Summary: State Party Lebanon ratified the convention on 5 November 2010, becoming the first State Party from the Middle East. Lebanon has expressed its desire to amend existing legislation to enforce the convention’s provisions. It has participated in every meeting of the convention and hosted the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut in September 2011. Lebanon was a lead sponsor on a UN resolution on the convention in December 2015. It has condemned new use of cluster munitions and elaborated its views on a number of important issues relating to the interpretation and implementation of the convention. Lebanon reports that it has never used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions. Cluster munitions were used in the past in Lebanon, most recently by Israel in 2006.

Policy

The Republic of Lebanon signed the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 3 December 2008, ratified on 5 November 2010, and the convention entered into force for the country on 1 May 2011.

Following a legislative review, Lebanon in September 2012 announced its desire to amend existing legislation to ensure implementation of the Convention on Cluster Munitions.[1] In April 2013, it stated that a final report with recommendations on national measures had been drafted for circulation to stakeholders.[2]

Lebanon submitted its initial Article 7 transparency report for the Convention on Cluster Munitions on 27 October 2011 and provided annual updated reports since then, most recently in March 2016.[3]

Lebanon participated throughout the Oslo Process that created the Convention on Cluster Munitions and advocated forcefully for humanitarian protection to be accorded first priority in the development of the convention’s provisions.[4] It hosted a regional conference on cluster munitions in Beirut from 11–12 November 2008 to draw attention to the convention and its Oslo Signing Conference.

Lebanon hosted the convention’s Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut on 12–16 September 2011.[5] Lebanon’s President General Michel Sleiman addressed the meeting’s opening ceremony with a statement that condemned the use of cluster munitions. Lebanon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Emigrants, Adnan Mansour, served as president of the Second Meeting of States Parties with the assistance of Lebanon’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Ambassador Najla Riachi Assaker.

Lebanon continues to play an active role in the work of the convention. From September 2014 until September 2015, it served as co-coordinator of the convention’s work on the general status and operation of the convention together with the Netherlands. In this role, Lebanon played a central role in helping to establish an implementation support unit (ISU) for the convention, including securing agreement on the financial procedures for its operation.

Lebanon participated in the convention’s First Review Conference in Dubrovnik, Croatia in September 2015, where it made several statements. In an address to the high-level segment of the meeting, Lebanon urged States Parties to pay greater attention to their international cooperation and assistance to ensure full implementation of the convention.[6]

Lebanon was a lead sponsor on and voted in favor of a UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on the convention adopted on 7 December 2015, which urges all states outside the convention to “join as soon as possible.”[7] A total of 139 states voted in favor of the non-binding resolution including many non-signatories.

Lebanon has participated in every Meeting of States Parties of the convention and the First Review Conference, as well as intersessional meetings in Geneva in 2011–2015. It has convened and participated in regional workshops on cluster munitions.

Lebanon has stated it is disturbed and deeply concerned at “cluster munition use anywhere by anyone.”[8] At the First Review Conference, Lebanon said, “we believe any use of cluster munitions must be condemned, regardless of who used.”[9] At the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International Security in October 2015, Lebanon’s representative stated that “based on its continuous painful experience as a victim of these weapons since 2006, Lebanon condemns any use of cluster munitions and calls for the universalization of the Convention.”[10]

Lebanon is not party to the Mine Ban Treaty. It is also not party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons.

Interpretive issues

Lebanon has elaborated its views on several important issues relating to the convention’s interpretation and implementation. It has stated that the prohibition on the transfer of cluster munitions includes a prohibition on “transit,” that foreign stockpiling of cluster munitions is prohibited, that financing and investment in cluster munition production or transfer is prohibited, and that Article 1 of the convention takes precedence over Article 21 so that “States Parties must never undertake any act that could constitute deliberate assistance with a prohibited act.”[11]

Use, production, transfer, and stockpiling

Lebanon has stated several times that it has never used, produced, or stockpiled cluster munitions.[12] It has confirmed no production of cluster munitions in its Article 7 reports.[13]

Lebanon has not retained any cluster munitions for training or research purposes because it says it sees no reason to do so as the “detection of submunition remnants does not require a more sophisticated technology than what currently exists.”[14]

Israel used cluster munitions in Lebanon in 1978, 1982, and 2006.[15] The United States (US) dropped cluster bombs against Syrian air defense units near Beirut during an intervention in December 1983.[16] In 2006, Hezbollah fired cluster munitions from southern Lebanon into northern Israel.[17]

Policy

The Republic of Lebanon has not acceded to the Mine Ban Treaty, but indicated in December 2009 that it intends to do so, saying that it “hopes to sign…in the future” and it “looks forward to joining the Mine Ban Treaty.”[1] More recently, in November 2018 Lebanon announced that the government “is studying the possibility to acceding to the Ottawa treaty, and great steps have been taken towards that.”[2]

Previously, in 2004, Lebanon had said that it was unable to join the Mine Ban Treaty due to the continuing conflict with Israel.[3] The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah further heightened concerns about the security of its southern border. In August 2013, Lebanon’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Adnan Mansour, reportedly stated that landmines “are protecting the border” with Israel.[4]

Lebanon has attended most meetings of the treaty, including the Third Review Conference in Maputo in June 2014 and more recently, the Seventeenth Meeting of States Parties in Geneva in November 2018, where it provided a statement on universalization. Lebanon did not attend the intersessional meetings in Geneva in May 2019.

Lebanon was not present for the vote on UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution 73/61 on antipersonnel mines on 5 December 2018.

Lebanon is party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and hosted its Second Meeting of States Parties in Beirut in September 2011. Lebanon is also party to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), and its Amended Protocol II on landmines.[5]

Production, transfer, use, and stockpiling

In December 2009, Lebanon confirmed that it “has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.”[6] During the war, Lebanon imported mines from a number of different countries. The United States sold Lebanon 5,352 M18A1 Claymore antipersonnel landmines in 1983-1984.[7] There have been no allegations of new use by Lebanese forces of antipersonnel mines or antipersonnel mine-like devices in Lebanon since 2006.[8] In late 2011 and in 2012, the Syrian Army laid antipersonnel and antivehicle mines along its borders, including the border with Lebanon in al-Buni, Heet (PMN-2 and TMN-46 mines), and Masharih al-Qaa.[9]

In August 2011, Lebanon informed the Monitor that “The Lebanese Government doesn’t use or stockpile or produce or transport any anti-personnel mines, though the Lebanese army retains very few numbers for training purposes.”[10] Earlier, in March 2008, the director of the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) said that the stockpile consists of a small quantity of mines, which he described as being lower than the maximum number permitted by the Mine Ban Treaty for training purposes.[11]

In August 2017, the Lebanese Army launched a military operation to expel Islamic State (IS) militants from an area they occupied in the western Qalamoun Mountains, near Arsala, on Lebanon’s border with Syria. The area occupied by IS was found to have extensive contamination from IS-laid improvised mines.[12]

Notes: CHA = confirmed hazardous area; SHA = suspected hazardous area; UXO = unexploded ordinance; ERW = explosive remnants of war. 

Mine Contamination

At the end of 2017, the Republic of Lebanon had a little over 20km² of confirmed mined area, including the Blue Line, across 1,415 CHAs (see table below).[1] There are also new mined areas along Lebanon’s northeast border, resulting from overspill from the conflict in neighboring Syria.[2] As part of military operation “fajr-al-jouroud,” the LAF recaptured Lebanese territory from Islamic State on the outskirts of Ras Baalbek and al-Qaa [towns] on the Syrian border in August 2017. Responsibility for mine action operations in this area were handed over to LMAC in the last quarter of 2017, whereupon LMAC and clearance operators visited the sites.[3] Non-technical and technical survey of the mined area is being conducted to estimate the size of contamination and the type of explosive devices present (believed to include improvised mines and booby-traps).[4] Survey by MAG and NPA began in July 2018, funded by the United States (US), and follow-on clearance is planned on completion of the survey.[5]

A further 323 “dangerous areas” totaling more than 15km² are suspected to contain mines, booby-traps, cluster munition remnants, or other UXO contamination.[6] The dangerous areas relate predominantly to rapid response or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) spot tasks and are often the result of accidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community,[7] for which further investigation/survey is required in order to confirm the type and extent of suspected contamination.[8] LMAC dispatches LAF engineering troops, partner NGOs, and community liaison officers to rapid response call-outs, depending on the situation, the availability of response teams, and proximity to the suspected area.[9]

Mine contamination by province (at end 2017)[10]

The 20km² of mine contamination as of the end of 2017 is the same as that reported for the end of the previous year,[11] despite clearance having taken place and the fact that no new areas of confirmed mine contamination were recorded in 2017.[12] LMAC clarified that the baseline of antipersonnel mine contamination at the end of 2016, including the Blue Line, was nearly 27.8km² (the 20.1km² of contamination reported last year excluded the Blue Line). Baseline contamination of 20.1km², at the end of 2017 included deduction of 0.51km² of mined area cleared in 2017, and an additional 7.19km² of clearance by the armed forces covering several years, but reported in 2017.[13]

Lebanon’s mine problem is largely a legacy of 15 years of earlier civil conflict and Israeli invasions of south Lebanon (in 1978 and 1982) and subsequent occupations that ended in May 2000. Mines affect the north and south of the country, though the majority are in the south. The minefields in north Lebanon and Mount Lebanon are typically “militia” minefields (i.e. were laid without a pattern and for which minefield records and maps do not exist), and were laid by multiple actors during the civil war. The minefields in the south are typically conventional minefields, laid in a pattern and where the location of the mines is identified on minefield maps.[14]

Mines hinder socio-economic development, restricting access to land and productive resources, and preventing construction of schools, parks, and infrastructure of benefit to the local community.[15] Most contamination is on valuable agriculture land and is in rural areas where the use of the land is crucial for livelihood activities.[16] According to LMAC, mine contamination along the Blue Line negatively affects more than 200,000 people.[17] It has been reported that people cross the Blue Line to harvest olive groves and graze livestock.[18]

Cluster Munition Contamination

At the end of 2017, Lebanon had 843 areas confirmed to contain cluster munition remnants, over a total area of almost 17.2km².[19] In addition, LMAC stated there was a further 115 areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants, totaling more than 6.8km², but this was not included in Lebanon’s Convention on Cluster Munition Article 7 transparency report for 2017.[20] It relates to the estimated proportion of 15km² of dangerous areas suspected to contain cluster munition remnants; the remainder of which contain mine/ERW contamination other than submunitions.[21] The dangerous areas relate predominantly to Rapid Response or EOD spot tasks, and are often the result of accidents having been reported to LMAC by the local community.[22] LMAC dispatches the LAF engineering troops, partner NGOs, and community liaison officers to Rapid Response call-outs, depending on the situation, the availability of response teams, and proximity to the suspected area.[23]

Cluster munition contamination (as at end December 2017)[24]

This compares to 883 areas confirmed or suspected to contain cluster munition remnants totaling almost 20km² at the end of 2016, [25] and almost 18.2km² at the end of March 2017.[26]

Previously unrecorded cluster munition contamination continues to be discovered, predominantly in south Lebanon, and during 2017, 43 new confirmed cluster munition-contaminated areas were identified, totaling 585,159m². Of this total, 36 hazardous areas totaling 515,159m² were identified during Rapid Response call-outs and seven hazardous areas totaling an estimated 70,000m² were identified by non-technical survey.[27]

Historically LMAC has recorded each new dangerous area as 33,000m² in its International Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database. However, as part of the National Mine Action Standards (NMAS) revisions, new dangerous areas, where there are no defined boundaries, will instead be recorded as covering 10,000m², until further investigation through non-technical and technical survey can confirm the actual extent, if any, of contamination.[28] Prior to the agreed change in methodology, superfluous—and expensive—clearance of the full 33,000m² area was frequently undertaken.[29]

Cluster munition contamination is largely the result of the conflict with Israel in July–August 2006. During the conflict, Israel fired an estimated four million submunitions on south Lebanon, 90% of which were dispersed in the last 72 hours of the conflict.[30] Approximately one million submunitions failed to explode.[31] In addition, some cluster munition remnants still remain from earlier conflicts with Israel in 1978 and 1982.[32] Types of submunitions found in Lebanon include M42, M43, M46, M77, M85, MK118, MZD-2, BLU26, BLU61, and BLU63.[33]

The accuracy of the baseline of cluster munition contamination is also complicated by clearance undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 cluster munition strikes, during which emergency clearance of submunitions spotted in and around infrastructure, schools, and roads was carried out by the LAF as well as individual Lebanese. According to the LMAC, not all clearance undertaken in the years immediately following 2006 was in accordance with the IMAS. Some Israeli bombing data has been provided—most recently through the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—but has proved to be very inaccurate.[34]

Throughout the period of the current national mine action strategy 2011–2020, the baseline of cluster munition contamination in Lebanon has not reduced proportionally with the amount of cluster munition-contaminated area released through survey or clearance in the same period, potentially leading to the incorrect assumption that little or no progress is being made to address cluster munition contamination. In reality, the reason for the lack of reduction to the baseline contamination is that previously unrecorded contamination continues to be discovered,[35] and that many of the cluster munition clearance tasks undertaken cleared a larger area than the one recorded in the database, thereby impacting the baseline contamination area.[36] LMAC has now determined that baseline contamination should be fixed, and that new contamination will be accounted for separately.[37]

Cluster munition contamination is reported to be affecting the lives of more than one million people living in 768 affected villages.[38] It is mostly located in rural areas, where communities depend on agriculture for income generation.[39] MAG conducted a survey in 2014, which found that in four-fifths of the areas, contamination had made access to resources unsafe or had blocked access altogether.[40] Nonetheless, many landowners and workers still enter cluster munition-contaminated areas, declaring they have no alternative.[41]

Post-clearance surveys concerning cluster munition strike areas, carried out by LMAC in collaboration with clearance operators, have revealed that, of the cleared land that was subsequently exploited, 78% was used for agriculture, 15% for pasture, and the remainder for residential and infrastructure development.[42]

The influx of well over one million refugees from Syria has led to a huge increase in population density in Lebanon, and greater demand to use rural land for economic purposes. Many contaminated areas are inhabited by Syrian refugees and/or are used for agricultural activities, increasing the exposure of civilians to risk and causing an increase in the number of casualties from cluster munition remnants, mines, and other UXO.[43]

Program Management

The Lebanon Mine Action Authority (LMAA) is the responsibility of the Ministry of Defense and is chaired by the Minister of Defense himself. The LMAA has overall responsibility for Lebanon’s mine action program.[44] LMAC also manages risk education and victim assistance.[45] LMAC, part of the LAF,[46] is based in Beirut. The Regional Mine Action Center (RMAC), based in Nabatiye, is a part of LMAC and has overseen operations in south Lebanon and western Beqaa.[47] In south Lebanon, coordination meetings between RMAC and operators take place at least monthly.[48]

The director of LMAC is typically rotated every couple of years, and in recent years there has been a high turnover of the colonels who have run the RMAC. A new director of LMAC started in early 2017, while a new director of RMAC started in May of that year.[49]

UNDP personnel, funded by the European Union (EU), are also seconded to LMAC and RMAC, providing support towards capacity-building, including for transparency reporting, strategic reviews, IMSMA database entry, community liaison, and quality assurance.[50]

A donor support group meeting is convened annually, which brings together donors, operators, and the national authorities.[51]

On 17 January 2018, a workshop on survey and clearance was organized in Beirut by the Norwegian Embassy, facilitated by GICHD, and with participation from national and international operators, donors, and representatives from the UNDP and Mine Action Review.[52] This was a follow-up to a workshop on implementation of Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 4 held in November 2016.[53] It was agreed that an informal “Mine Action Forum” would be established, which will meet twice a year.[54] 

Regional activities

In 2015, the Lebanese Ministry of Defense, represented by LMAC, signed a memorandum of understanding with the GICHD to manage and coordinate the Arab Regional Cooperation Program (ARCP).[55] The role of the ARCP includes support to the national authorities in mine action in the MENA region; technical assistance and training; the coordination and hosting of exchange visits; promotion of best practices and documentation of lessons learned; and the mobilization of funding.[56] Planning, management, and coordination of the program were handed over to LMAC at the beginning of 2017.[57]

In addition, a Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon has been built in partnership between Lebanon and France, with technical mine action support provided by a French military officer dispatched to LMAC, to support the development of the curriculum on EOD disposal (levels 1, 2, and 3) in compliance with IMAS.[58] In the second half of 2017, the regional school became operational, enabling civilian and military personnel from Arab and other countries to benefit from a wide array of courses and workshops related to demining.[59] Training in 2017 addressed non-technical survey, EOD level 1, and gender and diversity in mine action in 2017.[60] Multiple further courses were planned for 2018.[61]

Strategic planning

In September 2011, LMAC adopted a strategic mine action plan for 2011–2020.[62] The plan called for clearance of all cluster munition remnants by 2016, and for completion of mine clearance outside the Blue Line by 2020. Both goals are dependent on capacity, but progress has fallen well short of planning targets,[63] which will not be met.

A first mid-term review to the strategy was conducted in January–March 2014 to assess progress towards the 2013 milestone, and to adjust the 2016 and 2020 milestones accordingly. The review revealed that in 2011–2013 mine clearance was slow, suffering from underfunding (with consequently few operating teams), while previously unrecorded contaminated areas were also identified.[64]

A second, mid-term assessment of the period 2014–2016, undertaken in 2016, but only released in March 2018, came to similar conclusions. It highlighted the huge gap between actual mine clearance output and planned output (according to the original strategy). The second milestone assessment also reflected on the achievements, challenges, and lessons learned, offering recommendations that reflected available resources (financial and human), as well as a qualitative roadmap to target 2020.[65]

Prior to 2016, demining along the border with Israel had been said to depend on “political developments,”[66] but the Lebanese government subsequently took the decision to initiate larger-scale, planned clearance on the Blue Line,[67] and clearance by humanitarian demining operators began in November 2016.[68]

Lebanon has set four levels of priority regarding mine action. The first is to address infrastructure (housing, roads, hospitals, schools etc.); the second is to address facilities such as water, electricity, sewage, and landlines; the third is to release agricultural land, including livestock etc.; and the fourth is to release land for activities other than agriculture (e.g. nature reserves or areas used by wildlife).[69] Areas in which mine-related incidents occur are immediately designated high priority.[70]

LMAC selects and assigns tasks for clearance based on the priorities set according to the initial survey, while updated information may lead to a change in priority for some areas. LMAC planned to survey all designated high-priority sites, to obtain accurate information, before tasking them for clearance.[71] Analysis during the 2016 second milestone review of the national strategic plan highlighted the importance of evidence-based decisions in prioritizing and tasking clearance operations, bearing in mind the linkages between mine action and the sustainable development goals.[72]

In 2017, LMAC organized a workshop on gender mainstreaming in mine action.[73]

Legislation and standards

There is no national mine action law in Lebanon.[74]

In February 2018, a revised edition of Lebanon’s NMAS was sent to the Ministry of Defense for approval.[75] Over the last couple of years, and throughout 2017, LMAC worked with UNDP and other partners, under a project funded by the EU, to revise the standards.[76] The revised NMAS has a focus on land release and evidence-based decision-making, in line with the IMAS, and based on analysis of operational data collected by the implementing agencies, and recommendations from demining operators. The new NMAS allows for the use of technical survey by operators.[77] A workshop was held in March 2018 to introduce the new standards to the clearance NGOs.[78] The standards will be revised based on a pilot project using explosive detection dogs (EDD) for technical survey of cluster munition remnants.[79]

NGOs are required to modify their standard operating procedures (SOPs) according to the new NMAS. Pending updating and approval of their SOPs, however, operators can include relevant NMAS revisions in their clearance plans for each task, which are approved by LMAC.[80]

Information management

IMSMA is used by LMAC and RMAC to record contamination and land release in Lebanon. LMAC has reported that operational data is now more accurate, especially in instances where the task size/area of mine or cluster munition contamination exceeds the original task size in the database.[81]

As of April 2018, there were plans to integrate the RMAC information management database on the LMAC server. Full harmonization and consolidation of the servers was expected in the course of 2018, which will facilitate synchronization, as IMSMA reports will be sent directly to LMAC for approval, improving the accuracy and efficiency of the process. The integration will also help better protect data and decrease maintenance costs.[82]

Furthermore, LMAC has secured funding for the migration from its current version of IMSMA (IMSMA NG) to IMSMA Core, which it hopes will help facilitate the production of clearer reports that can be translated into dashboards for stakeholders, including donors, to monitor and follow.[83] The UNDP has executed an information technology (IT) assessment to determine the needs of LMAC; how to ensure harmonization between RMAC and LMAC and enhance data security; explore the options for migration to IMSMA Core; and determine the financial costs of such projects.[84]

Operators

In 2017, clearance was conducted by international operators DanChurchAid (DCA), HI, MAG, NPA; national operators POD and LAMINDA (Lebanese Association for Mine and Natural Disaster Action); and by the Engineering Regiment of the LAF. Demining capacity of the NGOs totaled 11 teams,[85] with another two teams working for the LAF Engineering Regiment); five mechanical teams (four operated by the Engineering Regiment of the LAF and one by MAG); and seven MDD teams operated by the Engineering Regiment.[86] At the beginning of the year, there were a total of 24 BAC teams operating (17 teams with international NGOs and seven with national NGOs), and by the end of the year the number had decreased to 20 teams (14 with international NGOs and six with national NGOs).[87] In addition, LMAC had four non-technical survey teams in 2017.[88] UNIFIL also has sufficient demining capacity to enable conduct its operations on the Blue Line.[89]

All LAF engineering companies have EOD-specified personnel that are trained to deal with explosives ordnance.[90] The LAF Engineering Regiment conducted Rapid Response tasks, but did not have any BAC teams in 2017.[91] This is a reduction from the two LAF BAC teams in 2016,[92] the result of the diversion of the LAF BAC capacity to military operations on the northeastern borders with Syria in 2017.[93] In addition, the LAF has two non-technical survey teams that were deployed in 2017.[94]

MDDs and machines are mostly used as secondary assets to support the clearance teams, and in some cases for technical survey, based on needs and the terrain of the area. Machines are used for ground preparation, including rubble removal and vegetation cutting.[95] However, often the terrain is not suitable for MDDs or machines.

In 2017, DCA deployed two manual mine clearance teams[96] and five BAC teams in 2017, in addition to supervising two additional teams in partnership with LAMINDA, a national NGO founded in 2014.[97] DCA’s partnership with LAMINDA also aims to strengthen LAMINDA’s mine action capacity.[98] LAMINDA also deployed one BAC team independently, not under the supervision of DCA.[99]

HI deployed four mine clearance teams in north Lebanon in 2017,[100] totaling 28 deminers, plus supervisors, team leaders, and support staff.[101] This represents the same capacity as the previous year. HI’s mine clearance operations in north Lebanon and the Mount Lebanon area are determined by seasonal factors: clearance of minefields below 1,000 meters occurs during winter (October to April), and then clearance tasks above 1,000 meters begin in April and continue through the summer, depending on snow.[102] Most of the remaining demining tasks in the area in which HI has been operating since 2011 are in contaminated cedar forests at high altitude.[103] HI expected its demining capacity to remain the same in 2018.[104]

The number of manual mine clearance teams deployed by MAG in 2017 varied from three to six (averaging 85 personnel across the year), in addition to one mechanical team.[105] MAG began 2017 with seven BAC teams deployed (up from the five BAC teams in 2016), but ended the year with only four teams.[106] MAG is the only international operator in Lebanon with mechanical assets to support manual clearance operations, and these assets can be used by other organizations upon request of LMAC. In 2017, MAG reported using nine machines and mechanical attachments to support manual activities.[107]

Prior to 2017, NPA, had only conducted cluster munition operations in Lebanon, but in January 2017 it expanded the scope of its operations to include mine clearance operations in southern Lebanon along the Blue Line.[108] NPA deployed two manual mine clearance teams in 2017,[109] totaling 18 personnel, including a medic and driver. It expected to maintain this capacity in 2018.[110] NPA operated four BAC teams throughout 2017,[111] but subsequently reduced to three teams in 2018.[112]

The 2017 capacity of the Engineering Regiment (for combined mine and cluster munition remnants operations) was said to comprise two mine clearance teams, four mechanical demining teams, and seven MDD teams.[113]

Peace Generation Organization for Demining (POD) deployed four BAC teams in 2017,[114] a reduction of one team compared to 2016.[115]

UNIFIL was established in 1978[116] to confirm withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon (which occurred in 2000); restore international peace and security; and assist the government of Lebanon to re-establish its authority in the area.[117] The primary task of UNIFIL mine clearance teams has been to clear access lanes through minefields in order to visibly demarcate the 118km-long Blue Line. UNIFIL does not conduct clearance on the Blue Line for humanitarian purposes but only to facilitate placement of markers by clearing three-meter-wide lanes into mined areas.[118] UNIFIL coordinates demining activities with the LAF and LMAC.[119] The UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) continues to engage with UNIFIL regarding the possibility of UNIFIL re-engaging in humanitarian mine action.[120] LMAC reported that it held a meeting with UNIFIL in April 2018 to discuss a memorandum of understanding for cooperation on demining.[121] UNMAS reported that Lebanon and UNIFIL have discussed the topic of UNIFIL tasking assets for humanitarian mine clearance, but as of August 2018, no agreement had been signed.[122]

In 2017, operational assets were provided by two UNIFIL Troop Contributing Countries: Cambodia and China. Operational capacities and capabilities of UNIFIL are determined by operational need, and capacity as of August 2018 comprised five manual clearance teams, two EOD teams, and one mechanical team.[123]

UNMAS trains UNIFIL demining units and conducts QA and monitoring of UNIFIL demining to ensure compliance with NMAS and IMAS.[124]

Land Release (mines)

Total mined area released by clearance in 2017 was just below 0.51km²,[125] slightly less than the 0.55km² of mined area released by clearance in 2016, but with significantly more antipersonnel mines destroyed during the year (9,205 antipersonnel mines in 2017, compared to 417 in 2016). This is due to clearance of high-density mapped minefields on the Blue Line in the South and clearance undertaken by the LAF as part of operation “fajr-al-jouroud,” to re-capture Lebanese territory from Islamic State, in outskirts of Ras Baalbek and al-Qaa [towns] on the Syrian Border in August 2017.[126]

A further 0.1km² of mined area was reduced by technical survey. Most notably, over 1.2km² was cancelled by non-technical survey—a significant increase on 2016.

Survey in 2017 (mines)

In 2017, 99,694m² of mined area was reduced by technical survey and 1,219,025m² of mined area was cancelled through non-technical survey by the LAF, in 23 areas (see table below).

In addition, a further 8,000m², in one dangerous area was cancelled, for which the specific type of contamination was not disaggregated.[127]

A total of 221,062m² was confirmed as mined.[128]

LAF landmine survey in 2017[129]

TS = Technical survey

Clearance in 2017 (mines)

LMAC reported clearance of almost 0.51km² in 2017, with the destruction of 9,205 antipersonnel mines, 184 antivehicle mines, and 302 other items of UXO (see table below).[130]

Mine clearance in 2017[131]

Note: AP = antipersonnel; AV = antivehicle.
*Number of items of UXO destroyed during clearance in minefields and dangerous areas.

In addition, national NGO, POD, which conducts cluster munition clearance in Lebanon, destroyed one antipersonnel mine during its 2017 operations.[132] Furthermore, UNIFIL reported destruction of 317 antipersonnel mines during its 2017 operations on the Blue Line.[133]

HI’s clearance output increased by 18% in 2017, compared to the previous year, and the daily productivity of the deminers increased by 20%. HI attributed this increase to the experience of the HI teams; good collaboration with LMAC, especially on the allocation and management of tasks; and to regular internal and external QC visits.[134]

HI reported that of the 16 tasks it cleared in 2017, five were found not to contain antipersonnel mines, representing 12% of HI’s total clearance output.[135] Due to the nature of the militia minefields in north Lebanon, there is sometimes a lack of clearly defined CHAs. Accordingly, in certain areas, additional non-technical survey and technical survey could help to more accurately define areas of actual contamination. As of August 2018, non-technical survey by LMAC in north Lebanon was ongoing (since 2016), and HI was awaiting the final results of the non-technical survey in order to define its strategy for the coming years.[136] Unfortunately, deployment of MDDs or demining machinery to help facilitate survey and clearance in north Lebanon is limited in scope, due to the climate and terrain of many of the tasks in the region.[137]

MAG reported that it cleared one Blue Line minefield, in Meiss El-Jabal (MF1526), in the course of which no antipersonnel mines were found.[138]

The CHAs tasked by LMAC to clearance operators do not include obligatory fade-out distances, which can considerably increase the overall size of the task.[139]

Mined areas in pattern minefields/along the Blue Line have been reclassified into high-threat hazardous area (HTHA) and low-threat hazardous area (LTHA). The use of technical survey, instead of full clearance, is now permitted for some parts of the CHA based on discussion and agreement between LMAC/RMAC operations officers and clearance operators.[140]

Land Release (Cluster Munition Remnants)

Total cluster munition-contaminated area released by clearance in 2017 was just over 1.41km²,[141] a decrease on the 1.9km² of area cleared in 2016.[142]

No area was reported as reduced by technical survey or canceled by non-technical survey in 2017.[143]

Survey in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

Lebanon did not report any land released through survey in 2017, marking a reduction compared to 2016, when 514,866m² was canceled by LMAC/RMAC.[144] It did, however, report the discovery of seven previously unrecorded areas of cluster munition contamination through non-technical survey, totaling 70,000m². In addition, 36 further cluster munition remnant hazardous areas, totaling 515,159m², were identified during Rapid Response call-outs.[145]

Clearance in 2017 (cluster munition remnants)

Lebanon reported clearing just over 1.41km² of cluster munition-contaminated land in 2017, across 43 areas, destroying in the process 5,525 submunitions (see table below).[146] This includes 619 submunitions destroyed during rapid response/EOD spot tasks in 2017.[147] MAG and NPA reported slightly different results.

Clearance of cluster munition-contaminated area in 2017[148]

Manual clearance is the primary method of clearing cluster munition remnants in Lebanon, but machines are sometimes deployed to make access lanes and prepare the ground.[151]

MAG conducted clearance in the districts of Nabatieh, Jezzine, and West Bekaa.[152]

Progress in 2018

EDDs from NPA’s Global Dog Center in Sarajevo received accreditation in April 2018 for a pilot project and were deployed on their first technical survey task at the end of April.[153] As part of the pilot project, non-technical survey will also be conducted as standard, prior to technical survey and deployment of the EDDs.[154]

Deminer Safety

One deminer from the Engineering Regiment of the LAF was injured during antipersonnel mine clearance operations in 2017.[155]

In 2017, a MAG employee suffered minor injuries to a finger, during partial demolition of an M77 submunition during vegetation cutting drills.[156] NPA had two accidents in 2017, both of which involved NPA searchers being injured by M77 submunitions.[157]

Progress towards completion of mine clearance

Lebanon is not a state party to the Mine Ban Treaty.

Lebanon stated that “While Lebanon is not signatory to the Ottawa Convention, LMAC works in spirit of the treaty,”[158] and that LMAC adheres to its noble causes and tries to work along with the Maputo Action Plan.[159]

Clearance of mined areas was originally expected to be completed by the end of 2020, in accordance with the 2011–2020 national strategy, but meeting the target was contingent on deployment of considerable resources: 125 manual clearance teams (45 for minefields excluding the Blue Line and 80 for the Blue Line), two mechanical teams, and nine two-strong MDD teams.[160] Current mine clearance capacity is far lower.

The second mid-term review, conducted in 2016, and finally released in March 2018, confirmed that progress against the strategy has fallen well behind schedule, and that significant increased capacity would be required to bridge the gap. LMAC calculates that with a constant capacity of 45 demining teams, supported by two mechanical teams and nine MDD teams, mine clearance (excluding the Blue Line) could be completed within 10 years. Current capacity is however, far lower.[161]

Lebanon has cleared less than 4km² of mined area in the last five years, as detailed in the table below. Based on the reported 20km² of total mined area as of the end of 2017, and average clearance rates of less than 1km² per year, it will take many years for Lebanon to become mine-free. However, there is the potential for operational efficiencies and swifter progress through reduction of the mine clearance depth from 20cm to 15cm and adjustment of fade-out requirements as enshrined in the new NMAS, along with LMAC’s stated commitment to promote effective use of non-technical and technical survey in its operations.[162]

Mine clearance in 2013–2017[163]

LMAC reported that rocky and forested terrain continued to pose a challenge to demining operations, in addition to lack of minefield records for much of the contamination (especially in the North), and lack of funding.[164]

Article 4 Compliance

Under Article 4 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, Lebanon is required to destroy all cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control as soon as possible, but not later than 1 May 2021. Lebanon is not on track to meet this deadline. At the Seventh Meeting of States Parties in September 2017, Lebanon confirmed that it will not meet its Article 4 deadline based on existing capacity and that around 65 BAC teams would be needed annually in order for Lebanon to meet its 2021 deadline.[165]

Originally, clearance of cluster munition-contaminated land had been expected to be completed by the end of 2016, in accordance with the 2011–2020 national strategy.[166] However, meeting this target was contingent on maintaining the number of BAC teams needed.[167] The first review of the 2011–2020 strategy in early 2014 confirmed that with existing capacity it would not be possible to finish cluster munition clearance before 2020 at the earliest.[168]

The second mid-term review, conducted in 2016, and finally released in March 2018, confirmed that progress against the strategy has fallen well behind schedule, and that significantly increased capacity would be required to bridge the gap. LMAC calculated that based on empirical data using the old cluster munition clearance depths and fade-out requirements, 33,000m² task sizes on average, and 22 BAC teams, it would take 9.3 years to clear the remaining identified cluster munition-contaminated areas. According to LMAC, in order to finish cluster munition clearance in three years by the 2021 deadline, 66 teams would be needed, at a total cost of US$75.5 million.[169] Similarly, Lebanon’s most recent Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 7 report (for 2017), said a total of around 65 BAC teams would be needed annually in order for Lebanon to meet its 2021 deadline.[170]

However, these calculations do not take into the account the potential operational efficiencies made possible through the revised NMAS.[171] LMAC also noted that a more accurate picture of land release predictions would be available at the end of 2018, once data from survey and clearance operations, including the technical survey pilot project, is available.[172]

With the exception of 2016, annual clearance of cluster munition-contaminated land has decreased successively since 2012, as illustrated in the table below. In total, less than 10km² of cluster munition contamination has been cleared in the last five years.

Five-year summary of cluster munition clearance[173]

* In addition, a further 99,641m² of re-clearance was conducted.

Lebanon reported in its latest Article 7 report that the main challenges in the implementation of Article 4 were the discovery of previously unreported contaminated areas; the impact of working in increasingly difficult terrain, which slows down clearance operations; and securing funding for additional teams.[174]

Lack of international funding continues to pose a challenge to cluster munition operations, and 2017 saw a decrease in BAC capacity.[175] There is also a concern that funding in some cases risks being diverted from BAC towards other objectives, such as mine clearance on the Blue Line, or survey and clearance in the northeastern border with Syria.[176]

The Monitor acknowledges the contributions of the Mine Action Review (www.mineactionreview.org), which has conducted the primary mine action research in 2018 and shared all its country-level landmine reports (from “Clearing the Mines 2018”) and country-level cluster munition reports (from “Clearing Cluster Munition Remnants 2018”) with the Monitor. The Monitor is responsible for the findings presented online and in its print publications.

In 2018, contributions from eight international donors for mine action activities in the Republic of Lebanon totaled US$16.2 million, about $10 million more than in 2017.[1]

International contributions: 2018[2]

In 2018, Lebanon reported contributing an average of US$9 million per year.[3] Since 2014, the government of Lebanon has contributed $45 million to its mine action program, or 45% of its total mine action budget, while international contributions totaled some $55.6 million, an average of $11.1 million per year.

Summary of contributions: 2014–2018[4]

Casualties in 2017 – details

In 2017, 28 civilian casualties were reported by the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC). Five military casualties and one deminer were reported in the media. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded two casualties as the result of a landmine left by the non-state armed group calling itself the Islamic State (IS).

Twenty-five of the 36 casualties occurring in 2018 were Lebanese and eight were Syrian.

Annual mine/ERW casualty rates have declined significantly from the 113 casualties recorded in 2000, except for a spike in casualties between August and December 2006 immediately following the July 2006 bombing, shelling, and cluster munition attacks on southern Lebanon by Israel.[2]

The total number of mine/ERW casualties in Lebanon recorded by the LMAC from 1975 to December 2017 was 3,775.[3] Between 2006 and 2017 LMAC reported 509 casualties (64 killed and 445 injured). Of these, 354 were adults and 155 were children. Ninety-three percent (473) were male and 7 percent (36) were female. Fifty-seven were caused by mines, 47 by ERW, 338 by unexploded submunitions, and 67 by unknown devices.[4]

Cluster munition casualties

Five unexploded submunition casualties were reported for 2017, an increase from the one reported for 2016, but fewer than the 13 reported for 2015.

Through December 2017, the Monitor had identified 740 cluster munition casualties, including those recorded by LMAC. Little data is available on casualties that occurred during cluster munition strikes; only 16 (three killed; 13 injured) were identified.[5]

Survivor assistance action points

• Create a sustainable funding strategy for the physical rehabilitation sector that relies on international funding and national donations.
• Ensure that all survivors in the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC) database have received a healthcare card to facilitate their access to care.
• Secure sufficient and sustainable survivor assistance funding.

Survivor assistance planning and coordination

International commitments and obligations

Laws and policies

The Republic of Lebanon’s Law 220/2000 on the “Access and Rights of People with Disability” addresses the rights of persons with disabilities to have access to adequate education, rehabilitation services, employment, medical services, sports, public transport, and other facilities.[8] Lebanese citizens with a disability can register for a disability card.[9] However, little progress has been made since parliament passed the law on disabilities in 2000.[10]

Discrimination against persons with disabilities is prohibited by law, but discrimination continues. The National Disability Law stipulates a 3% quota for hiring persons with disabilities for all employers. However, there was no evidence the law was enforced. The law required that buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities, but the building code still required amendments.[11] Most public schools were not yet accessible.[12]

Major Developments

The number of refugees in Lebanon remained steady compared to 2017.[13] There were no significant changes in terms of victim assistance funding.[14] In 2018, survivor assistance funding came from the European Union (EU), the Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI), and DanChurchAid (DCA). In 2019, only DCA’s vocational training project was ongoing.[15]

Needs assessment

No national needs assessment survey was conducted in 2018 due to a lack of funds.[16] In 2018, LMAC continued to update the mine victims’ database.[17]

Medical care and rehabilitation

The health system is weak due to limited government budget.[18] Emergency care and medical treatment was provided to mine/ERW survivors free of charge.[19] In 2018, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) supported 19 hospitals through training and material support.[20] The ICRC also conducted first-aid courses and provided the Lebanese Red Cross’s emergency medical services with technical and material support.[21]

The government focal point for victim assistance reported that national standards for prosthetic devices had been established.[22]

In 2018, 85 mine/ERW survivors received rehabilitation services through EU and MLI funding.[23] The ICRC delivered four prostheses to mine/ERW survivors, one of whom was a child.[24]

Government bodies such as the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Social Affairs were also involved in the provision of physical rehabilitation services to mine/ERW survivors, but these services were limited in 2018 due to limited governmental funding.[25] Other organizations at the national level, including the National Rehabilitation and Development Center (NRDC); Al-Jarha, Vision Association for Development, Rehabilitation, and Care–Al Ru’ya; Tamkeen; and the Lebanese Welfare Association for the Handicapped (LWAH) provided prosthetic services or assistive devices.[26]

Socio-economic and psychosocial inclusion

With funding from the Marshall Legacy Institute (MLI) and the EU, the LMAC, and the member organizations of the National Steering Committee on Victim Assistance jointly conducted nine income-generation workshops to train 146 landmine survivors, 51 of whom received a grant to start an income-generating activity.[27] Al-Jarha Association provided financial support to survivors to cover school fees and social reintegration initiatives. Al-Jarha also conducted vocational trainings and provided loans for survivors to set up their businesses.[28] The NRDC facilitated inclusive education for children with disabilities.[29]

In 2018, DCA covered the tuition fees for 20 mine/ERW survivors,[30] and the ICRC fostered the social inclusion of persons with disabilities by sponsoring two wheelchair basketball tournaments.[31]

In 2018, 20 mine/ERW survivors received psychosocial support services funded by the EU.[32]

Cross-cutting

LMAC, through the Steering Committee members, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Health, provided social and medical assistance to the widows and children of people killed by mines/ERW.[33]

The victim assistance program of the government of Lebanon does not include support to Syrian refugees. Syrian refugees, including mine/ERW survivors, received support from the ICRC; the United States Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for medical care, prosthetics, and other assistive devices.[34] A 2018 report found that among Syrian refugees in Lebanon, “65.4% of those who use mobility aids still experience significant difficulties…walking.”[35] The report also found that households with disabilities had difficulties accessing medical services, in particular, because of the cost of those services.

Survivor assistance providers and activities