Note: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordinance.

Mine Contamination

The Republic of Colombia’s mine problem is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The precise extent of contamination remains highly uncertain, but as of October 2018 at least 28 of Colombia’s 32 departments were suspected to have a mine threat.[3] Colombia still lacks an accurate understanding of total contamination, which according to its Article 7 report submitted in April 2018 is 46,024,965m².[4] The previous estimate of 51km² provided in its strategic plan for 2016–2021 was reduced based on demining work that has been conducted.[5] This estimate is unreliable. It is based on a calculation that takes 15% of the number of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) “events” from 1990 to 2009 and adds them to 24% of the number IMSMA events from 2010 to 2015, with a further 20% added for both periods. These percentages were calculated based on information from historic humanitarian demining operations. The figure it generates is then multiplied by an estimated average CHA of 5,000m², which generated the baseline contamination figure for the country.[6]

Colombia continues to report on “events” included in its database. From 1990 to 2001, the information about accidents and incidents due to antipersonnel mines, UXO, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) came from both governmental sources, specifically the Department of Administrative Security, and non-governmental sources, including unconfirmed media reports. Since 2002, a more systematic registration of the effects of landmines, UXO and IEDs began. It was mandated by Article 13 of Law 759/02 that the Ministry of Defense must submit monthly reports of all the events related to antipersonnel mines that were known by their troops. Similarly, local authorities are duty-bound by Law 759/02 to report on any mine accidents or incidents. In addition, information was provided by relevant government departments and health services at a local level and at a national level by the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development and the Ministry of Health among others.[7] As of December 2017, 25,767 of these “events” had been registered in IMSMA across 530 municipalities.[8] When an operator is assigned a task they are given a map of the area and information about the events that have been recorded in that area, which they must then investigate.[9] However, operators reported that these IMSMA events are notoriously unreliable, and often they do not correspond to the presence of either landmines or UXO.[10] In Vista Hermosa in the Meta department, for example, of the 15 IMSMA events contained in the task allocation, 12 were cancelled by NPA, however after conducting non-technical survey in the area, they also found contamination in areas where no IMSMA events had been reported.[11] Sometimes the events are duplications (when a mine is reported and then cleared by the army, these events are duplicated rather than cancelling each other out), or incorrect coordinates are given, or the report of a mine or UXO is actually a hand grenade that has been confiscated by the army. According to Descontamina Colombia, the national mine action center, IMSMA-recorded events of the military confiscating weapons were ended in 2017.[12]

Descontamina Colombia reported that, by the end of 2017, it had recorded 644 CHAs covering 2,045,425m² and a further 691 SHAs covering 2,920,525m² across 79 municipalities.[13] Of these, 546 were in Antioquia, the department with the largest number of landmine victims.[14] In its Article 7 transparency report for 2017 Colombia reported that 606 suspected mined areas had been recorded between 1990 and 2017, a reduction from 647 at the end of the previous year, and 671 at the end of 2015.[15]

In January 2017, UNMAS had reported that incidents involving mines and UXO have been reported in 673 of Colombia’s 1,122 municipalities since 1990.[16] Based on Descontamina Colombia analysis of incident trends, of those 673, 199 municipalities are considered to be highly impacted (type I), 291 moderately impacted (type II), and 183 suffer from low impact (type III).[17]

All of the landmines remaining in Colombia are said to have been laid by NSAGs and are essentially victim or command-operated, artisanal explosive devices. According to The HALO Trust, mined areas in Colombia are low-density, nuisance minefields that average 4,000m² in size.[18] Although contamination levels are relatively low, each mined area can significantly impact rural communities across the country. As there was little, if any, mapping of mined areas by NSAGs and the intended victims were the military or paramilitary, local communities were often informed that certain areas were mined, though no specifics were given. This has led to a widespread attitude that mines are everywhere and local people are afraid to use vast areas of land for fear of mines, despite there being little real evidence of their presence.[19]

Improvised mines were planted in isolated rural areas by NSAG factions to protect strategic positions; often coca cultivations whose crops were used to fund operations. When the groups moved on, the mines were left behind, blocking access to roads, paths, schools, and other civilian infrastructure, preventing productive use of land.[20] The impact of mine contamination is social, economic, and humanitarian, as the presence of mines divides and isolates rural communities, prevents agricultural land that is suspected of contamination being used, and reduces access to services such as schools and rural development projects.[21]

As of September 2017, Colombia had more than 7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs),which amounts to almost 15% of the country’s total population who have been displaced by the more than 50-year-long conflict.[22] There is a clear link between mine contamination and displacement, as displaced people cannot return to areas where there is a risk of landmines. The presence of mines acts as an obstacle to land restitution as well as to the return of IDPs because Colombian law states that victims of the conflict cannot knowingly be endangered. Demining and survey are therefore essential to allow the safe return of Colombia’s vast displaced population, as well as to enable rural communities to recover from years of persecution and ensure the safety of local residents in the long term.[23]

Cluster Munition Contamination

It is unclear whether Colombia is affected by cluster munition remnants. Colombia ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 10 September 2015, declaring that “it is possible that there remain, in national territory, cluster munitions or cluster munition remnants of whose location the State has no knowledge or suspicion…Regarding article 4, and in connection with the particular circumstances of its internal armed conflict, the Republic of Colombia understands ‘cluster munition remnants’ to mean those whose location is known or suspected by the State.”[24]

In its initial Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2016, Colombia reported that it was in the process of determining the extent of cluster munition contamination and requested international assistance for training and equipment in order to carry out survey and clearance at a cost of almost $4.2 million in 2016–2026.[25] Its Article 7 report submitted in 2017, it noted that Form F (covering contamination and clearance) was “unchanged.”[26] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2018, Colombia reported that it “has no knowledge or suspicion of the existence of cluster munitions in its territory.”[27]

In May 2009, Colombia’s Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, acknowledged that the Colombian Armed Forces had used cluster munitions in the past “to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups,” but noted the submunitions sometimes did not explode and “became a danger to the civilian population.”[28] In 2010, the Ministry of National Defense said that the Colombian Air Force last used cluster munitions on 10 October 2006 “to destroy clandestine airstrips belonging to organizations dedicated to drug trafficking in remote areas of the country where the risk to civilians was minimal.”[29]

In November 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that Colombia had violated the rights to life and to physical, mental, and moral integrity by using a United States World War II “cluster adapter” to disperse fragmentation bombs during an attack on the village of Santo Domingo in December 1998.[30] A helicopter dropped an AN-M1A2 cluster munition containing six submunitions, killing 17 civilians, including six children, and injuring a further 27 civilians, including nine children. The action also resulted in the displacement of the village’s inhabitants. Colombia had sought to attribute the deaths to a bomb placed by FARC guerrillas.[31]

The Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA–Descontamina Colombia) stated that no cluster munition contamination is registered in IMSMA and there are no reports of accidents caused by cluster munition remnants.[32] HALO Trust did not encounter any cluster munition remnants in Colombia in 2017 or receive any reports of casualties,[33] nor did NPA,[34] however they did not conduct activities in the area of Santo Domingo. The CCCM reported that there has been no survey or clearance operations in the area of Santo Domingo, Arauca. However, the CCCM has conducted risk education in the area, and has not received reports of cluster munition contamination or accidents.[35]

Program Management

In September 2014, Decree 1649 created the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) to replace the earlier mine action body, the Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (PAICMA).[36] In August 2017, DAICMA became DAICMA–Descontamina Colombia.[37]

DAICMA retained the same mandate and functions as PAICMA; the only change being that DAICMA was now supporting the Minister-Advisor for Post-Conflict, Human Rights, and Security as well as the Minister-Advisor’s office in the strategic management of the national mine action program.

In April 2017, following the adoption of a Presidential Decree, DAICMA was made Colombia’s national mine action authority, with responsibility for formulating the strategic direction of mine action, coordinating and monitoring mine action at national and local level, applying technical guidance and regulating state and non-state operators, and elaborating and implementing national standards, though in practice it also serves as the national mine action center.[38]

The National Interministerial Commission on Anti-personnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP) was previously the national mine action authority responsible for implementing the Mine Ban Treaty, including developing a national plan and policy and coordinating international assistance.[39]

In 2011, Decree 3750 created the Interinstitutional Court of Humanitarian Demining (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario, IIDH), which is composed of a representative from the Ministry of National Defense, the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces, and Descontamina Colombia. It is responsible for recommending or suspending the certification of humanitarian demining organizations to the Ministry of National Defense and, determining and assigning demining tasks.[40]

Descontamina Colombia’s ability to coordinate has come under scrutiny, as it has been locking in operators to tasks before the extent of the challenge is known and without a clear appreciation of operators’ future capacities. In the view of UNMAS, in Descontamina Colombia’s push to assign tasks demonstrating the peace accord’s new opportunities (see below), operators often deployed into new areas which were disconnected from their existing areas of operation, without prior consideration of their capacity and efficient resource deployment.[41] Descontamina Colombia are willing to permit international demining operators to swap tasks between themselves but see this as an internal organizational decision rather than something that should happen at a national level, and in reality very few tasks have been swapped.[42]

The Organization of American States (OAS) serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia.

UNMAS provides technical assistance to mine action authorities and state entities. It also promotes capacity development of humanitarian demining operators.[43]

Strategic planning

Colombia’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request projected, improbably, that all mined areas would be released by 2020.[44] This will not occur.

Colombia developed a Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021, the aim of which is to address antipersonnel mine contamination in 199 high-impact municipalities, 291 medium-impact municipalities, and 183 low-impact municipalities, covering a total estimated area of 51km².[45] As of August 2018, the suspicion of mines has been removed in 270 municipalities,[46] though in only 99 of these was this achieved through actual survey or clearance. Moreover, antipersonnel mines were found in only 17 of the 99 municipalities. In around 160 of the contaminated municipalities, access for humanitarian demining organizations is constrained by the prevailing security situation and therefore they have yet to be assigned for demining.[47]

Colombia did not attain the targets set in the 2011–2013 operational plan to address 6,000 dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 municipalities where the presence of mines is suspected, covering an estimated 15km².[48] It was then due to submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013, but did not do so. Colombia did present a demining “action plan” for 2014–2016 at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo in July 2014.[49] The plan foresaw a first phase of mine action in 91 municipalities and steadily increasing national army demining capacity to 54 units, as well as the number of non-technical survey teams to 15 by 2016.[50]

Colombia prioritizes its task allocation according to the IIDH and the Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021. The IIDH takes into account information provided by local bodies, the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office, the General Command of the Military Forces, and Descontamina Colombia. In the strategic plan, municipalities have been categorized according to three typologies: type I comprise incidents involving antipersonnel mines or UXO registered on IMSMA since 2010; type II are incidents involving antipersonnel mines and UXO registered on IMSMA before 2010; and type III are IMSMA “events” without human impact.[51] Operators can only bid for tasks in type I areas while the armed forces have been assigned all type II and III areas, many of which they have been able to cancel and release through discussion with the local community and local security councils.[52]

As of December 2017, Descontamina Colombia reported that 27km² had been allocated for humanitarian demining operations: half of the total contamination estimated in the strategic plan.[53] It further reported that, by July 2018, two departments and 264 municipalities had been liberated of the suspicion of mines, while 192 municipalities currently have mine action operations. As a result, it reports that 6.94km² of area has been “liberated” and 6,007 items destroyed since operations began. In terms of capacity, 5,692 personnel and 24 mine detection dogs (MDDs) have been accredited for demining; and there are 12 mine action operators, including both national and civil society capacity.[54]

Mine action and the 2015 peace deal

On 7 March 2015, negotiators for the government of Colombia and FARC announced that agreement had been reached by the two parties on demining.[55] According to a joint statement, the government and the FARC would select a number of pilot zones with the highest level of threat from antipersonnel mines, IEDs, UXO, or other ERW. Following signature in August 2015 of an agreement with the European Union for support to the Pilot Project on Humanitarian Demining, NPA was overseeing non-technical survey of SHAs and technical survey and clearance of CHAs.[56] This led to the clearance of two areas: the villages of El Orejón (municipality of Briceño, department of Antioquia) and Santa Helena (municipality of Mesetas, department of Meta). By December 2016, a total of 40,723m² had been cleared, eight contaminated areas had been identified, and 67 mines were destroyed.[57]

On 7 August 2018, Iván Duque Márquez, winner of Colombia’s presidential election, assumed office. President Duque, and his political mentor former president Uribe, have refused to recognize key pillars of the peace deal and have promised to “modify” it once in power. This fosters further uncertainty in a country whose transition to peace is under threat from groups struggling for power in the vacuum left behind by a demobilized FARC. This includes FARC dissidents, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and drug-trafficking groups, especially the largest among them, the Gaitán Self-Defense Forces. Most of the fight for control is concentrated in about one-quarter of the country’s municipalities, just 5% of which are under state control. For humanitarian demining groups this impacts their ability to conduct survey and clearance.[58]

Mine action operations will only be undertaken with the local community’s agreement. In areas where mistrust of the state is high, community members are often skeptical of the operator’s intentions. In 2017–2018, in the Vista Hermosa municipality, HALO Trust and NPA have had their vehicles seized and burned, while CCCM had their vehicle seized for a month as a warning that they were not welcome to conduct demining in certain areas.[59] Unfortunately, these are often areas with the highest suspected contamination. Humanitarian demining operators will not conduct demining in areas where they have not received agreement from the local community. In ELN strongholds, such as the coastal department of Chocó, it has been reported that actors are emplacing mines in order to protect their territory.[60]

Legislation and standards

Colombia has legislation mandating the establishment of the CINAMAP, PAICMA, DAICMA, and most recently Descontamina Colombia, as well as the IIDH, which acts as a decision-making body. Decree 3750 of 2011 also called for the elaboration of National Standards for Humanitarian Demining and regulates the external monitoring of demining operations. Decree 3750 defines humanitarian demining activities as non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance.[61] In July 2017, Decree 1195 was promulgated with a view to reducing the impact of demining on the environment. The main objective of the decree is to outline the mitigation and correction measures that must be applied by operators when undertaking demining in National Parks and other areas of ecological value. This is intended to reassure the environmental authorities that mine clearance can take place in these areas without causing unnecessary ecological damage.[62]

Colombia now has 15 national mine action standards in place, including a glossary of mine action terms, up from just three when the 2016–2021 strategic plan was launched.[63] In 2017, nine new national mine action standards were adopted, which include standards on clearance, mechanical demining, MDDs, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[64] The national standard on technical survey was approved by Descontamina Colombia in December 2017.[65] The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and UNMAS have both been supporting Descontamina Colombia with the development and implementation of national standards.[66]

In 2017, 10 existing national standards were modified, some more than once. According to Descontamina Colombia, most of the amendments were at the request of the operators.[67] In the case of task assignment and clearance, the national standards were modified three times during the year. This has caused difficulties for both the operators and the OAS, as each modification of the standard means that operators’ standing operating procedures (SOPs) must also be changed, which then need to be approved by OAS. The national standard on non-technical survey has had seven modifications.[68] Operators have raised this with Descontamina Colombia, who have agreed to suspend modifications to standards to allow operators to develop more efficient operations using the standards that have been elaborated.[69]

Quality management

The OAS serves as the body for accreditation and monitoring of humanitarian demining in Colombia. They have received some criticism from operators for being too focused on compliance rather than on supporting the effective running of demining operations. This has manifested itself in non-critical conformities being determined by rigid application of national standards and/or SOPs, leading to delays in operations.[70] There have also been long waiting times after paperwork has been submitted, which have delayed operations and land release.[71] At the request of Descontamina Colombia, FSD has been seeking to build capacity in the OAS in quality management.[72]

The OAS is also responsible for the accreditation and re-accreditation of MDDs. Re-accreditation takes place annually at a center in Guatavita, which is an hour outside of Bogota in an area with a very cold climate. MDDs must travel from their operation base to the OAS center and with time for acclimatization the MDDs can be away from operations for a month.[73]

As of August 2018, a new national standard in quality management was in the process of being implemented. This standard includes the implementation of confidence levels, which will be ascribed to an operator and should improve efficiency. An operator with good confidence levels will be subject to less frequent visits from OAS, allowing them to focus on operators that need more support.[74]

Each operator carries out their own internal quality control in accordance with the provisions in the Quality Management national standard and their organizational SOPs. From June 2016 to June 2018, Descontamina Colombia had a team of Quality Managers that provided technical assistance to the operators on issues such as accreditation of personnel and demining techniques, interpretation of and compliance with national standards, and conflicts between the OAS and the operators.[75]

Information management

Government Decree 1649 of 2014 assigned Descontamina Colombia responsibility for maintaining the IMSMA database and to “compile, systematize, centralize, and update relevant information” to serve as a basis for program planning.[76] However, information management remains a central challenge for the program.

NPA supported Descontamina Colombia on information management from July 2016 until March 2018, when FSD took over.[77]

Descontamina Colombia in conjunction with FSD has been training the OAS to use IMSMA and states that the quality of the database is improving. IMSMA is now available online.[78]

The “events” on the IMSMA database that form part of the prioritization of demining are beset with errors, including duplications and inaccuracies. This leads to inefficiencies at an operational level as operators spend time and resources investigating IMSMA events that do not correspond with actual contamination.[79]

Operators

The Armed Forces Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario, BRDH), formerly called the Humanitarian Demining Battalion (BIDES), has been conducting humanitarian demining since 2005.[80] As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in 214 municipalities across the departments of Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Caquetá, Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Chocó, Cordoba, Cundimarca, Guaviare, Huila, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Putumayo, Quindío, Risaralda, Santander, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca.[81] As of October 2018, 4,450 personnel had been accredited as well as 18 MDDs and three mechanical assets.[82] As of September 2018, the OAS was investigating two incidents of an explosive item being found after clearance in Planadas and Pensilvania had been conducted by MDDs.[83]

The Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association (AEDIM) was created and activated through CARMA Decree 41 of 30 December 2014. It has a Humanitarian Demining company, made up of three platoons, and which conducts clearance and destruction of antipersonnel mines and ERW in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Navy.[84] As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in 12 municipalities across the departments of Bolivar and Sucre.[85] As of April 2018, 240 personnel had been accredited.[86]

In 2017, HALO Trust employed 347 operational personnel (split between non-technical survey and manual demining).[87] HALO employs a number of ex-combatants from various NSAGs when the respective donor’s policy allows it.[88] In 2018, HALO acquired a mechanical asset for vegetation clearance. As of August 2018, it was in the process of developing its SOPs with the support of FSD and will begin using the mechanical asset once the SOPs have been approved. The HALO is also conducting field trials of four MDDs. HALO conducts EOD using thermite or a disruptor, and in 2018 it purchased a drone.[89] As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in 23 municipalities across Antioquia, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, Putumayo, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca.[90]

NPA formally initiated a mine action program in April 2015, having taken part in the peace talks between the government and FARC that concerned demining. The first step in the process of implementing the agreement on demining was to conduct non-technical survey of suspected contamination in the departments of Meta and Antioquia. The parties chose two pilot projects, one in the village of El Orejón (Antioquia) and a second in the village of Santa Helena (Meta). NPA’s role has been to lead and supervise a mine clearance project as a trust-building exercise between the government of Colombia and FARC. The Colombian army has been conducting the mine clearance, with NPA providing verification with two MDD teams, while FARC has given information on contaminated areas.[91]

In 2017, NPA was supporting the Demining Brigade with its MDD and dog handler training.[92] NPA began conducting clearance operations with manual deminers in March 2017. In October 2017, MDD and mechanical assets were deployed with an immediate increase in productivity of 224%. NPA deployed almost 170 personnel in 2017 with five survey and seven clearance teams, including three teams of MDDs and three mechanical teams.[93] Since November 2017, NPA has employed FARC ex-combatants as “local guides,” which has improved the safety and efficiency of clearance operations. As of June 2018, NPA had been assigned tasks in 10 municipalities in the departments of Antioquia, Caquetá, Choco, and Meta. As of August 2018, NPA were using a disruptor for EOD but were planning to acquire thermite.[94]

In 2018, NPA had two incidents where its manual capacity found mines after clearance had been conducted by MDD teams, one in April in Vista Hermosa and one in August in Briceno. NPA has conducted internal investigations as well as thorough MDD review from the Global Training Center to assess the use of MDDs in Colombia and why incidents occurred. The incident in Briceno was also subject of formal Descontamina Board of Inquiry. All reports conclude that it was the way in which MDD assets were used and not the effectiveness of the assets as such that were the issue. NPA has developed detailed corrective action plans to address identified issues.[95]

The CCCM began humanitarian demining work in Colombia in 2017. UNMAS has supported the CCCM to develop from an advocacy organization to a demining operator, assisting in the development and review of operational plans and providing initial funding to the CCCM for this transition.[96] The CCCM conducts clearance using manual techniques only.[97] In 2017, it had five clearance teams with a total of 20 deminers, nine demining leaders/supervisors, and four paramedics.[98] The CCCM also employs FARC ex-combatants as part of its survey and clearance teams. As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in three municipalities across Antioquia, Cauca, and Huila.[99]

HI began humanitarian demining in Colombia in 201`7. In 2017, it employed a total of 62 personnel for non-technical survey and clearance.[100] HI currently conducts clearance using only manual demining.[101] As of September 2018, it had begun operations in five municipalities across the departments of Caquetá, Cauca, and Meta.[102] As of August 2018, HI had approval to use thermite and a disrupter for EOD.[103]

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) is in the process of setting up its mine action program in Colombia and is currently providing mine risk education to affected communities in the departments of Meta and Cundinamarca. In March 2017, DDG received Phase 1 accreditation to conduct demining in Colombia.[104]

Humanicemos DH, the FARC demining organization, was accredited in August 2017.[105] In 2017, NPA trained 28 ex-combatants in clearance and non-technical survey, 10 of whom were also trained as section leaders and five as team leaders.[106] Between the CCCM and Humanicemos DH, with UNMAS support, an additional 100 ex-combatants are trained in the same technical areas.[107] As of August 2018, 124 ex-combatants were awaiting accreditation.[108] Due to funding limitations of their main donors, the OAS is unable to quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) ex-combatant deminers. The government of Colombia has therefore decided to mandate UNMAS to assume this role, though the formal mandate to do so was still unsigned as of September 2018. This has led to delays in Humanicemos being able to start clearance operations with personnel sitting idle while they wait for their accreditation.[109] The United States (US) still recognizes the FARC as a terrorist organization, which means that ex-combatants cannot be associated with any US-funded projects.[110]

FSD has been providing technical assistance to Descontamina Colombia since early 2016. In 2017, it provided capacity-building with four specialists: one each for MDDs, mechanical assets, environmental protection and EOD, supporting the development of its national mine action standards in these areas. FSD also supported the elaboration of Decree 1195 of 2017, which regulates the impact of demining on the environment. At the request of Descontamina Colombia, FSD has also been providing support to the OAS to improve processes and simplify the forms around SOPs and accreditation. In 2018, FSD planned to support implementation of the national mine action standards.[111]

Land Release

There are discrepancies between data sources: Descontamina Colombia, the Article 7 report and operators (see survey and clearance sections below).

In 2017, according to Descontamina Colombia, just under 1km² was released by clearance and survey, with under 0.4km² cleared and the remainder cancelled or reduced by survey. In 2016, Colombia cleared less than 0.3km² of mined area. Just under 1.2km² was “released” through data clean-up in 2017.[112] This occurs in low impact areas after discussions between the armed forces and the local security councils.[113] A further 1.2km² of land was confirmed as contaminated with antipersonnel mines.

Survey in 2017

Colombia reported that in 2017, 110 SHAs were cancelled through non-technical survey covering 239,068m², while 346,301m² was reduced by technical survey. A total of 192 areas were confirmed as contaminated with antipersonnel mines, covering 1,165,237m².[114]

Survey in 2017[115]

Note: TS = technical survey.

There were discrepancies between data reported by Descontamina Colombia, the Article 7 report for 2017 and operators. The Article 7 report for 2017 reports 209,866m² as cancelled by non-technical survey and 283,046m² reduced by technical survey.[116] Survey data from Descontamina held on the IMSMA database is based on reports from operators that have been received and validated by the OAS, a process that can take several months, so this does not represent the total survey that has been undertaken in 2017. This goes some way in explaining the discrepancies in the data. The CCCM reported that it had conducted survey in Huila and Meta and confirmed 12 (rather than 11) areas covering 25,381m² (rather than 21,436m²).[117] HI reported that it had not cancelled any SHAs by non-technical survey (rather than 400m² in Meta) and confirmed 30 areas (rather than 18) as contaminated with mines in Caqueta, Cauca, and Meta (rather than just Cauca and Meta) covering 81,074m² (rather than 55,985m²).[118] NPA reported that it confirmed 21 areas (rather than eight) as contaminated with mines in Meta covering 136,967m² (rather than 70,055m²).[119] HALO Trust reported that it confirmed 82 areas as contaminated with mines covering 389,978m² in Antioquia, Meta, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca, and cancelled two areas of 7,289m² in Antioquia and Meta. Colombia reported that HALO Trust confirmed 67 areas as contaminated with mines covering 290,117m² in Antioquia, Meta, and Tolima, cancelled 61 areas covering 57,213m² in Antioquia, Meta, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca, and reduced 7,188m² by technical survey in Antioquia and Tolima.[120]

Operators are often conducting survey in communities that have been inaccessible in previous years due to the security situation and are skeptical of governmental initiatives. All the operators stressed the importance of community liaison and of working with local people when conducting non-technical survey as a way of both building relationships with the community and as a source of accurate information about the existence of contamination.[121] HALO Trust, for example, spent four months on community liaison in Cauca to gain the trust of the local community before beginning non-technical survey.[122] NPA, HALO, and the CCCM have been employing “local guides” who have either direct or indirect links with FARC.[123] At one of their sites in Vista Hermosa, NPA’s information came from an ex-FARC explosives expert who gave them exact information on how many mines had been planted and where.[124]

Clearance in 2017

Descontamina Colombia reported clearance of 383,951m² in 2017 across nine departments: Antioquia, Bolivar, Caldas, Caquetá, Cauca, Huila, Meta, Santander, and Tolima, destroying 104 antipersonnel mines.[125]

Mine clearance in 2017[126]

Note: AP = antipersonnel.

There were discrepancies between data reported by Descontamina Colombia, the Article 7 report for 2017 and operators. The Article 7 report for 2017 reports 259,783m² as released by clearance.[127] Clearance data is only visible in IMSMA when an operator officially hands over the area to the community and a completion report is submitted to Descontamina Colombia and that is approved by the OAS, which goes some way to explaining this difference. There was a small difference in the clearance figure reported by CCCM in Meta of 1,601m² rather than 1,426m². The CCCM also reported that they cleared 10 antipersonnel mines while Colombia reported that they cleared no mines but three IEDs.[128] HALO Trust reported clearing 39 (rather than 35) areas covering 273,224m² (rather than 182,960m²) in the departments of Antioquia, Meta, and Tolima, destroying 119 mines.[129] HI reported that it cleared two areas in Cauca and Meta totaling 4,679m² and destroyed one IED rather than one area in Cauca of 408m².[130] NPA reported it conducted clearance in 16 areas in Meta covering 82,606m² and three areas in Antioquia covering 10,007m², destroying 50 antipersonnel mines, 18 UXO, and 37 IEDs.[131]

In 2017, a further 140 antipersonnel mines and 47 items of UXO were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.[132]

Deminer safety

In September 2017, while conducting a non-technical survey a deminer from the Humanitarian Demining Brigade was injured by a UXO.[133]

There have also been a number of security incidents.

In June 2017, an NPA vehicle was set on fire in Santa Helena, Mesetas municipality of the department of Meta by dissidents of the FARC-EP. NPA evacuated its personnel and has not been able to return to the area.[134]

In April 2018, FARC dissidents in La Reforma, San Martin municipality in the department of Meta seized a CCCM vehicle and held it for just over a month before returning it to the CCCM. When non-technical survey had been conducted in the area, the FARC dissidents had felt ignored but after consultation the CCCM were allowed to conduct operations.[135]

In July 2018, HALO Trust had a vehicle seized and set on fire in the village of Santander, Uribe municipality, in the department of Meta. An armed group of 15 FARC dissidents detained a team of four people conducting non-technical survey, forcing them to leave the vehicle before setting it on fire. The group threatened the non-technical survey team and informed them that they did not want HALO Trust operating in the Uribe or Mesetas municipalities.[136]

Land Release in 2017: cluster munition-contaminated areas

No assessment, survey, or clearance of cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2017.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. It is not on target to meet the deadline, though the current national strategic plan still envisions that Colombia will fulfil its demining obligations by 2021.

Colombia does not have a meaningful understanding of baseline contamination. The report from Descontamina Colombia that 27km² of the contaminated area has been allocated for humanitarian demining operations may seem impressive but operators have found that tasks have been allocated in a way that does not allow them to work efficiently. Tasks may be spread across the country forcing operators to set up multiple location bases with all the resources that entails.

The areas that have so far been declared free of mines have had very low or even no contamination. The majority of the high-impact areas are not yet assigned due to the difficult security situation in those areas. The ongoing issues with security, with the rise of FARC dissidents, the ELN, and drug traffickers, means that it is unlikely humanitarian demining organizations will be able to access these areas until the security situation changes.

Non-technical and technical survey are vital to efficient demining operations and are particularly important in Colombia when the initial information given at the task allocation stage has been found to be so unreliable. Non-technical survey, and the associated community liaison, is also vital to building trust with communities to enable access to these areas.

The national standard for technical survey was approved in 2017 and it is hoped that the greater use of non-technical and technical survey will more accurately determine the location and extent of actual contamination, and cancel areas not contaminated. Costs of demining are high in Colombia, on average between US$8 and $20 dollars per square meter, and the amount of clearance varies widely depending on the demining techniques used and the terrain. In Briceño, NPA have been conducting manual excavation, which per deminer is as little as only one to five square meters a day.[137] Descontamina Colombia reports that across all the operators productivity, per deminer ranges from 5 to 20m² per day.[138]

There was a substantial increase in capacity in 2017 following the signature of the peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP in 2016, with humanitarian demining playing an important part in the implementation of the peace process.

Mine clearance in 2013–2017

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Colombia is required to destroy all cluster munitions in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. Colombia does not have areas of confirmed or suspected cluster munition contamination.

Colombia may be able to declare full completion of its Article 4 obligations once assessment and survey have been conducted.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.