Summary: State Party Colombia ratified the convention on 10 September 2015. It has participated in every meeting of the convention and has condemned new use of cluster munitions. Colombia voted in favor of a key UN resolution on the convention in December 2018.

Colombia never produced cluster munitions, but it imported them and destroyed a stockpile of 72 cluster munitions and 10,832 submunitions in November 2009. Colombia is not retaining any cluster munitions for training or research purposes.

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 10 September 2015, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 March 2016.

Law 1604, adopted on 12 December 2012, approved Colombia’s ratification of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, incorporating it into domestic law. [1] Colombia has reported this and other relevant legislation and decrees under national implementation measures for the convention. [2] Colombia provided its initial Article 7 transparency report on 28 August 2016 and has submitted annual updated reports, most recently on 27 April 2019. [3]

Colombia participated in several meetings of the Oslo Process that produced the convention and said that its decision to join stemmed from its concern about the “humanitarian impact” of cluster munitions. [4]

Colombia actively engages in the work of the Convention on Cluster Munitions. It has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention, most recently the Eighth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in September 2018. Colombia attended the convention’s First Review Conference in 2015 and intersessional meetings in 2011–2015. It has participated in regional workshops on cluster munitions.

Colombia voted in favor of a key UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution promoting the implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in December 2018. [5] Colombia has voted in favor of the annual UNGA resolution on the convention since it was first introduced in 2015.

Colombia has “deplored” the use of cluster munitions in countries such as Syria. [6] It has voted in favor of UNGA resolutions expressing outrage at the use of cluster munitions in Syria, most recently in December 2018. [7]

Colombia is a State Party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Colombia provided its views on certain important issues related to interpretation and implementation of the convention in a March 2010 response to a Monitor questionnaire. [8] The government “absolutely rejects and prohibits any manner of transfer or storage of foreign cluster bombs in Colombian territory” as well as “military operations with states not party to the convention in which they carry out exercises or actions prohibited by the Convention.” It also prohibits investment in production of cluster munitions. In addition, “Colombia considers that the countries that are still not a part of this convention can take steps toward honoring the spirit of the convention.” Colombia reaffirmed its position on all these interpretive issues in a May 2011 response to the Monitor. [9]

Production and transfer

In a May 2011 letter to the Monitor, Colombia stated that it has never produced cluster munitions. [10] In the past, it imported cluster munitions from Chile, Israel, and the United States (US). In 2010, Colombia stated that it has not transferred cluster munitions “to a third state.” [11]

In 2012, Chile’s Ministry of National Defense provided the Monitor with a document detailing two past transfers of 191 cluster munitions to Colombia: 132 250kg cluster bombs in in 1997 and 55 250kg cluster bombs, four air-dropped 250kg cluster bombs, and one fin stabilizer for a CB-250kg cluster bomb in 1994. [12]

Use

In an April 2012 letter, a Ministry of External Relations official told the Monitor that the Colombian Air Force decided to stop using cluster munitions after an evaluation found that they did not meet the operational requirements or needs of Colombia. [13]

In May 2009, Colombia’s Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, acknowledged that the Colombian armed forces had used cluster munitions in the past “to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups” and noted that the submunitions sometimes did not explode and “became a danger to the civilian population.” [14]

The Monitor has reported on the case of apparent cluster munition use by the Colombian Air Force at Santo Domingo in the municipality of Tame (Arauca) on 13 December 1998, which killed 17 and injured 27 others. [15] An investigation showed that a World War II-era “cluster adapter” of US origin was used to disperse several 20-pound (9kg) fragmentation bombs during the attack. [16] In December 2012, the Inter-American Human Rights Court published its verdict on the case that found the Colombian Air Force used an AN-M1A2 bomb, which it said meets the definition of a cluster munition. [17] The court found that Colombia should treat victims of the attack in accordance with its victim assistance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In November 2017, the Supreme Court of Colombia upheld the decision. [18]

Stockpiling and destruction

Colombia announced the completion of the destruction of its stockpile of cluster munitions on 24 November 2009. [19] It destroyed a total of 72 cluster munitions (31 ARC-32 and 41 CB-250K cluster bombs) containing 10,832 submunitions. [20]

Colombia is not retaining any cluster munitions or submunitions for research or training purposes. [21]

Policy

The Republic of Colombia signed the Mine Ban Treaty on 3 December 1997, ratified on 6 September 2000, and became a State Party on 1 March 2001.

Law 759, which took effect on 25 July 2002, serves as Colombia’s implementing legislation for the Mine Ban Treaty.[1] Colombia reports that activities prohibited by the treaty are criminalized by its Penal Code.[2] It has also enacted laws on victim assistance, land restitution, and mine clearance.[3]

Colombia submitted its 18th Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 transparency measures report on 30 April 2019, which outlined additional provisions amended regarding mine clearance standards.[4]

Colombia has made significant contributions to the Mine Ban Treaty at the highest levels, including by hosting the Second Review Conference in Cartagena in November–December 2009. It has participated in the two other Review Conference and every Meeting of States Parties, most recently the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018. Colombia has also attended all of the treaty’s intersessional meetings in Geneva since 1999, most recently in June 2019.

In 2018–2019, Colombia is serving on the Mine Ban Treaty’s Committee on Article 5 (mine clearance implementation).[5]

In September 2016, the government of Colombia concluded a peace accord with the country’s main non-state armed group (NSAG), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo, FARC-EP) that has resulted in a major effort to clear mine-affected areas.[6] On 29 August 2019, a small contingent of former FARC leaders announced that they were entering a “new stage of armed struggle.”[7] It is not yet clear what this means for demining efforts in the country.

Colombia is party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.

The Colombian Campaign against Landmines (Campaña Colombiana contra Minas, CCCM) works to address the country’s extensive landmine problem.[8] On 4 April each year since 2011, Colombians have participated in an annual Remángate (“Roll-up”) action, in which people roll-up a pant leg in support of efforts against landmines and in solidarity with victims.[9]

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

Colombia’s State Military Industry (Industria Militar, INDUMIL) ceased production of antipersonnel mines in September 1998 and destroyed its production equipment on 18 November 1999.[10]

The government of Colombia is not known to have ever exported antipersonnel mines.

Colombia reported completion of the destruction of its stockpile of 18,531 antipersonnel mines on 24 October 2004.[11]

Colombia has retained the same number of mines for training purposes since 2007. It declared a total of 586 MAP-1 mines retained for training purposes in its 2009 Article 7 report and has never provided a number in subsequent reports, but has instead stated that there has been “no change” in information previously provided.[12] Colombia last destroyed or consumed mines in training activities in 2006, when 300 retained mines were destroyed in three separate events.[13]

Colombia has not reported in detail on the intended purposes and actual uses of its retained mines, as agreed by States Parties, but in 2011, Colombia informed the Monitor that the mines were “used for training the humanitarian demining units [of the armed forces], in the use of equipment for mine clearance.”[14]

Production and use by non-state armed groups

Both the FARC and the National Liberation Army (Unión Camilista-Ejército de Liberación Nacional, ELN) have manufactured antipersonnel mines as well as remotely controlled improvised landmines. Colombia’s Article 7 reports contain detailed information on at least 12 different types of mines produced by NSAGs, including antipersonnel, antivehicle, and Claymore-type directional fragmentation mines. Some fitted with antihandling devices.[15]

There were several reports and allegations of new use of antipersonnel mines by NSAGs in Colombia during the reporting period.[16] In August 2019, Human Rights Watch interviews in the Catatumbo region included allegations by local residents and organizations that the ELN and the Popular Liberation Army (El Ejército Popular de Liberación, EPL) were emplacing mines in rural areas.[17]

A Colombian Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal-Descontamina Colombia, PAICMA) country-wide review of records of landmines cleared by the Colombian army during military operations as well as reported landmine casualties and Colombian army seizures of improvised landmines, attempts to attribute responsibility for mine use during 2017 and the first half of 2018.[18] It found that residual or dissident FARC forces were responsible for 306 mine incidents in 2017 and 341 incidents recorded in the first half of 2018, while ELN forces were responsible for 219 mine incidents recorded in 2017 and 48 in the first half of 2018. It also attributed mine incidents to criminal groups or paramilitaries, often working with drug traffickers.

Previous Use

From 1999 through 2016, Landmine Monitor reported extensive use of landmines in Colombia by the FARC and by other NSAGs.

On 24 November 2016, FARC and the Colombian government signed a final agreement committing both parties to end their long-running armed conflict and build peace, including through mine clearance.[19] FARC ex-combatants established a civil organization in 2017 to contribute to survey and mine clearance activities.[20]

An October 2017 ceasefire agreement between the government of Colombia and the ELN included a commitment not to use antipersonnel landmines.[21] As of September 2019, the temporary ceasefire accord between the government and the ELN, which expired in January 2018, had not been renewed.[22]

On 12 March 2018, the government of Juan Manuel Santos announced that it resumed dialogue with the ELN, after suspending them for two months due to the group’s actions. The peace process continued until the change of government. Once the new president took office on 7 August 2018, the talks with the ELN were suspended. During this period there was no progress on demining issues that were being discussed with the ELN.

Note: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; ERW = explosive remnants of war; UXO = unexploded ordinance.

Mine Contamination

The Republic of Colombia’s mine problem is the result of decades of conflict with non-state armed groups (NSAGs). The precise extent of contamination remains highly uncertain, but as of October 2018 at least 28 of Colombia’s 32 departments were suspected to have a mine threat.[3] Colombia still lacks an accurate understanding of total contamination, which according to its Article 7 report submitted in April 2018 is 46,024,965m².[4] The previous estimate of 51km² provided in its strategic plan for 2016–2021 was reduced based on demining work that has been conducted.[5] This estimate is unreliable. It is based on a calculation that takes 15% of the number of Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) “events” from 1990 to 2009 and adds them to 24% of the number IMSMA events from 2010 to 2015, with a further 20% added for both periods. These percentages were calculated based on information from historic humanitarian demining operations. The figure it generates is then multiplied by an estimated average CHA of 5,000m², which generated the baseline contamination figure for the country.[6]

Colombia continues to report on “events” included in its database. From 1990 to 2001, the information about accidents and incidents due to antipersonnel mines, UXO, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) came from both governmental sources, specifically the Department of Administrative Security, and non-governmental sources, including unconfirmed media reports. Since 2002, a more systematic registration of the effects of landmines, UXO and IEDs began. It was mandated by Article 13 of Law 759/02 that the Ministry of Defense must submit monthly reports of all the events related to antipersonnel mines that were known by their troops. Similarly, local authorities are duty-bound by Law 759/02 to report on any mine accidents or incidents. In addition, information was provided by relevant government departments and health services at a local level and at a national level by the Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Development and the Ministry of Health among others.[7] As of December 2017, 25,767 of these “events” had been registered in IMSMA across 530 municipalities.[8] When an operator is assigned a task they are given a map of the area and information about the events that have been recorded in that area, which they must then investigate.[9] However, operators reported that these IMSMA events are notoriously unreliable, and often they do not correspond to the presence of either landmines or UXO.[10] In Vista Hermosa in the Meta department, for example, of the 15 IMSMA events contained in the task allocation, 12 were cancelled by NPA, however after conducting non-technical survey in the area, they also found contamination in areas where no IMSMA events had been reported.[11] Sometimes the events are duplications (when a mine is reported and then cleared by the army, these events are duplicated rather than cancelling each other out), or incorrect coordinates are given, or the report of a mine or UXO is actually a hand grenade that has been confiscated by the army. According to Descontamina Colombia, the national mine action center, IMSMA-recorded events of the military confiscating weapons were ended in 2017.[12]

Descontamina Colombia reported that, by the end of 2017, it had recorded 644 CHAs covering 2,045,425m² and a further 691 SHAs covering 2,920,525m² across 79 municipalities.[13] Of these, 546 were in Antioquia, the department with the largest number of landmine victims.[14] In its Article 7 transparency report for 2017 Colombia reported that 606 suspected mined areas had been recorded between 1990 and 2017, a reduction from 647 at the end of the previous year, and 671 at the end of 2015.[15]

In January 2017, UNMAS had reported that incidents involving mines and UXO have been reported in 673 of Colombia’s 1,122 municipalities since 1990.[16] Based on Descontamina Colombia analysis of incident trends, of those 673, 199 municipalities are considered to be highly impacted (type I), 291 moderately impacted (type II), and 183 suffer from low impact (type III).[17]

All of the landmines remaining in Colombia are said to have been laid by NSAGs and are essentially victim or command-operated, artisanal explosive devices. According to The HALO Trust, mined areas in Colombia are low-density, nuisance minefields that average 4,000m² in size.[18] Although contamination levels are relatively low, each mined area can significantly impact rural communities across the country. As there was little, if any, mapping of mined areas by NSAGs and the intended victims were the military or paramilitary, local communities were often informed that certain areas were mined, though no specifics were given. This has led to a widespread attitude that mines are everywhere and local people are afraid to use vast areas of land for fear of mines, despite there being little real evidence of their presence.[19]

Improvised mines were planted in isolated rural areas by NSAG factions to protect strategic positions; often coca cultivations whose crops were used to fund operations. When the groups moved on, the mines were left behind, blocking access to roads, paths, schools, and other civilian infrastructure, preventing productive use of land.[20] The impact of mine contamination is social, economic, and humanitarian, as the presence of mines divides and isolates rural communities, prevents agricultural land that is suspected of contamination being used, and reduces access to services such as schools and rural development projects.[21]

As of September 2017, Colombia had more than 7 million internally displaced persons (IDPs),which amounts to almost 15% of the country’s total population who have been displaced by the more than 50-year-long conflict.[22] There is a clear link between mine contamination and displacement, as displaced people cannot return to areas where there is a risk of landmines. The presence of mines acts as an obstacle to land restitution as well as to the return of IDPs because Colombian law states that victims of the conflict cannot knowingly be endangered. Demining and survey are therefore essential to allow the safe return of Colombia’s vast displaced population, as well as to enable rural communities to recover from years of persecution and ensure the safety of local residents in the long term.[23]

Cluster Munition Contamination

It is unclear whether Colombia is affected by cluster munition remnants. Colombia ratified the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 10 September 2015, declaring that “it is possible that there remain, in national territory, cluster munitions or cluster munition remnants of whose location the State has no knowledge or suspicion…Regarding article 4, and in connection with the particular circumstances of its internal armed conflict, the Republic of Colombia understands ‘cluster munition remnants’ to mean those whose location is known or suspected by the State.”[24]

In its initial Article 7 transparency report submitted in 2016, Colombia reported that it was in the process of determining the extent of cluster munition contamination and requested international assistance for training and equipment in order to carry out survey and clearance at a cost of almost $4.2 million in 2016–2026.[25] Its Article 7 report submitted in 2017, it noted that Form F (covering contamination and clearance) was “unchanged.”[26] In its Article 7 report submitted in 2018, Colombia reported that it “has no knowledge or suspicion of the existence of cluster munitions in its territory.”[27]

In May 2009, Colombia’s Minister of Defense, Juan Manuel Santos, acknowledged that the Colombian Armed Forces had used cluster munitions in the past “to destroy clandestine airstrips and camps held by illegal armed groups,” but noted the submunitions sometimes did not explode and “became a danger to the civilian population.”[28] In 2010, the Ministry of National Defense said that the Colombian Air Force last used cluster munitions on 10 October 2006 “to destroy clandestine airstrips belonging to organizations dedicated to drug trafficking in remote areas of the country where the risk to civilians was minimal.”[29]

In November 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights found that Colombia had violated the rights to life and to physical, mental, and moral integrity by using a United States World War II “cluster adapter” to disperse fragmentation bombs during an attack on the village of Santo Domingo in December 1998.[30] A helicopter dropped an AN-M1A2 cluster munition containing six submunitions, killing 17 civilians, including six children, and injuring a further 27 civilians, including nine children. The action also resulted in the displacement of the village’s inhabitants. Colombia had sought to attribute the deaths to a bomb placed by FARC guerrillas.[31]

The Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA–Descontamina Colombia) stated that no cluster munition contamination is registered in IMSMA and there are no reports of accidents caused by cluster munition remnants.[32] HALO Trust did not encounter any cluster munition remnants in Colombia in 2017 or receive any reports of casualties,[33] nor did NPA,[34] however they did not conduct activities in the area of Santo Domingo. The CCCM reported that there has been no survey or clearance operations in the area of Santo Domingo, Arauca. However, the CCCM has conducted risk education in the area, and has not received reports of cluster munition contamination or accidents.[35]

Program Management

In September 2014, Decree 1649 created the Directorate for Comprehensive Mine Action (Dirección para la Acción Integral contra minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) to replace the earlier mine action body, the Presidential Program for Comprehensive Mine Action (PAICMA).[36] In August 2017, DAICMA became DAICMA–Descontamina Colombia.[37]

DAICMA retained the same mandate and functions as PAICMA; the only change being that DAICMA was now supporting the Minister-Advisor for Post-Conflict, Human Rights, and Security as well as the Minister-Advisor’s office in the strategic management of the national mine action program.

In April 2017, following the adoption of a Presidential Decree, DAICMA was made Colombia’s national mine action authority, with responsibility for formulating the strategic direction of mine action, coordinating and monitoring mine action at national and local level, applying technical guidance and regulating state and non-state operators, and elaborating and implementing national standards, though in practice it also serves as the national mine action center.[38]

The National Interministerial Commission on Anti-personnel Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP) was previously the national mine action authority responsible for implementing the Mine Ban Treaty, including developing a national plan and policy and coordinating international assistance.[39]

In 2011, Decree 3750 created the Interinstitutional Court of Humanitarian Demining (Instancia Interinstitucional de Desminado Humanitario, IIDH), which is composed of a representative from the Ministry of National Defense, the General Inspectorate of the Military Forces, and Descontamina Colombia. It is responsible for recommending or suspending the certification of humanitarian demining organizations to the Ministry of National Defense and, determining and assigning demining tasks.[40]

Descontamina Colombia’s ability to coordinate has come under scrutiny, as it has been locking in operators to tasks before the extent of the challenge is known and without a clear appreciation of operators’ future capacities. In the view of UNMAS, in Descontamina Colombia’s push to assign tasks demonstrating the peace accord’s new opportunities (see below), operators often deployed into new areas which were disconnected from their existing areas of operation, without prior consideration of their capacity and efficient resource deployment.[41] Descontamina Colombia are willing to permit international demining operators to swap tasks between themselves but see this as an internal organizational decision rather than something that should happen at a national level, and in reality very few tasks have been swapped.[42]

The Organization of American States (OAS) serves as the monitoring body for humanitarian demining in Colombia.

UNMAS provides technical assistance to mine action authorities and state entities. It also promotes capacity development of humanitarian demining operators.[43]

Strategic planning

Colombia’s Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 deadline extension request projected, improbably, that all mined areas would be released by 2020.[44] This will not occur.

Colombia developed a Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021, the aim of which is to address antipersonnel mine contamination in 199 high-impact municipalities, 291 medium-impact municipalities, and 183 low-impact municipalities, covering a total estimated area of 51km².[45] As of August 2018, the suspicion of mines has been removed in 270 municipalities,[46] though in only 99 of these was this achieved through actual survey or clearance. Moreover, antipersonnel mines were found in only 17 of the 99 municipalities. In around 160 of the contaminated municipalities, access for humanitarian demining organizations is constrained by the prevailing security situation and therefore they have yet to be assigned for demining.[47]

Colombia did not attain the targets set in the 2011–2013 operational plan to address 6,000 dangerous and mined areas in 14 of 660 municipalities where the presence of mines is suspected, covering an estimated 15km².[48] It was then due to submit an operational plan for 2014–2020 at the Thirteenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2013, but did not do so. Colombia did present a demining “action plan” for 2014–2016 at the Mine Ban Treaty Third Review Conference in Maputo in July 2014.[49] The plan foresaw a first phase of mine action in 91 municipalities and steadily increasing national army demining capacity to 54 units, as well as the number of non-technical survey teams to 15 by 2016.[50]

Colombia prioritizes its task allocation according to the IIDH and the Strategic Plan for Comprehensive Action against Antipersonnel Mines 2016–2021. The IIDH takes into account information provided by local bodies, the Early Warning System of the Ombudsman’s Office, the General Command of the Military Forces, and Descontamina Colombia. In the strategic plan, municipalities have been categorized according to three typologies: type I comprise incidents involving antipersonnel mines or UXO registered on IMSMA since 2010; type II are incidents involving antipersonnel mines and UXO registered on IMSMA before 2010; and type III are IMSMA “events” without human impact.[51] Operators can only bid for tasks in type I areas while the armed forces have been assigned all type II and III areas, many of which they have been able to cancel and release through discussion with the local community and local security councils.[52]

As of December 2017, Descontamina Colombia reported that 27km² had been allocated for humanitarian demining operations: half of the total contamination estimated in the strategic plan.[53] It further reported that, by July 2018, two departments and 264 municipalities had been liberated of the suspicion of mines, while 192 municipalities currently have mine action operations. As a result, it reports that 6.94km² of area has been “liberated” and 6,007 items destroyed since operations began. In terms of capacity, 5,692 personnel and 24 mine detection dogs (MDDs) have been accredited for demining; and there are 12 mine action operators, including both national and civil society capacity.[54]

Mine action and the 2015 peace deal

On 7 March 2015, negotiators for the government of Colombia and FARC announced that agreement had been reached by the two parties on demining.[55] According to a joint statement, the government and the FARC would select a number of pilot zones with the highest level of threat from antipersonnel mines, IEDs, UXO, or other ERW. Following signature in August 2015 of an agreement with the European Union for support to the Pilot Project on Humanitarian Demining, NPA was overseeing non-technical survey of SHAs and technical survey and clearance of CHAs.[56] This led to the clearance of two areas: the villages of El Orejón (municipality of Briceño, department of Antioquia) and Santa Helena (municipality of Mesetas, department of Meta). By December 2016, a total of 40,723m² had been cleared, eight contaminated areas had been identified, and 67 mines were destroyed.[57]

On 7 August 2018, Iván Duque Márquez, winner of Colombia’s presidential election, assumed office. President Duque, and his political mentor former president Uribe, have refused to recognize key pillars of the peace deal and have promised to “modify” it once in power. This fosters further uncertainty in a country whose transition to peace is under threat from groups struggling for power in the vacuum left behind by a demobilized FARC. This includes FARC dissidents, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and drug-trafficking groups, especially the largest among them, the Gaitán Self-Defense Forces. Most of the fight for control is concentrated in about one-quarter of the country’s municipalities, just 5% of which are under state control. For humanitarian demining groups this impacts their ability to conduct survey and clearance.[58]

Mine action operations will only be undertaken with the local community’s agreement. In areas where mistrust of the state is high, community members are often skeptical of the operator’s intentions. In 2017–2018, in the Vista Hermosa municipality, HALO Trust and NPA have had their vehicles seized and burned, while CCCM had their vehicle seized for a month as a warning that they were not welcome to conduct demining in certain areas.[59] Unfortunately, these are often areas with the highest suspected contamination. Humanitarian demining operators will not conduct demining in areas where they have not received agreement from the local community. In ELN strongholds, such as the coastal department of Chocó, it has been reported that actors are emplacing mines in order to protect their territory.[60]

Legislation and standards

Colombia has legislation mandating the establishment of the CINAMAP, PAICMA, DAICMA, and most recently Descontamina Colombia, as well as the IIDH, which acts as a decision-making body. Decree 3750 of 2011 also called for the elaboration of National Standards for Humanitarian Demining and regulates the external monitoring of demining operations. Decree 3750 defines humanitarian demining activities as non-technical survey, technical survey, and clearance.[61] In July 2017, Decree 1195 was promulgated with a view to reducing the impact of demining on the environment. The main objective of the decree is to outline the mitigation and correction measures that must be applied by operators when undertaking demining in National Parks and other areas of ecological value. This is intended to reassure the environmental authorities that mine clearance can take place in these areas without causing unnecessary ecological damage.[62]

Colombia now has 15 national mine action standards in place, including a glossary of mine action terms, up from just three when the 2016–2021 strategic plan was launched.[63] In 2017, nine new national mine action standards were adopted, which include standards on clearance, mechanical demining, MDDs, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD).[64] The national standard on technical survey was approved by Descontamina Colombia in December 2017.[65] The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) and UNMAS have both been supporting Descontamina Colombia with the development and implementation of national standards.[66]

In 2017, 10 existing national standards were modified, some more than once. According to Descontamina Colombia, most of the amendments were at the request of the operators.[67] In the case of task assignment and clearance, the national standards were modified three times during the year. This has caused difficulties for both the operators and the OAS, as each modification of the standard means that operators’ standing operating procedures (SOPs) must also be changed, which then need to be approved by OAS. The national standard on non-technical survey has had seven modifications.[68] Operators have raised this with Descontamina Colombia, who have agreed to suspend modifications to standards to allow operators to develop more efficient operations using the standards that have been elaborated.[69]

Quality management

The OAS serves as the body for accreditation and monitoring of humanitarian demining in Colombia. They have received some criticism from operators for being too focused on compliance rather than on supporting the effective running of demining operations. This has manifested itself in non-critical conformities being determined by rigid application of national standards and/or SOPs, leading to delays in operations.[70] There have also been long waiting times after paperwork has been submitted, which have delayed operations and land release.[71] At the request of Descontamina Colombia, FSD has been seeking to build capacity in the OAS in quality management.[72]

The OAS is also responsible for the accreditation and re-accreditation of MDDs. Re-accreditation takes place annually at a center in Guatavita, which is an hour outside of Bogota in an area with a very cold climate. MDDs must travel from their operation base to the OAS center and with time for acclimatization the MDDs can be away from operations for a month.[73]

As of August 2018, a new national standard in quality management was in the process of being implemented. This standard includes the implementation of confidence levels, which will be ascribed to an operator and should improve efficiency. An operator with good confidence levels will be subject to less frequent visits from OAS, allowing them to focus on operators that need more support.[74]

Each operator carries out their own internal quality control in accordance with the provisions in the Quality Management national standard and their organizational SOPs. From June 2016 to June 2018, Descontamina Colombia had a team of Quality Managers that provided technical assistance to the operators on issues such as accreditation of personnel and demining techniques, interpretation of and compliance with national standards, and conflicts between the OAS and the operators.[75]

Information management

Government Decree 1649 of 2014 assigned Descontamina Colombia responsibility for maintaining the IMSMA database and to “compile, systematize, centralize, and update relevant information” to serve as a basis for program planning.[76] However, information management remains a central challenge for the program.

NPA supported Descontamina Colombia on information management from July 2016 until March 2018, when FSD took over.[77]

Descontamina Colombia in conjunction with FSD has been training the OAS to use IMSMA and states that the quality of the database is improving. IMSMA is now available online.[78]

The “events” on the IMSMA database that form part of the prioritization of demining are beset with errors, including duplications and inaccuracies. This leads to inefficiencies at an operational level as operators spend time and resources investigating IMSMA events that do not correspond with actual contamination.[79]

Operators

The Armed Forces Humanitarian Demining Brigade (Brigada de Desminado Humanitario, BRDH), formerly called the Humanitarian Demining Battalion (BIDES), has been conducting humanitarian demining since 2005.[80] As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in 214 municipalities across the departments of Antioquia, Boyacá, Caldas, Caquetá, Casanare, Cauca, Cesar, Chocó, Cordoba, Cundimarca, Guaviare, Huila, Magdalena, Meta, Nariño, Putumayo, Quindío, Risaralda, Santander, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca.[81] As of October 2018, 4,450 personnel had been accredited as well as 18 MDDs and three mechanical assets.[82] As of September 2018, the OAS was investigating two incidents of an explosive item being found after clearance in Planadas and Pensilvania had been conducted by MDDs.[83]

The Marine Corps Explosives and Demining Association (AEDIM) was created and activated through CARMA Decree 41 of 30 December 2014. It has a Humanitarian Demining company, made up of three platoons, and which conducts clearance and destruction of antipersonnel mines and ERW in areas under the jurisdiction of the National Navy.[84] As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in 12 municipalities across the departments of Bolivar and Sucre.[85] As of April 2018, 240 personnel had been accredited.[86]

In 2017, HALO Trust employed 347 operational personnel (split between non-technical survey and manual demining).[87] HALO employs a number of ex-combatants from various NSAGs when the respective donor’s policy allows it.[88] In 2018, HALO acquired a mechanical asset for vegetation clearance. As of August 2018, it was in the process of developing its SOPs with the support of FSD and will begin using the mechanical asset once the SOPs have been approved. The HALO is also conducting field trials of four MDDs. HALO conducts EOD using thermite or a disruptor, and in 2018 it purchased a drone.[89] As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in 23 municipalities across Antioquia, Cauca, Meta, Nariño, Putumayo, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca.[90]

NPA formally initiated a mine action program in April 2015, having taken part in the peace talks between the government and FARC that concerned demining. The first step in the process of implementing the agreement on demining was to conduct non-technical survey of suspected contamination in the departments of Meta and Antioquia. The parties chose two pilot projects, one in the village of El Orejón (Antioquia) and a second in the village of Santa Helena (Meta). NPA’s role has been to lead and supervise a mine clearance project as a trust-building exercise between the government of Colombia and FARC. The Colombian army has been conducting the mine clearance, with NPA providing verification with two MDD teams, while FARC has given information on contaminated areas.[91]

In 2017, NPA was supporting the Demining Brigade with its MDD and dog handler training.[92] NPA began conducting clearance operations with manual deminers in March 2017. In October 2017, MDD and mechanical assets were deployed with an immediate increase in productivity of 224%. NPA deployed almost 170 personnel in 2017 with five survey and seven clearance teams, including three teams of MDDs and three mechanical teams.[93] Since November 2017, NPA has employed FARC ex-combatants as “local guides,” which has improved the safety and efficiency of clearance operations. As of June 2018, NPA had been assigned tasks in 10 municipalities in the departments of Antioquia, Caquetá, Choco, and Meta. As of August 2018, NPA were using a disruptor for EOD but were planning to acquire thermite.[94]

In 2018, NPA had two incidents where its manual capacity found mines after clearance had been conducted by MDD teams, one in April in Vista Hermosa and one in August in Briceno. NPA has conducted internal investigations as well as thorough MDD review from the Global Training Center to assess the use of MDDs in Colombia and why incidents occurred. The incident in Briceno was also subject of formal Descontamina Board of Inquiry. All reports conclude that it was the way in which MDD assets were used and not the effectiveness of the assets as such that were the issue. NPA has developed detailed corrective action plans to address identified issues.[95]

The CCCM began humanitarian demining work in Colombia in 2017. UNMAS has supported the CCCM to develop from an advocacy organization to a demining operator, assisting in the development and review of operational plans and providing initial funding to the CCCM for this transition.[96] The CCCM conducts clearance using manual techniques only.[97] In 2017, it had five clearance teams with a total of 20 deminers, nine demining leaders/supervisors, and four paramedics.[98] The CCCM also employs FARC ex-combatants as part of its survey and clearance teams. As of June 2018, it had been assigned tasks in three municipalities across Antioquia, Cauca, and Huila.[99]

HI began humanitarian demining in Colombia in 201`7. In 2017, it employed a total of 62 personnel for non-technical survey and clearance.[100] HI currently conducts clearance using only manual demining.[101] As of September 2018, it had begun operations in five municipalities across the departments of Caquetá, Cauca, and Meta.[102] As of August 2018, HI had approval to use thermite and a disrupter for EOD.[103]

The Danish Demining Group (DDG) is in the process of setting up its mine action program in Colombia and is currently providing mine risk education to affected communities in the departments of Meta and Cundinamarca. In March 2017, DDG received Phase 1 accreditation to conduct demining in Colombia.[104]

Humanicemos DH, the FARC demining organization, was accredited in August 2017.[105] In 2017, NPA trained 28 ex-combatants in clearance and non-technical survey, 10 of whom were also trained as section leaders and five as team leaders.[106] Between the CCCM and Humanicemos DH, with UNMAS support, an additional 100 ex-combatants are trained in the same technical areas.[107] As of August 2018, 124 ex-combatants were awaiting accreditation.[108] Due to funding limitations of their main donors, the OAS is unable to quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) ex-combatant deminers. The government of Colombia has therefore decided to mandate UNMAS to assume this role, though the formal mandate to do so was still unsigned as of September 2018. This has led to delays in Humanicemos being able to start clearance operations with personnel sitting idle while they wait for their accreditation.[109] The United States (US) still recognizes the FARC as a terrorist organization, which means that ex-combatants cannot be associated with any US-funded projects.[110]

FSD has been providing technical assistance to Descontamina Colombia since early 2016. In 2017, it provided capacity-building with four specialists: one each for MDDs, mechanical assets, environmental protection and EOD, supporting the development of its national mine action standards in these areas. FSD also supported the elaboration of Decree 1195 of 2017, which regulates the impact of demining on the environment. At the request of Descontamina Colombia, FSD has also been providing support to the OAS to improve processes and simplify the forms around SOPs and accreditation. In 2018, FSD planned to support implementation of the national mine action standards.[111]

Land Release

There are discrepancies between data sources: Descontamina Colombia, the Article 7 report and operators (see survey and clearance sections below).

In 2017, according to Descontamina Colombia, just under 1km² was released by clearance and survey, with under 0.4km² cleared and the remainder cancelled or reduced by survey. In 2016, Colombia cleared less than 0.3km² of mined area. Just under 1.2km² was “released” through data clean-up in 2017.[112] This occurs in low impact areas after discussions between the armed forces and the local security councils.[113] A further 1.2km² of land was confirmed as contaminated with antipersonnel mines.

Survey in 2017

Colombia reported that in 2017, 110 SHAs were cancelled through non-technical survey covering 239,068m², while 346,301m² was reduced by technical survey. A total of 192 areas were confirmed as contaminated with antipersonnel mines, covering 1,165,237m².[114]

Survey in 2017[115]

Note: TS = technical survey.

There were discrepancies between data reported by Descontamina Colombia, the Article 7 report for 2017 and operators. The Article 7 report for 2017 reports 209,866m² as cancelled by non-technical survey and 283,046m² reduced by technical survey.[116] Survey data from Descontamina held on the IMSMA database is based on reports from operators that have been received and validated by the OAS, a process that can take several months, so this does not represent the total survey that has been undertaken in 2017. This goes some way in explaining the discrepancies in the data. The CCCM reported that it had conducted survey in Huila and Meta and confirmed 12 (rather than 11) areas covering 25,381m² (rather than 21,436m²).[117] HI reported that it had not cancelled any SHAs by non-technical survey (rather than 400m² in Meta) and confirmed 30 areas (rather than 18) as contaminated with mines in Caqueta, Cauca, and Meta (rather than just Cauca and Meta) covering 81,074m² (rather than 55,985m²).[118] NPA reported that it confirmed 21 areas (rather than eight) as contaminated with mines in Meta covering 136,967m² (rather than 70,055m²).[119] HALO Trust reported that it confirmed 82 areas as contaminated with mines covering 389,978m² in Antioquia, Meta, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca, and cancelled two areas of 7,289m² in Antioquia and Meta. Colombia reported that HALO Trust confirmed 67 areas as contaminated with mines covering 290,117m² in Antioquia, Meta, and Tolima, cancelled 61 areas covering 57,213m² in Antioquia, Meta, Tolima, and Valle del Cauca, and reduced 7,188m² by technical survey in Antioquia and Tolima.[120]

Operators are often conducting survey in communities that have been inaccessible in previous years due to the security situation and are skeptical of governmental initiatives. All the operators stressed the importance of community liaison and of working with local people when conducting non-technical survey as a way of both building relationships with the community and as a source of accurate information about the existence of contamination.[121] HALO Trust, for example, spent four months on community liaison in Cauca to gain the trust of the local community before beginning non-technical survey.[122] NPA, HALO, and the CCCM have been employing “local guides” who have either direct or indirect links with FARC.[123] At one of their sites in Vista Hermosa, NPA’s information came from an ex-FARC explosives expert who gave them exact information on how many mines had been planted and where.[124]

Clearance in 2017

Descontamina Colombia reported clearance of 383,951m² in 2017 across nine departments: Antioquia, Bolivar, Caldas, Caquetá, Cauca, Huila, Meta, Santander, and Tolima, destroying 104 antipersonnel mines.[125]

Mine clearance in 2017[126]

Note: AP = antipersonnel.

There were discrepancies between data reported by Descontamina Colombia, the Article 7 report for 2017 and operators. The Article 7 report for 2017 reports 259,783m² as released by clearance.[127] Clearance data is only visible in IMSMA when an operator officially hands over the area to the community and a completion report is submitted to Descontamina Colombia and that is approved by the OAS, which goes some way to explaining this difference. There was a small difference in the clearance figure reported by CCCM in Meta of 1,601m² rather than 1,426m². The CCCM also reported that they cleared 10 antipersonnel mines while Colombia reported that they cleared no mines but three IEDs.[128] HALO Trust reported clearing 39 (rather than 35) areas covering 273,224m² (rather than 182,960m²) in the departments of Antioquia, Meta, and Tolima, destroying 119 mines.[129] HI reported that it cleared two areas in Cauca and Meta totaling 4,679m² and destroyed one IED rather than one area in Cauca of 408m².[130] NPA reported it conducted clearance in 16 areas in Meta covering 82,606m² and three areas in Antioquia covering 10,007m², destroying 50 antipersonnel mines, 18 UXO, and 37 IEDs.[131]

In 2017, a further 140 antipersonnel mines and 47 items of UXO were destroyed during EOD spot tasks.[132]

Deminer safety

In September 2017, while conducting a non-technical survey a deminer from the Humanitarian Demining Brigade was injured by a UXO.[133]

There have also been a number of security incidents.

In June 2017, an NPA vehicle was set on fire in Santa Helena, Mesetas municipality of the department of Meta by dissidents of the FARC-EP. NPA evacuated its personnel and has not been able to return to the area.[134]

In April 2018, FARC dissidents in La Reforma, San Martin municipality in the department of Meta seized a CCCM vehicle and held it for just over a month before returning it to the CCCM. When non-technical survey had been conducted in the area, the FARC dissidents had felt ignored but after consultation the CCCM were allowed to conduct operations.[135]

In July 2018, HALO Trust had a vehicle seized and set on fire in the village of Santander, Uribe municipality, in the department of Meta. An armed group of 15 FARC dissidents detained a team of four people conducting non-technical survey, forcing them to leave the vehicle before setting it on fire. The group threatened the non-technical survey team and informed them that they did not want HALO Trust operating in the Uribe or Mesetas municipalities.[136]

Land Release in 2017: cluster munition-contaminated areas

No assessment, survey, or clearance of cluster munition remnants was conducted in 2017.

Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Compliance

Under Article 5 of the Mine Ban Treaty (and in accordance with the 10-year extension granted by States Parties in 2010), Colombia is required to destroy all antipersonnel mines in mined areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2021. It is not on target to meet the deadline, though the current national strategic plan still envisions that Colombia will fulfil its demining obligations by 2021.

Colombia does not have a meaningful understanding of baseline contamination. The report from Descontamina Colombia that 27km² of the contaminated area has been allocated for humanitarian demining operations may seem impressive but operators have found that tasks have been allocated in a way that does not allow them to work efficiently. Tasks may be spread across the country forcing operators to set up multiple location bases with all the resources that entails.

The areas that have so far been declared free of mines have had very low or even no contamination. The majority of the high-impact areas are not yet assigned due to the difficult security situation in those areas. The ongoing issues with security, with the rise of FARC dissidents, the ELN, and drug traffickers, means that it is unlikely humanitarian demining organizations will be able to access these areas until the security situation changes.

Non-technical and technical survey are vital to efficient demining operations and are particularly important in Colombia when the initial information given at the task allocation stage has been found to be so unreliable. Non-technical survey, and the associated community liaison, is also vital to building trust with communities to enable access to these areas.

The national standard for technical survey was approved in 2017 and it is hoped that the greater use of non-technical and technical survey will more accurately determine the location and extent of actual contamination, and cancel areas not contaminated. Costs of demining are high in Colombia, on average between US$8 and $20 dollars per square meter, and the amount of clearance varies widely depending on the demining techniques used and the terrain. In Briceño, NPA have been conducting manual excavation, which per deminer is as little as only one to five square meters a day.[137] Descontamina Colombia reports that across all the operators productivity, per deminer ranges from 5 to 20m² per day.[138]

There was a substantial increase in capacity in 2017 following the signature of the peace deal between the Colombian government and the FARC-EP in 2016, with humanitarian demining playing an important part in the implementation of the peace process.

Mine clearance in 2013–2017

Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Colombia is required to destroy all cluster munitions in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 March 2026. Colombia does not have areas of confirmed or suspected cluster munition contamination.

Colombia may be able to declare full completion of its Article 4 obligations once assessment and survey have been conducted.

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2018, the Republic of Colombia received US$33.1 million of international assistance from 10 donors; this was 52% less than 2017 when 14 donors contributed some $68.4 million.

The largest contributions were provided by the United States (US) and Norway, which contributed a combined total of $29.3 million and accounted for nearly 90% of all international assistance.[1]

International contributions: 2018[2]

Since 2014, international contributions to Colombia totaled more than $150 million. No information on any national contribution was available for 2016–2018. Between 2012 and 2015, the government of Colombia contributed some $6.6 million to support its national mine action program.

Summary of international contributions in 2014–2018[3]

Note: ERW = explosive remnants of war.

Casualties in 2017—details

Mine/ERW casualty data for the Republic of Colombia from the Department for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Dirección para la Acción Integral Contra Minas Antipersonal, DAICMA) for 2017 recorded 52 mine/ERW casualties. This marked a decrease from 2016 and continued a decline in total annual casualty numbers from previous years.

The ratio of civilian to military casualties was reversed for the first time in many years, a notable change in the trend of there being more military casualties.[2] Civilians made up 71% of recorded casualties in 2017, the highest percentage recorded since DAICMA collection data for 1990. In 2017, casualties were recorded in 10 departments: Antioquia, Arauca, Bolivar, Caqueta, Cauca, Choco, Guaviare, Meta, Nariño, and Norte de Santander.

Casualty numbers increased significantly in 2018. By end of September, over 100 casualties were recorded (12 people were killed and 94 injured). Civilians were also the majority of recorded casualties for 2018 through September (69, or 65%).

Since 1982, mine/ERW casualties have been recorded in all of Colombia’s 32 departments.[3]

Nearly all victim-activated explosives that can be triggered by the contact of a person are referred to as antipersonnel mines in the casualty data for Colombia. These casualties have been caused by victim-activated improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that act like antipersonnel landmines, rather than by industrially manufactured antipersonnel mines.[4] If any accidents occurred in the past as a result of industrially produced landmines, before military bases were cleared of this type of landmine, they have not been recorded as such.[5]

Cluster munition casualties

As identified in Case No. 12.416 (Santo Domingo Massacre versus the Republic of Colombia) heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster munition strike in Santo Domingo, Colombia, on 13 December 1998.[6] No unexploded submunition casualties have been reported in Colombia.

Action points based on findings

• Expedite processes for mine/explosive remnants of war (ERW) survivors to access their rights under the Victims’ Law, including ensuring that out of pocket expenses for a range of services are covered within insurance systems.
• Coordinate donor funding to specific victim assistance projects as part of the commitment to mine action for peace.
• Dedicate resources to the comprehensive implementation of new policies and programs, including those promoting the rights of persons with disabilities.
• Harmonize victim assistance and disability legal frameworks, coordination, and new initiatives.
• Ensure survivors, their families, and communities in rural areas can access assistance, services and reparations; streamline administrative requirements and facilitate access across long distances to service providers.
• Include peer support services under the health system (EPS) and through the psychological services coordinated for, and offered to, conflict victims.
• Strengthen and facilitate survivor participation in decision-making though processes for victims of armed conflict and persons with disabilities.

Victim assistance commitments

The Republic of Colombia is responsible for a significant number of mine/ERW survivors who are in need of assistance. Cluster munitions victims have also been reported. Colombia has made commitments to provide victim assistance through the Mine Ban Treaty and as a State Party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions.

Colombia ratified the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) on 5 May 2011.

Casualties[1]

Casualties Overview

In 2015 the Department for Comprehensive Action Against Antipersonnel Mines (Dirección para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal, DAICMA)[2] recorded 222 mine/ERW casualties in 2015.[3]

There were 161 military casualties in 2015, of which three occurred during demining activities.[4] Civilian casualties (61) made up 28% of the total.[5] Almost half (45%) of civilian casualties were children (22 boys; six girls). There is a steady trend of increasing child casualties as a percentage of annual civilian casualties. The percentage of child casualties in 2015 has tripled compared to 2010. However, in absolute terms child casualties came back to the levels observed in 2010 when there were 28 child casualties. There were four casualties among women, a number similar to the four women casualties in 2014. The remainder of all recorded civilian casualties (48%) were men.

The overall mine/ERW casualty total in 2015 (222) represents a 32% decrease in annual casualties in comparison to 2014 (292 casualties, as revised by DAICMA in 2016. Between 2006 and 2010, the Monitor identified a trend of declining annual casualty rates since the peak of almost 1,200 casualties recorded annually in 2005 and 2006.[6] In 2011 and 2012, the decline slowed with annual casualty totals remaining fairly consistent, at 496 and 549 casualties per year, with a drop once again in 2013 that continued through 2015.

Since 1982, mine/ERW casualties have been recorded in 31 of Colombia’s 32 departments. In 2015, casualties were recorded in 15 departments, of which Antioquia, Cauca, Meta, and Caqueta recorded the highest rates.[7]

Cluster munition casualties

As identified in Case No. 12.416 (Santo Domingo Massacre versus the Republic of Colombia) heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 17 civilians were killed and 27 were injured during a cluster munition strike in Santo Domingo, Colombia on 13 December 1998.[8] No unexploded submunition casualties have been reported in Colombia.

Victim Assistance

There were some 9,000 recorded mine/ERW survivors in Colombia as of December 2015.

Victim assistance during the Cartagena Action Plan 2010–2014

More than 60 local disabled persons’ organizations (DPOs) and approximately 20 survivor associations have been formed through the work of national and international NGOs, and Colombian authorities gradually increasing opportunities for peer-to-peer support as well as socioeconomic inclusion.[9]

The national Victims and Land Restitution Law (Ley 1448: Ley de Víctimas y Restitución de Tierras, or Victims’ Law 1448) of 2011 guarantees comprehensive assistance to all mine/ERW survivors—among many other victims of conflict, the majority being displaced persons since 1985—as redress for violations of their rights resulting from armed conflict. Coordination of the implementation of the law is the responsibility of the Unit for the Assistance and Comprehensive Reparation of Victims (Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a Víctimas, or Victims’ Unit) and the National Victim Attention and Comprehensive Reparation System (Sistema Nacional de Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas, SNARIV). Throughout the period, a series of legislative measures were adopted to guarantee the rights of mine/ERW survivors through branches of the administrative routes, or pathways, to accessing assistance and reparations for conflict victims, which apply specifically to mine/ERW victims (Ruta de atención integral para víctimas de MAP, MUSE y AEI, or Pathways to Assistance). The Pathways to Assistance provide legislative and practical frameworks through which victims can access their rights to emergency care and by registering as conflict victims to gain access to compensation, rehabilitation and other forms of assistance.[10] They also identify the bodies responsible for relevant procedures. Pathways to Assistance are developed at the national, departmental, and municipal levels. However, as of 2015, many mine/ERW survivors had not completed the necessary processes or benefited from the law. The Victims’ Law 1448 itself is time-limited to the period of a decade, until 10 June 2021.

Access to services and support through the Pathways to Assistance for mine/ERW survivors can involve several stages and require registration with a number of different institutions. There are two separate key phases: an emergency care phase for all new survivors, and a subsequent phase of assistance and reparations following the registration and approval as a victim of armed conflict. Emergency healthcare is covered by a state fund for victims of conflict and car accidents through the Health Finance Solidarity Insurance Fund (Fondo de Seguridad y Garantía, FOSYGA). Ongoing health and rehabilitation needs of victims are covered by the existing healthcare insurance system, however access to the health system can be expedited by specific legislation and facilitated by the Victim’s Unit. Mine/ERW survivors, like other registered conflict victims are to be provided with an individual assistance plan (plan de atención, asistencia y reparación integral, PAARI), that can include specific interventions based on needs and recommendations for sustainable investments in livelihood activities using the indemnity/compensation payments provided to victims.

Victims’ Law 1448 specifies that victims must access health and rehabilitation services through the national health system and its registered service providers (Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios de Salud, IPS).[11] Colombia has a system of universal health insurance with both contributive and fully-state subsidized elements through a system of identification for social assistance beneficiaries according to their economic means (SISBEN).[12] Under the General Health Social Security System (Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud, SGSSS) framework survivors with adequate incomes contribute to health insurance through health insurance companies (Empresas Promotoras de Salud, EPS) as paying policy holders. Those without the means can be registered with an EPS through the fully subsidized funding system, with the approval of SISBEN. Since March 2014, conflict victims, including mine/ERW survivors, not already registered with an EPS for insurance are to be automatically included in the subsidized system.[13]

Legislative changes to be implemented by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection and the Victims’ Unit reduced the time for new survivors to be included in the subsidized health system and for uninsured mine/ERW survivors with disabilities identified in the Registry of Victims (RUV) to be registered with an EPS.[14] However, for many survivors there were considerable delays in the process of accessing services through an EPS and discrepancies in the provision of assistance by the institutions providing health services (IPS).[15] In some cases, the EPS only provided for transportation, although survivors also needed support with food and accommodation in order to access medical treatment.[16]

Due to difficulties in accessing health insurance, healthcare, physical rehabilitation services and humanitarian assistance, and compensation remain inaccessible for the poorest living in areas affected by the armed conflict.[17] Complicated procedures to register as a mine victim and delayed reimbursements have meant that many survivors could not access the care they needed and therefore the ICRC and national and international NGOs often played crucial roles by facilitating access to and/or paid for services. Decreasing international funding for NGOs since 2012 limited their efforts to fill gaps in existing care and to facilitate access by paying for transportation and accommodation.[18] In 2015, the decline in international cooperation funding continued to force some organizations to reduce their services, including rehabilitation services and prosthesis.[19]

The decrease in funding to victim assistance activities in Colombia and changes in the system of insurance for health and rehabilitation due to restructuring of funding under the Victims’ Law 1448 meant that NGOs continued to fill gaps in assistance, particularly in transportation to access services, in economic and social inclusion programs, and in psychological support, which should be addressed through the system of benefits provided by the government. The majority of mine/ERW survivors lived in rural and remote areas with limited access to transportation and communication.

Moderate improvements were reported in the overall availability or access to services and programs for mine/ERW survivors. While there were still many mine/ERW survivors waiting for services and benefits, service providers and organizations working with survivors gained a better understanding of the assistance pathways process to access survivors’ rights at the local and departmental levels, improving the overall quality and effectiveness of services received by survivors and reducing delays. Overall access to assistance services therefore improved somewhat as a result of promotion and awareness raising of Victims’ Law 1448 and the assistance pathways by the government.[20] However, survivors still struggled to access the benefits of the law as they face multiple financial, physical, and administrative barriers to obtain basic medicines and rehabilitation services.

Victim assistance in 2015

Survivors had a better understanding of their rights and procedures to access them. Access to assistance improved overall. However, assistance is still largely provided at the level emergency care, but comprehensive rehabilitation remained far less available. Changes in administrative roles due to elections often delayed the implementation of guaranteed rights and services, and reinforcing the relevant actors used the scarce time and capacity resources of civil society.[21]

Of all survivors eligible for assistance, less than half received the services to which they are entitled. Despite efforts to improve access to rehabilitation, complex bureaucratic procedures often resulted in delayed access to services.[22] Gaps in the provision of health, rehabilitation, and psychosocial services remained prevalent.[23] Overall in 2015, an increased emphasis on children and women was noted, as well as improved efforts and mechanisms to include families of victims of the armed conflict and other minorities in the provision of assistance.[24] Colombia has a strong legal framework to assist and address the rights and needs of victims and persons with disabilities and there were notable advances, however many of these policies were not entirely implemented.

Assessing victim assistance needs

DAICMA is legally mandated to collect and manage all information on mine/ERW casualties and victim assistance.[25] There are also many additional sources of information on mine-related accidents.[26] In 2015, needs evaluation procedures were modified to allow clearer evaluation of local assistance needs and gaps in accessing services.[27]

In June 2015, the deadline expired for the registration of persons victimized between 1 January 1985 and 10 June 2011. As of June 2015, 5,539 mine/ERW victims were officially registered in the Registry of Victims (RUV), managed by the Victims’ Unit.[28] This figure was less than half of the total number of mine/ERW casualties recorded by DAICMA for the same period in its Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database.[29] There was also still a need to cross reference IMSMA data on casualties with the health systems SISBEN registry.[30]

When the registration period for past conflict victims concluded in June 2015, it became significantly more complicated for victims from events prior to 2011 to get registered in the Victims’ Unit system if they had not already been recorded in the IMSMA database. Registration would entail specific explanations of the circumstances of victimization and require that the victims provide adequate reasoning for not having registered earlier. Conflict victims occurring after 2011 have a period of two years from the time of victimization to register.[31]

In 2015, it was believed that some victims, especially civilians and those for whom the mine/ERW incident occurred many years ago, were not registered in either DAICMA’s IMSMA database or the RUV. In some cases, victims were not recorded because they were either unaware of their rights or because they had avoided registration due to the fear of repercussions.[32] Some mine/ERW victims who had received support or partial compensation through the funding of the Health Finance Solidarity Insurance Fund (FOSYGA) prior to the adoption of the 2011 Victims’ Law, were unaware that they were still eligible for some assistance. Not all mine/ERW survivors, nor all persons with disabilities, were registered in both the IMSMA database and the RUV. [33] To start addressing this, DAICMA took steps to improve coordination with the Victims’ Unit.[34] Efforts to identify persons with disabilities, however, did not include whether the identified individuals were also mine/ERW survivors.[35]

From 2014 to October 2015, DAICMA, with support of the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas, CCCM), implemented a data management project with use of apps and information technology tools, including: a) using social protection or other existing registries; b) a national strategy for data management on all registered mine victims; c) systematization of updated national-level information.[36]

In May 2015, DAICMA finalized a two-year survey of 846 mine/ERW survivors in 201 municipalities.[37] The findings were shared with relevant institutions including the National Victim Attention and Comprehensive Reparation System (SNARIV).[38]

In 2015 and 2016, DAICMA periodically contacted mine/ERW victims to identify gaps and improve services delivered through the Pathway to Assistance. Of 59 new civilian survivors registered in 2015, 90% were contacted and able to access services.[39]

NGOs and government institutions continued to collect data on victims and to monitor access to services. The national NGO Pastoral Social maintained a database on the state of assistance to survivors, including with case studies.[40]

Victim assistance coordination

Coordination

DAICMA is the governmental body legally responsible for coordinating mine/ERW victim assistance, raising awareness, and facilitating victims’ participation. In 2015, DAICMA held 15 meetings to strengthen inter-institutional coordination and to draft and implement the Plan for Comprehensive Assistance and Reparation for Victims of Mines/ERW (Plan Nacional para la Atención Integral a Víctimas de Minas, REG). Meetings were used to improve cross-checked information on victims, analyze access to services, and updates on procedures.[41]

In 2016, the National Planning Department and DAICMA initiated the evaluation process of the 2009 mine action policy, including its impact on mine/ERW victims.[42]

To improve economic inclusion, DAICMA held five coordination meetings with the National Federation of Coffee Producers and the Polus Center, with the objective of including mine/ERW victims in coffee production initiatives.[43] In addition, 10 coordination meetings took place between DAICMA, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Agrarian Bank, and the Victims’ Unit to provide subsidies to mine/ERW victims for the construction of adapted houses in rural areas.[44]

Throughout 2015, DAICMA disseminated information on the national Pathway to Assistance for mine/ERW survivors, emphasizing the CRPD.[45] DAICMA also continued to work with local authorities to develop pathways to assistance for mine/ERW survivors in the departments of Antioquia, Arauca, Bolívar, Caquetá, Cauca, Chocó, Córdoba, Meta, Nariño, Norte de Santander, Putumayo, and Tolima and 23 municipal authorities in eight departments.[46] DAICMA developed separate Pathways to Assistance processes for mine/ERW survivors and family members from vulnerable groups, such as indigenous persons, Afro-Colombian populations, and persons with disabilities, as well as children and adolescents—the latter being in application since the second half of 2014.[47] DAICMA and civil society organizations advocated for the incorporation of victim assistance elements in local and national mine action and post-conflict plans.[48] In 2015, DAICMA held three meetings with the Program against Illicit Crops (Programas contra Cultivos Ilícitos, PCI) to update procedures and training for sector managers.[49] In 2015, DAICMA and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) held almost 300 coordination meetings and formed 15 guidance and monitoring committees to develop local strategies to promote guidelines for comprehensive assistance to child and adolescent mine/ERW victims and to initiate pilot tests in 10 municipalities.[50] The Organization of American States (OAS) participated in its coordination and implementation.[51]

Bilateral and multi-stakeholder coordination meetings were held among NGOs, service providers, DAICMA, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, National Health Institute, departmental state bodies, and survivor networks in 2015.[52] These meetings were used to improve assistance by optimizing the use of resources, increasing understanding of the needs especially at the local level, and for expediting assistance in urgent cases.[53] The meetings provided opportunities to better understand services available, promote advocacy, and identify barriers in accessing services, particularly regarding health insurance companies (Empresas Promotoras de Salud, EPS). Victims could also share their experiences and coordinate with relevant institutions.[54]

The National Disability System (Sistema Nacional de Discapacidad, SND),[55] is responsible for implementing and monitoring the national disability policy, managing the Registry for Identification of Persons with Disabilities (Registro para la Localización y Caracterización de las Personas con Discapacidad, RLCPD),[56] and coordinating with other national, departmental, and municipal bodies.[57]

Five coordination meetings on disability policy and victim assistance, highlighting the similarity of needs, were held between the SND and the National Victim Attention and Comprehensive Reparation System (SNARIV) in which DAICMA, the Victims’ Unit, and the Ministry of Health and Social Protection participate.[58] The legal framework for the rights of victims of armed conflict was developed in parallel with the legal instruments for disability rights, resulting in a gap between the two frameworks, and therefore, mine/ERW victims did not always fully participate in disability coordination mechanisms.[59] In 2015, efforts were made to promote the participation of victims of the armed conflict in regional committees on disability.[60] Despite efforts to coordinate between state and civil society disability and victim assistance institutions, challenges to integrating both legal frameworks remained.[61] A Ministry of Health and Social Protection representative said that there was a need to improve coordination between national, regional, and local institutions in the implementation of disability legislation and the Victims’ Law.[62]

National plans

The National Plan for the Comprehensive Reparation and Assistance for Victims of Violence, under Victims’ Law 1448[63] is supported by an implementation strategy, guidelines, a budget, and monitored through a mechanism at the Victims’ Unit.[64] SNARIV is also responsible for the implementation of the plan.[65]

A National Plan for Comprehensive Assistance to Victims of mines/ERW (2014) adopted by the National Intersectorial Commission for Mine Action (Comisión Intersectorial Nacional para la Acción contra las Minas Antipersonal, CINAMAP) is implemented through agreements with several governmental institutions including the Victims’ Unit, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Agriculture. DAICMA monitors the implementation of the plan.[66] Monitoring decreased because the focus turned to humanitarian demining and away from victim assistance in 2015.[67] The Mine Action Working Group monitors this plan at the departmental level.[68]

Reporting

Colombia provided detailed updates on the progress and challenges for victim assistance at the Mine Ban Treaty intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2016 and at the Mine Ban Treaty Fourteenth Meeting of States Parties, in Geneva in December 2015 as well as through its Mine Ban Treaty Article 7 report for calendar year 2015.[69] Colombia’s initial Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report was submitted on 28 August 2016. Form H for victim assistance stated that there are no registered cluster munition victims in Colombia.[70]

The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities reviewed Colombia’s initial CRPD reporting (of 2013) in 2016. Recommendations included: strengthening participation mechanisms for persons with disabilities in decision-making bodies, strengthening anti-discrimination measures, ensuring compliance with physical accessibility standards through a national plan, harmonizing of victim assistance and disability legal frameworks, and including a disability perspective in all victim assistance initiatives. The committee also highlighted the need to facilitate access to civilian justice processes for women and children victims of armed conflict-related violence.[71] Handicap International (HI) Colombia provided input on victim assistance for the alternative (shadow) CRPD reporting.[72]

Survivor inclusion and participation

In general, survivors or their representative organizations were invited to participate in discussion and consultation fora on themes that affect them, however participation was limited due to both political will and resources.[73]

Community leaders identified as focal points by NGOs report accidents and immediately communicate the assistance required. NGOs also provide a link between survivors and departmental health institutes.[74]

Survivors did not participate in mine action coordination meetings led by DAICMA or in coordination meetings between DAICMA and the Ministry of Health and Social Protection. Two survivors actively participated during the peace negotiations in Havana.[75]

Survivors are represented in the Victims’ Unit and the SNARIV, both responsible for the implementation of the Victims’ Plan, where they can participate in monitoring and in public policies. Although there is an effective presence, participation of survivors from remote areas is more difficult. In addition, despite the participation of mine/ERW survivors at the municipal and departmental levels, their participation at the national level is hindered by the fact that they do not have a recognized position, as do the majority categories of victims, including internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2015, the Colombian Campaign to Ban Landmines (CCCM) advocated for mine/ERW survivors to be recognized as a specific category of victims with an allocated place for national-level participation.[76]

Representatives of persons with disabilities participate in the National Disability Council (CND). However, it is not likely that survivors can participate in both the National Victim Attention and Comprehensive Reparation System (SNARIV) and CND due to time and access constraints.[77] The UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities expressed concerns regarding the lack of participation mechanisms for persons with disabilities in the National Disability System (Sistema Nacional de Discapacidad, SND) and the CND.[78]

Child mine/ERW survivors and family members participated in committee meetings of the guidelines for comprehensive assistance to mine/ERW children and adolescent victims project.[79]

DAICMA and the CCCM continued a project started in 2014 to strengthen the capacity of 10 mine/ERW victim representative organizations in nine departments.[80] In 2015, 270 meetings were held with the associations, and DAICMA representatives provided guidance in the development of strategies. Guidelines for capacity-building were implemented in pilot areas. Survivors’ associations were involved in all stages of the project.[81]

The National Network of Organizations of Mine/ERW Survivors and Victims with Disabilities, an umbrella body, organized capacity-building training for member organizations in order to develop the network through the ICBL-CMC Survivor Network Project.[82] The Ministry of Health, DAICMA, and national and international civil society organizations increased their efforts to strengthen the capacities of organizations of persons with disabilities. Most available capacity-building support for mine/ERW survivor associations was provided through international cooperation, which has been declining in the last years. However, DAICMA also led some initiatives to build the capacity of victim representation.[83] In the department of Florencia, the Chamber of Commerce provided the survivor association with materials and technical assistance, while organizational capacity-building was supported by the UNDP and CCCM.[84] HI held international seminars on advocacy capacity.[85] In July 2015, the District Association of Landmine Survivors (Asociación Distrital de Sobrevivientes de Minas Antipersonal y Municiones sin Explotar, ADISMAM) participated in a forum on antipersonnel mines and survivors’ rights in Bogota.[86] The Colombia Comprehensive Rehabilitation Center (Centro Integral de Rehabilitacion de Colombia, CIREC) worked with associations of persons with disabilities to promote participation in local and intersectorial disability coordination and to strengthen organizational capacities.[87]

Service accessibility and effectiveness

Victim assistance activities[88]

Emergency and ongoing medical care

A pathway to assistance developed by the Ministry of Health and Social Protection included facilitated access to emergency assistance services for armed conflict victims.[89]

However, in 2015 a decline in access to the healthcare was reported by national NGOs. Public services were often unattainable, or access was significantly delayed, and NGOs filled the gaps. This was due in part to a sharp decline in international funding, and a donors focus on emergency rather than comprehensive assistance. In addition, the newly adopted legislation stipulating that victims must obtain health services directly through the EPS further complicated access with its increased bureaucracy. State assistance, and municipal-level assistance in particular, is often considered ineffective.[90] NGOs found that services included in the Pathway to Assistance improved support for survivors to address the complex bureaucratic procedures required to access legally guaranteed services.[91]

In 2015, national NGOs[92] continued to visit hospitals in the aftermath of mine/ERW-related accidents to provide emergency response. The response also included distribution of WASH and food kits to the affected families.[93] The CCCM provided accompanying support for victims to obtain emergency aid, with support from UNICEF.[94] The ICRC supported wounded people to access healthcare services, provided training on first aid and weapon-wound management for emergency and medical personnel, and delivered medical materials. More persons with disabilities attended ICRC-supported centers than in 2014.[95]

Health coverage and accessibility for persons with disabilities overall was also lacking in rural and remote areas.[96]

Physical rehabilitation, including prosthetics

Due to funding reductions there was a decrease in access to prostheses for survivors, and to training for physical rehabilitation professionals.[97] This occurred despite a general overall improvement in the provision of physical rehabilitation services for several years, which has been increasingly under the responsibility of the state.[98] Access to physical rehabilitation provided by the state through the EPS and IPS declined, as services are often denied or delayed due to complicated bureaucratic and judicial procedures between EPS and IPS approval.[99]

Service delivery was also often delayed. In some departments, prosthesis and orthosis were of poor quality and there was often a lack of continuity in the rehabilitation process. Survivors can wait up to one year to obtain their prosthesis.[100] DAICMA requested that the Ministry of Health and Social Protection address these issues.[101] NGOs continued to fill gaps in access to and the provision of rehabilitation services.[102]

In 2015, the ICRC supported more rehabilitation services centers than in previous years, including with advice and training. The ICRC continued to cover the costs of transportation, accommodation, and prosthetic services for the most vulnerable. It supported the adoption of a resolution on good practices.[103]

SENA increased its prosthesis training in Bogota.[104] CIREC provided physical rehabilitation support for mine/ERW survivors through the EPS, as a registered IPS. This reduced its ability to provide outreach and referral services through community-based groups as it had done in previous years. However, CIREC reported increased geographical coverage and improvements in the technology used to provide services. The number of mine/ERW survivors within its overall beneficiaries decreased because they attended state rehabilitation institutions. In 2015 and into 2016, CIREC continued cooperation with the Colombian Red Cross.[105] In 2015, the national NGO Pastoral Social started implementing aquatic therapy for persons with disabilities.[106]

Economic inclusion

The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities noted the lack of promotion of professional integration of persons with disabilities.[107] There was a lack of government assistance in employment referrals or income-generating projects. Local, departmental, and national programs were regarded as limited, unsustainable, and inadequate.[108]

In 2015, national NGOs carried out income-generating projects with a family productive unit approach through micro-loans and cooperatives, with support from HI and the UNDP. The CCCM supported income-generation projects for survivors through an agreement with HI.[109] SENA provided vocational training, though rarely in remote and rural communities.[110]

In 2015, bureaucratic procedures to access pensions were reduced for survivors registered as having more than 50% disability. However, despite Constitutional Court rulings on the right to a pension for victims, the majority of survivors had difficulties in accessing those benefits.[111]

Survivors also face complex bureaucratic procedures to access benefits and indemnity compensation, which frequently cause them to abandon their claims.[112] Persons with disabilities were required to cover the cost of the mandatory physical evaluation (at the price of an average month’s wages) to prove their loss of ability to work, which is required to access the disability pension.[113] Since the end of 2015 however, through the Pathways to Assistance process, registered survivors could use a separate free registration process directly with an EPS in order to receive a diagnosis from a doctor in order to prove disability for indemnity payments. Many survivors and their supporting organizations were not aware of this change.[114] The ICRC facilitated the registration of mines/ERW survivors and other weapon-wounded people in the national welfare system.[115]

Social inclusion and education

In its strategic plan for 2015, the state of Colombia included a social inclusion and reconciliation program.[116] Programs or projects aimed at social inclusion were limited to major urban centers, while the majority of mine/ERW survivors are located in rural and remote areas.[117] Social inclusion assistance was mainly provided by NGOs that support survivors and their families. Some activities specifically targeted children.[118]

Social inclusion projects for persons with disabilities through the use of information and communications technology were carried out by organizations including the Relay Center, Connecting Senses, Movies for All, and Convertic.[119]

The vast majority of teachers lacked training on inclusive education for persons with disabilities.[120] In 2015, 2,301 mine/ERW survivors aged between five- and 25-years-old were registered in the Ministry of Education Integrated Registering System (Sistema Integrado de Matricula, SIMAT) in 520 municipalities.[121] The Ministry extended special educational coverage to address the right to education for victims of the armed conflict for the period 2014–2018. The Colombian educational sector developed a specific system of access to education for conflict victims from pre-school to higher education, including literacy courses for adults. It is not mandatory to be registered in the Registry of Victims (RUV) to access education through these measures. However, registered victims on low incomes with good academic performances can receive economic support for study.[122] National NGOs carried out inclusive education projects. In 2015, HI supported inclusive education in rural schools in mine/ERW-affected areas and advocacy, as well as increasing access to higher education in the department of Nariño.[123] The University of Antioquia reserved places for conflict victims with disabilities, including one mine survivor.[124]

Psychological support, including peer support

Public psychological support services in hospitals are not available in the majority of the municipalities where survivors live, or are only provided in the hospital immediately following injury.[125]

The Ministry of Health and Social Protection Program for Psychosocial and Comprehensive Health of Victims (Programa de Atención Psicosocial y Salud Integral a Víctimas, PAPSIVI), implemented through the EPS and health centers, assessed the psychosocial needs of all victims of armed conflict.[126] In 2015, the services offered were limited compared to needs, especially in remote areas and psychological support remained a major need for mine/ERW victims.[127] In 2015, the relevant state bodies developed guidelines on psychosocial support for persons with disabilities, including children and adolescents. As of May 2016, the guidelines had not been implemented.[128] An evaluation found that 83% of survivors continue to suffer from psychological trauma. A lack of psychosocial support and vocational training for family members of persons killed by mines/ERW remained major barriers to the fulfillment of their rights.[129]

National and international NGOs provided counseling, group and individual therapy, as well as peer support for survivors, including gender considerations.[130] The National Network of Organizations of Mine/ERW Survivors and Victims with Disabilities organized peer support training for survivor representatives from the departments of Meta, Arauca, Cauca, Caquetá, Norte de Santander, Antioquia, Arauca, and Cundinamarca, with support from the Survivor Network Project. Three survivor representatives also attended an intensive educational capacity-building field trip on victim assistance and disability rights to El Salvador.[131] HI organized follow-up psychosocial support and human rights workshops and training. It also conducted an international seminar on psychosocial support for mine/ERW victims and initiated the training of survivors on peer support methodology, with support from the ICBL-CMC. Some of the workshops led by HI specifically targeted female carers.[132]

Water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH)

Colombia’s Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016, involves access to safe water, hygiene, and sanitation measures for the most vulnerable communities, including those in remote areas.[133] The ICRC facilitated infrastructural improvements in access water, sanitation, and shelter for IDPs and residents from rural communities.[134]

Laws and policies

As mentioned above, National Victims’ Law 1448 guarantees comprehensive assistance to all mine/ERW survivors injured and others victimized since 1985—among many other victims of conflict, the majority being displaced persons—as redress for violations of their rights resulting from armed conflict.[135] Under this law, spouses, partners—including of the same sex (marriage and civil status), and first degree family members are considered as victims and can benefit from the provisions stated in the law.[136] However, it was reported that families of victims often do not actually receive these benefits.[137] 

Illicit crop eradicators injured by landmine explosions and armed attacks have been unable to obtain adequate assistance in many cases. Many workers were peasants and not registered with a healthcare provider (EPS). Consequently, they have faced ongoing challenges in accessing the medical care that they need. Many eradicators did not receive compensation for injuries by mines incurred during the course of their work.[138] Observations from Colombia’s periodic review at the Human Rights Council in 2016 found that Colombia should discontinue the use of civilians in manual eradication activities in mine-affected areas until such areas are made effectively landmine-free according to international standards as well as free from other deadly hazards. The observations state that Colombia must also ensure that injured persons (survivors), or the relatives of casualties in the event of death, receive comprehensive reparations.[139]

Survivors do not have a good knowledge of their rights, obligations, existing services in their area, or procedures to access them. Assistance is still largely provided at the emergency level, but a lot less at the reintegration level. Of all survivors eligible for assistance, less than 50% received all the services to which they are entitled. An accident certificate is necessary to be eligible for assistance from the state, but obtaining it requires completing complex bureaucratic procedures that result in delayed access to services.[140]

In order to enable survivors access services and compensation, NGOs provided legal support for persons with disabilities to access disability pensions services. In addition, there was a specific focus on the needs of women and casualties’ family members.[141] The CCCM worked with four universities to build cross-thematic teams from departments for law, social work, psychology, and employment in order to address survivors individual cases, provide direct assistance and referrals to services, as well as legal aid to overcome bureaucratic barriers and make submissions for the implementation of guaranteed rights via routine court procedures.[142] HI included counseling on the needs survivors in the legal aid clinics of universities[143] ICRC provided assistance for mines/ERW survivors to complete administrative requirements for obtaining financial compensation and free medical care.[144]

Victims’ Unit Resolution 090 of February 2015 updated the prioritization criteria for victims’ access to reparation measures that also apply to mine/ERW victims.[145] Law 1751 on health, adopted in March 2015, guarantees access to quality and appropriate health services for vulnerable groups, including victims of armed conflict and persons with disabilities. However, the law lacked implementing legislation and was not fully operational as of September 2016.[146]

Decree 056 of 2015 released by the Ministry of Health, which establishes that health services to victims of the armed conflict must be provided directly through the EPS, added some burdensome and possibly useless bureaucratic requirements for victims that hinder access health services for the most vulnerable. As a result, access to healthcare through the EPS in general was seen as less effective in 2015.[147] Ministry of Health Resolution 1328 (2016), aims to simplify access to specific healthcare by circumventing the need for committee approval.[148]

The Protocol for the Effective Participation of Armed Conflict Victims, Resolution 0388 (May 2013) promotes the participation of armed conflict victims in the implementation of the Victims’ Law, while Resolution 0848 (December 2014) establishes modalities of reparations for personal injuries and access to reparations for mine/ERW victims.[149]

Legislation of 2011 prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, education, access to public buildings, air travel and other transportation, access to healthcare, or the provision of other state services, but some NGOs reported that these laws were seldom enforced.[150] Law 1752, adopted in 2015, also prohibits discrimination based on disability as a criminal act.[151] Despite these efforts, discrimination against persons with disabilities, particularly women and children, was reported in the form of denial of reasonable accommodation.[152]

Law 1618 (2013) guarantees the rights of persons with disabilities in line with the CRPD.[153] The national policy on disability and social inclusion for implementation of the disability law in line with the CRPD (“Conpes 166”) was approved in December 2013.[154] Law 1618 established a deadline of 27 February 2015 for public offices to comply with new accessibility requirements. The National Disability Council was responsible for monitoring compliance.[155] In many departments, especially in remote areas, physical accessibility is limited to hospitals and health facilities.[156] In 2016, the absence of a national plan to ensure compliance with physical accessibility norms was highlighted by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, as well as the discriminatory attitude shown by health professionals and in the work environment in general.[157] Although there is no specific policy regulating the provision of education for mine/ERW victims, their needs are considered within the broader Ministry of Education guidelines on persons with disabilities.[158]

DAICMA reported that assistance provided to children and adolescents took into account their specific needs and made appropriate referrals to services.[159] Some national NGOs provided assistance to broader groups, such as victims of terrorist attacks with disabilities, carers, and persons with disabilities in general, and some of them adopted an age- and/or gender- sensitive approach.[160] The Ministry of Interior mandated the National University of Colombia to lead an investigation on the situation facing women and girl victims of the armed conflict, including disability issues.[161] CIRCEC increased its emphasis on children and women through implementation of physical rehabilitation, employment initiatives, access to healthcare, and rights training.[162] HI worked with service providers to develop gender-sensitive training methodologies.[163]