just over 60.3km2 remained to be addressed.[3]

Mined areas (at end 2017)[4]

Location

Confirmed mined area (m2)

Musengezi to Mazowe
(formerly one area, Musengezi to Rwenya)

11,784,543

Mazowe to Rwenya
(formerly one area, Musengezi to Rwenya)

11,802,059

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3
(formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner)

16,508,588

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4
(formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner)

7,196,038

Rusitu to Muzite Mission

8,550,808

Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest

5,895,954

Lusulu

56,000

Total

61,793,990

 

Zimbabwe’s contamination, the overwhelming majority of which is of antipersonnel mines, originates from the laying of minefields in the late 1970s during a conflict of decolonization. At the time of its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe was left with seven major mined areas along its borders with Mozambique and Zambia, and one inland minefield laid by the Rhodesian army.[5] Initially, antipersonnel mines were laid in very dense belts (reportedly 5,500 mines per kilometer of frontage) to form a “cordon sanitaire.” Over time, this cordon sanitaire was breached or subject to erosion. In response, in many sections, a second belt of “ploughshare” directional fragmentation mines protected by antipersonnel mines was laid “inland” of the cordon sanitaire.[6] Antivehicle mines were used extensively by insurgents but most were detonated by vehicles or have since been cleared.[7]

At the end of 2017, remaining contamination comprised five primary minefields, of which two were further divided into four areas for the purpose of tasking, identification, and reporting, making a total of seven minefields referred to by ZIMAC, as set out in table above above. All areas are confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and no suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) remain to be addressed in Zimbabwe following the completion of significant re-survey in 2016.[8]

ZIMAC reports that antipersonnel mines continue to have a humanitarian as well as a socio-economic impact in 2017, most severely affecting poor, rural populations living along heavily mined border areas.[9] Mines continued to separate relatives living on both sides of minefields, deny use of agricultural land, kill and injure livestock and impede access for grazing, halt the productivity of areas of commercial farming, and impel some poor communities to take unacceptable risks to use contaminated land.[10] Accordingly, clearance of mined areas will generate opportunities for local farmers, commercial agriculture, business, and tourism, allow for the construction of schools and clinics, and enable the safe return of those displaced as a result of the mine threat.[11]

Program Management

The National Mine Action Authority of Zimbabwe (NAMAAZ), under the Ministry of Defence, is a policy and regulatory body on all issues relating to mine action in Zimbabwe. ZIMAC reports to NAMAAZ.[12]

Since 2012, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has provided assistance under a joint cooperation agreement with the government to the national program, training ZIMAC personnel, and supplying metal detectors, protective equipment, and trauma kits.[13] This concluded in 2016, but the ICRC reported that in 2017 it provided support for the mine action authorities to enhance national ownership, delivered training on clearance, quality assurance and control, and information management, and made a financial contribution towards the launch of Zimbabwe’s new National Mine Action Strategy for 2018–2025. It stated that, as planned, the ICRC ended its support for support for mine action in the country at the end of 2017.[14]

In its fifth Article 5 deadline extension request, submitted in 2017, Zimbabwe again pledged to relocate ZIMAC outside of military installations once the Ministry of Defence has secured the necessary funds.[15] As of April 2018, ZIMAC was still housed within military premises, reportedly owing to budgetary constraints.[16]

Strategic planning

The National Mine Action Strategy 2018–2025, Zimbabwe’s first ever national mine action strategy and developed with the support of GICHD, was formally approved by the government in October 2017, presented at the Mine Ban Treaty 16th Meeting of States Parties in December 2017, and officially launched on 9 March 2018 by the vice president and minister of defence and war veterans affairs in a public event.[17] The strategy’s timeline corresponds to Zimbabwe’s revised fifth Article 5 deadline extension request with the overall goal of completing clearance in 2025.[18] In June 2018, ZIMAC reported that, together with NAMAAZ, efforts were ongoing to ensure that the plan was widely disseminated.[19] Gender and diversity considerations are also addressed in the strategy.[20]

Legislation and standards

There is no national legislation specific to mine action in Zimbabwe. In June 2018, ZIMAC reported that it had identified areas of Zimbabwe’s national mine action standards that required revision, including, but not limited to, standards for mine detection dogs (MDDs), mechanical assets, clearance depth, technical survey, and the cancellation of land already in use. It stated that standards for these areas would be considered during 2018, having previously reported that revisions would be made at the end of 2017.[21]

Information management

A Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) information management advisor held a workshop at the start of 2018 to ensure that the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database was accurate and that ZIMAC personnel were able to retrieve all the information from it, with positive results.[22]

NPA additionally provided technical support to ZIMAC on information management during the year and assistance in data reconciliation.[23]

Operators

The Zimbabwean Armed Forces’ National Mine Clearance Squadrons (NMCS), HALO Trust, MAG, and NPA conduct land release in Zimbabwe. MAG became operational in December 2017, and APOPO, while accredited, was yet to commence operations as of September 2018.[24]

In 2017–2018, HALO Trust was assigned operations on the Musengezi to Mazowe minefield in Mashonaland Central, while MAG was assigned to the Mazowe to Rwenya minefield in Mashonaland East province (formerly one area, the Musengezi to Rwenya minebelt). Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3 was assigned to the NMCS and Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4 was assigned to APOPO (both in Masvingo province and formerly one area, Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner). Rusitu to Muzite Mission and Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest in Manicaland province remained assigned to NPA, and Lusulu, in Matabeleland North province to the NMCS.[25]

In 2017, HALO Trust deployed a total of 291 operations staff for clearance, with a further 83 support staff. Its capacity increased slightly in 2017 with the introduction of the program’s first mechanical demining team, while the number of its manual demining teams remained consistent at 28 as of the end of 2016.[26]

NPA reported that as a result of increased funding, at the start of 2017 its capacity increased from five manual clearance teams to seven, as well as one MDD team. This increased national demining personnel from a total of 56 in 2016 to 98.[27] It lost capacity, however, due to subsequent funding cuts during the year, and was down to three manual demining teams and one MDD team by January 2018.[28]

ZIMAC reported that the capacity of the NMCS increased from 120 deminers to 150, across 15 teams, thanks to equipment supplied by the ICRC in 2016. The NMCS also recruited two additional teams of 10 deminers each in March 2018 to deploy to the Lusulu minefield.[29]

In 2016, ZIMAC began accrediting MAG and APOPO, both of which were scheduled to begin operations in 2017.[30] In September 2017, MAG had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with ZIMAC and established an office in Harare ready to support the start of clearance operations later in the year.[31] MAG became operational in December 2017 and deployed one manual clearance team with 12 staff and one non-technical survey team with two staff.[32]

APOPO signed a MoU with ZIMAC, and the Ministry of Defence granted permission for it to begin operations in 2017. It was tasked, in cooperation with the NMCS, to survey and clear a 37km-long stretch of minefield along the border with Mozambique, running southwest from the Sango Border Post to the Mwenezi river. It stated that, as of May 2017, a task assessment had been carried out and that it expected to recruit and train approximately 25 national operations and support staff in the second half of 2018 to deploy in two manual demining sections.[33] However, despite its accreditation in 2017, APOPO failed to import its equipment from Mozambique in time to become operational. As of September 2018, APOPO was still waiting for both the equipment and sufficient funding to begin operations.[34]

While the majority of clearance in Zimbabwe continued to be manual in 2017, mechanical assets and the use of MDDs were in the process of being integrated into the national mine action program. As of mid-2018, however, the use of MDDs was limited to technical survey and clearance of soil with a high metallic content and the use of mechanical assets limited to clearance of areas with deeply buried mines and also areas with a high metallic content.[35]

Land Release

A total of just over 6.2km2 of land was reportedly released in 2017, with close to 4.5km2 of mined area released by clearance and technical survey and just under 1.8km2 cancelled by non-technical survey.[36] A further 1.8km2 was confirmed as mined. Results in 2017 compare to total release in 2016 of nearly 9.5km2.[37]

While clearance of antipersonnel mines remained steady in 2017, with just under 1.7km2 released through clearance, there was a major drop in cancellation output in 2017 of nearly 1.8km2 compared to close to 7.8km2 in 2016, due to the fact that comprehensive survey was finalized at the end of 2016. By 2017, Zimbabwe had a significantly more robust and realistic picture of verified contaminated area remaining, and therefore little survey or cancellation was carried out that year.[38]

Survey in 2017

Just over 4.5km2 of land was released by survey in 2017: 1,768,118m2 was cancelled through non-technical survey while 2,794,713m2 was reduced through technical survey. A further 1,782,579m2 was confirmed as mined.[39] In 2016, close to 7.8km2 of land was released (just under 6.3km2 cancelled, 1.5km2 reduced) with a further 9.8km2 confirmed as mined.[40]

As noted above, no major survey was conducted in 2017; instead only low-scale, pre-clearance re-surveys were carried out to confirm previous data of surveyed areas. In 2014–2016, a large amount of survey was undertaken, resulting in huge cancellation of land, and no new significant survey has been undertaken or required since and there ceased to be any cancellation of that magnitude. According to ZIMAC, the few areas of cancellation recorded in 2017 were a limited number of areas along the Mozambique border, which had been previously erroneously identified as cleared by the Mozambican mine action program or had since been put to use by locals.[41]

The additional areas reported as confirmed to contain antipersonnel mines in 2017, particularly in the NMCS’s areas of operations (see Table 2 below), were the result of the confirmation of a number of polygons that had been overlooked during previous survey and the subsequent enlargement of the recording of the size of these areas. These had not been accounted for in the results of the primary survey ending in 2016.[42]

HALO reported that its survey cancellation in 2018 was the result of non-technical re-survey of several tasks. It stated that the tasks themselves were not cancelled, but re-survey was done to be better able to identify the contaminated area, generally through reducing the estimates of the depth of lower-density ploughshare minefields by engaging with more members of the community and by tracking the location of mine rows on adjacent tasks.[43]

Mined area survey in 2017[44]

Operator

Area

Area cancelled (m²)

Areas confirmed

Area confirmed (m²)

Area reduced by TS (m2)

HALO

Musengezi to Mazowe

568,118

0

219,233

839,330

NPA

Muzite to Rusitu

0

0

0

83,190

NPA

Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest

0

0

0

802,308

NMCS

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 3

1,200,000

0

1,548,946

1,069,885

APOPO*

Mwenezi to Sango Border Post Sector 4

0

0

14,400

0

Total

 

1,768,118

0

1,782,579

2,794,713

Note: TS = Technical survey.
* While APOPO was not operational in 2017, the areas reported as confirmed in its assigned areas of operations occurred as a result of remapping and correction of grid points by ZIMAC.

Clearance in 2017

Clearance of antipersonnel mined area in 2017 was almost the same as in 2016. A total of 30,533 antipersonnel mines and one item of unexploded ordnance (UXO) were destroyed.[45] This represented an increase of 7,340 antipersonnel mines destroyed in 2017 over the year before, potentially the result of improvements in the targeting of clearance.

Mine clearance in 2017[46]

Operator

Areas cleared

Area cleared (m²)

AP mines destroyed

UXO destroyed

HALO (all areas of operations)

21

941,576

16,652

1

NPA (Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest)

5

583,650

13,446

0

NPA (Rusitu)

1

68,025

0

0

NMCS (Sango)

1

62,571

435

0

APOPO

0

0

0

0

MAG

0

39

0

0

Total

28

1,655,861

30,533

1

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.

NPA reported that its increase in clearance output of more than 140,000m2 in 2017 compared with 2016 was due to funding that enabled an increase in the number of its manual demining teams from five to seven, and the introduction of an MDD team during the year. Productivity also improved from the agreement with ZIMAC to reduce clearance fade-out distances by five meters along the minebelts; to deploy MDDs as the main technical survey assets in the field; and an enhanced technical survey approach, under which the size of a standard technical survey search box doubled from 32 meters to 64, while processing requirements were reduced from 10% to 5%, enabling an increase in survey output.[47]

HALO reported a slight decrease in the total area cleared by its operations in 2016, though the number of mines destroyed was largely the same. More areas were processed in 2017 where, due to heavy soil disposition, many antipersonnel mines had sunk deep into the ground and were below metal-detector detection depth, necessitating a large increase in the number of slow “missing mine drills” that had to be conducted during clearance. These involved gaps in the minefield pattern being reinvestigated by excavating a top layer of soil and re-sweeping with a metal detector. The HALO Trust reported that the introduction of a mechanical demining team in 2017 was highly effective and that in areas of deeply buried mines, it was working six-times as quickly as a manual demining section.[48]

Deminer safety

ZIMAC reported that one member of the NMCS was injured by a R2M2 antipersonnel mine in the Limpopo to Sango Border minefield in 2017.[49]

Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the eight-year extension granted in 2017), Zimbabwe is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 31 December 2025. It is currently on track to meet this deadline.

Zimbabwe’s fifth extension request initially submitted in April 2017 and then revised in August, sought a final period of eight years through to 31 December 2025, setting a deadline for the completion of all clearance for the first time. The request was approved by at the 16th Meeting of States Parties in Vienna in December 2017.

Operators commended the cooperative and inclusive process behind the preparation of the extension request and the national mine action strategic plan, as well as efforts to accurately define the amount of contamination remaining, enabled by the application of solid survey methodology in earlier years.[50]

In June 2014, Zimbabwe was granted a fourth Article 5 clearance deadline extension of three years until 1 January 2018. Prior to that, since its initial Article 5 deadline expired on 1 March 2009, it had submitted three previous extension requests, the last of which expired on 1 January 2015. The extension until 1 January 2018 was to enable further survey and clearance, but did not commit Zimbabwe to complete its clearance obligations within the requested period.[51]

In its latest extension request, Zimbabwe lists three primary factors that have prevented it from completing its Article 5 obligations thus far: the extent of the contamination, inadequate national funding for demining, and a lack of demining equipment. Positively, however, Zimbabwe reported that the impact of these factors was ameliorated by the completion of re-survey, allowing efforts to focus on clearance; by increasing partnerships between international operators and the government to build capacity; and by assistance from the ICRC for better demining equipment.[52] In the request, Zimbabwe also enumerated risks and assumptions that could impede it from completing clearance in due time, including heavy rain, difficult terrain, significant metal contamination in ploughshare minefields, and lack of funding.[53]

In June 2018, Zimbabwe informed States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty that it had reassessed and revised its annual land release output figures in its extension request and National Mine Action Strategy on the basis of 2017 results and progress to date, versus expected future results. It stated that the adjustment was also in part the result of changes to surveyed polygons, particularly in the area of Rushinga, and the unexpected discovery of an extension of the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner minefield which occupied much of the NMCS’s capacity in 2017.[54] The revised figures were also reported in its Article 7 transparency report submitted in April 2018, and were not expected to affect its overall completion deadline projection of 2025.[55] The revised annual milestones to be achieved project that a total of 7.16kmwill be addressed in 2018; 8kmin 2019; 8.3km2 in 2020; 8.99km2 in 2021; 8.87km2i n 2022; 7.97km2 in 2023; 6.73km2 in 2024; and finally, 5.83km2 in 2025.[56]

ZIMAC reported that a total of 7,160,645m2 was set to be released across the country during 2018 and that remaining contamination was expected to drop to a total of 54.6km2. It expected positive developments during the year with an increase in national capacity, as it expected MAG to double its capacity by mid-2018, along with the two additional NMCS teams deployed to carry out demining on the Lusulu minefield, and with APOPO operational by the end of the year.[57]

In mid-2018, ZIMAC confirmed that Zimbabwe was on track to meet its targets under its Article 5 extension and affirmed that the revised workplan is highly achievable, provided that funding is secured from both the government and international donors.[58] ZIMAC reported that key priorities were securing funding for independent offices to house ZIMAC outside of its current location in a military cantonment, in order to enable freer interaction with all mine action stakeholders; purchase of additional demining equipment to better equip the NMCS, which it reported had significant human resources available but lacked equipment that could enable it to double its capacity; funding to conduct a comprehensive national victim survey; and information management and communication equipment, such as laptops, shared drives, and for the construction of a website.[59]

According to ZIMAC’s projections, a total of US$130.34 million is required to meet its Article 5 extension request clearance deadline by 2025, with on average close to US$16.3 million per year.[60]

HALO Trust reported it was expanding its mechanical demining operations in 2018, even if additional funding is not secured.[61] As of September 2018, MAG was deploying two additional teams and an expanded existing team, for a total of three teams in the field.[62]

NPA planned to deploy three manual demining teams in 2018, with two teams working in the Muzite to Rusitu minefield and one team in the Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest minefield, each supported by the MDD team for technical survey. This is a decrease however from seven manual demining teams deployed in 2017, due to a significant cut in funding from the United States, which forced it to stop the work of four demining teams.[63]

In December 2017, during the 16th Meeting of States Parties, Zimbabwe and the Committee on the Enhancement of Cooperation and Assistance convened an “Individualised Approach Platform” meeting, which ZIMAC reported enabled Zimbabwe to present its needs and challenges to international mine action stakeholders and donors. It hoped that on the basis of this meeting, additional assistance could be secured to fund its eight-year workplan.[64]

 

 

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from“Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.



[1] Email from Capt. Cainos Tamanikwa, Operations Coordinator, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[2] Ibid., 4 July 2017.

[3] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[4] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.

[5] Mine Ban TreatyFourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 31 December 2013, p. 1; and email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 10 October 2017.

[6] HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated; Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Executive Summary, 31 December 2013; and Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, submitted by the President of the 13th Meeting of States Parties on behalf of the States Parties mandated to analyse requests for extensions, 18 June 2014, p. 3.

[7] HALO Trust, “Zimbabwe, History of Minelaying,” undated.

[8] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.

[9] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Analysis of Zimbabwe’s Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 18 June 2014, pp. 2–4. 


[12] Mine Ban Treaty Fourth Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, p. 7. 


[13] ICRC, “Zimbabwe: Living with the dread of an invisible enemy,” 29 November 2013.


[14] ICRC, “ICRC Annual Report 2017,” p. 229.

[15] Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 Extension Request (revised), 9 August 2017, p. 39.

[16] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form I.

[17] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[18] Ibid., 10 October 2017; and from Åsa Massleberg, GICHD, 27 September 2017.

[19] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[20] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[21] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018, and 4 July 2017.

[22] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[23] Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.

[24] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018.

[25] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form D.

[26] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[27] Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[28] Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.

[29] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017.

[30] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2015), p. 7; and interviews with Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, in Harare, 30 June 2016; and with Claus Nielsen, NPA, in Mutare, 2 July 2016.

[31] Email from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 29 September 2017.

[32] Ibid., 13 April 2018.

[33] Email from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Grant and Regional Manager, APOPO, 29 May 2017.

[34] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018; and emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018; and from Ashley Fitzpatrick, Director of Grants and Contracts, APOPO, 12 September 2018.

[35] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[36] Ibid.; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[37] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[38] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[39] Ibid.; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[40] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 July 2017; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[41] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[42] Ibid., and 4 September 2018.

[43] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[44] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June and 4 September 2018; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[45] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018, and 4 July 2017; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018.

[46] Emails from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018; from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 27 August 2018; from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018; and from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018. HALO reported a total of 16,673 antipersonnel mines destroyed and stated that the item of UXO was not destroyed during mine clearance but as a spot task. According to Zimbabwe’s Article 7 report, four antivehicle mines were destroyed in Leacon Hill to Sheba Forest and two items of UXO in Musengezi to Mazowe minefield in 2017.

[47] Emails from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February and 30 August 2018.

[48] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[49] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[50] Emails from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 24 April 2017; and from Claus Nielsen, NPA, 31 March 2017.

[51] Under its three-year extension until January 2018, Zimbabweundertook “to clarify the remaining challenge, understand what progress will be possible once partners operate at full capacity and once additional support has been identified, produce a detailed plan, and submit
a subsequent request for fulfilment of its Article 5 obligations.” Decision on Zimbabwe’s Article 5 deadline Extension Request, Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference, Maputo, 26 June 2014; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, 31 December 2013, pp. 5–6.

[52] Mine Ban Treaty Fifth Article 5 Extension Request (revised), 9 August 2017, pp. 8–9.

[53] Ibid., p. 41.

[54] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[55] Ibid.; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Annex A, “Revised Workplan for 2018–2025.”

[56] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Annex A, “Revised Workplan for 2018–2025.”

[57] Email from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 12 June 2018.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

[60] Statement of Zimbabwe, Mine Ban Treaty Intersessional Meetings, Geneva, 8 June 2018.

[61] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 22 February 2018.

[62] Emails from Adam Komorowski, MAG, 13 April 2018; and from Capt. Tamanikwa, ZIMAC, 4 September 2018.

[63] Email from Chimwemwe Tembo, NPA, 13 February 2018.

[64] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2017), Form I.


Support for Mine Action

Last updated: 19 November 2018

In 2017, five donors contributed US$5.6 million toward clearance operations in the Republic of Zimbabwe, 14% more than in 2016.[1] All funds were allocated to clearance and risk education activities.

International contributions: 2017[2]

Donor

Sector

Amount (national currency)

Amount (US$)

United Kingdom

Clearance and risk education

£1,574,501

2,029,532

United States

Clearance and risk education

$1,500,000

1,500,000

Norway

Clearance

NOK11,137,000

1,347,017

Japan

Clearance

¥71,138,324

634,597

Ireland

Clearance and risk education

€70,000

79,107

Total

   

5,590,253

During 2013–2017, the government of Zimbabwe contributed nearly $3 million to its mine action program, or 12% of its total mine action budget.[3] International contributions have totaled more than $20 million.

In December 2013, Zimbabwe submitted its fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, in which it estimated a total of $12,965,125 would be needed to clear some 4km2 between 2015 and January 2018, of which $2.9 million would be provided by Zimbabwe. The remaining $10 million would need to be sought from other sources, which implies that Zimbabwe’s capacity to address its mine contamination largely depends on adequate and steady international funding.[4]

Summary of contributions: 2013–2017[5]

Year

National contributions (US$)

International contributions (US$)

Total contributions (US$)

2017

500,000

5,590,253

6,090,253

2016

500,000

4,903,865

5,403,865

2015

500,000

3,194,625

3,694,625

2014

500,000

4,209,173

4,709,173

2013

800,000

2,261,847

3,061,847

Total

2,800,000

20,159,763

22,959,763

 



[1] Emails from Leah Murphy, Desk Officer, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Section, Ireland Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 25 September 2018; from Ingrid Schoyen, Senior Adviser, Section for Humanitarian Affairs, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 31 May 2017; and from Katherine Baker, Foreign Affairs Officer, Weapons Removal and Abatement, United States (US) Department of State, 9 and 24 October 2018; Japan, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2018; United Kingdom, Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 Report, Form I, 30 April 2018.

[2] Average exchange rate for 2017: €1=US$1.1301; NOK8.2679=US$1; £1.289=US$1; ¥112.1=US$1. US Federal Reserve, “List of Exchange Rates (Annual),” 11January 2018.

[3] Zimbabwe, Fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, December 2013; and Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Reports, April 2017 and 2018.

[4] Zimbabwe’s Fourth Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline Extension Request, December 2013.

[5] See previous Monitor reports.


Casualties

Last updated: 04 January 2017

Casualties Overview

All known casualties by end 2016

1,615 mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) casualties

Casualties in 2016

5 (2015: 8)

2016 casualties by outcome

4 injured; 1 unknown (2015: 1 killed; 7 injured)

2016 casualties by device type

Unknown

 

In 2016, the Monitor identified five landmine/ERW casualties in the Republic of Zimbabwe. Two were boys, both injured, a third was an adult male whose survival outcome was unknown, and two were deminers injured in the course of their work. The boys were injured while tampering or playing with an explosive resulting in the loss of one’s hand and fragmentation injuries to the other. The adult was injured while herding cattle. Of the two deminers, one suffered only minor injuries while the other lost a finger and sustained other injuries to his arms.[1]

Five casualties represent the lowest number reported since the Monitor began casualty tracking. The Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC) attributes this reduction to the success of mine risk education activities and minefield marking programs.[2] However, the only casualty reporting mechanism in Zimbabwe comes from the two international operators, the HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), which are working in a limited area along the northeastern border of Zimbabwe. No casualties were reported from the Rushitu to Muzite Mission minefield on the eastern border or the Sango Border Post to Crooks Corner Minefield on the southern border. Had casualties occurred in either of those minefields, it is not clear if those casualties would have been reported to ZIMAC.

Since 1980, 1,615 casualties have been reported in Zimbabwe.

Cluster munition casualties

There have been at least three cluster munition casualties in Zimbabwe, dating to the period of the 1970s liberation war. In an incident documented by a former Rhodesian soldier in his memoirs, two children were killed and a third injured when they found an unexploded bomblet and threw it against a large rock.[3]



[1] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report for calendar year 2016, Form J; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Col. Ncube, ZIMAC, 4 October 2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] PJH Petter-Bowyer, Winds of Destruction: The autobiography of a Rhodesian born pilot covering the Rhodesian bush war of 1967–1980 (Trafford Publishing: 2003).


Victim Assistance

Last updated: 09 October 2017

Action points based on findings

  • Expand casualty data collection to all areas affected by landmines and all organizations working in mine action.
  • Disability policies should be updated and aligned with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).
  • Ensure sustainability of prosthetic and orthotic services.
  • Provide economic inclusion opportunities for survivors and persons with disabilities.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Zimbabwe is responsible for a significant number of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors who are in need. Zimbabwe has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty.

Victim assistance since 2015

In 2015, support from the Norwegian government concluded but other stakeholders have stepped in to deliver wheelchairs and other mobility devices to support the Local Rehabilitation Workshop (LOREWO) based near the Mpilo referral hospital in Bulawayo.[1] The ICRC Special Fund for the Disabled (SFD) provided support to the Parirenyatwa group of hospitals until 2013 when the SFD ended support, as expected, as part of the ICRC SFD phase out, believing that they had reached a satisfactory level of autonomy.[2] ICRC SFD assistance to the Bulawayo Rehabilitation Center had been phased out by the end of 2012, as planned.[3]

Disability issues are coordinated by the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, while emergency assistance is led by the Victim Friendly Unit. Responsibility for surveying survivors needs and other assistance to mine/ERW survivors is centralized through the national mine action center, ZIMAC.[4]

Victim assistance in 2016

Assessing victim assistance needs

No systematic victim assistance needs assessment was conducted in 2016. Casualty data and the individual needs of survivors are collected and reported to ZIMAC by the international operators, HALO Trust and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). HALO and NPA, with the support of the United States (US) Department of State, identify survivors in their working areas, and conduct individual assessments.[5] In 2016, HALO assessed the needs of fewer survivors than in 2015.[6]

ZIMAC communicates all reported landmine casualties to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare for inclusion in the database of all persons with disabilities maintained by the ministry, instead of creating a parallel data management system.[7]

Victim assistance coordination[8]

Government coordinating body/focal point

Zimbabwe Mine Action Centre (ZIMAC)

Coordinating mechanism

N/A

Plan

No active victim assistance plan

Note: N/A = not applicable.

Victim assistance coordination has been the responsibility of ZIMAC, a section within the Zimbabwean army. Coordination for disability programming nationally is the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare. ZIMAC has provided information on survivors to the Ministry to enable the survivors to access services available through the ministry. In 2017, the victim assistance focal point changed from ZIMAC to the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare.[9]

In 2016 the ICRC hosted a study tour for ZIMAC officials to visit Lebanon and observe the mine action program there, including victim assistance programming.[10]

ZIMAC, with the support of the Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the Mine Ban Treaty’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU), is developing a National Mine Action Strategic Plan, which may be published in 2017. It is unclear how victim assistance will be included in that plan.[11]

A draft national disability policy was pending an endorsement by the cabinet as of September 2017.[12]

Participation and inclusion in victim assistance

In the absence of a coordinating mechanism for victim assistance or a formal plan for victim assistance activities, survivors are unable to participate in the formulation of victim assistance strategies. However, a strong disability community exists in Zimbabwe, including disabled people’s organizations (DPOs) and service providers, which could contribute to a future coordinating mechanism. DPOs and their representatives, including the Federation of Organizations of Disabled People in Zimbabwe (FODPZ), were consulted on the development of the policy. The government of Zimbabwe recognized FODPZ as the “voice of the disability movement” in Zimbabwe.[13] Survivors and persons with disabilities are employed by Local Rehabilitation Workshop (LOREWO) and Jairos Jiri in the manufacture of wheelchairs and assistive devices.[14]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[15]

Name of organization

Type of organization

Type of activity

Changes in quality/coverage of service in 2016

National Rehabilitation Hospitals

Government

Seven rehabilitation centers with mobile workshops, includes limited psychological counseling

Ongoing

Ministry of Public Service,  Labour and Social Welfare

Government

Financial support to war victims, and management of disability benefits programs

Ongoing

Jairos Jiri

NGO

Prosthetic and orthotic devices, wheelchairs; community-based rehabilitation; inclusive education; vocational training

Ongoing; with support from Christian Blind Mission, provided emergency relief to persons with disability affected by drought. Orthopedic workshop’s output is limited by availability of raw materials

Leonard Cheshire Disability Zimbabwe Trust

NGO

Advocacy; programs for children with disabilities

Three-year vocational training and economic inclusion project came to an end in December 2015

Cassim’s Prosthetics

Commercial company

Prosthetic and orthotic devices

Delivery of prosthetics to survivors living along the Mozambican border

Local Rehabilitation Workshop (LOREWO)

NGO

Wheelchairs

International support declining; introducing physical and occupational therapy

Disabled Women in Africa

NGO

Advocacy

Publications and meetings to address accessibility of health care for persons with disabilities. Discussions around organizing community for localization of CRPD

National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe

NGO

Advocacy

Discussions around organizing community for localization of CRPD

Disabled Women Support Organization

NGO

Advocacy

Educate parliamentarians about CRPD; produced DVD about voter education for persons with disabilities

Christian Blind Mission

NGO

Advocacy, coordination of services, support to Jairos Jiri Association

Ongoing

 

Emergency and continuing medical care

Emergency medical and surgical services are available at the national referral hospitals, which are not near the mine-affected regions. Survivors and others in need of services often must travel long distances to obtain necessary medical treatments, usually at cost to the individuals.[16] In case of an incident, HALO sends its staff to the Karanda Mission Hospital, a private facility about two hours’ drive from the minefields.[17] NPA uses the Mutare Provincial Hospital, one of the national referral hospitals, for this purpose.[18]

Physical rehabilitation including prosthetics

Physical rehabilitation and orthopedic services are limited to the major cities.[19] Jairos Jiri maintains a community-based rehabilitation program that covers several, but not all, provinces of Zimbabwe.[20] Jairos Jiri, with the support of Christian Blind Mission, continues to operate its orthopedic workshop in Harare to produce and repair wheelchairs and prosthetics, but output is limited due to a lack of raw materials.[21]

The Leonard Cheshire Trust purchased and provided mobility appliances and prosthetics to several children with disabilities as part of its physical rehabilitation program.[22]

HALO has contracted with commercial prosthetic company, Cassim’s Prosthetics in Bulawayo to provide fittings and orthopedic devices for survivors in HALO’s working area. Due to funding constraints, no survivors received prosthetics from HALO in 2016, though several were fitted for devices that were delivered in 2017.[23]

In 2016, the Zimbabwe National Army supported some 50 survivors with artificial limbs in its working areas along Zimbabwe’s southern borders.[24]

Economic inclusion

With only 15% of the population engaged in formal employment, few opportunities for meaningful work exist for Zimbabweans. LOREWO and the Jairos Jiri Prosthetic Workshop operate as sheltered workshops for persons with disabilities.

Psychological support and social inclusion

Few, if any, psychological services are available for survivors and persons with disabilities in Zimbabwe, and what services do exist are inadequate for the needs.[25] The government of Zimbabwe reported significant efforts to implement inclusive education programming. The subsidies for children with disabilities under the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), which provided US$600 per student per year have been restored with 10% of the BEAM allocation reserved for children with disabilities. An inclusive education manual has been developed and Disability Resource Centers were established at many institutions to provide educational and psychosocial support to learners with disabilities.[26]

Laws and policies

Zimbabwe has several national policies, including the Disabled Persons Act, the War Victims Compensation Act, the Social Welfare Assistance Act, and the State Service (Disabled Benefits) Act, related to victim assistance and disability. The Disabled Persons Act was hailed as a major milestone when it was passed in 1992, but has since been superseded in international policy by the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Zimbabwe’s 2013 Constitution recognizes the rights of persons with disabilities and requires the government to provide mechanisms for the realization of those rights with an important and disastrous caveat: government action is contingent upon available resources.[27]

Several policy changes and programs are awaiting final approval by the government. The government of Zimbabwe and the Africa Disability Alliance have drafted a memorandum of understanding to develop a national disability mainstreaming plan but the memorandum of understanding has not been approved by the Cabinet. A draft National Disability Policy, which was drafted by and has the support of the disability community in Zimbabwe has yet to be validated by the Cabinet.[28]

Zimbabwe ratified the CRPD on 23 September 2013, but has yet to domesticate the law and revise existing legislation in accordance with the convention.[29]



[1] Interviews with Anywhere Chimbambaira, Local Rehabilitation Workshop, 22 June 2015; and with Isaac Nyathi, National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe, 22 June 2015; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Michele Angeletti, Christian Blind Mission (CBM), 8 April 2016.

[2] ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2013,” Geneva, May 2014, p. 19.

[3] ICRC SFD, “Annual Report 2012,” Geneva, May 2013, pp. 13, 20.

[4] Presentation of Zimbabwe, “ICRC-AU Workshop to Advance the Implementation of Victim Assistance Obligations Arising from Various Weapons Treaties,” Addis Ababa, 6 March 2014.

[5] Interview with Dennis Hadrick, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, US State Department, 15 February 2017.

[6] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017.

[7] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016).

[8] Ibid.

[9] Email from Amir Musanovic, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), 19 September 2017; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017.

[10] ICRC, “Annual Report 2016,” Geneva, May 2017, p. 229.

[11] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J.

[12] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[13] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[14] Interviews with Anywhere Chimbambaira, Local Rehabilitation Workshop, 22 June 2015; and with Jairos Jiri Prosthetic Workshop, 17 June 2015.

[15] Interviews with Tendayi Sengwe, ICRC, 16 June 2015; with Sneddon Soko, Ministry of Labor & Social Welfare, 16 June 2015; with Jairos Jiri Prosthetic Workshop, 17 June 2015; with Rejoice Timire, Disabled Women Support Organization, 17 June 2015; with Don Chauke, Independent Consultant, 17 June 2015; with Anywhere Chimbambaira, Local Rehabilitation Workshop, 22 June 2015; with Isaac Nyathi, National Council of Disabled Persons of Zimbabwe, 22 June 2015; with Tione Mzila, Disabled Women in Africa, 22 June 2015; and with Dawood Cassim and Noordan Cassim, Cassim’s Prosthetics, 22 June 2015; Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for calendar year 2016), Form J; Jairos Jiri Association, “Community Based Rehabilitation,” undated; Leonard Cheshire Disability Zimbabwe, “Annual Report: 1 April 2015–31 March 2016,” undated; and responses to Landmine Monitor ruestionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017; and by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[16] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2016), Form J.

[17] Email from Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 9 December 2014.

[18] Email from Sheila Mweemba, NPA, 19 March 2015.

[19] Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 Report (for the calendar year 2016), Form J.

[20] Jairos Jiri Association, “Community Based Rehabilitation,” undated.

[21] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[22] Leonard Cheshire Disability Zimbabwe, “Annual Report: 1 April 2015–31 March 2016,” undated.

[23] Response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Tom Dibb, HALO Trust, 17 September 2017.

[24] “Sanctions won’t stop de-mining,” The Herald, 3 August 2017.

[25] US Department of State, “2016 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Zimbabwe,” Washington, DC, 3 March 2017.

[26] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016.

[27] Proceed Manatsa, “Are disability laws in Zimbabwe compatible with the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)?” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention, Vol. 4, Issue 4, April 2015, pp. 25–34.

[28] Republic of Zimbabwe, Statement delivered to the 9th Conference of States Parties to the CRPD, 14 June 2016; and response to Landmine Monitor questionnaire by Deborah Tigere, CBM, 27 September 2017.

[29] Interview with Tione Mzila, Disabled Women in Africa, 22 June 2015.